How communities manage risks of crime and violence

Patti Petesch
The World Bank
How Communities Manage Risks of Crime and Violence

Background Note for the
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Managing Risk for Development

Patti Petesch, World Bank Consultant (patti@pattipetesch.com)

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Executive Summary

Why are some communities peaceful while others struggle with persistent crime and violence? This background note presents a relatively new and insightful comparative case study literature that seeks to explain this variance.

Much of the recent work on community violence favors interactional arguments, an approach that traces risks of violence to the interests and actions of elite actors and their ties to armed groups, on the one hand, and the quality of trust and networks among the wider social groups in a community, on the other. A rich literature especially surrounds persistent problems of collective violence between ethnic and religious groups, which accounts for the largest share of today's major violent conflicts.

Violence patterns have strong geographic, gender, and generational dimensions. Rates of crime and violence are usually higher in cities than rural areas, and within cities violence frequently clusters in poorer communities. Young men are the chief perpetrators and victims of crime and violence. Nevertheless, problems of domestic violence against women continue to be severe in many localities around the world, but are often poorly addressed and documented by local law enforcement.

Many case studies are making important contributions to understanding causes of violence by framing their samples to include communities in relatively close proximity with similar demographics and other traits, but strong differences in levels of crime and violence. In explaining the variation in violence, however, scholars differ in their relative emphasis on the role of local leaders and associational life. Ashutosh Varshney's (2002) exploration of Hindu-Muslim strife in six cities of India found that the three peaceful cities in the sample were distinguished by their strong inter-ethnic networks that functioned to constrain political leaders from addressing conflicts through violent means. The three cities affected by waves of ethnic riots, by contrast, lacked such integrated networks among their local businesses, political parties, unions, professional associations, clubs and neighborhoods. Other comparative studies emphasize the pivotal role of leaders in mobilizing violence. A case study of lynch mobs in rural Indonesia by Janet Welsh (2010), for instance, assigns great weight to local leaders, and concludes that communities with high incidence of mobbing were characterized by active involvement or tacit approval of leaders and law enforcement. Community case studies of national and municipal policing reforms, decentralized poverty programs, and active policies to reduce social group inequalities demonstrate the strong potential of public action to influence local levels of crime and violence.

The case study literature indicates that building community capacities for managing risks of crime and violence requires recognition of formal and informal local governance systems, civic networks, and the uncertain dynamics of change processes on the ground. Policy measures and community programs are discussed that improve crime and violence monitoring systems, reduce societal fragility and social group inequalities, strengthen local law and order and conflict mediation capacities, expand local economic opportunities, and provide effective redress mechanisms for community development interventions.
Introduction¹

"Indeed, many famines have occurred without there being much political rebellion or civil strife or intergroup warfare." -- Amartya Sen, (2006, 143).

Violence kills, maims, shatters trust, destroys assets, and sets development backwards. Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011, 1) estimates that more than 526,000 people die annually around the world due to lethal violence. Much larger populations endure risks of violence. World Development Report: Conflict Security, and Development reports that 1.5 billion people reside in "areas affected by fragility, conflict, or large-scale organized criminal violence" (World Bank 2011b, 1).

But imagine that along with the devastation and horror that accompanies this mayhem and lawlessness, periods of major violence sometimes create opportunities. The shock of violent episodes in some cases can weaken or topple structures and norms that divide and separate societies—allowing new leaders, new institutional arrangements, and new forms of associational life to emerge that are more fair and inclusive as well as more economically productive. Fundamentally, such processes of "vast experimentation and struggle, including civil war" are rare but seminal processes of democracy building (Tilly 2007, 33). Forging the capacity to survive, wage, and win violent campaigns accompanied the building of most of today’s most prosperous nation states (Bates 2001).

Interstate wars, the deadliest violence, largely gave way to intrastate wars halfway through the 20th century. And for the most part, high income countries with democratic regimes and strong state capacities have greatly reduced levels of violence. Simultaneously, beginning in the 1960s, violent crime surged in middle and low income regions of the world as they transitioned to democracy, or more often, to partial forms of democracy (LaFree and Teseloni 2006).² Notably, the share of major conflicts labeled as "ethnic"³ rose from 15 percent in 1953 to nearly 60 percent by 2005 (Stewart 2008, 7). But interpersonal crime and violence also grew more severe in many countries over this period. Although Central America has roughly the same population as Spain, murders for 2006 amounted to an astonishing 14,257 in Central America to Spain's 336 (World Bank 2011, ii). The sharp variations in forms and levels of violence found at national level are echoed at subnational and community levels.

