

Regulations and Challenges of Implementing Performance-based Agreements In Tertiary Education in Chile

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Introduction

The tertiary education system in Chile has very distinctive features which differentiate it from most OECD countries. A fundamental feature is the degree of institutional autonomy, reflected in the extensive freedom institutions have to define key aspects such as the number of places available, academic programs, fees, academic teaching staff and teacher salaries. This autonomy is complemented by a wide range of institutions, a mixed provision structure, a mostly market-based coordination system and a funding model that has been progressing from bi-modal funding, a historical baseline and demand, to multimodal funding with a wider variety of instruments and with increasing emphasis on results, on their transparent disclosure and on public accountability. The model has a significant private funding component through fees (the role of families), proportionately one of the highest rates in the world, along with Korea.

One of the most serious problems that obscures the transparency of the Chilean tertiary education system is the lack of reliable, appropriate and timely information from both the system and each institution. The process of gathering quality information for the tertiary education system, the institutions themselves and the different actors generally interested in the system, has been slow and problematic.

The Ministry's reaction to the current scenario of corporate information systems and the limited evidence-based management has been to encourage the installation or improvement of institutional research units to develop programs and projects, and to facilitate institutional management and the updating of the National Information System for Higher Education, part of Ministry of Education. However, regarding this matter, evaluation reports still warn of an inability to systematize and use the information

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generated within tertiary education institutions (J. Allende et al, 2008, 2009, J. Donner et al, 2010).

International experience has developed several public funding instruments that seek essentially three major policy objectives for the systems : i) increase access and equity, ii) increase external efficiency, and iii) increase internal system efficiency.

Mechanisms for greater economic rationality are hoped to be incorporated specifically via public funding, associating the funds with results. In Chile this funding is streamlined using three instruments: Direct Public Support, (AFD), Indirect Public Support (AFI) and MECESUP Program. The latter is the only competition-based instrument which demands results. In 2007 the MECESUP Program experience promoting these three policy objectives gave rise to the experimental development of a new results-based resource allocation instrument – the Performance-based Agreement. Its overall purpose is to increase the effectiveness of public spending, align institutional objectives with objectives of national interest, promote public accountability and associate the improvement of institutional performance with financing.

Broadly speaking, this instrument matches one of the most important suggestions from the Presidential Advisory Council on Higher Education: "a results-based resource allocation system using competitive mechanisms is the best option" (Advisory Council, 2008). In practice, it meets the need to design and implement other financial instruments which differ from the existing ones, given that some structural problems in the tertiary education system still persist and remain unresolved (such as teacher performance and undergraduate learning outcomes).

Internationally there are generally three public resource allocation alternatives: inertial funding, the use of formulas and contracts (García de Fanelli, 2005). The first alternative corresponds to the more traditional stable baseline allocation, which corresponds to AFD in Chile. The other two generally assign a secondary budget.

The formula-based funding takes several forms, some based on intake, such as number of students, or the number of academics with PhDs. Other formulas consider the cost per student or national objectives, a type of preferential subsidy, such as specific national or regional high priority degree programs, or they are rather associated with the type of student who enrolls from typically underrepresented areas. There are also formulas that have components associated with outcomes such as graduate numbers, or the amount of taught credits or the number of ISI publications. (In Chile the formulas are basically AFI and 5% recurring AFD).

Results-based funding rewards institutions for their actual outcomes rather than promises, using triggers that reflect public policy interests. There are two results-based funding mechanisms of particular importance. The competitive funding that finances academic improvement and is assessed by peers, such as the Academic Innovation Fund (AIF) and the pilot MECESUP program Performance-based Agreements (PBAs), in which measurable objectives are agreed upon between the institutions and the Chilean Government.

PBAs implemented in several countries and various U.S. states³ have dissimilar features; some are based on standards and triggers, others set general system-based objectives and specific targets for each institution; some account for a small percentage of fiscal contribution and in other cases, it is the full amount. In short, most of these clearly indicate the areas in which they are useful, such as improving teacher efficiency and triggers (retention and graduation rates), the strengthening of scientific and technological productivity (number of publications, impact and relevance for innovation) and improving institutional management (financial indicators and infrastructure, among others). PBAs are a funding instrument, but are mainly an incentive and means to achieving significant improvements in institutions and the tertiary education system. From a practical point of view, they comprise a different way of working between funding bodies, like the Ministry of Education, because they negotiate and agree on common objectives.

