

Migration Patterns and Policies in Africa

Africa is known for its long history of migration within and beyond the vast continent. The number of people of African descent that live outside the continent is estimated at almost 140 million, most of them in the Western Hemisphere (Shinn 2008). Many of these people are not emigrants but members of families that have lived in destination countries for many generations and may have few ties to Africa. By contrast, migrants that left their country in recent decades—conservatively estimated to number more than 30 million—have been able to keep in close contact with their relatives and maintain economic, social, and political relationships with their country of origin, mainly thanks to globalization and improvements in communications technology.

This chapter presents a broad description of international migration from Africa, based on studies, cross-country data, and household surveys.¹ It focuses on differences in migration rates between Africa and other regions as well as on migration within regions and countries in Africa; the choice of destination country by African emigrants; the potential for increasing migration from Africa in the coming years; and the socioeconomic characteristics of migrants and migrant households. The analysis is based on official data, which likely underestimate actual migration flows, particularly within Africa. Several conclusions emerge from this analysis:

- The majority of international migrants from Africa (particularly from the poorer countries) go to other African countries, as most potential emigrants lack both the financial resources to travel to distant continents and the education and skills required to succeed in rich countries' labor markets. In contrast, 90 percent of North African emigrants go to destinations outside of Africa, predominantly Europe, the Middle East, and North America.

- African migration has been heavily influenced by the continent's history of conflict, coups, insurgencies, dictatorships, war, and natural disasters. Past emigration to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries appears to facilitate current emigration through network effects.
- Colonial ties continue to exert an influence on the choice of destination countries, with half of African countries reporting that the most common destination for emigrants is the former colonizer.
- Recent household surveys of a few countries (Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal) provide some tentative information on the profile of African emigrants. Migrants from these countries tend to be young, relatively well educated, and predominantly male. The probability of a household having a member abroad is positively related to family size, education, and wealth. The majority of migrants from the households surveyed left their country to obtain employment. Migration tends to have a dramatic impact on the labor market status of migrants, often reflecting a shift from self-employment to wage employment. The rate of return migration from households in these surveys is relatively low (less than 10 percent of total emigrants in Nigeria and Senegal).
- Large differences in potential earnings, the aging of populations in high-income countries, the rapid increase in working-age cohorts in Africa (and the decline of such cohorts in Europe and North America),² and the importance of network effects will continue to boost pressures for emigration from Africa to high-income countries. Whether these increases in the demand for and supply of migrants result in more migration will depend, in part, on policy decisions. The willingness of high-income countries to accept migrants, and their ability to effectively control their borders, will be tested in the years to come. Potential migrants will need to obtain the skills required to make them competitive in high-income labor markets: poor African laborers who lack education and language skills have little ability to secure jobs in Europe or the United States. Migration decisions will also be affected by the ability of African governments to establish the framework required for rapid development and income-earning opportunities. Migration can provide enormous welfare benefits to developing countries, but ultimately development should reduce the need for migration.
- African governments face major challenges in managing migration. Governments could help protect migrants by improving regulation of intermediaries, strengthening legal safeguards against trafficking, and providing information on the potential dangers involved in illegal bor-

der crossings and exploitative practices by destination country officials and employers. Undocumented migration is accepted in many areas—particularly where migrants come from contiguous areas of neighboring countries and have ethnic ties to people in their new country—but can be a source of considerable social tension. Coping with undocumented migration is a daunting challenge in both rich and poor countries. At a minimum, governments should prevent violent or exploitative practices such as mass expulsions or tolerance of corrupt officials who prey on undocumented immigrants. International cooperation can support better management of migration through well-regulated temporary migration programs, which need to be carefully supervised to avoid the exploitation of migrants. The substantial resources required to effectively supervise such programs means that they can cover only a very small proportion of potential emigrants.

The chapter is organized as follows. The first section documents migration trends from and within Africa. The second section looks at immigration to Africa. The third section examines cross-country migration patterns. The fourth section identifies the socioeconomic characteristics of migrants from Africa. The last section suggests what countries can do to manage migration.

MIGRATION FROM AND WITHIN AFRICA

Emigration from Africa has increased substantially over the past several decades (see Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990 for an early survey and World Bank 2011 for recent data). Nevertheless, the migration rate (the ratio of emigrants to the total population of the country of origin) remains low on average, albeit with marked variation across countries (table 1.1).

According to the World Bank's bilateral migration matrix data, in 2010 about 30.6 million African people (3 percent of the world's population) were living in countries other than the one in which they were born. However, official data on migration in Africa significantly understate the actual movement of people (box 1.1). The actual number of African emigrants is likely to be significantly larger.

At the country level, France stands out as the leading destination for emigrants from Africa (9 percent of total emigrants), followed by Côte d'Ivoire (8 percent), South Africa (6 percent), Saudi Arabia (5 percent), and the United States and United Kingdom (4 percent each) (figure 1.1). In most OECD countries, the share of African emigrants is less than 3 percent. Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia account

Table 1.1 Emigrants as Percentage of the Population in Selected World Regions, 2010

Region	Emigrant stock (millions)	Population (millions)	Emigrants/population (percent)
Africa	30.6	1,032	3.0
North Africa	8.7	170	5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	21.9	862	2.5
East Asia and Pacific	21.7	1,974	1.1
Europe and Central Asia	43.0	404	10.7
Latin America	30.2	581	5.2
South Asia	26.7	1,644	1.6
World	215.8	6,909	3.1

Source: World Bank 2011.

Note: Figures include intraregional migration.

Box 1.1 Problems with Data on African Migration

Data on migration in Africa are often missing, out of date, or inconsistent with definitions used in other countries. Intraregional migration flows are often informal and not captured in official statistics. Data on seasonal and transit migration remain a big challenge. The recording of refugee flows by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is more accurate and timely.


Although 49 of Africa's 54 countries provide data from a national census on immigrants by source country, the data on intra-African migration suffer from significant gaps. Only 15 African countries have data for the period after 2000, 24 countries have data for the 1990s but not later, and 10 countries have no data even for the 1990s. Coverage varies across subregions. Data for the 1990s are available for all southern African countries, three-quarters of East and West African countries, and half of Central and North African countries. Central Africa has the weakest data, with no country providing data after 2000. Throughout Africa many countries report migrants only from the major source countries.

