'A Lot More than the NGOs Seem to Think':

The Impact of Non-governmental Organizations on the

Bretton Woods Institutions

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND & WORLD BANK

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The following is excerpted from a dissertation of the same title.

Please contact me for the full text and datasets.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This section provides an extremely brief summary of the project and results. The later sections expand the treatment, including the results and conclusions, plus the most relevant data.

My research questions are: Do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) impact the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI – International Monetary Fund and World Bank), and why or why not? I advance four hypotheses to explain change at the Bank and Fund which accord with NGO preferences:

HN) Great Power Influence (Null Hypothesis)
H1) Organizational Defense
H2) Efficiency
H3) Institutional Redefinition

These hypotheses are based in three main paradigms of international relations (IR) theory: HN from neorealism; H1 and 2 from neoliberal institutionalism; H3 from social constructivism.

However, neoliberal and social constructivist theories on the behavior of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) often end with indeterminate assertions on IGO autonomy. I therefore use organizational theories to fill out the substance of H1-3. Systems theories of organizations suggest organizations adapt to pernicious environmental impacts; I term this 'organizational defense' (H1). Structural-functional organizational theories suggest organizations adapt for the rational purpose of more efficient mission completion (H2). Finally, interpretive and sociological theories of organization suggest organizations, like any social institution, may learn from environmental pressures and so redefine their self-understanding. The NGOs seek to 're-imagine' the Bank and Fund's self-conceptions, to rethink them from narrow IGOs into 'global governance agencies' with a wider sense of accountability than simply to the state system (H3).

Should the null hypothesis prove incorrect, I postulate a battery of indicators of NGO impact to correspond to the counter-hypotheses. Change on these indicators suggests support for the parallel hypotheses. These indicators begin with the adaptive behavior of simple organizational defense and rise to the deep organizational learning of institutional redefinition:

I1) Organizational Change   (H1)
I2) Program Consultation   (H1)
I3) Program Impact   (H2)
I4) Evaluation   (H2)
I5) Legitimacy   (H3)
I6) Policy Change   (H3)

The method is a structured, focused comparative study across this spectrum of indicators of NGO impact. Each institution is mapped against the scale of indicators. I conclude with a comparison of the two institutions' 'movement' down the scale of indicators.

The primary means of data collection were 1) a survey, 2) interviews, and 3) documentary analysis. 1) A survey was sent to all the NGOs who attend the primary biannual interaction point between the BWI and NGOs ('Civil Society Dialogues'). 2) Interviews were conducted with officials from the civil society, external affairs, and operations departments of both BWI. 3) The voluminous literature from both BWI on NGOs was analyzed.

The data disproved HN. From there, I found that the Bank has moved further down the list of indicators of NGO impact than the Fund. The Bank engages NGOs, because 1) NGOs improve mission performance (H2), and 2) to a lesser degree, the Bank is cautiously expanding its sense of self to include NGOs (H3). Conversely, the Fund appears to be negotiating NGO pressure primarily as an institutional challenge (H1). NGOs do not improve its mission accomplishment (H2), nor have they successfully redefined the Fund from its self-understanding as a strictly intergovernmental organization (H3).

This dissertation is relevant because of the importance of the BWI as lenders to poor and middle-income states. NGO impact feeds through to the programming of the BWI 'on the ground.'

The following expanded treatment begins with the formal argument constructed in the research design. The flow of the indicators from the hypotheses, and the reasons for those choices, are explained briefly. I elucidate the method, noting a triangulation strategy using both qualitative and quantitative evidence from both the BWI and NGOs. I then summarize the results in one integrated presentation, including a discussion of the discontinuities in the data. All events are multi-etiological, but I sought to raise one hypothesis above the others. There was some discretionary judgment in my decisions, which I try to make clear. Finally, I propose improvements in the research design. On the whole, I argue my design worked well, but for a reliability problem.

2. Goals of Research Design

There are two goals to this research. First, I sought theory improvement of the study of NGOs and IGOs. Second, I sought to improve the benchmarks by which we measure NGO impact on IGOs.