This background note is concerned with why crime and violence patterns differ so much on the ground. Why are some communities relatively resilient to this scourge while others remain mired in endless waves of violence? The paper first presents highlights from the literature about principal causes and patterns of crime and violence around the world, and then zooms down to explore a relatively new and insightful comparative case study literature that seeks to explain this

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¹ The author would like to thank Rasmus Heltberg and Alys Willman for their encouragement and comments on this paper.
² Collier's assessment especially draws attention to problems of democracy among the "bottom billion": "But in low-income countries, democracy made the society more dangerous" (2009, 20). For more sociological analysis of trends in global violence based on available datasets, see chapter 3 of Tilly (2003).
³ In much of the literature on crime and violence, ethnic classifications of population groups encompass religious identities as well. Some scholars use the term ethnoreligious.
local variance. The note is designed to inform the chapter on community risks for 2014 World Development Report: Managing Risks for Development.

The case studies of community violence contain important regularities. Most current assessments link problems of local violence to an interplay between contests for power among elite actors, on the one hand, and to weak networks and lack of trust between social groups in a community, on the other.

I. Understanding local violence

"Political development occurs when people domesticate violence, transforming coercion from a means of predation into a productive resource. Coercion becomes productive when it is employed not to seize or to destroy wealth, but rather to safeguard and promote its creation" (Bates 2001, 102).

Three Theories of Violence

Schools of thought about causes of violence can be classified into the three broad camps around notions of ideas, behaviors, and social interactions. While the principal drivers of violence vary among the three, scholars increasingly draw on valuable insights from across approaches in their explanations about where, why, and how violence happens. Notably, because ethnic strife has become such a significant concern, a particularly rich multidisciplinary literature now surrounds the role of ethnic and religious cleavages in shaping violence. But identities, boundaries, and violent contests also revolve around other societal differences, including socio-economic status, political party, caste, language, and so forth.

The work of Sudhir Kakar (1996), a psychoanalyst, on Hindu-Muslim strife in Hyderabad, India, exemplifies the "ideas" or primordial tradition, the oldest of the three camps on causes of violence. Kakar defines cultural identity as a "group's basic way of organizing experience through its myths, memories, symbols, rituals and ideals" (1996, 143); and his explanations of the triggers and intensity of violence in Hyderabad's ethnic riots draw on social-psychological processes associated with enjoying status, belonging, and security through strong attachment to an ethnic group. He especially brings to light the deep family-like emotional bonds and mutual defense mechanisms that become strengthened by traumatic conflict experiences, and by recalling memories of them (which may be fantasy). As he argues, "... Hindus and Muslims do not perceive their conflict in terms of local issues but as one involving the 'essential' nature of a Hindu or Muslim which does not change over history. Such as essentialization, found in many other ethnic conflicts... will always make a conflict more intractable" (Kakar 1996, 118).

4 This presentation borrows heavily from Tilly (2003, 5-9) and Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock (2011, 29-34). Both provide succinct and accessible summaries of these major schools of thought. Although with somewhat different labels, Stewart (2008, 7-12) applies the same three lenses in her introduction to how cultural identities are constructed and associated with problems of inequality and violence.

5 Amartya Sen (2006) provides an eloquent critique of primordial perspectives. Rather than seeing these conflicts as "ancient feuds which allegedly place today's players in preordained roles in an allegedly ancestral play," her calls for recognition that individuals have multiple identities, and interpretations that provide more fully for "prevailing politics and to investigating the processes and dynamics of contemporary incitements to violence" (Sen 2006, 43).
dismisses analytic arguments of violence resting solely on contemporary power politics among elites and disregard for deeply embedded cultural values and forms because these approaches cannot explain why and how it is that cultural identity is such a consistent and potent mobilizing force for violence across very different periods of time and contexts.⁶

In his seminal work, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (2000), Horowitz specifies various processes that commonly lead ethnic groups to organize into separate occupational, partisan, and civic organizations, and that over time congeal and reinforce ethnic differences into a hierarchy of advantaged and disadvantaged identity groups. "Many of the current disparities between ethnic groups are traceable to accidents of colonial location," argues Horowitz (1998,680), "Groups near a port, a missionary school, a colonial capital or commercial center obtained a head-start that they retained," he argues (1998, 680). Horowitz also discusses the shaping of ethnic fault lines around “sons of the soil” original settlers who take pride in their farming versus enterprising migrant traders, who are characterized by perhaps stronger values for education and who often then enter into government and business in disproportionate numbers. Examples include Tamils in Sri Lanka, or ethnic Chinese in Malaysia.

Whether native or migrant (often a subject of debate), ethnic groups have encountered very different fortunes around the world, with ethnic and socio-economic status frequently intertwining and underpinning a durable and unequal ranking of ethnic groups in a society. Findings in the empirical literature about the significance of ethnicity for violence are mixed.⁷ Frances Stewart's work on group-based "horizontal" inequalities (1998 and 2008) has drawn attention to how ethnic marginalization frequently overlaps with other disadvantages (e.g. in health, education, income, political inclusion, and other outcomes); and where these inequalities are severe and persist across generations they are also associated with higher likelihood of violence.

