

Chapter 7

Evaluation Highlights

- Bank advocacy goes beyond the country level and involves producing collective global responses and promoting the development interests of the poor.
- Promoting global trade reform represents the Bank's advocacy at its best—in its analytical and practical depth and its proactive dissemination.
- The Bank's advocacy work on avian influenza built on robust economic analysis, convening power, fiduciary reputation, and multisectoral expertise.
- The Bank has had some advocacy successes related to environmental commons, though its influence on advancing work on climate change is more debatable.
- The voice of developing countries is still underrepresented in global programs, particularly in their governance.



Indonesian elementary schoolchildren wear surgical masks in response to 2003 outbreak of SARS in China; photo ©Reuters/Corbis, reproduced by permission.

The Bank's Advocacy on Global Public Goods: What Has Worked and What Has Not?

The Dimensions of Advocacy

The Bank can advocate for action on GPGs in at least three ways. First, it can encourage specific actions supported by the global community at the country level. This lies at the heart of the Bank's country-based model and was discussed in chapter 6.

Second, the Bank can help inform collective global responses to providing GPGs. For example, independent and robust research on the costs of communicable disease threats (such as avian flu) can help inform international partners in developing an appropriate response. Practical analysis, and sometimes the Bank's convening power, can also be used to help develop markets—such as that for carbon finance—and so deliver new tools to provide GPGs.

Third, the Bank's focus on poverty and development can be used to promote the interests of developing countries in international dialogue on mechanisms to tackle GPG issues. This is particularly applicable where the community of nations considers developing and implementing (binding) international agreements to set a framework for collective action. In such cases, the Bank has a potentially powerful ability to ensure that development interests are properly considered—not least, how costs and benefits

of new arrangements will affect the world's poor.

This chapter explains aspects of advocacy using three high-profile examples—trade, environmental commons, and avian influenza. It draws on the importance of voice for developing countries, especially related to the governance of global programs. Finally, it presents a perspective on very recent innovations of the Bank in supporting advocacy through its financial capabilities.

Advocacy at Its Best: The Bank's Experience with Trade

The role of the Bank as a constructive advocate for developing countries on GPG issues has been shown in its work on trade (IEG 2006a). Arguably, the Bank was somewhat slow to emphasize this strand of its work, but it was given prominence from 2001 onward, significantly later than other country-based components of the Bank's work

which had been growing since the late 1980s. But the Bank emerged as a leader in global trade work with high-profile reports ahead of major international trade reform meetings in Doha (2002) and Cancun (2004).¹

Furthermore, the Bank's advocacy role was useful in positioning the Bank among client countries, especially those with which it might otherwise be less engaged on trade issues. For instance, even though some Latin America countries had been skeptical with regard to the Bank's policy advice because of the perceived failure of the Washington Consensus (Rodrik 2006), the Bank has had an active country-level

engagement on trade. This illustrates an important connection—that the Bank may indeed have to be seen as a constructive advocate in the global arena if it is to open doors at the country level, to persuade and work with national partners to deliver on-the-ground action. It may well be that on other GPG priorities—for example, climate change—the Bank is not yet seen as such a high-profile advocate for developing countries, hence constraining its delivery capacity at the country level.

The advocacy role was not an unqualified success, and at least two drawbacks have appeared. Recently, the analytical basis and findings of some of the Bank's earlier work has been challenged, and indeed some recalibrations have been made. This, in itself, hardly undoes the impact of the Bank's advocacy but it illustrates the difficulty of putting in place analytical foundations that are deep and can stand the test of time. The second drawback relates to how advocacy is then followed through with practical action to build developing-country capacity. The most high-profile initiative in trade capacity-building work was the Bank's involvement in the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance—a multidonor, multiagency collaboration set up in 1997 to provide trade-related technical assistance to 49 less-developed countries. This global program instrument exhibited some weaknesses, however, including a slow pace of implementation, insufficient focus on improved trade outcomes, and a shortage of funds. The absence of a good results-based management framework also typifies a problem common to a good number of global programs.

What were the ingredients that contributed to the Bank's advocacy role in trade? Certainly a long gestation period of working on the ground and directly with partner countries (especially through the late 1980s and into the 1990s) on trade issues, gave the Bank a good understanding of, and motivation to promote, the impact of trade on development. This was a case in which the global-country link worked in both directions.