First, theory improvement drove the creation of a rigid research design with empirical indicators of NGO impact tied to causal hypotheses. There is poor theoretical cumulation in the literature on NGOs and IGOs. Case studies, narratives of NGO successes, and idiosyncratic, ad hoc explanations are common. Generic, rigorous designs to measure and explain NGO impact across IGOs as a class are lacking. I fill this gap. My design purposefully ties its causal hypotheses tied to empirical indicators in generic language. This brings greater rigor and generalizability to the excessively anecdotal literature on NGOs around IGOs.

Second, if my design performs well, it should be used for future social science use. Hence my second purpose is to test the design itself. That is, my research is also what the World Bank terms a "measurement study." It examines the utility of the hypotheses and indicators themselves. Do the hypotheses actually capture the reasons for change? Do the indicators benchmark relevant NGO-driven change at an IGO? For if the research design itself is faulty, then my conclusions are questionable.

This executive summary will examine, in order, the results of my design in application, as well as the reliability and validity of the design itself in explaining NGO impact.

3. Formal Argument

3.1. Null Hypothesis (HN): Great Power Influence

The argument begins with the null hypothesis or HN. If the great powers' preferences concerning NGOs and IGOs shift, then IGO practices and policies will follow those changes. In this case NGOs are epiphenomenal to IGO change.

HN is driven by neorealism in international relations theory. Neorealism sees IGOs' behavior as determined by the preferences of the most powerful states in the system – the great powers. In the case of the BWI, the great powers are, roughly, the G-7. Neorealist theory on IGOs sees a fairly direct transmission belt from national capitals to IGOs; NGOs' own preferences for an IGO are irrelevant. Even if the IGO does as NGOs desire, it is not so because of NGOs, but the dominant states. Such change is overdetermined.

That is not the case at the BWI. Neither the Bank nor the Fund are definitively pushed one way or the other concerning NGOs by the representatives of the states – the Executive Directors (EDs).

First, national preferences, at least with regard to NGOs and their preferred issues, are frequently at odds, or are ill-defined at the BWI. While not fully independent of their state creators, the BWI do have noticeable internal autonomy. Many informants, from both camps, confirmed this. Further, the "requirements of multilateralism" (Ngaire Woods) demand it. If the BWI were universally understood as pawns of the G-7, or the G-1 (the United States), many state members would exit. A certain level of genuine multilateralism - and autonomy for the BWI - is a functional requirement.

Second, there is a deep split in the BWI executive boards over NGOs. Lending and borrowing states broadly disagree over the treatment of NGOs. Mixed signals from the board create room within the institutions to decide the fitting responses to NGOs and their concerns.

Third, there appear to be information transmission failures. NGO informants frequently decried how NGO-sympathetic EDs were in the dark on what the BWI do regarding NGOs; BWI, especially at the Bank, noted only mixed interest from the board in the details of Bank practices and policies.

HN is less operative than a strict game theoretic interpretation of interstate politics implies. This does not overturn the great power reasoning of neorealism, but it does suggest that it may not be enough. My work does not refute neorealism so much as place a scope condition on it.

3.2. Counter-Null Hypotheses (H1-3)

Having established that the Bank and Fund are not definitively pushed by their state owners to engage NGOs one way or the other, the field is open to other solutions. The uselessness (rather than falsification) of HN suggests the Bank and Fund move on NGOs for internal reasons, which may differ. I have therefore suggested alternate explanations and created empirical benchmarks by which verify those reasons.

Diagram 1 elucidates the move from HN to other hypotheses (H1-3) and the empirical indicators (I1-6) tied to these counter-null hypotheses. H1-3 and their corresponding indicators are scaled by intrusiveness on BWI practices and policies. H1 represents less change than H2

than H3. This scalar relationship is denoted by the vertical arrow from I1/H1 to I6/H3, from "adaptation" - mild structural alterations within a larger unchanged framework - to "learning" - robust redefinition of institutional identity (Peter and Ernst Haas).

