

VII. ANNEXES

Annex A: Interview Protocol

Sample Selection

In order to gather a wide range of stakeholder perspectives we sought interviewees from core stakeholder groups (i.e. WB or WBI staff, program staff, participants, and other stakeholders such as government representatives and other funding agencies). We spoke with savvy insiders to identify a range of perspectives within each stakeholder group such as individuals with different political beliefs, in different organizational contexts, and with different levels of engagement in the intervention. Not all individuals we selected were willing and able to be interviewed. We used a table with the ideal distribution of interviewees across multiple characteristics to make decisions about replacements. The table below summarizes the resulting sample of interviewees.

Distribution of Interviewees by Stakeholder Group and Country*

	WB or WBI Staff	Program Staff	Participants	Other Stakeholders	Totals
Burundi	8	12	27	4	53
Timor-Leste	10	11	18	9	50
CAR	4	5			5
Tajikistan	2				2
Totals	24	28	45	13	110

**In some cases the cell amounts do not equal "total" values because interviewees may have represented multiple stakeholder groups or the best way to group the interviewee was unclear.*

PRE-INTERVIEW COMMUNICATIONS

Prior to establishing the interviews, an email was sent from Alastair McKechnie, Director of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, to all staff interviewees explaining the purpose of the work and emphasizing the importance of their participation. Once the email was sent, interviews were arranged by Bank staff or the consultants.

Interviews conducted in Burundi and Timor-Leste were primarily arranged once the consultants were in country and arranged in close collaboration with and under the advisement of Bank staff and program staff.

INTERVIEW

At the beginning of the interview, the interviewer provided a brief reminder of the purpose of the interview and the general interview process. Interviewees were informed that the information they provided during the interview was confidential (see informed consent protocol).

Informed Consent Protocol

Interviewees were informed that the notes taken would only be available to the two project consultants. We indicated that observations would be combined and included in reports, but that specific statements would not be attributed to the interviewee or their title/position. We also indicated that the information provided would be used to provide the World Bank with an assessment of the lessons that have been learned from the leadership development projects that they have supported and to recommend possible future directions for leadership interventions. English was not the primary language of many interviewees. The service of a professional translator was arranged in Timor-Leste and Burundi. Translators were informed about the purpose of the interview, the general interview process, and the confidential nature of the interviews.

Interview Questions

The interviews were semi-structured; not all questions were asked of all interviewees. In addition to the core questions provided below, a list of specific questions was developed for each project in relation to the information already available for the project and was reexamined at the end of each interview day. We also asked questions not on the list as appropriate. The table below includes the template used to conduct the interviews, which provides a general indication of the nature and scope of interviews.

CONTEXT AND INITIATION	
1.1	<p>What was your role in this project?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When & how did you become involved?
1.2	<p>Why was this project funded?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What were the criteria for selection? • How was success defined by LICUS or PCF?
1.3	<p>Who initiated this project?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whose idea was it? • Who drove the initial development? • Who wrote the proposal?
1.4	<p>What was the challenge that this project aimed to address?</p>
1.5	<p>What was this project's concept/definition of leadership?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How well do you think the notion of leadership used in the program matched/aligned with the needs and perspectives of participants? What was similar/different?
DESIGN	
2.1	<p>What were the leadership objectives? What about leadership would be different as a result of this project?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How were the objectives developed? • How do they relate to the context and problem?
2.2	<p>Describe the vision for how the project would lead to the desired changes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How was it envisioned that the project would lead to that difference? • What was the desired change in people, if any? • What was the desired change in inter-group interaction, if any? • What was the desired change in organizations or society, if any?
2.3	<p>When did you expect to see those changes?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did you think that they would be temporary or enduring changes?
2.4	<p>Who was targeted for participation? Why?</p>

2.5	<p>What was the process for selecting and recruiting participants?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Why was so much responsibility and authority provided to the government to select the participants and determine the direction of the training? How did this pan out? • Challenges with accessing this group? • What worked well? • What didn't work well? • What are your recommendations for determining, recruiting, and selecting participants of leadership development interventions like this one?
2.6	<p>How was the training content and delivery decided upon and designed?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who was involved? What role did they play? • Were potential participants consulted?
2.7	<p>Was there an M&E plan associated with the intervention?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who was responsible for that work? How was it developed? What was the purpose of M&E? Was the plan followed? • To whom was the project accountable? How was this visible in the M&E?
DELIVERY	
3.1	<p>Who was responsible for implementing the project?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were they involved in the design and/or conceptualization of the project? • Did this change over time? If so, how?
3.2	<p>Who was consulted during the process of implementation? Did this influence the implementation? If so, how?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there a Steering Group? If so, how did that work? • How was Bank headquarters involved? • Was there feedback to participants and/or other people during the design and implementation?
3.4	<p>If applicable, what approaches were used to enhance the sustainability of outcomes and transfer of learning?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was there program follow-up or support after the intervention? • Did participants understand how to use the behaviors, skills, etc. within their context?
3.5	<p>Was the original design altered during implementation?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How? Why? What was the result of those changes?
3.6	<p>What facilitated effective design and implementation? What were barriers to effective design and implementation? Recommendations?</p>

3.7	<p>The World Bank is beginning to think about leadership as vision, competence, and integrity. What connections, if any, do you see between the intervention and those dimensions?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Vision is defined as</u> the capacity to engage various constituencies to produce a shared vision of the future, identify realities to be addressed to reach the vision, and to inspire, motivate, and mobilize others to achieve the vision/change; • <u>Competence is defined as</u> capacity to: (i) diagnose underlying problems/issues; (ii) prioritize among multiple and competing challenges; (iii) find solutions (technical capacity); (iv) mobilize stakeholders; and (v) implement (management capacity); • <u>Integrity is defined as</u> a commitment to serve the public good, to personify individual and professional ethics, and to champion accountability relationships that inspire mutual trust in institutions, communities, and society as a whole.
IMPACT	
4.1	To what extent did the project do what it set out to do in terms of providing (such and such) training, training (such and such group)?
4.2	<p>To what extent did the project lead to the bigger changes it hoped to create (such as...)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What was the impact of the project?
4.3	What were the unintended outcomes (positive and negative)?
4.4	What are your recommendations for enhancing the impact of future projects?
4.5	Is there anyone else with whom we should speak about this initiative? Do you have any documentation that you could share that might be helpful to us?
4.6	<p>If you were asked to evaluate the program – what kinds of indicators would you use to determine of the program was of value or not?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where would you get your information from? Why?

Annex B: Glossary of Acronyms

PCF	Post Conflict Fund
LICUS	Low Income Countries Under Stress
LICUS TF	Low Income Countries Under Stress Implementation Trust Fund
RRA	Rapid Results Approach
RRI	Rapid Results Initiative
BLTP	Burundi Leadership Training Program
CAD	Capacity-Building Assistance and Development
LCCNR	Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal
LED	Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development
GLCDP	Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program
WBI	World Bank Institute
CAR	Central African Republic
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper



Annex C: Burundi Case Study

	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program (GLCDP)
Dates	12/02 – 07/04	01/07 – 01/09
Funding	\$993,279	\$423,800
Specific Contextual Issues	Burundi's Transitional Government faces the fundamental challenge of planning for social and economic recovery and building a post-conflict, development-oriented state after years of turmoil.	There are important challenges facing Burundi's leaders in the day-to-day running of the country – the reality, however, is that the leadership team is new, lacks experience, and operates in an environment of weak institutional and organizational capacity.
Goal	Strengthen the ability of the Burundian Government to develop, through a participatory approach involving civil society, a vision for economic recovery as well as a strategic and socio-economic recovery plan for the transitional period that would establish the conditions for sustainable economic development.	Improve the confidence, accountability, and ultimately the effectiveness of national leaders and through them, the accountability of thematic and geographic teams.

A. *The Country Context*

Burundi's civil war began in 1993, triggered by democratic elections. Ethnic hatred between Hutu and Tutsi is frequently cited as the root cause of the war. Examination of Burundi's history, nonetheless, reveals a more complex and nuanced story. Prior to colonialism, Burundi's different ethnic groups (*ganwa*, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa) were united under the rule of the benevolent king (*mwami*). Contrary to most definitions of ethnic groups, the different ethnic groups in Burundi spoke the same language, shared the same culture, and were organized in a complex social hierarchy. Status was determined by many characteristics other than ethnicity and social mobility within and between ethnic groups was common. Colonialism reduced opportunities for social mobility and destroyed the social structure that had helped to unify society. After being granted independence in 1962, Burundi began a steady downward spiral toward internal war. Events in Rwanda provided an example to Burundian Tutsis that Hutu rule was brutal. A small Tutsi underclass took hold of the Burundian state and brutally oppressed any Hutu opposition. All Burundians feared for their life, and ethnicity became a dividing factor. The fear of attack by one ethnicity often led to preemptive actions to control the threat and vice versa— paving the road for a cycle of violence, uprising, and oppression.

Since the beginning of Burundi's transition out of war with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in August 2000, Burundi has had several leadership transitions. During the four-year transitional phase, Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, governed for eighteen months, followed by Ndayizeye, a Hutu, who governed for three years. The goal of PCF-funded Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) was to support a participatory leadership approach in this first leadership transition. In 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza, a Hutu, won Burundi's first democratic presidential election since the war. The goal of the Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program (GLCDP) was to strengthen the leadership capacity of this new administration.

B. Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)

In December 2002, the Post-Conflict Fund provided the Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) with \$993,279 to be spent over a period of fifteen months. During the second year of PCF funding, the BLTP staff solicited funding from other sources, namely the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK Department for International Development (DfID) to conduct BLTP intervention spin-off activities. The BLTP is now a national NGO in Burundi and continues to engage in projects related to the initial PCF-funded workshops. The most visible impacts of the BLTP work were funded by other donors, although the PCF funding arguably played a role in catalyzing these other efforts.

The information and findings below are derived from extensive documentation by the BLTP team, an external evaluation conducted in 2004, and approximately 20 interviews primarily conducted during our ten day field visit to Burundi in December 2008.

i. Intervention Goals

The goal outlined in the BLTP's proposal to PCF was as follows:

The proposed capacity building project is designed to strengthen the ability of the Burundian Government to develop, through a participatory approach involving civil society, a vision for economic recovery as well as a strategic and socio-economic recovery plan for the transitional period that would establish the conditions for sustainable economic development. In particular, the proposed training initiative seeks to build trust and social capital among Burundian decision-makers, to foster economically and socially inclusive planning processes; and to strengthen Burundian leaders' organizational capacity to implement a joint vision for economic recovery and poverty reduction.

While the BLTP included economic development elements in its design, this was neither a core competency of the BLTP team nor the core aim of the project. The economic development aim was included in the proposal to appeal to the Bank's desire to fund projects that contributed directly to economic development. Following the 2004 external evaluation of the BLTP, which recommended that the BLTP drop its (unsuccessful) attempt to directly impact economic development, the BLTP dropped the related aspects of its project.

The primary aim of the BLTP was to help the new transitional leaders, many of whom had been former enemies, work together to advance the country's war-to-peace transition. According to the proposal:

In many cases, people see public decision-making as inevitably an adversarial process. This presumption often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing confrontation and deadlock. An alternative approach is offered in the workshop – changing the game from head-to-head confrontation to a joint problem-solving process of persuasion through

understanding interests and the creation of innovative options to satisfy the legitimate needs of the parties.

According to the 2004 external evaluation, *“The BLTP adds an entirely different dynamic for transitional change, using a more empowering process rather than a conditionality/pressure one. It seeks to provide key players in Burundi’s transition with the attitudes, skills, and relations that should make them more willing to and capable of conducting the complex negotiations that they are faced with on a daily basis within the transitional government and thus, hopefully, help to bring the transition to a peaceful end.”*¹

ii. Intervention Design and Outputs

The BLTP team solicited input from all relevant stakeholders and garnered support for the initiative. The team also sought opportunities to increase impact by training other interested groups, and adapted the intervention design to meet the needs of these groups and institutions.

a. Original intervention design

The BLTP design outlined in the project proposal consisted of four components. The first component was a needs assessment to determine and prioritize the skills needed, the most appropriate mix of training methods, and to garner support for the workshops from the intended target audience. The needs assessment included a pilot module. The second component included three 5-7 day training workshops with 25-35 participants in each workshop. The workshops were designed to equip participants with the skills and knowledge needed for effective economic recovery and policy development and implementation. The third component was support for social and economic recovery follow-on projects developed by workshop participants. The fourth component was a feedback program consisting of three half-day meetings to enable project managers to identify both problem-areas and emerging opportunities in the course of project implementation, and to enable colleagues in the World Bank, international community and other concerned scholars and practitioners to learn from this initiative. Monitoring and evaluation plans included a final evaluation, a joint supervision mission by the World Bank, the participants’ evaluation of follow-on activities, feedback meetings, and interviews with stakeholders close to the political transition process.

b. Design alteration and outputs

The BLTP Executive Director (Howard Wolpe) and Project Manager (Steve McDonald) carried out an extensive needs assessment with key stakeholders from the full spectrum political parties, rebel groups, civil society, concerned regional states, and international community. To select participants, they asked all stakeholders which formal and informal leaders in Burundi had the power to make or break the political transition. They did not distinguish between “good leaders” and “bad leaders”, but rather focused on the identification of individuals who had the power to influence Burundi’s political transition, for good or bad.

Wolpe and McDonald created a database of 300 potential participants. They used the following criteria to select 105 participants: participants must be seen as capable of impacting Burundi’s future, either by virtue of the positions they held, or by virtue of the influence they exercised over significant constituencies; each workshop had to reflect a broad representation of Burundian society (e.g., ethnically balanced, geographically balanced, and with significant representation of women); and each workshop had to encompass a broad array of social sectors (i.e. both political and governmental structures as well as grassroots society). All participants were invited in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their respective organizations and institutions.

To further target the workshop content, the BLTP team asked eleven of the invited workshop participants the following questions: How do you define ‘leadership,’ and what differentiates a ‘good’ leader from a ‘bad’

¹ Peter Uvin and Susanna P. Campbell, *The Burundi Leadership Training Program: A Prospective Assessment*, July 23, 2004, The World Bank, p. 5.

leader? What skills do you hope to gain from the training experience? How would you apply the skills learned in their real-live occupation/role?

The final six-day workshop design aimed to: enable effective decision-making processes; develop the means of building relationships and strengthening their communication skills; provide the skills required to develop options for creative joint problem-solving; and provide tools with which to develop both a guiding policy vision, and to plan and implement concrete projects. The intervention modules included: Orientation and Introductions; The Arm Wrestling Exercise: Collaboration v. Competition; The seven-element framework for measuring success; SIMSOC; Communication for Effective Leadership; Four Quadrant Brainstorming Tool; Planning for Economic Recovery. After the external evaluation in May-June 2004, the BLTP team altered the design; removing the activities on economic recovery. The external evaluation coincided with the end of the PCF grant, and thus reduced the impetus to focus on economic development. A full description and evaluation of the workshop content is found in the appended Composite Document.

The three workshops were conducted in Ngozi Province, a two-hour drive from Bujumbura. After discussions with stakeholders, the BLTP team concluded that it was important to hold the workshop in Burundi, rather than in a neighboring country, to show that the peace process had progressed to such a point that former enemies could safely meet inside the country. At the same time, they felt that the workshop should not take place in the capital, Bujumbura, because it was important to have participants' undivided attention and to increase the time available to socialize with each other (rather than returning home at the end of the day)

The 2004 external evaluation found the intervention design and preparation process to be very impressive. "Seldom in our careers have we seen a project for which the preparation was so complete and thorough, the buy-in so widespread, and the understanding of the challenge so nuanced. The BLTP team has a strong sense of how its contributions relate to the ongoing dynamics and to other donors' activities. The team is also very politically savvy in continuously informing and including all possible parties. The importance of this pre-project preparation cannot be underestimated. Howard Wolpe and Eugene Nindorera's political clout and understanding of the complex dynamics in Burundi made this type of preparation possible."²

Under the Post-Conflict Fund grant, the main outputs of the BLTP were three workshops (Ngozi I, II, and III), eight follow-up workshops, and one six-month assessment and feedback meeting in Washington, DC. The dates, number of participants, and content of these workshops are summarized below.

Table 1: BLTP Workshops³

	Workshop Title	No. of Participants	Workshop Description
March 11-16, 2003	Ngozi I	34	<p><i>Participants:</i> The workshop composition was distinctive for its ethnic balance (18 Hutu, 14 Tutsi, 2 Twa), and included 23 men and 11 women and drew leaders from all of the targeted institutional sectors – government and non-government, civilian and military</p> <p><i>Content :</i>The 6 Day workshop included: Orientation and Introductions; The Arm Wrestling Exercise: Collaboration v. Competition; The seven-element framework for measuring success; SIMSOC;</p>

² Uvin and Campbell, Executive Summary, p. 2.

³ Table is taken from Uvin and Campbell, p. 53 and altered to include additional data.

			Communication for Effective Leadership; Four Quadrant Brainstorming Tool; Planning for Economic Recovery.
April 15-16, 2003	Follow-up workshop 1 for Ngozi I	29	The content of this workshop was developed by participants during Ngozi I who decided that this session would be comprised of four elements: (1) training in team-building; (2) training in visioning; (3) a consideration of their respective experiences in applying the lessons learned from the Ngozi training; and (4) further work in elaborating their analysis of the principal obstacles to economic recovery and of the means by which these obstacles might be overcome.
May 13, 2003	Six-month Assessment and Feedback Meeting	unknown	Presenters included: The Project Management team; The Trainers; and Two Workshop Participants. To facilitate project evaluation, the session also brought together donor agencies, NGO practitioners in the field of conflict resolution, and others who were involved in Great Lakes region issues to reflect on the methodology and substance of the training program and to comment critically on the program's evolution, and the applicability of project modalities to other conflict situations.
June 14-16, 2003	Follow-up workshop 2 for Ngozi I	23	This workshop included activities on how to prepare for and interact with prospective donors and partners.
September 23-28, 2003	Ngozi II	31	Same content as Ngozi I.
Sept. 30, 2003	Third Follow-Up Ngozi I	21	unknown
November 17-18, 2003	Ngozi II First Follow-up	24	unknown
February 9, 2004	Ngozi II Second Follow-up	21	See subsequent follow-up workshop..
February 10-11, 2004	Joint Ngozi I-II Follow-up	38	<p>The BLTP convened a second follow-on session for the Ngozi II participants, and followed that up with the first ever "combined" workshop of all the participants from Ngozi I and II. At the conclusion of this joint workshop, and in furtherance of the BLTP objective of encouraging the creation of a cohesive leadership network, the two groups decided to abandon the nomenclature of "Ngozi I" and "Ngozi II." Henceforth, they choose to be known simply as the "Ngozi Group."</p> <p>21 participants of Ngozi II and 17 of Ngozi I attended the joint workshop. They included representatives from business, labor, youth groups, women's organizations, the media, and grassroots relief groups as well as representative of various political parties</p>

May 18-19, 2004	Follow-up workshop 2 for Ngozi I & II	36	This workshop was focused on a hypothetical mediation and negotiation exercise designed to increase participant communication and problem-solving skills and ended with a discussion of ways in which the BLTP network could be strengthened and project formulation deepened. It began, as always with a review of the expectations of the participants and a recounting (<i>compte rendu</i>) of the ways in which they had used the tools, skills, or network of the BLTP since the last meeting. The workshop ended with a lengthy discussion of a variety of project ideas that have been tabled by the Ngozi groups.
May 24-29, 2004	Ngozi III	30	unknown
June 28-30, 2004	Ngozi III First Follow-up	unknown	unknown

According to the external evaluation, the follow-up workshops and the network were an important element of the BLTP design. "Unlike so many other training or dialogue projects, the BLTP has a follow-up system in place that tries to reinforce and deepen the impact of the initial workshop."⁴ According to the 2004 external evaluation: "The proportion of initial participants who attended the first follow-up workshop were very high in both cases (85% for Ngozi I; 77% for Ngozi II), testifying to the enthusiasm and sense of community created by the workshop. Attendance at subsequent follow-up workshops shows a consistent decline –to be expected, really, and not at all a sign of failure. The most recent attendance rates were 45% for Ngozi I (5th follow-up workshop for them, including the integrated ones with Ngozi II) and 54% for Ngozi II (3rd follow-up workshop). Note that these figures are relatively generous, as they include people who only came for a short time."⁵ In addition, the evaluation indicates that 26% of participants in Ngozi I and 45% of participants in Ngozi II came to all follow-up workshops.⁶

BLTP activities funded by other donors

The BLTP team raised funding from several other donors to respond to new opportunities and to continue the work catalyzed by the PCF grant. Other donors funded the training of the military-rebel groups (EMGI and JCC) charged with unblocking the forces agreement. Negotiations. DfID also supported the BLTP team in developing a training curriculum for the newly integrated National Defense Forces and the National Police. The BLTP team built on the momentum of the three Ngozi workshops and conducted a training of trainers of people who had been involved in the initial three Ngozi workshops. With the support of USAID, it developed a community-based leadership training program. The BLTP also supported several other initiatives, most notably the current Cadre de Dialogue that is being implemented by the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) with the financial support of the Peacebuilding Fund. Finally, the BLTP team continued to support the network, , but few tangible results have come from the network. While the PCF funding was necessary for the BLTP team to carry out these other activities, it was insufficient to catalyze them. The approach and dedication of the BLTP team was also necessary. The BLTP team took advantage of key opportunities that appeared in the Burundi context and raised funding to support these approaches.

⁴ Uvin and Campbell, p. 20.

⁵ Uvin and Campbell, p. 26.

⁶ Uvin and Campbell, p. 26.

iii. Intervention Monitoring and Evaluation

There is more documentation about the BLTP than any other project reviewed here. Nonetheless, BLTP lacked a systematic monitoring and evaluation system to track and document the process and impact. The external evaluation's assessment of the BLTP's approach to monitoring and evaluation is as follows.

"The BLTP has very little in the way of formal M&E systems. Your average World Bank project generates more monitoring data in one week than this one did in one year. Baseline data hardly exist, impact measures are unavailable, tracking systems of participants are largely absent, and anecdotal stories provide most of the data for proving success. Much of this is due to the nature of the work: the aims are multi-dimensional and hardly quantifiable, the problems of attribution stunning, the time horizon uncertain but certainly medium to long-term (i.e., beyond the duration of the project's funding in phase one), the sources of objective verification basically absent. The only more or less quantitative data available are participant evaluations of the workshops, and these are notoriously uncertain sources of data."⁷

"A good M&E system for projects such as the BLTP is different from, say, one for an infrastructure project: aims are much more changing and dynamics ambiguous; projects need to be much more flexible. In short, then, creating elaborate quantitative systems risks being time-consuming and rather futile. This is not the same as arguing that M&E systems are un-important, however. In this context, two elements are needed for a good M&E system: one is a *workplace environment* that valorizes constant gathering and critical analysis of relevant information; and the other is *programming*, setting out explicit intermediary and final aims and expectations."⁸

"As to the former, a workplace that favors quality M&E and fine-tuning of a project approach would possess some of the following features: regular soliciting of feedback by knowledgeable third-party observers; a frank inter-personal atmosphere where critical questions and open discussion are encouraged and rewarded; a constant willingness to re-analyze the local political and social dynamics, and to reflect on how to steer the project in the light of available information; and an open listening atmosphere towards the Burundian participants, who are the people who will ultimately determine the project's impact. The BLTP did well on these variables. We base this judgment on two main factors: conversations with the team, individually and in group; and actual behavior: the project has constantly fine-tuned its approach, whether it comes to the training modules, the follow-up activities, the selection of participants, the spin-off of new target publics and new projects, etc... Even during the time we conducted the evaluation, many changes were introduced to the project as a direct result of our discussions."⁹

"In short, the BLTP project, while not gifted with the sort of M&E system that ordinarily passes for desirable, seems to have acted as a learning organization, self-critical, flexible, etc... Still, the record of the BLTP on the second element of a good M&E system is less good. The project should begin working seriously on a detailed programming system, allowing in turn critical and intelligent monitoring and evaluation by comparing ongoing trends to expected outcomes. All this does not need to be quantitative, but it does need to be a step beyond anecdotes and feelings; if not, the risk is that people who do not share the teams' feelings can too easily question the entire approach, for success is merely in the eyes of the beholder. It should be linked to the establishment of intermediary objectives (as discussed earlier) and a much clearer idea of the particular objectives of each activity and how those can contribute to the intermediary and final objectives. In the absence of a capability to measure the highest level of impact – on national institutions, on sustainable peace – it may be possible to do a bit more work on measuring participants' actual behavior, the capacity of the network to analyze and find solutions to problems (and possibly to take actions), and specific changes seen in institutional decision-making and process following targeted workshops."¹⁰

⁷ Uvin and Campbell, p. 48.

⁸ Uvin and Campbell, p. 49.

⁹ Uvin and Campbell, p. 49.

¹⁰ Uvin and Campbell, p. 50.

iv. Intervention Impact

The BLTP had an important impact on individuals, institutions, and the peace process in general when military officials, who participated in their initial training of approximately 100 leaders from across government and civil society, suggested that they organize follow-up trainings that would support the integration of the former rebels and former army into a new National Defense Force. Building on the momentum created by the PCF's original support, the BLTP team raised bilateral funding from the UK Department for International Development (DfID) to carry out two workshops targeted at breaking the deadlock in negotiations around the reform of the Burundian military. They applied the same training that they used with the first 100 leaders to two smaller military-rebel committees who were charged with finding a solution to how different rebels and military would be classified, thus determining who would be demobilized and how the hierarchy of the new National Defense Force would function. One of these groups, the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), did not arrive at an agreement because they were not motivated and/or did not have the authority to do so, possibly because of their own political interest and their interest in continuing to receive per diems. The other group, Etat-Majeur Général Intégré (EMGI), was a group of technicians (not politicians) and was given the political go-ahead after the JCC failed to reach an agreement. They reported they were initially discouraged by the difficult problems they were charged with resolving, but the DfID-funded BLTP training gave them the confidence and skills to return to negotiations and find a solution. The resulting agreement was a significant milestone in Burundi's post-conflict transition. While the PCF grant did not directly cause this outcome, it made it possible by exposing military leaders to the BLTP method, supporting the development of the BLTP method, and creating confidence in the capacity and approach of the BLTP team.

The 2004 external evaluation of the BLTP concluded that it had the following direct and indirect impacts.

a. Direct impact

"1. Attitude change. At the level of individual attitude change, both our own observations and interviews with dozens of participants and observers indicate that the BLTP workshops do effect a personal transformation in the way people perceive themselves in relation to the other participants. They begin to break through some of the stereotypes and a priori's that they may have carried for years. The degree of attitude change during the workshop depends on the previous experiences and mindset of each individual, with some of the most dramatic impact occurring with extremists, refugees, and newcomers to the political game."

"2. Social Capital. Most participants cited the relationships that they built at the workshops as an important impact. Given the current context in Burundi, where there is much more collaboration and dialogue (making the job of pulling all of these people together a bit easier), but where there is also the real threat that division and violence will erupt again, the relationship-building that takes place at the BLTP takes on an increasing importance. Many people said that the fact that the BLTP is able to bring together such a diverse group of people and create dialogue between them is already an enormous contribution. There is no other venue where this group of decision-makers can come together informally and relate relatively openly with one another. Some go as far as saying that the social capital that is being created at the BLTP is essential for helping the peace process to move forward, precisely because there is still the real possibility that it will fall apart. For that reason, maintaining this social capital beyond the initial workshop is considered crucial by all."

"3. Skills. In general, the participants were pleased with the skills, tools, and methods learned in the BLTP training. The skills transmission during the BLTP workshops has been very successful at helping to build better communication among participants. It has been moderately successful at bringing the participants to a level that allows them to use these skills in their professional work – there is a clear demand for more such professionally relevant training. The BLTP's aim (and impact) was not to train professional negotiators, mediators, analysts, or trainers, thus enabling the participants to transfer the skills beyond themselves; this level, however, is something it may decide to focus on in a next phase."

"4. Capacity for Economic Policy. The BLTP has not been successful in developing effective economic recovery strategies, project, or activities. The development projects developed during the initial and follow-up workshops of Ngozi I and II engage only a few people, are not necessarily of particularly high quality nor do they embody the BLTP "spirit", and there is still little real chance of them getting funded (creating frustration among participants). As for the development of larger strategies for economic recovery in Burundi, the BLTP has made an attempt, but with little success. During the economic recovery brainstorming sessions, participants tend to rehash old, general development strategies without critically analyzing how these would create anything new or different compared to the past. Let's face it, nothing in the composition of the workshop groups, the training team, or the content of the workshops is of a nature to make one expect that high-quality development projects or policies will emerge."

"5. Understanding this, the BLTP has begun to move away from focusing on developing general strategies for economic recovery or even specific project proposals. Instead, it has increasingly begun privileging the building of confidence, a network of committed people, a broad range of activities in support of the transition, and targeted interventions in security sector reform. We strongly support this choice. It is justified by two main factors: first, the choice of development projects as a product of the BLTP workshops has shown itself not to be a good strategic choice (it tends to exclude and de-motivate people, only to yield of mediocre projects); second, the general context in Burundi requires attention to the current transition before all else. If successful (in combination with other policies) in advancing the current transition, the BLTP may well have a crucial impact on future economic policymaking in Burundi. In addition, there are some interesting ideas floating around as to how to adapt the BLTP approach to economic sectors, such as agriculture, which may in fact be pursued in the future (see recommendations). However, looking back at its first year, we believe the BLTP's decision to focus on influencing the current political transition was the right choice."

b. Indirect impact

"6. Participants Behavior Changes. There exists anecdotal evidence that some participants of the Ngozi I and II workshops have taken some of the new insights home with them, beginning to apply them in their personal and professional environments. There are a number of instances mentioned where people have applied some of the tools in their professional spheres – foremost by teachers and professional trainers, sometimes in general workplace management, and a few times in real negotiations (with the officers from the EMGI acting as the ideal example here). Similarly, people regularly mention using the tools and the overall approach at home or in the family. It is hard to measure this impact, but this does not mean it is absent. The BLTP team should develop a better M&E system to track (and promote) this sort of impact."

"7. Security Sector. The most immediate impact on national institutions and policies has come in relation to the security sector training, and particularly the training of the Etat-Majeur Général Intégré (EMGI) in Gitega in May 2004 [neither of which were funded by the PCF]. It is important to understand, nonetheless, that the fact that the BLTP training helped the EMGI to have a breakthrough on the "status of combatants" issue was in large part due to incentives that existed among the EMGI participants to come to an agreement. The BLTP increased the trust among them as well as their communication capacity, so that an agreement could more easily be reached, but it could only contribute to success because a number of contextual variables (not controlled by the BLTP) were favorable to it. The important lesson learned here is that the most direct impact of the BLTP will be observed with institutions and decision-making mechanisms that are faced with issues that they need to resolve, and have incentives to do so. This is clearly not the case with every institution in Burundi, and the BLTP team should evaluate this "ripeness" when choosing which institutions to target."

"8. The network. Many of the Ngozi I-III participants told us that they did not have the power, leverage, or even the incentives as individuals to make a serious impact at the present time on institutional

transformation, economic reconstruction, or sustainable peace. But, they and observers also said that the significance of the BLTP was that it continued to create relationships among a group of people that may be able to help keep the transition, and the country, from falling apart (which is currently a real risk). They have tentacles in all institutions in the country and they constitute a network that shares, more than any other group of such political and social diversity, a sense of trust and openness to mutual discussion. The challenge for the BLTP is to maintain this impact, and extend it further through concrete actions.”

“9. Spin-Off Activities. The BLTP produced a set of spin-off activities, which were not planned or predicted at the outset: three additional workshops in the security sector (funded by DfID and the EU), and a major decentralization project adopting the BLTP approach in two Provinces (with WWIC technical assistance, but funded and executed by OTI). These spin-off activities may constitute the most direct impact of the BLTP on national institutions and policies, and possibly longer-term peace and economic reconstruction; certainly the EMGI training has produced clearly visible results. They also demonstrate that the BLTP team works as a flexible learning organization, capable of rapidly responding to emerging opportunities, soliciting funds from a broad range of other international actors. In a second phase, the spin-off activities may increasingly come to define the BLTP – yet, it is important to remember that it is the experience and the credibility gained from the Ngozi I-III workshops that allowed them to occur.”

c. Post-PCF funding impact

During our ten-day field visit to Burundi in December 2008, we revisited the impact of the BLTP, and concluded that the network did not seem to have delivered on its intended aims. By 2008, there was still no systematic way that the network members could contact each other. Email was not widely used and travel funds were not available. A few local people came to the BLTP office to use the internet, but the network seemed to serve little other purpose. Several participants met a few times to start an NGO, but never developed a clear strategy and the idea was eventually shelved. Neither the BLTP team, nor the BLTP network had sufficient means to continue to invest in the network.

The activities associated with the biggest impacts articulated by stakeholders were not funded by the PCF, but by other grants that built on the initial work of the PCF. And yet, the Ngozi workshops catalyzed these other efforts. Without them, and the PCF support, the subsequent impacts would not have been possible. As noted above, the training of the EMGI was the BLTP project that had the most direct impact on the peace process. In addition, the training of trainers both as part of the Community-Based Leadership Development Project and as part of the BLTP training-of-trainers provided core group of Burundians who were able to use these skills in their own work, and thus *transfer* the learning, and who were able to support subsequent activities that aimed to use the same skill-set. For example, according to core members of its organizing team, the current dialogue process among Burundian political parties would not have been possible without the BLTP team or the trainers that it trained. The BLTP staff helped to design some of the core elements of the dialogue process and the some of the facilitators of the dialogue process were trained by the BLTP. The impact of the UN dialogue process is not yet known, but if we take the transfer of capacity as one indicator of success, the BLTP has clearly been successful in this regard. The BLTP sought out and took advantage of opportunities to implement these types of follow up activities as indicated as early as its 2003 trip report:

Senior Army leaders have already expressed an interest in similar leadership training being undertaken by both Army and rebel military leaders who will be centrally involved in security reform, demobilization and integration activities. Support for this security-focused training would have to be sought from other donors, but this is precisely the kind of spin-off initiative we hope the Burundi Leadership Training Project will generate.

Nonetheless, neither the BLTP nor the World Bank took advantage of the opportunity to mainstream the BLTP method into other World Bank projects. According to the 2004 external evaluation, “The local Bank

office seemed very interested in the idea of mainstreaming the BLTP into its own programming. Discussions with World Bank staff revealed options that include training the World Bank Country Team, targeting specific sectors (Agriculture, PRSP), working with the community infrastructure projects, and supporting the decentralization strategy.¹¹ The GLCDP was pitched as a follow-up to the BLTP, but it did not involve any of the BLTP staff, did not use the methods, and did not work with any of the same people. In addition, it also overlooked the opportunity to mainstream its method into other World Bank projects. This opportunity is only being taken advantage of now that national staff members in DC and Bujumbura have begun to tell their Bank colleagues about the method.

v. Implementation Arrangements

The BLTP was designed, managed, and implemented by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS). The World Bank gave significant input into the design and closely followed the project implementation, but did not play a direct role in implementing the project. The 2004 evaluation found the World Bank buy-in impressive. "After all, this is the sort of project that is rather marginal to the Bank: it spends a small amount of money in an institution where moving money is an important career incentive; it deals not with quantitative, economic or infrastructure matters in an institution that generally valorizes exactly such competencies – yet, we found generally a serious interest in, and enthusiasm for, the BLTP among Bank staff.... This reflects a sense that the BLTP does contribute to the World Bank's work, in an original and indirect manner possibly, but nonetheless potentially highly relevant."¹²

World Bank staff that we interviewed in 2008 emphasized the importance of Bank staff's engagement in leadership development interventions not only for oversight purposes, but also because it represented an opportunity for Bank staff to learn about the political context and to gain a better understanding of the motivations of their government interlocutors.

The 2004 evaluation viewed the hands-off approach of the Post-Conflict Fund management structure as an asset. "The Post-Conflict Fund set-up is among the lightest management systems the Bank possesses. Essentially, money is transferred to the WWIC, which then has complete management responsibility. WWIC regularly reports, but in a much lighter format than with directly Bank-managed projects, to the Bank. Bank staff has at times asked questions about certain procurement decisions, and these have received satisfactory answers – but overall, the system is light and easy to manage."¹³ The PCF's hands-off approach seemed to work because the BLTP team was so attuned to the complexities of the Burundian conflict, the Burundian staff were highly respected by a broad spectrum of society, and the trainers were highly skilled, adaptable and the primary trainer lived in the country. If the team and their understanding of the context had not been of such a high caliber, the PCF's hands-off approach could have enabled ineffective and even harmful interventions.

The BLTP team remained the same throughout the PCF-funded portion of the project, and remains largely the same.

In addition, partly based on the recommendations of the 2004 external evaluation, the WWICS created a local NGO to continue the BLTP's approach in Burundi with the support of the WWICS team in Washington, DC. This more sustainable approach had both positive and negative outcomes. On the positive side, it allowed the BLTP to remain connected to the complex and evolving political transition in Burundi, reinforce the local capacity of the people who it had trained as trainers, serve as a general resource for the BLTP methodology in Burundi, and become involved in new leadership development and capacity building interventions. On the negative side, the BLTP team in Washington, DC and in Burundi were viewed by the

¹¹ Uvin and Campbell Executive Summary, p. 8.

¹² Uvin and Campbell, p. 51.

¹³ Uvin and Campbell, p. 51.

Burundian administration that came into power in 2005 as a relic of the previous administration. When we mentioned the BLTP in our discussions with new government ministers, they easily dismissed as an old initiative that was not longer relevant to them. Even though the BLTP trained the entire cabinet shortly after they were elected in 2005 as well as several parliamentarians, people seemed to view it as an initiative that focused on a different time in Burundi's transition.

The tendency to shun past trainers and "capacity builders" is a common occurrence with leadership development interventions, where the people who worked with the past leadership are often discarded by the new leadership, regardless of how skilled or knowledgeable they are. Given its new less-favorable position in relation to the Burundian Government, the BLTP could refocus its work on a different level of capacity development, possibly at the community level, or on building a reputation and skill as a general training institute that provides management and leadership services to all of Burundi's leadership. This latter option would likely be less threatening to Burundi's current government than the direct interventions at the highest political level that the BLTP had engaged in previously. Thus, leadership development intervention that is sustained over time is likely to require a significant change in tactics and approach as the leadership transitions and the context changes.

vi. **BLTP Lessons Learned**

Because the BLTP is the longest-existing leadership development project under study, it provides some important lessons for current and future leadership development interventions. We have organized these lessons learned in the same leadership development framework used in the main section of the report.

Context and Intervention Goals

- The BLTP was strongly linked to the context because of the staff involved and the processes used. Nonetheless, when the leadership in Burundi changed in 2005, its role was less clear and the new leaders expressed much less interest in the BLTP approach and methods. There is a tendency to discard or distance oneself from leadership development work associated with past leadership when there is a change in leadership, of which the BLTP team's reduced influence is an example. The extent to which people or an approach are perceived to be aligned with the "old order" tends to reduce the likelihood the "new order" will accept it. Working across stakeholder groups is one way to help guard against this.