There are some design factors that must be taken into account. What proportion of resources should be allocated in this way? What indicators should be used to measure outcomes? And, how should institutions that underperform be dealt with? (Salmi-Hauptman, 2006). Other important considerations are when to introduce results-based resource allocation mechanisms and whether PBAs refer to reliable and appropriate information at system and institution level. If these aspects are not considered, evaluating institutional outcomes becomes difficult. It is also important for institutions to implement appropriate internal management practices. In sum, even when this instrument promotes improved management, with a special emphasis on results, it requires skill to carry the project forward.

From the point of view of when PBAs are announced, the themes and plans for institutional improvement may be established by the institutions themselves (in accordance with a preferably corporate strategic vision) or by public funding bodies, which set specific ex-ante national strategic objectives (such as curricular reform, the shortening

² Germany, Austria, Canada, Catalonia, United States of America (in a number of states), Finland and France.

of degree programs or incentives for corporate change to achieve more relevant and effective teacher training) in order to tackle certain public policies both effectively and proactively.

Performance-based Agreements

A performance-based agreement (PBA) is a State resource allocation instrument for accordingly-selected tertiary education institutions. This instrument is characterized by the extent to which an institution that receives public funding must undertake the commitment to reaching notable academic outcomes. Said outcomes are negotiated with the Ministry of Education, and the institution is made publicly accountable for their achievement.

A PBA aims to produce academic goods with high social return. To this end, higher education institutions (HEI) must achieve significant qualitative and quantitative improvement in certain spheres that shape their work.

These PBA are characterized by the extent to which challenges are directly associated with institutional quality and strategic change. They are based on institutional strategic development plans and involve a medium-term contractual relationship between the Ministry of Education and the participating institution. The amounts awarded to the institutions are significant, and require measurable, verifiable results and impacts in the short and medium term.

Performance-based Agreements as a State resource allocation instrument have a number of features that distinguish them from other funding alternatives.

Firstly, a PBA essentially finances public goods, with an explicit academic commitment from the institution receiving the resources, which is publicly accountable for outcomes and impacts achieved.

Secondly, PBAs align HEI resources and capabilities with national priorities, fostering synergy since resources are combined with institutional resources and other strategic initiatives. This creates a cause and effect relationship, allowing a continued cycle of success.

Thirdly, PBAs not only have an impact on society through the generation of public goods,

but also strengthen institutional capacities and management, as well as quality, effectiveness and efficiency.

Consequently, a Performance-based Agreement must generate a positive social return in a transparent manner, accounting for the use of allocated public resources. In addition, PBAs enable the strengthening and leveraging of HEI strategic resources, implementing and combining capacities which extend beyond PBA implementation time limits.

A PBA must generate public goods. For the tertiary education system, these goods are associated preferentially with the training of advanced undergraduate and graduate human capital, research, development and innovation.

Since a PBA presumes that the participating institution will undertake express commitments with the Ministry of Education and that these commitments will be the result of a negotiation process, the question arises whether this accountability mechanism deprives institutions of their autonomy.

A first consideration of the matter is that institutions are free to choose the area and the specific topics in which they will participate. Their freedom of choice is guaranteed. No institution is forced to participate nor are the topics it intends to cover imposed. Indeed, requesting an agreement with the State implies it is a voluntary process to align strategic priorities. The institution's autonomy is not affected, although it may not always be able to use public resources as it sees fit. On the other hand, the institution gains in transparency and society benefits from the generation of public goods.

A second issue is that the corporate governance of the participating institution is not affected in any shape or form. The institution freely defines the members of its community and the managers who will participate in the PBA. Thus, self-determination is guaranteed: the management team and corporate governance are not affected by the PBA.

Therefore, institutions are free to define issues and the team that will participate. In that way, they may autonomously preserve their institutional mission statement and the features that shape the hallmark of the institution. As PBA-allocated resources represent only part of the funding, other discretionary expenses, that are not eligible, may be financed by the institutions themselves. This model then allows institutions to have a mix of funding sources to further institutional improvement plans.

MECESUP Performance-based Agreements

The pilot MECESUP program Performance-based Agreements (PBAs) are contracts signed between the Ministry of Education and the institutions on the basis of a previously agreed Institutional Improvement Plan (IIP), which sets out the objectives to be achieved, the strategies to achieve them and the goals to be reached, measured by outcome triggers.