Diagram 1: Research Design Flow Chart

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HN                    →  Yes, stop research

                              ↑   I6 → H3      Learning
                              │   I5 → H3
                              │   I4 → H2
                              │   I3 → H2
                              │   I2 → H1
                  No, then   │   I1 → H1      Adaptation
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I have explicitly derived my counter-null hypotheses, H1-3, from the other two major paradigms in IR theory. This is uncommon in the literature on the Bank and Fund. Conservatives tend to view the institutions as the tools of the great powers, and lament when this is not the case. 'Pro-NGO' academic liberals tend to assume the Bank and Fund enjoy autonomy and then decry conservative elements and philosophies within. I have tried to hew a closer line to established bodies of theory, in order to tie this organizational study closer to the IR field.

H1 understands NGO engagement by an IGO as institutional defense against external critics. H2 suggests an IGO includes NGOs in order to exploit their mission usefulness. Both hypotheses respond to the "logic of expected consequences" (March and Olson) and derive from rationalist, liberal institutionalism. Engagement is rational; it yields positive benefits to the BWI in terms, e.g., of public opinion, institutional survival, budgetary expansion, or performance enhancement.

The social constructivism of H3 takes a more expansive sociological track. It grounds IGO engagement with NGOs in a "logic of appropriateness" (March and Olson): including NGOs is appropriate, even if it is not cost-beneficial. IGOs and NGOs are social actors in an intersubjective field where appropriate expectations and behavior are themselves contested and constantly redefined. NGOs are not only separate actors trying to push their separate preferences

on the BWI. They are also 'ideational' or sociological actors pressing 'deep politics' at 'third face of power' on the institutions. They seek to reorient or redefine the BWI's sense of self away from simple IGOs - with accountability strictly to states - into a more complex "global governance agencies" (Jan Scholte) - which perceives a wider remit and range of accountable constituents.

3.3. Counter-Null Indicators

The empirical indicators of NGO impact of an IGO, from Diagram 1, are: I1. an internal NGO facility; I2. program consultation with NGOs by the IGO; I3. programmatic change due to NGOs; I4. retrospective evaluation of NGOs and engagement with them; I5. acceptance of NGOs as politically legitimate participants in internal decision-making; I6. policy and/or paradigm change due to NGOs.

The indicators tie directly to the hypotheses. They are to 'indicate' which hypothesis is accurate on a sliding scale. I1 and 2 accord with H1; I3 and 4 accord with H2; I5 and 6 accord with H3. By a sliding scale I mean that H2 will show high scores on I1 and 2, as well as 3 and 4. H3 should show high scores on I1 – 4, as well as 5 and 6. The lower the indicator, the simpler the engagement. Hence, the higher hypotheses will also include the lower indicators.

The indicators are designed on the assumption, challengeable in future research, that shifts in IGO practices represent lesser change than shifts in IGO policy. The lowest indicator, I1, is simply the creation of an NGO office or unit. By contrast, I6 is policy change. The logic is that policy prescription defines political institutions. Hence I6 ties to the highest hypothesis, H3, which denotes institutional redefinition. Between these extremes of light change in practice and serious change in policy is arrayed a series of steps, I1-6, to indicate greater NGO penetration.

I1 and 2 indicate H1 – organizational defense. The creation of an NGO facility (I1) is simple organizational change. Such an office can funnel, deflect, and domesticate external critiques. It represents little more than basic adaptation to a pernicious environmental change. Consultation with NGOs (I2), as the NGOs so frequently told me, is also light change. Talk is cheap and easy. Alone, it represents no commitment to change. The NGOs often wondered aloud whether all their engagement made any difference. Consultation with no commitment to act on it is empty, and 'consultation fatigue' – "talking the NGOs to death" in the words of one – is an easy defensive strategy. Hence, while I1 and 2 are a necessary part of the other hypotheses, on

their own, they suggest little more than low adaptation for the purposes of defense against external critics.