Intervention Strategy and Design

- Uvin and Campbell conclude that there is no fixed answer as to whether the broad/inclusive approach of Ngozi 1-11 was better or worse than the more narrowly targeted military workshops funded by other donors. "There is no fixed answer to this question; it all depends on the strategic aim of the BLTP. The main advantage of widening the social basis of the workshops is clear: the discussions, the social capital, and the network will be broader. As a result, the concerns and the needs of the large majority of Burundian people *may* become more central to the workshop and subsequent network dynamics. The disadvantage is one of opportunity cost: more such people means less people with real power now. The project had to make a choice here in function of its vision of its contribution to Burundi's evolution. If the prime aim of the BLTP is to support, strengthen, and improve the current transitional dynamics (as seems to be the case), then selecting mainly people with current power (including spoiling power) is a better use of scarce resources. This choice is most visible when one trains specific institutions. In the EMGI workshop, for example, there were no civil society people at all –nobody to speak for those displaced since years by the warring factions, those whose human rights were massively being trampled on the ground by the FAB and the CNDD (and the FDR, not present at that workshop), nobody to discuss what it would take to promote human security for Burundi's ordinary citizens. The nature of the discussions and the network, then, were very narrow. Yet, it is this narrowness that, at least in part, accounts for the fact that this workshop produced rapid results feeding into the current transition. If,

on the other hand, the aim is to lay the groundwork for the long-term emergence of *new* leaders in Burundi and to contribute to better post-transition development policies, then the inclusion of more civil society representatives, youth, refugees, farmer's and women's organizations, and the like, is warranted."¹⁴

Implementation Arrangements

- According to Uvin and Campbell, "Politically sensitive projects like the BLTP need to be headed by well-known, widely respected, experienced, and committed leaders. It is critical that these leaders have political clout in and a deep understanding of the particular country."¹⁵
- World Bank staff that we interviewed emphasized the importance of Bank staff's engagement in leadership development interventions not only for oversight purposes, but also because it represents an opportunity for Bank staff to learn about the political context and to gain a better understanding of the motivations of their government interlocutors.
- If the team and their understanding of the content and context had not been of such a high caliber, the PCF's hands-off approach could have enabled ineffective and potentially harmful interventions.

Monitoring & Evaluation

- The BLTP produced extensive documentation, but relied primarily on anecdotes to demonstrate its impact. A more critical and evidence-based approach to monitoring and evaluation would have been much more convincing.
- The intervention design and buy-in process was more fully resourced and implemented than was the monitoring process. While, evaluation data were used to inform programmatic changes, the data were not comprehensive and integrated into the intervention overall.
- The BLTP was very adept at integrating and responding to the feedback of external evaluators.

Intervention Impact

- The BLTP had its most important impact with activities that were funded after the PCF grant. The capacity of the PCF grant to catalyze this impact relied on the ability of the BLTP team to find other funding and refocus its intervention design on emerging opportunities. If they had not been able to do this, then the investment made by the PCF would have been lost. If the goal of short-term grants, like the PCF, is to catalyze impact, then they may have an interest in helping that impact to be catalyzed either by providing longer-term funding or by helping the intervention to find other sources of funding.
- The BLTP team and participants tried to establish a network but they didn't have the resources or incentives. The network didn't seem to serve its intended purpose of maintaining social cohesion, at least not once the BLTP stopped organizing follow-up workshops.
- The transfer of learning from the BLTP is limited by the tools provided by the BLTP. The BLTP did not provide in depth training in any one method, but rather provided exposure to (and for ToTs full training in) a special package of methods. The BLTP expressed interest in broadening the skills that it is able to provide, thus increasing its potential impact.
- At the individual level, we found that the impact of the BLTP was greatest when participants had the motivation, knowledge, opportunity, and authority to apply what they learned. This was most evident with the people that it trained as trainers.

¹⁴ Uvin and Campbell, p. 17-18.

¹⁵ Uvin and Campbell, Executive Summary, p. 9.

- At the group and organizational levels, the impact of the BTLP seemed to be greatest when it trained a critical mass of people who worked together or were in frequent contact and could reinforce the new skills, attitudes, and behaviors. This was most evident with the training of the EMGI.

C. Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program (GLCDP)

In January 2007, the Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program (GLCDP) received \$423,800 from the LICUS Trust Fund for two years. The funding was requested by the Burundian Government. While the BLTP, funded by the PCF, focused primarily on the transitional period in Burundi, 2001-2005, the GLCDP focused on building leadership capacity of the government that came into power in 2005. Because the GLCDP was requested by the Government of Burundi, it had a high level of access to and buy-in from the highest government levels of the. GLCDP aimed to improve the capacity of social service sectors of the Burundian government to deliver results, by providing management training and improving teamwork through the use of pilot project teams.

An evaluation of the GLCDP is scheduled for 2009. At the time of our review there was not an effective monitoring structure in place. The description and findings below are derived from review of the existing project documents and interviews with approximately 30 stakeholders including participants, World Bank staff, and observers during our ten-day field visit to Burundi and two days of interviews in Washington, DC. Because the purpose of and resources allocated for this report were intended to provide a global review of eight leadership development interventions, and not a detailed evaluation of each intervention, the information and findings provided below are inevitably preliminary, particularly in the absence of systematic monitoring. Nonetheless, our preliminary review of the interventions shows that it has made a positive impact on the capacity of certain groups within the government to deliver significant results to the Burundian people. The challenges that this intervention faces are challenges faced by any intervention in Burundi – a weak state, extreme poverty, scarce resources, corrupt practices, and a culture of mistrust and self-protectiveness resulting from decades of violent conflict and state disintegration.

i. Intervention Goals

The goal of the GLCDP, as articulated in its proposal to the LICUS-TF, is to “improve the confidence, accountability, and ultimately the effectiveness of national leaders and through them, the accountable thematic and geographic teams.” This goal is in response to the following problem that the GLCDP staff identified in Burundi: “There are important challenges facing Burundi’s leaders in the day-to-day running of the country – ranging from budget issues and the necessity of keeping the PRGF on track to putting in place mechanisms that curb corruption and protect human rights. How the leadership tackles these issues is critical to Burundi’s future. Managing these challenges and the expectations of Burundians and of donors will require extraordinary leadership capacity in terms of developing realistic strategies and policies and delivering results. The reality, however, is that the leadership team is new, lacks experience, and operates in an environment of weak institutional and organizational capacity.”

To build and support the leadership capacity of Burundi’s new leaders to deliver concrete results, the GLCDP, aimed to contribute to: “Creating an environment for the achievement of sustainable results; Providing leaders across society with an improved understanding of their roles and responsibilities as leaders; Building further consensus between different stakeholder groups in the country; Mainstreaming good governance practices in leaders’ respective sectors of responsibility, leading to improvements in governance mechanisms and structures (increased accountability and transparency, improved participatory processes). Given the above, and in recognition of the considerable effort already made to generate trust and build relationships within the scope of the BLTP, the key capacities and endogenous processes that this program aims to encourage, facilitate and develop include, but are not limited to: Visioning and prioritizing; Managing for results, including: assigning accountabilities; developing feedback systems; mobilizing multiple

stakeholders; and building consensus around desired results and outcomes; and Using diagnostic and community based tools to monitor governance and public sector performance.”

ii. Intervention Design and Outputs

The GLCDP was implemented in stages; initially implementing two pilot projects in the rapid results method, and then presenting the result before a High-Level cabinet meeting. This approach helped convince people that the project could make a difference by showing concrete cases of positive change and impact. The GLCDP team also focused on getting high-level leadership buy-in. The team believed that this project was only possible with the buy-in, support, and pressure of high-level Burundian leadership. In fact, high level support is a known factor that contributes to effective leadership development. The strategy of engaging high-level leadership in the project has provided a very important incentive for some staff to dedicate the time and energy necessary to achieve the desired rapid results. The GLCDP employed the Rapid Results Approach (RRA), which is a set of management tools, processes, and skills that help leaders in organizations use a series of short-term projects to translate long-term goals into concrete actions, results, and impact. Small teams work on Rapid Results Initiatives, which are projects lasting 100 days.

a. Original implementation design

The GLCDP design outlined in the LICUS-TF proposal had three components: Preparing for the donor Round-table and PRSP implementation through studies, pilots, and a culminating seminar; Support to implementation and achievement of outcomes under PRSP plans of action through pilots, work-shops and seminars; and Monitoring and evaluation. In addition, it aimed to address some of the key constraints to implementation outlined in the Governance and Corruption study that the President of Burundi requested from WBI. Specifically, the proposal indicated that the GLCDP planned to:

- hold High-level Cabinet/Leadership seminars to provide exposure to international lessons learned and best practices and a forum for dialogue, communication, and information sharing;
- hold skill building exercises in process and system analyses for existing thematic groups (for PRSP or other);
- contract local consultants to conduct preparatory studies, which would feed into activity design;
- contract local consultants to carry out case studies, which would feed into activity design;
- organize practical pilots to “target systemic change for the establishment of a results culture, using just one or two sectors for demonstration effect and as a way to begin sequenced change (success in one area replicated in others, based on the new norms, behaviors, and capacities in place.)” The logic of the pilot projects, as articulated in the GLCDP proposal, is that capacity “develops through the process of achieving results in the short term (in support of wider development goals), and in doing so; governance improves by identifying solutions to some of the major implementation constraints. While the initial pilots proposed for this program target only one or two sectors (e.g. education, health...), the capacity developed is durable insofar as it represents a reconfiguration of habits and patterns – the dynamics, behavioral change, and knowledge acquired are applicable to other sectors.”

The proposal indicated that the target audience for the intervention is “representatives from government and non-government spheres, including government representatives, representatives from parliament, civil society, media, NGOs, religious groups, and political parties. Selection criteria will be developed with due regard to the criteria applied for other past and ongoing leadership initiatives, seeking synergies and work with “alumni” where this presents added value and, conversely, seeking to spread beyond the group of participants already targeted by other initiatives where this is more valuable. Criteria for participant selection for each event will be specified in the concept note for the events themselves. While WBI will communicate criteria for participation, emphasizing the value of having all major stakeholders represented during such activities, the final decision as to who participates and benefits from the program and the different activities lies with the government.” The pilot projects were selected based on 3 criteria: they

responded to an identified priority and could generate tangible impacts; there were sufficient resources for their implementation; and they could be completed within 100 days.

b. Design alteration and outputs

According to project documents, by December 2008 the program had concluded the following activities.¹⁶

Date	Event/Innovation	Content
May 2006	WBI scoping mission	The mission met and consulted with the main national stakeholders at government and civil society level, as well as with Bank representatives. All stakeholders expressed demand for a leadership-focused capacity development initiative. Based on these initial consultations, a concept note for further activities and a LICUS TF proposal were developed.
Autumn 2006	3 Background Studies	The commissioning of three background studies examining the education and health sectors and the synergies between different donor and government results frameworks. The studies were executed by three national consultants.
November 2006	Launch of rapid results pilots in the education and health sectors	n/a
February 2007	Launch of further rapid results pilots—in four additional sectors.	n/a
May 2007	First Government Retreat	Lessons from rapid results pilots were showcased, examined and discussed, and international experiences presented by three high-level international resources persons Three working groups of ministers and non-government participants agreed upon a set of follow-up actions or a new wave of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI's) based on priority needs and constraints emerging from the pilot phase. Additional RRI's in other sectors could be initiated in cases where the key responsible parties clearly demonstrate their commitment to engage in such initiatives, are able to identify concrete actions that are likely to generate visible results within 100 days, and are ready to allocate the resources necessary for this work.
September 2007	Rapid Results Training	This week trained 10 coaches and raised awareness of 30 focal points in the Ministries. There were 19 Ministries represented, and 5 other institutions represented. By the end of the week, 11 Rapid Results Pilots were ready to be launched in Mid-September.

¹⁶ List taken from WBI Mission Report of Cia Sjetnan, Kay Winning, and Benjamina Randrianarivelo from September 2008, the report from the October 2008 training, and Report on Burundi Leadership Retreat 2007.

October 2007, February/March 2008	Launch of rapid results initiatives in 11 sectors—to government programmes.	Two waves of initiatives have been launched and terminated (to September 2008).
February/March 2008	Launch of rapid results initiatives within the PAGE project.	n/a
July 2008	Launch of rapid results initiatives in the governance sector—linked to the governance study.	n/a
February 2008	Several additional innovations were reported by the WBI Mission.	<p>Adoption of a “challenge letter” - a new tool in the implementation of rapid results initiatives.</p> <p>Establishment of an Advisory Group. Comprising all the strategic leaders for on-going rapid results initiatives, an Advisory Group was appointed to analyze the progress and process of the rapid results initiatives, draw lessons from these initiatives, and contribute to solving problems and removing constraints to achieving results.</p> <p>TV address by the First Vice-President. Upon being briefed on progress, the First Vice-President – who was new to the program and the rapid results methodology - took the initiative to go on national TV, explaining the rapid results approach and pledging the commitment of the Government to deliver rapid results by applying this methodology in all areas of the government's work.</p> <p>Tim Carrington, media and communications expert, joined the mission to develop appropriate communications material for the government and WBI. At the current stage of the program, this process increasingly involves capturing lessons of experience and disseminating them to support a broader change in mentality and behavior.</p>
October 6-10, 2008	Training Workshop in RRA Method	120 Participants, primarily from the Burundian Government.

It is not clear how the original design was altered, as the initial design was vague enough to allow for specification and alteration at a later date. In general, it seems that the desired outputs were achieved. The total number of people trained and their distribution across government agencies is not available in the project documents that were provided to us. However, there was an impressive number of rapid results projects across ministries that had begun or were still underway.

iii. Intervention Monitoring and Evaluation

Although a monitoring and evaluation system was designed by a consultant, it was never implemented. The project maintained reports from all external WBI visits and the national project staff maintained a record of the ongoing projects, reports of meetings and training workshops, and held weekly meetings to discuss progress. (We were not provided with any budget reports.) Nonetheless, all of these documents lack a critical analysis of whether the project is actually achieving its desired aims, what it would take to achieve

these aims, and how it could improve its impact. The project does not seem to be modeling the processes it is sharing with the Burundian government: to take the overall strategic aims and design a plan to achieve them. The project appears to be demand-driven at this point, responding to requests from the government, but risking being completely overstretched and insufficiently strategic in the allocation of its resources. Furthermore, without a clear plan it may be unable to build on and strengthen the capacity of the people whom it has already trained, many of whom told us they needed further training and support in order to be able to continue to apply the rapid results methods. A good monitoring and evaluation system would help the team clarify their strategic aims and objectives, monitor those objectives, and strategically use their scarce resources.

iv. Intervention Impact

Since there has not yet been an evaluation of the GLCDP and monitoring data are lacking, it is impossible to provide evidence of impact. The WBI reported in February 2008 that the pilots launched in December 2007 had an average completion rate of 85%, which we were unable to verify. Nonetheless, our interviews with over 30 participants selected from all RRIs revealed that there had been an important impact of some of the work. In one case, an RRI enabled the Ministry of Education and Finance to reduce by eight months the time that it takes to pay new teachers. Other individuals who had been trained and involved in RRI reported that it created an unprecedented level of teamwork in the RRI teams, that it provided them with a workplan, which they had not previously had, and it gave them a sense of satisfaction at being able to deliver real results. Interviewees reported that prior to the RRI method, they did not understand how to translate the large strategies and plans, such as the PRSP, into manageable daily tasks. In addition, they reported that the RRI enabled and pressured leaders to provide leadership and guidance to their teams, by involving them in the planning and by holding them accountable for the results delivered.

The RRI method seemed to be most successful when the individuals applying it had the motivation, capability, and opportunity to use it. In addition, it seemed to be easier to implement in relation to goals that required no additional funds, as RRIs are not provided with any additional funds to support the implementation of the projects. Only a few people that we interviewed reported that they were able to use the RRI method out of the RRI projects supported by the World Bank. In these cases, the individuals became convinced of the method and had the authority and conviction to apply it to their other work. In other cases, people saw the RRI as taking them away from their other tasks that could provide them with more money through per diems or other rewards. For many civil servants who make between US\$200 and US\$500 a month, the search for and expectation of additional resources here and there has become part of their culture. The funding issue influences both participation and project success.

The lack of additional resources provided by the RRI is both a strength and a hindrance. In two of the most reportedly successful cases, the payment of the teachers' salaries and community agricultural projects, no additional funding was required. The problem that the RRI sought to address was one of a dysfunctional system, not one of scarce resources. The innovation and determination of the project leaders as well, combined with critical support from the GLCDP team, helped these RRIs to achieve reportedly successful outcomes and even encouraged them to replicate the methodology elsewhere. In another case, where the RRI required some sort of resources, it in fact created conflict. Individuals involved in the project agreed to put in their own resources, but then could not agree on how to reapportion the resources when the project ended, creating interpersonal conflict and tension that could not be addressed by the RRI method.

The expected outcomes articulated in the GLCDP proposal were that the program "will lead to the institutionalization of new approaches and processes that will enhance the internalization of the learning that has taken place." The outcome indicators put forward in the proposal were: "Increased focus on results in government planning and implementation; Resolution of old implementation problems with new approaches; Roles and responsibilities clearly defined in implementation procedures and mechanisms; Inclusion of major stakeholders in project implementation and decision-making processes; Establishment of multi-stakeholder

teams; and Improved governance mechanisms and structures: (i) increased accountability and transparency; (ii) improved participatory processes.” These outcome indicators are either output indicators (i.e., establishment of multi-stakeholder teams) or very vague outcome indicators. Thus, even though the GLCDP does seem to offer an important approach that is valued by those with the incentive, capability, and opportunity to use it, the broader impact of the method is unlikely to be captured by the articulated outcomes or indicators.

v. Implementation Arrangements

The GLCDP is Bank executed. The three national staff members work in the visiting mission quarters in the World Bank Bujumbura Office. The Task Team Leader and other project staff are based in WBI’s Washington, DC offices. During our interviews, we asked whether or not Bank affiliation of this project made a difference. Some responded that it gave the project the clout and authority necessary to work with such high-level leadership. In addition, some said, the Government was interested in being seen by the Bank to perform, which gave them an incentive to implement and follow-through on the RRI projects. Others said that the Bank affiliation was confusing to many people because it did not come with any money. Because of its name – “The World Bank” –most Burundians equate the Bank with endless amounts of money, and expect some of that money to come their way when they collaborate with the Bank. Almost every person who we interviewed requested that the Bank provide money along with the RRI methodology.

The GLCDP also has a very active Steering Committee which meets regularly and provides a peer accountability mechanism for the various ministries who participate. Participants reported that a competition had evolved between many of the different ministries to successfully and quickly implement their RRI projects. The Steering Committee’s role in the design and decision-making in relation to the GLCDP was unclear from our interviews.

Through our interviews, we were unable to fully illuminate the management and decision-making structure of the GLCDP. The DC-based TTL and team, and the Madagascar-based lead trainer seem to keep in touch with the Burundi-based team via email, video-conference, and periodic visits. While the Burundi Country Manager was certainly interested in, supportive of, and informed about the project, she did not seem to be directly engaged in managing or overseeing the project, which is the core responsibility of the TTL. The Bujumbura-based team therefore appeared to be working largely on their own with some support from afar: developing their own strategy, responding to government requests, organizing visits for consultants (like ourselves), organizing training workshops, and meeting on a weekly basis to share notes. While the team is clearly competent and well-positioned to carry out this work, they do not have a clear vision of where the GLCDP is going and how it can get there. The level of oversight of the team and the project necessary to create the incentives to ensure that the project moves forward, and to prevent unintended consequences of the intervention is unclear.

The skill and reputation of the GLCDP Burundi-based team, or “coaches”, seem to be a critical factor in the successes of the project thus far. They are widely respected as being both balanced and competent. As former government employees, they are comfortable with the players and the system and are able to leverage their World Bank position and their knowledge of the government to put critical pressure on RRI teams to achieve results. One interviewee told us that when her boss was not giving sufficient attention to the project she called one the project coach and told him so, and he subsequently called her boss and got him to allocate the necessary resources to the project. In spite of the skill and competence of the GLCDP Burundi-based team, the implicit aim and hope of the project – to increase the management and leadership capacity of the Burundian government – seems beyond the capacity and training of these four individuals. As a result, the GLCDP should consider how it can clarify the project aims to ensure that they seem achievable with its current capacity, and do not result in failed expectations for either the team or the government. A clear for enhancing the dispersion and transfer of the training seems critical to achieving the broader goal. In addition, the GLCDP could benefit from expanding its repertoire of leadership skills and

approaches beyond the RRA approach and search for other potential partners in its effort (possibly including the BLTP, with whom it has not yet directly collaborated).

vi. **Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

Context and Intervention Goals

- The fact that the main GLCDP coaches were highly politically connected and widely respected within Burundian political circles seemed to be a critical factor in their effectiveness at supporting the implementation of the RRA method in the Burundian Government.

Intervention Strategy and Design

- The initial engagement of high-level leadership, the implementation of pilot RRAs, and the presentation of the results of the RRAs to a larger group of high-level leaders seemed to be a very effective strategy in convincing people within the government of the intervention's value and creating buy-in across the government.
- Although the GLCDP repeatedly referred to its desire to build on the BLTP's work, we found no evidence of this. Nonetheless, these two approaches are potentially compatible and options to integrate them together should be evaluated in the future.
- In fact, the GLCDP project seems to have a strategic deficit and should begin practicing what it is preaching to the Burundian government: to take the overall strategic aims and design a plan to achieve them. The project is in many ways too demand-driven at this point, responding to requests from the government, but risking being completely overstretched and insufficiently strategic in the allocation of its resources. Furthermore, without a clear plan it may be unable to build on and strengthen the capacity of the people whom it has already trained, many of whom told us they needed further training and support in order to be able to continue to apply the rapid results methods. Many of the people we interviewed requested further training and support. Several internal coaches within the government said that they did not have the skills to transfer learning to their colleagues. Once this strategy has been clarified, a good monitoring and evaluation system would help the team clarify their strategic aims and objectives, monitor those objectives, and strategically use their scarce resources.

Monitoring and Evaluation

- A monitoring and evaluation framework was developed, but was not implemented.
- Like the BLTP, the reports from the intervention team seemed to be focused on proving that it worked rather than discussing the real challenges and opportunities, in addition to the outputs and outcomes. A more thorough and critical monitoring and evaluation system would likely help to improve the effectiveness of the project, by encouraging introspective discussion, and provide more tangible data to demonstrate the value added of the project.

Intervention Impact

- The GLCDP seems to be making an important contribution to the capacity of, at least, certain individuals and groups within the Burundian Government to deliver results. Nonetheless, it does not have a strategy for building on the impact that it has already had and increasing the sustainability of the impact.
- There is an important opportunity to integrate the RRA approach into other World Bank projects. This opportunity should be explored seriously, although following up on it should not result in abandonment of the gains already made in the work done directly with the Burundian Government.



Annex D: Timor-Leste Case Study

	Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)	Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)
Dates	08/01 – 06/02	06/04 – 01/07	11/06 – 06/08
Funding	\$249,993	\$250,000	\$1,078,100
Specific Contextual Issues	The task of governance is not only difficult because of the massive destruction to physical infrastructure, but also because of the lack of management and public administration experience [and] skills in conflict resolution and mediation.	Those youth groups who played an important role in the resistance struggle and who expected to be rewarded for their efforts in the fight, instead now find themselves without a voice, in search of a new role in an independent Timor-Leste.	In the critical period between the cessation of violence and formation of the new government, and the May 2007 elections, even small visible improvements in leadership and governance stances which signal openness and communication are expected to have significant positive effects.
Goal	Enhance participants' skills and techniques as effective national leaders and managers; unite a broad range of Timorese leadership and society in building an anti-corruption strategy; and help participants acquire the tools to understand and resolve conflict in a non-political context so that they may play an important role as mediators and conflict-managers.	Build trust among urban youth groups and youth-at-risk and to engage them in policy dialogues with government and community leaders; and support young people through peer-to-peer non-formal training sessions to strengthen self-confidence and a sense of identity, and to value positive expression of cooperation and teamwork.	Build leadership capacities of state and non-state actors with a view to strengthening trust and thus an ability to work more cooperatively, more collaboratively and therefore more effectively; and enhance the communication skills and information-sharing abilities not only of individuals but of state institutions with civil society and the public more broadly.

Abstract

Three leadership development interventions were funded in Timor-Leste. The table above provides an overview of the interventions. The first intervention was a workshop (Capacity-Building Assistance and Development or CAD) for high-level leaders focused on leaders' ability to communicate with one another and resolve conflicts effectively. The workshop took place outside of the capital city in order to foster a more retreat-like environment; offering an opportunity to remove leaders from their immediate context. The lead workshop facilitator, Dean Williams, was a seasoned Harvard professor with a great deal of experience working with high-level leaders. Facilitator selection for this intervention was particularly critical. The

facilitator needed to be someone with a high degree of credibility (e.g. highly educated, highly experienced), seen as independent and therefore non-threatening (i.e. someone without a hidden or political agenda), have the ability to establish his or her leadership with the group while concurrently acknowledging the groups' significant leadership experience and expertise, and the ability to respectfully and effectively respond to individuals or the group if the dialogue became toxic or destructive. The second intervention funded in Timor-Leste, about which we had the least information, was Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED). This intervention sought to address the important and increasingly volatile youth issues in the country – aiming to increase their ability to collaborate peacefully with one another and to communicate effectively with the government. The hope was that horizontal and vertical social capital would be created through this process, and would address some of the communication and leadership gaps in the society. Youth were, and remain, a critical population to address with regard to leadership development. The riots of 2006 reinforced the need for this work. However, the LED intervention may have only supported one political constituency, which if true would be an unintended negative consequence of the intervention¹⁷. The third intervention, Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR), sought to build trust among groups and enhance the communication skills and information-sharing abilities broadly in order to foster cooperation and collaboration.

A. The Country Context

High-Level Government Leadership

These are the country's visionaries who led the struggle for independence from home and abroad. They were largely unified, with some exceptions, in their struggle against Indonesia, and united the people in a resistance movement. The unity within the resistance broke down after independence was won and tensions increased between the individuals who had led the resistance. There were key moments of violence related to these tensions. Recent examples include the widespread riots in 2006 and the attempted presidential assassination in early 2008. Interviewees indicated that top leaders often gave mixed or incomplete messages (resulting in confusion and gossip), did not follow through on commitments and policies (reducing the peoples' trust in them and hope for something better), undermined one another (creating or exacerbating societal fissures), and while often inspirational, they lacked managerial skills (resulting in a lack of clarity about what actions to take and how). For many Timorese, disappointment with these leaders seemed to be increasing. Many interviewees indicated that the leaders did not seem to appreciate how their words and actions affected the lives of ordinary people, and could possibly lead to conflict and violence. The government bureaucracy also has significant leadership deficits. No one in high-level government position has had much experience governing. For almost a century, the country has been controlled by one foreign power or another – from the Japanese to the Portugese, to the Indonesians. When Timorese were in positions of leadership, it was under someone else's rules and systems. A leadership culture of secrecy and hierarchy, which clearly served the country well during the resistance movement, has not functioned as well in these newly emerging democratic institutions. It has created a situation where opinions are not openly shared and criticism is taken very personally. It also seems to put high-level leaders in the position of feeling that have to respond to all requests themselves, rather than delegating authority and building the capacity of their staff to do so.

Government Leadership in General

The nature of leadership is highly relationship-oriented and leaders need to be seen as having authority - the ones to provide orders. Furthermore, many Timorese have been educated outside of the country – Indonesia, Portugal, Australia, United States – and carried these institutional rules and norms with them, leading to different patterns of communication and varying ideas about how these differences should be resolved. Legal matters and other official government business is conducted in Portuguese rather than the far more commonly spoken Tetum which serves to further exclude the general population and helps to keep

¹⁷ We were unable to gather strong evidence about the extent to which the intervention was politicized. However, it did not seem that people thought it was intention of the Bank, rather that the Bank was unaware of the situation because politics are not always openly discussed or revealed.

decisions and processes under a veil of secrecy. To further complicate matters, the international community has placed an unprecedented number of technical assistants in the various ministries – many of which are operating with their own notions of leadership and management; in some cases quite different from each other resulting in government officials receiving different messages from the experts while not having a core expertise by which to gauge the value of different approaches. Identifying and developing governing expertise in a manner suitable within context requires a great deal of time. In the meantime, there are multiple, immediate needs that must be addressed and cannot wait. Thus, the international community is doing much of the technical work of running the state (in order to meet the multiple and pressing needs), rather than building capacity to run the state. The state is clearly run under the guidance of domestic leaders but technical activities are often carried out by the technical assistants.

There was general agreement among interviewees that within this context, more soft skills are needed. There has been a lot focus on the big, tangible pieces of work, such as infrastructure, elections, etc. but little on the relationships and processes necessary for the country to figure out what it wants to be, how it wants to govern itself, and how it will manage the residual tensions and societal fractures caused by the conflict and reinforced by the competitive institutions of this new state. Some interviewees expressed a great deal of responsibility to contribute towards that effort. Without the focus on soft skills, infrastructure is built, but it is seen as someone else's infrastructure. As one interviewee expressed it, schools would be built, but would not be used effectively by teachers and students and buildings would fall into disrepair because the people would not have a sense of ownership or purpose. Alternatively, many interviewees indicated that Timorese are so used to being occupied and governed by others, that there is no real willingness to or understanding of how to take charge.

Political Party and Administrative Leadership

In addition to the problems with the top leaders, interviewees discussed issues with the political parties. Parties seem more focused on their political agendas and their identity than on national issues. They jockey for power with one another, and vie for support. This has led to the manipulation of interest groups, civil society, youth groups, community groups, and others. Everything is interpreted as political. Problems at the community level seemed to be interpreted along lines of group differences and result in further polarization between groups. For instance, a land issue in the community was less about the land issues and more about group politics. Politicians seemed to capitalize on these differences in order to gain support.

Youth Leaders

Many interviewees indicated that a change in leadership culture was primarily a question of timing – once the old leaders were out of office, then the new leaders could step in and do something differently. The belief seems to be that younger leaders are less wrapped up in old feuds; they have less baggage and are more able to lead differently. But, this begs the question what evidence is there that these new leaders will be more effective? They still need to know how to build and manage a state. The next generation of leaders needs support in order to build the knowledge, skills and experiences to enable them to lead. Furthermore, younger leaders may be more receptive to professional development than the high-level leaders. Some high-level leaders seemed to view attending development as admitting they didn't know something and they did not want to demonstrate openness and vulnerability that may lead to a reduction of their stature. Younger leaders were often assumed to be less stuck in their ways, and at a point in their life were changing might be easier for them and associated with fewer risks.

Leadership Context in General

The tendency to see things in a polarized way increases the potential that divisive leadership at the top could lead to greater conflict and violence at the bottom. There are mechanisms to resolve conflict at the district level, but the linkages between the state and society are weak. In addition, the youth are easily manipulated by the high level leaders and by their own leadership: forming into gangs and other youth groups that can be mobilized for good and for bad. When we asked people which group was most in need of

leadership and conflict resolution training to prevent conflict in the next five years, a large number of interviewees pointed to the youth. The number of unemployed and largely unemployable male youth is staggering. Education is primarily conducted in languages other than Tetum. The quality of education was reported as poor, but another, perhaps larger issue was the lack of accessibility of education in terms of infrastructure and in terms of students and teachers communicating in a language in which they were fluent. There are few educational resources in Tetum, which remains an incomplete language. Language is strongly connected to national identity and perceptions of power. Portuguese is seen as the language of the elite and of government, and spoken by very few people. Bahasa Indonesia is the language of the previous occupier, from whom they fought to gain independence. Language is highly symbolic of deeply felt issues, and a difficult issue to address for logistical reasons.

Leadership and communication issues are deeply linked in Timor. Interviewees indicated that there was both a leadership and communication problem. Individuals are not able to communicate with one another in a way that is open and leads to the peaceful resolution of disputes. In addition, open and clear communication is not modeled by leaders. The country is rife with rumor, partly because of clandestine habits of the revolution, the absence of professional and accessible media, the polarization of groups (encouraging different perspectives and interpretations), and because rumors are a successful way to seed and reinforce discontent that benefits certain actors. This situation is not unique to Timor-Leste; rumors plague most war-torn countries. The absence of transparency and the environment of rumor are causes and effects of the conflict.

Our interviews revealed widespread agreement that everyone needed to improve their capacity to peacefully resolve problems, which is an aspect of all the interventions. As was mentioned above, the leadership culture that served the resistance movement so well, did not serve the state-building phase as well. Interviewees also agreed that it would be a good idea to reduce the manipulability of the population by increasing education levels and by improving leadership at the community level, so that community leaders could encourage peaceful resolution of conflict, rather than renewed violence. And, as said earlier, there was also a need to increase the capacity of leaders within each institution to manage their institution and create systems of accountability and transparency. There was an expressed need in change at the institutional level, so that the institutions of the state could serve the people and not just the leaders, and so that the people within these institutions could better understand how to manage them, pointing toward the need for improved institutional systems, technical skills, public sector management training, and the understanding of how to use these systems in less personal, more bureaucratic way. However, it remains unclear whether people really want to make the shift to a more impersonal bureaucratic system as it means letting go of some aspects of a highly personal relationship with leaders. Nonetheless, there was an expressed desire for broad cultural change; cultural change that would help the society understand what it meant to govern itself, what democracy meant, what the relationship between the state and society should be, and the role and responsibility of every individual within society in accomplishing this.

B. Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)

Because of the delay between the implementation of the CAD and our review, as well as the high-level status of CAD participants, we were not able to interview many of those participants. The participants who we were able to interview reported that the CAD was very helpful to them, in navigating the challenges of their roles and in better understanding one another. It helped them face the enormous challenges that they were up against, and they would definitely be open to the Bank supporting something like this in the future. But, in order to do it, it would require high-level political engagement by the Bank. Although there are negotiation efforts ongoing, there are no other equivalent leadership development efforts. Communication, empowerment and confidence building seem to be critical in Timor-Leste. The CAD did not attempt

sustainability, and this was the biggest criticism of the intervention; the duration was too short and follow-through lacking.

i. Intervention Goals

- The main objectives of the workshops proposed in Phase I of the Capacity Building and Development project (CAD) were:
 - (i) to enhance participants' skills and techniques as effective national leaders and managers;
 - (ii) to unite a broad range of Timorese leadership and society in building an anti-corruption strategy; and
 - (iii) to help participants acquire the tools to understand and resolve conflict in a non-political context so they may play an important role as mediators and conflict-managers.
- A secondary goal or objective of the CAD project is to use funds from the PCF to leverage greater funding for an intended TFET subordinate capacity-building and technical assistance trust fund.

ii. Intervention Design and Outputs¹⁸

The intervention had a **start-up period** intended to finalize the design partly through facilitated workshops with East Timorese to help identify capacity building needs and shape the program to meet their learning style. This period also sought to identify individuals from developing countries who have received similar training to share their experiences with regard to the usefulness and application of such training.

The Bank had several **internal processes that led to eventual design**. They had internal team coordination meetings to determine the desired impact, risks and opportunities, and to develop a strategy for participant selection. In their participant selection process they set objective criteria for the selection and they determined "champions" and supporters of the process who could help galvanize others. There were also assessment missions to determine the relevance of the proposed leadership component, gather data, confirm or determine pressure points and make beneficiaries co-creators of the session.

The **participants** came from the Government (Transitional Administration), the Parliament (Constitutional Assembly), the Military and the security sector, political parties, civil society (youth groups, women's groups, and religious representatives), and the private sector. **Participants were selected based on the following criteria:** historical/political involvement (Pre-1975, Post-1975); internal v. Diaspora balance; Diaspora v. Diaspora balance (Diaspora from Mozambique v. Portugal v. Australia); participant affiliation balance (see above); formal authority v. informal authority (outliers or political spoilers v. formal authority/reformers); ethnic, regional, and district balance; gender and age balance (youth v. old guard).

There were **three key interventions**. The first one occurred in August 2001 during the peaceful election transition of the Timorese Constituent Assembly. The second one occurred in June 2002 during the formation of an independent Timorese Government. The third took place after the first 100 days of the new administration and immediately following the youth riots in December 2002.

The workshops were led by Dean Williams from Harvard University, a specialist in transformational leadership. The content included generic leadership and problem solving approaches that integrated a discussion of the history of relationships among the Timorese leaders and the relationship between the younger and older generations.

¹⁸ Because of the weak reporting on the CAD, this data is taken from a power point presentation prepared given by Sarah Cliffe, *Timor-Leste Case Study: Transforming a Resistance Movement to meet the Challenge of Nation Building*, Internal Workshop on Leadership and Post-Conflict Governance, March 31, 2005.

iii. Intervention Monitoring and Evaluation

The documentation of this intervention was incomplete. There was no monitoring or evaluation component of this intervention, nor was there a final report.

iv. Implementation Arrangements

The CAD was Bank-executed with the support of an international trainer and national consultants.

v. Intervention Impact

In spite of serious effort during our ten days in Timor-Leste we were only able to speak with one participant and one observer of the training. This was largely due to the high political position of most of the participants and the time that had passed since the intervention. The participants, observer, and staff whom we spoke with reported that the intervention had an important influence on the participants. They said that Dean Williams was able to provide important guidance and support to Timorese leaders during a difficult time. The only thing that they regretted was that the intervention had not continued. They said that this type of support, by someone like Dean Williams, was very helpful.

According to the presentation by Sarah Cliffe, the intervention had the following impact, which we were unable to verify. Participants felt it was useful. It created an enabling environment and enthusiasm for consultation, participation of, and engagement with communities in the development of a five-year National Development Plan and follow-on results-based Annual Action Plans. It created a process that supported and increased success of other follow-on training with senior civil servants on development planning and technical work. Leadership felt less threatened by these processes. It assisted in resolving pre-and post-independence transition tensions. Finally, all parties noted that more consistent follow-up processes would have been useful.

According to a baseline for the LCCNR completed by Marc Sommers in November 2007, “[m]any of those who had been trained by LCCNR in early November mentioned the only prior training of the same sort: the fabled “Dean Williams” workshop of 2001. That workshop was widely reported to be groundbreaking: it took place fairly soon after Timor-Leste had been established as a nation, and it included many of its most prominent leaders. Much less evident is what result emerged from this training, six years later. Yet the symbolic significance of this training remains clear: for many LCCNR trainees, and others as well, the “Dean Williams” training was significant if only because it took place, was highly relevant, and included a number of the central players in Timor-Leste’s national politics.”

vi. CAD Findings

There was insufficient data for us to draw significant findings from the CAD intervention. The LED design process explicitly stated that it learned from the lack of monitoring and evaluation of the CAD, and integrated a monitoring and evaluation component into its design.

C. Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)

As with the CAD project, the documentation of the LED was incomplete and, despite significant effort, we were only able to meet with a few people who were involved in implementing the CAD, and were unable meet with any participants.

i. Intervention Goals

According to the revised project proposal:

- The project's main objective was to build trust (or social capital) among urban youth groups and youth-at-risk, to engage in policy dialogues with government and their community leaders. The purpose is to strengthen the relationship of youth with government and/or community leaders, their parents and build other positive social networks.
- A secondary objective was to support young people through peer-to-peer non formal training sessions— to strengthen self confidence and a sense of identity, and learn to value positive expressions of cooperation and teamwork.

ii. Intervention Design and Outputs

The **final intervention design** outlined in the revised proposal included the following elements.