Behavioral understandings, the second major school of thought, are rooted in individual motives and the incentives provided to individuals by local and national opportunity structures. Behavioral analyses vary in their stress on: i) evolutionary or biological foundations of human aggression and violence; ii) "general needs and incentives for domination, exploitation, respect, deference, protection, or security"; and iii) "resolutely economic stances" (Tilly 2003, 5). In the

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At the same time, he also criticizes reductionist models centered purely on economic motives and disregard for "aims, objectives, and priorities" that may well be in reference to a collective rather than singular identity (Sen 2006, 20).

⁶ Similarly, Samuel Huntington (1993) argued that cultural divides between the world's civilizations, "the product of centuries," will be the predominant source of future conflicts in the world. He contends, "The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.... [These differences] will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies or political regimes" (Huntington 1993, 25).

⁷ Econometric analysis by Fearon and Laitin (2003) finds that the factors most associated with the onset of 127 civil wars between 1945 and 1999 were poverty, large populations, and weak central governments that lack the administrative and military/police capacities to contain rebellion, in part because of "inert and corrupt counterinsurgency practices" (76). Their models did not find ethnic or religious diversity, inequality, lack of democracy, poor civil liberties, or state discrimination against minorities to be good predictors of conflict. By contrast, Østby (2008) finds a significantly higher chance of conflict in contexts with higher inequalities between identity groups. Wood (2003) and Kalyvas (2008) provide two useful reviews of this literature.
late 1990s, work by Paul Collier (1998) and David Keen (1998) launched a useful debate over the relative importance of economic—or "greed versus grievance"—motives in the triggers of civil wars. Applying econometric tools and a development lens to civil war data, Collier’s early work in collaboration with Hoeflir (1998) identified causal links between the onset of armed violence and low-income economies that rely on primary commodities for their exports. Collier’s more recent analyses (2009 and with others in 2003) assign greater weight to political factors and problems of ethnic polarization, but continue to stress the steep challenges faced by conflict-affected nations with low incomes.

Finally, a third school of thought about processes that fuel violence centers on interactions between leaders, their ties with violence specialists, and popular struggles for security. Charles Tilly is among the pioneers in this camp, and his explanations train a microscope on the "pairs of actors" who make violence possible and their specific capacities for framing public discourse and inciting groups to take up arms (Tilly 2003, 45). Among other factors, his analysis of how the West secured more stable and less violent democracies draws attention to the 19th century evolution of state capacities for effective and independent policing across the national territory. Nevertheless, interactional assessments of violence also give strong weight to civic engagement: "Overall, collective violence rises with the extent that organizations specializing in deployment of coercive means... increase in size, geographic scope, resources, and coherence. But [emphasis added] democratic civilian control over violent specialists mutates those effects" (Tilly 2003, 40).

As nation states have consolidated their political structures, greater trust and alliances among ordinary citizens have also grown and adapted to constrain their leaders from major abuses of authority. State-society conflicts marked by a legacy of deep unfairness and inequality between identity groups feature in these explanations of violence, but this camp cautions that equally strong social divides and grievances also mark many nonviolent contexts.

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8 For a useful overview of this discourse and its evolution into a more nuanced and multidisciplinary assessment of civil war causes, see Cynthia Arnson (2005). For discussion of the micro-level links between violent conflict and chronic poverty, see Justino (2006).

9 Numerous conflict scholars challenged the “greed” arguments as simplistic and countered with historical and empirical evidence signaling the importance of political regimes and state capacities for mediating conflict, rather than simply a country’s economic level and natural resources, as drivers of collective violence. For example, William Zartman, a specialist on Africa and conflict, stresses that most civil wars have political and socio-economic roots in past injustices; however, when wars become protracted and an opportunistic war economy sends out deep roots, the forces of "greed" can then become ascendant, but the causal processes that trigger violence fundamentally start from grievances related to “need” and “creed” (Zartman 2005).

10 Tilly often refrains from using commonly accepted labels for competing armed groups, arguing that motives are difficult to discern and changing, and one group’s "freedom fighters" may be another’s "terrorists." His violence specialists variously include governmental "military personnel, police, guards, jailers, executioners, and judicial officers...” but may also be private actors including all manner of athletes and, "Armed guards, private police, paramilitary forces, guerrilla warriors, terrorists, thugs, bandits, kidnappers, enforcers, members of fighting gangs, and automobile wreckers...” (Tilly 2003, 35).

11 In a sample of 39 developed and developing countries over the period 1980-94, Lederman, Loayza and Menendez find that a sense of trust among community members was significantly associated with lower homicide rates. They did not find significant effects of membership in organizations, but acknowledged that their dataset did not allow for more refined analysis around organizational purpose and functionings.