Beyond that, the assembly in-house of first-rate intellectual and analytical research capacity on trade was essential (Deaton and others 2006).²

This gave the platform for the Bank to produce detailed, innovative, and well-regarded reports that informed the ongoing debate in trade, most notably the benefits to be gained from a more free-market approach to the markets for agricultural products and other

The Complex Challenge of Environmental Commons and Climate Change

The Bank has long paid attention to the global dimension of the environmental commons—and more recently to climate change itself. Indeed, there are very specific examples in which the Bank has played a practical advocacy role to develop new approaches to what is a very complex challenge. When the GEF was being put

Key ingredients included a long period of working directly with partner countries, first-rate research capacity, and a willingness to engage in public debate.

The Bank's work also gained traction in the context of "live" negotiations for the Doha round of trade talks.

together, there was considerable debate among partners as to whether resources should be new or drawn from existing allocations to the Bank (and others). For its part, the Bank did play an advocacy role and is reported as holding the position that “it would participate only if additional funding was made available.” In the end, an agreement was reached in London in 1990 with “the World Bank, and specifically the president of the bank, clearly designated as the administrator and manager of the central function of the fund: financing projects and programs to meet the incremental costs of article 5 [that is, developing country] parties” (Benedick 1998).

The Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) emerged from advocacy work by the Bank and others, as explained in box 7.1. The main, universally recognized contribution of the PCF is that it gave credibility to the burgeoning field of carbon finance. The PCF is also respected by several

experts in the field because they assess the methodologies it has developed for ascertaining additionality to be relatively sound, especially as compared with other projects approved by the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism. Some 22 methodologies for measuring additionality developed in the PCF and Carbon Finance Unit of the Bank have been approved by the Clean Development Mechanism. But there is not unanimity on these issues, as shown in box 7.1.

Advocacy has also been very noticeable in the Bank's contribution to setting up new Climate Investment Funds. Emerging from preliminary high-level discussions at the Gleneagles Summit in 2005, the creation of these funds has been assisted by the Bank and other partners over the last three years. Now it is reported that a multibillion dollar pledge has been made by the governments of Japan, the United Kingdom, and the

On environmental commons, the Bank has played a positive advocacy role in some very practical settings.

Box 7.1: Advocacy for Carbon Finance: The Bank's Role in the Growth of a World Market

Since the 1990s, the Bank has supported proposals for carbon finance—an instrument to contain carbon dioxide and other harmful emissions by allowing a developed country government or company to meet some of its own environmental obligations by investing in projects in developing countries, to help reduce emissions there. The Bank's president promulgated the concept at the United Nations General Assembly in 1997 (World Bank 1997), and the Bank's advocacy bore fruit with the launch of the Prototype Carbon Fund in 2000, the world's first carbon fund. Since then, the PCF's catalytic effect has been an example of advocacy through demonstration, and has been one factor in the global carbon market's exponential growth, from \$38 million in 2002, to \$64,000 million in 2007.

Carbon finance is not without controversy, and critics have questioned the extent to which additionality occurs and if invested projects are truly sustainable. For example, two studies by outside observers conclude that “additionality is unlikely or questionable for up to 40 percent of registered projects” and that “left to market forces, the Clean Development Mechanism does not significantly contribute to sustainable development.” A forthcoming

detailed IEG examination of additionality in Bank-supported carbon projects should give a more accurate assessment.

The PCF's advocacy position was initially hampered around the issue of governance. The host developing countries had no voice in PCF governance. In response to this situation, the Bank, after the first year of PCF operation, created a Host Country Committee, which now covers all Bank-managed carbon funds. But the Host Country Committee remains strictly advisory and some members still complain that they have no contact with the funds' participants committees.^a Other members and Bank managers argue that some aspects of the operational structure cannot be fully inclusive because of the need to discuss confidential pricing information. Some Host Country Committee members would like to see in-country capacity-building efforts on a greater scale and impact than the \$21 million allocated to the Carbon Finance Assist program, housed in the World Bank Institute.