- Since workshops are intended to be demand-driven rather than supply-driven, the menus of activities above will either be scaled-up or down depending on the impact/feedback from participants.
- Leadership for Economic Development Program
 - Targets vertical social capital.
 - This component involves homogenous and heterogeneous leadership retreats that promote problem solving, build processes of collective decision-making, and support social learning and progress. (See Revised Proposal Dec 3 03 for detailed chart of potential activities and learning objectives).
- Youth Capacity Development Program
 - Targets horizontal social capital.
 - Building horizontal ties among the youth is intended to empower and reinforce youth self-confidence to develop the social foundations necessary for economic development. (See Revised Proposal Dec 3 03 for detailed chart of potential activities and learning objectives targeting capacity at institutional, individual and societal levels).
- Monitoring and Evaluation Design
 - Activity and workshop monitoring – An external international consultant will be contracted to work with LED to ensure appropriate baseline indicators for outcome and impact analysis of the project. The consultant who will develop a questionnaire for the initial in-country assessment missions and the SC-IQ type of pre and post-workshop questionnaire, will also work as a facilitator to jointly develop the tools together with youth (so that they understand how to develop such tools, their importance and usage).
 - Independent evaluation will be conducted.
- Community of Practice and Learning
 - This component covers all forms of project communication and outreach for the development of a community of practice and learning, and to ensure broader impact of the youth retreats on youth stakeholders groups throughout the country. Communication activities under this component may involve the production or development of the following:
 - a documentary on youth aspiration and values, and videos produced of youth at retreats and their lessons gained;
 - community radio programs airing interviews with youth during the retreats and materials covered in those workshops for maximum outreach to youth groups throughout the country (their own youth leaders help to transmit messages and lessons learned from retreats, and could become part of a radio program for youth), and

- a website developed with various hands-on tools from retreat sessions, including all written materials, case studies, manuals, and links to videos used.

The LED proposal also outlined the following **participant selection process**.

- The project aims to reach two sets of beneficiaries:
 - The first set of beneficiaries is at-risk-youth who are empowered to contribute to their communities through leadership and social skills training. These are youth in urban centers and rural districts, who are likely between the ages of 15 to 30 years of age, many of whom are excluded and idle due to lack of employment¹⁹.
 - The second set of indirect beneficiaries is leaders from national and local government agencies, parliamentarians, civil society and community leaders.
 - Participants in all capacity building sessions will be selected from diverse groups according to objective criteria. Some sessions may be geared specifically to one subset of homogenous actors or a group of heterogeneous stakeholders (such as a homogenous group of higher-level government leaders, or government leaders mixed in a heterogeneous session together specifically with youth). The purpose of the homogenous and heterogeneous groupings is to build self-confidence and cover specific topics relevant to one group on their own first (horizontal social capital), and then to slowly build-up vertical relationships across more heterogeneous groupings over time.

According to the grant completion report prepared in July 2007, the **intervention outputs** were as follows.

- Youth councils were revived in all 13th districts of the country to facilitate nationwide consultation/youth social assessment for designing the youth policy. A youth social mapping and youth institutional assessment was carried out to help identify youth concerns and issues. District visits were conducted to identify possibilities for designing youth programs involving youth at risk.
- Support was provided for the national youth policy formulation process. On September 29, 2006 a seminar was organized to present the policy and the detail strategies draft to some of the national and international NGOs representatives in Fundação do Oriente.
- An inter-ministerial meeting has been held to ensure youth concerns are covered within sectoral ministry policies where relevant. A youth survey was also conducted to better understand youth aspiration and the results have been dissemination among various stakeholders. Various youth workshops have been held to gather relevant information for the national policy formulation.
- Training on financial management, life skills, leadership training, entrepreneurship and organizational management skills were provided for at least 137 youth in Dili, Aileu and Manatuto.
- The Tabloid Lian Foinsa'e (The Voice of Young People) began publication in June 2006. It provided a range of information for young people and helps them to be aware of issues and progress in the youth sector in Timor-Leste, in the region and worldwide and is a way to respond to the needs of young people as identified in the National Youth Survey. It started as an 8-page publication and only 20 copies circulated and by December 26, the publication had increased to 16 pages of information with 3000 copies per edition. Unfortunately the newspaper publication was never "owned" by the Secretary of Youth and not included as part of the government budget. It has not continued after the LED project ended. In addition, there was no feedback sought as to its usefulness.

¹⁹ Note that not all youth between the ages of 15-30 will be included in this project, but rather a representative sample of variously carefully mapped youth factions (social mapping conducted under component 1). By design the definition of youth participants has been undefined since the actual definition/criteria for youth selection and participation will be developed as the result of participatory workshops under component one.

iii. Intervention Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation were limited to periodic reports on the intervention outputs.

iv. Implementation Arrangements

The intervention was implemented by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth, and Sports with the support from a World Bank staff person. It also had a Steering Committee, which was charged with supervising, supporting, and advising the implementation of the project.

v. LED Findings and Lessons Learned

LED seems to have achieved some of its goals – strengthening of youth councils and the development of a youth policy. However, the program may also have had unintended consequences because of the possible politicization of the project. LED may have had a sustainable impact through the strengthening of the Youth Councils and the Youth Policy, but these Youth Councils may be politicized. Thus, they are sustainable, but likely not in a way that would meet the overall goal of the project. We were unable to verify this, but the possibility that it is true raises an important lesson for leadership development interventions. It reflects the high importance of savvy project oversight to reduce the potential they are not hijacked by particular interests. This example shows that delegating and providing insufficient oversight over projects can lead to unintended negative outcomes. It also points to the challenge of going through previously established structures, because the structures may not be fully representative, particularly in highly politicized conflict-affected states. Additionally, the fact that we were unable to verify whether the project had these unintended consequences or had an important impact demonstrates the critical importance of monitoring and evaluation that extends beyond periodic reports on intervention outputs.

B. Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)

i. Intervention Goals

According to the project's February 2008 progress report, the refined project goals were to:

- build the leadership capacities of State and non-State actors with a view to strengthening trust and thus an ability to work more cooperatively, more collaboratively and therefore more effectively; and
- enhance the communication skills and information-sharing abilities not only of individuals but of State institutions, with civil society and the public more broadly.

Reflecting on these goals in his 2007 baseline report, Marc Sommers wrote "Given the situation facing Timor-Leste's leadership, it is already clear that such aims are going to be difficult to accomplish. To begin with, no training program can accomplish its goals without participants who are willing to improve their skills and are open to changing the way they negotiate and communicate. Moreover, helping people change their ways under stressful, high stakes conditions, is never easy. At the same time, LCCNR may be just what is needed to facilitate a breakthrough towards lasting solutions."

ii. Intervention Design and Implementation

The leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR) program comprised two component parts:

- 1) subgrants to local and international NGOs doing important work in the field of strengthening communication and leadership; and
- 2) transformative leadership and communication workshops for formal and non formal leaders.

Three multi-day workshops took place with a total of 109 participants; not everybody attended all sessions.

1.4 Participants and Participation Statistics 2007-2008 (Year #1)

	Group 1	Group 2	Group 3
No. of people attending the first retreat day	36	45	33
No. of people staying for entire retreat	35	45	32
No. of people attending the follow-up sessions	19	16	21
No. of people attending the SIMSOC simulations	24	22	24

Each group participated in four training activities: one three-day initial retreat; two two-day follow-up workshops; and one one-day networking activity that included a training component.

Some of the participants we interviewed indicated that there should have been more of an effort to encourage those who traditionally do not speak up, to do so, thus increasing their leadership capacity and changing the dynamics between the participants. In Timor, this was particularly true for women, those who were less educated, or junior level people. The unwillingness of people to speak up is also related to the deference that most Timorese give to authority. Thus, if the objective of having a mixed group is to change the relationships between the people in the group, then exercises and methods should be included in the training to do so. In addition, participants felt that people with different education levels should have been grouped together. Interviewees generally agreed that high-level leaders should not be mixed with people who were their juniors; particularly in cases where higher-level government leaders were in the same intervention as lower level civic leaders. However, other interviewees liked the opportunity to interact across groups.

From an intervention design perspective, this illustrates the importance of matching the problem definition to the design and clearly keeping the goal of the program in mind and woven throughout the intervention. If the major fault lines in society are along gender, regional, political, age, and institutional lines, then the leadership training has to be designed to address these fault lines in an appropriate and constructive manner. This can be achieved by working with social identity groups separately or by strategically mixing groups. LCCNR participant selection was conducted to engage a broad group, however the reasons for and consequences of selecting a mixed group were not addressed in the program design and delivery. The assumption seems to have been that CMPartners could deliver an intervention similar to BLTP, but the feedback from participants we interviewed indicates that a fuller understanding of the leadership reality and challenges would have been necessary to enable all participants to fully participate in and benefit from the training, and to establish and lead to the desired outcomes. There are numerous tradeoffs in the choice of participants, but whichever choice is made, it must be accompanied by a design that fits the specific leadership challenge and capacity to be addressed (described in more detail in the Design and Evaluation of Leadership Development in Context Annex).

iii. Implementation Arrangements

The LCCNR was executed by the World Bank, and the training design and implementation was carried out by CMPartners under supervision by the World Bank. The LCCNR experienced a fair amount of staff turnover, which exacerbated a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities, leading to internal tensions within the implementation team. Misunderstandings and tensions among team members can be expected in endeavors this complex. It is not the existence of those tensions that matters, but how they are handled. The tensions within the LCCNR team were not mentioned by participants in our interviews, which is an indication that the situation was managed. The willingness to talk about the misunderstandings and tensions among team members is a sign of functionality, demonstrating a willingness and desire to address potential

problems rather than to hide them. While other teams who we interviewed did not provide significant information about misunderstandings and tensions among team members, it seems likely that some level of misunderstanding and tension would have been present

Most importantly, regardless of who implements the intervention (i.e., the World Bank or an external recipient of funds), it is necessary that the staff implementing the project have a shared understanding of the context (i.e., culture, history, politics, and leadership challenges); the methodology to be employed in the leadership intervention; and the process by which the intervention will unfold. This shared understanding needs to be revisited by the entire team as the intervention progresses, contextual dynamics change, and feedback is gathered from the participants.

iv. Intervention Impact

The independent evaluation of the LCCNR conducted in August 2008 concluded that “numerous participants reported a higher awareness of leadership and communication matters and the use of the tools acquired in the training” but that the intervention had not yet reached its aim of inducing institutional and systemic change. In our interviews, many people commented that the training was interesting, but that there were not high enough level leaders involved, who were the only ones with the authority to implement the approach. However, the majority of people with whom we spoke reported that they appreciated the training and that it improved their communication and problem solving capacities. Many of the participants we interviewed asked for further follow-up, or at least were very open to further follow up.

There did not seem to be significant unintended negative consequences of the training. The training has a positive reputation, and the staff members involved are considered a very capable group. Based on the feedback from a previous evaluation, the intervention (now primarily funded by AusAID) has decided to focus on IDPs. The training targets two communities where most of the displaced individuals came from and returned to, in order to support their reintegration. IDPs are an area where conflict could potentially arise, making the sector a good choice for a program largely focused on conflict management and relationship-building. It is unclear how, or if, individuals from the IDP sector who were trained in the original LCCNR intervention and the new group of IDP-focused training will be brought together to generate support for each other. The original LCCNR participants seemed to have no knowledge of this new initiative; exposing a lack of communication with intervention alumni.

Conclusion - Timor-Leste Cases

All three of Timor-Leste leadership interventions were largely disconnected from the Bank's main programs. That AusAID is now funding LCCNR speaks to its financial sustainability, at least for this grant, but not to the sustainability of the impact that has already been achieved. In general, the investment made by the initial trainings has not been linked to other efforts or capitalized upon by either the Bank or its implementing partners. This reduces the likelihood of the desired return on investment. Several interviewees, particularly within the international community, criticized the projects for not being linked up to any concrete programs or actions, with the exception of the LED.



Annex E: Central African Republic Case Study

	Leadership Seminar 2004	Leadership Workshop 2005
Dates	08/04 – 02/05	09/05 – 06/06
Funding	\$129,380	\$123,000
Context	CAR is in the midst of a major transition from a provisional government to a return to constitutional government with presidential elections scheduled for January 2005.	Historically, skills to implement reform programs in CAR have been lacking, and the country has suffered from political instability and bouts of armed conflict, corruption, contributing to poor socio-economic outcomes.
Goal	Build capacity of senior leadership to manage more effectively and carry out the short-term reforms necessary to ensure stability and continued engagement with the international community and lay the groundwork for broader leadership-building activities following the transition.	Strengthen capacity of leadership to articulate priorities and deliver on short-term goals in the context of the PRSP framework.

Documentation about the leadership development interventions that occurred in CAR was difficult to locate and often not complete. We were unable to locate evidence of monitoring and evaluation. In addition, because CAR was not one of the case study countries that we visited we did not have the opportunity to build the relationships and presence that facilitates data collection. These two forces combined to significantly limit the amount and quality of information available for the review and this case study.

A. The Country Context

The former French colony of Ubangi-Shari became the Central African Republic upon independence in 1960. After three tumultuous decades of misrule - mostly by military governments - civilian rule was established in 1993 and lasted for one decade. President Ange-Felix PATASSE's civilian government was plagued by unrest, and in March 2003 he was deposed in a military coup led by General Francois BOZIZE, who established a transitional government. Though the government has the tacit support of civil society groups and the main parties, a wide field of candidates contested the municipal, legislative, and presidential elections held in March and May of 2005 in which General BOZIZE was affirmed as president. The government still does not fully control the countryside, where pockets of lawlessness persist. Unrest in neighboring nations, Chad, Sudan, and the DRC, continues to affect stability in the Central African Republic as well. Important constraints to economic development include the CAR's landlocked position, a poor transportation system, a largely unskilled work force, and a legacy of misdirected macroeconomic policies.

Factional fighting between the government and its opponents remains a drag on economic revitalization. Distribution of income is extraordinarily unequal. Grants from France and the international community only partially meet humanitarian needs.²⁰

B. LICUS #15 - Central African Republic Leadership Seminar – 2004

At the onset of this intervention CAR was in the midst of a major transition from a provisional government to a return to constitutional government with presidential elections scheduled for January 2005. To help manage this transition, the government worked with the Bank and other donors to put in place a multi-donor transitional 'implementation matrix' of concrete actions on security, governance, economic management, and delivery of social services to tackle the most critical development challenges in the months ahead. Historically, leadership skills have been a key gap in implementing reform programs in CAR.

i. Intervention Goal and Design

The purpose of the intervention was to 1) build capacity of senior leadership to manage more effectively and carry out the short-term reforms necessary to ensure stability and continued engagement with the international community and lay the groundwork for broader leadership-building activities following the transition and 2) to build commitment to critical elements of the transitional results framework and fostering a stable process in the pre- and post-election period. The intervention was requested by Minister of Finance, after changes in the government, was even more popular because of need for credibility with donors. The project team was advised by WWIC and Notre Dame and consultations with a broad range of donors and government. The intervention was co-sponsored by BONUCA and UNDP. The main themes identified as part of the consultation process included: i) stability and security; ii) promoting commitment to good governance and financial transparency; iii) natural resource management. The subsidiary themes that were identified included: i) importance of leading by example; ii) effective communication within government as well as among government, civil society, and the international community.

The intervention design included a two-day seminar with high-level peer-to-peer presentations by Pres. Buyoya of Burundi on security and stability, Minister Ouedraogo of Burkina Faso on management of natural resources, Mr. Legamble of Madagascar on good governance and transparency. The first day included introductions of participants, discussion of the context, and presentations by the three speakers. On the second day of the intervention working groups were created based on Day 1 themes facilitated by Day 1 speakers. The training relied on whatever expertise and knowledge the speakers were able to convey. There were no specific leadership skills that the seminar attempted to convey and no follow-up was planned.

Approximately 40 participants were selected and included a roughly equal distribution of government and non-governmental representatives. Participants were selected based on initial proposals by the government and refined in consultation with the government's technical working group and donor partners. The PCF/LICUS Committee was asked if the project targeted future leaders, in view of elections, the project team responded that it was limited mostly to current leaders.

ii. Design implementation and alteration

There was a delay in implementation due to resignation of the Minister of Finance, who had asked for the workshop, and the subsequent cabinet reshuffle. These changes increased cost because of need for second consultancy trip. The situation also increased prominence of event because of government's desire to increase credibility with donors. Focus on elections was not explicit in proposal, but the output of the "Electoral Code of Conduct" seems to be seen as one of the most successful aspects of the seminar.

²⁰ Intro text taken from CIA Factbook – will be rewritten.

ii. Implementation Arrangements

The World Bank implemented this initiative via the use of an external consultant (\$39,640), a facilitator (\$13,420), and three speakers (\$19,920). A technical working group of government staff and one human rights NGO organized the intervention in cooperation with the Bank. It is unclear how this worked.

iv. Intervention Impact

Very little monitoring and evaluation was conducted in conjunction with this intervention. The LICUS 2005 CAR proposal indicated the seminar resulted in a common declaration on how to proceed in the months leading up to the election, which subsequently was transformed into a code of conduct for the period up to and during the elections. The Electoral Code of Conduct was a common declaration of shared beliefs about the country's needs and a commitment to promoting a peaceful and fair electoral process. From the report, it appears that the major contribution was the Electoral Code of Conduct (which was not envisioned in the design). The Code appears to be seen as successful because it fed directly into another mechanism (i.e., the Committee of the Wise). It also appears that the commitment of the government to this seminar, and the positive press it received, helped to increase the population's confidence in the government. Of course, none of these relationships has been well established, but it is the best information that we have. These two outcomes do not appear to be part of the original logic of the proposal, which is not necessarily bad, but indicates that success is due, in part, to adjustment in the initial aims. It is possible that there has been an impact on the transitional implementation matrix, but that it was a less immediate impact and thus was not observed in the report.

According to email from Gilles Alfandari,, LICUS:

"The leadership seminar was the most successful activity of the LICUS program in CAR, so far. In particular, it led to the adoption of the "code de bonne conduite électorale", an ethic charter setting the tone for the general elections, which significantly contributed to pacify the political climate and provide the background required by the Committee of the Wise - a mediation group of senior civil society personalities - which successfully convinced Pt Bozize to allow the candidacy of several of his opponents at the Presidential elections. As a result, the elections took place without major outbreak of violence (contrary to most previsions) and were assessed by international observers as overall fair, a precondition for donor reengagement in the country....It had resonated broadly with the population at large through an extensive media coverage, and directly contributed to restore hope in the country."

v. Recommendations and Lessons Learned

- a. Strong partnerships with government and prominent donors were beneficial.
 - Government - brought contextual knowledge and facilitated communication with senior government officials.
 - Unified donor front emphasized importance of event and brought combined clout.
- b. There was evidence of government interest supported by broad consultation. This combination made the intervention a visible and desirable event.
 - The team was able to quickly mount a second mission to meet and engage the new [government] counterpart, verify commitment among the reconfigured cabinet and conduct additional consultations. This was important in confirming plans, refining the agenda, and creating (or maintaining) buy-in across stakeholder groups.
 - A thorough (and early) search to recruit experienced experts from appropriate countries was conducted and there was dialogue with speakers well in advance of the event to inform and prepare them.
 - There appeared to be an active and successful strategy to manage the media and communications.

- Structuring the working group sessions around the transitional results framework helped to build awareness of and commitment to it, and gave the working groups a very concrete, substantive character that inspired participation and lively exchanges.

C. LICUS #15-b - Central African Republic Leadership Seminar – 2005

This intervention was financed under the LICUS grant, the government of CAR, with the support of the World Bank, BONUCA and UNDP. The PRSP was the framework for developing consensus around the strategy for achieving these prerequisites, but required effective leadership to prioritize actions and mobilize key stakeholders. Historically, skills to implement reform programs in CAR have been lacking, and the country has suffered from political instability and bouts of armed conflict, corruption, contributing to poor socio-economic outcomes. The new government was, however, committed to the implementation of a reform program, but lacked the capacities to lead a country in achieving visible and concrete results.

i. Intervention Goals and Design

The purpose of this intervention was to strengthen leadership capacity to articulate priorities and transparently deliver on short-term goals in the context of the PRSP framework, including:

- (i) build consensus around and engage multiple stakeholders in short-term action planning to implement the agreed priorities under the PRSP;
- (ii) engage national leaders in an experience sharing and peer learning event with fellow leaders who have themselves managed similar situations, and
- (iii) expose government and non-government leaders to lessons learned from implementation of a pilot rapid results initiative to achieve selected outcomes from among the strategic priorities of the PRSP (under development).

The intervention was designed to occur in two phases. Phase 1 was a pilot initiative to select, develop and achieve concrete short-term outcomes in selected priority PRSP results areas which would be implemented ahead of the Leadership seminar. A simplified version of the RRA was to be used to prioritize outcomes, unbundle constraints, mobilize actors, and monitor progress towards achieving visible and measurable outcomes. The intention was that national leaders would internalize the experience and the processes used and that the pilot would subsequently be scaled up to achieve further results under the program. Phase 2 of the intervention was the delivery of a leadership seminar, which would:

- Serve as a forum for dialogue and exchange of targeted experiences between senior CAR leadership, champions of post-conflict transitions, and experienced practitioners with convincing and relevant track-records.
- Translate multi-stakeholder consensus around PRSP priorities into action-planning for first-year implementation of the PRSP, developing a shared understanding of constraints and obstacles associated with achieving select PRSP outcomes.
- Extract lessons learned in consultative process for PRSP design and in problem-solving from implementation of pilot initiative and analyze the implementation experience.
- Build confidence in stakeholders for overcoming obstacles and achieving results.
- Serve as a forum for sharing experiences, building cross-sectoral alliances and partnerships, and strengthening the team spirit among the nation's leaders and decision-makers, all of which could serve to improve the country's image internationally and build confidence nationally.

A total of 60 of individuals participated in the leadership seminar: 6 heads of constitutionally-established bodies (i.e., President, President of the National Assembly, etc...); 23 government ministers; 13 other governmental representatives; 9 national NGO/ civil society representatives; 3 representatives of prominent

churches (Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim); 6 representatives of the international community. The participant selection process was unclear, but was conducted in consultation with the Government. The Guiding Principles for Achieving Results is a very general document with ambitious aims. There was no specific discussion about how to operationalize this document, or capacity built to do so. The devil is certainly in the details of the implementation of such a document.

ii. Intervention implementation and alteration

The design, development, and delivery of the activity were conducted in a partnership between the government of CAR and the World Bank Institute, where WBI's role was to assist the government – as a facilitator – in the development and design of the activity. While the grant was Bank-executed, the overall responsibility for the activity was with the Prime Minister. From the start of the project, a government Steering Committee was established, charged with the overall coordination and planning for the activity. In addition, about 50 government and non-government representatives were involved in the preparation and the execution of the rapid results pilots.

As the work to develop the country's PRSP had not advanced sufficiently in order to use this document as the framework for the leadership seminar, the Steering Committee for the seminar decided to use the government's annual planning tool, the *Politique Générale de l'Etat*, as the framework for the seminar. In strengthening leaders' capacity to implement priorities as stated in the *Politique Générale de l'Etat*, however, capacity to implement priorities under the PRSP would also be strengthened, thereby contributing to the longer-term objectives of the PRSP and the objectives as stated original grant proposal. The inclusion of 22 Ministers may have been helpful for the creation of a general approach toward planning, but it does not seem that all of these ministers were involved in the PRSP process.

iii. Intervention Monitoring, Evaluation, and Impact

It seems that the seminar conflated a political buy-in objective with a management objective, possibly leading to the participation of many people for whom the workshop was minimally useful. We do not have data on this however.

Existing documentation indicates that the tools and methodologies introduced through the rapid results initiative and the leadership seminar – including practical experience in implementing strategies for achieving results – have provided the stakeholders with important tools and learning in terms of implementing other strategies and programmes, notably the PRSP and that the seminar and the rapid results pilot have contributed to a heightened interest in results-based management in CAR—reported by the UN Coordinator in CAR. The pilot projects appeared to achieve many of the established results (results established at the beginning of the 90-day period), RRI1 achieving about 50% of expected results, while RRI2 achieved about 10% above expected results). Understandability, a consensus on realistic and doable first-year targets for PRSP was not achieved as work on the PRSP had not advanced enough to be used as the framework for the activity. As an alternative, the Steering Committee opted to use the *Politique Générale de l'Etat* as the general framework and multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder teams targeting priority results were put in place as part of the rapid results pilot initiatives. The establishment of a local Steering Committee and the delivery of the seminar in partnership with the government also contributed to capacity development on the client side. Documents indicate a commitment to operationalize the one page "engagement" note synthesizing consensus by all participants on Guiding Principles for Achieving results. A one hour focused private meeting with the President of the Republic, the above resource persons, the Bank representative in CAR, and Brendan Horton from operations was reported to result in a more satisfactory communication and level of engagement. Subsequent to the December 2005 seminar, the President of the Republic reinvigorated the "Groupe des Sages" ("Group of Wise Men") which was established after a November 2004 leadership seminar in CAR in order to enhance national dialogue and consensus. Following

the December 2005 seminar, Lamine Loum - one of the international resource persons who took part in the event - has been engaged in follow-up work in CAR.

The seminar exposed the leaders to the method, but did not necessarily give them any training in using it. To really accomplish its objective of “strengthening the capacity of the leadership team in CAR in articulating priorities and transparently delivering short-term goals” a much more involved training and follow-up process would need to be developed. It seems that this was an initial step in this process, but it did not achieve any concrete results in terms of the government’s capacity other than a commitment to this approach.

iv. Lessons Learned

Engagement of and ownership by local counterparts and the anchoring of such activities with key decision-makers/key ministries was helpful.

Donor coordination and involvement in the design and development of leadership capacity development activities was beneficial in the following ways;

- Enhancing the neutrality and objectivity of the design of the activity.
- Increasing the usefulness of such activities in exposing capacity development needs in the country in general and for leadership teams in particular.



Annex F: Tajikistan Case Study

	Tajikistan
	Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Dates	03/07 – 04/07
Funding	\$70,000
Context	Although a peace agreement was signed in 1997 and significant progress has been achieved in terms of growth, Tajikistan remains the poorest and among the most fragile of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Goal	Enhance the capacity of the Government of Tajikistan to make informed decisions on the strategic directions for development to achieve sustainable growth.

Documentation about the leadership development intervention that occurred in Tajikistan was difficult to locate and often not complete. In addition, because Tajikistan was not one of the case study countries that we visited we did not have the opportunity to build the relationships and presence that facilitates data collection. These two forces combined to significantly limit the amount and quality of information available for the review and this case study.

i. Country Context²¹

The civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) reduced the country's production of goods and damaged the country's economic infrastructure. A peace agreement was signed in 1997 and peaceful elections were held in 1999. However, Tajikistan remains the poorest and among the most fragile of the 15 former Soviet republics. The fragility of the economic situation is due, in part, to uneven implementation of structural reforms, corruption, weak governance, widespread unemployment, seasonal power shortages, and the external debt burden. Presidential elections were held in November of 2006.

In 2007, the Government of Tajikistan requested the assistance of the World Bank Group to prepare a high-level seminar to think through some of the challenges and trade-offs of a complex and large reform agenda as the country entered its next phase of development with the drafting of the second PRSP. The PCF Grant allowed the Bank to respond quickly to the country's demand for support in thinking through strategic development orientations. The IDA resources available for the country were limited and the innovative nature of the activity could not be linked to an ongoing IDA operation.

The Government of Tajikistan (GOT) has requested the assistance of the World Bank Group to prepare a high-level Seminar or Retreat to think through some of the challenges and trade-offs of a complex and large

²¹ Much of the country context has been taken from the CIA World Factbook site at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html>

reform agenda as the country enters its next phase of development with the drafting of the second PRSP. This is the first time that a request for funding from the PCF has been submitted to organize a high-level leadership seminar for Tajikistan. The first two seminars (2004, Istanbul and 2005, Warsaw) were co-sponsored with other donors (Canadian Embassy; Turkish Development Bank) while the last seminar (Vienna, 2006) was sponsored by the Bank Netherlands Partnership Program Trust Fund. The Grant will allow the Bank to respond quickly to the country's demand for support in thinking through strategic development orientations. In addition, the IDA resources currently available for the country are limited and the innovative nature of the activity cannot be linked to an ongoing IDA operation.

ii. Intervention Goals²²

The intervention was intended to assist high-level government officials in their efforts to strategically think through a set of key priority reforms for the next couple of years, including thinking through the sequencing and management of reforms. Rather than focusing on the reforms themselves, the intervention focused on the strategic approach to achieve sustainable growth with special attention to private sector development, governance and human development, priority areas outlined in the Country Partnership Strategy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The objective was to enhance the capacity of the government to make informed decisions on the strategic directions for development to achieve sustainable growth. The event was timely as it took place a few months only after a new government was formed in Tajikistan.

Similar leadership events for Tajikistan officials had taken place on an annual basis since 2004 but all of them focused on providing technical guidance on "how to" proceed with the largely Bank driven policy agenda. This seminar focused more on the experiential peer-to-peer knowledge sharing approach. Besides a few country case studies, the seminar engaged participants in roundtables and working group sessions facilitated by a small group of resource persons. The seminar took place in Istanbul, Turkey to create the conditions for a friendly, neutral and intimate environment and facilitate discussion on sensitive reform issues among all participants such as governance, anti-corruption, cotton and energy sectors. Organizing the event outside of Tajikistan was intended to ensure that Tajik leaders who are spending long work days on a large number of small tasks, in sometimes weak organizations, have enough time for strategic thinking, stock-taking and networking with presenters. The GOT explicitly asked the Bank that such seminars be held outside of Tajikistan.

iii. Intervention Design and Implementation

The seminar was for top-level policy makers in charge of implementing reforms. It is noteworthy that, in contrast with previous seminars, senior level government representatives from social sectors (education, health, migration) as well will be invited to participate in the seminar in an effort to foster inclusion and participation and therefore promote transparency and accountability among several members of the new Government. However, the limited number of participants could appear to be designed to enable a nice trip for a few officials.

The design first day of the event included: a focus on fundamentals of good governance as a basis for sustaining economic and sectoral reforms and speakers from the government and the Bank as well as the Institute for European Affairs in Ireland. The design for the second day included sessions to discuss the institutional, regulatory, administrative and financial barriers to promoting an enabling environment for private sector development. Speakers from GOT, Albania (Deputy Minister of Finance), Bulgaria (Institute for Market Economics), and the World Bank were also planned. The third day was intended to focus on the drivers of economic and productivity growth in the region, key institutional/governance reform links within the public sector, and the role of government in developing a modern, transparent and effective administration, with speakers representing the Bank, the government, Latvia (MP), and the IMF.

²² Information about intervention goals and planning taken primarily from the grant proposal and completion report.

The seminar was a two-day event (April 9-11, 2007) attended by 20 government representatives. The structure of the workshop agenda was anchored in case studies presented by senior practitioners or experts from other countries (i.e. Ireland, Albania, Bulgaria, South Korea, and Latvia). The agenda was deliberately "light" with abundant time for informal interactions during break-out group. Each session begin with an external presenter giving a personal view on what worked and what did not work during their time in office, which was followed by a candid exchange of views on what could have been done differently and the usefulness and content of international best practices and to what extent the experiences could be applied to Tajikistan. Finding cases from the "right" countries proved to be challenging (i.e. countries not too advanced from a development perspective and not too similar from the recipient country, in this case Tajikistan). Another design challenge was finding the right balance between cross-cutting issues and sector specific issues; as well as between strategic and technical issues in order to accommodate the different levels of seniority/expertise of the participants.

Roundtable Discussion and Working Group Sessions discussions were facilitated by a Russian facilitator, who was previously on Bank staff. The Chief Economist of the ECA region attended the meeting and gave a presentation to facilitate the debate. However, seats were arranged in a U shape form, instead of roundtables, per the request of the Tajikistan Government, in order to maximize the time and opportunity for interaction and dialogue among each participant, given that some of the government representatives had been recently nominated and the significant number of non-Tajikistan participants (e.g. World Bank; IFC; IMF). A few days prior to the seminar, a respected Russian expert on strategic reforms worked with key Tajikistan Government members to help them prepare their presentations in accordance with the cross-cutting development issues of the seminar and to build consensus. This task was critical as some of the Government participants had been recently nominated following the November 2006 elections in Tajikistan and had never made a presentation in front of the entire Cabinet. The Russian expert had previously participated in one of the Tajikistan leadership seminars and was highly appreciated by the Tajik government members. As a result of the expert mission, the Government prepared and shared a series of well developed presentations on the following strategies: (1) investing for growth; (2) key priorities in human development; (3) sustainability in infrastructure development; (4) private sector development; (5) public administration reform; and (6) public expenditures and public finance management.

iv. Intervention Output and Impact

There was no evaluation of this intervention. Thus, we have based the following primarily on existing documentation which suggests that the intervention appeared to have enhanced capacity of the government to make informed decisions on the strategic directions for development to achieve sustainable growth. The five case studies (Albania, Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, and South Korea) on key cross-sectoral development issues as well as the delivery of the Seminar outside of Tajikistan prior to other major international meetings on Tajikistan is an indication that the activity has achieved its grant development objective in terms of knowledge generation, sharing and analysis.

The analysis and strategic thinking achieved in the seminar provided a critical input into a major donor community meeting on Tajikistan, the Tajikistan Development Forum. The most significant outcome was indicated to be a large group of government representatives was brought together outside of Tajikistan in a short amount of time to think strategically about reforms and development priorities, in preparation for the June Tajikistan Development Forum, a significant donors' community meeting. Other claims of significant development impacts included: the ability to discuss the cross-sectoral implications of policy discussions, given that all line ministries were represented together with the President's advisors; the Tajikistan government members leading the strategic discussions, having come prepared to lead discussion with their own presentations on Tajikistan's overall development and sectoral strategies; the seminar led to a coherent strategy discussion by the Government at the Development Forum in Dushanbe; the requests for sectoral strategic discussions and more frequent discussions, brokered by the Bank.

Another result indicated was that government participants better appreciated some of the trade-offs which may occur when implementing major policy reforms and were able to value the need to build consensus around a set of key structural reforms such as in the infrastructure sector where the push for major infrastructure expenses needs to be balance with the urgency to ensure good basic public services in health and education and good governance. The seminar also seems to have contributed towards building a sense of ownership among the government members as to the implications of choosing one policy reform over another. In addition, given the country heavy reliance on export of commodities, the seminar offered an opportunity to encourage the country to look at other sources of growth, especially since prices remain volatile for commodities and consider other reform options. Listening to other countries' experiences such as Albania and Latvia, participants discussed strategies for improving tax collection to better finance public investments and the need to address inefficiencies within key sectors.

The outcomes of the grant activities were hoped to be sustained beyond the duration of the grant for the following reasons: (a) its timeliness with the Tajikistan Development Forum held two months after the seminar in Turkey; (b) the interest expressed by the Government members to have a mini-event in October/November 2007 with the country's economic team and key members of the Bank country team as a follow-up event and (c) the official request from the Government to organize another high-level seminar in FY08, the fifth in a series of annual events.

v. Recommendations and Lessons Learned

It is important to meet and discuss with the government participants prior to the event in order to build consensus, prepare the ground for the analysis, assist in the preparation of presentations, agree on content, estimate the gaps in "knowledge" and assess the receptivity to international policy advice. This was the purpose of the Russian expert's mission to Dushanbe a few days before the Seminar. This field based preparatory work was not part of the previous Tajikistan leadership seminars.

Early identification of speakers and facilitators is key to ensuring that the presentations are adequately customized and relevant to the recipient's country context. Speakers and facilitators need to be given sufficient time to read, get familiar and understand a country's development challenges. In that respect, the Policy Notes prepared by the Bank should have been shared earlier with both the resource persons and the government members.

It may have been useful to organize working group sessions during the seminar to facilitate focused discussions on technical issues, following the strategic, policy-level presentations and lessons learned from other countries in order to generate more actionable knowledge.

Annex G: Composite of Project Documents

All of the content below is taken directly from the project documents, usually as a direct quote.²³

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS	48
I. LICUS #15 - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LEADERSHIP SEMINAR - 2004	52
CONTEXT.....	52
PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED.....	52
OBJECTIVES	52
ACTIVITY DESIGN	52
<i>Design process:</i>	52
<i>Final design:</i>	52
PARTICIPANTS	53
<i>Distribution:</i>	53
<i>Selection Process:</i>	53
IMPLEMENTATION.....	53
<i>Team:</i>	53
<i>Partners:</i>	53
<i>Changes during implementation:</i>	53
OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES.....	53
<i>Outputs:</i>	53
<i>Outcomes:</i>	53
LESSONS LEARNED	54
II. LICUS #15-B - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC LEADERSHIP SEMINAR – 2005	55
CONTEXT.....	55
PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED.....	55
OBJECTIVES	55
ACTIVITY DESIGN	56
<i>Design process:</i>	56
<i>Final design:</i>	56
PARTICIPANTS	56
<i>Distribution:</i>	56
<i>Selection Process:</i>	56
IMPLEMENTATION.....	57
<i>Team:</i>	57
<i>Partners:</i>	57
<i>Changes during implementation:</i>	57
OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES.....	57
<i>Outputs:</i>	57
<i>Outcomes:</i>	57
LESSONS LEARNED	58

²³ Please note that this is an internal Bank document and for official use only.