I3 and 4 indicate H2 – mission efficiency. Impact on programming (I3) suggests that NGO input is valuable in its own right. Consultation has graduated to impact - in the case of the Bank and Fund, on projects and national loan packages. Impact on performance outcomes is real. Retrospective evaluations by an IGO of its engagement with NGOs (I4) similarly suggest that the IGO takes NGOs seriously. Measurement (especially in econometric institutions like the BWI) suggests care and concern. Hence, evaluation (regardless of its findings) implies a role for NGOs that is worth evaluating in the IGO's 'business plan.'

Indicators 1-4 reflect a limited, adaptive engagement with NGOs. I1-4 retain a sharp dividing line between the IGO itself and the NGOs. The actors are distinct with identifiably separate preferences. This is a rationalist model close to neoliberal institutionalism.

Indicators 5 and 6 are more challenging. They reflect the larger NGO effort of IGO transformation - deep politics or learning. The NGOs not only seek to change this or that loan package, encourage social benchmarks, or bring more non-economists into the BWI. They also seek to radically re-imagine or re-envision what the BWI do and how they self-conceive. NGOs challenge the dominance of the state as the sole voice of people in a given territory. They challenge the intellectual hegemony of capitalist economics. They wish the BWI, and IGOs more broadly, to expand their sense of self to include NGOs as entitled actors to whom they must be accountable. I have tried to capture this 'identitarian' challenge by using Scholte's notion of a 'global governance agency' in H4. It catches the wider sense of accountability and expanded engagement ('mission creep') that the NGOs want from IGOs generally, and the BWI specifically. This socially interactive model derives from constructivism; it is premised on more intrusive 'learning,' rather than easier 'adaptation.'

Empirically benchmarking such change is difficult. Much of this effort is sociological or ideational. The NGOs want the BWI to re-think themselves; this is not easily amenable to positive demarcation. Nevertheless, I have suggested two indicators. First, the internal legitimacy of NGOs to an IGO (I5) connects to H3, because the move from an IGO to a global governance agency requires reaching out to non-state actors – civil society generally, and NGOs particularly. The legitimate co-participation of NGOs is different engagement from the expected utility logic of H1 and 2. The logic of appropriateness dictates that if actors are legitimate, they are consulted,

even if it is cost-inefficient. Democracy and pluralism are slow and costly, but we believe they are appropriate decision-making mechanisms nonetheless. I sought to uncover if the same relationships existed between the Bank and Fund, and NGOs.

NGO-driven policy and/or paradigm change (I6) also captures H3, because policy sets the tone of the institution. If an organization is what it does, and its policy is to inform its action, then policy changes suggest identity change. In the case of the BWI, the NGOs have sought distinctly left-leaning socio-economic policy changes, such as deep debt-relief, environmental safeguards, or looser macroeconomic targets, as well as a paradigm shift away from the Washington Consensus. To make such moves would not simply imply a routine shift at the Bank and Fund, but significant change in their purpose (a point not lost on my BWI informants)

4. Method

The research methodology was a structured, focused, comparative case study. There were four primary modes of data collection: 1) documentary analysis; 2) a mail survey (of NGOs); 3) interviews (of BWI staff mostly, but of some NGOs as well); and 4) participant observation.

The primary documents content analyzed were BWI annual reports, as they have board approval. A list of NGOs focused on the BWI was newly created from the attendance lists at the BWI Civil Society Dialogues around the Spring and Annual Meetings. These attendant NGOs were surveyed by mail. Interviews of BWI staff, as well as a few NGO staff personally known to me, complemented the NGO survey. 38 of 227 NGOs responded to the Bank survey; 32 of 219 responded to the Fund survey. 29 Bank interviews were organized through the External Affairs Department (EXT); 10 Fund interviews were organized through the External Relations Department (EXR). A single questionnaire with ten closed-response questions corresponding to HN-4 and I1-6 was used across both BWI and NGO informants to insure cross-comparability and methodological rigor. These questions employed a 1-5 point Likert scale of intensity to quantitatively measure answers. Open-ended, qualitative feedback was also requested. I purposefully sought a diversity of evidence and relied heavily on direct interaction at the Bank and Fund with staff, as well as NGO critics.