The first call to state universities to submit PBA development pre-proposals was made in 2006. These proposals had to consider IIP implementation within three years. They pledged greater outcomes and impacts than those provided by conventional instruments, which were called notable or remarkable outcomes.

These early PBAs were intended as a pilot for the development and fine-tuning of the instrument and for learning about the system. According to the Ministry of Education, the objective of this instrument was to "align institutional mission statements with national and regional priorities, university autonomy with public accountability and institutional performance with public funding" (Performance-based Agreement Regulations, 2006). It tackled the development of competences in universities for results-based management, strengthened institutional competencies in areas of national priority, improved the quality of educational alternatives and engaged the periodic, transparent and public measurement of results.

To guide the institutions, five ministerial priorities were established: consistency of IIP with proposals submitted to the competition, increasing the percentage of full-time academics with PhDs, increasing graduation rates whilst decreasing the time to achieve them, increasing coverage of program accreditation and overall improvement of academic quality.

The IIP must consider strategies to achieve measurable results in the field of institutional management. Therefore, results are expected in the following areas: installation and development of institutional research skills, design and implementation of information management systems, an increase of skills for institutional leadership, evidence-based decision-making and long-term strategic planning, among others. In the field of academic quality, results are expected in relation to improving program quality and their importance and relevance, increasing equity in access to quality, responsible management of student enrolment, increasing efficiency, academic and curriculum renewal, and increasing university-labour relations.

A PBA is a contract which sets out instrument objectives and stipulates, among other things that:

- It is a partnership between both parties to achieve agreed outcomes.
- It is based on academic improvement and improved management capabilities.
- There is a degree of explicit alignment between ministerial and institutional priorities.
- A notable improvement in management and academic quality is pledged.
- Timely delivery of academic and financial information, and outcome triggers is required.
- It depends on an Institutional Research Unit for implementation, monitoring and supervision.
- It welcomes ongoing and systematic monitoring and evaluation from the Ministry.
- It produces annual outcome triggers.

The contract also requires the institution to comply with all IPP goals. For each one, lines of action, milestones and outcome triggers must be established. These triggers must specify both annual and target goals and figures. For the second and the remaining instalments to be delivered, objective evidence of milestones and targets is required in the triggers created by the University in the IPP.

A feature of Performance-based Agreements, which could be crucial during implementation, is the ability to dynamically change resource allocations, seeking to maximize its target function. This flexibility is critical for the performance improvement purposes pursued. Since it is generally very difficult to prepare an ideal IPP to achieve notable outcomes, feedback and learning provided by their implementation are crucial. This is also the experience that can be gained from the implementation of other relevant PBAs. Any conflicts that may arise for this reason within HEI are generally "good" conflicts; i.e., they must be addressed to overcome differences (and not be left "unresolved" as often happens in many other cases).

PBA implementation is carried out through an annual list of goods and services that allows the tasks required by the agreement to be completed. For PBAs in the implementation stage, this list has been modified to fit the reality of project progress and surfacing situations.

To reach the final version of the IIP, the Ministry appoints an expert or negotiator to lead the preliminary IPP negotiation process. This process has proven to be very important for improving this initial IPP and defining agreed notable performances. Negotiators are essential to agree on ambitious goals, but realistic about the outcomes (which are higher

than those achieved with the same resources under conventional management). Negotiators encourage HEIs to consider all types of scenarios and have not finished their duty once the contract is signed since they are in charge of monitoring and evaluating PBA implementation. They are considered an important contribution to the proper development of the initiatives (J. Allende et al, 2008 and 2009; J. Donner et al, 2010).

In the first call, pre-proposals were selected from four different state universities in order to "verify the instrument under as varied conditions as possible" (PBA Regulations, 2006). These universities are: University of Tarapaca (UTA), University of Chile (UCH), University of Bio-Bio (UBB) and University of la Frontera (UFRO).

The amounts involved in this pilot initiative reached a public investment of nearly ten billion Chilean pesos. As for its impact on institution budgets, PBA contributions account for⁴ 4.5% of AFD, in the case of University of Chile, and 30.1% in the case of University of Bío Bío. It could be said that, in at least the two cases of UBB and UFRO (29.1%), PBA contributions in relation to AFD are substantial. However, considering PBA contribution in relation to the total budget revenue of each university, these range from 0.4% in the case of the University of Chile to 2.6% for the University of Tarapacá, i.e. a lower⁵ budgetary impact. However, according to two recent reports from the MECESUP International Program Advisory Committee and the Mid Term International Evaluation Report, the experimental PBAs were perceived as a powerful tool to improve institutional management.