III. PCF #171 – TIMOR-LESTE CAPACITY-BUILDING ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (CAD)

60

CONTEXT..... 60
 PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED..... 60
 OBJECTIVES 60
 ACTIVITY DESIGN 61
 Design process:..... 61
 Final design:..... 61
 PARTICIPANTS 62
 Distribution: 62
 Selection Process:..... 62
 IMPLEMENTATION..... 62
 Team: 62
 Partners:..... 62
 Changes during implementation:..... 62
 OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES..... 62
 Expected outputs (Proposal):..... 62
 Outputs:..... 63
 Outcomes:..... 63
 LESSONS LEARNED 63

IV. PCF #258: TIMOR-LESTE – BUILDING LEADERSHIP CAPACITY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (LED)

64

CONTEXT..... 64
 PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED..... 64
 OBJECTIVES 64
 ACTIVITY DESIGN 65
 Design process (Revised Proposal):..... 65
 Final design:..... 65
 PARTICIPANTS 66
 Design process:..... 66
 Distribution: 66
 IMPLEMENTATION..... 67
 Team: 67
 Partners:..... 67
 Implementation challenges:..... 67
 Changes during implementation:..... 67
 OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES..... 68
 Outcome indicators 68
 Outputs:..... 68
 Outcomes:..... 69
 LESSONS LEARNED 69

V. LICUS #51: TIMOR-LESTE – LEADERSHIP AND COMMUNICATION CAPACITY FOR NATIONAL RENEWAL (LCCNR)

71

CONTEXT..... 71
 PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED..... 71
 OBJECTIVES 72
 Theory of change 72

ACTIVITY DESIGN	73
<i>Design process and resulting design:</i>	73
<i>Method</i>	75
<i>Final design articulated in Proposal:</i>	75
PARTICIPANTS	77
<i>Selection design:</i>	77
<i>Distribution:</i>	78
<i>Selection Process:</i>	78
IMPLEMENTATION.....	78
<i>Team:</i>	78
<i>Partners:</i>	78
<i>Implementation challenges:</i>	78
<i>Changes during implementation:</i>	81
OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES.....	82
<i>Outcome indicators (Proposal):</i>	82
<i>Output indicators (Proposal):</i>	82
<i>Outputs:</i>	82
<i>Outcomes:</i>	83
LESSONS LEARNED	84

VI. PCF #208 – BURUNDI LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM (BLTP)

85

CONTEXT.....	85
PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED.....	85
OBJECTIVES	85
<i>Theory of Change</i>	85
ACTIVITY DESIGN	86
<i>Design process:</i>	86
<i>Final design:</i>	86
PARTICIPANTS	89
<i>Selection design:</i>	89
<i>Distribution:</i>	90
<i>Selection Process:</i>	90
IMPLEMENTATION.....	91
<i>Team:</i>	91
<i>Partners:</i>	91
<i>Implementation challenges:</i>	92
<i>Changes during implementation:</i>	92
OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES.....	92
<i>Expected outcomes:</i>	92
<i>Outcome indicators:</i>	92
<i>Outputs:</i>	92
<i>Outcomes:</i>	93
LESSONS LEARNED	96

VII. LICUS #52 – BURUNDI GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

97

CONTEXT.....	97
PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED.....	97
OBJECTIVES	98
<i>Theory of change</i>	98

ACTIVITY DESIGN	99
<i>Design process:</i>	99
<i>Final design:</i>	99
PARTICIPANTS	102
<i>Design:</i>	102
<i>Distribution:</i>	102
<i>Selection Process:</i>	102
IMPLEMENTATION.....	102
<i>Team:</i>	102
<i>Partners:</i>	103
<i>Implementation challenges:</i>	103
<i>Changes during implementation:</i>	103
<i>Reports of what worked during implementation</i>	103
OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES.....	104
<i>Outcome indicators (Proposal)</i>	104
<i>Outputs</i>	104
<i>Outcomes:</i>	105
LESSONS LEARNED	106

VIII. PCF #350 – TAJIKISTAN LEADERSHIP SEMINAR ON STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

107

CONTEXT.....	107
PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED.....	107
OBJECTIVE	107
ACTIVITY DESIGN	107
<i>Design process:</i>	107
<i>Final design:</i>	108
PARTICIPANTS	108
<i>Design:</i>	108
<i>Distribution:</i>	109
<i>Selection Process:</i>	109
IMPLEMENTATION.....	109
<i>Team:</i>	109
<i>Partners:</i>	109
<i>Implementation challenges:</i>	109
<i>Changes during implementation:</i>	109
OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES.....	109
<i>Outcome indicators:</i>	109
<i>Output indicators:</i>	109
<i>Outputs:</i>	109
<i>Outcomes:</i>	110
LESSONS LEARNED	111

I. LICUS #15 - Central African Republic Leadership Seminar - 2004

- \$129,380 approved, \$87,980 spent
 - \$13,000 Goods; \$72,980 Services; \$2,000 Miscellaneous Services
- 8/04 – 2/05

Context

- CAR is in the midst of a major transition from a provisional government to a return to constitutional government with presidential elections scheduled for January 2005.
- To help manage this transition, the government has worked with the Bank and other donors to put in place a multi-donor transitional 'implementation matrix' of concrete actions on security, governance, economic management, and delivery of social services to tackle the most critical development challenges in the months ahead.

Problem to be addressed

- Historically, leadership skills have been a key gap in implementing reform programs in CAR.

Objectives

- Build capacity of senior leadership to manage more effectively and carry out the short-term reforms necessary to ensure stability and continued engagement with the international community and lay the groundwork for broader leadership-building activities following the transition. (Proposal)
- Building commitment to critical elements of the transitional results framework and fostering a stable process in the pre- and post-election period. (Final Report)

Activity design

Design process:

- Requested by Minister of Finance, after reshuffle, was even more popular because of need for credibility with donors
- Advised by WWIC and Notre Dame
- Broad consultations with donors and government at outset
- Co-sponsored by BONUCA and UNDP
- Main themes chosen through consultation: i) stability and security; ii) promoting commitment to good governance and financial transparency; iii) natural resource management.
- Subsidiary themes: i) importance of leading by example; ii) effective communication within government as well as among government, civil society, and the international community.

Final design:

- Two-day seminar
- High-level Peer-to-Peer presentations by Pres. Buyoya of Burundi on security and stability, Minister Ouedraogo of Burkina Faso on management of natural resources, Mr. Legamble of Madagascar on good governance and transparency.
- Day 1 – Introduction and discussion of the context, presentations by 3 speakers
- Day 2 – Working groups on Day 1 themes facilitated by Day 1 speakers

Participants

- 37 participants (40 registered)

Distribution:

- 20 top government officials, including President, Vice-President, and Prime Minister
- 20 non-governmental representatives
- 33% government; 19% public institutions; 19% political parties; 4% unions; 26% civil society.
- 93% male; 7% female
- 2 IO representatives, SRSR and his representative (not counted as "participants")

Selection Process:

- Selected based on initial proposals by the government and refined in consultation with the government's technical working group and donor partners.
- PCF/LICUS Committee asked if the project targeted future leaders, in view of elections. Project team responded that it was limited mostly to current leaders.

Implementation

Team:

- World Bank implementation with an external consultant (\$39,640), facilitator (\$13,420), and 3 speakers (\$19,920).
- Technical working group of government staff, and one human rights NGO, to organize in cooperation with WB. (unclear how this worked)

Partners:

- BONUCA, UNDP, UNICEF, French Embassy.

Changes during implementation:

- Delay due to resignation of the Minister of Finance, who had asked for the workshop, and the subsequent cabinet reshuffle. Increased cost because of need for second consultancy trip. Also increased prominence of event because of government's desire to increase credibility with donors. (Was this because of the credibility lost in the reshuffle?)
- Focus on elections was not explicit in proposal, but the output of the "Electoral Code of Conduct" seems to be seen as one of the most successful aspects of the seminar.

Outputs and outcomes

Outputs:

- "Electoral Code of Conduct" – a common declaration of shared beliefs about the country's needs and a commitment to promoting a peaceful and fair electoral process.
- Summary of working group deliberations (security, natural resources management, and governance), with reference to the transitional results framework.

Outcomes:

- Outcome indicator:

- Demonstrable progress is made on completing the actions agreed in the government's multidonor transitional implementation matrix.
- According to email from Gilles Alfandari, LICUS:
 - The leadership seminar was the most successful activity of the LICUS program in CAR, so far. In particular, it led to the adoption of the "code de bonne conduite électorale", an ethic charter setting the tone for the general elections, which significantly contributed to pacify the political climate and provide the background required by the Committee of the Wise - a mediation group of senior civil society personalities - which successfully convinced Pt Bozize to allow the candidacy of several of his opponents at the Presidential elections. As a result, the elections took place without major outbreak of violence (contrary to most previsions) and were assessed by international observers as overall fair, a precondition for donor reengagement in the country."
 - "It had resonated broadly with the population at large through an extensive media coverage, and directly contributed to restore hope in the country.
- According to the LICUS 2005 proposal:
 - The seminar resulted in a common declaration on how to proceed in the months leading up to the election, which subsequently was transformed into a code of conduct for the period up to and during the elections.

Lessons learned

- Strong partnerships with government and prominent donors
 - Government - brought contextual knowledge and facilitated communication with senior government officials.
 - Unified donor front emphasized importance of event and brought combined clout.
- Clear government interest supported by broad consultation.
 - "Hot ticket" event.
 - [T]he nature of the Bank's dialogue with governments means that the responsibility for ensuring that civil society is engaged at an early stage of the process rests principally with the government. (Is this accurate?)
- Moving quickly to mitigate unexpected events along the way.
 - The ability to quickly mount a second mission to meet and engage the new [government] counterpart, verify commitment among the reconfigured cabinet and conduct additional consultations was important in confirming plans and refining the agenda.
- A thorough (and early) search to recruit experienced experts from appropriate countries.
- Dialogue with speakers well in advance of the event.
- An active strategy to manage the media and communications
- Mounting a unilingual (French) event
- Adopting a results-based approach for the seminar
 - Structuring the working group sessions around the transitional results framework helped to build awareness of and commitment to it, and gave the working groups a very concrete, substantive character that inspired participation and lively exchanges.

II. LICUS #15-b - Central African Republic Leadership Seminar – 2005

- \$123,000 approved
 - Proposed (no final budget report available): \$19,200 Goods; \$83,380 Services; \$20,420 Other.
- 09/05 – 06/06

Context

- Financed under the LICUS grant, the government of CAR, with the support of the World Bank, BONUCA and UNDP, organized a leadership seminar in November 2004. The seminar resulted in a common declaration on how to proceed in the months leading up to the election, which subsequently was transformed into a code of conduct for the period up to and during the elections.
- Prerequisites for successful reengagement with the international community, including IDA arrears clearance, comprehend tackling imbalances in the macro-economic framework, the development of systems to monitor financial equilibrium, and the establishment of a clear medium-term policy framework.

Problem to be addressed

- The PRSP will be the framework for developing consensus around the strategy for achieving these prerequisites, but will require effective leadership to prioritize actions and mobilize key stakeholders. Historically, skills to implement reform programs in CAR have been lacking, and the country has suffered from political instability and bouts of armed conflict, corruption, contributing to poor socio-economic outcomes. The new government is, however, committed to the implementation of a reform program, but lacks the needed capacity in leading a country in achieving visible and concrete results.

Objectives

- Strengthen capacity of leadership to articulate priorities and transparently deliver on short-term goals in the context of the PRSP framework. (Proposal)
 - (i) build consensus around and engage multiple stakeholders in short-term action planning to implement the agreed priorities under the PRSP;
 - (ii) engage national leaders in an experience sharing and peer learning event with fellow leaders who have themselves managed similar situations, and
 - (iii) expose government and non-government leaders to lessons learned from implementation of a pilot rapid results initiative to achieve selected outcomes from among the strategic priorities of the PRSP (currently under development).
- Altered grant objective:
 - As the work to develop the country's PRSP had not advanced sufficiently in order to use this document as the framework for the leadership seminar, the Steering Committee for the seminar decided to use the government's annual planning tool, the Politique Générale de l'Etat, as the framework for the seminar. In strengthening leaders' capacity to implement priorities as stated in the Politique Générale de l'Etat, however, capacity to implement priorities under the PRSP would also be strengthened, thereby contributing to the longer-term objectives of the PRSP and the objectives as stated original grant proposal.
- Specific objectives for each of two phases:

- Phase 1: A pilot initiative to select, develop and achieve concrete short-term outcomes in selected priority PRSP results areas which will be implemented ahead of the Leadership seminar. A simplified version of the rapid results methodology will be used to prioritize outcomes, unbundle constraints, mobilize actors, and monitor progress towards achieving visible and measurable outcomes. Further, it is planned that national leaders will internalize the experience and the process used and that the pilot will subsequently be scaled up to achieve further results under the program.
- Phase 2: Delivery of a leadership seminar, which will:
 - Serve as a forum for dialogue and exchange of targeted experiences between senior CAR leadership, champions of post-conflict transitions, and experienced practitioners with convincing and relevant track-records.
 - Translate multi-stakeholder consensus around PRSP priorities into action-planning for first-year implementation of the PRSP, developing a shared understanding of constraints and obstacles associated with achieving select PRSP outcomes.
 - Extract lessons learned in consultative process for PRSP design and in problem-solving from implementation of pilot initiative and analyze the implementation experience.
 - Build confidence in stakeholders for overcoming obstacles and achieving results.
 - Serve as a forum for sharing experiences, building cross-sectoral alliances and partnerships, and strengthening the team spirit among the nation's leaders and decision-makers, all of which could serve to improve the country's image internationally and build confidence nationally.

Activity design

Design process:

- Process unclear.

Final design:

- The leadership seminar will provide a forum for dialogue and exchange of experiences between senior CAR leadership and experienced global practitioners. This “peer to peer” approach will draw on the expertise of successful change leaders from other countries which have undergone comparable transitions and implemented similar reform programs. The seminar also aims at developing a common medium to long-term vision for achieving concrete results in priority PRSP areas among national leaders, and to examine experiences from the pilot initiative in achieving short-term results in one or a few select PRSP priority areas. (Proposal)

Participants

Distribution:

- Total of 60 participants in leadership seminar: 6 heads of constitutionally-established bodies (i.e., President, President of the National Assembly, etc...); 23 government ministers; 13 other governmental representatives; 9 national NGO/ civil society representatives; 3 representatives of prominent churches (Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim); 6 representatives of the international community.

Selection Process:

- Unclear. In consultation with the Government.

Implementation

Team:

- The design, development, and delivery of the activity were done in partnership between the government of CAR and the World Bank Institute, where WBI's role was to assist the government – as a facilitator – in the development and design of the activity. While the grant was Bank-executed, the overall responsibility for the activity was with the Prime Minister. From the start of the project, a government Steering Committee was established, charged with the overall coordination and planning for the activity. In addition, about 50 government and non-government representatives were involved in the preparation and the execution of the rapid results pilots.

Partners:

- BONUCA, UNICEF, UNDP, WB Team in CAR

Changes during implementation:

- Adjustment to the absence of a complete PRSP.

Outputs and outcomes

Outputs:

- Two rapid results pilots were launched in September 2005, in two areas:
 - RRI1: restoration of confidence in service delivery in the region of Bossangoa;
 - RRI2: increase in revenues from imports on the road to Douala, Cameroon.
- The leadership seminar took place on December 12 and 13 2005, attended by 60 participants – including the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and Cabinet members. Representatives from the private sector and civil society—including National Assembly representatives and representatives from diverse NGOs—also attended the seminar.
- An engagement note for results-based implementation of government strategies and policies was developed—as part of the output from the working group sessions—during the leadership seminar. Both government and donors were very pleased with the engagement note, which can serve as a basis for developing an implementation strategy for the forthcoming PRSP.

Outcomes:

- The overarching objective of the activity was to strengthen the capacity of the leadership team in CAR in articulating priorities and transparently deliver on short-term goals.
- *Outcome indicators:*
 - Demonstrable progress on rapid results pilot goals.
 - A consensus on realistic and doable first-year targets for PRSP.
 - Existence of multi-stakeholder teams targeting priority results.
 - Increased and more consistent media coverage of national priorities and stakeholder commitments.
- *Learning Outcomes:*
 - The tools and methodologies introduced through the rapid results initiative and the leadership seminar – including practical experience in implementing strategies for achieving results – have provided the stakeholders with important tools and learning in terms of implementing other strategies and programmes, notably the PRSP.

- The seminar and the rapid results pilot have contributed to a heightened interest in results-based management in CAR—reported by the UN Coordinator in CAR. This has, among other things, been demonstrated by 12 ministers attending a recent review of UNDAF implementation in CAR—not just those ministers working closely with the UNCT.
- *Operational Outcomes:*
 - *Demonstrable progress on rapid results pilot goals.*
 - These pilots did achieve many of the established results (results established at the beginning of the 90-day period), RRI1 achieving about 50% of expected results, while RRI2 achieved about 10% above expected results).
 - *A consensus on realistic and doable first-year targets for PRSP.*
 - Not achieved as work on the PRSP had not advanced enough to be used as the framework for the activity. As an alternative, the Steering Committee opted to use the Politique Générale de l'Etat as the general framework.
 - *Existence of multi-stakeholder teams targeting priority results.*
 - Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder teams targeting priority results were put in place as part of the rapid results pilot initiatives.
 - Energy and confidence gained by the two multi-stakeholder rapid results pilot teams (governmental, NGO and private sector) originating from the knowledge gained on rapid results approach, the visibility of the process, and the outcomes and lessons of the seminar.
 - *Increased and more consistent media coverage of national priorities and stakeholder commitments.*
 - A press conference/working session with the press was held prior to and in preparation of the leadership seminar, with the aim of informing the press of the objectives and expected results from the seminar.
 - The establishment of a local Steering Committee and the delivery of the seminar in partnership with the government also contributed to capacity development on the client side.
 - Commitment to operationalize a one-page "engagement" note synthesizing consensus by all participants on Guiding Principles for Achieving Results. The note itself opens the door for a number of important interventions and future actions for all partners.
 - A one hour focused private meeting with the President of the Republic, the above resource persons, the Bank representative in CAR, and Brendan Horton from operations. This resulted in a more satisfactory communication and level of engagement, which was confirmed by both the Bank and the leadership.
 - Subsequent to the December 2005 seminar, the President of the Republic reinvigorated the "Groupe des Sages" ("Group of Wise Men") which was established after a November 2004 leadership seminar in CAR in order to enhance national dialogue and consensus.
 - Following the December 2005 seminar, Lamine Loum - one of the international resource persons who took part in the event - has been engaged in follow-up work in CAR.

Lessons learned

- Importance of engagement and ownership of local counterparts and the anchoring of such activities with key decision-makers/key ministries (Presidency/Prime Minister's office);

- Importance of donor coordination and involvement in the design and development of leadership capacity development activities;
- Neutrality and objectivity of the design of the activity. Such activities are not—and should not be perceived as—World Bank instruments to push a “Bank agenda”;
- Usefulness of such activities in exposing capacity development needs in the country in general and for leadership teams in particular.

III. PCF #171 – Timor-Leste Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)

- \$249,993
 - \$36,700 - Workshop research, design, and co-facilitation; \$119,200 – Workshop trainers and technical assistance; \$85,453 – Travel, transport, and per diem; \$8,640 – Materials and other supplies.
- 08/01 – 06/02

Context

- Period of transition and reconstruction in East Timor (no specific context or problem provided).

Problem to be addressed

- East Timorese leadership and participation at all stages has been critical to ensuring sustainability of reconstruction programs.
- In the months since the first TFET donor review meeting (Lisbon, June 2000) a growing sentiment has emerged that capacity building for the East Timorese leaders and new managers is both urgent and critical to ensure their involvement in leading and managing development initiatives in the transition to independence.
- After the referendum and the ensuing violence, the East Timorese -- largely inexperienced in the tasks of governance – were left to design and administer a new government and reconstruct a devastated nation with the assistance of the United Nations and TFET. The task of governance is not only difficult because of the massive destruction to physical infrastructure, but also because of the lack of management and public administration experience. A parallel lack of skills in conflict resolution and mediation also constrains the ways in which Timorese leaders approach the task of governing.

Objectives

- The main objectives of the workshops proposed in Phase I of the Capacity Building and Development project (CAD) are:
 - (i) to enhance participants' skills and techniques as effective national leaders and managers;
 - (ii) to unite a broad range of Timorese leadership and society in building an anti-corruption strategy; and
 - (iii) to help participants acquire the tools to understand and resolve conflict in a non-political context so they may play an important role as mediators and conflict-managers.
- A secondary goal or objective of the CAD project is to use funds from the PCF to leverage greater funding for an intended TFET subordinate capacity-building and technical assistance trust fund.
- The World Bank Mission in East Timor hopes to not only produce the individual outputs identified under the different topics described herein, but also seeks to build a coordinated and diversified approach to the challenge of capacity building.... The activities described in this proposal have been specifically designed to complement, not duplicate, the capacity building and public administration training programs currently planned by the UNDP and other donors.
- The overarching goal of this PCF-funded capacity-building project is to leverage substantial additional commitments from donors and funding sources for expanded capacity-building initiatives. By demonstrating the value and benefits of capacity building through these high-profile activities, the Mission in East Timor intends to build consensus for establishing a special protected

section of TFET so that donors may pledge specific expanded resources exclusively for capacity-building in East Timor -- including but not limited to, all topic areas outlined herein.

- Besides providing a venue for training, workshops will provide the opportunity for networking and problem solving, by jointly analyzing current obstacles to implementation and finding cooperative solutions to common problems.

Activity design

Design process:

- Start up period intended to finalize the design partly through facilitated workshops with East Timorese to help identify capacity building needs and shape the program to meet their learning style. This period also sought to identify individuals from developing countries who have received similar training to share their experiences with regard to the usefulness and application of such training.
- Phase I: Identification, revision, and preparation of manuals and case studies will be undertaken for each of the three workshop series (core topics: leadership, anti-corruption and good governance, conflict resolution) planned for Phase I.

Final design:

- Eight Training workshops for approximately 85 participants over a period of 6 to 8 months.
- Course Modules proposed for Phase I:
 - A) Leadership Training
 - 3 day workshop on The Practice of Transformational Leadership
 - Taking a practical hands-on approach, the course: (i.) distinguishes between authority and leadership; (ii.) provides a diagnostic framework for assessing mechanisms by which social systems avoid work on critical issues; and (iii.) explores strategies and tactics of intervention for transformational leadership. The course consists primarily of practical discussion and case work.
 - Trainer: Dr. Dean Williams, Harvard
 - B) Anti-Corruption and Good Governance
 - Developing an Anti Corruption Strategy (funded by Danish Trust Fund for Governance)
 - 3 day workshop on Understanding and Curbing Corruption
 - What is corruption? Country comparisons, placing East Timor in the range of other countries' experience. Brainstorming elements of an anticorruption strategy for East Timor.
 - Trainers: Robert Klitgaard and Patrick Meagher
 - 2 day workshop on Alternative Structures and Systems for Curbing Corruption
 - The participants will be able to produce an outline with distinct elements required to "operationalize" a national integrity strategy, along with an outline of specific action plans for each element of that national strategy.
 - Trainers: Patrick Meagher and Kumar Upudhay
 - C) Conflict Resolution Training
 - 3 day workshop on Tools for Conflict Resolution

- This is an introductory workshop customized to provide members of the Timorese leadership with the basic analytical terms and tools to understand and resolve conflict in a non-political context.
- Trainers: Conflict Management Group (CMG)

Participants

Distribution:

- The target audience for each module of the three workshop series will be tailored to the subject matter, but a large core (more than 50%) of the participants will attend all workshops within a series.
- No real discussion of distribution because there is no final report.

Selection Process:

- The selection process will be conducted in start-up phase. No further details provided.

Implementation

Team:

- World Bank execution because of lack of capacity in ET Government and because of their confidence in the WB and request that they take on these types of activities.
- Through Bank execution, both NGOs with experience implementing such programs and individual consultants with unique skills in leadership, conflict resolution, and governance training programs will be contracted to conduct training seminars in leadership, anti-corruption, and conflict resolution.

Partners:

- Additional financial support of \$99,778 will be provided for anti-corruption work by the Danish Trust Fund for Governance to (i) carry-out an initial series of facilitated workshops on anti-corruption; (ii) develop an anti-corruption framework and strategy; and (iii) conduct a national anti-corruption awareness campaign.

Changes during implementation:

- Request for extension by 6 months. Implementation unclear. No final report.

Outputs and outcomes

Expected outputs (Proposal):

- conduct training seminars and training of trainers workshops in
 - (i.) leadership and organizational management;
 - (ii.) anticorruption strategies, and
 - (iii) conflict management, mediation and resolution in a specifically non-political context, using apolitical case studies and exercises.
- An assessment of current capacity in local conflict management methods and of culture-specific or traditional methods for resolving conflict in East Timor.
- A brief assessment of training needs and target audiences – distribution, size, institutional groupings, language groupings, etc.

- A final report outlining best practices and lessons learned to be applied in a broader, more comprehensive capacity building program in the future.

Outputs:

- Unclear. No final report.

Outcomes:

- Learning outcomes:
 - Unclear. No final report.
 - Experience with the PCF funded 2001 Governance in Transition workshops demonstrated the utility of training in addressing leadership capacities. In a series of video-taped interviews six months after the events, participants in the 2001 leadership workshops reported that they had acquired skills that allowed them to 1) work more strategically in mobilizing teams to attack difficult problems, 2) build coalitions across groups who have enduring differences of opinion, and 3) be better communicators. The frequency with which participants from the 2001 events continue to cite that experience as something that “is important for all leaders” and “would be beneficial to repeat” reflects a high level of both interest and commitment. (From 2006 proposal, #51)
 - The fieldwork suggests that this is precisely what Timor-Leste’s leaders have never had. There was no evidence from any of the interviews that any substantive process of follow-up after leadership training workshops (or, indeed, for workshops on related issues) has yet taken place in Timor-Leste. Much more common are what are known as “one-offs”: trainings or workshops that take place virtually in isolation. Once the training is complete, the program draws down and contact between program officials and workshop trainees withers. Many of those who had been trained by LCCNR in early November mentioned the only prior training of the same sort: the fabled “Dean Williams” workshop of 2001. That workshop was widely reported to be groundbreaking: it took place fairly soon after Timor-Leste had been established as a nation, and it included many of its most prominent leaders. Much less evident is what result emerged from this training, six years later. Yet the symbolic significance of this training remains clear: for many LCCNR trainees, and others as well, the “Dean Williams” training was significant if only because it took place, was highly relevant, and included a number of the central players in Timor-Leste’s national politics. (From Sommers’ baseline)
- Operational outcomes:
 - Unclear. No final report.

Lessons learned

- Unclear. No final report.

IV. PCF #258: Timor-Leste – Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)

- \$250,000
 - \$165,855 – Consultants; \$77,475 – Workshops and Training; \$6,670 – Operation/Implementation.
- 6/04 – 1/07

Context

- The colonial and Indonesian usage of ‘divide and rule,’ the overall history of the resistance struggle, and its clandestine composition all created layers of uncertainty and distrust within the society. This distrust continues to affect the formation of relationships and stakeholder groups today, and hampers some from moving forward towards progress and development. Historical stakeholder-rifts formed 27 years earlier, even before the Indonesian invasion, are rising to the surface and may detrimentally effect the direction and future of the Timor-Leste as a nation.²⁴

Problem to be addressed

- Those youth groups who played an important role in the resistance struggle and who expected to be rewarded for their efforts in the fight, instead now find themselves without a voice, in search of a new role in an independent Timor-Leste. Although the youth carry tremendous potential for overcoming the effects of conflict, left to their own devices, they could pose a serious threat to themselves and to the long-term stability of the country. The youth’s feelings of disenfranchisement have been further compounded by unemployment rates of 20%, almost half of which are made up of urban males between the ages of 15 to 24, and half of this 20% are educated with secondary education or higher.
- The project responds to the urgent requests by the President and Prime Minister in view of recent violent events in the country, reflecting the need to pro-actively contribute to social capital-building among various stakeholders. (6/11/03 Memo)
- (ToC) Building a foundation of trust (or social capital) may be a building block to economic development in Timor-Leste. LED aims to bridge vertical relationships between government and stakeholder groups, while also fostering relationships between youth organizations and youth-at-risk, thereby helping to build horizontal social capital as well. Youth leadership development will not only help the government to become aware and more responsive to youth demands, the horizontal interactions among these groups will foster more productive partnerships, shed light on government’s commitment to youth, and help youth to understand the tough trade-offs faced by government in trying to respond to all demands.

Objectives

- The project’s main objective is to build trust (or social capital) among urban youth groups and youth-at-risk, to engage in policy dialogues with government and their community leaders. The purpose is to strengthen the relationship of youth with government and/or community leaders, their parents and build other positive social networks. (Revised Proposal)

²⁴ On Dec. 4th, 2002 youth riots engulfed Dili. With the reported support of various factional leaders, the youth stormed the parliament, threw stones at government buildings, looted and burned stores and hotels, and set the Prime Minister’s personal residence ablaze. Then later on January 4th, 2002 using semi-automatic machine guns, a gang of youth opened fire on a community in the district of Ermera, approximately 45 minutes drive from the capital city in Timor-Leste. These events have demonstrated the fragility of the security situation in the country, but have also further reinforced the distrust among factional groups in the country.

- A secondary objective is to support young people through peer-to-peer non formal training sessions— to strengthen self confidence and a sense of identity, and learn to value positive expressions of cooperation and teamwork. (Revised Proposal)
- To foster relationships of trust and strengthen cooperation among youth and other key stakeholders for stability, social and economic growth, and poverty reduction, which include:
 - (i) building trust among urban youth groups and youth-at-risk and to engage them in policy dialogues with government and community leaders; and
 - (ii) supporting young people through peer-to-peer non formal training sessions to strengthen self-confidence and a sense of identity, and learn to value positive expression of cooperation and team work. (Completion Report)

Activity design

Design process (Revised Proposal):

- Assessment mission to assess and prepare the social capital retreats (outlined in component 2 and 3), which involves the following five activities:
 - in-country assessments, identification of “pressure points,” and materials design,
 - stakeholder inventory and “mapping” (i.e.: “who’s who”),
 - objective criteria for participant selection and participant selection, and
 - Identification of national trainers/facilitators and translators (as part of workshop delivery team).
- Every component of the project will be developed by youth for youth.

Final design:

- Since workshops are intended to be demand-driven rather than supply-driven, the menus of activities above will either be scaled-up or down depending on the impact/feedback from participants.
- Component 2: Leadership for Economic Development Program
 - Targets vertical social capital.
 - This component involves homogenous and heterogeneous leadership retreats that promote problem solving, build processes of collective decision-making, and support social learning and progress. (See Revised Proposal Dec 3 03 for detailed chart of potential activities and learning objectives).
- Component 3: Youth Capacity Development Program
 - Targets horizontal social capital.
 - Building horizontal ties among the youth is intended to empower and reinforce youth self-confidence to develop the social foundations necessary for economic development. (See Revised Proposal Dec 3 03 for detailed chart of potential activities and learning objectives targeting capacity at institutional, individual and societal levels).
- Component 5: Community of Practice and Learning
 - This component covers all forms of project communication and outreach for the development of a community of practice and learning, and to ensure broader impact of the youth retreats on youth stakeholders groups throughout the country. Communication activities under this component may involve the production or development of the following:

- a documentary on youth aspiration and values, and videos produced of youth at retreats and their lessons gained;
 - community radio programs airing interviews with youth during the retreats and materials covered in those workshops for maximum outreach to youth groups throughout the country (their own youth leaders help to transmit messages and lessons learned from retreats, and could become part of a radio program for youth), and
 - a website developed with various hands-on tools from retreat sessions, including all written materials, case studies, manuals, and links to videos used.
- M&E design (Component 4):
 - Activity and workshop monitoring – An external international consultant will be contracted to work with LED to ensure appropriate baseline indicators for outcome and impact analysis of the project. The consultant who will develop a questionnaire for the initial in-country assessment missions and the SC-IQ type of pre and post-workshop questionnaire, will also work as a facilitator to jointly develop the tools together with youth (so that they understand how to develop such tools, their importance and usage).
 - Independent evaluation will be conducted.

Participants

Design process:

- The project aims to reach two sets of beneficiaries:
 - The first set of beneficiaries is at-risk-youth who are empowered to contribute to their communities through leadership and social skills training. These are youth in urban centers and rural districts, who are likely between the ages of 15 to 30 years of age, many of whom are excluded and idle due to lack of employment²⁵.
 - The second set of indirect beneficiaries is leaders from national and local government agencies, parliamentarians, civil society and community leaders.
 - Participants in all capacity building sessions will be selected from diverse groups according to objective criteria. Some sessions may be geared specifically to one subset of homogenous actors or a group of heterogeneous stakeholders (such as a homogenous group of higher-level government leaders, or government leaders mixed in a heterogeneous session together specifically with youth). The purpose of the homogenous and heterogeneous groupings is to build self-confidence and cover specific topics relevant to one group on their own first (horizontal social capital), and then to slowly build-up vertical relationships across more heterogeneous groupings over time.

Distribution:

- No data.
 - Selection Process:
 - No data.

²⁵ Note that not all youth between the ages of 15-30 will be included in this project, but rather a representative sample of variously carefully mapped youth factions (social mapping conducted under component 1). By design the definition of youth participants has been undefined since the actual definition/criteria for youth selection and participation will be developed as the result of participatory workshops under component one.

Implementation

Team:

- The government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (signed by the Ministry of Planning and Finance) will be the grant recipient, and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth and Sports (MECYS) will be the implementer of the grant. A very limited project steering committee will be formed solely for decision-making and approval on project procurement or contracting, monitoring grant expenditures, and endorsing other implementation arrangements.

Partners:

- The Ministry of Education, Culture, Youth, and Sports (MECYS) will implement the project with assistance from a youth NGO coordinating committee and two international advisors (one skilled in financial management/procurement, and the other in communication/facilitation techniques).
- Where possible, tasks will be shared among donors, who in the past have been willing to provide in-kind support for some component activities, and co-financing will be sought with institutions working on complimentary training programs.

Implementation challenges:

- From 2004-2005 Report from Ministry of Education, Culture, and Youth
 - 1) Weak capacity of Ministry in terms of human, financial and physical resources.
 - 2) The broad scope of the project and its objectives.
 - 3) Young people did not want to provide information to an additional assessment because they had provided information to previous assessments.
 - 4) The available capacity in the government is not able to cope with the needs and demands of the beneficiaries, leading them to conclude that they need to build the network, build joint intervention mechanisms, and need to empower youth groups to solve their own problems.
 - 5) Access to target beneficiaries in rural areas is difficult because of the absence of infrastructure.
 - 6) Weakness of youth organizations.
 - 7) Transportation and communication difficulties.
 - 8) Need to improve staff capacity.
 - 9) Steering Committee stopped meeting.
 - The Ministry concludes that they urgently need more staff and facilities to support the project implementation.
- From April – Dec. 2006 Progress Report.
 - Some of youth groups' involvement in violence has been a challenge for future interventions on issues affecting youth. The public opinion is that unemployment is the cause of youth groups violence. However, its is not necessary the only case. They also need to be equipped with civic attitudes and behaviors to be active and good employees.

Changes during implementation:

- Political and military crisis in May and June 2006, including attacks on the office of the Secretary of Youth and Sport.

Outputs and outcomes

Outcome indicators

- Increased *trust* between leaders from government, executive office, parliament, youth, civil society, community and district government ²⁶
- Increased *activity in partnerships and collective decision-making* between leaders from government, executive office, parliament, youth, civil society, community and district government
- Increased participation of youth in policy development (especially with regard to issues which affect youth)

Outputs

- From Annual Report, July 2004 - June 2005, by the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Youth.
 - 1) Establishment of the Steering Committee, which is charged with supervising, supporting and advising on the implementation of the project.
 - 2) Attend International Conference on Youth, Development and Peace in Sarajevo on September 5-7, 2004.
 - 3) Building network and mapping related activities and capacities.
 - 4) Recruited five staff.
 - 5) Youth retreat organized October 4-6, 2004 with the support of UNICEF. There were 75 participants from 13 districts and national youth organizations, ranging in age from 15 to 35 years (old youth!). Four main issues were discussed: health, education, socio-economic issues, socio-cultural issues, and youth development.
 - 6) Development of National Youth Policy and the Youth Social Analysis Mapping and Institutional Assessment (in cooperation with the World Bank).
 - 7) District visits to identify the conditions of youth centers, which concluded that the majority youth centers had collapsed, and design district youth programs for youth at risk or marginalized youth.
 - 8) Trainings in Dili, Aileu and Manatuto for people elected to run the Youth Councils. Trainings were in Management, Entrepreneurship, Leadership, and Life Skills. There were two sessions on Management and Entrepreneurship, of 20 participants each. There was one two-week leadership training session for 20 Youth Council representatives from three districts. UNICEF organized a basic Life Skills course.
- From Progress Report, April – December 2006
 - Activities completed:
 - 1) Training of 137 Youth in "institutional capacity development and citizen education";
 - 2) 14 initiatives by District Youth Councils and the National Youth Council were supported, with a total of \$24,866;
 - 3) publication of a monthly youth tabloid in response to finding from survey that young people in the districts have minimal access to information about what is happening in Dili or other cities; and
 - 4) supported the National youth Policy formulation process by organizing a seminar of 50 people on September 29, 2006.

²⁶ In general social capital indicators include those which measure levels of trust, membership in a group, belonging to networks and interaction across groups, participation in decision-making, strength of norms of reciprocity and sharing, and so on. Such data will be gathered as part of the monitoring and evaluation component of this project, to quantitatively analyze the project's impact on developing social capital in Timor-Leste.

- From Grant Completion Report, 7/30/07
 - Assessment and Preparation
 - Youth councils have been revived in all 13th districts of the country to facilitate nation wide consultation/youth social assessment for designing the youth policy. A youth social mapping and youth institutional assessment were carried out to help identify youth concerns and issues. District visits were conducted to identify possibilities for designing youth programs involving youth at risk.
 - Leadership for Economic Development Program
 - Support was provided for the national youth policy formulation process. On September 29, 2006 a seminar was organized to present the policy and the detail strategies draft to some of the national and international NGOs representatives in Fundação do Oriente.
 - An interministerial meeting has been held to ensure youth concerns are covered within sectoral ministry policies where relevant. A youth survey was also conducted to better understand youth aspiration and the results have been dissemination among various stakeholders. Various youth workshops have been held to gather relevant information for the national policy formulation.
 - Youth Capacity Development Program
 - Training on financial management, life skills, leadership training, entrepreneurship and organizational management skills for have been provided in Dili, Aileu and Manatuto.
 - Monitoring and Evaluation Systems
 - No data in final report on M&E system.
 - Community of Practice and Learning
 - The Tabloid Lian Foinsa'e (The Voice of Young People) began publication in June 2006. It provided a range of information for young people and helps them to be aware of issues and progress in the youth sector in Timor-Leste, in the region and worldwide and is a way to respond to the needs of young people as identified in the National Youth Survey. It started as an 8 page publication and only 20 copies circulated and by December 26, the publication had increased to 16 pages of information with 3000 copies per edition. Unfortunately the newspaper publication was never "owned" by the Secretary of Youth and not included as part of the government budget. It has not continued after the LED project ended. In addition, there was no feedback sought as to its usefulness.

Outcomes:

- Unclear.
- The development of the youth policy done in collaboration with other Ministries lays the foundation for setting up an institutional framework for ensuring the concerns of youth are met. In addition, Youth Councils ensure this further at the district levels.

Lessons learned

- M&E was specifically added since this was not taken into consideration for the first project implemented under CAD (and was a lesson learned).
- LED also includes three new components not included in CAD, namely (a.) youth capacity development component, (b.) monitoring & evaluation system component, and (c.) community of practice & learning component.

- This proposal seems to have been significantly revised and may have benefited from learning from other leadership programs. Did it?
- The crisis has revealed the importance of some of the issues that have not got attention in the past. Promoting institutional capacity of youth organizations continue to be a real need for the existing organizations. However, young people need to be equipped also with civic concept, attitudes and behavior to be active and effective citizens by performing their rights and duties. The modules we have developed and some of the trainings conducted need revisions in order to be more relevant to needs and demands.

