

Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza: The Value of Collective Action

By

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Presentation by two of the authors, Maureen Cropper and Stephen Hutton, on international cooperation to mitigate a pandemic:

- 1) Is it cost-effective for wealthy nations to pay for the purchase and distribution of antivirals (or vaccines) in the outbreak source country or other poor countries so as to slow the spread of the pandemic?
- 2) What global allocation rules are most effective in reducing the number of cases and in reducing the aggregate economic impact?

In the case where treatment with antiviral drugs alone can be used to contain a potential pandemic, there is an obvious case for wealthy nations to pay for pandemic containment. But what about the case where a pandemic cannot be detected early enough or treatment is not effective enough for containment to be possible? Pandemic epidemiology involves two types of externalities that suggest that it might be in the self-interest of wealthy countries to fund such a scheme. They found that there are benefits to rich countries from donating antivirals to poor countries. These benefits are modest, but real.

Comments on the presentation by Dr. Daniel Miller is titled “Learning from the 2009 H1NI Pandemic Response.” Comments included noting the difficulties of modelling influenza since the virus is highly unstable and our understanding is limited. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic showed that there is poor surveillance; this area is among those which are excellent candidates for more investments since early interventions have a high pay-off. Prevention would have far greater benefits for health and for reducing pandemic impact than mitigation through use of antivirals.

Presentations:

- [*Policy Response to Pandemic Influenza: The Value of Collective Action*](#)
- [*Learning from 2009 H1Ni Pandemic Response*](#)