

TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE:
DYNAMIC TENSIONS BETWEEN STATE-BUILDING AND PEACE-BUILDING

REPORT ON 9/22/08 SEMINAR DISCUSSIONS

This seminar, part of the World Bank's Headline Seminar and Research Series, was organized to help inform thinking within the Bank, and in the international community, as to the most effective approaches for balancing the complementary aims of state building and peace building in fragile and conflict-affected countries. As a critical source of ideas for the Bank's corporate strategy on Fragility and Conflict, this debate among distinguished experts was intended to provide insights to strengthen policy and operations as well as to reveal areas of inquiry that could be pursued through future research. The seminar agenda and list of invited speakers are annexed to this report. Other participants who contributed their views at the seminar came from a wide range of regional experience and professional backgrounds.

Development, state- and nation building

Discussing how the international development community might more effectively contribute to state- and/or nation building, seminar participants distinguished nation building from state building.

Nation building—formation of a national identity through creating a common culture, language, and mythology—is a process that a country must undertake largely for itself, in particular using the education system and other means of broad-based communication to create common symbols and cultural reference points. Experiences in Revolutionary France and Meiji Restoration Japan—as well as Tanzania and India, with their high degree of ethnic and religious differences—emphasize that national identities are socially constructed and can take generations or massive concentrated efforts to achieve. Some participants pointed to rapid improvements in perceived levels of corruption in Baltic and Arab Gulf states, as measured by Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index*, as evidence that not all nation-building processes take a very long time. A speaker also noted that in some of the Arab states after WWII, strong nations emerged, building institutions and national identities without handholding by the international community. All seemed to agree that ***the international community must be sensitive to the need for nation building and aware that local elites must take on this responsibility***. Some participants emphasized that a shared sense of nationhood is needed for accountable, efficient governance. They argued that because this shared sense takes time to achieve, the international community should abandon its “transitional” mindset in conflict-affected countries and prepare at the outset for long-lasting engagement.

State building—creating durable national institutions and bureaucracies to carry out the functions of the state—can be supported directly by outside parties. All participants agreed that state building has a strong political content, and that outsiders seeking to assist the process must understand local vested interests and their sources of economic rents.

Time horizons

Security is key to state building and state building is key to security. Discussing the goals and timeframes for international involvement, participants noted that the immediate goal of international intervention in conflict countries is simply to make them stable enough for normal economic and political activity. How to achieve stability depends on the specific situation, but always depends on a sound understanding of local culture, aspirations, and power relations. The medium- and longer-term goal of achieving a sustainable peace through economic and political transformation calls for a functioning state. International military and development operations thus need to go hand in hand over the initial five to ten years, and sometimes longer.

Speakers expressed different views about how the task for the development community evolves over time. One emphasized that “Post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction is not primarily making poor states rich or even authoritarian states democratic. It’s about making violent states peaceful. That’s why the international community sends troops in.” He pointed to the spontaneous growth of commerce that usually takes place after a conflict ceases: “Whether there’s any assistance or not, people stop killing each other and go back to work and you get economic growth.” Early on, development agencies have little if any contribution to make: “Economic and political transformation may be the objective of a longer-term exercise which is called development, but that’s not why the international community will have intervened militarily in the first place.”

An alternative and, it seemed, more widely shared view was that the development community needs to be involved right from the start of an international intervention, with the goal of helping to build an environment conducive to nation building and sustainable economic development. Several participants cautioned against seeing the establishment of peace and the building of the state as a linear process (“*you* will hand over a stable situation, then *we* will start helping with development”). They emphasized that often the peace process itself is not linear, and also that by the time a political situation is stabilized, power relationships will have re-solidified, and the changes entailed in development will be harder to achieve. ***When power relationships are still in flux, when government structures are not yet stabilized, is when development practitioners should seize opportunities—which are often fragile and very short-lived.*** Aid agencies need to think of practical ways to operationalize this. (As first steps, discussed further below, they need to be present before a peace settlement is negotiated and they need to understand the dynamics of the conflict and the motivations of its actors.)