In spite of each PBA's objectives being general across the board, they do have specific features which reflect institutional priorities. The UTA PBA seeks to position the university as an agent for cross-border integration; the UCH PBA to install a new model of corporate governance; the UBB PBA to focus on improving structural levels of student success; and finally, the UFRO PBA to balance UFRO management, teaching efficiency and research development in the area of bio-resources.

An analysis⁶ of performance triggers involved in PBAs and their relationship with the triggers suggested in the regulations shows that, unlike the other agreements, the UCH PBA is purely related to the field of management without compromising academic results. Also this analysis shows that the UTA PBA is associated more with research than

⁴ Source: Mecesus2 Program. <http://www.mece2.com/> (Performance-based Agreements)

⁵ According to some authors, (e.g. García de Fanelli, 2005) the amounts involved in the PBA must be significant in relation to the budget to incentivise processes of change.

⁶ Source: PBA Competition Regulations and university Performance-based Agreements. <http://www.mece2.com/>

undergraduate study, whilst the UBB PBA is concerned with undergraduate study. In the case of UFRO, the agreement involves results in both of those areas.

In 2007, the Chilean President announced special resources to fund the development and improvement in the humanities, arts, social sciences and communication sciences at state universities. To this end, allocation was also decided by Performance-based Agreements.

Lessons Learnt

Performance-based Agreements present specific challenges and others which affect the tertiary education sector in more general terms. The former include system-specific features (such as their degree of administrative autonomy and / or regulation) and state-based (in administrative matters). Among the latter is the degree of policy stability and consistency and the domain where the instruments are implemented, i.e. institutional eligibility.

The experience gained so far has reaffirmed that the instrument provides the opportunity for further dialogue between the Government and universities. "These actors [negotiators] accompany the institutions and Government throughout the entire process and help as interpreters in the alignment of objectives between both parties. This facilitates the convergence of objectives between the agency (universities) and the principal (the government) "(García de Fanelli, 2005). Coincidentally, the March 2009 International Mid-Term report and the International Advisory Council (CAI) report both positively evaluated the work of the negotiators and the quality of the negotiation processes which according to university directors led them to determine demanding and realistic goals and outcome triggers.

The investments and changes that occur in universities due to PBA implementation involve new recurrent costs, which are mitigated as much as possible during the negotiation processes. Despite this effort, there remains a need for new initiatives to be set up by projects with permanent resources. This puts pressure on the institutional authorities to deal with additional revenue and reservations regarding the sustainability of the instrument.

The achievement of objectives will be one of the most important factors when evaluating this instrument. This is operationalized by measuring the degree of compliance with each project's institutional objectives. To this end, benchmarks and triggers shall be used, which until now have not yet been submitted to rigorous testing.

Continuous monitoring and evaluation throughout PMI project development is one of the strengths of the Chilean design. Besides, it also enables continuous supervision of actions and evolution of results. This contrasts with the French experience; France has one of the longest trajectories in developing this type of instrument. Their agreements are essentially evaluated when a new contract is negotiated (García de Fanelli, 2006).

Despite this difference, the European experience of the program contracts (García de Fanelli, 2006) has had similar effects in Chile. For instance, the association between targets and funding has proven to be important, institutional capacities have been reinforced, specification and focus on proposals has been achieved, and evaluation and funding policies have been coordinated.

One factor that represents a generic challenge for PBA management is "the ability to convey the message to the operational units of the organization" (García de Fanelli, 2005). In the Chilean experience, the agreements have been managed and negotiated with teams established by the Vice-Chancellor and they can thus be interpreted as internally-managed projects. The structure of institutional decision making and faculty priorities may hinder the alignment needed to implement the agreement. To this end, effective strategies must be foreseen to involve and commit academic units to the work behind the agreement objectives. In turn, a further step is to engage the work of individuals.

One aspect that has affected IPP implementation included in the PBAs has been the difficulty in managing the bureaucratic processes required by the State and the World Bank, which have not always been mutually well coordinated. The delay in implementation impedes reaching the milestones pledged and hampers the fulfilment of annual goals. The CAI report, (J. Allende at the 2008, 2009, J. Donner et al, 2010) aware of this situation, recommends the State and universities adapt to the requirements of the new instrument, learn from the experience and work on the removal of administrative obstacles.