V. LICUS #51: Timor-Leste – Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)

- \$1,078,100 (\$750,000 co-financing AusAid)
 - \$667,415 Services; \$19,400 Goods; \$391,285 Subgrants
- 11/06 – 6/08

Context

- The second constitutional government, led by Prime Minister Ramos Horta, has signaled an intention to govern with greater openness and renewed efforts to reach the public. This greater openness provides an important opportunity to assist the state in establishing the systems and attitudes necessary to fostering better communications, and to support leaders from diverse groups in society as they seek to improve their ability to engage with each other in a spirit of reconciliation and recovery. (Proposal)
- In the critical period between the cessation of violence and formation of the new government, and the May 2007 elections, even small visible improvements in leadership and governance stances which signal openness and communication are expected to have significant positive effects. The proposed project responds to suggestions made during consultations with the President and the Prime Minister. (Proposal)
- The LCCNR has thus arrived in Timor-Leste at a time when its leadership training program is both highly appropriate and unusually difficult. It may be that leadership training is precisely what is called for. At the same time, given the instabilities and challenges surrounding Timor-Leste and its leaders, garnering substantive and lasting impact may be hard to accomplish. The combination of need and challenge helps explain why many leaders who were interviewed called for a “process,” not a series of isolated trainings. (Sommers)

Problem to be addressed

- The challenges in communications critically overlap with leadership, and addressing the nexus between these two areas will be central to rebuilding public confidence in, and effectiveness of, the state. (Proposal)
- Challenges in leadership capacity in Timor-Leste manifest in several dimensions: (Proposal)
 - over-reliance on limited definitions and skills sets for ‘leadership’, characterized by confusion between leadership and authority
 - a limited capacity to mobilize individuals and groups across different spheres to surmount challenges;
 - significant resistance to defining areas of common or national interest across stakeholders who also have strong differences of opinions on other topics;
 - gap between the need for critical thinking and problem-solving and the skills and confidence of formal and informal leaders in those areas; and
 - limited opportunities for and mechanisms to promote collaborative, as compared with competitive, interactions.
- Challenges in communication in Timor-Leste exist on three planes: i) between institutions of the state; ii) between the state and civil society; and iii) between the state and the general public. These challenges have persisted in Timor-Leste both under the UN transitional administration (1999–2002) and under the first post-independence government (2002-2006). Information needs have been inadequately served, and critical channels for two-way communications between different actors, institutions, and constituencies have not been established. (Proposal)

- Cross-cutting challenges include: weak media; inadequate degree of literacy in language of administration; poor experience with style and crafting of messages in communicating with the population; inadequate information flows in government; and illiteracy and poor communications infrastructure. (Proposal)

Objectives

- The proposed grant will finance facilitation, training, and technical and material inputs to build capacity across a wide range of stakeholders, seeking to support improved skills (at the individual level), signals (at the managerial and leadership levels) and systems (at the unit, community, or organizational level) in order to enhance effective communication and leadership during the national recovery and reconciliation effort. (Proposal)
- The objectives of this component have been redefined from the original project document thus (Progress Report February 2008):
 - Build the leadership capacities of State and non-State actors with a view to strengthening trust and thus an ability to work more cooperatively, more collaboratively and therefore more effectively; and
 - Enhance the communication skills and information-sharing abilities not only of individuals but of State institutions, with civil society and the public more broadly.
- Given the situation facing Timor-Leste's leadership, it is already clear that such aims are going to be difficult to accomplish. To begin with, no training program can accomplish its goals without participants who are willing to improve their skills and are open to changing the way they negotiate and communicate. Moreover, helping people change their ways under stressful, high stakes conditions, is never easy. At the same time, LCCNR may be just what is needed to facilitate a breakthrough towards lasting solutions. (Sommers)

Theory of change

- Based on these objectives, the LCCNR team has established four assumptions that will be used to assess the program's impact (Progress Report February 2008). They are:
 - Leaders with good negotiation and communication skills are able to effectively: Collaborate with others; and Understand the needs of their constituents/fellow citizens.
 - The LCCNR training program will enhance the effectiveness of leaders by improving their: Collaborative decision-making skills; Negotiation skills; Communication skills.
 - As a result of participation in LCCNR trainings, leaders will be more effective because they will be better able to: Collaborate, negotiate, and communicate with other leaders (within and outside formal institutions); and Better understand the needs of their constituents and/or their fellow citizens.
 - Training a critical mass of leaders will have a positive impact on: The effectiveness of institutions.
- Based on some of the key findings from the *Communication Stocktake*, early in the program design phase it was decided to functionally merge the leadership and communication components of the program. The hypothesis is that the LCCNR program can only really deliver change when the participants themselves have undergone an attitude shift. The participants need to be prepared to change their own behaviors, and to learn and implement new leadership and communication skills that will ultimately change workplace behaviors. Effective communication is one of the most important leadership skill sets. (Progress Report Jan. – July 2007)
- In enhancing these skill sets, it is hoped that Timorese leaders will eventually be able to reinvent both the formal and non-formal institutions in which they work using a more collaborative and value-creating approach. To do this, they must overcome the legacy of resistance and history of

rigid hierarchy, and recognize and capitalize on the value of leaders that are found in all sectors of Timorese society. (Progress Report, Feb. 2008)

Activity design

Design process and resulting design:

- The Communication Team leader undertook a *Communication Stocktake*. The stocktake involved more than 50 formal and informal meetings with staff from eleven state institutions and ministries as well as donors, NGOs, and INGOs which have worked in civil service reform. The 17-page, confidential stocktake report showcases the gaps in communication, identifies the key barriers, and explores some of the cross cutting themes which hinder effective communication inside and amongst critical state institutions.
- The Program Manager conducted an initial on the ground assessment of leadership attitudes and practices, among actors at both the national and district levels. The findings were presented to the task team in a confidential *Leadership Assessment*, which formed the basis for subsequent design work. LCCNR
- Baseline Study conducted by Marc Sommers in November 2007.
- From Progress Report, February 2008
 - The initial curriculum development process took place in Dili from 8-15 October 2007. The purpose of the curriculum development process was both to test the diverse tools and simulations that had been used successfully by CMPartners in post-conflict States, as well as to prepare the entire LCCNR team (including translators) for the upcoming training activities. The process culminated in a two-day workshop that took place in the World Bank office, attended by the LCCNR team in Dili, the CMPartners coordinator who operates out of the Dili World Bank office, and six translators.
 - Participants at this workshop test underwent several exercises where they experimented with the CMP tools and practiced different simulations. After each session, participants were requested to provide inputs regarding the relevance of the concepts to the local context. Corrections to the "Tetum vocabulary" and modifications to the tools and simulations were done according to these inputs: Negotiation exercises and simulations were simplified and adapted to the Timorese reality; Training materials were re-designed and printed in order to compensate for the lack of electricity at the Maubara retreat venue; All materials were then translated into Tetum and Portuguese, and then a panel of translators again revisited the Tetum materials a second time to ensure that translations were consistent and clear.
 - In November 2007 two key leaders' retreats were conducted in Timor-Leste. Both took place in Maubara, about 1 hour west of Dili. The workshops are held outside of Dili. The reasons are two-fold. First, in order to ensure that the leaders were exposed to and had the opportunity to integrate all the skills and tools offered, it was necessary that they attended all sessions, from start to finish. Had the training been held in Dili, the temptation to "fit the training in" with their daily responsibilities and busy schedules would have been too difficult to resist for most participants. Secondly, in order for the leaders to build relationships across political and socio-economic lines, they needed to spend time together. The breaks, lunches, dinners, and post-workshop discussions served to reinforce and enhance these relationships.
 - During the November workshops, leaders were exposed to several analytical tools designed to enhance communication, decision-making, and negotiation capacities. They then applied those tools in simulations and exercises on topics of their choosing. They also worked in sub-groups to test the applicability of the tools to issues facing Timor-Leste. The international trainers, the locally based CMPartners staffer and the LCCNR team worked with the participants in subgroups (where the discussions and interactions took place in Tetum.)

- Follow-up workshops
 - In addition, new tools and exercises were prepared to be offered in the follow up workshop activities for the first two groups. These two follow up sessions had been scheduled in February 2008, for the week commencing Sunday 10 February. The core activity of the follow-up workshops was to be William Gamson's Simulated Society (SIM SOC), which has been adapted by CMPartners for use by leaders in post-conflict countries. Before the planned February workshops, a full-day test of SIM SOC was carried out, so we could be sure that the concept would be well understood in Timor-Leste, and that the lessons learned from a "game" such as SIM SOC could be interpreted in terms of how realities have unfolded in Timor-Leste.
 - As part of the preparation for the workshops, the LCCNR team had interviewed over a hundred leaders from within Dili and in the districts. The list included bishops, politicians, veterans, the head of the police and military in Timor-Leste, gang leaders, IDP camp leaders, traditional leaders, business leaders, community and youth leaders, and political party leaders.
- Mentoring and Coaching
 - In all mentoring activities, the LCCNR team focuses on providing clarification on how to use the tools, provide facilitation advice, and offer suggestions on how participants can deepen their understanding of the skills and apply them in real life. The team does not offer their own solutions and will remain neutral with regard to the content of specific issues confronting the leaders with whom they are working.
 - The mentoring and coaching process differs from more structured follow-up workshop activities in the following ways. First, it provides individuals and persons working in the same institution with the opportunity to have targeted and personalized feedback on how they are applying the skills and tools in their day-to-day lives. Second, the process provides yet another means of reinforcing lessons learned during the workshops. Third, the mentoring process allows the LCCNR team to target individuals or institutions who the team feels are especially critical to the reform of leadership in Timor-Leste. Finally, the mentoring process is another method of gathering data and information about the relevance of the program, the skills, and the tools. This information is then fed back into the curriculum and program development processes.
- Training of trainers
 - In order to ensure the sustainability of the benefits of the LCCNR program and to expand the capacity of the Timorese to develop and implement on-going training programs, the long-term vision of the LCCNR team is to train a small cadre of Timorese trainers. This is particularly important given that Tetum is the language of most of Timor-Leste's leaders and to be truly effective, the training will ultimately have to be offered completely in Tetum.
 - However, based on observations and feedback from the initial Baseline Measurement and Evaluation report, the original idea of targeting a selection of talented Timorese with training skills, plus the members of the LCCNR team, will have to be redefined. The politicization of the conflict in Timor-Leste means that any effort designed to address the conflict has to involve trainers who are deemed by all to be neutral. This kind of neutrality does not really exist in Timor-Leste where individuals and families are very often defined by their political preferences. Good trainers or those with good potential to be trainers are not necessarily politically neutral. The incorrect choice of trainers could conceivably contribute to further conflict or perceptions of bias, thus damaging the potential positive impact of the LCCNR program.

- In light of this, we have revised our thinking about the training-of-trainers component. The initial focus will be on the members of the LCCNR team and on trainers who are working within institutions, for example, F-FTDL, PNTL and INAP (the directorate within Ministry of State Administration that has the mandate for training and professional development of civil servants). Institutional staff, who already has a training role could add to their repertoire with new leadership and communication skills. Potential trainers from INAP, STAE, PNTL and possibly The University of Dili and University of Timor-Leste, will participate in upcoming workshops.
 - Training - June 30, 2008
 - In early March, a new, third group of approximately 35-40 will be trained. This group will consist of: senior civil servants and political appointees from the Ministry of State Administration, the Ministry of Economy and Development, the Ministry of Finance, the Secretary of State for Security, (police and internal security) the President's office, STAE (Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Electoral Processes) and CNE (National Commission for Elections – the independent body that oversees elections at all levels of government in Timor-Leste). Coupled with these key and influential institutional leaders will be the two most senior staff of the Parliamentary Secretariat as well as one to three parliamentarians from each of the parliamentary committees that “match” with the above mentioned. In this workshop, we will be specifically seeking to address issues that adversely impact institutional effectiveness.
 - Further follow up workshops for groups one, two and three, as well as Train the Trainer modules are planned for April, May and June 2007.

Method

- Progress Report February 2008 reported:
 - The approach used by CMPartners is derived in part from the Harvard Negotiation Project “interest-based” negotiation principles and addresses behaviors, attitudes, and thinking to engender system-wide transformation.
 - The LCCNR program includes a series of training, mentoring and evaluation activities designed to build relationships amongst leaders at all levels of Timorese society; reinforce their capacities in negotiation, communication, and conflict management; and encourage information sharing within and amongst State institutions, civil society actors, and the public.

Final design articulated in Proposal:

- Activities will be programmed with a deliberately front-loading of activities in the period between September/October 2006 and October 2007. The time-frame is explicitly designed to bridge the period of the current government and the opening months of the new post-election government. Dedicated coordination capacity will be mobilized to ensure not only the timely implementation of each input but also the effective linkage of grant activities with other interventions being planned under the overarching framework of national reconciliation and dialog, led by former Nobel committee member Bishop Gunnar Stalsett at the request of the Prime Minister and President.
- In order to ensure compliance of Bank engagement with IDA articles, the task team will observe three operational principles in the development of project activity: i) develop and present activities that do not include political topics or techniques; ii) guard against partisan aspects in participant selection both in appearance and in action; and iii) treat all participants in an even-handed and apolitical manner.
- The design consists of 3 components

- Component One: Leadership capacity for national renewal
 - *Objectives*
 - To make maximum advantage of the openness created by the crisis, and the hunger for dialog and reconciliation, to introduce and refresh leadership concepts and skills to a cross section of formal and informal leaders across state and non-state sections of Timor-Leste's society.
 - To encourage the creation of skills and mechanisms for crisis management among leaders.
 - To support and harness existing or recent initiatives in leadership skills training conducted by a range of actors at community and group levels.
 - *Activities*
 - Activity 1: Transformative Workshops for Leadership, and follow-on coaching.
 - Activity 2: Skills Workshops in Communications, Critical Thinking and Problem Solving, Team-building and Managing, and other leadership-critical skills sets
 - Activity 3. Strategic Considerations of Leadership and Communication in State-Building
 - Activity 4: Sub-grants to support leadership training through existing national capacity
- Component Two: Communication for national renewal
 - *Objectives*
 - To take stock of existing formal and informal patterns of communication and institutional information flow.
 - To support improved skills (at the individual level), signals (at the managerial level) and systems (at the unit level) in order to enhance effective communication on key topics during the national recovery and reconciliation effort.
 - *Activities*
 - Activity 1: Institutional Information and Communications Stocktaking
 - Activity 2: Training for Chiefs of Staff, Directors, and other designated staff
 - Activity 3: Technical assistance in re-orientation of staffing and systems, as needed
 - Activity 4: Training of working level staff
 - Activity 5: Joint review with participating units
 - Activity 6: Sub-grants to support communications training through existing national capacity
 - A major output of Component Two will be assisting Government in the production of a communications strategy, which Government currently does not have. However, this strategy will be viewed as an output for the second six months of the grant, recognizing the need for training of both director and working level staff first and the fact that a communications strategy will be most useful when twinned with the initial planning process and mandate of the new Government.

- For the sub-grant activity of both Component One and Component Two, the sub-grant committee structure, involving representatives from the Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister, civil society, and the World Bank, will provide a transparent governance structure, while assuring input of Government and the President's office into the selection of sub-grants. Additionally clear selection criteria and a transparent, non-partisan selection process will be developed by the committee, with support and input by the task team. Sub-grants for both components will range from \$10,000 to \$50,000, with specific decisions to be based on the criteria agreed by the sub-grant committees, taking into account implementation capacity as well as alignment with grant objectives.
- Component Three: Coordination support for communications and leadership capacity.
 - *Objective*
 - To coordinate inputs and activities under the grant in a collaborative way, with full consultation with national stakeholders and leaders, and to facilitate the real-time feedback of participants as well as the end-of-activities evaluation and audit.
 - *Activities*
 - Activity 1: Coordination and Delivery of Communications and Leadership Interventions
 - Activity 2: Independent Evaluation and Audit of Grant Activities

Participants

Selection design:

- From Proposal
 - The intended beneficiaries go beyond those in positions within the formal institutions of the state to include non-state actors, in recognition of i) the importance of supporting leadership across a number of levels; and ii) the upcoming elections which may alter the constellation of leaders in formal institutions.
 - Within the state, key interlocutors (and participants) are expected to include: Office of the Prime Minister; Office of the President; Parliament; Line ministries - ministries with portfolios that are especially *critical to conflict reduction* (Ministry of Labor and Community Reinsertion, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of State Administration) as well as *critical service delivery* (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Agriculture) ministries.
 - Non-state actors are equally vulnerable to the challenges posed by communication and leadership demands in this fragile context, and the proposed facilitation support and training activities will offer opportunities to work with a diverse range of these, to possibly include: organized civil society, including women's and youth groups, faith-based organizations, issue or constituency-based NGOs, district youth councils; veterans groups or rural social movements; and community and rural constituency groups, including *suco* councils, *chefes do suco*, district assemblies, and/or farmer or water users' groups.
- From Progress Report, February 2008
 - In many cases, we were advised that we could not mix the "national leaders", who were usually older, with the emergent leaders, who were usually younger. The concern was that the older leaders would be affronted at being invited to a workshop that included the young and inexperienced. Similarly, we were told that the younger, emergent leaders would be loathe to state their mind in the presence of the older leadership group.

- In addition to this advice, we were also told in most interviews, and it has been noted in several key reports on the crisis of 2006, that the substantial gap between the older and younger generations in Timor-Leste was a key factor that would hinder the country's ability to move forward and find lasting peace.
- We opted to take a calculated risk to mix the emergent and "older" leaders in each group. In the beginning, participants clung to the small group of people they knew. On the first evening at Maubara after the introductions sessions, the group showed the first early signs of greater cohesion. After the first full day of activities, which involved a lot of group work and simulations, there was evidence of real cohesion and new friendships emerging.

Distribution:

- Workshop 2 - There were 45 participants 31 male, 14 female. They majority (18) were from international agencies, 8 were from NGOs, 7 represented political and security organizations in Timor-Leste.

Selection Process:

- Unclear.

Implementation

Team:

- The Bank will execute this grant on behalf of the Government of RDTL, working directly through consultants (facilitators and trainers) and indirectly through the groups who receive sub-grants under the grant components 1 and 2.
- CM Partners (Liz McClintock as lead facilitator) were hired to do leadership training.
 - Building on their experience in leadership capacity building in Burundi, the Democratic Republics of Congo, and Liberia, CMPartners has worked with the LCCNR team to design a training program that is intended to meet the very specific challenges of Timor-Leste. The LCCNR team has extensive depth of knowledge and important trust relationships within the various leadership cadres in the country, while CMPartners staff bring specific expertise in the delivery of their curriculum and knowledge of the leadership challenges facing post-conflict countries.
- Every effort is made to keep abreast of other programs which may intersect or offer collaboration opportunities.

Partners:

- Ausaid

Implementation challenges:

- From First Progress Report, January to July 2007
 - The sub-grants program experienced two significant challenges which affected the speed of program implementation. First, reaching consensus across all internal stakeholders (ACTTF, LOA, CTR, LICUS, and LEG) in the Bank on the systems for review and management, grant agreement, and disbursement modalities for the sub-grants took over seven months. This effectively compressed into a little over two months a process which ideally would have been ongoing. (Progress Report Jan. – July 2007)
 - The truncated time-frame essentially precluded the intensity of involvement necessary to work effectively with many Timorese NGOs, much less community groups. This is

regrettable, given i) that the sub-grant component was designed specifically in order to collaborate with Timorese NGOs, and ii) supporting a number of smaller, local level initiatives could have produced the kind of entrepreneurial, innovative projects which are often the most positive outcome of a well-designed sub-grant program.

- Second, the leadership training consultant who had originally agreed to participate in the design and at least initial training interventions unexpectedly became unavailable, forcing the team to open a new procurement. While a constraint, this second delay has not caused insurmountable difficulties, given that elections have now produced an entirely new government. The start of training activities will coincide with the launch of the new government program. (Progress Report Jan. – July 2007)
- Small World Bank country offices, such as the Timor-Leste office, require significant support in order to execute projects. Bank-executed activities ranging from sub-grants to procurement of goods and hiring consultants are difficult within current World Bank systems, due to a lack of flexibility which can constrain operations on the ground. For example, the procurement of laptop computers for a Bank-executed TF required three months and intensive follow-up.
- Relatedly, as the program was not attached to one of the sectors, the task team often had a hard time identifying assistance in Washington or the region. As a result assistance was often ad hoc, for example in the case of seeking help when eConsult glitches stopped progress and no one seemed to be able to clear the blockages. Most TTLs could fall back on someone in Washington for help, but the LCCNR team had to undertake many routine administrative tasks without guidance or support. All of these factors at times proved a hindrance to implementation of the program.
- The eConsult system proved to be a particular hurdle. As the system is new, not user-friendly, and without sufficient technical support, it proved extremely difficult use from the field. (The helpline had not yet been established when the LCCNR team was doing the bulk of its work, and even now, only a skeleton eConsult help desk staff are available to take calls from us given the time difference between the HQ and this region.) Because the task team was having difficulties entering information into the system due to system glitches, eConsult was unable to process the initial request fast enough to respond to the most qualified consultants' window of availability. This resulted in a two-month delay in the deployment of the mission and the loss of the best candidate.
- From Second Progress Report, February 2008
 - The LCCNR team recognizes that there is a substantial challenge in addressing leadership issues in Timor-Leste as it requires attitudinal and behavioral changes – which cannot and will not happen quickly.
 - While significant interest has been expressed in the training and the long-term program by key members of Cabinet, the officials have not yet had the opportunity to free themselves from their responsibilities in order to commit to any training. In the second half of 2007 they were deeply involved in the transitional budget and then the new budget preparation. Security and IDPs have been key issues this year and the assassination attempts on the Prime Minister and President have taken the Cabinet's full attention.
 - Given that at this stage, facilitation at workshops is done mostly in English, the quality of the translation of written material and the interpretation to Tetum is critical to success.²⁷ This is made more challenging given the often "abstract and conceptual" nature of some of the materials. The educational history of most Timorese – even leaders – did not include a great deal of conceptual thinking, this is a key challenge.

²⁷ Materials were also created in Portuguese but are not often requested. Tetum is the preferred language of the leadership trainees.

- Incongruent skill set requirements for a program with sub-grants and training elements
 - There is a clear thematic link drawing together the two arms of this program – sub-grants and the leadership and communication retreats and mentoring. However, it has become clear that the skill set requirements for implementing each of these programs is distinctly different. We sought in the sub-grants to work with local NGOs where possible. In many cases, the NGOs were supported in the implementation of their programs by international partners, but these partners usually had little role in the narrative or financial reporting.
 - Our sub-grants program provided an excellent opportunity for these grassroots organizations to undertake what for them were big programs. However, it is a major challenge for our team to provide ongoing support for the grant managers in these grassroots organizations. The provision of the sub-grants manual in four languages and at least four site visits to each subgrantee to check both programmatic activities and financial records did not overcome the lack of experience and the requirement for many labor-intensive edits of the narrative and financial reports. We were required to provide a phone help-desk service, especially for financial managers, to answer their daily questions. Attention to detail, analytical thinking and numeric skills that are all required for subgrant reporting, are attributes that are generally weak within Timor-Leste.
 - The issue was not our inability to do this “hand holding” work. The challenge resulted from the huge amount of time it took to do this work well, and the fact that this type of work was not in any way similar to the duties required for the leadership and communication retreats or mentoring activities.
 - *Recommendation:* Despite the success to date of the sub-grants program, we will not continue with it, due to lack of ongoing financial and human resources. We will instead concentrate on the leadership and communication capacity development program. The sub-grants program comes to a natural conclusion in June 2008.
- *Low retention and use of new skills in the workplace by some trainees*
 - Given low education standards and an education system under the Indonesian regime that did not encourage analytical or critical thinking, low retention of training information is an issue with programs in Timor-Leste. To address this, some elements of the curriculum have been simplified and the pace of the program has been slowed.
 - However, the group activities in the workshops demonstrate that the participants mostly do have a clear understanding of the concepts and they are able to use them in exercises. What is of greater concern is that senior leaders especially do not feel that they can use tools like decision making models or negotiation models as they do not see it as their place to make decisions or to plan negotiations. This is left to the top-most leaders.
 - *Recommendation:* The M&E paper indicates that decision making by anyone other than the most senior leaders is not encouraged and is thus counter-cultural in Timor-Leste. The prevalence of the resistance model makes the task of the LCCNR team all the more difficult, but all the more important. There are early indications that the younger participants are more open to learning and using new skills in their workplace. Also encouraging, we have found in the mentoring that some of the older, senior leaders are using skills like active listening and problem solving within the confines of their extended family and have found good results. This shows that skills are being learned and can be used, but it will take

a lot of time, and a critical mass of trainees, for the culture to change. The CM Partners experience in Burundi indicates that widespread results are evident in a timeframe of five years plus.

Changes during implementation:

- Following team strategy discussions it was decided to fully integrate the leadership and communication components of the program, in recognition of the fact that a holistic approach to interventions would be significantly more effective. (Progress Report Jan. – July 2007)
- Delay of training activities until after election of new government.
- The short time-frame for issuing sub-grants also led to the elimination of the sub-grants committee, given that the task team had to make quick decisions about proposals from a relatively small pool. Campaigning and elections, taking place in April, May, and June also meant that a number of the representatives originally tapped for membership on the sub-grants committee were not available. (Progress Report Jan. – July 2007)
- Revised project objectives.
- The adaptation of the curriculum and tools is an ongoing process and feedback from the two Key Leaders Retreats completed in November 2007 provided further insights and suggestions, which have been incorporated into the LCCNR curriculum.
- Follow-up workshops
 - The first follow up workshop for groups one and two were to be conducted in February 2008 in back-to-back retreats between February 10 and February 16. At this time, participants would have recapped their knowledge and understanding of the various analytical tools, and would have participated in SIM SOC. SIM SOC provides insight into the dynamics of social and political conflict, and illuminates a number of principles of leadership, communication, conflict resolution and joint decision-making.
 - Due to the events on February 11, 2008, when the attempts were made against the lives of the President and the Prime Minister, it was decided to return to Dili.²⁸ Given the State of Siege that was declared on February 12 with the introduction of a nightly curfew, it was decided that the second workshop, due to begin on Wednesday February 13, would not go ahead. Instead, it was decided that participants from workshops one and two would be merged for an all-day SIM SOC held at the World Bank office on Thursday, February 14.
- Mentoring
 - Plans have been made to ensure that participants from the districts do not miss out on mentoring. However, given the current ban on district travel to most regions, this activity cannot start in earnest until alleged renegade elements are arrested by authorities. It was planned that at the proposed February workshops, the dates for district mentoring visits would be agreed with the district-based participants. The interruption to the February workshops has been another setback in this regard.
- Training of trainers
 - Changed targeting of trainers to be trained because of fear of partiality of original target group of talented Timorese leaders.
- Decided not to renew sub-grants program.

²⁸ Some members of the group wanted to stay in Maubara and continue with the workshops, saying that the events of February 11 showed that leadership and communication were huge issues. One participant, a youth gang leader, said: [translation from Tetum] “*If we go back to Dili now before we have learned more about leadership and communication at this workshop, how we can help to drag out country out of this new mess?*”

Outputs and outcomes

Outcome indicators (Proposal):

- Leadership able to mobilize groups and individuals across different spheres to address challenges and resolve political and institutional crisis
- Improved ability among leaders at different levels to define areas of common interest across stakeholders
- More frequent and open formal and informal inter-institutional communication

Output indicators (Proposal):

- Transformative workshops and coaching for leadership completed
- Series of workshops in communications, critical thinking and problem-solving, and team-building completed
- Protocols for formal communications and guidelines for complementing formal with informal communications implemented
- Working level staff perform key communications functions, including correspondence and disseminating information to other state offices and the public
- Definition of staff job responsibilities and task assignments with respect to communication

Outputs:

- From LCCNR Progress Report (January to July 2007)
 - Progress has been made towards the objective of enhancing effective communication and leadership through implementation of a training program and of a sub-grants program to NGOs currently engaged in this sector. Specific progress to date includes preparing the groundwork for the implementation of the Leadership and Communication Training Program including research and preparation on topic development, identification of a lead training agency, promotion of the LCCNR project to a wide array of stakeholders, and identification of potential training participants. In addition, seven recipients of the sub-grants have been approved, one subsequently withdrew and the remaining six are ready to start implementation of their activities. To date the following outputs have been achieved:
 - 1) A Stock-take that involved more than 50 formal and informal meetings with staff from 11 state institutions and ministries as well as donors, NGOs and INGOs who had worked in civil service reform. The report showcases the gaps in communication, identifies the key barriers and explores some of the cross cutting themes which further hinder effective communication inside and amongst critical state institutions.
 - 2) A scoping mission from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was completed and its final report received.
 - 3) In a competitive bidding process four international consulting firms submitted their expression of interest to conduct the Leadership and Communication Training.
 - 4) Assessments were conducted of the four expressions of interest and CM Partners was selected and will commence in mid-September.
 - 5) Interviews conducted with 70 individuals to present the platform for the Leadership and Communication Training and seek input for development of the training as well as identification of participants for the training. Meetings conducted with key individuals from a wide range of sectors including: Government, Military, Civil Society NGOs, Media, Youth Groups, Women's Network.

- 6) Sub-grants manual completed that outlines the Sub-grant application process, procurement and reporting guidelines.
- 7) Eleven sub-grant proposals received from local and international NGOs, reviewed and recommendations for approval made.
- 8) Seven Recipients selected for funding including the following: Asosiasaun Advogadu Timor Lorosa'e (Lawyers' Association of East Timor); Advocats Sans Frontiers (ASF); Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat (STP-CAVR); Catholic Relief Services / Timor-Leste (CRS); Forum Tau Matan (has subsequently withdrawn from the sub-grants component); Government Information Office (GIO) / Centro de Formação em Relações Públicas (NGO); International Organization for Migration (IOM), in partnership with local NGO, Belun.
- From Second Progress Report, February 2008
 - 6 subgrants disbursed. While there have been some challenges in the implementation of the programs, each has managed to deliver on its objectives to date, or has put in place new plans to overcome obstacles. In all cases, the very positive outcomes would not have been possible without the funding from this program. The closing date for all subgrant activities is April 30, with final reports due no later than mid May 2008.
 - CMPartners, in collaboration with the LCCNR program team, has designed and begun to implement a multi-faceted, long-term training program targeting a range of Timor-Leste's leaders. To date, a cross-section of eighty leaders have begun the training and mentoring program with the LCCNR.
 - In November 2007, a baseline assessment was conducted. Considerable effort was made to gather the views of a reasonable cross-section of Timorese leaders and non-leaders.
 - *Training Workshops* - The first workshops with the first two groups of leaders were held in November 2007. The leaders trained to date include emergent as well as national leaders, and we have also sought to bring together leaders from urban areas as well as key leaders from the districts. See annex for list of individuals trained to date.
 - In November 2007 two key leaders' retreats were conducted in Timor-Leste. Both took place in Maubara, about 1 hour west of Dili.
 - 4-9 November 2007– First Key Leaders retreat, facilitated by Elizabeth McClintock, Managing Partner, CMPartners, with support from the LCCNR Dili team. Thirty-six leaders participated.
 - 19-23 November 2007– Second Key Leaders retreat, facilitated by Ricardo Perez Nückel, CMPartners Senior Trainer, with support from the LCCNR Dili team. Forty-four leaders participated.
 - *Follow-up Workshops* - The first follow up workshop for groups one and two were to be conducted in February 2008 in back-to-back retreats between February 10 and February 16, were combined and held on February 12.
 - *Mentoring and Coaching* - A mentoring plan has been developed and to date, 20 participants from workshops one and two have received at least one mentoring visit from a member of the LCCNR staff.

Outcomes:

- No systematic data yet.

Lessons learned

- The Committee also raised questions on the plans for dealing with implementation risks and for preventing an input based grant. The country team explained that the grant is in part based on the PCF funded 2001 Governance in Transition workshops, which provided valuable information on how to lead trainings that can provide significant outputs. (LICUS Committee Discussion)
- OPCFS provided the Committee with information on the similar legal challenges presented in 2001 when the PCF grant "Capacity Assistance for Development" funded the two Governance in Transition leadership workshops, where the Timor country team drew upon the expertise of their country lawyer to articulate three operational principles: develop and present activities that do not include political topics or techniques, guard against partisan aspects in participant selection both in appearance and in action, and treat all participants in an even-handed and apolitical manner. (LICUS Committee Discussion)
- If the Bank decides to offer similar programs that provide sub-grants in post-conflict environments, it may be useful to carefully examine the requirements to ensure they are realistic. (July 2007 Progress Report)

VI. PCF #208 – Burundi leadership Training Program (BLTP)

- \$ 993,279
- 12/02 – 7/04

Context

- Burundi's Transitional Government faces the fundamental challenge of planning for social and economic recovery and building a post-conflict, development-oriented state after years of turmoil. Burundi's challenge is particularly formidable, given very limited social capital and cohesion; the absence of an inclusive and transparent decision-making structure and culture; and continued insecurity on the ground. (Proposal)
- The climate lends itself [to social cohesion] in any case: since the negotiation process, a certain culture of inclusion of different groups and their interests in the definition of a society project is gradually setting in. (Training participants' message for six-month review)

Problem to be addressed

- The new Transitional government faces many challenges, not the least of which is to rebuild Burundi's shattered economy. The government's ability to meet its economic challenge will depend, first, on its ability to strengthen its institutional and human resources and, second, on the rebuilding of trust and confidence among those who are leading the transition. The transitional government will be required to develop and implement a shared vision of the future, an economic recovery plan that reflects the aspirations and values of all Burundians, and a poverty reduction strategy that will command the support of its population. (Proposal)

Objectives

- The proposed capacity building project is designed to strengthen the ability of the Burundian Government to develop, through a participatory approach involving civil society, a vision for economic recovery as well as a strategic and socio-economic recovery plan for the transitional period that would establish the conditions for sustainable economic development. (Proposal)
- In particular, the proposed training initiative seeks to build trust and social capital among Burundian decision-makers, to foster economically and socially inclusive planning processes; and to strengthen Burundian leaders' organizational capacity to implement a joint vision for economic recovery and poverty reduction.

Theory of Change

- As studies have shown, successful completion of development policies is increasingly linked to participatory approaches to governance. Representative institutions and good governance have a measurable impact on poverty alleviation. With a view to prepare for a full PRSP, this project will seek to increase the participatory nature of the transition in Burundi and to assist Burundian leaders in identifying the constraints, opportunities, incentives and needs of varied segments of their population. (Proposal)
- In many cases, people see public decision-making as inevitably an adversarial process. This presumption often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing confrontation and deadlock. An alternative approach is offered in the workshop – changing the game from head-to-head confrontation to a joint problem-solving process of persuasion through understanding interests and the creation of innovative options to satisfy the legitimate needs of the parties. (Proposal)
- Efforts by the international community in the immediate post-conflict phase tend to concentrate on the short-term. Capacity building takes a longer-term view of reconstruction and development. It is also recognized that the inclusion of erstwhile excluded groups may best be achieved in the

context of newly created institutions, such as the transitional government in Burundi. Furthermore, a platform will be required within the country that brings together the government, program protagonists, and civil society. The proposed project would help reinforce required capacities.

Activity design

Design process:

- *Modular approach.* The proposed project is modular and sequential. First, the requisite “buy-in” will be established in broad consultation with all of the key stakeholders in Burundi. This will be a principal objective of the first-stage-assessment. It will be underscored to all that this initiative is focused on the building of organizational capacity for economic recovery and development, that individuals will be participating in their individual capacities, and that the training modules will not entail any form of political negotiations. (Proposal)
- From Recruitment Trip Report:
 - Donor and Regional Consultations – In Belgium met with Belgian MFA and head of EU Conflict Prevention Unit, both of whom were very supportive. In Bujumbura, met with Belgian MFA representative, DfID Country Representative, EU Special Envoy, and Several NGO Representatives. In South Africa, Met President Thabo Mbeki and VP Jacob Zuma.
- Participant Interviews - We were able to hold pre-workshop interviews with eleven of the prospective participants. These interviews, designed to help insure that the content of the training program would be responsive to the needs of the participants and to deepen their “buy-in,” centered on three questions (see trip report for answers):
 - How did the participant understand “leadership,” and what differentiated a “good” leader from a “bad leader?”
 - What skills did the participant hope to gain from the training experience?
 - How would the participant apply the skills learned to their real-life occupation/role?
- Location
 - The Executive Director and Project Manager visited Ngozi as the possible site of the first training workshop. Ngozi had been recommended by a number of Burundian stakeholders during earlier interviews. Original plans to hold the first workshop in Nairobi in order to ensure rebel participation were rejected by almost all interviewees as unnecessary. Most felt strongly that it was time to bring training and other activities into the country. In part this was seen as reinforcing the progress that had been made in the peace process; in addition, several persons said that many Burundians had grown tired of being constantly being asked to travel outside Burundi. An auxiliary but important rationale for an internal venue was that participants would be more inclined to take the process seriously; they would not be attending simply in order to receive lucrative per diem payments. While there was a strong consensus that the training be conducted inside Burundi, there was an equally strong view that the workshop be held outside of Bujumbura to avoid the distractions of office and family.

Final design:

- The project would consist of four principal components: i) needs assessment and pilot module; ii) three training modules; iii) follow-on in-country projects; and iv) a three-part project to receive feedback and permit the evaluation of this capacity-building initiative. (Proposal)
 - *Needs Assessment and Pilot Module* – An initial assessment would be undertaken both to determine the most urgently needed skills training and the most appropriate mix of training methods, and to garner support for the workshops from the intended target audiences. The initial assessment would be followed by the implementation of a pilot

module, consisting both of a workshop and a follow-on project inside Burundi. A systematic review of these activities would inform the implementation of the two subsequent modules.