It seemed to be broadly agreed that the international community assisting a conflict-affected country needs to plan for quick wins while also taking a longer-term view. Though a long time is needed to undo the effects of a war economy and a lack of national identity, “if you do not have deliverables in the next two or three years following the end of a conflict, the odds of a resumption of violence are very, very high.” Goals to be met during the two to three years after the conflict ceases should both promote security and support initial steps toward building well-conceived state institutions. Meanwhile, the aid community should seek to define its longer-term goals for assisting the country’s political

progress and economic gains, and the notional resource commitments that might underpin those goals over at least a ten-year horizon. Though the resources would not all be made available upfront, *the point is to have a shared idea of the country's desired development path and to signal to stakeholders that the peace and development process will be sustained.* (For further discussion of this idea, see "Looking Ahead" section below.)

Shared responsibility for core state functions

Many fragile states will lack the resources to develop locally owned institutions with the capacity to deliver core state functions. Hence it was suggested that some type of long-term shared sovereignty with the international community may be appropriate. Under such a model the sovereign functions of the state are clearly delineated, with some retained by local bodies and others devolved on to the international community for an agreed period.

Several participants felt that a model of co-production with the international community works best in post-conflict states. In Liberia, for example, the Governance Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) has worked successfully with the Treasury under such a model. An international organization working with a nation state has been a successful model in Sierra Leone, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Not every fragile state wants to share sovereignty. Speakers observed that a backlash can emerge against a new government that agrees to do so, as happened in Timor Leste, especially if the international community seems to be "in the driver's seat." And *country authorities may prefer to outsource to the private sector, rather than the international community*, core government services such as customs administration as well as strategic activities such as electric power supply or port management. Other options might be to promote a public-private, state-business, cooperative arrangement at every level of project design, financing, implementation, and monitoring, to develop free business zones like those emerging in Vietnam, in Djibouti, and some other parts of Africa. Such approaches can get things done and help to preserve political stability in countries with seemingly very little history of institution building and almost zero sense of nationhood.

Building state functions, institutions, and capacity

State-building efforts need to focus on the development of accountable institutions, and in particular on assuring an inclusive political system and a civil service whose staffing is based on merit. Many speakers emphasized that assistance for state building requires a longer-term and more integrated perspective than the individual project planning horizons that are common in the aid community.

All participants acknowledged the important role that aid can play in helping build merit-based institutions that are run using modern management principles. *Several speakers stressed the importance not only of support for higher education to produce graduates with suitable skills, but also of making the civil service attractive to competent people, and of measures to ensure the country's police are committed to national, rather than ethnic or tribal, goals.* There is a tension between achieving merit-based state services

and the political desires of parties to reward their supporters and their constituencies. To maintain merit-based institutions calls for merit-based appointments, effective pay scales, and good leadership. The discussions made clear the significant difference between the technical capacity to operate the state and the actual exercise of governance—and that “without the right kind of leadership within [government], reform attempts go nowhere.”

The actors and networks that thrived during war are critically important when it comes to designing development programs and targeting development interventions. Often, as happened in Liberia, a country’s new administration must contend with ex-combatants who are elected to government and act as spoilers within the state. Early in a peace process, the development community should look at who are potential reformers and at the incentives for reform, and at how to get the system to identify them and to cope with the risks inherent in doing new things.

It is vital to produce stakeholders in the new rules of the game. A good long-term way the development community can support this effort is through education, including investment in universities. In the shorter term, speakers argued, it may fall to the development community to bring a group of stakeholders together, co-opting different groups and giving them incentives to compete in more acceptable ways than previously.

Part of the discussion focused on the need for the international community to help identify the core functions of government, which are prerequisites for others. Agreeing on a clear view of what are core institutions and functions helps with the needed sequencing of aid for capacity building. Public finance and its core building blocks are usually key to the rest of the system, not only because the government costs money to run but also because stakeholders are ultimately created through resource distribution. Tanzania and Uganda, helped by the World Bank, built out from budget processes to create other parts of government. In Afghanistan, early discussions with the donor community missed the opportunity to decide on what should be the government’s core functions and what should be the role of the private sector; part of the result was that the economy became heavily criminalized.