Data on emigration from Africa to high-income countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are of significantly better quality and are more current than data on intra-African migration. Immigration data from the OECD national censuses conducted in 2000 were augmented by labor force and population surveys in 2005–07.

The migration data for all destination countries were used to construct a bilateral matrix of migration stocks for 2010 (Ratha and Shaw 2007; World Bank 2011). The migrant stocks for each destination country—and a breakdown by source country—were scaled to the UN Population Division's latest estimates of immigrant stocks in each destination country for 2010.

The reliance on infrequent census data particularly impairs knowledge of migration flows in countries affected by significant economic or political shocks. Côte d'Ivoire, for example, a major destination for migrants from neighboring countries, may have become less attractive after the 2002–04 civil war. Similarly, the latest South African census does not fully capture the surge in immigrants from Zimbabwe since that country's economic crisis began almost a decade ago. Overall, migration data in Africa, especially on intra-African migration, require substantial improvement in availability, timeliness, quality, and cross-country comparability.

Figure 1.1 Major Destination Countries for Emigrants from Africa, 2010
(share of African emigrants)




Source: Authors, based on data in World Bank 2011.

for only about 37 percent of total African migrants (65 percent if intra-African migration is excluded).

Many African countries have experienced sharp changes in net migration rates (the difference between immigration and emigration as a share of origin country population) since the late 1970s, reflecting the tumultuous events in the continent's history during this period.³ In part, these wide variations in net migration rates were caused by civil and external conflicts. For example, net migration rates have been particularly volatile in Eritrea, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (see annex table 1A.1).⁴ For Africa as a whole, however, net migration rates have been stable over time, ranging from -0.4 percent to -0.6 percent across five-year periods from 1975 to 2010. As a large percentage of African migration is within the continent, the cross-country average tends to be close to zero. Patterns since 2006 indicate some decline in the average net migration as well as its variability across countries.

The rate of emigration varies significantly across countries. Some of the smaller countries (for example, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mali, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Seychelles) have gross emigration rates that exceed 10 percent (figure 1.2). This high level of emigration partly reflects limited livelihood opportunities and a high variability of income

Figure 1.2 Rate of Migration, by Country, 2010

Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011.

Note: Figures show stock of emigrants divided by population.

as a result of dependence on primary commodities (Docquier and Schiff 2009). Several countries suffering civil disorder also have high emigration rates. For example, after more than three decades of war, Eritrean emigrants represent almost 20 percent of the country's population.

A marked feature of the movement of people across the globe is that at least half of it takes place within the same continent (except for emigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, most of whom go to North America, and for East Asia and Pacific) (table 1.2).⁵ The intra-Africa emigration rate is about 50 percent, which is similar to intraregional rates for developing countries in Europe and Central Asia (59 percent) and the Middle East (45 percent).

There is a significant difference between Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa in this regard. Intraregional emigration in Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for almost 65 percent of total emigrants, the largest intracontinental or South-South movement of people in the world. In contrast, more than 90 percent of emigrants from North Africa head to countries outside Africa (table 1.3). Intra-African emigration is driven largely by a search for job opportunities in neighboring countries. It is also driven by the complexities of historical state formation—colonial borders often overlooked linguistic and ethnic commonalities—as well as by waves of internal and cross-border conflicts (box 1.2).

Table 1.2 Origin and Destination of Emigrants, by World Region, 2010
(percent of total emigration)

Source region	Destination region						High-income countries
	Africa	East Asia and Pacific	Europe and Central Asia	Latin America and the Caribbean	Middle East	South Asia	
Africa	50	0	0	0	4	0	46
East Asia and Pacific	0	15	0	0	1	0	83
Europe and Central Asia	0	0	59	0	0	0	41
Latin America and the Caribbean	0	0	0	13	0	0	87
Middle East	2	0	1	1	45	0	51
South Asia	0	2	0	0	8	30	61
High-income countries	1	1	3	5	2	0	87

Source: World Bank 2011; Ratha and Shaw 2007.

Note: Rows may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding errors.

The bulk of intra-African emigration has occurred across neighboring countries. In West Africa, more than 70 percent of emigration took place within the same subregion; in southern Africa 66 percent of emigration was intra-African, reflecting the strong pull of South Africa (see table 1.3).

The predominance of cross-border emigration reflects common linguistic and historical roots. For example, a large number of emigrants from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia are found in the same region because of strong ethnic, religious, and linguistic ties along the

Table 1.3 Migration within and outside Africa (percent of all emigrants)

Origin subregion	Destination subregion					
	Central Africa	East Africa	North Africa	Southern Africa	West Africa	Out of Africa
All Africa	3	13	2	11	21	50
Central Africa	23	26	0	9	3	39
East Africa	1	52	3	3	0	41
North Africa	0	0	6	0	0	93
Southern Africa	0	7	0	66	0	28
West Africa	5	0	0	0	71	24
Other regions	0	0	0	0	0	100


Source: World Bank 2011.

Note: Includes only identified sources and destinations. Rows may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding errors.

Box 1.2 Forced Migration in Africa

Nearly 2.2 million Africans living in countries other than the ones in which they were born are recognized as refugees, displaced mainly by war or drought and other natural disasters (UNHCR 2010). About half of these refugees are in Kenya, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan (box figure 1.2.1). The main sources of international refugees are Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Eritrea (box figure 1.2.2). Another 6.5 million people are considered internally displaced persons, who were forced to move within African countries.


Box figure 1.2.1 Cross-Border Refugees in Selected African Countries, End 2009



Source: UNHCR 2010.

The number of refugees has declined sharply from the late 1990s, when their numbers reached about 5 million and 1 out of every 5 Africa migrants was a refugee (Hatton and Williamson 2003; Lucas 2006). The decline reflects the lower frequency of coups, guerilla insurgency, government collapse, and civil war.

Refugees can impose a substantial burden on host countries by requiring additional public expenditures, putting pressures on infrastructure, and contributing to environmental degradation (Puerto Gomez and Christensen 2010). For example, the presence of Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees was perceived by their Sudanese hosts to pose an enormous strain on the fragile Sudanese economy (Ek and Karadawi 1991). A large influx of refugees can lead to the transformation of forest and rural land into camps and settlements, and displaced people may resort to unsustainable activities in absence of other means of survival (Hugo 2008). The social and economic impact of a protracted refugee presence can be addressed by targeting development assistance to affected areas, as in the Zambia Initiative, which used community development projects to cope with the impact of more than 100,000 Angolan refugees (Puerto Gomez and Christensen 2010).