12 Resort to violence is a risky and costly tactic to maintain or challenge authority structures, and most conflicts are not addressed through violent means. James Scott (1985) provides a rich account of the many "quieter" tactics (as well as some vandalism) deployed by elites and peasants in the village of Sedaka, Malaysia when conflict arose over the introduction of mechanized agriculture.
There is a small but growing literature on the gender dimensions of collective violence. Wood (2006) and Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz (2007) document extensive and varied forms of wartime gender-based violence across countries. Wood assesses competing theories on why some armed groups engage in much more sexual violence than others, and concludes that interactional arguments about power hierarchies and discipline within armed groups best explain the variation. Problems of sexual violence were more contained where the armed group's leadership and hierarchy discouraged and disciplined troops that committed these acts. In her conclusion, however, she acknowledges that "a range of causal mechanisms" likely interact to drive the varied levels of wartime sexual violence (Wood 2006, 330). Sexual violence where it is widespread may be a strategic tactic for building fighters' or terrorizing and displacing a population, but it must also be at least tacitly condoned by the command structure. Wood's theories appear to have wider relevance for peacetimes and civilian governance structures as well.

Violence at the hands of intimate partners and family members, rather than unknown perpetrators, is the far more acute problem facing women around the world. Current theories of domestic violence attribute it to an "interplay among personal, situational, and sociocultural factors" (Heise 2012, 7), rather than just one factor. Men resort to violent behavior as a tactic for asserting and demonstrating their manhood and their power over women when they feel their position is threatened (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). And the pervasive and continued acceptance of this form violence in diverse contexts around the world point to the realities of gender power inequalities that are particularly stark and difficult to shift. Witnessing or experiencing domestic violence as a child is a common characteristic of both male perpetrators and female victims; and some literature indicates that gang and political violence, for instance, might also be viewed as "continuing the cycle of violence begun in the home."

The theoretical literature draws a blurry line between forces that drive collective versus individual acts of crime and violence, and this is no more apparent than during and after major political upheavals when lawlessness is pervasive. Across the conflict areas that participated in the seven-country Moving Out of Poverty study, Rising from the Ashes of Conflict, extensive evidence was provided of government property destruction, corruption, petty crime, looting, plunder of natural resources, revenge attacks, land seizures, sexual violence, and other illicit doings (Narayan and Petesch 2010). Periods during and after wartimes provide an especially effective cover for all manner of more and less organized crime and violence to take hold and spread. Stathis Kalyvas' work on variations in levels of violence during civil war warns of how the objectives of armed groups may “be subverted by the local” as the wider war is used by

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13 Cohen (2010) builds on theories about gangs to argue that the extensive gang rape during Sierra Leone's war was used as a tactic to help to cement bonds and create "a coherent fighting unit" among armed groups that were forcibly recruited and lacked a strong organizational hierarchy to enforce discipline.

14 In a rapid qualitative assessment conducted in 97 communities across 20 countries as background for the 2012 World Development Report on Gender Equality and Development, focus groups widely acknowledged that physical and emotional abuse of women can be triggered for breaking everyday gender norms for women's behaviors (such as "nagging" or serving dinner "late"); and women reported domestic violence to be a regular or frequent problem for women in a third of the study communities (Muñoz Boudet, Petesch, and Turk, forthcoming).

15 (World Bank 2011a, 26). A discussion of the literature on the links between domestic violence of women and children and other forms of violence can be found in this report.
Politics and Violence

noncombatants and combatants alike to settle personal scores and advance private agendas (2006, 366-7).16

Although with different emphases, analysts usefully borrow from across the theoretical traditions to make sense of patterns of violence. Bates, for instance, draws on all three approaches when discussing the case of the Nuer pastoral society in southern Sudan, where kinship groups have largely lived a peaceful co-existence for generations, although each group arms themselves heavily to guard their livestock and way of life. Nevertheless, where groups must independently ensure their own security and survival, Bates cautions that "military prowess lies embedded in codes of honor, from which it derives credibility as a deterrent" (2001, 46). In such contexts, societal interactions "thus take place in a volatile ambience of honor and impudence; young hotheads move to the fore; and a culture of machismo permeates the society" (Bates 2001, 46).

For Bates, the exigencies of security in such contexts give rise to "hair-trigger" societies that exact steep costs on local development: "To forestall predation, [community members] may simply choose to live without goods worth stealing. In such a setting poverty becomes the price of peace" (Bates 2001, 47).

The literature finds on the whole that political control based on threat of violence is fragile because it violates normative codes and foments collective resistance. Bates (2001) highlights the institutional shifts that can unfold when political authority structures become invested in and accountable to protecting and nurturing economic development and social cohesion rather than preying on local populations' assets and fears.