Regarding this last point, a structural weakness remains in the Ministry of Education, which has already been observed in other contexts and noted in international reports. The broad and rich dialogue that takes place between institutions and the government under an agreement requires senior staff at the Ministry of Education to serve as a counterpart to a sector "searching for these new capabilities "(J. Allende et al, 2008, 2009; J. Donner et al, 2010).

For the correct functioning of an agreement, its management must come from a position of authority and therefore must be part of the upper echelons of the university structure. Effective leadership is also a requirement. Bearing in mind that staff in senior positions have little time available, the PBA team needs professional training. In addition, PBA objectives should ideally be established on a strategic level at the University with a view to achieving institutional responsibilities.

Likewise, a direct dialogue with the operational units must be attained regarding degree programs, management and researchers; not only as part of the PBA technical management team, but also of the Mecesup2 technical negotiation team. A track record of agreements and progress made in meetings must be kept since this generates feelings of participation and trust and shows PBA progress. The internal University community and institutional technical teams should become aware of the meaning of PBAs; it is not just another project, but a contract between the State and the University pursuing goals that involve prominent or notable changes.

In general, the Vice-Chancellor and the management team have shown remarkable commitment to PBA success. In some cases, the quality of leadership of the Vice-Chancellor has become evident on higher levels, highlighted by a transformational style, appropriate to PBA goals.

Management "at the highest level of the organization," without creating ad-hoc intermediate structures, has eliminated red tape and established a management style at senior level which is focused on results, not as a non-systematic activity, but as part and parcel of proactive management.

Additionally, it has been possible to appreciate quick and broad variations in areas of intervention which are traditionally slow in their evolution and require long-term interventions, insofar as there is a careful design of the plans of actions deemed appropriate according to the organizational culture and development which lead to the achievement of the triggers.

Finally, Management for Institutional Research and Development has provided the analytical support needed for the achievement of agreed results.

The current situation of PBAs in the Chilean tertiary education system requires both their quantitative and qualitative classification. It is therefore essential to establish eligibility criteria for institutions which are likely to implement this type of State-funded instrument. Once the group of institutions able to undertake PBA requirements has been defined, a team of senior negotiators at Ministry of Education must be composed.

Firstly, to determine the success of PBAs the institutions which benefit from these State resources must be carefully selected.

Secondly, the degree to which the institutional goals and public goods are aligned must be considered according to what the institution has agreed to produce via the PBA. The public goods upon which a notable performance is agreed must be essential to the institution and under no circumstances marginal to the achievement of its mission statement.

A third factor is the negotiation team, which should consist of senior professionals with extensive and successful senior management experience at university level. These professionals should also have an appropriate profile to negotiate and monitor complex entities and an ability to negotiate with a thorough understanding of the main issues at stake.

And a final aspect to consider for success in PBA implementation is the leadership undertaken by the Vice-Chancellor at the institution. A transformational leadership style is needed, in addition to the active and committed participation of the most senior institutional authorities.

A Performance-based Agreement means a commitment to changing the administrative structures on both sides, namely, the University and Ministry of Education. Thus, it becomes a learning process for both, paving the way for the installation of the new instrument as a stable mechanism for allocating resources. However, it should be noted that the three year-long implementation period is actually short if administrative constraints are not resolved as they are part and parcel of the system.

- *On the necessary transformation in the Ministry of Education and the World Bank:*

PBA application not only requires the transformation of the universities involved, but also the entities that promote and lead it, in this case the Division of Higher Education at the Ministry of Education and the World Bank.

Notable outcomes are achieved when institutions and their environment change at the same time. If you only change the institutions, the performances will not be as impressive as they could be. It is therefore important for both the Ministry of Education and the World Bank to make some changes in their internal structures to foster greater PBA success. In particular, it is absolutely essential to accelerate approval cycles of administrative management, facilitate rescheduling, have support

systems (e.g., databases of specialists by area) and be results-oriented (and not only towards activities and processes).

- *On procurement procedures:*

World Bank procurement procedures are not wholly appropriate for PBA implementation given that they unnecessarily slow down the obtaining of goods and services. In a PBA, time for completion is key. With regard to the Public Market, adjustments should also be introduced to make them appropriate for a PBA.