The new Carbon Partnership Facility, scheduled to become operational later in 2008, will need to carefully address these and other tensions.

a. The two committees meet at the same time but in different rooms. The current Chair of the PCF Participants Committee has never met the Chair of the Host Country Committee. Under the new Bank-supported Carbon Partnership Facility, expected to become operational in late 2008, host-country members are to have equal representation and voting rights with company members.

United States to kick-start this significant initiative. But as illustrated in box 7.2, there is substantial pressure on the Bank to mainstream climate-friendly approaches into all its development work.

The example of the Montreal Protocol (and indeed of the carbon finance business, which emerged from the incentives created by Kyoto Protocol commitments) illustrates an important point: the World Bank can play a strong role in the supply of GPGs, but primarily when supported by an appropriate treaty instrument. The Montreal Protocol is one of the most successful treaties in history. The Bank has contributed to its success, but the real credit belongs to the treaty itself and to the nature of this particular global challenge (Barrett, 2008). Similarly, the Bank's ability to contribute to the much harder problem of climate change will depend on the effectiveness of the treaty arrangement for this challenge.

our time. The Bank's analytical and research work has certainly been less prominent in this sphere than in the trade arena. While major publications such as the Stern report, and the advocacy of Nobel Prize winners, have been recognized worldwide, the Bank's materials have neither been as hard-hitting nor attracted the same level of attention. This may be because the Bank's need to balance different viewpoints among its shareholders has constrained its room to maneuver. It may reflect a less-than-strong skill set to produce the necessary leading research, as suggested in IEG's environment evaluation (2008a). Or perhaps at this stage of the cycle, the Bank is only now (appropriately) beginning to gear up on the advocacy front.

Whatever the mix of factors in the explanation, it is becoming ever more pressing for the Bank to approach the advocacy element of climate change (and its important dimension on development) more visibly and forcefully. The Bank president's public statements,⁴ and the opportunity opened by the new Strategic Framework for Climate Change, provide a platform upon which to build.

One important area in which the Bank's advocacy can be ramped up relates to the adapta-

The extent to which the Bank has been a leading influential advocate on climate change is more debatable. The extent to which the Bank has been a leading advocate to date on the broad issue of climate change is more debatable, particularly now that global climate change is considered by many as one of the greatest challenges of

Box 7.2: Clean and Dirty Energy—Can the Bank Do Both?

Some external commentators criticize the Bank Group, arguing that while it is doing the right thing in expanding its climate-friendly initiatives—through GEF projects, the creation of the Prototype Carbon Fund, and some analytical research—it is doing the wrong thing by continuing to finance large energy and infrastructure projects that emit carbon dioxide on a massive scale (Wheeler 2008).

Withdrawing from or reducing investments in traditional projects would be a major challenge. As recently as fiscal 2006, these energy investments accounted for 92 percent of the Bank's total energy portfolio, or nearly \$2 billion (World Bank 2007g). And there continues to be equally substantial pipeline demand. It is argued that these investments are meeting a real development need, and one cannot expect such a transformational "sea change" to occur

overnight (House of Commons 2008). Moreover, some critics argue the Bank has little incentive to scale down a line of business that, particularly in IBRD countries, provides a steady flow of profitable projects in the context of declining lending volumes (Redman 2008).

Can the seeming contradiction be reconciled? There are steps the Bank Group can take. One would be to include a shadow price for carbon emissions in project appraisals, and to set a timetable for its introduction as a key factor in decision making by, say, 2010. Another would be to start costing out and regularly reporting on the subsidy that would be required in any given year to help these energy and infrastructure projects become climate-friendly. This would provide the international community with better ongoing knowledge of the price tab for collective action, and how far it is being met.

tion to climate change. Adaptation is needed because of the failure (to date primarily by industrialized countries) to supply the GPG of climate change mitigation. IEG's evaluations have argued that the Bank could be strategic and effective with regard to reducing the vulnerability of countries and the poor to natural disasters and climate change (IEG 2008a). They also concluded that the Bank Group has not been able to provide financial resources to assist countries to address environmental concerns as high priorities. The emphasis in the IDA15 replenishment on the Bank's role in assisting eligible countries to adapt to climate change is a step forward in this regard.