General Patterns of Crime and Violence

The Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011) identifies 58 countries with high rates of lethal violence (more than 10 deaths per 100,000), and important regional variations in types of violence among this group. Homicides related to gangs or organized crime is significantly higher in Central and South American than in Asia or Europe. Robbery or theft rates are higher in countries with more income inequality. Intimate partner or family violence is a significant share of homicides in some countries in Europe and Asia. As do many reports, this report stresses how violence erodes development.

Surprisingly, there is still little consensus on classification schemes for the diverse forms of violence experienced around the world. Existing violence typologies are based variously on casualties, armed actors, instruments of violence, events, scale, causes, onset, duration, ceasefire or peace agreements, and so forth. Within the classifications, definitional issues loom large.17

16 Kalyvas further argues that selective applications of violence are only possible in contested areas where an armed group has strong capacities and resources, and can establish meaningful ties with the local population, which then enables a continuous stream of strategic information on threats (both local and not) and other resources for their troops. By contrast, armed groups with more limited capacities to secure local loyalties frequently deploy large scale indiscriminate violence to maintain their control. Such abuses, however, also sow the seeds of defection, and over time propel troops and civilians into aiding rival groups.

17 As Fakuda-Parr and others (2008) explain, for instance, conventional datasets on war-related deaths omit violence against civilians, thereby not accounting for 800,000 lives lost to state-sponsored genocide in Rwanda, 15,000 deaths in northern Ghana in the mid 1990s due to communal riots, or untold other civilian lives lost during the
Figure 1 is not designed to contribute to the important discourse on violence types, but rather presents a rough mapping of violence risks facing communities that are discussed in this background note. The downward arrows are intended to suggest that risks of major forms of collective violence diminish for communities, households, and individuals as formal and informal institutional capacities for democracy, law and order, social inclusion and economic prosperity grow and become reinforcing at both national and local levels.

Figure 1. Types of violence discussed in background note

Major political violence
• Interstate wars
• Intrastate wars
• Irregular armed conflicts (e.g. guerrilla or paramilitary groups)

More or less localized collective violence
• Organized crime (and underground economies)
• Communal violence (riots, pogroms, blood feuds)
• Gangs
• Scattered attacks (brawls, lynchings)

Individual violence
• Indiscriminate assaults, theft, robbery, crime
• Domestic violence, child abuse
• Family or private violence (e.g. over inheritance, property titles)

Much of the conflict literature focuses on collective forms of violence because its consequences can be so severe. Nevertheless, depending on the locality, persistent "everyday" problems of low level individual violence may be acute. And where there is extensive individual violence, the community case study literature frequently uncovers strong links to more collective forms. In a participatory appraisal of violence in a poor community of Nairobi, Kenya, for instance, focus groups identified their main threat to be political violence -- and "politicians us[ing] local youth as a cheap method to unleash violence competitors" -- but problems of "domestic violence, tribal, and economic and tenant landlord violence" also posed severe risks for residents in the Nairobi community (Moser and Rodgers 2012, 6).

Violence types and trends have strong geographic dimensions. In the absence of large-scale wars, rates of crime and violence are higher in cities than rural areas around the world. UN-mayhem of wartimes to hunger, disease and criminal violence. Also, violence against women is poorly monitored, and likely unreported, if documented at all (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011, 138).

18 Table 1.1 of World Bank (2011b, 54) provides a helpful presentation of multiple forms of political and organized violence that can overlap in a country. Table 1 of Moser (2004, 5) provides a useful "roadmap" of urban violence. 19 Many cases of major rural violence can be found, however. For example, Nigeria's Central Plateau state underwent a state of emergency in 2004 when herder-farmer conflicts "resulted in 'near-mutual genocide' of Christians and Muslims and more than 20,000 refugees fleeing to neighboring Cameroon" (Moritz 2010, 138).
HABITAT (2012, 6-7) identifies diverse drivers for higher concentration of violence in cities, including stark inequalities, dense populations, dynamic commerce networks, an abundance of banks and other outlets where cash and valuables attract robbers and trade in illegal goods; and cities are also center of political protest and media. Within cities, moreover, violence frequently clusters. In Cape Town, South Africa, for instance, 44 percent of all homicides took place in three neighborhoods that were among the city's poorest (UNODC 2011, 79-80).

Box 1 presents Robert Sampson’s (2004) stylized overview of the mix of factors associated with neighborhood-level clusters of crime and violence in urban contexts of the United Kingdom and United States. The case studies below similarly identify violence and crime to be more concentrated in poorer urban areas, and Sampson's findings seem relevant for cities in middle and low income countries as well.