- *On Mecesup Program and Negotiators:*

Install a PBA as a dynamic means of aiming for remarkable results, which guides individuals from the University to focus on results rather than on processes and activities.

Create an atmosphere of trust, openness and orientation towards authentic transformation.

Foster teamwork amongst managers from different fields and levels of the University involved in the PBA. A "task force" approach has meant constructive collaboration, synergy and an ability to face and share difficulties.

Encourage the creation and use of tools to support PBA management (computerized PBA monitoring and control).

- *About the participating University:*

Administrative procedures are an important management variable for compliance with university work plans. To address the difficulties that often occur, the following aspects should be considered:

Directly link the people who perform administrative duties at the University to the Mecesup2 program technical team, hopefully through meetings to resolve specific situations.

Adapt the traditional functioning of the University to PBA requirements, particularly in compliance with procedures and deadlines.

Redesign University internal procedures, which would also be desirable for the World Bank and the Ministry of Education.

Install capacity and a willingness to focus and prioritize.

Install capacity and a willingness to reallocate resources according to PBA needs, the outcomes and, in particular, when faced with delays which may occur transferring and receiving resources.

A remaining challenge to be addressed concerns the replication of results in other institutions. The lessons learnt from the current agreements will save significant time and money, in addition to allowing greater efficiency, efficacy and better levels of social impact. Finally, it is necessary to provide adequate continuity that allows sustained growth of the indicators, avoiding their stagnation or decay (a detrimental situation for the installation and scaling of the instrument).

Recommendations

Based on the experience gained thus far in the development of the four implemented PBAs, areas of improvement are suggested so as to better achieve:

- sustainability for this instrument as a public policy.
- a guarantee that universities adopt an integral vision and strategy of its quality improvement in everything it does.

The framework for success in implementing a PBA entails:

- an appropriate selection of HEI, focusing on institutions which possess levels of development ensuring solvency and a capacity to undertake new strategic challenges;
- the selection of central themes to institutional development and the fulfilment of its mission and goals;
- a team of highly professional negotiators; and
- a committed and motivated management team which assumes the challenge of achieving high impact and significant results.

The main suggestions and recommendations are summarized below:

- Specify in the competition regulations that the institutions which may participate and be eligible have to clearly define the following minimum criteria:

i) Have a well-developed and officially approved Strategic Development Plan, in addition to a Training Project (or Educational Project), that explains among other things:

- a) The hallmark that the institution wishes to give its graduates.
- b) The educational model of the institution.
- c) Its policies at undergraduate, graduate and research level, in addition to its links with its environment according to the type of project planned.
- d) A basic information management system.

ii) The Higher Education Institutions which undertake a PBA must demonstrate a satisfactory initial level of institutional development and in their academic work.

iii) Ensure full alignment of projects submitted by institutions and the Higher Education policies defined by the Chilean Government.

iv) The areas presented in the PMI proposal must be accredited.

v) The PBA organization team must be aligned with the institutional organic structure so that PBA achievements continue enhancement once external funding is completed.

vi) Improve PBA evolution accountability instruments at institutional level, emphasizing desired notable outcomes.

vii) Fully comply with the funding transfer date from the Ministry of Education to the institutions.

viii) Look for significant improvements to facilitate all processes related to procurements and calls for bids, which is particularly difficult for state-dependent institutions, including MINEDUC.

ix) Widely diffuse PBA competition regulations through seminars or other events, highlighting the difference between this new instrument and other funding instruments, especially for Mecesup2 projects.

x) Widely diffuse currently implemented PBAs, underlining their positive aspects (important achievements) and the main difficulties encountered.

Future of Performance-based Agreements in Chile

As a means of finalizing the setting for PBA implementation in Chile, the latest developments in its scaling-up to a larger number of HEI must be mentioned. To this end, it is important to note the implementation of a Revitalization Plan for the Humanities, Arts, and Social and Communication Sciences at State universities. This Plan is in its initial implementation phase, using PBAs that follow the model being explored with the MECESUP Program at Campus Juan Gómez Millas, University of Chile since January 2011. Likewise, the current Chilean Government has decided to partially scale up pilot PBAs to the whole tertiary education system in a 2011-2014 program, which considers significant funds set aside and a strategic focus to support teacher training, the tuning of undergraduate curricula, international outreach of national PhD programs and vocational training.

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