Community-driven reconstruction and development have great potential in some circumstances, as shown by the Afghan National Solidarity Program. To succeed, a participant noted, communities need to be recognized as an independent sector, next to government and the private sector, and a segment of central government needs to be sufficiently developed to work with them, devolving decision making rights and helping leverage their resources.

To assist state-building efforts effectively, development agencies need to be well informed. Speakers urged them to obtain sound analyses of the political economy of the conflict, including the grievances that fuel it and the resources that sustain it, though they should not themselves get involved in the politics of the situation. Sub-conflicts too need to be understood. Fairness is crucial; especially in conflicts where one side has been in control, the underdog is often romanticized and gets too much sympathy. *Not only security but aid agencies need to “keep continuously abreast of changes in the*

country's political power structure", recognizing that because power is constantly shifting, analysis quickly becomes out of date. Neither embassies nor academic researchers typically produce what is needed here, but some NGOs have good in-house capacity. Some participants advised international agencies to adopt more of a network approach to information gathering on fragile/conflict states, by funding in-depth analyses of a conflict and its causes and roots on an ongoing basis and disseminating the reports as widely as possible; this would help the international community as a whole to act on the basis of common assessments.

Speakers highlighted some state building and governance problems that cannot be solved by the international community. Examples include (a) where elites are invested in rents and privileges and the international community cannot buy them out; or (b) where tradeoffs must be drawn between desirable goals such as quick delivery of services and local ownership (faster action with less buy-in may be desirable for certain reasons, but has less sustainable results than slower action based on a broad social consensus)—the country's authorities themselves need to make these decisions. In particular, participants emphasized, national budgeting is a social and political, not a technical, process, and as a central instrument of policy, the allocation of budget resources needs to be prioritized by the country's cabinet.

Aid modalities and state capacity

Some speakers thought that usually in fragile states more aid is better than less, even if aid is inefficiently used. But others stressed that a large influx of aid can be counterproductive, by draining the attention of ministry staff away from key tasks—and that having technical assistance from a few key experts, each making a big difference in a particular ministry or sector, is often preferable. The right choice would clearly depend on the context. (In Afghanistan, for example, the work burden associated with a rapid influx of donor money and project activity deflected the new government's attention from the core goal of building up the capacity of central government ministries.)

In post-conflict countries, absorptive capacity is often a bigger problem than aid availability. Participants noted that it helps if members of government know how to work the aid system, for example to request assistance from individuals with specific sets of skills and to know what type of aid to ask for. Without such knowledge, they tend to ask for cash, which often is not efficiently absorbed.

One speaker, arguing the need to foster local ownership and resource flows if development is to be sustained, stressed that “less is really much more”: relatively small amounts of financial aid and technical assistance, accompanied by acceptance of some corruption, mismanagement, and improvisation, are more effective in the long run than providing large resource flows accompanied by demands for full transparency and the rule of law.

Further, small investments of technical assistance in “getting the design right”, backed by financial guarantees, can stimulate the private sector to produce tangible development benefits, said one participant. For example, a guarantee of US\$1 million for Afghanistan

from the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation paved the way for one billion dollars of private investment in telecoms; the country now has more than five million telephones.

So that local actors understand the rules of the game, a participant argued, international agencies working in conflict-affected countries need an early dialogue with country authorities that clarifies the role of aid and the responsibilities and resources needed to carry out this role. If the aid community is a referee, it should define and level the playing field. Or is it a player? A catalyst? A co-producer? The context will determine which role is appropriate.

Parallel bureaucracies/project management units (PMUs) are often needed in countries with low capacity, and both aid agencies and countries themselves have huge incentives to use them. But, as documented over four decades of aid literature, they tend to suck away core talent from government and to drain the national budget, undermining capacity building. This often happens, unregulated, with multiple aid agencies simultaneously. Technical assistance for the mainstream civil service is one way to address the problem of low capacity, but the trained people then tend to move into the PMUs, where they can earn more money. Some participants advocated using national legislation to control salaries in PMUs.