**Box 1. Robert Sampson on Neighborhood Inequality and Violence**

As way of background I think it is important to underscore the durable inequality that defines neighborhood-level phenomena. A long history of research in the United Kingdom and United States has established a reasonably consistent set of findings relevant to the community context of crime, safety, and general well-being. I would summarize these facts as follows.

- First, there is considerable social inequality between neighborhoods in terms of socioeconomic and racial segregation. There is also clear evidence on the connection of concentrated disadvantage with the geographic isolation of racial and ethnic minority groups.
- Second, a number of social problems tend to come bundled together at the neighborhood level, including, but not limited to, crime, adolescent delinquency, social and physical disorder, low birthweight, infant mortality, school dropout and child maltreatment.
- Third, these two sets of clusters are themselves related—neighborhood predictors common to many child and adolescent outcomes include the concentration of poverty, racial isolation, single-parent families, and rates of home ownership and length of tenure.
- Fourth, the ecological differentiation by factors such as social class, race, and health is a robust and apparently increasing occurrence that emerges at multiple levels of geography. The place stratification of local communities is seen for both smaller neighborhoods and larger community areas –even cities.
- Fifth, the ecological concentration of poverty appears to have increased significantly during recent decades, as has the concentration of affluence at the upper end of the income scale.

Taken together, these findings yield an important clue in thinking about why it is that communities matter for well-being and hence public governance. If multiple and seemingly disparate outcomes are linked together empirically across communities and are predicted by similar characteristics, there may be common underlying causes or mediating mechanisms. For example, if ‘neighborhood effects’ of concentrated poverty exist, presumably they stem from social processes that involve collective aspects of neighborhood life ...

*Source: Sampson (2004, 107-8).*

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20 Willman and Makisaka (2010, 9) cite studies finding that community conditions and exposure to violence, rather than family or individual characteristics, are more reliable predictors of violent behavior in individuals; conversely, access to services and opportunities for participation in local social and economic life can provide important protective factors. Also see Willman and Makisaka for review of literature on macro risk factors.
By comparison, rural areas endure less violence, if not necessarily less conflict. Bates (2003) and many others especially warn of tinder box conditions in villages where a culture of honor prevails. In such environments, conflicts, for instance, over livestock theft or infidelity can become deeply aggressive and locked in cycles of revenge killings across kinship networks. Among the ten communities visited in Mindanao, Philippines for the Moving Out of Poverty study, half reported periods of rido, or blood feuds, many linked to local political contests. Bates (2003) and many others especially warn of tinder box conditions in villages where a culture of honor prevails. In such environments, conflicts, for instance, over livestock theft or infidelity can become deeply aggressive and locked in cycles of revenge killings across kinship networks. Among the ten communities visited in Mindanao, Philippines for the Moving Out of Poverty study, half reported periods of rido, or blood feuds, many linked to local political contests.

Patterns of violence are also highly gendered and generational. Young men remain overwhelmingly chief perpetrators and victims of lethal violence, with male victims accounting for 83 percent of intentional homicides (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011, 2). Women are much more likely to die at the hands of intimate partners or other family members than men, but again this form of violence is often poorly recognized in violence statistics and poorly addressed by law and order institutions. Surveys of the proportion of women experiencing physical and/or sexual assault from a partner in the past 12 months range from roughly 1.6 percent of women in the United States (Tjaden and Thoennes 1998) to more than half of all women in some developing country settings (WHO 2005). In many communities around the world, women may be even less safe in the public domain of their communities than in their homes. Among other factors, women's physical mobility can be greatly restricted by risks stemming from assaults, harassing behaviors, and social ostracism for violating gender norms that women belong mainly homebound and not participating in the economic and civic life of their communities.

In a village of Uganda along Lake Victoria, women "defined law and order as more than the absence of crime. They defined it positively in terms of responsible behavior, especially by men and youth" (Lonergan 2004, 4). Older adults in this village expressed concerns about youths, who were, "unemployed school drop outs drinking too much, being promiscuous, taking drugs and resorting to theft..." (Lonergan 2004,5). They perceived the youth "as a potentially destabilizing factor" for their village and the surrounding area. When viewed from the ground, levels and forms of violence vary greatly, and perceptions of and vulnerabilities to risks are gendered and generational and linked to local power struggles and the quality and functioning of collective action.

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21 Deininger (2003) in a micro level survey of violence patterns in Uganda found that lack of infrastructure and economic development, more prevalent in rural areas, to be a key factor where civil strife (as contrasted with theft and physical violence) was higher, but theft and physical violence were more prevalent "closer to the center of the municipality," or typically the more urban environments of the country.

22 Hull and Echavez report that, "Mayoral elections sparked a rido in Lomamoli in 1988, when the elected incumbent was murdered by supporters of his defeated opponent" (2010, 253).