- *Training Workshops*: Three workshops would be designed to equip participants with the skills, knowledge, and models for more effective economic recovery policy development and implementation. Skills to be taught include group problem solving; consensus building; strategic planning; managing organizational change; fostering public deliberation; methods of clarifying policies, problems, values, and interests. All of these are highly developed, specific training skill-sets for which there are manuals, resource materials, and experts available. The workshops, each with 25-35 participants would last five to seven days and would seek to facilitate participation from a broad spectrum of stakeholders. Workshop participants will be present in their individual capacities, not as representatives of the respective organizations or institutions with which they may be identified.
 - The workshops will be a mixture of presentations, interactive exercises, simulations, debriefing sessions, and consultations on real-world transitional problems. One specific simulation exercise, SIMSOC, is designed to yield insight into the dynamics of organizational development. SIMSOC exposes its participants to a variety of issues that underpin organizational capacity: Communications, trust, power, conflict, legitimacy and coercion.
- *Follow-on Projects*: The workshop participants would subsequently define and participate in follow-on social and economic recovery projects in Burundi.
- *Feedback Program*: To enable project managers to identify both problem-areas and emerging opportunities in the course of project implementation, and to enable colleagues in the World Bank, international community and other concerned scholars and practitioners to learn from this initiative, the WWICS will host three half-day meetings to discuss the pilot module, the workshops, the progress, and finally the outcome of the proposed project. The three “feedback” sessions will seek to identify the lessons learned from the Burundi project that might have significance not only for Burundi but for other societies in transition.
- **M&E plan** included the final evaluation, joint supervision mission by the World Bank, the participants’ own evaluation during follow-on activities, feedback meetings, and interviews with stakeholders close to the transition process.
- From 6 Month Review
 - The project team summarized the project methodology: Securing a Burundian ‘buy-in’; Extensive consultations with concerned regional states; Insuring project sustainability; Concrete economic recovery projects would be the ultimate test of project success; Strategic selection of leaders; Framing of the invitation; Venue and timing.
 - The training team summarized the workshop methodology: participant oriented; emphasized experientially-based learning; focused on real world problem-solving; community-based rather than elite-centered. They outlined the principle workshop training objectives: To enable leaders to design effective decision-making processes; To help leaders develop the means of building relationships and strengthening their communication skills; To provide the leaders with the skills required to develop options for creative joint problem-solving; and, To provide the leaders tools with which to develop both a guiding policy vision, and to plan and implement concrete projects.
- From external evaluation by Uvin and Campbell: A Narrative Description of the Ngozi II Workshop:

- The introductory session seeks to create relationships by having each participant introduce another participant they did not previously know. The goal here is for them to understand the perspective and story of one another from the beginning of the workshop. The first tool aims to help people think about criteria for measuring a successful negotiation. It introduces the possibility of a win-win solution and how you can get there.
- The second major tool presented is the SIMSOC (Simulated Society). This is by far the most elaborate, sophisticated, and engaging tool used in the workshop, lasting a full day. The objectives of SIMSOC are to show, among others, that 1) you could have just as easily been born into a different group/situation that would have completely altered your access to power and wealth, 2) you are dependent on the other groups in society (even if you are in the top-dog group) and you can have an intentionally or unintentionally positive or negative impact on the other societal groups, 3) some type of institutional framework is necessary to mitigate between the different groups, 4) your capacity to actively listen to and communicate with other groups will help to ensure your own progress and survival in the long term, and 5) investment in social resources benefits all groups in society. SIMSOC is very successful and stimulates an enormous amount of discussion among the participants. It allows them to think creatively about Burundian society without ever talking explicitly about the country. As many of them are deliberately placed in a group with different characteristics from their “real life” social, they are forced to walk in someone else’s shoes for a whole day. During the remainder of the week, people kept on referring back, in off moments, to the SIMSOC. Also participants we interviewed who had participated in Ngozi I and II unanimously declared this to be the tool with the strongest impact, which they still remember until now.
- The next set of tools seeks to teach active listening and communication skills. The two facilitators demonstrate, through role-plays, how different communication skills can be applied to open up dialogue between people with different interests and positions of power. Although a bit slow at times, the participants appreciate this discussion and the inclusion of communication between people coming from different positions of power. It is also significant that the facilitators simply alter their the way in which they communicate, but do not seek to change the nature of the person that they are representing. This is not, however, followed by role-plays among the participants, which could have helped them to more directly evaluate their own behavior.
- The next set of tools seeks to help the group understand that totally different interpretations of the same situation are possible based on ones own conditioning. This is done by showing a picture that can be correctly interpreted as both a young woman and old woman, prior to which each participant was shown a picture of either a young woman or an old woman. Then, active communication skills are applied to the discussion among the participants as they describe what they saw. This exercise, too, seeks to undermine people’s certitudes and make them more prone to doubt and thus humility.
- The facilitators then switched course to the 7-Element framework, which is a basic conflict analysis and resolution tool from Fisher’s “Getting to Yes.” The purpose is to help participants think through a conflict and come up with creative options for resolving it. It empowers the participants to influence the outcome of the conflict in ways that they had not thought of previously. While everyone seems to find the tool interesting, its application is much more difficult. The participants that we observed chose very large topics that cannot easily be addressed with the tool and, partially as a result, were not remotely able to complete the tool, and thus understand how to transform the problem that they are trying to address. Thus, it ends up being neither a complete discussion of a substantive issue in Burundi nor the complete learning of the skill of using the 7-element

framework for decision-making and negotiation. This session ends with an exhausted group that has moderately enjoyed their discussion but does not feel that it is done. They hope that it will be picked up the next day, but it is not.

- The next tool is a metaphor (the way that a father distributes his cows to his sons) that seeks to show that problems can be resolved creatively. It is a very simple tool that helps to start a good discussion, but the facilitator is not able to pick up many of the problems mentioned that are specific to conflict resolution in the Burundian context – the issue of jealousy for example.
- Then, the four-quadrant analytical tool is presented. This is a very simple problem-analysis tool designed to help people analyze complex problems and produce actions. This tool seems too simple for many of the problems present in Burundi and does not include a capacity analysis that might help the participants see how they themselves can take action on the problem. The tool is also applied to very large issues related to economic development, and the participants end up once again with large lists of general options and few concrete ideas about what they, personally, can do about it. Once again, though, people seem to find the tool interesting and seem to enjoy working on it together: the discussion in most groups is rather animated, and, given the extremely diverse composition of these groups, this is not a simple feat. It must also be noted that in subsequent interviews with Ngozi I and II participants, many politicians cited the four-quadrant tool as being very useful for them in making decisions, precisely because of its simplicity.
- The last day starts with a short presentation of how the 7-Element framework can be applied to one rather specific issue area (demobilization of soldiers before the elections). The evening before, the team had brought together the group of 5-6 participants who had been working on this issue during the workshop (and not gotten very far), and helped them to work their way through it. The results of this, while still incomplete, are interesting in the depth and the frankness of the analysis. The purpose of this was not to engage in a substantive debate of the demobilization questions, but rather to demonstrate to the participants the sort of quality thinking that can be produced with the use of this tool in only one hour, provided people are at ease and some skilled facilitation is provided. It is the first time the team had done this, following discussions with us.
- The final session tries to build a link with the after-workshop life, as in: what will the BLTP do during future short workshops, and what will the participants do in their own life? Currently, there are four steps here: 1) Small groups identify three issues: first, what they expect from the BLTP in the future; second, how they would like to maintain the network, and third, what could be done (by them, one presumes) to increase the impact of the workshop's benefits on other institutions. 2) The team synthesizes the list of propositions that people made, and then distributes it back to the participants. It is not further discussed; however, it will inspire the work plan for the BLTP team, which may use it to decide on future trainings and activities. 3) This is followed by a brief statement by each individual of one thing each of them will personally do to take this forward.

Participants

Selection design:

- Participants in the workshops and follow-on projects would be selected according to objective criteria – including national and local level public officials, the private sector and civil society. Some workshops and projects may be geared specifically to one subset of actors (such as those

concerned with a specific Ministry or subject), while other sessions might involve a diverse combination of actors. (Proposal)

Distribution:

- Ngozi I (From Report on Workshop 1):
 - In all significant respects, the final panel of workshop participants – selected after broad consultation with a large number of Burundians and non-Burundian analysts – constituted a representative cross section of Burundian society. First, the workshop composition was distinctive for its ethnic balance (18 Hutu, 14 Tutsi, 2 Twa), and included 23 men and 11 women.
 - Second, the workshop drew leaders from all of the targeted institutional sectors – government and non-government, civilian and military. Two leading Army officers – a general and a colonel – were joined by persons identified with six of the seven rebel factions; the only rebel group not included was Alain Rwasa’s FNL. A spokesman for Rwasa had earlier indicated that security considerations precluded the FNL’s participation in the first workshop; however the FNL welcomed the initiative and wanted to maintain contact with the evolving project. A number of parliamentarians and other party leaders were present; the party organizations represented included FRODEBU, UPRONA, INKINZO, PARENA – and, as previously indicated – five rebel organizations (CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA, CNDD/FDD, the Alain Mugabarabona wing of the Palipehutu/FNL, and the Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye wing of the CNDD/FDD. Also included among the participants were the President of Burundi’s Constitutional Court and two Bashtunigaye.
 - The fourteen participants drawn from “civil society” included a Catholic priest and a Catholic nun and the Secretary-General of the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission, a representative of the Pentecostal Church, three entrepreneurs (one of whom had earlier served in the Army, as Governor of Ngozi, and as Minister of the Interior), several leaders of activist women organizations, a journalist, two academics, and one student.
 - While the workshop was designed to be inclusive of Burundi’s key institutional and social sectors, all participants were invited in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their respective organizations and institutions.
- February 2004 Follow-up Workshop:
 - The participants are selected to reflect the breadth of Burundi society and represent all sectors of society, including government and non-government, civilian and military, the dissident armed factions, and “civil society.” All participants were invited in their individual capacities and not as representatives of their respective organizations and institutions.
 - In all, 21 participants of Ngozi II and 17 of Ngozi I attended the joint workshop -- for a total of 38 participants. They included two senior army officers, persons identified with six of the seven armed factions (CNDD, PALIPEHUTU, FROLINA, CNDD/FDD, the Alain Mugabarabona wing of the Palipehutu/FNL, and the Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye wing of the CNDD/FDD). On the political front, a number of parliamentarians and other political figures representing FRODEBU, UPRONA, RADDES, A.V. Intwari, PP, RPB. and INKINZO were also present. Participating political leaders included the President of the National Court and the Governor of Ngozi Province. The participants drawn from “civil society” included representatives from business, labor, youth groups, women’s organizations, the media, and grassroots relief groups.

Selection Process:

- From Ngozi I Recruitment Trip Report:

- The Executive Director and the Project Manager compiled a database of almost 300 Burundians as possible workshop participants from confidential lists that were submitted by several of our Burundian interlocutors.
- The criteria for selection were three-fold:
 - All participants must be seen as capable of impacting on Burundi's future, either by virtue of the positions they hold, or by virtue of the influence they exercise over significant constituencies.
 - Every training group of 35 must be broadly representative of Burundian society – meaning that there should be ethnic balance, geographic balance, and significant representation of women among the participants.
 - Each workshop must also encompass a broad diversity of Burundian social sectors, reflective both of political/governmental structures and of Burundian grassroots society. “Government/political” participants will encompass persons who are representative of the principal political families, the Army, rebel leaders and key economic role players. “Grassroots” civil society participants will be drawn from the churches, from the business sector, from women's organizations, from human rights groups, from academia, from labor unions, and from youth organizations.
- A tabulation was made of the number of “nominations” prospective participants received. Those who received the largest number of “nominations” were given the highest priority for inclusion in the first training workshop; additional names were drawn from the database to insure that the totality of invitees would be broadly representative of Burundian society, would meet the criteria specified above, and would encompass the requisite diversity. Letters of invitation were then extended to 45 individuals.

Implementation

Team:

- WWICS Implementation.
- Regarding the use of an international NGO to implement the project, please note that given the sensitivity of the project, a local NGO would not have the requisite neutrality to guide the proposed process. Regional think tanks (e.g., from South Africa) also cannot be perceived as neutral because of the active role of regional governments in assisting the Burundian peace process. For these reasons, the project would be implemented by a qualified international NGO, as requested by the government of Burundi. (Proposal)
- For the conduct of training workshops, consultants with the requisite skills and Burundi experience have already been identified. (Proposal)
- Local office run by one Burundian staff person (Fabien Nsabimana), and advised by one consultant (Eugene Nindorera). Both had been highly placed in the Burundian government and were highly respected among a wide range of Burundians.
- The training was led by Elizabeth McClintock, Senior Associate at the Cambridge-based Conflict Management Group, and by Alain Lempereur, Professor of Law and Negotiation, and the Director of IRENE (the Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe).

Partners:

- The project intends to build on relations between the World Bank and the Burundian government, donors, and multilateral agencies – while also building social capital across society and strengthening global partnerships. Cooperation with donors and UN agencies, and in particular with

the transitional administration, would be essential throughout project implementation to build ownership, avoid duplication, and ensure effective coordination.

Implementation challenges:

- Unclear.

Changes during implementation:

- From Recruitment Trip Report (2003):
 - Senior Army leaders have already expressed an interest in similar leadership training being undertaken by both Army and rebel military leaders who will be centrally involved in security reform, demobilization and integration activities. Support for this security-focused training would have to be sought from other donors, but this is precisely the kind of spin-off initiative we hope the Burundi Leadership Training Project will generate.

Outputs and outcomes

Expected outcomes:

- In general terms, this training initiative will have four principal outputs (Proposal):
 - Project participants will emerge with an increased awareness of (a) the process of managing conflict and solving problems that will arise as they seek to develop a vision and strategic plan for economic recovery; (b) their own role in this process; and (c) the constraints, opportunities, incentives and needs of varied segments of the Burundian population.
 - Project participants will acquire an analytical framework for approaching the problems of economic visioning and management, and improved skills in consensus-building, joint decision-making, and joint problem-solving.
 - They will acquire an enhanced ability to learn from their own future experiences in economic visioning and planning, and to continuously refine and impart those skills to others. (Last part is tall order)
 - New initiatives on the ground, designed to strengthen Burundian governance and to broaden the base of participation in the planning and implementation of the transitional government's economic objectives.

Outcome indicators:

- None provided.

Outputs:

- Assessment Mission – November 24 – December 20, 2002
- Recruitment Trip – January 22 – February 6, 2003
- Ngozi I - March 11-16, 2003
 - *Overview* - The first training of a diverse cross-section of 34 Burundian leaders was held in Ngozi, in northern Burundi, from March 11-16. Most of the training was conducted by Elizabeth McClintock, Director of Programs for the Cambridge-based Conflict Management Group, and by Alain Lempereur, Professor of Law and Negotiation, and the Director of IRENE (the Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe). Project Executive Director Howard Wolpe led a day-long SIMSOC simulation – an exercise developed by Dr. William Gamson of Boston College.
 - *Method* – 6 Day workshop including: Orientation and Introductions; The Arm Wrestling Exercise: Collaboration v. Competition; The seven-element framework for measuring success; SIMSOC; Communication for Effective Leadership; Four Quadrant Brainstorming Tool; Planning for Economic Recovery.

- Ngozi I Follow-up Workshop, April 15-16, 2003, Bujumbura
 - Content of workshop developed by participants during Ngozi I - They decided that this session would be comprised of four elements: (1) training in team-building; (2) training in visioning; (3) a consideration of their respective experiences in applying the lessons learned from the Ngozi training; and (4) further work in elaborating their analysis of the principal obstacles to economic recovery and of the means by which these obstacles might be overcome.
- Six-month Assessment and Feedback Meeting (Washington, DC), May 13, 2003
 - Presenters included: The Project Management team - Howard Wolpe, Steve McDonald, Eugene Nindorera; The Trainers - lead facilitator Elizabeth McClintock, Alain Lempereur; Two Workshop Participants - Remy Nahimana, Domitille Barancira. To facilitate project evaluation, the May 13 session also brought together donor agencies, NGO practitioners in the field of conflict resolution, and others who are involved in Great Lakes region issues to reflect on the methodology and substance of the training program and to comment critically on the program's evolution, and the applicability of project modalities to other conflict situations.
- Ngozi II – September 23-28, 2003
 - From September 23-28, 2003, a second group of 31 Burundian leaders (dubbed Ngozi II) was convened for a six-day retreat which repeated the “core” BLTP leadership training.
- Ngozi II Follow-up - November 17-18, 2003
- Follow-up Workshop for Combined Ngozi I & II – February 9-11, 2004
 - Then, from February 9-11, 2004, the BLTP convened a second follow-on session for the Ngozi II participants, and followed that up with the first ever “combined” workshop of all the participants from Ngozi I and II. At the conclusion of this joint workshop, and in furtherance of the BLTP objective of encouraging the creation of a cohesive leadership network, the two groups decided to abandon the nomenclature of “Ngozi I” and “Ngozi II.” Henceforth, they choose to be known simply as the “Ngozi Group.”
- Follow-up Workshop for Combined Ngozi I & II – May 18-19, 2004
 - 36 Participants
 - This workshop was focused on hypothetical mediation and negotiation exercise designed to increase participant communication and problem-solving skills and ended with a discussion of ways in which the BLTP network could be strengthened and project formulation deepened. It began, as always with a review of the expectations of the participants and a recounting (*compte rendu*) of the ways in which they had used the tools, skills, or network of the BLTP since the last meeting.
 - The training modality employed was a mediation workshop entitled the “Taking of Hostages in Guanti.” This is a simulation in which some participants assume the role of a representative of the government of an imaginary state, Guanti; some assume the role of a representative of a rebel group that had taken hostages; other participants serve as the mediators between the two sides. The workshop ended with a lengthy discussion of a variety of project ideas that have been tabled by the Ngozi groups.
- Ngozi III – May 24-29, 2004

Outcomes:

- From Independent Evaluation by Peter Uvin and Susanna Campbell
 - *Direct impact*

- *Attitude change.* At the level of individual attitude change, both our own observations and interviews with dozens of participants and observers indicate that the BLTP workshops do effect a personal transformation in the way people perceive themselves in relation to the other participants. They begin to break through some of the stereotypes and a priori's that they may have carried for years. The degree of attitude change during the workshop depends on the previous experiences and mindset of each individual, with some of the most dramatic impact occurring with extremists, refugees, and newcomers to the political game.
- *Social Capital.* Most participants cited the relationships that they built at the workshops as an important impact. Given the current context in Burundi, where there is much more collaboration and dialogue (making the job of pulling all of these people together a bit easier), but where there is also the real threat that division and violence will erupt again, the relationship-building that takes place at the BLTP takes on an increasing importance. Many people said that the fact that the BLTP is able to bring together such a diverse group of people and create dialogue between them is already an enormous contribution. There is no other venue where this group of decision-makers can come together informally and relate relatively openly with one another. Some go as far as saying that the social capital that is being created at the BLTP is essential for helping the peace process to move forward, precisely because there is still the real possibility that it will fall apart. For that reason, maintaining this social capital beyond the initial workshop is considered crucial by all.
- *Skills.* In general, the participants were pleased with the skills, tools, and methods learned in the BLTP training. The skills transmission during the BLTP workshops has been very successful at helping to build better communication among participants. It has been moderately successful at bringing the participants to a level that allows them to use these skills in their professional work –there is a clear demand for more such professionally relevant training. The BLTP's aim (and impact) was *not* to train professional negotiators, mediators, analysts, or trainers, thus enabling the participants to transfer the skills beyond themselves; this level, however, is something it may decide to focus on in a next phase.
- *Capacity for Economic Policy.* The BLTP has not been successful in developing effective economic recovery strategies, project, or activities. The development projects developed during the initial and follow-up workshops of Ngozi I and II engage only a few people, are not necessarily of particularly high quality nor do they embody the BLTP "spirit", and there is still little real chance of them getting funded (creating frustration among participants). As for the development of larger strategies for economic recovery in Burundi, the BLTP has made an attempt, but with little success. During economic recovery brainstorming session, participants tend to rehash old, general development strategies without critically analyzing how these would create anything new or different compared to the past. Let's face it: the composition of the workshop groups, the training team, the content of the workshops –none of it is of a nature to make one expect that high-quality development projects or policies will emerge.
- Understanding this, the BLTP has begun to move away from focusing on developing general strategies for economic recovery or even specific project proposals. Instead, it has increasingly begun privileging the building of confidence, a network of committed people, a broad range of activities in support

of the transition, and targeted interventions in security sector reform. We strongly support this choice. It is justified by two main factors: first, the choice of development projects as a product of the BLTP workshops has shown itself not to be a good strategic choice (it tends to exclude and de-motivate people, for a yield of mediocre projects); second, the general context of Burundi requires attention to the current transition before all else. If successful (in combination with other policies) in advancing the current transition, the BLTP may well have a crucial impact on future economic policymaking in Burundi; in addition, there are some interesting ideas floating around on how to apply the BLTP approach targeted on economic sectors such as agriculture –these may be pursued in the future (see recommendations). However, looking back at its first year, we believe the choice made by the BLTP to favor influencing the transition was the right choice.

○ Indirect impact

- *Participants Behavior Changes.* There exists anecdotal evidence that some participants of the Ngozi I and II workshops have taken some of the new insights home with them, beginning to apply them in their personal and professional environments. There are a number of instances mentioned where people have used some of the tools taught in the initial or follow-up workshops in professional spheres –foremost by teachers and professional trainers, sometimes in general workplace management, and a few times in real negotiations (with the officers from the EMGI acting as the ideal example here). Similarly, people regularly mention using the tools and the overall approach at home or in the family. It is hard to measure this impact, but this does not mean it is absent. The BLTP team should develop a better M&E system to track (and promote) this sort of impact.
- *Security Sector.* The most immediate impact on national institutions and policies has come in relation to the security sector training, and particularly the training of the Etat-Majeur Général Intégré (EMGI) in Gitega in May 2004. It is important to understand, nonetheless, that the fact that the BLTP training helped the EMGI to have a breakthrough on the “status of combatants” issue was in large part due to incentives that existed among the EMGI participants to come to an agreement. The BLTP increased the trust among them as well as their communication capacity, so that an agreement could more easily be reached, but it could only contribute to success because a number of contextual variables (not controlled by the BLTP) were favorable to it. The important lesson learned here is that the most direct impact will be observed with institutions and decision-making mechanisms that are faced with issues that they need to resolve, and have incentives to do so. This is clearly not the case with every institution in Burundi, and the BLTP team should evaluate this institutional “ripeness” when choosing which institutions to target.
- Many of the Ngozi I-III participants told us they did not have the power, leverage, or even the incentives as individuals to make a serious impact at the present time on institutional transformation, economic reconstruction, or sustainable peace. But, they and observers also said that the significance of the BLTP was that it continued to create relationships among a group of people that may be able to help keep the transition, and the country, from falling apart (which is currently a real risk). They have tentacles in all institutions in the country and they constitute a network that shares, more than any other group of such political and social diversity, a sense of trust and openness to mutual discussion. The

challenge for the BLTP is to maintain this impact, and extend it further through concrete actions.

- *Spin-Off Activities.* The BLTP produced a set of spin-off activities, which were not planned or predicted at the outset: three additional workshops in the security sector (funded by DfID and the EU), and a major decentralization project adopting the BLTP approach in two Provinces (with WWC TA, but funded and executed by OTI). These spin-offs may constitute the most direct impacts of the BLTP on national institutions and policies, and possibly longer-term peace and economic reconstruction; certainly the EMGI training has produced clearly visible results. These spin-off activities demonstrate that the BLTP team works as a flexible learning organization, capable of rapidly responding to emerging opportunities, soliciting funds from a broad range of other international actors. In a second phase, these spin-off activities may increasingly come to define the BLTP –yet, it is important to remember that it is the experience and the credibility gained from the Ngozi I-III workshops that allowed these spin-offs to occur.

Lessons learned

- All obvious lessons learned by the project have been integrated into the design and implementation. What lessons learned during the BLTP were applied by the same team in Timor-Leste?

VII. LICUS #52 – Burundi Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program

- \$423,800
 - \$150,000 Goods; \$236,300 Services; \$7,500 Training; \$30,000 Independent Grant Evaluation.
- 01/07 – 01/09

Context

- The Country Director provided a brief background on the current situation of the Burundian Government, which after years of civil war is seen as inexperienced in the field of governance and leadership. After recent elections the government now needs to and wants to deliver significant improvements to its citizens. The government recognizes it has made early mistakes as the cabinet is inexperienced. This has prompted the president to request the Bank for support to improve confidence, accountability, and effectiveness of national leaders, and through them, the accountable thematic and geographic teams. Preparatory work for the project, which has been funded by the Burundian government, has been ongoing. The situation has changed since 2004 from a transitional government with training of individuals to today's elected government working as a team. The planned leadership training will be inclusive and aim to reach out to all elements of society, which will ensure the required neutrality of the training. (Committee Minutes 1-4-07)
- With regard to the use of the LICUS Trust Fund in an active IDA country such as Burundi, the time-critical aspect of this proposal was emphasized as one of the important reasons for the selection of the LICUS TF as the source of funding for the project. Additionally, there are presently no IDA financed Bank operations to which these activities could be appended or any ongoing projects that can be reallocated. (Committee Minutes 1-4-07)
- The proposed leadership program is a continuation of a six-month process which has created demand for ongoing involvement. The President of Burundi has recognised the value added by this type of results-oriented leadership development and requested an expansion of current activities. (Proposal)
- From Proposal M&E baseline: Peace is fragile; Skills have been developed, but not to the point where they can be transferred; Capacity for economic policy and programming weak; Carry-over of "pratiques de maquis" into state institutions; Lack of competent civil servants; No evidence of process of consultation and cooperation; Lack of strong coalition for change; Lack of internalization of new "statut de la Fonction Publique"; Tense relationship with civil society, including media; and Weak governance structures and mechanisms. (Proposal)
- The proposed Leadership program specifically targets the social services sectors and the improvement of basic services delivered, seeking to improve leaders' capacities for implementation and achieving concrete results – particularly as pertaining to the social services sectors. The program also aims to assist the country in transitioning from managing humanitarian aid (inputs) to formulating and implementing strategies and development programs (outcomes). The objectives for the proposed program thus fully support the objectives as stated in the Bank's ISN. The program will complement the leadership training efforts of the ongoing Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTF), which is focusing its efforts on building leadership capacity in the legislative branch of Government and in the security sector. (Proposal)

Problem to be addressed

- There are important challenges facing Burundi's leaders in the day-to-day running of the country – ranging from budget issues and the necessity of keeping the PRGF on track to putting in place

mechanisms that curb corruption and protect human rights. How the leadership tackles these issues is critical to Burundi's future. (Proposal)

- Managing these challenges and the expectations of Burundians and of donors will require extraordinary leadership capacity in terms of developing realistic strategies and policies and delivering results. The reality, however, is that the leadership team is new, lacks experience, and operates in an environment of weak institutional and organizational capacity. (Proposal)

Objectives

- The main objective of the proposed leadership program is to improve the confidence, accountability, and ultimately the effectiveness of national leaders and through them, the accountable thematic and geographic teams. Further, the proposed program aims to contribute to (Proposal):
 - Creating an environment for the achievement of sustainable results;
 - Providing leaders across society with an improved understanding of their roles and responsibilities as leaders;
 - Building further consensus between different stakeholder groups in the country;
 - Mainstreaming good governance practices in leaders' respective sectors of responsibility, leading to improvements in governance mechanisms and structures (increased accountability and transparency, improved participatory processes).
 - Given the above, and in recognition of the considerable effort already made to generate trust and build relationships within the scope of the BLTP, the key capacities and endogenous processes that this program aims to encourage, facilitate and develop include, but are not limited to:
 - Visioning and prioritizing;
 - Managing for results, including: assigning accountabilities; developing feedback systems; mobilizing multiple stakeholders; and building consensus around desired results and outcomes; and
 - Using diagnostic and community based tools to monitor governance and public sector performance.

Theory of change

- Most of the challenges the country is facing are interlinked and can only be fully addressed through a systemic, long-term, comprehensive program building on significant institutional and organizational change. The proposed Leadership Program for Burundi, with its modest budget and limited timeframe, clearly cannot commit to deliver that. However, combining outcomes from previous leadership programs in the country that strengthened communication among opposing interests with the current approach of building confidence by working together on shared outcomes, this initiative *can* have a significant impact and create demand for significant long-term changes. (Proposal)
- Good governance fosters trust and legitimacy. For Burundi lack of trust is a key issue and therefore the capacity of the state to meet moral and political expectations of the electorate need to be reinforced. This is not possible without strong leadership. The workshops and leadership activities will strengthen leadership capacity to address critical governance issues that will contribute to build the trust necessary for peace and stability to prevail. (Proposal, from M&E framework.)
- The cross-sectoral problem solving, prioritization, mobilization, and implementation skills that will be enhanced in participants during the program, are key capacities needed for leaders to implement the recently completed PRSP. The first phase of activities will also contribute to the country's preparations for the donor Round-table. (Proposal)

- The reason for convening participants around the effectiveness dimension of leadership capacity, including the ability of leaders to drive change and achieve concrete and specific results in high priority sectors, is based on evidence from conflict settings that approaches which invite participants to work together toward a goal are of greater value to both parties than approaches that focus primarily on individual attitude change and relationships,²⁹ and have the additional benefit of ultimately improving the lives of the poor through concrete gains in service delivery. Attitude change is a necessary and important means towards larger ends. Building on the social capital established from the earlier BLTP reconciliation work, the proposed project moves into the phase of initiating and managing change on key development, service delivery, and governance issues at the broader, systemic level. (Proposal)
- In this model, capacity develops through the process of reaching specific results; governance improves through identifying and working through the constraints to implementation. The proposed program is designed to have a demonstration effect – it will target specific and limited results areas in one or two priority sectors. The capacity developed, however, is durable, insofar as it represents a reconfiguration of habits and patterns. The dynamics, behavior change, and knowledge acquired will be applicable to other sectors. (Proposal)

Activity design

Design process:

- The Committee raised concerns on the risk of the Bank to be perceived as purposely excluding specific sectors. The Country Team explained that the President selected the two sectors that the project will focus on, education and coffee. (Committee Minutes 1-4-07)
- The program design is based on lessons from similar programs in other countries and on the achievements of other leadership programs in Burundi. (Proposal)
- An international rapid results expert is part of the WBI team. (Proposal)
- An outside M&E expert is hired from project conception. (Proposal)
- Local consultants have been hired to develop background notes and documentation that will inform the design of specific activities. (Proposal)

Final design:

- From Proposal
 - The proposed program has three components:
 - Preparing for the donor Round-table and PRSP implementation through studies, pilots, and a culminating seminar;
 - Support to implementation and achievement of outcomes under PRSP plans of action through pilots, work-shops and seminars; and
 - Monitoring and evaluation.
 - In May 2006, WBI received a request from the President of Burundi to support the implementation of a diagnostic study on the state of governance and corruption (GAC Study). Based on the above, it is anticipated that weak institutions and accountability will represent some of the key constraints to implementation identified through the leadership interventions. Recognizing this, the proposed program will devote some of its

²⁹A qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the impact of peace education on attitude change through peace camps with groups from both sides of the Georgian/Abkhazian conflict showed that over four years, little attitude change was achieved. However, joint work initiatives were perceived as fruitful by the adversary groups even without any explicit work on attitude change. (Ohanyan, A. with Lewis, J. 2005. Politics of Peacebuilding: Critical Evaluation of Interethnic Contact and Peace Education in Georgia-Abkhaz Peace Camp, 1998-2002, in: Peace and Change, 30 (1), 57-84.) Anecdotal evidence from street lighting projects in conflicted communities in South Africa suggests the same. (Weeks, Dudley, Eight Essential Steps to Conflict Resolution.)

resources to an initial response aimed at addressing these constraints, also making use of the GAC study and its findings as a basis. The proposed program will therefore be made up of the following components and types of activities:

- High-level Cabinet/Leadership seminars:
 - Exposure to international lessons learned and best practices;
 - Forum for dialogue, communication, and information sharing;
 - Skills building exercises in process and system analyses for existing thematic groups (for PRSP or other);
 - Preparatory studies: To be undertaken by local consultants. These will feed into the design of different activities;
 - Case studies: To be undertaken by local consultants. These will feed into the design of different activities;
 - Practical pilots: The pilots target systemic change for the establishment of a results culture, using just one or two sectors for demonstration effect and as a way to begin sequenced change (success in one area replicated in others, based on the new norms, behaviors, and capacities in place.) Capacity develops through the process of achieving results in the short term (in support of wider development goals), and in doing so; governance improves by identifying solutions to some of the major implementation constraints. While the initial pilots proposed for this program target only one or two sectors (e.g. education, health...), the capacity developed is durable insofar as it represents a reconfiguration of habits and patterns – the dynamics, behavioral change, and knowledge acquired are applicable to other sectors;
 - Technical workshops and participatory fora to design and develop tools and instruments to address emerging governance issues.
- From Report on Burundi Leadership Retreat 2007
 - A Leadership Program was developed that aims to help leaders to tackle PRSP implementation challenges. The President-appointed steering committee leads the process, supported by the World Bank Institute (WBI). Leaders include the head of state, his deputies and cabinet, as well as key leaders in the private sector and civil society. The methodology involves prioritizing critical outcomes, unbundling and analyzing the implementation constraints, and piloting actions using new techniques. The methodology – a combination of peer knowledge sharing and rapid results pilots - is designed to encourage innovations in problem solving and sharing accountability for visible outcomes that make a difference to beneficiaries.
 - Design for Leadership Retreat on May 3-4, 2007:
 - Participants included the President of Burundi and a group of political and civil society leaders from his team, including his cabinet, as well as heads of representative civil society organizations (30 percent of participants.) This was the first time they all met together in a government retreat. Burundi's two Vice Presidents actively chaired working groups. The President, in addition to opening and closing the event, participated actively in several working sessions during the two days. A synthesis was delivered at the end of the second day to the President, participants, special guests, and the whole donor community, who had been invited to hear the results of the workshop.
 - The retreat was structured to underscore and reinforce national ownership of the process. Peer perspectives were provided by H.E. Haja Nirina Razafinjatovo, Minister of National Education and Scientific Research in Madagascar;

- Ambassador Tertius Zongo from Burkina Faso; and Joseph Foubi, who provided expert input as UNICEF representative in Rwanda.
- The facilitator and consultant on Rapid Results, Benamina Randrianarivelo from Madagascar and WBI advisor in Morocco and Madagascar, reinforced the participatory dimension with hands-on work during which participants were given the task of prioritizing specific difficulties confronted in the ongoing pilots, analyzing them, and brainstorming on “out of the box” solutions to well-known and longstanding constraints.
 - Reaching decisions was facilitated by brainstorming, prioritization of challenges within sectors, application of the methodology, and problem-solving in cross-stakeholder teams as the basis for moving forward. There were highly participatory working groups, and strong and early appreciation for the role that results can play as incentives for driving implementation – especially new ways of implementing.
 - Next steps: Three working groups of ministers and non-government participants agreed upon a set of follow-up actions or a new wave of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI's) based on priority needs and constraints emerging from the pilot phase. Additional RRI's in other sectors could be initiated in cases where the key responsible parties clearly demonstrate their commitment to engage in such initiatives, are able to identify concrete actions that are likely to generate visible results within 100 days, and are ready to allocate the resources necessary for this work.
- Next steps following May 3-4 Retreat (From Roadmap for Next Steps)
 - Launch of the first wave of Rapid Results Initiatives within the next 90 days
 - The fervent hopes of seminar participants for speedy and concrete actions that address priority needs should be transformed into reality by launching a first wave of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI) -- along the lines of the initiatives that were carried out during the recent pilot projects, and that were also the subject of presentations at the seminar.
 - Successive reviews of each wave of RRI (following each 90-day cycle)
 - This stage, which is an integral part of the rapid results methodology, will evaluate each initiative on three levels: (i) Percentage completion of planned results (ii) degree to which RRI tools and methods were adopted, and (iii) behavioral change by relevant parties in the course of the launch and conduct of the Rapid Results process.
 - Launch of second 90-day wave of RRI (mid-September 2007)
 - A second wave of Rapid Results Initiatives could be launched around mid-September, following evaluation of the first wave and applying lessons learned during that first wave. By benefiting from the learning curve, one could also significantly expand the choice of RRI, by focusing on the highest priorities at that time, again choosing activities that are likely to generate visible impacts in the space of three months.
 - Second Leadership Seminar
 - The second leadership seminar, which will conclude the joint WBI-Government program of support for leadership development, will reaffirm ownership of the process by the Burundian side, through deepening of the lessons learned, sharing of experiences and good practice, and establishing systematic approaches to conducting

monitoring and evaluation activities, as well as the creation of mechanisms for piloting and support for future RRI.

Participants

Design:

- The Committee also questioned whether the leadership participants were equally selected from the central government and the local level to prevent the creation of a “new elite” and an over centralized government. The Country Team explained that the leadership representatives included civil servants, elected officials, representatives of civil society and private sector leaders. Furthermore, the activities that the leaders will work on although initiated and completed at the central level, will ultimately leverage outcomes in the local level. (Committee Minutes 1-4-07)
- The targeted audience for the program is representatives from government and non-government spheres, including government representatives, representatives from parliament, civil society, media, NGOs, religious groups, and political parties. Selection criteria will be developed with due regard to the criteria applied for other past and ongoing leadership initiatives, seeking synergies and work with “alumni” where this presents added value and, conversely, seeking to spread beyond the group of participants already targeted by other initiatives where this is more valuable. Criteria for participant selection for each event will be specified in the concept note for the events themselves. While WBI will communicate criteria for participation, emphasizing the value of having all major stakeholders represented during such activities, the final decision as to who participates and benefits from the program and the different activities lies with the government. (Proposal)

Distribution:

- No data on participants.

Selection Process:

- Beneficiaries will be identified by the GoB, based on proposed criteria from WBI, including assuring multi-stakeholder participation and inclusion. Processes and techniques learned through the interventions under the proposed program are expected to be replicated and applied outside the scope of the program, thereby assuring a larger exposure than the immediate beneficiary groups. (Proposal)

Implementation

Team:

- Bank execution.
- A Steering Committee has been named and set up by the two Vice Presidents on the Burundian side. This Committee will serve as the main local counterpart in the design and delivery of the leadership program. The members of the Committee represent the office of the President, the offices of the two Vice Presidents, the Ministries of Finance, Good Governance and Planning. WBI will serve as a facilitator in the project design and delivery, gradually taking on less and less responsibility, assuring that local capacities are built for continuing the program after project completion if that is desired from the side of the country. The program will, however, be Bank executed in terms of financial transactions. (Proposal)
- The Country team re-emphasized that the Bank’s role in this project will be to serve as a facilitator and advisor rather than a supporter of specific stakeholders, which will allow the government to retain ownership of the project. A Steering Committee, set up by the government, will serve as the main local counterpart in the design and delivery of the leadership program. (Committee Minutes 1-4-07)

- The Task Team Leaders of the proposed project is Moira Hart-Poliquin, Senior Operations Officer, WBICD. Her team will include Cia Sjetnan, Program Officer, WBICD, and EIRay Henriksen, Consultant, WBICD.

Partners:

- No data.

Implementation challenges:

- No data.

Changes during implementation:

- From BTOR, WB Mission to Burundi, February 18-29, 2008
 - Innovations:
 - Cross-ministerial communications and collaboration around a shared goal.
 - Mobilization of communities and non-traditional stakeholders in implementation, e.g. mobilizing communities during public works on Saturday mornings to transport and plant trees as part of an anti-erosion program.

Reports of what worked during implementation

- From Report on Burundi Leadership Retreat 2007:
 - *Ownership:* From the beginning, emphasis was placed on a process owned and led by the Burundians. While facilitated by WBI and supported by the Rapid Results consultant from Madagascar, who provided mentoring and technical support, it was clear that the local team had pulled the Leadership Retreat together, taken the risks, and shared the positive response with the retreat participants.
 - *Process:* The concerns prioritized by the leadership team related to systemic weaknesses in the implementation capacity of the existing government institutions to deliver expected results from national and donor-funded service delivery and reform programs. The areas originally identified were health and education. Reform of the coffee sector and successful management of the Round Table process were added to the list at a later stage.
 - The methodology involved bringing together key actors in each sector and selecting a representative result or outcome for which resources were available but organizational and institutional capacity was weak. An action plan with benchmarks and measurable outcomes was agreed upon, initially in health and education, to be achieved in 100 days.
 - *Multi-Media:* Technology has played an important role throughout the program as well as during the retreat. Documentation was uploaded on the PRSP website on the first day of the retreat. Videotaped presentations from former President Abdou Diouf of Senegal and President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of Liberia were presented by video clips. The key stakeholders and resource persons were interviewed on video to facilitate capturing of attitudes and perceptions at this point in the program and allow for sharing of the experience with other colleagues and countries.
 - *Evaluation:* An evaluation expert was able to engage with a local counterpart before, during, and after the event, in order to conceptualize and introduce to the participants the idea of evaluating not only the Leadership Seminar but also the impact of this program on the attitudes, processes, and systems used by leaders.
 - *Outcomes:* A set of recommended priority actions for deepening and broadening the application of the approach in existing initiatives and branching out to other issues post-Round Table was generated by the working groups and reported in a formal synthesis presented at the end of the retreat. There was strong and early appreciation for the role that results can play as incentives for driving innovative types of solutions to implementation challenges.