Despite the 2005 Paris Declaration, speakers said, donor activities still lack harmonization and alignment. Individual donors have tried to minimize their burden in conflict-affected countries by choosing small discrete projects that are highly likely to succeed, but may not be what the new government most wants or the country most needs. And the demands of adequately coordinating so many small activities far outrun the capacity of a weak state. Citing the post World War II Marshall Plan, one speaker argued that using a national-level strategy for aid, that brings together a network of national and international actors, would be a more productive way to build state capacity in post-conflict countries than using the project-based approach. It seemed to be broadly agreed that *post-conflict countries would benefit from national-level programs to coordinate development aid*, especially in education and health.

Many participants commented that the aid community moves too slowly and inflexibly, and for some, this was the most fundamental criticism of aid to fragile states. Practitioners on both the security and the development sides stressed that big opportunities arise and disappear very quickly; they stressed the importance of recognizing and seizing the moment. Sometimes, it was noted, a key reformer is discredited or destroyed, because the aid community has not provided the needed resources soon enough for him/her to deliver promised changes.

Other points about the way the development community works:

- *Contracting*. Overreliance on contractors, and especially an assumption that competition exists where there is actually little or none. Early in a fragile state's development process, some participants felt, local procurement rules would be

more suitable than international ones. And having a pre-approved list of contractors would help to avoid long delays in contracting.

- *Technical assistance (TA)*. Failure to customize technical assistance to the country's conditions results in a lot of waste. TA should build, not bypass, local institutions. Many commentators stressed that the quality of TA is more important than quantity. To provide good TA, technical specialists need to know how government functions. TA providers' high pay is a big problem, partly because it leads competent civil servants to seek to earn as much as the TA providers, pulling them into PMUs or international agencies and breaking their identification with the nation itself. As one speaker commented, "nation-building requires people to identify with state-building as a career."
- *Insufficiently country-specific knowledge and structures*. Aid tends to use a Fordist model: "You can have any car you like so long as it's black." By contrast, the Ottoman Empire allocated state functions based on locally defined rules of the game, and did not undermine the foundations of local social organization in the countries it ruled; hence its authority tended to be perceived as legitimate. A speaker noted that for today's development agencies to practice such an art of the contextual would require big changes in their current culture, rules, and people.

What about whole-of-government approaches? Should all bilateral development aid programs in fragile states adopt such an approach? Some participants' experiences suggested that despite its many advantages when applied in peaceful states, a whole-of-government approach poses a challenge for bilateral development agencies in fragile states. This is partly because the military branch of government has much greater resources and moves much faster than they do, and partly because the more centralized decision making that a whole-of-government approach requires within the donor government makes international coordination on the ground more difficult than it otherwise would be.

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) which the US has been using in Afghanistan, are one way of integrating military and civilian functions. Some speakers mentioned the advantages of PRTs as a temporary measure, as a means of responding quickly to local communities' demands for an international presence, and, perhaps, retaining hearts and minds in areas vulnerable to being re-taken by hostile forces. But most participants seemed to agree that embedding aid workers in a military setting risks getting most of the fundamentals wrong: it puts the military in the driver's seat, it is not at all cost-effective, and it fragments the aid effort and cuts it off from the national partners.

Speakers repeatedly mentioned that, in aid to fragile states, second-best solutions are often the only ones. Pragmatism, mixed arrangements, and flexible approaches that take into account political realities on the ground get better results than trying to be purist or applying simply technically-driven solutions.

Role of development agencies in DDR and SSR programs

Nowadays the security and development agendas in fragile states are usually similarly motivated, and usually mandated and funded by the international community. In

principle, said one speaker, the agendas need to be blended. Some speakers warned, though, about the risks of compromising the development agenda and the development community itself in ventures where the military is in the driver's seat. But participants seemed to agree that in any country emerging from conflict a first priority is to reduce the number of soldiers, increase the number of police, and improve the professionalism of both forces.

Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs need strategic leadership and have big fiscal implications. In countries with extensive militarization, said one participant, DDR programs cannot handle everyone who is armed. So ***a good set of minimum goals is to take away all the crew-served weapons (mortars, etc) and to break up the structures in which the combatants have been organized, so that after six months the ex-combatants cannot overthrow the government even if they become criminalized.*** But often even those goals are not met.

Citing many examples, speakers widely agreed that although DDR should be where the development and security communities and their interests intersect, too often one agency does the DD and another does the R, and too often the R is done poorly, so that ex-combatants become criminalized.

Some participants cautioned that expectations should be kept low for reintegration programs, especially where unemployment is already high. Some advocated paying more attention to *who* are being reintegrated, so as to better match the country's development needs with the ex-soldiers' existing skill sets and preferences. But one noted that ex-combatants in many settings have rejected vocational training altogether, feeling that they should simply be given things. Another suggested that symbolism and the involvement of communities potentially play key roles in DDR, and that experience with displaced people in China and India holds useful lessons for how ex-combatants can bring value to their villages. (When the Chinese displace somebody, he said, they assign them a voucher that sends them to an enterprise or a village; the vouchers have come to be seen as very valuable, and enterprises compete to employ people who hold them. India never did this, leaving many displaced people feeling like outcasts.) A general recommendation was to try for better coordination among the stakeholders in DDR efforts and not to lose sight of long-term goals and commitments, say up to a ten-year planning horizon. Kosovo's approach, turning ex-combatants into the Kosovo Protection Corps—an unarmed, civil, disaster relief force that continues indefinitely to be paid—was cited as a good long-lasting example.

Security sector reform (SSR) is an important basis for building the core capacity of the state. For much of its functioning, the emerging state depends on enforcement capacity (e.g. for taxation, payment of customs duties, respect of property rights, or maintenance of safe passage along transport corridors), so it needs accountable security forces and an effective judicial system. SSR is a key part of the discussion in a peace process, because it influences who has guns and controls the situation. Speakers noted that "Any reform of the security sector is a political undertaking from beginning to end", in the size and definition of the program, and the recruitment of people into the program. But they felt

that *development actors such as the World Bank should contribute to technical aspects of such reforms, including the fiscal implications and the way in which payments, particularly salaries, are made.*

Speakers noted that by now the international community knows quite a lot about what works and doesn't in security sector reform. They mentioned the following lessons:

- National structures should carry the burden of the political choices that are to be made, and the Finance Ministry must participate in these decisions. For example, in Afghanistan under one rejected proposal for army reform, 80 percent of the national revenue over four years would have been needed to operate and maintain the reformed force.
- Do not ignore the political and administrative structure of the security sector. In Afghanistan, Haiti, and Timor Leste, for example, the reform of the military dealt with the ministry of defense itself, and was more successful than the reform of the police, which dealt only with the police and not with the parent ministries of the interior, and quickly broke down. "If its old leadership remains the same, a reformed agency will rot from the head." In Bosnia and Haiti, efforts are now being made to reform the whole judicial system and to focus on the whole political context of security sector reform, recognizing that judicial reform has important symbolic, as well as practical, value.
- The success of a police reform depends much more on *who* has guns than on technical training and rules about how guns should be used.
- Do not neglect the prison system; if no one can be imprisoned for breaking the law, this undermines the effort to improve security.
- Arrangements for paying soldiers and police officers can be crucial. Systems are needed to pay individuals themselves; lump sums paid to their commanders may go astray, endangering the sustainability of agreements reached.

Role of development agencies in peace negotiations

Some participants thought development agencies should be directly involved in peace negotiations; others thought they should not.¹ But all seemed to feel that it was beneficial to have development agencies if not at the table then "in the back room" at negotiations and in the lead-up to negotiations. In particular, said one participant, since most of the contentious issues in a conflict are economic, and contestants are economically motivated, part of aid agencies' role is to ensure that the economic/benefit sharing aspects of conflict resolution get enough attention for a resolution to be sustainable. Further, providing information on the fiscal aspects of a proposed peace process is important to avoid expensive promises being made that may not be able to be honored later. As well as providing inputs, development agencies learn much vital information from back-room engagement, for example about the grievances that led to the conflict, the nature of the protagonists, and which are the most contentious issues under discussion.