23 Jacobson [2006, citing a study by Breines, Connel, and Eide (2000)] reports that an average of 90 percent of serious assaults were carried out by men in statistics reported by 62 countries to the International Criminal Police Organization. Although in much smaller numbers than men, women and girls do commit assaults and also join armed groups and gangs, often for protection (see Willman and Makisaka 2010, 16-17 for discussion of literature).

24 In a rapid qualitative assessment conducted in 97 communities across 20 countries as background for the 2012 World Development Report on Gender Equality and Development, focus groups widely acknowledged that physical and emotional abuse of women can be triggered for breaking everyday gender norms for women's behaviors (such as "nagging" or serving dinner "late"); and women reported domestic violence to be a regular or frequent problem for women in a third of the study communities, and frequently associated the violence with economic hardships and men's alcohol use (Munoz Boudet, Petesch, and Turk forthcoming).
II. How communities experience and manage crime and violence

"An integrated organizational and civic life makes the state behave much better than intellectual and political exhortations that it do so [italics in original]." --Ashutosh Varshney (2002, xxi).

A spate of fieldwork has emerged over the past decade that provides compelling comparative case studies on community crime and violence. Below are highlights of this literature, first from urban and then rural communities. The focus throughout is on findings about what distinguishes the communities that are more resilient to violence. Building on Varshney’s (2002) methodological approach discussed more below, most feature samples of communities with and without problems of collective violence. Many usefully trace violence patterns over long periods of time. A few make valuable contributions by applying mixed methods. Most are set in "post-conflict" contexts, and this no doubt reflects that these are environments of great concern in addition to providing fertile grounds for explorations into reasons for variance in local-level violence. "Time heals," cautions Collier about post-conflict recovery, "but its effects seem to be decade by decade rather than year" (2009, 89).

Figure 1 presents an adaptation of the forthcoming WDR 2014 framework for understanding processes of risk management, including that of local violence and crime. The model involves confronting risks, preparing for them (ex ante risk management), and coping with their effects (ex post risk management). Risk management is an important determinant of a system’s exposure and recovery capacity. Given that risks of violence are highly varied on the ground, interactional explanations of community violence more often spotlight "internal conditions" rather than the external environment. These accounts stress the specific interplay of local leaders, popular networks, and the normative climate that make crime and violence more or less likely. A final section examines evidence that the "external environment"—and national policy frameworks and their effective implementation—can also matter intensely to local prospects of crime and violence.
Peace and violence in the city

"Whatever leaders may plan, the plans would not come to fruition if the rioters did not find the festive infliction of suffering and degradation thoroughly satisfying. No hidden logic of costs and benefits can explain the violence tout court" (Horowitz 2001, 123).

An important debate on reasons for variations in urban crime took off following a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. They posited a "broken windows" theory of violence which argued that minor signs of neighborhood disorder such as a broken window or public intoxication can trigger serious criminal violence because these circumstances send normative signals that neighbors lack concern or capacity for controlling anti-social behaviors. Their arguments were used to justify "zero tolerance" policing reforms involving active pursuit of and heavy sentencing for petty crimes. Evaluations of these programs are mixed. Kelling and Sousa (2001) present evidence that stronger policing was significantly responsible for dramatic declines in violent crime in New York City in the 1990s, while Sampson and Raudenbush (2001) among others find no direct relationship between disorder and crime in their assessments. The broken windows theory has also come under fire for justifying costly and aggressive tactics that have overstretched law and order institutions and caused high incarceration and recidivism of young offenders for minor crimes (see, for instance, Howell 2009).

25 Similarly, Rodgers, Muggah, and Stevenson (2009) found little evidence that policies focused on incarcerating gang members prevent or reduce gang violence.
Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) challenge the broken windows theory by developing and measuring the role of "collective efficacy" of community members as a factor that prevents neighborhood violence. They rated nearly 200 neighborhoods of Chicago on scales of "social and physical disorder" and also surveyed 3,500 residents on perceptions of local social cohesion (especially working trust) and expectations for "social control of public space." They found strong links between respondents' reports of collective efficacy and rates of crime and observed disorder among neighborhoods. Their recognition and measurement of ordinary citizens’ agency in constraining crime and violence resonates with a growing literature on variance in crime and violence in developing country contexts.

Ashutosh Varshney (2002) provides a rich and influential inquiry into Hindu-Muslim strife in India. His analysis proceeds by comparing three separate pairs of cities, taking each pair in turn. The individual pairs are marked by similar population size and ethnic composition, but one city is characterized by peace while the other city struggles with waves of ethnic violence. Varshney's headline finding is deceptively simple. He attributes peace to the presence of inter-ethnic civic networks, while cities that endured waves of riots feature intra-ethnic associational life. More specifically, Varshney demonstrates how the presence of integrated formal and informal networks that include Hindu and Muslim members keep pressure on leaders to address conflicts through nonviolent means: "In cities of thick interaction between different communities, peace committees at the time of tension emerge from below in various neighborhoods .... Such highly decentralized tension-managing organizations kill rumors, remove misunderstandings, and often police neighborhoods" (Varshney 2002, 47).