The inferential step in the analysis is from the empirical indicators, I1-6, to the counter-null hypotheses, H1-3. If null hypothesis is incorrect, arbitrating between the counter-null hypotheses remains. The questionnaire therefore asked all informants which hypothesis they

thought most accurate. It also asked them, if they rejected HN, to measure NGO-sympathetic movement at the BWI along the range of empirical markers (I1-6). These markers are to 'indicate' which counter-hypothesis is correct.

Hence I asked two overlapping questions – first directly on the causal hypotheses, and second on the empirical indicators. This allowed, first, greater data collection and, second, overt redundancy as a reliability test of my design (the measurement study). If the answers to the hypothetical questions do not align with the answers to the indicators which emanate from those hypotheses, then my indicators are possibly misplaced.

Quantitative figures came mostly from the closed-response questions on the questionnaire. The dataset of anonymously coded responses in spreadsheet is available by request. Some quantitative data was also drawn from the plethora of written statements from the Bank and Fund regarding NGOs.

Qualitative feedback came mostly from participant observation and the open-response answers on the questionnaire. This material was the most rich and exciting, but also tricky. I heard many memorable anecdotes and stories. And the body language and tone of interviewees, from both sides, suggested various conclusions (specifically, that the debate between the BWI and NGOs is deeply polarized). Nonetheless, I only flagged a vein of qualitative findings if several informants corroborated it, or if participant observation at events and meetings reinforced my impressions. Only continuing research in this area, and exposure to these informants, can confirm if some of the most explosive remarks made represent real trends, or just outliers.

The occasionally strident and harsh language of the qualitative feedback broaches a final methodological concern throughout my work – for neutrality. I frequently perceived attempted manipulation by one side or the other in a harsh political climate. Several off-the-record remarks from both sides suggested that some informants sought to co-opt me or had exaggerated their feedback for political reasons. In the dissertation literature review, I noted previous scholars (Michelle Miller-Adams, Jonathan Pincus) who detected similar concerns. I maintained a strict nonintervention posture to prevent compromising the research, occasionally to the ire of informants. Perhaps most colorfully, one NGO informant termed me "a tool of the IMF." But this was methodologically proper, as well as necessary. The polarized climate reduces access for researchers. Scholarly partisanship in observation will only worsen this problem.

5. Results

Despite the long list of validity threats – perceived co-optation, anecdotal outliers, some mixed signals from the quantitative feedback, and others - the conclusions of this dissertation are fairly robust. HN was roundly rejected for both the Bank and Fund, by both the NGO and BWI informants.

At the Bank, all the data from the Bank-side – quantitative and qualitative, interviewees and documents – strongly suggested H2, the engagement of NGOs for mission improvement. Most informants thought the Bank had moved on from defensive positioning (H1) years ago. Long lists of programs with NGO involvement are available from a myriad of Bank documents and offices.

The NGO data was less enthusiastic, but H1 only just edged out H2 in the quantitative data. The NGO qualitative data was also mixed. As I grew accustomed to the interview and participant observation process with NGOs, my sense grew that the NGOs saw real change at the Bank but were hesitant to admit it. To do so would take the wind from their sails, reduce their relevance, and give the Bank a 'win.' There is, I believe, almost a reticence in the NGO community to admit the Bank has moved beyond defensive engagement (H1). Indeed, there is even some evidence, both in the Bank's documents and in my Bank interview data, that the Bank is drifting haltingly toward H3, institutional redefinition. H2 is the probable answer at the Bank.

The quantitative data collected on the Bank is presented in Tables 1 and 2. Measurement occurred on a Likert scale from -2 (strongly negative) to +2 (strongly positive). The more diffuse qualitative data is fully presented in the body chapters of the dissertation.

Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses (World Bank)

Hypotheses	HN	H1	H2	H3	
NGOs *n=38*	-.50	+.45	+.37	-.16	Mean
	-.5	+1	0	0	Median
WB Staff *n=29*	-.90	+.10	+.62	-.52	Mean
	-1	0	+1	-1	Median

Table 2: Summary of Indicators Indexed to Non-Null Hypotheses (World Bank)

Indicators (Hypotheses)	I1 (H1)	I2 (H1)	I3 (H2)	I4 (H2)	I5 (H3)	I6 (H3)	
NGOs *n=38*	-.24	+.11	-.39	-.35	-.13	-.47	Mean
	0	0	0	0	0	-.5	Median
WB Staff *n=29*	+1.01	+.72	+.34	+.17	-.34	-.48	Mean
	1	1	1	0	0	-1	Median

The Fund is quite different. The data – both qualitative and quantitative, from the NGOs and the Fund – cut in different ways that make a solid conclusion more difficult. It needs to be more disaggregated than the Bank's. In the quantitative data, NGO and Fund informants broke evenly against each other on the direct question of which non-null hypothesis (H1-3) was correct. The Fund staff clearly rejected H1, defensive posturing, for H2, mission utility; the NGOs went inversely. But in the quantitative questions on the empirical indicators, Fund staff answers suggested H1, while the NGO data was erratic and indeterminate.

The qualitative and documentary data followed similar breakages. The qualitative data from the NGOs strongly, almost ferociously, fell in favor of H1, institutional defense. Indeed, that is the most robust finding in my data collection. Yet again, the Fund qualitative data broke the other way, although not so intensely. As at the Bank, most Fund interviewees suggested that the IMF had graduated from H1 defensiveness to a more constructive, H2 relationship built on utility. Finally and most surprisingly, the Fund's documentary data, even in recent years, broke in favor of H1. There are open admissions in the Fund's printed material of a hostile or awkward relationship with NGOs, of EXR's purpose to persuade or educate external critics of the Fund, and of the NGOs' continuing inability to seriously contribute to the Fund's work.

So while the data is not as clear as the Bank's, I concluded in favor of H1 for the Fund. The quantitative data collected on the IMF is presented in Tables 3 and 4. Measurement occurred on a Likert scale from -2 (strongly negative) to +2 (strongly positive). The more diffuse qualitative data is fully presented in the body chapters of the dissertation.

Table 3: Summary of Hypotheses (IMF)

Hypotheses	HN	H1	H2	H3	
NGOs *n=32*	-.62	+.40	-.78	-.75	Mean
	-1	+1	-1	-1	Median
IMF Staff *n=10*	-1.20	-.30	+.40	-1.00	Mean
	-2	-.5	+1	-1	Median

Table 4: Summary of Indicators Indexed to Non-Null Hypotheses (IMF)

Indicators (Hypotheses)	I1 (H1)	I2 (H1)	I3 (H2)	I4 (H2)	I5 (H3)	I6 (H3)	
NGOs *N=32*	-.87	-1.42	-1.48	-1.11	-1.00	-.87	Mean
	-1	-2	-2	-1.5	-1	-1	Median
IMF Staff *n=10*	+.80	+.20	-.80	-1.50	-1.30	-.90	Mean
	+1	0	-1	-1.5	-1	-1	Median

6. Measurement Study

The research design sketched above is original. It tries to fill a gap of methodological rigor in research on NGOs and IGOs. However, my sliding scale of indicators tied to causal hypotheses was untested. So my project has a second end, beyond simply measuring along the scales. It was also important to determine whether the scales themselves captured the relevant aspects of NGO-IGO interaction. This is the measurement study; reliability and validity are measurement issues lurking behind this project. First, do my indicators and hypotheses reliably connect to one another, thereby justifying my causal inferences from I1-4 to H2 for the Bank, and from I1-2 to H1 for the Fund? Second, are my indicators and hypotheses valid markers for measuring and explaining change at these institutions?

My dissertation performed better on the second than the first question. Concerning validity, I asked in both the survey and interviews if there should be other indicators and hypotheses beyond my suggestions. I was pleased that only a few interviewees at the Bank suggested presidential leadership. Perhaps President Wolfensohn's zeal for NGOs drove NGO-sought change at the Bank. Only a small minority of informants corroborated this explanation. Most suggested that NGO change at the Bank was deeper than such entrepreneurship and would likely survive President Wolfensohn's departure. The imminent arrival of Paul Wolfowitz will be a good test of my argument against a strong role for leadership. Clearly other indicators and hypotheses could exist and will be fleshed out as this project expands. But the positive response regarding alternatives does suggest that my measurement structure did capture relevant explanations and benchmarks of change.