¹ Its Articles of Agreement prevent the World Bank from interfering in the "political affairs" of its member countries.

Some felt that having the development community at the table was a risk; it would create the illusion that a peace negotiation is a technical negotiation about development, whereas it is actually a discussion about power. One participant took the view that while the development community is inherently conservative, often what is needed is a leap of faith, with provisions that are critical to the outcome but difficult to work through. (In Nepal in 2006, for example, European Union donors were urging the country's Maoists and Nepali civil society organizations to take what they could get while the going was good; following their advice would have produced a much less radical and desirable solution than the actual one.) All participants seemed to agree that the development community should stay out of peace negotiations in circumstances where it has to take sides, or where the parties perceive that its involvement is favoring one side over another or is an effort to co-opt a party into a lesser political outcome than it might otherwise get.

Most participants seemed to believe that development agencies should engage in a conflict-affected state before a peace agreement is concluded. They should do preparatory work so that even if the negotiation fails they will have the capacity on-site for when peace is later agreed. They should establish and maintain a dialogue with sector authorities, receiving constant information from them and giving their views on economic issues important to the population and the conflict. They will need to be ready with just-in-time advice to negotiators about fiscal aspects of the peace process, including those of possible DDR and SSR programs, about options for clearing the country's prior debts, about the feasibility of some basic infrastructure projects (Bosnia, for example, could make decisions on basic infrastructure very rapidly because the World Bank had already done the needed feasibility studies), and about the basic arrangements that could be used for contracting.

Handling security challenges to aid operations

How can development practitioners deploy under hostilities? Participants generally felt that (a) where development agencies and their workers are themselves targets, they need to stay away, even though the development effort then becomes hostage to the security situation; (b) where they are not targets, there is no clear yardstick for advice, but they should not always wait for clear security or stability to be established, because by then power relationships will have solidified, leaving them few or no opportunities for influence.

One speaker with extensive practical experience pointed out that to allow aid operations to proceed, the key issue is not the achievement of peace but simply the imposition of order. Still-conflicting parties may agree to an imposition of order, with certain consequences including for human rights, if the international authorities are pragmatic and clear about this.

What should be done to provide security for aid efforts, or to start reconstruction at the grassroots level, in conflict zones? (For example, in Iraq or Beirut, the World Bank has remote ways of working but these are not very efficient; the difficulty it faces is with access to sites and clients.) Asked whether aid workers should be supported by armed guards, participants had no universal answer. Some felt that while in cases of extreme

danger, the only approach may be to embed aid workers in a military setting (for example in PRTs), but that this is not normally advisable, for the reasons mentioned earlier. For international interventions, participants favored the notion of having civilian leadership at the theater level, using the military and police as the tools rather than in decision-making roles.

One participant emphasized that aid agencies often give too little thought to arrangements for assuring the safety of their national staff.

Looking ahead

Two main recommendations emerging from the discussion were for the international community to make longer-term commitments and to explore the use of a more strategic, coordinated approach to assisting individual fragile states.

Longer-term commitments and the limits of ownership. Not every newly stable state wants to guard its sovereignty and many may benefit from a lengthy period of shared sovereignty with the international community. Rather than always seeking to hand over responsibilities quickly to national authorities, perhaps international agencies should make a credible commitment to continue performing certain critical governance functions over a long period. For the international community to be able to make such a commitment may call for changes in the normative and legal structure in which it operates.

At the least, the international community assisting a fragile state should seek to have a clear idea of what the country's development path will be, and should define its assistance goals, together with a notion of the associated resource commitments, over a longer horizon than has been customary—of at least ten years. Neither the Board of the World Bank nor the UN Security Council should be asked to make such long-term commitments formally. But having an agreed perspective and set of benchmarks over a long-term horizon would facilitate the commitment of donors and clarify incentives for local actors, making it easier to gather support for development initiatives and deliver on political promises.