Outputs and outcomes

Outcome indicators (Proposal)

- Increased focus on results in government planning and implementation
- Resolution to old implementation problems with new approaches
- Roles and responsibilities clearly defined in implementation procedures and mechanisms
- Inclusion of major stakeholders in project implementation and decision-making processes
- Establishment of multi-stakeholder teams
- Improved governance mechanisms and structures: (i) increased accountability and transparency; (ii) improved participatory processes

Outputs

- *Expected output indicators* (Proposal)
 - New working processes that apply acquired leadership techniques, such as the rapid results methodology
 - Increase in the number of multi-stakeholder project and implementation teams
 - Demand for use of tested approach in other sectors
 - Consolidation of results matrices
 - Concrete results identified in government planning tools
 - Action plans contain elements of learning from seminars and relate to priority sectors of the PRSR
 - Program planning and implementation increasingly conducted as a transparent and participative process
 - New initiatives to curb corruption in the provision of public services in targeted service delivery sector
 - M&E incorporated from project planning stage
- From Report on Burundi Leadership Retreat 2007
 - The Program's initial analysis included three background studies focusing on implementation constraints in the government's agreed priority sectors of health and education, and an overview of the relationships between the multiple results frameworks (including the PRSP) for which the government is accountable.
 - At the end of this pilot phase, a high-level Leadership Retreat for the entire cabinet and civil society leadership was held on May 3 and 4, 2007 to share lessons and reflect on the value-added of this methodology and the insights it imparted to national leaders collectively accountable for achieving results.
- Rapid Results Training, September 2007. (Note 13 – orientation – RRI Launch)
 - This week trained 10 coaches and raised awareness of 30 focal points. There were 19 Ministries represented, and 5 other institutions represented. By the end of the week, 11 Rapid Results Pilots were ready to be launched in Mid-September.
 - The pilot projects were selected based on 3 criteria: they responded to a real priority and could generate tangible impacts; there were sufficient resources for their implementation; and they could be completed within 100 days.
 - The 11 Ministries implementing pilots include: Planning and Development; Coordination with External Aid; National Solidarity; Defense; Public Administration; Environment; Transportation; Health; Agriculture; Commerce; and Communication.
- From BTOR, WB Mission to Burundi, February 18-29, 2008

- The pilots launched in December 2007 achieved an average completion rate of 85%.
- All 11 initiatives were prioritized, developed and approved by strategic leaders who delivered signed challenge letters (“lettres de défi”) to the teams. The first vice president articulated full support for the approach and the process based on these achievements.
- Commitment to a follow-up High Level Government Consultation, tentatively planned for June 2008. The second high level consultation (RG2) will be led by the two Vice-Presidents who will be advised and briefed by a special Advisory Group composed of “strategic leaders” involved in the implementation of the on-going rapid results initiatives.
- Applying the RRM to the implementation of a Bank project. Eight elements of the 2008 WPA for the Programme d’Appui aux Projets Gouvernance et Economique (PAGE) were identified, five PIU staff were introduced to the rapid results methodology and are being supported in these initiatives by on the ground rapid results coaches.
- Adoption of a “challenge letter” - a new tool in the implementation of rapid results initiatives.
- Establishment of an Advisory Group. Comprising all the strategic leaders for on-going rapid results initiatives, an Advisory Group was appointed to analyze the progress and process of the rapid results initiatives, draw lessons from these initiatives, and contribute to solving problems and removing constraints to achieving results.
- TV address by the First Vice-President. Upon being briefed on progress, the First Vice-President – who was new to the program and the rapid results methodology - took the initiative to go on national TV, explaining the rapid results approach and pledging the commitment of the Government to deliver rapid results by applying this methodology in all areas of the government’s work.
- Tim Carrington, media and communications expert, joined the mission to develop appropriate communications material for the government and WBI. At the current stage of the program, this process increasingly involves capturing lessons of experience and disseminating them to support a broader change in mentality and behavior.

Outcomes:

- *Expected outcomes*
 - Given the strong process-oriented approach, it is expected that the program will lead to the institutionalization of new approaches and processes that will enhance the internalization of the learning that has taken place. Also, experience from other countries where this approach has been used, show that individuals seize the tools they are exposed to and use them, if the right incentives exist. (Proposal)
- Background Studies and Rapid Results Pilots (Report on 2007 Leadership Retreat)
 - Practical pilot initiatives using the Rapid Results Methodology (RRM) were identified to test the conclusions of the background studies and to experiment with innovative solutions to the implementation constraints. The implementation of pilot initiatives using the new methodology generated some remarkable achievements – far beyond what was anticipated in some areas. In the education sector, for example, the long-standing problem of distribution of text books to primary schools was solved initially in one locality and then scaled up in a matter of weeks to cover the entire country.
 - In addition to improving the situation for beneficiaries, the improved distribution of text books increased the confidence of the authorities. It also overcame long-lasting bottlenecks, such as lack of transport resources for local level education staff. Ministries shared transport at the local level and involved parents and students in local distribution as part of mandatory weekly community service. The experience also underlined to all concerned the power of using measurable results to mobilize action.

- The May 3-4, 2007 Leadership Retreat helped consolidate the learning gains from the analyses and the pilots and engaged the top leaders in a broader effort to prioritize and mobilize around key development challenges prior to the donors' Round Table, during which much attention would be on the implementing capacity and accountability of the government.
- From BTOR, WB Mission to Burundi, February 18-29, 2008
 - "Remarkable achievements":
 - Reduction, by the Ministries of Education and Finance, in the time it takes to process the files of new teachers from one year to four months.
 - Extraordinary enthusiasm observed and relayed within the Ministry of Defense to replicate the use of the method as a team building, problem solving and accountability tool.
 - Further interest in rapid results expressed for two Bank projects.

Lessons learned

- From BTOR, WB Mission to Burundi, February 18-29, 2008
 - Most critical success factors: (i) engagement of strategic leaders in strategizing and problem solving; and (ii) availability of resources from the outset.

VIII. PCF #350 – Tajikistan Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development

- \$70,000
 - \$ 42,290 Services; \$26,600 Training; \$1,110 Other
- 3/07 – 4/07

Context

- Although a peace agreement was signed in 1997 and significant progress has been achieved in terms of growth, Tajikistan remains the poorest and among the most fragile of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Government of Tajikistan (GOT) has requested the assistance of the World Bank Group to prepare a high-level Seminar or Retreat to think through some of the challenges and trade-offs of a complex and large reform agenda as the country enters its next phase of development with the drafting of the second PRSP. (Proposal)
- This is the first time that a request for funding from the PCF has been submitted to organize a high-level leadership seminar for Tajikistan. The first two seminars (2004, Istanbul and 2005, Warsaw) were co-sponsored with other donors (Canadian Embassy; Turkish Development Bank) while the last seminar (Vienna, 2006) was sponsored by the Bank Netherlands Partnership Program Trust Fund. The Grant will allow the Bank to respond quickly to the country's demand for support in thinking through strategic development orientations. In addition, the IDA resources currently available for the country are limited and the innovative nature of the activity cannot be linked to an ongoing IDA operation.
- The economy has substantially grown and stabilized since 1997 and GDP has grown at an astonishing rate of 9 percent during the period 2001-2005. The formation of a new government and the recent completion of the National Development Strategy and the 2007-2009 PRSP offer tremendous opportunities to move forward. (Kiosk Article)

Problem to be addressed

- This seminar will aim to assist high-level government officials in their efforts to strategically think through a set of key priority reforms for the next couple of years, including thinking through the sequencing and management of these reforms. Rather than focusing on the reforms themselves, the seminar will attempt to focus on the strategic approach to achieve sustainable growth with special attention to private sector development, governance (social inclusion) and human development (health and education), priority areas outlined in the Country Partnership Strategy (CSP) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). (Proposal)

Objective

- To enhance the capacity of the GOT to make informed decisions on the strategic directions for development to achieve sustainable growth. (Proposal)
- The original objective of the grant proposal is to assist high-level government officials from Tajikistan in their efforts to strategically think through a set of key priority reforms for the next couple of years, including thinking through the sequencing and management of these reforms. The event was timely as it took place a few months only after a new government was formed in Tajikistan. (Grant Completion Report)

Activity design

Design process:

- Similar leadership events for Tajikistan officials have taken place on an annual basis since 2004 but all of them focused on providing technical guidance on "how to" proceed with the largely Bank

driven policy agenda. This year, we will move away from this approach and focus more on the experiential peer-to-peer knowledge sharing approach as well as encourage as much as possible participation from the audience. (Proposal)

- In order to create an environment for an open and frank discussion to take place, the seminar will allow a significant amount of time for debate, interaction and exchange among all participants and will depart from a traditional seminar format with a series of presentations followed by Q&A. Besides a few well-selected country case studies, the seminar will engage the participants in roundtables and working group sessions facilitated by a small group of well-respected resource persons from the Bank or outside. (Proposal)
- The seminar will be organized in Istanbul, Turkey to create the conditions for a friendly, neutral and intimate environment and facilitate discussion on sensitive reform issues among all participants such as governance, anti-corruption, cotton and energy sectors, etc... Organizing the event outside of Tajikistan will ensure that Tajik leaders who are spending long work days on a large number of small tasks, in sometimes weak organizations, have enough time for strategic thinking, stock-taking and networking with presenters. In addition, given the newly formed Government, this event represents a unique opportunity for some of the new Cabinet members to interact among themselves as well as with other practitioners and renowned experts and get first-hand experiences on how to turn political visions into reality. Finally, based on successful prior events, the GOT has explicitly asked the Bank that such retreats be held outside of Tajikistan. (Proposal)

Final design:

- Two-day seminar, with 20 government representatives.
- The structure of the workshop agenda will be anchored in a selected number of case studies (three to four) presented by senior practitioners or experts from other countries whose cultural and political context is perceived by the Tajikistan participants to be relevant and appropriate. The agenda will therefore be deliberately "light" with abundant time for informal interactions during break-out groups to allow for the most candid discussions possible. At the beginning of each session, the discussion will begin with the external presenter giving a personal view on what worked and what did not work during their time in office. This will then be followed by a candid exchange of views on what could have been done differently and the usefulness and content of international best practices and to what extent the experiences could be applied to Tajikistan. The presentation of the case studies will then pave the way for a debate among the participants which in some cases will be lead and moderated by the participants. (Proposal)
- 2 and one-half day seminar, April 9-11, 2007, Istanbul, Turkey. Day 1: Focus on fundamentals of good governance as a basis for sustaining economic and sectoral reforms. Speakers from GOT and the WB as well as the Institute for European Affairs, Ireland. Day 2: The sessions will discuss the institutional, regulatory, administrative and financial barriers to promoting an enabling environment for private sector development. Speakers from GOT, Albania (Deputy Minister of Finance), Bulgaria (Institute for Market Economics), and the World Bank. Day 3: Focus on the drivers of economic and productivity growth in the region, key institutional/governance reform links within the public sector, and the role of government in developing a modern, transparent and effective administration. Speakers include representatives from the WB, GOT, Latvia (MP), and the IMF. (Agenda)

Participants

Design:

- Intended beneficiaries will include senior representatives from the following key government agencies: Minister of Finance; Minister of Economy and Trade; Minister of State Revenues and Duties; National Bank of Tajikistan; Department of Economic Reforms and Foreign Investments, Executive Office of the President of Tajikistan; Minister of Education; Minister of Health; Project

Implementation Unit of the Second Institutional Building Technical Assistance Project; and the PRSP Monitoring Unit, Executive Office of the President of Tajikistan. It is noteworthy that, in contrast with previous seminars, senior level government representatives from social sectors (education, health, migration) as well will be invited to participate in the seminar in an effort to foster inclusion and participation and therefore promote transparency and accountability among several members of the new Government. (Proposal)

- This seminar is intended for top-level policy makers in charge of implementing reforms and is an integral component of on-going discussions in the country on the reform agenda process. Civil society members are being simultaneously consulted as part of the National Development Strategy (NDS) and the PRSP. The Consultative Group meeting is also planned for later in the Spring providing further opportunities for engagement with civil society. (Proposal)

Distribution:

- Unclear.

Selection Process:

- Unclear.

Implementation

Team:

- World Bank Execution.

Partners:

- Do not appear to be any partners.

Implementation challenges:

- Finding cases from the “right” countries (i.e. countries not too advanced from a development perspective and not too similar from the recipient country, in this case Tajikistan)
- Finding the right balance between cross-cutting issues and sector specific issues; as well as between strategic and technical issues in order to accommodate the different levels of seniority/expertise of the participants.

Changes during implementation:

- None. Only 2-month period between grant approval and closing.

Outputs and outcomes

Outcome indicators:

- Enhanced capacity of the GOT to make informed decisions on the strategic directions for development to achieve sustainable growth. (Proposal)

Output indicators:

- Improved capacity to elaborate and develop strategic directions for sustainable growth. (Proposal)
- Creation of a Community of Practice among participants and speakers to continue the exchange of experiences. (Proposal)

Outputs:

- The timely preparation and submission of five case studies (Albania, Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, and South Korea) on all key cross-sectoral development issues as well as the delivery of the Seminar outside of Tajikistan prior to other major international meetings on Tajikistan is a clear indication that the activity has achieved its grant development objective in terms of knowledge generation, sharing and analysis. (Completion Report)
- Roundtable Discussion and Working Group Sessions

- The discussions were facilitated by a Russian facilitator, previously Bank staff. In addition, the Chief Economist of the ECA region attended the meeting and gave a presentation to facilitate the debate. However, seats were arranged in a U shape form, instead of round-tables, per the request of the Tajikistan Government, in order to maximize the time and opportunity for interaction and dialogue among each participant, given that some of the government representatives had been recently nominated and the significant number of non-Tajikistan participants (World Bank; IFC; IMF). (Completion Report)
- In addition, a few days prior to the seminar, a respected Russian expert on strategic reforms worked with key Tajikistan Government members to help them prepare their presentations in accordance with the cross-cutting development issues of the seminar and to build consensus. This task was critical as some of the Government participants had been recently nominated following the November 2006 elections in Tajikistan and had never made a presentation in front of the entire Cabinet. The Russian expert had previously participated in one of the Tajikistan leadership seminars and was highly appreciated by the Tajik government members. (Completion Report)
- As a result of the expert mission, the Government prepared and shared a series of well developed presentations on the following strategies: (1) investing for growth; (2) key priorities in human development; (3) sustainability in infrastructure development; (4) private sector development; (5) public administration reform; and (6) public expenditures and public finance management. (Completion Report)

Outcomes:

- From Completion Report:
 - The objectives of the grant were clear and important as the analysis and strategic thinking achieved in the seminar provided a critical input into a major donor community meeting on Tajikistan, the Tajikistan Development Forum.
 - The most significant outcome of the seminar lays in the fact that a large group of government representatives (19 in total), some of them key ministers, and a large number of resource persons, were brought together outside of Tajikistan in a short amount of time to think strategically about reforms and development priorities, in preparation for the June Tajikistan Development Forum, a significant donors' community meeting.
 - Other significant development impacts include the following:
 - 1. The ability to discuss the cross-sectoral implications of policy discussions, given that all line ministries were represented together with the President's advisors;
 - 2. The Tajikistan government members leading the strategic discussions, having come prepared to lead discussion with their own presentations on Tajikistan's overall development and sectoral strategies;
 - 3. The seminar led to a coherent strategy discussion by the Government at the Development Forum in Dushanbe;
 - 4. The requests for sectoral strategic discussions and more frequent discussions, brokered by the Bank.
 - In particular, the seminar enabled the government participants to better appreciate some of the trade-offs which may occur when implementing major policy reforms. The government members were able to value the need to build consensus around a set of key structural reforms such as in the infrastructure sector where the push for major infrastructure expenses needs to be balance with the urgency to ensure good basic public services in health and education and good governance. More importantly, the seminar contributed towards building a sense of ownership among the government members as to the implications of choosing one policy reform over another.

- In addition, given the country heavy reliance on export of commodities, the seminar offered an opportunity to encourage the country to look at other sources of growth, especially since prices remain volatile for commodities and consider other reform options such as lowering the cost of remittances (taxes, transfers costs, and so on), which currently could be as high as 21 percent of GDP; introducing the right incentives for cotton producers as the country has the potential to double its cotton production; and taking advantage of a labor intensive industry.
- The seminar also presented an occasion for the government members to consider a variety of follow-up measures to some of the bold reforms which have already been undertaken (such as the reduction in the number of administrative personnel). Listening to other countries' experiences such as Albania and Latvia, participants discussed strategies for improving tax collection to better finance public investments and the need to address inefficiencies within key sectors.
- The outcomes of the grant activities will be sustained beyond the duration of the grant for the following reasons: (a) its timeliness with the Tajikistan Development Forum held two months after the seminar in Turkey; (b) the interest expressed by the Government members to have a mini-event in October/November 2007 with the country's economic team and key members of the Bank country team as a follow-up event and (c) the official request from the Government to organize another high-level seminar in FY08, the fifth in a series of annual events.

Lessons learned

- From Completion Report:
 - One of the most positive lessons is the importance to meet and discuss with the government participants prior to the event in order to build consensus, prepare the ground for the analysis, assist in the preparation of presentations, agree on content, estimate the gaps in "knowledge" and assess the receptivity to international policy advice. This was the purpose of the Russian expert's mission to Dushanbe a few days before the Seminar. This field based preparatory work was not part of the previous Tajikistan leadership seminars. Such work is strongly recommended as it greatly contributed to having focused discussions on policy reforms.
 - The experience from the seminar has also shown that early identification of resource persons is key to ensuring that the presentations are adequately customized and relevant to the recipient's country context. Resource persons need to be given sufficient time to read, get familiar and understand a country's development challenges. In that respect, the Policy Notes prepared by the Bank should have been shared earlier with both the resource persons and the government members.
 - Finally, in retrospect, it may have been useful to organize a few working group sessions during the seminar to facilitate focused discussions on technical issues, following the strategic, policy-level presentations and lessons learned from other countries. Also, it may have been useful to organize a day-long meeting prior to the seminar between the facilitator and the resource persons given the number of case studies and the focus of the seminar on cross-sectoral issues.

Annex H: Terms of Reference

The Challenge of Governance in Transition:
Supporting Leadership Development
A Global Review of Interventions funded by LICUS TF and PCF

Background

Development poses daunting challenges. Developing country leaders are faced with navigating complex and competing interests, responding to on-going crises and managing the long-term development agenda of their countries. These reform agendas must often be implemented in less-than-favorable environments, under intense pressure from multiple stakeholders. Moreover, often weak (and in conflict-affected states, nearly obliterated) institutional environments make individual leaders especially critical to both the quality and probity of current action and the creation of effective institutions to guide future action. Leaders in developing countries must be attuned to fully actualizing the three dimensions of effective leadership – leading with vision, demonstrating capacity for results, and governing with integrity.

Leadership is crucial to poverty reduction and the building of effective states. At the heart of the development challenge is the building of effective states – that is, states capable of delivering the vital public goods promised citizens. Specifically, this entails an institutional reform agenda and a focus on producing positive, on-the-ground results from all the institutional players that go to make up an effective state. Institutional reform to various degrees and at various levels is critical to establishing the appropriate frameworks for responsibly managing public affairs. This reform agenda may range from limited institutional reforms in middle income countries, moderate renewal in post-transition countries, to a thorough-going state reconstruction in post-conflict or fragile states. Leaders of the state and its institutions, the private sector, and civil society organizations are the entry point to operationalizing a constructive engagement within and between these institutions, and to inspiring individuals and collectivities toward fundamental change.

Governance matters. A large body of empirical evidence shows that governance -- how power is acquired and exercised in a society -- plays a critical role in any effort to improve a country's performance across all development dimensions, including growth. Leaders are at the fulcrum, determining opportunities for or constraints to development by how they exercise power and make policy choices. In this context, leaders are critical in both promoting institutional change, but also modulating the initial take-off of such institutions so as to establish institutional predominance in a context of personalistic environments – this is likely to be particularly pertinent in the context of fragile states. Leaders must also model public and private behavior that reinforces accountability, integrity, and institutional constraint on power. In many countries, issues of integrity are obstacles to development, but they are also often the result of an entrenched value-system that condones or accepts certain behaviors. Leaders are therefore critical to breaking the mold.

Effective states also require responsible, effective citizens. Just as it is important to focus on public and private sector leaders and ask how the Bank can support them to do the right thing, the right way for the right reason, it is important to also focus on broader society as having the power to elect leaders, but also in bearing responsibility in holding leaders to account.

Three dimensions of leadership are crucial to realizing both small and large scale change in public life and toward achieving capable and accountable states that produce sustainable results for the poor:

- **Vision: Change Dimension:** capacity to engage various constituencies to produce a shared vision of the future, identify realities to be addressed to reach the vision, and to inspire, motivate, and mobilize others to achieve the vision/change;

- Competence: Effectiveness Dimension: capacity to: (i) diagnose underlying problems/issues; (ii) prioritize among multiple and competing challenges; (iii) find solutions (technical capacity); (iv) mobilize stakeholders; and (v) implement (management capacity);
- Integrity: Values Dimension: commitment to serve the public good, to personify individual and professional ethics, and to champion accountability relationships that inspire mutual trust in institutions, communities, and society as a whole.

Objective of Global Review

The purpose of this review is to:

1. Assemble narrative and descriptive information about the full range of leadership capacity development interventions funded by the Post Conflict Fund (PCF) and the Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Implementation Trust Fund (LICUS TF) during the period from 2000-2007.
2. Review those experiences through a set of strategic questions that seek to investigate key themes, highlight common approaches, identify lessons learned, and suggest strategic and operational implications for future Bank engagement in leadership capacity development in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Structure and Methodology of Review

Phase I: Desk Review

(Bank staff time plus one mid-level consultant already familiar with Bank interventions)

- annotated bibliography organized by country (sub-divided by project for the countries with more than one intervention)
- framework with all individual interventions presented descriptively (“apples to apples”)
- suggestions for key themes of investigation in Phase Two

Phase 2: Investigation and Analysis

(Bank staff time plus Phase One consultant already familiar with Bank interventions)

- key informant interviews for all countries
- 2 field visits (selected from Timor-Leste, Madagascar, Burundi, CAR)
- workshop with findings

This work will be done by the end of calendar year 2008.

Key Themes for Investigation

- What were the most important challenges and capacity constraints the Leadership Development intervention was intended to address?
- How did the intervention design assess the targets’ “readiness for change” at entry? What is the retroactive assessment of that readiness (what “ex post” revisions would have been suggested to the design)?
- Who as/were the change agents (in country), what was the entry point (operational political, central, decentralized/local), who was/were targeted for LD support, and why?
- What leadership development approaches (tools, methodologies, content) were applied? [*cluster under headings of transformational, experiential including Rapid Results Approach, and technical skills transfer*]

- How was existing capacity measured, and needs identified? To what extent was the intervention built on self-diagnosis of leadership gaps/needs?
- What results were expected, what change was anticipated?
- What aspects of the approach used were most critical for driving the results and the change? [*possibilities include high-level support and/or peer support, diagnostic and formulation process, target group, systemic or focused approach, credibility of facilitator, urgency, perception of direct benefit*]
- What leadership skills were targeted? [*visioning, consensus-building, setting targets, monitoring, implementing, problem-solving, mobilizing across constituencies*]
- What learning outcomes were expected/generated?
 - a. raised awareness
 - b. enhanced skills
 - c. improved consensus and teamwork
 - d. fostered networks
 - e. formulating policy/strategy
 - f. implementing policy/strategy
- What operational outcomes were expected/generated?
 - a. short-term gains through unblocking “stuck” processes or kick-starting reform/change
 - b. soft results – gains in confidence, changed relationships, political capital
 - c. short-term improvements in visible results or quality of life at population level
 - d. systemic results – new processes and mechanisms generate ‘new way of business’ from within the institution
 - e. long-term gains – tangible and concrete development results
- What changes in terms of capacity and development results can be attributed to the intervention?
- What other factors contributed to or fostered those results or changed capacity?
- What sustainable institutional outcomes were expected/generated?
 - a. use of the approach was carried forward by the individuals involved
 - b. capacity is available and interest expressed in replicating and expanding this approach
 - c. approach has been integrated into the institution’s ‘way of doing business’

Annex I: Research Design

For The Challenge of Governance in Transition:

Supporting Leadership Development

A Global Review of Interventions funded by LICUS TF and PCF

Prepared by Susanna Campbell and Kelly Hannum

August 2008

Table of Contents

STATEMENT OF CONTEXT AND PURPOSE	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
REVIEW PURPOSES	116
RESEARCH APPROACH	ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS RATIONALE AND BASIS FOR COMPARISON	118
<i>Table 1: Overview of Leadership Development Interventions</i>	119
<i>Dates</i>	121
<i>Amount of Funding</i>	121
<i>Leadership objective</i>	121
<i>Number of Participants and length of training</i>	121
<i>Participant group(s)</i>	122
<i>Instructional Method(s)</i>	122
<i>Design and Implementation Process</i>	123
<i>Outcome</i>	124
RESEARCH QUESTIONS	124
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	127
DRAFT TIMELINE	127

DRAFT COMMUNICATION PLAN	127
DRAFT INTERVIEW PROTOCOL.....	2
ANNEX I: OUTCOME EVALUATION FRAMEWORKS	130

Statement of Context and Purpose

The World Bank's Post Conflict Fund (PCF) and the Low Income Countries Under Stress Implementation Trust Fund (LICUS TF) have been critical sources of financing for leadership development interventions in fragile and conflict-affected situations. In 2007 the PCF-LICUS Committee recommended a review of those interventions to extract lessons learned. This Global Review examines the eight leadership capacity development interventions that have been supported by one of these two funds.

At the heart of the development challenge is building of states capable of delivering the vital public goods to citizens, which is dependent on effective leadership. An informal World Bank Working Group has identified three dimensions of effective leadership relevant to meeting this challenge – leading with vision, demonstrating capacity for results, and governing with integrity. These leadership dimensions are further defined below:

- **Vision: Change Dimension**: capacity to engage various constituencies to produce a shared vision of the future, identify realities to be addressed to reach the vision, and to inspire, motivate, and mobilize others to achieve the vision/change;
- **Competence: Effectiveness Dimension**: capacity to: (i) diagnose underlying problems/issues; (ii) prioritize among multiple and competing challenges; (iii) find solutions (technical capacity); (iv) mobilize stakeholders; and (v) implement (management capacity);
- **Integrity: Values Dimension**: commitment to serve the public good, to personify individual and professional ethics, and to champion accountability relationships that inspire mutual trust in institutions, communities, and society as a whole.

Leaders of the state and its institutions, the private sector, communities, and civil society or mass-based organizations are an important entry point to operationalizing constructive engagement within and between these institutions, and to inspiring individuals and collectivities toward fundamental change. Engaging leaders within and across multiple sectors is essential to build and maintain effective leadership and therefore, effective states.

Review Purposes

A review of interventions funded by PCF-LICUS is being conducted to understand the context, input, process and impact of previous interventions in order to improve the effectiveness of future interventions. The specific purposes of the review are described below.

1. Understand the investment made in and intended results of leadership development interventions funded by the Post Conflict Fund (PCF) and the Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Implementation Trust Fund (LICUS TF) during the period from 2000-2007.
 - a. Documentation will include the following: country of intervention, funded amount, participant type, tools, content, and delivery processes, number of participants, intended outcomes (at multiple levels), leadership skills/competencies targeted, challenges, and success factors.
 - b.

2. Identify common processes, challenges, and success factors in order to inform future Bank engagement in leadership capacity development in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
3. Provide evidence-based suggestions to inform the Bank's future strategic and operational engagement in leadership capacity development in fragile and conflict-affected countries. Specifically, these suggestions will synthesize the lessons learned from past leadership interventions into general guidance regarding the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of leadership capacity development in fragile and conflict-affected countries.
- 4.

Research Approach

In this review we will examine the eight interventions from two perspectives; within-case evaluation and cross-case comparison. The within-case evaluation will document contextual elements, assess the degree to which each of the eight interventions has achieved its short-, medium-, and long-term objectives, and investigate the reasons for positive and negative outcomes in each case. The cross-case comparison will compare the cases along several dimensions (e.g., objectives, context, method, design and implementation, and outcomes) to investigate key themes, highlight common approaches, identify lessons learned, and suggest strategic and operational implications for future Bank engagement in leadership capacity development in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

During this Global Review we will carry out field visits and construct in-depth case studies for two of the eight interventions. For the remaining six interventions where field visits will not be conducted, the within-case analysis will be based on a review of primary documents, phone interviews, and desk-based country case studies. Field visits will be conducted in Burundi and East Timor, which were chosen because they have had the longest histories of PCF- or LICUS TF-funded leadership interventions, and represent a wide range of modalities and approaches across their subset of projects. The field visits will employ semi-structured interviews, and possibly surveys, informed by the research questions provided below.

The cross-case comparison is the focal point of this review because it is more likely to provide information that has strategic and operational implications for The Bank. However, in order to conduct an accurate and useful cross-case comparison, we must first understand each intervention separately. Each intervention has different factors that influence the success of the leadership project (e.g., the political and cultural context, intervention design and implementation, and management processes). Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that each intervention was designed and implemented in a different context. While there are similarities, each intervention and its context is different enough that it is not possible to control for the wide variety of factors that influence the contribution of each intervention. As a result, the cross-case comparison will focus on common lessons learned from each case rather than comparing each case in relationship to the same leadership outcome or other dependent variable. This is one of the consequences of conducting post-hoc comparisons of predefined cases rather than other types of comparative case study or experimental research.

To better understand and compare the outcomes of each intervention, we will attempt to gather information about three general aspects of the work: 1) the impact on the individuals participating in the project (i.e., changes in knowledge, skills, attitudes, and perceptions); 2) changes at the interpersonal, institutional, or societal level; and 3) relevant information about the fit between the project and context. The first level – individual outcomes – reflects the most basic contribution of training interventions (i.e., initial reaction and learning).³⁰ The second level – interpersonal, institutional, and societal outcomes – refers to impact beyond

³⁰ Donald L. Kirkpatrick, *Evaluating Training Programs*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1998); W.K. Kellogg Foundation, *Evaluating Outcomes and Impacts: A Scan of 55 Leadership Development Programs* (Brookline: W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2002) http://www.wkcf.org/DesktopModules/WKF.00_DmaSupport/ViewDoc.aspx?fld=PDFFile&CID=148&ListID=28&ItemID=1483780&LanguageID=0 [accessed August 7, 2008]; and John T. Grove, Barry M. Kibel, and Taylor Haas, *EVALULEAD: A Guide for Shaping and Evaluating Leadership Development Programs* (Oakland: The Public Health Institute) <http://www.phi.org/pdf-library/EvaluLEAD.pdf> [accessed August 7, 2008].

that on individuals.³¹ This second level corresponds to the goals of the interventions, which usually aim to support individual change in order to effect change at the interpersonal, institutional, and societal level. The final level – contextual fit – refers to the relationship between the project and the country context. For this aspect of the review, the “contextual fit” level will attempt to gather information about the relationship between the intervention and the leadership needs and expectations of the country. This review will use these general criteria (building on literature on the evaluation of leadership and peacebuilding interventions) to propose suggested elements of a new framework for designing and evaluating leadership development interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

Confidentiality of all interviewees will be maintained and communicated through an informed consent protocol (see detailed discussion in interview section of this document). Individuals will often be more candid and honest in their responses when they know that their data will not be shared with others. While confidentiality does not guarantee candor and honesty, clarity about data treatment and uses is critical to ethical research and helps to create an environment of trust and openness. Nonetheless, the desire to document the data collection process and the desire to maintain confidentiality are often in tension. To manage this tension, each researcher/evaluator for this review will take extensive field notes, which will be summarized without attribution and maintained in the electronic archives of the World Bank's LICUS TF and PCF files.

Cross-case Analysis Rationale and Basis for Comparison

The cross-case analysis will be conducted by comparing similarities and differences between the cases in terms of several variables including but not limited to: the type of leadership objective; the participant groups; the instructional method employed; the design and implementation process; and the outcome of the activities in relation to the project's objectives. The characteristics of each of the eight leadership interventions are summarized in Table 1.

³¹ Susanna Campbell, *What is Successful Peacebuilding?* (Baltimore: Catholic Relief Services, 2007); Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play* (Derry/Londonderry: INCORE 2002); Cheyanne Church and Julie Shouldice, *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Part II: Emerging Practice & Theory* (Derry/Londonderry: INCORE 2003); Cheyanne Church and Mark M. Rogers, *Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs* (Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground, 2006); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Guidance on Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Working Draft for Application Period (Paris: OECD, 2008).

Table 1: Overview of Leadership Development Interventions

	Central African Republic - Leadership Seminar 2004	Central African Republic – 2005 Leadership Workshop	Timor-Leste – Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)	Timor-Leste – Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Timor-Leste – Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Burundi Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program	Tajikistan – Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Project #	LICUS 15	LICUS 15-b	PCF 171	PCF 258	LICUS 51	PCF 208	LICUS 52	PCF 350
Dates	08/04 – 02/05	09/05 – 06/06	08/01 – 06/02	06/04 – 01/07	11/06 – 06/08	12/02 – 07/04	01/07 – 01/09	03/07 – 04/07
Amount of Funding	\$129,380	\$123,000	\$249,993	\$250,000 (\$745,895 various donors)	\$1,078,100 (\$750,000 co-financing AusAid)	\$993,279	\$423,800 (\$200,000 Belgian TF)	\$70,000
Leadership Objective(s)	Build capacity of senior leadership to manage more effectively and carry out the short-term reforms necessary to ensure stability and continued engagement with the international community and lay the groundwork for broader leadership-building activities following the transition.	Strengthen capacity of leadership to articulate priorities and deliver on short-term goals in the context of the PRSP framework.	Enhance participants' skills and techniques as effective national leaders and managers; unite a broad range of Timorese leadership and society in building an anti-corruption strategy; and help participants acquire the tools to understand and resolve conflict in a non-political context so that they may play an important role as mediators and conflict-managers.	Build trust among urban youth groups and youth-at-risk and to engage them in policy dialogues with government and community leaders; and support young people through peer-to-peer non-formal training sessions to strengthen self-confidence and a sense of identity, and to value positive expression of cooperation and teamwork.	Build leadership capacities of state and non-state actors with a view to strengthening trust and thus an ability to work more cooperatively, more collaboratively and therefore more effectively; and enhance the communication skills and information-sharing abilities not only of individuals but of state institutions with civil society and the public more broadly.	Strengthen the ability of the Burundian Government to develop, through a participatory approach involving civil society, a vision for economic recovery as well as a strategic and socio-economic recovery plan for the transitional period that would establish the conditions for sustainable economic development.	Improve the confidence, accountability, and ultimately the effectiveness of national leaders and through them, the accountability of thematic and geographic teams.	Enhance the capacity of the Government of Tajikistan to make informed decisions on the strategic directions for development to achieve sustainable growth.
Number of Participants & Length of training	37 participants in two-day seminar	60 participants in two-day seminar	? trained in two five-day leadership retreats	75 youth for 3 day youth retreat; 20 youth for two week leadership training; 20 youth for 3 trainings of ? day multi-skill training; 137 youth trained in institutional capacity development and citizen education	36 leaders participate in six-day leadership retreat; 44 leaders participate in five-day leadership retreat; ? leaders participate in follow-up workshop; 20 people from leadership retreats receive mentoring/coaching	95 leaders participate in six-day Ngozi workshops; over half of leaders trained participated in follow-up workshops.	? leaders trained in high-level leadership retreat; 10 coaches trained in Rapid Results Approach; 30 people's awareness raised about Rapid Results Approach	19 government officials participated in 2 ½-day seminar
Participant Group(s)	Govt. & CivSoc Leadership (Current)	Govt. & CivSoc Leadership (Current)	Govt. & CivSoc Leadership (Current)	Youth & Govt. Leadership (Current and Emergent)	Govt. & CivSoc Leadership (Current and Emergent)	Govt. & CivSoc Leadership (Current and Emergent)	Govt. & CivSoc Representatives	Govt. Leadership

	Central African Republic - Leadership Seminar 2004	Central African Republic – 2005 Leadership Workshop	Timor-Leste – Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)	Timor-Leste – Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Timor-Leste – Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Burundi Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program	Tajikistan – Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Instructional Method(s)	Peer-to-Peer	Peer-to-Peer; Rapid Results Approach Exposure; Use of Rapid Results Approach in projects; Anti-corruption Exposure	Transformational leadership; Anti-corruption Exposure; Conflict Resolution Exposure; Strategy/Plan Development	Strategy/Plan Development; Youth projects supported; Multi-skill exposure; Network development; Communication/PR efforts	Transformational leadership; Conflict resolution exposure; SIM SOC; Follow-up workshops; Mentoring/coaching Development projects; Communication/PR efforts	Transformational leadership; Conflict resolution exposure; SIM SOC; Follow-up workshops; Mentoring/coaching; Development projects; Network	Peer-to-Peer; Rapid Results Method Exposure; Use of Rapid Results Method in projects; Communication/PR efforts	Peer-to-Peer; Case studies; Anti-corruption Exposure
Implementation	Bank-executed; Altered Design	Bank-executed; Steering Committee; Altered Objective	Bank-executed; Altered Design	Recipient-executed; Steering Committee; Assessments; Altered Objective; Altered Design	Bank-executed; Assessments; Altered Design	Recipient--executed; Assessments; Altered Design	Bank-executed; Steering Committee; Assessments	Bank-executed
Documented Outcome(s)	Tool exposure; Commitment to common document (Electoral Code of Conduct) ³²	Tool exposure; Progress on 2 RRA projects; Heightened interest in RRA; Commitment to common document (Principles for Achieving Results) ³³	Tool exposure; Network; Breakthrough in political process ³⁴	Tool exposure; Development of National Youth Policy; Implementation of youth projects ³⁵	Tool exposure; Network ³⁶	Tool exposure; Tool use; Breakthrough in peace process; Network ³⁷	Tool exposure; Tool use; Implementation of 11 projects; Adoption of "challenge letter"; Increased efficiency of Ministry of Education ³⁸	Tool exposure; Tool use; Improved capacity to understand strategy and policy; Important reform discussion took place prior to donor roundtable ³⁹

³² Outcomes for CAD LICUS #15 were briefly discussed in final report and in cover email. No final evaluation.

³³ Outcomes for CAD LICUS #15-b outlined in Completion Report. No final evaluation.

³⁴ Outcomes for Timor-Leste PCF #171 are unclear because there is no final report or evaluation. These outcomes were provided by interviews with project staff. There is mention in other reports (2007 #51 proposal and Sommers' baseline) of an important perceived impact of the Dean Williams training.

³⁵ Outcomes for Timor-Leste PCF #258 are unclear because of the absence of a final report or evaluation. These outcomes are taken from interim reports.

