GOLDEN GROWTH

Restoring the lustre of the European economic model

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DOI: 10.1596/978-0-8213-8965-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gill, Indermit Singh, 1961-
Golden growth: restoring the lustre of the European economic model / Indermit Gill and Martin Raiser; together with Andrea Mario Dall'Olio ... [et al.]. p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Europe—Economic conditions—1945—Econometric models. 2. Economic indicators—Europe. I. Raiser, Martin. II. Title.
HC240.G523277 2012
330.94—dc23
2011045981

Design and typesetting by Zephyr
www.wearezephyr.com
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In Europe, a rapid convergence in living standards—not much elsewhere.

Almost half of the global goods trade involves Europe.

More trade in services in Europe, but apparently in more traditional activities.

In Europe, foreign capital has boosted growth in emerging economies.

European enterprises have delivered jobs, productivity, and exports.

Much of Europe is becoming more productive, but the south has fallen behind.

Smaller firms contribute half of value added in the EU15 South, but just a third elsewhere.

Western European investors have been looking east, not south.

Southern and Eastern Europe must make it easier to do business.

Productivity growth in Europe’s larger economies has slowed down since the mid-1990s.

The United States specializes in younger, more R&D-intensive products.

Outsourcing the rest of the world.

Europe’s pension systems have support people for many more years.

Europe’s labor force will shrink, while North America’s will grow by a quarter.

Europeans are less mobile, even within their own countries.

Governments in Europe are big.

Social protection explains the difference in government size between Europe and its peers.

Small differences in annual pensions per beneficiary, big in overall public pension spending.

Western Europe has to reduce fiscal deficits by 6 percent of GDP, emerging Europe by less.

Greening production but not consumption.

Europe is the most open region in the world.

Convergence in incomes was faster in Europe than elsewhere.

In much of Europe, capital flows to high-growth countries.

Institutional quality varies a lot within Europe.

Business is expected to be socially responsible in Europe.

Emerging European countries are the best performers in emission reduction.

The business climate varies substantially across Europe.

Europe’s governments spend more on R&D, the private sector spends less.

Europeans work less and retire earlier.

Employment protection is higher in Europe.

Wages in Europe are less differentiated than in other regions.

Social spending is higher in Europe.

Redistribution through the tax and transfer system is more pronounced in Europe.

Europe’s productivity leaders are lagging behind the United States.

Southern Europe lags the EU15 North, and Eastern Europe is catching up to it.

Europe’s population could shrink by a third over the next 40 years.

European governments are the biggest in the world, and often heavily indebted.

Europe—the lifestyle superstar.

Europeans work fewer hours while Americans work more.

Convergence until the 1980s, divergence since.

Big increases in productivity during the transition, especially in the former Soviet Union.

Productivity got a big boost from ICT in the United States, not so much in Europe.

Policy affects the pace and composition of productivity growth.

Information technology played a bigger role in Eastern Europe.

Growth has been greater in Europe’s southern states.

Europe has the world’s busiest trade.

The European Union does a brisk trade in services.

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