A unified strategy for aid in individual fragile states? Though traditional-style reconstruction projects are still needed in infrastructure, the widespread use of project-based approaches to aid often makes for poor coordination and poor investment choices in weak states. Countries that have very limited capacity may benefit from the use of a unified strategic plan for coordinating their economic aid. One advantage of having such a unified strategy is that it lengthens the planning horizon between governments and donors to four-five years. Also, bilateral donors might find that taking part in a unified strategy made their operations and decision making easier.

There is no institutional mechanism for achieving a more strategic allocation of aid, and the UN and World Bank have no such mandate. Perhaps the key international institutions should integrate their approaches for the purpose of coordinating economic aid to conflict-affected countries. Could this idea be tested, initially, in a country where major

aid donors have a strong interest in achieving sustainable peace and development? What incentives would be needed for the different agencies to coordinate their activities within a single program? Where would the leadership within the UN lie? Since to agree on and implement a unified aid strategy would probably require a single manager or agency to be in charge, perhaps the effort should have a UN head and a World Bank deputy. Should a new UN Deputy Secretary-General post be created for this purpose?

The World Bank will explore these and the other provocative ideas that emerged from the seminar to see where strategic approaches might be adapted and where additional research and analysis is needed.

HEADLINE SEMINAR SERIES
“Transition from Conflict to Peace:
Dynamic Tensions Between State-building and Peace-building”
September 22, 2008
World Bank Headquarters, Washington, DC

Agenda

- 8:30 – 9:00 **Breakfast and Registration**
- 9:00 – 9:15 **Welcome by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Managing Director, World Bank**
- 9:15 – 10:45 **Session 1: Development, State and Nation-building**
Main question: How can, and to what extent should, the international development community more effectively contribute to state- and/or nation-building?
Moderator: *Jeffrey Gutman*, Vice President, Operational Policy and Country Services, World Bank
Presenter: *Francis Fukuyama*, Professor, Paul Nitze School of International Affairs, Johns Hopkins University
Discussant: *James Dobbins*, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation
- 10:45 - 11:00 **Coffee break**
- 11:00 – 12:30 **Session 2: State Functions, Institutions and Capacity**
Main question: What is the optimal scope and timing for development implementation in fragile and conflict-affected states?
Moderator: *James Adams*, Vice President, East Asia and the Pacific Region, World Bank
Presenter: *Ashraf Ghani*, Chairman, Institute for State Effectiveness
Discussant: *Tarik Yousuf*, Dean, Dubai School of Government
- 12:30 – 2:00 Lunch for Invited Guests Only (World Bank Private Dining Room)
- 2:00 – 3:30 **Session 3: Peace-building and Development**
Main question: Should development practitioners be involved in peace processes and engaged in unstable environments? If so, when?
Moderator: *Joseph Saba*, Director, Strategic Cooperation, Middle East and North Africa Region, World Bank
Presenter: *Jean-Marie Guéhenno*, Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
Discussant: *Sidney Jones*, South-East Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group
- 3:30 - 3:45 **Coffee**
- 3:45 – 4:15 **Wrap-up and Next Steps**
Moderator: *Jeffrey Gutman*, Vice President, Operational Policy and Country Services, World Bank
Presenter: *Alastair McKechnie*, Director, Fragile and Conflict-affected Countries Group
- 4:15 – 5:00 **Closing discussion with Robert Zoellick**

Invited Speakers

1. **Ashraf Ghani**, Chairman, Institute for State Effectiveness
2. **Francis Fukuyama**, Professor, Paul Nitze School of International Affairs, Johns Hopkins University
3. **James Dobbins**, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation
4. **Jean-Marie Guéhenno**, Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
5. **Tarik Yousuf**, Dean, Dubai School of Government
6. **Sidney Jones**, South-East Asia Project Director, International Crisis Group
7. **Raymond Gilpin**, Associate Vice President, Sustainable Economies, Centers of Innovation, US Institute of Peace
8. **Serge Michailof**, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques - Paris, and University of Paris 1 Sorbonne; former Executive Director, Agence Francaise de Développement