The industrialized countries have acknowledged a responsibility to assist poor countries in adapting to climate change. What they have not determined is, first, a basis for calculating this assistance and, second, an arrangement for determining burden-sharing among the industrialized countries. The World Bank can help in calculating the level of financial support needed and then in implementing an adaptation assistance program. Indeed, the connection between adaptation and development is so intimate that the Bank is arguably the only global institution capable of playing this role.

Another angle on which advocacy could be enhanced relates to research and technology capability to produce climate-friendly solutions in many areas—including transport and energy production—suited for developing countries. Most attention has focused on the need for research and development (R&D) to be undertaken by the industrialized countries, with the technologies embodying this new knowledge being transferred to developing countries.⁵ However, technologies appropriate for industrialized countries may be less so for developing countries, given the different contexts. New technologies may be needed but currently this kind of R&D is seen to be somewhat neglected.

Developing countries need to be able to determine which technologies are necessary, whether the technologies available have to be

adapted to suit local circumstances, and how these technologies should be deployed and used. All of this requires a robust technical and scientific capability. This links to another of the Bank's strategic priorities—engaging with MICs, including Brazil, China, India, and Russia. This strategy is essential if the Bank is to play a meaningful role in helping the development transformation needed to mitigate climate change. Technology R&D is also needed for the world's poorest countries, but for reasons of scale, a policy that focuses exclusively on this latter group of countries would be unlikely to properly address the mitigation challenge.

Such an advocacy position is consistent with that put forward by the International Task Force on Global Public Goods (ITF 2006), an exercise led by respected developing country leaders, practitioners, and opinion makers. It recommended establishing an International Consultative Group on Clean Energy Research, "which includes both developed and developing countries, to collaborate and exchange information on research and development of more efficient and cleaner technologies." The recent report by the Global Leadership for Climate Action (GLCA 2007) endorses this idea. These proposals draw inspiration from the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)—a network to which the World Bank is tightly connected.

Climate change adaptation will also require innovation in other areas. A key area for future innovation might be called climate-resilient agriculture, a need which CGIAR has recognized. World Bank research has also begun to show the effects of climate change on agriculture.⁶

Creating a Unified Response: Learning from Avian Flu

The World Bank is seen by some partners to be playing an important role in the global response to threats emerging from avian flu and a potential human pandemic influenza. In terms of global

It is becoming ever more pressing for the Bank to advocate for development interests in climate change more visibly and forcefully.

Other opportunities for advocacy include promoting research and development tailored for the developing world.

The Bank has advocated for global action on avian flu.

action, the Bank identifies its comparative advantages as coordinating global responses and mobilizing finance, and thus far it has been quite an effective advocate along those dimensions.

The Bank's leadership role in coordinating a global response to avian and human influenza—beyond what is typically expected of a financial institution—has been seen as critical.⁷ Its early analysis of the global costs to the spread of avian influenza and the threat of a global pandemic (Brahmbhatt 2005) provided an umbrella under which the international technical agencies and the United Nations System Influenza Coordinator and donors could operate. This work identified the control of avian and human influenza as a GPG, noted its urgency, and helped bring global attention to the issue.

Given the urgency of this threat, the Bank helped quickly to convene major global partners around a strategy for action. Along with the World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, and World Organization for Animal Health, the Bank sponsored the first large-scale international meeting on the topic in Geneva in November 2005. The meeting was attended by more than 600 experts from over 100 countries, with substantial high-level government participation.

According to high-level participants, the Bank made several contributions at these meetings. First, it convinced international partners of the importance of integrated country plans that take into account animal health, human health, and pandemic preparedness. This was important because the Bank was the only sponsoring organization with a multisector perspective, without prejudice toward intervention in one sector over another. Second, the Bank argued that a global program should benefit developing countries, given that the response would have to be delivered on a country level and country-owned initiatives have proven to be most effective. Third, it helped to keep focus on developing the implementation arrangements for a global program

that could operate effectively, and an agreement of this type was reached during the run-up to and including the Geneva conference.