Box 1.2 Forced Migration in Africa (*continued*)**Box figure 1.2.2** Cross-Border Refugees from Selected African Countries, End 2009

Source: UNHCR 2010.

vast borders these countries share. Kenya is a common destination for emigrants from Tanzania and Uganda. Sudan is a principal destination of emigrants from Chad, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. Emigrants from Burundi and Rwanda often speak the same language as or share historical ties with natives of Tanzania and Uganda. Côte d'Ivoire is a melting pot for neighboring countries, as most migrants are able to communicate with people in the surrounding countries and share religious and historic bonds. Emigrants from Benin, Ghana, and Niger head to Nigeria for similar reasons. In southern Africa, migrants from Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland can blend into communities in South Africa, making mobility and settlement comparatively easy.

Intra-African migration flows are affected by income differences, as the large immigration to the relatively prosperous South Africa suggests. There are, however, exceptions. Tanzania, for example, is the most common destination for emigrants from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Zambia, despite the fact that the difference in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is negligible or favors the source country (figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3 Major Migration Corridors in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2010



Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011.

More than 90 percent of emigrants from North Africa end up outside Africa (see table 1.3). In contrast, only 41 percent of emigrants from East Africa, 24 percent from West Africa, 39 percent from Central Africa, and 28 percent from Southern Africa end up outside Africa. These figures suggest that people from North Africa, and to some extent East Africa, have better access to opportunities in OECD and Middle Eastern countries than do people in other parts of Africa.

Demographic changes (coupled with network effects) may further boost emigration from Africa to OECD countries in coming years. The working-age population is set to decline between 2005 and 2050 in Europe and the United States and to increase sharply (doubling the labor

Table 1.4 Projected Changes in the Size of the Working-Age Population in Selected World Regions, 2005–50 (*millions*)

Age group	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East and North Africa	South Asia	East Asia and Pacific	Eastern Europe and Central Asia	European Union and other Europe	North America
15–24	163	10	27	–78	–26	–18	–7
25–39	262	53	178	–65	–14	–37	–6
40–64	274	124	450	215	15	–33	1
Total working age (15–64)	699	187	655	72	–26	–88	–12
Total population	951	270	863	321	–7	–57	22

Source: Koettl 2010.

force) in Sub-Saharan Africa (table 1.4). Although the impact of a declining population on labor demand in industrial countries is uncertain, the aging of their populations will increase the demand for personal and healthcare services. At the same time, the growth of employment in Africa may not be strong enough to absorb all of the new entrants to the labor force. Thus both the demand for and supply of migrants are likely to rise in the future. Even if Africa achieves rapid growth, the income gap with industrial countries will remain a substantial incentive to migrate for the foreseeable future.


IMMIGRATION TO AFRICA

Immigration to Africa by people born outside Africa was estimated at about 618,000 in 2010, about 4 percent of total immigration in the continent, with the rest accounted for by migrants from within the region. The most common destinations for immigrants from Africa are Côte d'Ivoire (16 percent), South Africa (12 percent), and Burkina Faso (6 percent) (figure 1.4). South Africa and the Arab Republic of Egypt lead in the number of immigrants from outside Africa. Both have large communities of migrants from Australia, Lebanon, the Philippines, the West Bank, and Yemen.

UNDERSTANDING CROSS-COUNTRY MIGRATION PATTERNS


Differences in the ability to migrate account for a significant part of the variation in intra-African migration rates.⁶ Emigrants from poorer countries tend to remain in Africa, often in neighboring countries. Figure 1.5 compares per capita income with the share of a country's emigrants that go to other African countries. A 10 percent difference in per capita GDP

Figure 1.4 Rate of Immigration to African Countries, 2010



Source: Computations based on World Bank 2011.
 Note: Figures show stock of immigrants divided by population.

Figure 1.5 Relationship between Intra-African Migration and per Capita GDP, 2006




Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2008, 2009.

is associated with a 1 percentage point difference in the proportion of emigrants staying in Africa.⁷ Emigrants from middle-income countries disproportionately tend to migrate to destinations outside of Africa; African emigration rates to the OECD countries are strongly correlated with per capita GDP (figure 1.6). Emigrants from middle-income countries are more likely to have the resources to pay for transport to and resettlement expenses in the OECD countries, and they are more likely to have the education and other skills required to find jobs there.

Many African countries maintain close economic, political, and cultural ties with their former colonial rulers. France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom in particular cultivated special relationships with their former colonies in Africa that included opportunities for travel, study, and business. Language is also an important link: it is easier for migrants from francophone areas to travel to France and Belgium and those from anglophone areas to travel to the United Kingdom.


Colonial ties continue to play a role in influencing the choice of the destination country. The vertical axis of figure 1.7 plots the share of a country's emigrants to former colonizers; the horizontal axis measures the share of a country's emigrants to the most common destination. If the most common destination is the former colonizer, then the value for the x and y axes would be equal (the point would lie on the 45-degree line

Figure 1.6 Relationship between Emigration Rates to OECD Countries and Log per Capita GDP in Africa, 1990–2000



Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2008, 2009.

Figure 1.7 Relationship between Colonial Links and Emigration Patterns in Africa



Source: Authors, based on data from World Bank 2011.

from the origin). The large number of observations below the 45-degree line implies that the former colonizer is sometimes, but not always, the most favored destination. Although the trend line shows a limited relationship between former colonial power and the most common destination country for emigrants, a significant share of emigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa remain within the region. (The colonial tie would have a stronger impact on choice of destination if only emigration outside of Africa were considered.)

This relationship does not appear to have changed greatly over time: a study conducted in 1990 (Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990) also found that trans-African emigrants tended to migrate to former colonizers. The fact that the choice of destination country has not changed partly reflects immigrants’ ability to assist aspiring emigrants from origin countries (Hatton and Williamson 2009). Immigrants help new immigrants by financing trips, facilitating legal entry through family reunification programs, and providing information and other assistance that reduce the burden of resettlement.

SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS FROM AFRICA

Understanding the determinants of migration in Africa is difficult because of the lack of descriptive information on migrants and their households in

the origin country. Some detailed evidence on the determinants of internal migration in Africa is available, but there is little information on international migration.⁸ It is only recently that household surveys have begun to capture characteristics of households that have a member living in another country. This section presents results from the 2005/06 Living Standard Measurement Survey for Ghana and more recent surveys of Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Senegal completed for the Africa Migration Project.

Analysis of these household survey data shows that migrants from the countries surveyed tend to be young, predominantly male adults with some education beyond primary schooling (table 1.5). The sex, age, and educational composition of migrants vary by destination. Not surprisingly, migrants to OECD countries tend to be older and better educated, and more than 70 percent are men. There are some differences in the motive for migration among the countries covered in the survey. Employment is the predominant reason for emigration from Burkina Faso, whereas education and family reunion are cited as the reason for emigration by almost half of households interviewed in Nigeria and Senegal.

Table 1.5 Characteristics of Migrants from Selected African Countries (*percent*)

Characteristic/ destination	Burkina Faso	Ghana	Nigeria	Senegal
Age (middle 50 percent)				
Migrants in OECD countries	35	37	33	38
Intra-African migrants	32	35	28	35
Internal migrants	32	35	27	32
Gender (percent male)				
Migrants in OECD countries	79	70	72	80
Intra-African migrants	90	63	75	86
Internal migrants	82	62	62	75
Education (percent with given level of education)				
Migrants in OECD countries	52 secondary	61 secondary	45 tertiary	44 tertiary
Intra-African migrants	65 primary	45 secondary	38 secondary	48 primary
Internal migrants	45 secondary	54 secondary	49 secondary	35 primary
Reason for emigration				
Employment	78	..	48	48
Education	8	..	29	29
Family	10	..	20	20
Others	4	..	4	3

Source: Authors, based on data from Plaza, Navarette, and Ratha 2011.

Note: .. = negligible; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Both the Living Standard Measurement Survey of Ghana and the surveys of Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Nigeria conducted for the Africa Migration Project find that larger household size increases the probability that a household member emigrates and remains abroad. This relationship may simply reflect the fact that among a larger number of household members, it is more likely that someone had the desire and ability to migrate. It is also consistent with the view that, often, migration is a decision made by households to diversify their income sources in a risky environment in which insurance is unavailable or unaffordable (larger households have greater opportunities for diversification) (Hoddinott 1994). The likelihood that a household has sent a migrant abroad is also correlated with the average age in the family, a reflection of life-cycle effects. This effect is captured clearly in the case of Nigeria and Senegal, where both internal and external migrants come from older families.

In Ghana, the higher the education of the head of household (and that of the parents of the head of household), the higher the probability that a household member has emigrated. The marginal increase in the probability of sending a migrant is about 8 percent for each additional year of schooling of the head of household. This effect is dampened for households with relatively high wage rates. One way to explain the correlation between education and migration is that a higher level of education makes it easier to gather and process the information necessary for international migration. This trend is observed in Nigeria, where the probability of migration increases with education—up to a point. This effect is not seen in Burkina Faso, where obtaining an education was a more important reason for internal than international migration. This result reflects the fact that data were collected in predominantly rural areas, where secondary schooling may not have been available. Richer families in Burkina Faso are more likely to have a member abroad, but the effect may result from higher incomes from remittances. Income levels are not related to internal migration.

In Ghana, families that earn higher pay have a lower probability of having a member abroad. Controlling for the level of education attained and employment status, however, the level of earnings is not significantly related to the probability of migration. Some areas of Ghana (Greater Accra, Ashanti) have substantially higher international migration rates than others, which may reflect the importance of network effects in facilitating migration.

The survey data also provide information on the dramatic labor market effects of migration. In Burkina Faso and Nigeria, migration allowed a shift from self-employment, often in farming, to wage employment.

Migration appears to have differing implications for women's labor market status in these countries. In Burkina Faso and Nigeria, the share of housewives is higher in the sample after migration; in Senegal migration appears to have helped some women change their status from housewife to some form of employment (table 1.6). In Senegal, the shift in labor market status is significant for students, many of whom were able to find wage employment after migrating (table 1.7).

The Burkina Faso survey shows a significant change in labor market status following migration. Nearly all migrants were farmers in their original place of residence, which is not surprising given that the survey was administered predominantly in rural areas. Migration frequently resulted in changes in occupation. After internal migration, which was often from rural to urban areas, only one-third of internal migrants remained farmers (about half of international migrants continued as farmers). Although

Table 1.6 Occupation of Individuals from Burkina Faso before and after Migrating, 2009

Occupation	Before migration		After migration	
	Internal	International	Internal	International
Farmer	85.7	91.6	36.4	58.8
Trader	4.5	2.4	20.9	6.8
Professionals (managers)	4.1	2.1	16.0	23.0
Semiskilled workers	2.5	1.6	6.1	1.3
Unstable occupations	2.1	1.8	10.6	5.8
Other	1.1	0.5	10.0	4.3

Source: Authors, based on data from Plaza, Navarette, and Ratha 2011.

Table 1.7 Labor Market Status of Individuals from Selected African Countries before and after Migrating, 2009 (percent)

Labor market status	Burkina Faso		Nigeria		Senegal	
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After
Self-employed	80.3	64.1	15.7	25.6	42.2	42.7
Student	10.2	5.4	42.5	23.2	20.6	7.6
Housewife	2.9	5.1	1.3	4.9	9.4	7.6
Full-time wage earner	2.5	8.8	13.9	33.5	9.0	24.3
Part-time wage earner	1.5	12.2	2.7	4.1	3.3	4.2
Unemployed	1.9	1.5	22.0	4.3	8.9	3.4
Other	1.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	7.0	10.0

Source: Authors, based on data from Plaza, Navarette, and Ratha 2011.

Table 1.8 Return Migration in Selected African Countries (percent)

Item	Burkina Faso	Nigeria	Senegal
Returnees as a share of migrants	25	3	9
<i>of which:</i>			
Returned in less than 4 years	67	69	32
Returned in 5–15 years	16	23	2
Returned after more than 15 years	16	8	66

Source: Authors, based on data from Plaza, Navarette, and Ratha 2011.

many internal migrants became traders and some even mid-level managers, others ended up in unstable or casual employment.