Concerning the reliability of my tie between the indicators and hypotheses, the design was less successful. The predicted relationship in the indicator data is a declining, linear slope. I1 represents easier change than I6, and the other indicators in-between are scaled to be ever more intrusive. Hence, the scores gives to I1 should be higher than I2, than I3, and so on. I predict a stepwise decline from I1 to I6.

A second predicted relationship is that the outcome of the indicator questions would correlate to that of the hypothesis questions. The last indicator above the neutral score of zero (on the -2 to +2 Likert scale used in the questionnaire) should then correlate to the preferred hypothesis. For example, an informant who selected H1 as his preferred causal explanation should not then have provided scores above zero on I3-6.

Below are the quantitative results, presented in Tables 1-4 above, in linear chart form, using the mean scores.

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
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
Graph 3: IMF Hypotheses

Graph 4: IMF Indicators

My expected relationships only held in the World Bank data from Bank informants. There is a steady decline in impact from I1 to I6 in Graph 2. This fits my first prediction. The last indicator above the neutral score of zero was I4, and so suggested H2. The separate question on which hypothesis was most accurate also returned H2 as the primary choice (Graph 1). This fit my second prediction. My model worked well at the Bank.

Unfortunately for my research design, the NGO data curve on the World Bank indicators is 'spiky' (Graph 2). It bobs up and down from I1 to I6. The only indicator above the neutral score of zero was I2. This suggests H2, and the NGO data on the hypothesis question also suggests H2 (Graph 1). So my first prediction failed, but my second did not. The NGO data is not useless. However, their response may suggest I have not correctly arrayed my indicators from least to most intrusive.

At the Fund, the data alignment is also troublesome. On Graph 4, I1-3, for both the Fund and NGO data, show the predicted stepwise decline. But on I4-I6 for the NGOs, and I5-I6 for the Fund, the data curve perks back upward, creating a soft U-curve. This was quite unanticipated. The later scores that perk upward do not break the neutral score of zero, so my first prediction is not completely overthrown.

The similarly shaped curves of both data lines in Graph 4 suggest a clearer conclusion for the measurement study than the quirky NGO data of Graph 2. It appears I5 and I6 are not the very intrusive indicators I surmised, at least at the Fund. Hence, in the dissertation's recommendations to improve the research design, I suggested reevaluating the relationship between policy and practice as markers of NGO penetration. Specifically, it may be that I3, program impact, should displace I6, policy impact, as the deepest marker of NGO success. (As a generic conclusion for IGOs, however, that is bedeviled by the Bank data line in Graph 2.)

More problematic is my second predicted relationship. The data from Fund informants violates my postulated connection between the hypotheses and indicators. The Fund interviewees came down strongly for H2 on the direct hypothetical question (Graph 3), yet their answers to the indicators suggested H1 (Graph 4). This discrepancy may be a design flaw. Yet, my perception grew through the interviewing period that it may also be a participant distortion similar to the NGO unwillingness to admit H2 at the Bank. Insofar as interviewees wished to project a better image of the Fund - a concern frequently raised in the Fund's annual reports, but not in the Bank's - they may have optimistically selected H2 in the direct causal question (Graph

3). Meanwhile, the causal inference, from indicators to hypotheses, may not have been clear in the indicator questions, resulting in less self-conscious data in Graph 4. Certainly, my other sources of data, the NGO surveys and the Fund's written material, strongly reinforce H1. This raised the possibility issue of overly optimistic informant responses, and drives my eventual conclusion on the side of H1, not H2, for the Fund.

This 'test drive' of the research design worked reasonably well. Future work with these indicators, and their relationship to the causal hypotheses, will improve my scale. The fairly robust answers uncovered by the research design, as well as its reasonably strong performance in the measurement study, warrants continuing research with it.