Close collaboration with other major international organizations, with each working to its comparative advantage, was essential in the response to avian flu. There have not been any major conflicts between the Bank and the relevant UN agencies on avian flu. Some counterparts have expressed concern in IEG interviews, however, that the Bank may have gone a bit beyond its comparative advantage (to arrange finance for the technical strategies of the World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, and World Organization for Animal Health) and taken a more wide-ranging role that considered technical agencies as inputs. Others have been critical that the international community's collaboration has a weak spot in underestimating the severe global economic costs—both direct and indirect—that are likely in the event of a pandemic (Osterholm 2007). Overall, this experience illustrates a wider point about the importance of collaboration among international agencies, also pertinent to the Bank's advocacy position on HIV/AIDS, as described in box 7.3.

The Bank also supported efforts to mobilize finance to address avian and human influenza, particularly with regard to the “nuts and bolts” aspects of the challenge. The Bank's research into the possible global economic impact of a pandemic influenza that might be the result of uncontrolled avian influenza, noted above, found that the ultimate costs to the world economy could be several percentage points of gross domestic product (Brahmbhatt 2005). More recent research has put the price tag at \$2 trillion, and economic (but not human) costs would be concentrated among the wealthy countries. This revealed to developed nations the potential costs of inaction. The Bank also estimated country-by-country financing needs to control avian influenza and delay or reduce the probability of a pandemic (World Bank 2006b). This created a baseline against which to measure pledges, commitments, and disbursements.

Important ingredients included the Bank's robust economic analysis, convening power, fiduciary reputation, and multisectoral expertise and orientation.

Box 7.3: Importance of Collaboration on Advocacy: HIV/AIDS

The Bank's work on HIV/AIDS stepped up considerably in the late 1990s after internal pressure from the health sector staff in Bank Regions and the Research Department, and externally from newly created international agencies such as UNAIDS. The Bank then proactively raised awareness and demand for HIV/AIDS support among its staff and client countries.

The collaboration with civil society also ultimately influenced HIV/AIDS advocacy within the Bank on other important global health issues. International NGOs worked

with developing country partners to spearhead a global campaign to make existing drugs for HIV/AIDS and other diseases affordable to the populations of developing countries. They lobbied for preferential pricing for drugs and drug donations to developing countries. They supported developing countries in the potential to exercise their rights under international trade and intellectual property rights agreements. While the Bank and World Health Organization were slow to take a position on these issues, they have come to support wider access to drugs (IEG 2004b).

Working with the European Commission and other partners, the Bank helped prompt donors to pledge \$1.8 billion (well above the \$1.2 billion target) at an early 2006 conference in Beijing. Since that time, there has not been an outbreak of a pandemic, media attention has receded, and the topic may be seen as less urgent. Although an additional \$900 million was pledged at later conferences in Bamako and New Delhi, the amount was below the financing needs identified on those occasions.

The Bank and United Nations System Influenza Coordinator have since worked closely to monitor commitments and disbursements of funds pledged at the three conferences, and to encourage donors to follow through on their commitments. Thus far, resources actually committed have not kept up with existing financing gaps (UNSIC and World Bank 2007). And while the international partners agreed that integrated country plans were the key platform from which to tackle avian flu—and would involve activities for which very significant resources would be needed—only 40 percent of committed funds have been allocated to these plans. Furthermore, as shown in figure 7.1, of those \$700 million of funds committed to country programs so far, less than half have been disbursed, a much lower share than for funds committed to international or regional banks.⁸ This has left a gap in the finances available in many poorer countries, particularly in Africa, to


tackle this global challenge. Perhaps this difficulty could have been ameliorated either with better coordination among donor partners or with a centralized funding mechanism dedicated to actions in developing countries.

Effective Advocacy Benefits from Voice and Representation

To be an effective advocate, the programs the Bank supports must be seen to be legitimate. But the voice of developing countries in GPG arenas—not least in the governance of many global programs—is still underrepresented, and the question remains as to whether the Bank could have pushed harder to rectify this imbalance. While the organizational and strategic settings of such global programs vary, they share the common feature that they need to promote the cooperation and collective action of their own members to be effective. This puts the emphasis squarely on how to promote the participation of developing countries, which are among the intended beneficiaries of global programs and without whose engagement the effectiveness of many such programs may not be assured (Woods, forthcoming).

Giving proper voice and representation in global programs improves their responsiveness and long-term sustainability.