The survey data show low rates of return migration: the share of emigrants who returned was only 3 percent in Nigeria, 9 percent in Senegal, and 25 percent in Burkina Faso (table 1.8). The majority of those who did return in Burkina Faso and Nigeria came back in less than four years. In contrast, in Senegal two-thirds of returnees had spent 15 or more years abroad.⁹

MANAGING MIGRATION

African governments have done little to increase the benefits of migration or reduce the risks migrants face. The potential economic benefits of migration are impaired by the lack of support for migrants in key markets and insufficient flows of information. Migration also has important social implications for African societies that cannot be evaluated purely in economic terms (box 1.3). Subsequent chapters discuss key policy areas where governments can make a difference—remittances, high-skilled migration, and diaspora resources. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the principal challenges African governments face in protecting migrants, managing immigration within Africa, and encouraging greater legal migration to high-income countries.

EXPLOITATION

Migrants may be subject to exploitation by intermediaries and employers. They may suffer physical deprivation during illegal border crossings and be vulnerable to traffickers. The common practice of migration by children and the phenomenon of “child fostering” in West Africa (where children leave home for a period of years) increases the vulnerability of children to traffickers and makes it difficult to identify the victims

Box 1.3 The Social Costs and Benefits of Migration

Migration in Africa has important effects on social issues that cannot be evaluated purely in economic terms. These benefits include their effects on gender roles, family cohesion, and health.

Changes in Gender Roles

Migration shapes values and attitudes toward gender roles within the household (Ghosh 2009). When women move, their role as caregiver changes; as a result, men are more likely to engage in traditionally female activities such as caring for children and the elderly (King and Vullnetari 2006). When men emigrate, women are empowered to take a more prominent part in community decision making, controlling their own income, and expanding their role in the domestic sphere (Deshingkar and Grimm 2005).

Recent migration flows have included a larger number of women who are migrating independently rather than following fathers or husbands (ECA 2006). Migration provides women with new economic opportunities and sometimes escape from a failed marriage, particularly in societies in which divorce is not an option. Interpreting high divorce rates among migrants is not always straightforward. In traditional societies, where divorce is highly uncommon or not possible, migration has been associated with a higher probability of family breakdown. Although protracted separation can take its toll on family cohesion, Lucas (2005) points out that men and women whose marriages were unstable to begin with are more likely to migrate.

Gender differences are apparent in other ways as well. Manuh (2001) finds that Ghanaian men in Canada are more likely than Ghanaian women to return home. For men the attractiveness lies in the opportunity to go back to a patriarchal society; women do not relish losing the independence they have experienced in Canada.

Migration can entail substantial risks for women and children, who often find themselves victims of traffickers. Some research also indicates that migrants' fertility patterns tend to shift toward those of natives of the destination country, either through social adaptation or self-selection of migrants by fertility preferences (Kulu 2005). These changes may affect the broad population in migrant-sending areas.^a

Effects on Family Cohesion

Migration may spread attitudes and behaviors from democratic host countries to less-democratic sending countries through returning migrants, cross-border communications from diaspora members, and information networks in migrant-sending communities (Perez-Armendariz and Crow 2010). Although the decision to migrate may be made in the interest of household welfare, separation from one's immediate family often entails considerable emotional cost and can erode family structures and relationships (D'Emilio and others 2007). A breakdown of family ties because of emigration can impose significant emotional costs on children (McKenzie and Rapoport 2006).

To some extent, e-mail, Skype, and affordable telephone calls may allow transnational families to thrive even at a distance (UNDP 2009). Recent evidence from Mozambique suggests that migration may also strengthen social networks by enabling households that receive remittances to participate more actively in their communities (Gallego and Mendola 2010). Closer interfamily collaboration can, to some extent, remedy the absence of within-family cohesion and safety nets.

(Box continues on next page)

Box 1.3 The Social Costs and Benefits of Migration *(continued)***Effect on Spread of HIV/AIDS and Other Diseases**

Several studies have focused on the link between migration and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in different parts of Africa (Decosas and others 1995; Lurie and others 2000; Brummer 2002). Several studies have shown that migrant laborers tend to have higher HIV infection rates than nonmigrants (UNFPA 2006).^b Some researchers contend that South Africa has been turned into an AIDS hot spot primarily because of the nature and magnitude of circular labor migration in the region (Barnett and Whiteside 2002). HIV prevalence has been observed to rise with migration, a situation exacerbated by laws, regulations, and policies that present obstacles to effective HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support for migrants (UNAIDS 2008). Temporary circular migration also increases the risk of family breakdown, the fragmentation of social networks, and psychosocial stress (Kahn and others 2003). The effects of migration on tuberculosis and pneumoconiosis have been documented in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zambia (Packard 1989; Leger 1992).

- a. Fargues (2006) finds that fertility patterns in Egypt, Morocco, and Turkey were influenced by fertility patterns in destination countries (Western Europe versus the Persian Gulf). Beine, Docquier, and Schiff (2009) find that a 1 percent decrease in the fertility norm in the destination country reduces fertility rates in the origin country by about 0.3 percent.
- b. In a detailed study by Kane and others (1993), 27 percent of male Senegalese migrants were HIV positive compared with 1 percent of nonmigrant men from the same area. Migration from neighboring countries was observed to contribute to a rise in HIV infections and AIDS cases in Mali (World Bank 1993).

of abuse.¹⁰ A range of coercive and misleading practices are used in the trafficking of women, which can be compounded by rules in destination countries that leave women in the power of their employers. Inadequate legislation, poor enforcement, flawed or nonexistent birth registration systems, and social attitudes make trafficking difficult to combat.

The absence of domestic antitrafficking legislation in several countries offers law enforcement agencies little incentive to pursue criminal syndicates (Martens, Pieczkowski, and van Vuuren-Smyth 2003). Stricter enforcement of existing laws and the enactment of new laws could help control trafficking, but law enforcement is only part of the answer. Some countries have initiated programs to protect children from traffickers. To fight trafficking, in 2002 Burkina Faso introduced a new travel document that requires the name of the adult accompanying a fostered child and the adult who is to shelter the child (Wouterse and van den Berg 2004). Save the Children developed a program in Burkina Faso and Mali to provide children with alternative economic activities and training in their home villages. In general, addressing the root causes of child migration is likely to be more successful than attempts to regulate the employment of children away from home (Delap, Ouedraogo, and Sogoba 2005).