³⁶ Outcomes for Timor-Leste LICUS #51 are unclear because final evaluation and final reports are only now being prepared. These outcomes were provided by interviews with project staff.

³⁷ Outcomes for Burundi PCF #208 are based on interim reports and final evaluation by Uvin and Campbell.

³⁸ Outcomes for Burundi LICUS #52 are unclear because project is ongoing and there is thus no final report or evaluation. Outcomes listed are taken from interim reports.

³⁹ Outcomes for Tajikistan PCF #350 are taken from grant Completion Report.

The categories highlighted in Table 1 are described more fully below. For Table 2 through Table 6 the cells are shaded to indicate which objectives were intended for each intervention.

Dates

The row labeled “Dates” refers to period during which the intervention was funded by the PCF or LICUS-TF. This information is necessary to provide the context for the intervention (including the economic, political, and social landscape and its proximity to any key events).

Amount of Funding

The row labeled “funding” provides the information necessary to frame the outcomes in relation to the level of investment.

Leadership objective

The row labeled “leadership objective” describes the overall aim of the leadership project. The contribution of each project will be evaluated both in terms of its leadership objective, and the relationship between this objective and the project’s theory about the importance of this objective for the particular country at that point in time (i.e., theory of change). An overview of the leadership objectives across interventions is included as Table 2 below.

Table 2. Comparison of Leadership Objectives

Leadership Objectives	Central African Republic - Leadership Seminar 2004	Central African Republic – 2005 Leadership Workshop	Timor-Leste – Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)	Timor-Leste – Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Timor-Leste – Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Burundi Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program	Tajikistan – Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Improve capacity to deliver short-term reforms								
Improve capacity to develop effective policies and strategies								
Improve confidence of leadership								
Improve communication capacity								
Build conflict resolution and mediation capacity								
Build management capacity								
Build trust among leaders								
Build relationships among leaders								

Number of Participants and length of training

The row listing the number of participants and the length of training shows the major outputs for each project, which is critical for within-case analysis and cross-case comparison.

Participant group(s)

The row listing the participant group refers to the primary group that the intervention sought to train. This is important to know in order to understand the range of influence affected by the project (via the groups participating and their position). Examining the objectives and participant groups in tandem illuminates whether or not there is alignment between the two. The terms current and emergent refer to whether the participants were in current leadership positions or whether they were judged to be likely future leaders. Although not indicated in the table below, there was also differentiation in the time period that current leaders had been in office. In fact, half of the interventions trained government officials who had only recently been elected to office.

Table 3. Comparison of Participant Groups

Participant Groups	Central African Republic - Leadership Seminar 2004	Central African Republic - 2005 Leadership Workshop	Timor-Leste - Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)	Timor-Leste - Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Timor-Leste - Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Burundi Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program	Tajikistan - Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Government Leadership (Current)								
Government Leadership (Emergent)								
Civil Society Leadership (Current)								
Civil Society Leadership (Emergent)								
Youth Leaders								
General Government Leadership								
General Civil Society Leadership								

Instructional Method(s)

The row listing the instructional method refers to the approach used during the leadership interventions. In the cross-case comparison, the approach and outcomes of similar instructional methods will be compared. For the within-case analysis, the degree of alignment between the method, the participant groups, and the outcomes will be assessed.

Table 4. Comparison of Instructional Methods

Instructional Method	Central African Republic - Leadership Seminar 2004	Central African Republic - 2005 Leadership Workshop	Timor-Leste - Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)	Timor-Leste - Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Timor-Leste - Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Burundi Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program	Tajikistan - Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Multi-skill exposure								
Peer-to-Peer								
Rapid Results Approach								
Transformational Leadership								
Conflict Resolution Exposure								
SIMSOC								
Strategy/Plan Development								
Development Projects								
Follow-up Workshops								
Network								
Communication/ PR efforts								
Case studies								
Anti-corruption exposure								

Design and Implementation Process

The row labeled design and implementation process identifies the main characteristics of the design and implementation of each project. Comparison between the design and implementation processes of each case and across cases may provide insights about which types of results are related to which processes (including which institutions were involved and the extent of their involvement). An important aspect of the design and implementation process is determining the degree to which different stakeholders “bought-into” the design process and the implementation of the project. For example, stakeholders may have had a strong level of commitment and engagement during the design process that subsided during the implementation. Alternatively, stakeholders may have had a low level of commitment and engagement during the design process that increased during the implementation. In addition, information will be gathered about the different stakeholders’ familiarity with and understanding of the project during the initial design and throughout the implementation.

Table 5. Comparison of Design and Implementation Processes

Design and Implementation Process	Central African Republic - Leadership Seminar 2004	Central African Republic - 2005 Leadership Workshop	Timor-Leste - Capacity-Building Assistance & Development (CAD)	Timor-Leste - Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Timor-Leste - Leadership & Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Burundi Governance & Leadership Capacity Dev. Program	Tajikistan - Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Bank-executed								
Recipient executed								
Steering Committee								
Assessment Conducted								
Altered Design								
Altered Objective								

Outcome

The row labeled outcome refers to the outcomes that are articulated in the project documents or in preliminary interviews with project staff. Table 6 will be revised once we have full information about the outcomes of each project. We will frame these outcomes in terms of the general success criteria (discussed above) that we are developing for this review.

Table 6. Comparison of Outcomes

Outcome	Central African Republic - Leadership Seminar 2004	Central African Republic - 2005 Leadership Workshop	Timor-Leste - Capacity-Building Assistance and Development (CAD)	Timor-Leste - Building Leadership Capacity for Economic Development (LED)	Timor-Leste - Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal (LCCNR)	Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP)	Burundi Governance and Leadership Capacity Development Program	Tajikistan - Leadership Seminar on Strategic Directions for Development
Tool exposure								
Tool use								
Commitment to common document								
Development of a policy								
Discussion of reforms								
Completion of development projects								
Network								
Breakthrough in political process								

Research Questions

Table 7 contains revised phrasing of the Key Themes for Investigation document that accompanied the Terms of Reference for this evaluation, which have been grouped into three areas: 1) Participants and Context, 2) Design and Delivery, and 3) Impact. These questions form the basis of our investigation. During data collection we will seek and prompt for more detail related to the questions. Within each section we will seek information about the success factors of the approaches used as well as insights for future work.

Table 7. Research Questions

		How will the information be used?	How can we gather/locate the information?
PARTICIPANTS AND CONTEXT			
1.1	What was the overall challenge or opportunity that the intervention aimed to address?	Provides broader context for the intervention.	
1.2	Who was the intended audience (individuals, groups, organizations, etc.) for the intervention? What is the logic for the particular entry point/ targeted participants? What challenges were experienced accessing these audiences? What approaches worked well?	Allows us to understand outcomes in relation to audience. Provide recommendations about participant access for future work.	Content analysis of existing documentation Case study interviews
1.3	What was the process for selecting/recruiting participants? What challenges were experienced accessing this/these audience(s)? What approaches worked well? What are the recommendations for determining, recruiting, and selecting participants of leadership development interventions like this one?	Provide recommendations about participant selection/recruitment for future work.	Existing documentation Case study interviews
DESIGN AND DELIVERY			
2.1	How was the content and delivery approach design or decided? Who was involved in that process? What role did they play? What was the level of inclusion/effort? Who was responsible for implementing the project? Were they involved in the design process? Was there a M&E plan associated with the intervention? How was that developed?	Provides context. Provide recommendations about the design process and roles within the process for future work.	Existing documentation Case study interviews
2.2	What were the leadership objectives? How were the objectives developed and how do they relate to the context and problem?	Helps determine the underlying intervention logic/alignment.	Existing documentation. Case study interviews
2.3	What were the intended learning outcomes levels and content (for example, levels may include: enhanced awareness, enhanced knowledge, enhanced skills, content may include: team building, priority setting)	Provides context for other outcomes, etc... Match audience with outcomes.	Existing documentation Case study interviews
2.4	What were the temporal expectations for the outcomes (for example, short-term gains or improvements, long-term gains or improvements, systemic changes)	Provides context for other outcomes. etc. Link individual outcomes with operational outcomes	Existing documentation Case study interviews
2.5	If applicable, what approaches were used to enhance the sustainability of outcomes and transfer of learning?	Link operational outcomes with sustainable institutional outcomes (creating a chain of impact).	Existing documentation Case study interviews
2.6	To what extent did the intention of the intervention align with or feed into the Bank's emerging articulation of leadership (i.e. vision, competence, and integrity)? [NOTE: Since there is only an informal articulation of leadership	Helps provide concrete examples of connections between The Bank's emerging articulation of Leadership and	Document review Possibly case study interviews

	as a capacity parameter across the Bank, a lack of alignment does not indicate a breakdown.]	funded leadership development work in order to inform the Bank's dialogue about leadership.	
2.7	Was the original design altered during implementation? How? Why? What was the result of those changes?	Provides information helpful to determining what efforts lead to which outcomes.	Document review Case study interviews
2.7	What facilitated effective design and implementation? What were barriers to effective design and implementation? What are the recommendations for successful design and implementation of interventions like this one?	Provide recommendations about the design and implementation processes for future work.	Document review Case study interviews
IMPACT			
3.1	To what extent were outcomes achieved?	Provides information about program success.	Existing documentation Case study interviews
3.2	What were the unintended outcomes (positive and negative)?	Captures actual outcomes of the program. Enabling us to better document the chain of impact.	Existing documentation Case study interviews
3.3	What are recommendations for enhancing the impact of future programs?	Provide recommendations to enhance the impact of future work.	Existing documentation Case study interviews

Supporting Documents

Draft Timeline

Aug 8, 2008	Submit draft of Research Plan.
Aug 12, 2008	Possible phone call to clarify/solve issues related to research plan.
Aug 15, 2008	Submit finalized Research Plan.
Aug 15-31, 2008	Develop country-specific matrix and interview questions and divide up interview responsibilities.
Sept 2, 2008	Email to interviewees sent out.
Sept 3-30, 2008	Develop and begin populating outline. Conduct first round of interviews.
Late Sept, 2008	Share current status and discuss agenda for presentation and meetings in Oct with Laura. (Note: Kelly will be out of the country Sept 22-Oct 5)
October 8-10, 2008	Meetings at the World Bank in DC (Conduct face-to-face interviews, provide an overview of the review process, and discuss evaluation methods. Revise/discuss research plan, as needed, pick up travel medicines, review draft report templates)
Mid-October – Nov 15	Conduct remaining phone interviews, prepare report templates, and prepare for field visits.
Nov 16-Dec 16	Field visits to East Timor and Burundi (2 weeks at each site).
Jan 5, 2009	Submit draft of final report (at minimum an annotated outline) and draft of field notes.
Jan 16, 2009	Submit full draft of final report.
Jan 31, 2009	Submit final draft of revised report and final field notes.
Feb 2009	Presentation of findings at the World Bank in DC.

Draft Communication Plan

For the review to be maximally effective, the information gathered/created must reach and take into account the information needs of those making decisions or otherwise involved in the strategic and/or operational aspects of leadership development. To that end we recommend the following phases of communication:

Overview of the research design. We will craft a summary of the research plan for distribution prior to our meetings in DC in October 2008. We will facilitate a discussion of the research plan primarily to inform stakeholders, and to clarify intent and process. Recommended changes will be considered and incorporated as appropriate. We will contact additional people with whom we need to discuss the research plan via phone or email.

Presentation and Discussion of findings. The full reports and a summary document will be created and provided by end of January 2009. In February 2009, we will present our findings and suggestions for discussion at The Bank. We may choose to hold a small group session to discuss next steps, perhaps crafting plans for how to use the information provided in the report. We will inquire as to whether there are other individuals or groups to whom we should present or discuss the findings. The full dissemination of the report and any summary documents will be decided following the review of the report by The Bank.

Legacy Communications. We will archive the final report, our non-attribution field notes, and other documentation that would be helpful (e.g., recording of our presentation in DC, shortened versions of results, etc...).

Draft Interview Protocol

SAMPLE

OPCFC's trust fund Secretariat will provide the list of individuals associated with the eight interventions, which the researchers will supplement by snowball sampling. While the team will be able to access all four categories of interviewees for Burundi and East Timor, interviews for CAR and Tajikistan will focus on the first two categories although efforts will be made to include some individuals from the latter two categories.

<i>Category</i>	Bank Staff	Implementing Partners and Consultants	Participants	Observers
<i>Type</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LICUS/PCF Committee Members • Program Directors • Program Managers • Program Designers • Program Implementers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government Counterparts • Steering Committees • Facilitators • Speakers • Trainers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New Leaders • Old Leaders • Emerging Leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leaders not selected • Other donors supporting project • Donors who have decided not to support project
<i>Notes</i>			Our sample will be representative in terms of govt. v. civil society status, ethnicity, gender, region, class, and other selection criteria taken into account.	Snowball sampling will be particularly useful for this group.

PRE-INTERVIEW COMMUNICATIONS

Prior to establishing the interviews, an email will be sent from Alastair McKechnie, Director of Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group, to all interviewees explaining the purpose of the work and emphasizing the importance of their participation.

During the process of establishing an interview time with the interviewees, we will introduce who we are and refer to the email regarding the purpose of the interview (using language similar to that used in the email). We will send the interview questions ahead of time to allow the person to prepare for the interview (and to confirm the date and time of the interview).

INTERVIEW

At the beginning of the interview, we will give a brief reminder of who we are, the purpose of the interview, and the general interview process (i.e., the interview will last about half an hour, etc.). We will remind the participant that the information they provide during the interview is confidential and briefly describe how information will be stored, used, and communicated (i.e., through our informed consent protocol).

Informed Consent Protocol

I will take notes during this interview. Only myself and the other researcher/evaluator will have access to the notes I take in this interview. Our observations will be combined and included in our reports, but your statements will not be attributed to you or your position. You will have the right to ask me to refrain from recording something that you do not want to be written down. All information that you provide to me will be used to provide the World Bank with an assessment of the lessons that have been learned from the

leadership development projects that they have supported and to recommend possible future directions for leadership interventions.

List of Potential Interview Questions

The interviews will be semi-structured. Not all questions will be asked of all interviewees and we will ask probing and follow-up questions as appropriate. In addition, a list of specific questions will be developed for each project in relation to the information already available for the project.

Lead: I'd like to begin by asking some general questions about your work on the <insert intervention name>

- How did you become involved in the work?
- What are impressions of the motivation for the LICUS/PCF funding? What are the expectations for success?
- What was your role in the intervention? When were you involved in the work?
- What was the overall challenge or opportunity that the intervention aimed to address?
- What kind of leadership was necessary? What does "leadership" mean to you?
- Who was the intended audience (individuals, groups, organizations, etc.) for the intervention? Why was that group selected?
- What challenges were experienced accessing these audiences? What approaches worked well?
- What was the process for selecting/recruiting participants? What challenges were experienced accessing this/these audience(s)? What approaches worked well? What are the recommendations for determining, recruiting, and selecting participants of leadership development interventions like this one?
- How was the content and delivery approach design or decided (e.g., participatory, consultative)? Who was involved in that process? What role did they play? What was the level of inclusion/effort? Who was responsible for implementing the project? Were they involved in the design process? Was there a M&E plan associated with the intervention? How was that developed?
- What were the leadership objectives? How were the objectives developed and how do they relate to the context and problem?
- What specifically, was going to be different as a result of the intervention? (probe for specific examples such as enhanced awareness, enhanced knowledge, enhanced skills, content may include: team building, priority setting)
- When did you expect to see those changes? Did you think they would be enduring? (for example, short-term gains or improvements, long-term gains or improvements, systemic changes - probe for the rationale behind answers)
- If applicable, what approaches were used to enhance the sustainability of outcomes and transfer of learning? Was there program follow-up or support after the intervention? Did participants understand how to use the behaviors, skills, etc. within their context?
- Was the original design altered during implementation? How? Why? What was the result of those changes?
- What facilitated effective design and implementation? What were barriers to effective design and implementation? What are the recommendations for successful design and implementation of interventions like this one?
- To what extent were the outcomes you mentioned before achieved?
- What were the unintended outcomes (positive and negative)?
- What connections do you see between the intervention and various dimensions of leaderships such as vision, competence, and integrity? In theory or in practice.
- What are recommendations for enhancing the impact of future programs?
- Is there anyone else with whom we should speak about this initiative?

Annex J: Outcome Evaluation Frameworks

This review will develop suggested parameters for a new framework for designing and evaluating leadership development interventions in fragile and conflict-affected countries by consolidating and building on several frameworks for evaluating outcomes, a few of which are outlined below.

W.K. Kellogg Foundation's *Evaluating Outcomes and Impacts: A Scan of 55 Leadership Development Programs*⁴⁰

Individual Outcomes:


- Changes in Knowledge, Skills, Attitudes, and Perceptions
- Changes in Behavior
- Changes in Values and Beliefs
- Leadership Paths
- Relationships

Community Outcomes:

- Broadening Leadership Participation
- Increased Collaboration (connections and networking)
- Developing Future Leaders
- Policy Knowledge
- Changes in public discourse

⁴⁰ W.K. Kellogg Foundation, *Evaluating Outcomes and Impacts: A Scan of 55 Leadership Development Programs* (Brookline: W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2002)
http://www.wkcf.org/DesktopModules/WKF_00_DmaSupport/ViewDoc.aspx?fld=PDFFile&CID=148&ListID=28&ItemID=1483780&LanguageID=0 [accessed August 7, 2008].

EvaluLEAD Framework⁴¹



PARAMETERS FOR ANALYSIS


USAID/WKKF/PHI/PLP/SLI©

The EvaluLEAD methodology relies on identification and examination of four fundamental parameters, each of which is explained in more detail in this section.

- 1) **Context** refers to the purposes, assumptions, and expectations surrounding both leadership as defined by your project and the evaluation process.
- 2) **Result types**, or forms of change, are characterized as episodic, developmental, and transformative.
- 3) **Domains**, or social areas in which a leadership development program's results occur, are identified as individual, organizational, and societal/community.
- 4) **Forms of inquiry** that can be employed in a complementary manner to gauge and illuminate results are described respectively as evidential and evocative.

⁴¹ John T. Grove, Barry M. Kibel, and Taylor Haas, *EVALULEAD: A Guide for Shaping and Evaluating Leadership Development Programs* (Oakland: The Public Health Institute) <http://www.phi.org/pdf-library/EvaluLEAD.pdf> [accessed August 7, 2008].

Kirkpatrick's Levels of Learning⁴²



Adapted from Kaufman-Keller-Watkins Model⁴³

Measuring the Impact of Leadership Development

- Input – human, physical, and financial resources needed and used
- Process – The ways, means, activities, procedures, methods needed and used
- Micro – short-term results internal to the leadership development initiative
- Macro - mid-term results stemming from the leadership development initiative, but occurring within an organization, group, or community that is the larger context of the initiative
- Mega – long-range results that are connected to groups outside of the organization – clients, society (towards a shared purpose)

⁴² Donald L. Kirkpatrick, *Evaluating Training Programs*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1998).

⁴³ Kaufman, Keller and Watkins, "What works and what doesn't: evaluation beyond Kirkpatrick," *Performance and Instruction* 35, no. 2 (Dec. 1995): 8-12.

Annex K: Annotated Leadership Development Framework

The framework is based on the ADDIE instructional development model, Bloom's Taxonomy, the Organizational Elements Model, the CIPP model, and the D6 model⁴⁴. The framework, which is more fully described in the annexes, provides an overview of the phases related to leadership development interventions and is informed by decades of research from the fields of organizational development, instructional design, educational psychology, and program evaluation.

While the phases are organized in a linear fashion, progress through the phases is iterative and recursive. For example, as new information becomes available it is necessary to revisit phases to maintain integrity and alignment. Within each phase there are a wide variety of options regarding how information is gathered and documented, and who is involved in the process all of which are guided by assumptions about the process. For example, the framework may be applied with the assumption that the process will be a "learning by doing" or rapid prototyping approach in which information is gathered and used in quick succession. Alternatively, the framework can be applied with an assumption of a defined causal, or predictive, approach in which expectations are clearly articulated at the onset of the work and information is gathered to determine the legitimacy of assumptions and document impact. No matter the approach taken and the assumptions underlying that approach, the process of doing work that could be categorized into the five phases, though perhaps by other names and in different forms, is critical.

The five phases move from some form of needs assessment and goal setting, to creating a theory and a plan of action, to implementation, and gathering and using information for accountability and/or improvement purposes. There are never the resources available to do all the work that could be organized under the framework. However these key elements are necessary in order to determine and align perspectives and efforts to clarify and achieve an impact of value. Skipping or inadequately executing phases is particularly risky when working in post-conflict and fragile states for three reasons: 1) previous assumptions about the context are not likely to be accurate, 2) stakeholders are more likely to have very different beliefs and perspectives, and 3) the risk associated with missteps is greater than in more stable contexts. The framework provides a prompt for thinking about the phases of leadership development work in order to: 1) clarify and align different perspectives and needs (and to understand points of divergence); 2) articulate the connection between leadership development and the larger goal (or values); 3) ensure the tasks are logically aligned with/likely to contribute to the broader goal; 4) clarify roles and expectations; and 5) build in learning and/or actability with regard to the process and progress towards the goal. We used this framework as one of the inputs to our thinking about the evidence gathered about the eight leadership development interventions. The framework is our distillation and integration of a variety of research and theory known to be important to leadership development effectiveness and may be helpful as a tool to review interventions in order to offer suggestions for improvement prior to implementation.

The table below includes a description of tasks within that phase as well as the core questions to be addressed, the likely stakeholder groups to involve, and the processes that may be helpful to use in gathering or making sense of information. The term "problem" is used, however, that could easily be replaced with the "challenge to be addressed" or the "opportunity to be seized."

⁴⁴ Resources describing each of these inputs are included in the "Further Reading" annex.

Phase 1. Analyzing Context and Identifying Desired Goals	
Gather information about the Context	Surface explicit as well as tacit knowledge about the needs and the climate for learning and leadership.
Identify Potential Stakeholders and Gather Information	What are the influential perspectives To what extent is there a shared perspective on the situation, needs, solution, etc. What are the areas of agreement and disagreement? What are the motivations for making a change?
Identify Desired Goals	What are the larger agreed upon goals that leadership is seen as a pathway to reaching?
<p>Core Questions for Phase 1: What is the problem we are committed to solving? How does leadership development help address that problem? Is there a shared perspective about the value of leadership development and the desired "end state"? What approach to leadership development would be appropriate in this context? What are the associated risks with various courses of action? Who needs to be included in the intervention in order for it to be successful?</p> <p>Stakeholders: Funders, Designers, Intended Beneficiaries(broadly), Context Experts, Intervention staff Processes: Focus Groups, Media Scans, World Cafes, Interviews, Mapping relationships and issues Product: Synthesis of key themes and needs, statement of intended goal(s), stakeholder assumptions about leadership and leadership development.</p>	
Phase 2: Clarifying Intervention Design To Achieve Desired Goals	
Identify Focus of Change	Individuals; Groups (both intra-group and inter-group); Organizations; and/or Societies
Identify Target Groups for Change	Political leadership (existing and/or emerging leadership); Government Administration (centralized and/or decentralized); and/or Civil society (religious, community, youth, and/or non-governmental leadership in the capital or in the provinces).
Specify Content Domain	Examples include: Conflict management Communication Cultural Intelligence Influencing Strategic Planning Coaching/Mentoring Self-awareness
Articulate Types of Change	<p>Cognitive (Knowledge) - what someone knows</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theories and models <p>Behavioral (Skills) – what someone can do</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specific skills or abilities <p>Affective (Attitudinal) - how someone thinks or feels</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceptions of individuals, groups or situations, confidence and sense of responsibility

<p>Specify Levels of Change</p>	<p>Awareness – knowing that something exists or is important</p> <p>Understanding – understanding theories, models, approaches, perspectives, the steps associated with doing something, etc.</p> <p>Supported Use – applying theories, models, approaches, recognizing different perspectives, using skills, etc. with support</p> <p>Independent Use - applying theories, models, approaches, recognizing different perspectives, using skills, etc. without additional support</p> <p>Integration/Systemization – effectively adapting theories, models, approaches, perspectives, and skill sets, etc. for specific circumstances/situations</p>			
<p>Core Questions for Phase 2: What are the leadership levers we can address in order to address the problem identified? What stakeholders groups would benefit from training? Can that group be effectively identified and engaged in a leadership development effort? What content is most relevant to the problem? Do we have access to content experts? What types of changes are needed to address the problem (i.e. are changes in knowledge, skills and/or attitudes needed to address the problem)? Do we have access to the right resources to facilitate that type of change? What level of change is needed in order to have the desired impact? To reach the highest point on the continuum (Integration/Systemization) requires more time and effort than to reach the lowest point (Awareness).</p>				
<p>Less Time Needed _____ More Time Needed →</p>				
<p><i>Awareness</i></p>	<p><i>Understanding</i></p>	<p><i>Supported Use</i></p>	<p><i>Independent Use</i></p>	<p><i>Integration/ Systemization</i></p>
<p>Knowing that something exists or is important.</p>	<p>Understanding theories, models, approaches, perspectives, the steps associated with doing something, etc.</p>	<p>Applying theories, models, approaches, recognizing different perspectives, using skills, etc. with support.</p>	<p>Applying theories, models, approaches, recognizing different perspectives, using skills, etc. without additional support</p>	<p>Effectively adapting theories, models, approaches, perspectives, and skill sets, etc. for specific circumstances/ Situations</p>
<p>Stakeholders: Designers, Intended Beneficiaries, Context Experts, Content Experts. Process/Facilitation Experts</p> <p>Processes: Focus Groups, Interviews, Resource checks, Competing Commitments exercises, etc.</p> <p>Product: Storyboard, logic model, pathway map or similar document for the leadership development process.</p>				
<p>Phase 3: Detailed Design & Intervention Development</p>				
<p>Identify Participant Pool and Selection Process</p>	<p>Level of Leader (Emerging, Existing, Formal, Informal, etc.)</p> <p>Location of Leader (Government, Religious, Business, etc.)</p> <p>Process (self-selection, nomination, qualification, etc.)</p> <p>Selection Strategy (single identity selection, random sample, stratified sample, etc.)</p>			

Identify Appropriate Staff	Expertise (knowledge, process, cultural, linguistic, etc.) Experiences (facilitation ability, skills working in post-conflict settings) Reputation (unbiased, knowledgeable, experienced, etc.)
Determine Treatment of Contextual Factors	Attempt to remove contextual factors from the intervention Create a highly contextualized intervention
Determine Instructional Elements	<p>Assessing and Sharing Knowledge or Perspectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessments and case studies • Lectures • Moderated discussions • Peer-to-peer <p>Applying Knowledge or Perspectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small group work • Action learning • Simulations <p>Support</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coaching • Mentoring • Maintenance of a network
Determine Sequencing and Duration of Intervention	Should it be a single event or a series of linked events? What is the level and type of support needed? How long is needed to achieve goals (e.g. getting to the systemization and integration level requires more time than sharing knowledge)
Plan for Implementation & Evaluation	Role clarity (who does what) Decision making clarity (who makes which decisions and how?) What are markers of success How can we include critical feedback/learning loops to stay on track for our ultimate goal (not just count butts in seats)
Stakeholder Communication & Commitment Checks	Is everyone who needs to be on board with our goal and plan to get there? Are all the needed resources available?
<p>Core Questions for Phase 3: What are the options for intervention design and delivery? Can the “right” participants be identified and encouraged to participate in the intervention (what motivation do participants have for coming)? What might be the barriers and supports to learning transfer – can anything be done to reduce barriers and enlarge supports? What constraints exist (cultural and logistical)? What resources are needed to deliver the intervention? Do we have access to staff with the expertise, experience and reputation to successfully design and implement the intervention? Is the content and process of the intervention accessible and relevant to the intended participants? Does the intervention design logically link to the problem(s) and the context surfaced in phase 1? Are the intervention elements sequenced and linked in order to achieve the desired outcomes? Have all key stakeholders received information about the intervention goals, processes, etc.? Are all staff aware of their roles and responsibilities with regard to the intervention (e.g. is it clear who makes which decisions? Do staff have access to the information and resources to do their job well? Is it clear who is in charge of intervention quality?)? What indicators will be used to track progress and learn from missteps?</p> <p>Stakeholders: Designers, Intervention staff, Intended Beneficiaries, Context Experts, Process/Facilitation</p>	

<p>Experts, Funders Processes: Focus Groups, Interviews, Resource checks, Design meetings, Product: Detailed project plans and budgets, Instructional materials, Staff training materials, Participant and other stakeholder communications</p>	
Phase 4: Intervention Implementation	
Ongoing Implementation & Management	<p>Maintaining oversight (compliance) of process (fiscal, HR, logistics, etc.) Paying attention to process feedback (improvement) Responding to feedback (getting back on track – dealing with issues)</p>
<p>Core Questions for Phase 4: Is implementation unfolding as planned? What adjustments are needed to achieve the intended goals? Are stakeholder needs being met? Are participants engaged in the process? Stakeholders: Intervention staff, Intended Beneficiaries, Funders Processes: Staff meetings, After action reviews, Budget reviews Product: Detailed project plans and budgets, Revised instructional materials, Session-based evaluation data</p>	
Phase 5: Monitoring and Evaluation	
Track Inputs	Did the program go as planned? What resources were used to provide the program? What did the program cost? Who is participated in the program?
Measure Satisfaction	Did participants perceive the program to be relevant and appropriate? Did they see the program as valuable / beneficial?
Assess Knowledge/Skill Acquisition	What did participants learn as a result of the program? What values or perspectives have changed? What skills have they learned? What behaviors do they intend to changes as a result? Are they equipped to make desired changes?
Monitor Behavior/Performance Changes	To what extent and when are desired changes occurring? What is contributing to or preventing the changes?
Determine Results	What organizational/collective changes are expected to occur as a result of the program and individual changes? To what extent and when are changes occurring? What is contributing to or preventing the changes?
Track Goal Achievement	To what extent is the intervention contributing towards the overarching goal?
<p>Core Questions for Phase 5: What variances were there between the planning and the implementation? What adjustments were needed to achieve the intended goals? What is the immediate and long-term impact of the intervention? How do these changes contribute to the broad goal identified in phase 1? What has been learned about the context, content, or process that would be of benefit to others – how can that be shared? What additional steps could be taken to enhance the intervention and make further progress towards the goal? Stakeholders: Intervention staff, Intended Beneficiaries, Funders, Designers Processes: Staff meetings, After action reviews, Budget reviews, Data analysis and interpretation, Stakeholder meetings Product: Project reports, Budget documents, Evaluation reports, Stakeholder communications</p>	

Annex L: Further Reading

Grantmakers for Effective Organizations Investing in Leadership Series. Available at: <http://www.geofunders.org/leadershipdevelopment.aspx>

This series provides an overview of research about leadership development in nonprofit organizations. The first volume provides a framework for understanding nonprofit leadership development and discusses the current needs and trends. The second volume provides more detail about current leadership development practices within nonprofit organizations.

Hannum, K.M., Martineau, J.W. & Reinelt, C.R. Eds. (2006). The Handbook of Leadership Development Evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

The Handbook is a comprehensive resource filled with examples, tools, and the most innovative models and approaches designed to evaluate leadership development in a variety of settings. It will help you answer the most common questions about leadership development efforts, including: What difference does leadership development make? What development and support strategies work best to enhance leadership? Is the time and money spent on leadership development worthwhile? What outcomes can be expected from leadership development? How can leadership development efforts be sustained? This groundbreaking book—which brings together a distinguished list of contributors who share their knowledge and expertise about this important field—will help practitioners and researchers lay a foundation for the open exchange of ideas and put in place the process of application, adaptation, and subsequent learning of leadership development evaluation.

Hughes, R., Ginnett, R. & Curphy, G. (2005). Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience. 5th Edition.

Leadership is written for the general student to serve as a stand-alone introduction to the subject of leadership. The text consists of 13 chapters and a final section on Basic and Advanced Leadership Skills. Authors Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy have drawn upon three different types of literature: empirical studies; interesting anecdotes, stories and findings; and leadership skills to create a text that is personally relevant, interesting and scholarly. The authors' unique quest for a careful balancing act of leadership materials help students apply theory and research to their real-life experiences.

Kidd, T. & Song, H. (2007). Handbook of Research on Instructional Systems and Technology

There is substantial effort and research within various disciplines to tackle the current issues and trends in instructional systems and technology that deal with the improvement of computer- and technology-assisted learning settings and environments, online and distance education, technology and cognition, as well as the multicultural and cross-cultural aspects of instructional technology and learning. The Handbook of Research on Instructional Systems and Technology addresses these issues by providing information on the different styles of instructional design methodologies, tips, and strategies on how to use technology to facilitate active learning as well as techniques to help faculty and researchers develop online instructional and teaching materials. This Handbook of Research enables libraries to provide a foundational reference to meet the information needs of researchers, educators, practitioners, administrators, and all other stakeholders in the context of instructional systems and technology.

McCauley, C.D. & Van Velsor, E. (2004). Handbook of Leadership Development. 2nd Edition.

The Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) is the world's largest institution devoted exclusively to leadership research and education. For more than three decades, CCL has studied and trained hundreds of thousands

of executives and worked with them to create practical models, tools, and publications for the development of effective leaders and leadership. This second edition of The Center for Creative Leadership Handbook of Leadership Development brings together the wealth of practical knowledge that CCL has gained from this experience. It explores the essence of leadership development, reveals how individuals can effectively enhance their leadership skills, and demonstrates what organizations can do to help build leaders and leadership capacity. The book also includes a companion CD-ROM that contains a library of classic CCL publications for practicing leaders.

Northouse, P.G. (2008). Introduction to Leadership: Concepts and Practice.

Offering a straightforward introduction to the basic principles of leadership, Peter G. Northouse provides readers with practical strategies for becoming better leaders. An applied text by the author of the best-seller Leadership: Theory and Practice, this new text provides the much needed "how-to" component for students in leadership courses. Three interactive components in every chapter-self-assessment questionnaires, observational exercises, and reflection and action worksheets-get readers actively involved in applying leadership concepts to their own lives. Grounded in leadership theory, yet accessible and reader-friendly, this book covers a fundamental aspect of leadership in each chapter and illustrates its application in real leadership situations. A final chapter discusses the key topic of ethics in leadership.

Operations Policy and Country Services. (2005) Fragile States: Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies.

Available at:
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/STRATEGIES/EXTLICUS/0,,contentMDK:21392462~pagePK:64171531~piPK:64171507~theSitePK:511778,00.html>.

Romiszowski, A. (1984). Designing Instructional Systems: Decision Making in Course Planning and Curriculum Design

Deals with the major areas of decision making that face the instructional designer at the beginning of a project; establishing the needs and developing the objectives of a curriculum, and producing detailed plans for the structure, methods and evaluation system to be used. The book establishes basic principles from an analysis of current theory and practice. The author complements this with practical advice, presenting useful techniques for analyzing problems, establishing needs and selecting from alternatives. This is a comprehensive handbook for decision making in course planning and instructional design.

Annex M: Consultant Biographic Information

Susanna P. Campbell

Susanna Campbell is currently completing her dissertation entitled *Organizational Barriers to Peace* with The Fletcher School, Tufts University. She is a Research Fellow with the Centre on Conflict, Development, and Peacebuilding at The Graduate Institute in Geneva and a United States Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Peace Dissertation (2008-2009). She has been studying the capacity of the international intervention to prevent violent conflict and build peace for the past twelve years, including with: the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 1996-1999); the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) (London/Kenya, 1999-2000); UNICEF Burundi (2000-2002). As an independent consultant since 2003, she has authored studies on conflict prevention and peacebuilding for the International Crisis Group, International Alert, the World Bank Post-Conflict Fund, the National Defense University, Catholic Relief Services, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the World Bank Fragile and Conflict-Affected States Group.

Selected Publications:

- Uvin, Peter and Susanna P. Campbell (2009), "The Burundi Leadership Training Program," in Michael S. Lund and Howard Wolpe eds., *Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States*, Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, *forthcoming*.
- Campbell, Susanna P. (2008), "When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success," *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development* 4, no. 2:20-32.
- Campbell, Susanna P. (2008), "(Dis)integration, Incoherence and Complexity in UN Post-conflict Interventions," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4:556-569.
- Campbell, Susanna P. and Anja Kaspersen (2008), "Confronting Integration Barriers," *International Peacekeeping* 15, no. 4:470-485.
- Campbell, Susanna P., Anja Kaspersen, and Erin Weir (2007), *Integrated Missions Revisited: Synthesis of Findings* (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
- "Institutional Capacity Building for Conflict Sensitivity" (2004), in the *Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack* (London: International Alert, Saferworld and FEWER).
- A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi* (2003), International Crisis Group Africa Report No. 57.
- Rubin, Barnett with Susanna P. Campbell (1998), "Introduction: Experiences in Prevention," in *Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund/ Council on Foreign Relations) p. 1-21.

Kelly M. Hannum

Kelly Hannum earned a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Greensboro in Educational Research, Measurement, and Evaluation. She has been on faculty at the Center for Creative Leadership for over a decade. She focuses on the evaluation of educational programs as well as understanding and developing leadership across cultures. In 2008 she received the American Evaluation Association's Marcia Guttentag Award. She has been an active member of the Leadership Learning Community Board since 2007.

Selected Publications:

- Ernst, C.T., Hannum, K.M., & Ruderman, M.N. (in press). Developing Intergroup Leadership. In The Handbook of Leadership Development. Eds. McCauley, C.D., Van Velsor, E., & Ruderman, M.N. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Hannum, K.M. & Glover, S.L. (in press). Respect. In Political and Civic Leadership. Ed. R.A. Couto. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hannum, K.M. & Craig, S.B. Eds. (forthcoming) *Leadership Quarterly Special Issue: The Evaluation of Leadership Development*.
- Hannum, K.M., & Martineau, J.W. (2008). Evaluating the Impact of Leadership Development. San Francisco. Pfeiffer.
- Kulas, J. T. & Hannum, K.M. (2007). Investigation of 360-Degree Instrumentation Effects: Application of the RASCH Rating Scale Model, *Journal of Applied Measurement*. 8(4).1-14.
- Hannum, K.M. (2007). Measurement equivalence of 360-degree assessment data: Are different raters rating the same constructs? *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*. 15(3).293-301.
- Hannum, K.M., Martineau, J.W. & Reinelt, C.R. Eds.. (2006). The Handbook of Leadership Development Evaluation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Ruderman, M., Hannum, K.M., Leslie, J.B. & Steed, J. (2004). Making the Connection: Leadership Skills and Emotional Intelligence. In CCL Guide to Leadership in Action: How Managers and Organizations Can Improve the Practice of Leadership Eds. M. Wilcox & S. Rush. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Hannum, K.M. (2004). Choosing the Right Methods for Evaluation. *Leadership in Action*.23(6).
- Penny, J.A. & Hannum, K.M. (2001). Calculating Confidence Intervals for Multisource Feedback Reports. Technical Report. Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership.
- Hannum, K.M. & Miller, H. (2000) Evaluation in North America. In Cross-Cultural Evaluation: An International Annotated Bibliography Eds. C. Russon & K. Russon. New York, NY. Kluwer Academic Press.