There is not, however, a single best-practice governance framework for global programs because they differ markedly in size and scope and employ a diverse array of governance

Figure 7.1: Less Than Half of Funds Committed to Integrated Country Plans Have Been Disbursed

Source: UNSIC and World Bank 2007.

Note: Approximately \$650 million of pledged funds have yet to be committed to specific countries, projects, or programs.

models associated with the history and culture of each program (see box 7.4 for an example). IEG has emphasized the need for a global program “to establish legitimacy on a basis other than shareholder rights,” pointing to the value of adopting an inclusive and participatory governance framework (IEG 2007b). It can take considerable time and effort by partners and the Bank to develop good governance arrangements at the start-up of a global or regional program—but this is time well spent.

The evidence from important programs bears this out. In the case of the regional programs for Central Asia biodiversity and for the West Africa HIV/AIDS project, it took about two years to reach agreements among the participants on the appropriate institutional

and governance structure. But that was time the stakeholders considered a good investment, in light of the inclusiveness of the governance arrangements on which they were able to agree (IEG 2007c). It paid off because the structures were able to help resolve ongoing differences and sustain the buy-in of participants. And a far bigger global program—the GEF—took a considerable degree of institutional experimentation to achieve a governance framework that is currently regarded by many as participatory and inclusive, as noted in box 7.4.

Nonetheless, there is often a tension—actual or perceived—between organizational efficiency (which may be fostered by streamlined governance arrangements) and voice. While in many programs, developing countries are represented in the governing bodies, “stake-

Governance arrangements in several programs—including the GEF and CGIAR—have improved over time.

Box 7.4: Governance as Institutional Experimentation: GEF

The GEF began as a pilot program in 1991, with 16 OECD members and 9 developing countries pledging resources and representing the sole form of governance. Subsequently, the move from a pilot to a more established program resulted in a governance structure that melds those of the United Nations and the World Bank. Governance is based on a constituency system that allows for “a relatively small and effective Board,” instead of the “one-country, one-seat, and one-vote system in the United Nations General Assembly,” while maintaining the potential for universal representation (Woods and Lombardi 2006).

The more balanced representation of developing countries—through 18 of the 32 constituencies—is enhanced by the double-majority voting rule. When decisions are not supported by a consensus, they must garner the formal votes of at least a 60 per-

cent majority of the total number of participants in the GEF, as well as of a majority representing 60 percent of total contributions to the facility. Another feature supporting a greater sense of ownership of developing countries over the GEF is that the council cochairperson—in addition to the permanent cochairperson position provided by the chief executive—rotates between developed and developing countries.

The GEF governance also provides an institutionalized setting for engaging NGOs—a crucial factor in enhancing country-level coordination and country ownership. Participation by NGOs, both local and international, does not only take place at the project level but also at the policy-making level. GEF provides observer status for NGOs at council meetings and holds consultations with them in conjunction with each council meeting.

holder and shareholder influence is not always balanced,” and “donors and international agencies still largely govern the programs” (IEG 2004b). In some cases, the increase in representation in the main governing body has created problems of organizational efficiency. But governance arrangements need not be static, and the changes in the CGIAR (highlighted in box 7.5) illustrate how adjustments and compromises can be made. Likewise, the Association for the Development of Education in Africa has recently decided to establish an executive committee and Cities Alliance has transformed

its former steering committee into an executive body (IEG 2008b).

The emphasis in the current debate on fostering public goods raises the issue of the extent to which MICs are appropriately engaged in the governance of relevant global programs. The Bank itself has indicated that “a promising aspect of its relationship with MICs lies in its role in making connections between these partner countries and the provision of global public goods” (World Bank 2006a). Yet insufficient voice in global program governance is still a concern

Box 7.5: From Shareholder to Stakeholder Model: CGIAR

CGIAR, founded in 1971 and jointly sponsored by the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Fund for Agricultural Development, and United Nations Development Programme, has grown from an informal small club of donors with a shared concern for agricultural research into a partnership that now includes 25 developing and 22 industrialized countries, 4 private foundations, 13 regional and international organizations, which provide financing, technical, and strategic support to a network of 15 research centers, mostly located in developing countries.