Governments could enhance protection of potential victims by maintaining lists of legitimate recruitment agencies, publicizing the terrible

experiences of victims and the kinds of offers that might leave migrants vulnerable to traffickers, assisting parents in obtaining information on child-fostering opportunities, and assisting potential migrants to investigate the legitimacy of offers. Information campaigns could also be used to change public attitudes toward the exploitation of women and children.

A few African governments have assisted potential emigrants by providing information on migration opportunities and counseling them about the risks involved in migration. Ethiopia, Kenya, and Senegal provide predeparture orientation seminars to inform migrants about potential abuses. The Ethiopian government has also established an office to regulate private recruitment agencies, which are required to obtain a one-year, renewable license, to report the status of their work, and to submit to audits to ensure that workers are not being cheated by the agencies or foreign employers.¹¹ Overall, however, African governments have invested only limited resources in protecting migrants. In contrast, agencies in several Asian countries have been created to promote and regulate migration (Wongboonsin 2003). Passing legislation is not enough; it must be accompanied by enforcement of laws that protect migrants.

A few African countries restrict the right of women to emigrate, in part as a means of protecting them.¹² These laws actually increase vulnerability to trafficking, by forcing some women to migrate illegally and limiting their ability to call on the authorities for help (Black, Hilker, and Pooley 2004).

Bilateral agreements between origin and destination countries can be used to protect migrants. For example, some African countries have entered into agreements with France to enable their workers to receive benefits under French social safety net provisions (see, for example, the discussion of Senegal in Ammassari 2005). Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia have entered into agreements with the main destination countries to ensure that emigrants are provided social security and to shield them against racism and xenophobia (Musette 2006). But African countries have only limited ability to influence the immigration policies of high-income destination countries.

Destination countries can also help protect migrants. In the Middle East, rules that treat migrants who leave their job—in particular women who leave their work as domestic helpers—as illegal aliens increase migrants' vulnerability to physical abuse and exploitation. In some countries, migrants may not understand or be aware of the terms of the contracts they are forced to sign on arrival, leaving them at the mercy of employers through prohibitions on leaving the house without permission, heavy penalties for quitting their jobs, or requirements that large

debts to traffickers must be worked off before leaving. The regulation of recruitment and the monitoring of working conditions by destination countries would help curb abuse of migrants.

MANAGING IMMIGRATION WITHIN AFRICA

Limited resources, weak public institutions, and long land borders severely impede the control of migration in many African countries, resulting in large numbers of undocumented migrants. Although African countries generally have laws regulating who may immigrate, such laws are often enforced only at formal entry places, such as airports and ocean ports, and are easily evaded by migrants who take informal routes from contiguous countries. The large informal sector in most African economies means that it is difficult to regulate immigrants' participation in the domestic economy.¹³ In South Africa, many immigrants remain undocumented because of the considerable cost and time required to be regularized, even with the support of an employer.¹⁴

In some respects, the ineffectiveness of immigration restrictions may have a positive impact on development by permitting migration. Even where income differences between countries are not great, cross-border migration can improve welfare by diversifying income sources, facilitating trade, and exploiting differences in seasonal patterns. The West African Long-Term Perspective Study (WALTPS) concludes that the ability of West Africa to increase its agricultural production at the same rate as population growth may be attributable in part to migration to areas with high agricultural potential. The artisanal marine fishing industry in West Africa is thriving because of the ease of crossing borders at sea (Odotei 2006). In some cases (for example, migration between Ghana and Togo and between Benin and Nigeria), undocumented migration simply reflects uncontrolled but generally accepted movements across borders set by European colonial powers that divide ethnic groups accustomed to close communication (Adepoju 2005).

Some African countries do experience difficulties stemming from their inability to manage migration. Undocumented migration may result in large numbers of residents being perceived as foreigners, who often live in lower-income urban neighborhoods. Large numbers of undocumented immigrants may contribute to lawlessness and can undercut attempts to regulate labor market conditions and protect workers. Martin (2010) notes that cash grants in South Africa designed to support poor workers' incomes are evaded by hiring undocumented immigrants, who can become the focus of random violence and police harassment. Mass expul-

sions of immigrants—from Ghana in 1969, Nigeria in 1983, and Côte d’Ivoire early in the past decade—resulted in economic disruptions and severe hardships.¹⁵

Coping with undocumented immigration involves extremely difficult social choices that have confounded governments in both rich and poor countries. At a minimum, governments should avoid violent or exploitative practices, such as mass expulsions or tolerance of corrupt officials who prey on undocumented immigrants. Some countries where migrants have suffered from violence have made efforts to restore social peace. For example, Côte d’Ivoire’s 2008 anti-xenophobia law imposes sanctions on conduct that incites violence; South Africa set up the “No to Xenophobia” emergency phone line following violence in May 2008 (UNDP 2009).

ENCOURAGING LEGAL MIGRATION

Temporary migration programs may help reconcile the desires of migrants and destination country employers to reap economic benefits with the broader society’s concern over the social implications of permanent immigration. A survey by the OECD (2007) found that programs in 57 of 92 countries using temporary employment schemes were managed through bilateral agreements. The Global Forum on Migration and Development (2008) outlined a set of best-practice recommendations for such agreements. Topics covered include matching the demand for and supply of workers, involving all stakeholders in recruitment, encouraging circular migration, recognizing skills and qualifications, respecting workers’ rights and protecting them from high transportation and recruitment costs, ensuring equal access for and treatment of women, providing appropriate training, and encouraging return by easing reintegration and allowing for repeat migration. The close supervision of employers is essential to the success of such programs. As migrants’ authorization to work in the destination country is linked to a specific employer, it is important to monitor working hours, compensation, and conditions to avoid exploitation. Reliance on private intermediaries also requires close monitoring to ensure that migrants are treated fairly.

Some temporary migration programs have had success in encouraging legal, temporary immigration with minimal visa overstays. However, the supervision required to limit overstays and ensure against exploitation of migrants means that successful programs cover only a small number of migrants (World Bank 2006). Morocco’s agreement with Spain, for example, allowed for the movement of only 700 workers at a time when there were more than 200,000 Moroccan workers in Spain (Collyer 2004).

Box 1.4 The Evolution of European Policies toward Migration from Africa

The need to reduce undocumented migration has become a dominant theme of European policy making toward Africa since the early 1990s, particularly in the Mediterranean states—France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and, more recently, Malta. The approach to undocumented migration has evolved over the past two decades, from bilateral readmission agreements with origin and transit states (which proved difficult to ratify, because they were politically unpopular in the origin countries) to policies aimed at preventing conflicts, supporting peacekeeping, tying foreign aid to development strategies directed at the root causes of emigration, and imposing migration-related conditions on trade concessions and debt forgiveness.^a The European Commission has proposed negotiating “mobility partnerships” with third countries, with a view to meeting labor shortages through short-term movements of low-skilled workers, as well as circular migration programs covering the highly skilled to mitigate the problem of brain drain and foster skills transfers.

The Africa–EU Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME) partnership was launched in 2007 to improve the prospects for employment in Africa and the management of migration flows between Africa and the European Union (Africa–EU MME Partnership 2010). The first action plan under the joint strategy, covering 2008–10, was adopted in 2007. A new action plan for managing migration during 2011–13 was endorsed at the Africa–EU Heads of States Summit in Libya in November 2010. Examples of initiatives under the partnership include the following:

- the African Remittances Institute, which aims to facilitate cheaper, faster, and more secure remittance flows from Europe to Africa
- the Human Trafficking Initiative, designed to strengthen the protection of migrants and enhance prosecution of human trafficking in line with the Ouagadougou Action Plan
- the Diaspora Outreach Initiative, which builds on existing work to transfer skills, capacity, and knowledge to Africa
- the Observatory on Migration, established to create a network of researchers and research centers to provide policy makers, civil society, and the public with reliable and harmonized data on migration
- the Pan-African University’s Nyerere Program, which aims to contribute to high-level African human resource development and retention while supporting intra-African academic mobility
- the Centre for Migration Management and Information in Mali (with support from the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], France, Spain, and the European Commission)
- work on an African Guarantee Fund (by the African Development Bank and Spain) to increase access to finance for small and medium enterprises.

a. The readmission agreement signed by Italy and Egypt in January 2007 allowed Egypt to benefit from a bilateral debt-swap agreement, as well as from trade concessions for its agricultural produce and larger entry quotas for Egyptian nationals in Italy (Cassarino 2009). The bilateral agreement on the circulation of persons and readmission concluded in July 2006 between Algeria and the United Kingdom was part of a round of negotiations that extended to issues such as energy security, the fight against terrorism, and police cooperation.

A few African countries have entered into bilateral agreements with European nations to gain acceptance of some legal migration and support for development in return for cooperation in the return of undocumented migrants. Italy negotiated readmission agreements with Egypt, Morocco,

and Tunisia by offering cooperating partner countries increases in legal admissions. France, Greece, Italy, and Spain have entered into agreements that link readmission to various incentives (Cassarino 2009). Negotiations are underway between some West African governments and France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain to establish temporary migration programs as a means of discouraging undocumented migration. In general, Europe's policies toward reducing undocumented migration from North Africa through bilateral agreements have evolved significantly over the past few decades (box 1.4).

As return to one's nation of origin is a fundamental right recognized in UN declarations and few countries have limits on return, the leverage that origin countries gain by promising to facilitate return is minimal. Some of the agreements with North African countries go farther, however, by including commitments to strengthen immigration controls to limit undocumented migration from Sub-Saharan Africa (a large portion of which is assumed to be in transit to Europe). Morocco and Tunisia, for example, have passed laws with severe penalties for assisting undocumented migration (de Haas 2007). These efforts may have resulted in human rights violations, including the return of refugees to countries where they face persecution and the holding of refugees and undocumented migrants in detention camps (Adepoju, van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2009). Return from transit countries is a contentious issue between West African countries and countries in North Africa.

ANNEX 1A

Table 1A.1 Net Migration Rates in Africa per 1,000 People, 1975–2010

Region/country	1975–1980	1980–85	1985–1990	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05	2005–10
Eastern Africa	-1.09	-0.65	0.39	-1.56	1.2	-0.9	-1.1
Burundi	-2.83	4.33	-0.11	-8.6	-13.02	5.5	8.1
Comoros	5.68	-2.14	-1.83	0	0	-3.4	-3.1
Djibouti	56.77	5.65	38.49	-10.95	6.57	0.0	—
Eritrea	0	0	0	-22.42	-0.23	11.3	2.3
Ethiopia	-11.77	3.21	3.54	3.35	-0.15	-1.0	-0.8
Kenya	-0.04	0.04	0.05	1.74	-0.15	0.2	-1
Madagascar	-0.71	-0.17	-0.13	-0.09	-0.04	-0.1	-0.1
Malawi	-0.35	-0.3	20.95	-17.13	-0.93	-0.5	-0.3
Mauritius	-4.41	-5.45	-5.77	-1.28	-0.35	0.0	—
Mozambique	1.54	-5.89	-19.46	9.79	1.01	-0.2	-0.2
Reunion	-9.54	0.72	-0.62	2.68	2.45	—	—
Rwanda	-2.18	-3.96	0.48	-57.56	61.49	0.1	0.3
Somalia	59.79	-25.37	-16.06	-21.86	1.71	-5.1	-5.6
Uganda	-2.7	-1.56	3.11	1.44	-0.6	0.0	-0.9
Tanzania	-0.25	0.36	0.57	4.16	-1.25	-1.9	-1.4
Zambia	0.19	1.51	0.85	-0.16	1.74	-1.5	-1.4
Zimbabwe	-3.08	3.74	2.71	-3.28	-0.25	-11.2	-11.1
Central Africa	0.2	-0.43	-0.09	3.71	-3.27	0.2	-0.2
Angola	0.58	6.12	-3.41	2.83	-2.07	2.3	0.9
Cameroon	1.45	-1.05	0.46	-0.08	0	-0.1	-0.2
Central African Republic	-0.09	3.25	-2.94	2.38	0.64	-2.3	0.2
Chad	-5.37	-3.14	1.53	0.63	2.73	4.8	-1.4
Congo, Rep.	0	0.11	0.18	1.05	2.6	0.2	-2.8
Congo, Dem. Rep.	0.77	-2.31	0.43	5.9	-6.4	-0.9	-0.3
Equatorial Guinea	-26.85	48.77	0	0	0	5.3	3.1
Gabon	6.17	5.31	4.53	3.88	2.43	1.5	0.7
São Tomé and Príncipe	-2.53	-10.68	-4.42	-3.24	-2.86	-9.6	-8.8
Southern Africa	-0.05	0.73	0.39	0.25	-0.26	2.4	2.4
Botswana	-2.05	-1.66	-1.54	-1.01	-0.86	2.2	1.6
Lesotho	-3.27	-2.27	-7.28	-7.37	-4.15	-3.7	-3.5
Namibia	-9.16	-5.39	11.78	0.46	2.27	-0.1	-0.1
South Africa	0.54	1.16	0.25	0.81	-0.16	3.0	2.8
Swaziland	-2.95	0.33	5.98	-8.37	-109	-8.4	-1