The expansion of the membership, the widening of the research agenda, and the collective-action problems arising from the grow-

ing number of centers and donors, led CGIAR to establish an executive council, with the aim of simplifying the network's decision making. Following the recommendations of the Change Design and Management Team, in 2001, the council was set up as a stakeholder body appointed by CGIAR members to follow up on the group's decisions, to ensure alignment and congruence of recommendations, and to act on decisions requiring a more urgent time frame than the schedule of the group's Annual General Meeting would allow.

The establishment of the council, with formally elected members accountable to the particular groups they represent, was needed to increase the legitimacy as well as the efficiency of CGIAR.

for MICs, inhibiting their enthusiasm for and engagement in such programs (IEG 2007a). Even the larger MICs are represented in the decision-making bodies of only a small fraction of global programs, while, in contrast, several high-income countries are included in the governance of a much larger number.

countries, resulting in greater effectiveness for the overall program. This reinforces the Bank Development Committee's own underscoring of "the importance of enhancing voice and participation [in the Bank] for all developing and transition countries" through an "inclusive and consultative" process among shareholders.¹⁰

Governance arrangements for global programs can change over time. The governance arrangements for any specific global program—and how its advocacy position then emerges over time—are the results of many influences. The Bank is but one of those influences and hence responsibility for success or failure cannot rest solely—or perhaps even primarily—at its door. Indeed, the Bank's position is complex, and in a program it can play up to 11 different roles including that of convener and trust-fund manager.⁹ But that multiplicity of roles creates tensions and, indeed, potential for conflicts of interest (such as that between being a funder and a beneficiary), which must be carefully managed.

Moving forward, the growing involvement of the Bank in the provision of GPGs is associated with its own governance framework. Good governance is essential to help the Bank shape its broader strategy for GPGs, define and be selective in its own role in global programs, manage potential or actual conflicts of interests arising from the various global programs, and enhance its role as an advocate for developing-country needs. Alternatively, there is a risk that "strategies will be hard to define, legitimacy will suffer, and implementation will lag" (ITF 2006).

The experience of some global programs is quite encouraging in certain respects. Once all the stakeholders acknowledged the dynamic nature of a program's governance, they embarked on a reform process through which considerable changes have been introduced to the governance framework. Far from impairing the overall effectiveness of the program itself, this has prompted wider engagement of developing

New Dimensions of Advocacy: Innovation through Financial Capabilities

The creativity and innovation of the Bank has been displayed in its work to leverage funds for innovative approaches to development, especially applied to GPG challenges. The International Financing Facility for Vaccines and Immunization (IFFIm) provides an example. IFFIm sought to find a way for the international community to increase resources for life-saving vaccines and health services in developing countries. Its solution is to borrow from the international capital markets, based on donors' firm medium-term commitments, and then delivering that finance quickly and predictably through the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization.

The Bank can hardly be said to have played an explicit, traditional advocacy role in proposing and developing the concept of IFFIm. Rather, the original idea was formulated in a proposal by the United Kingdom's government, with the support of other interested parties, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. But the Bank has played an important role in using its financial capabilities and reputation in moving this advocacy to action. Specifically, at the request of IFFIm, the Bank has a range of treasury management and related services, which has gotten IFFIm off the ground. The Bank, in effect, acted as the start-up treasurer for this global initiative, and deployed creative approaches with prudent fiduciary standards in the international capital markets. It raised nearly US\$1 billion through a bond issue in November 2006, almost all the proceeds of which Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization scheduled to spend on immunization and health programs in poor countries through 2007. The initiative is still young and it will be important to assess the extent to

The Bank's financial robustness and reputation can be put to good use through innovative financial instruments that help move advocacy to action.

which IFFIm delivers additional financing over the long run.

Another innovative approach is the advanced market commitment for vaccines, also aimed at tackling communicable diseases on a global scale. Again, it would not appear that the Bank was a prime mover in the genesis of the proposal, and hence the potential for it to play a first-mover advocacy role was not captured. But the Bank's

technical expertise and reputation for financial soundness has been called upon by partners to move this advocacy to action. The Bank has contributed to an international advisory group and independent expert committee that has worked on the technical and structural options for a pilot advance market commitment, and proposed that such a commitment target pneumococcal disease as the first problem and conduct subsequent work on malaria.