ANNEX 1A

Table 1A.1 Net Migration Rates in Africa per 1,000 People, 1975–2010 *(continued)*

Region/country	1975–1980	1980–85	1985–1990	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05	2005–10
Western Africa	0.4	–0.8	–0.71	–0.71	–0.45	–0.4	–0.6
Benin	–4.85	–3.75	–3.23	1.84	–3.2	2.7	1.2
Burkina Faso	–6.73	–5.98	–3.07	–2.66	–2.3	1.6	–0.9
Cape Verde	–17.37	–11.11	–10.1	–4.65	–2.42	–5.5	–5.1
Côte d'Ivoire	11.07	9.11	4.35	2.98	0.8	–3.7	–1.4
Gambia, The	7.29	7.01	10.53	8.78	7.42	4.4	1.8
Ghana	–10.77	3.4	–0.42	0.49	–1.19	0.1	–0.4
Guinea	1.55	–1.52	2.45	10.41	–7.18	–9.7	–6.1
Guinea-Bissau	17.45	–0.04	0.35	3.63	–1.68	0.2	–1.6
Liberia	1.38	0	–34.17	–26.51	35.89	4.1	13.3
Mali	–5.25	–5.81	–5.65	–5.37	–5.1	–2.4	–3.2
Mauritania	–1.28	–1.88	–3.15	–1.36	0.8	2.1	0.6
Niger	–0.71	–0.81	–0.52	0.12	–0.12	–0.5	–0.4
Nigeria	2.87	–1.94	–0.23	–0.21	–0.18	–0.3	–0.4
Senegal	0.78	0.35	0	–1.79	–1.13	–1.9	–1.7
Sierra Leone	0	0	3.29	–18.68	–5.19	14.4	2.2
Togo	–8.36	3.64	0.06	–6.67	6.06	–0.1	–0.2
Northern Africa	–1	0.3	–2	–1.5	–1.7	–1.6	–0.7
Algeria	0.1	0.8	–0.6	–0.4	–1	–0.9	–0.8
Egypt, Arab Rep.	–4	–1.8	–2.1	–1.6	–1.6	–0.8	–0.8
Libya	8.6	10.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6
Morocco	–1.9	–0.5	–2.1	–3.5	–3.6	–3.7	–2.7
Sudan	3.5	3.7	–3.6	–1.2	–1.4	–2.9	0.7
Tunisia	–0.6	–0.7	–0.6	–1	–1.2	–1.7	–0.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	–1.35	–2.72	–0.35	–1.53	–0.94	–0.4	0.125
Africa	–0.4	–0.4	–0.6	–0.5	–0.6	–0.6	–0.5

Source: United Nations Population Division.

NOTES

1. The main data set used was the bilateral migration matrix compiled by the World Bank (2011), which takes stock of migrants by origin as well as destination. The analysis also relied on data provided by the United Nations Population Division (UNPD 2009), the Ghana Living Standard Measurement Survey (Ghana Statistical Service 2008), and household migration surveys collected in 2009 through the Africa Migration Project.

2. Sub-Saharan Africa's working-age population is projected to increase by 699 million between 2005 and 2050. Over the same period, the working-age population of Europe and North America is projected to fall by a total of 100 million (Koettl 2010).

3. Hatton and Williamson (2003) estimate a regression model to capture the determinants of net migration for Africa. Their findings suggest that movements of refugees; labor market conditions, specifically the wage gap; and the supply of labor, particularly among the young, explain a significant part of the variation in net migration rates in Africa.

4. The data for net migration are based on residual estimates from demographic accounting exercises compiled by the UN Population Division using census data.

5. See also UNDP (2009), Ratha and Shaw (2007), and Page and Plaza (2006) for useful discussions of intra-African migration.

6. The purpose of the discussion of figures 1.5–1.7 is to compare migration patterns with income levels and colonial ties. There is no claim that these are causal relationships. Establishment of causality would require a model that takes into account the main determinants of migration.

7. Other determinants of migration were not controlled for; this association may be driven by other variables (such as distance). It is also possible that the relationship is biased because errors in measuring migration may be correlated with per capita income.

8. Earlier studies on Africa include Lucas (1985), Bigsten (1994), and Hoddinott (1994). Azam and Gubert (2006) studied internal as well as international migration in Mali in the Senegal River Valley.

9. See Azam and Gubert (2005) for discussion of the pattern of migration in rural Senegal.

10. In Burkina Faso, for example, 9.5 percent of children ages 6–17 do not live with their parents; 29 percent of these children live abroad, mostly in Côte d'Ivoire (Pizarro 2006).

11. Information on Ethiopia is based on an interview with Ato Abebe Haile, Director of the Employment Service Promotion Directorate, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and a presentation by Minelik Alemuk, Director General for International Law and Consular Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia.

12. For example, a married woman requires her husband's permission to travel abroad in Algeria (applies only to women under age 18), the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Uganda (when traveling with children). Unmarried women under the age of 21 require their father's permission to travel in

Egypt, Libya, Swaziland, Sudan, and Yemen impose restrictions on both married and unmarried women (McKenzie 2005).

13. The International Labour Organization (ILO 2002) estimates that the informal sector accounted for 72 percent of total employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (78 percent if South Africa is excluded).

14. Employers wishing to hire foreign workers through legal procedures need to obtain the services of a recruitment company, which will recruit in the country of origin after a “no-objection certificate” has been obtained from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Alternatively, employers may support the regularization of undocumented foreign workers whom they may already have employed for a few months, but the law requires that applicants return to their home countries before work permits are granted.

15. See UNDP (2009) on Côte d’Ivoire; Lassailly-Jacob, Boyer, and Brachet (2006) on Nigeria; and de Haas (2007) on Ghana.

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