The particular histories, purpose, and functioning of the networks vary widely from one city to the next. The regularities are not in specific associational structures, but rather in the processes by which more integrated networks function to keep conflicts from flaring into violence. In Calicut, for instance, the peaceful city in the pair with Aligarth, Varshney details emergence of a large and influential Muslim middle class and of well-integrated neighborhoods and economic life. Significant Hindu-Muslim conflicts still surface on occasion in Calicut, but when tensions bubble up "all political parties," and media outlets supported local government efforts to maintain law and order, and simultaneously, neighborhood peace committees effectively squashed rumors (Varshney 2002, 123). In Aligarth, by contrast, at times of local crisis, "blatant falsehoods" about atrocities headlined local newspapers, violent criminals were not pursued by police, political organizations started or refused to silence rumors, and inter-ethnic neighborhood committees did not function because rival political parties refused to cooperate in their formation. While Aligarth has local committees, "They simply raise the perception of risk and harden views among those who participate in them" (Varshney 2002, 124).

Ukiwo (2008) employs a similarly rich comparative case study approach to assess factors driving contrasting records of peace and violence in two port cities of the Delta region of Nigeria. His conclusions on why Calabar is peaceful and Warri conflict-ridden, however, depart from

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26 Referred to in the social capital literature as “bridging” or “linking” ties, these more diverse webs of societal relations are valuable because they potentially link together actors, networks and organizations from different social groups and localities, thereby enlarging access to influential connections, jobs, resources, ideas, information, and so forth. And it is heterogeneous societal interactions and networks, whether these be formal or informal, that seem to provide invisible but terribly important scaffolding for the capacities of local level institutions to function in ways that are inclusive and fair (see, for instance, Narayan 2002, Narayan and Cassidy 2001, Woolcock 1998).
Varshney’s in placing more emphasis on leaders than societal networks. Ukiwo reaches back to the slave trade and colonial history to explain the rise to power of a single ethnic group in each city, the Efik of Calabar and Itsekiri of Warri. In the case of Calabar, Efik outnumbered rival groups and colonial powers bestowed upon them many privileges in exchange for their loyalties. Efik leaders, secure in their dominance, tolerated some political spoils and public recognition for the smaller ethnic groups. Calabar also featured the rise of "pan-Calabar organizations" that attracted members from across ethnic groups. While Ukiwo does not attribute these associations as instrumental to peace, he does acknowledge the capacity of ethnic leaders from less powerful groups in Calabar to provide public services, employment, and contract opportunities to their members. Presumably, these outlets for marginalized groups also helped them to interact and build more trusting relationships with the Efik.

In Warri, Itsekiri had been instrumental in opening up trade routes and defeating resistance to British rule, and thus became favored in the local administration despite their smaller population relative to other local ethnic groups. To secure Itsekiri loyalties and leadership, "colonial inspired categories" and codes took hold that initially barred non-Itsekiri groups from positions in the city's administration during colonial rule; and the codes were later adapted after independence to prevent electoral competition. To maintain its advantaged position, Itsekiri elite repressed rival groups from assuming important customary positions or displaying public symbols of their group. With no meaningful means of public recognition or political outlets for marginalized ethnic groups, most every action by public authorities or other leaders became interpreted in Warri's excluding environment through a divisive discourse of ethnic politics and favoritism. As Ukiwo explains, "The incentive to fight is strong when a deprived community believes it has been marginalized in all sectors" (2008, 197).

Rather than a comparative two-city case study, Rodgers (2003) presents a longitudinal exploration of transitions in gang violence in one poor barrio of Managua, Nicaragua, between 1996/7 and 2002. Gangs grew in number after 1990 in the wake of the Nicaraguan civil war,

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27 Efiks also enjoyed an early advantage because they were the first to embrace Christianity and western education; and they held prominent roles in early colonial administration and then consolidated their dominance after independence. The Itsekiri had been instrumental in opening up trade routes and defeating resistance to British rule, and thus became favored in the local administration of Warri, despite their smaller population relative to other local ethnic groups.

28 Rather than due to principles of inclusion, however, Ukiwo attributes the development of interethnic bonds to a convergence of interest among the native ethnic groups to resist encroachment by external ethnic groups who had been gaining a strong presence in the local economy.

29 Varshney argues that even relations that are hierarchical can embody trust and shared interests; and these ties on the ground likely helped to forestall the possibilities of mobilizing collective violence by Calabar's leaders. See Varshney's discussion of Lucknow, and how vertical ties between Muslim artisanal embroiderers and Hindu merchants function to prevent violent outbreaks. Although Ukiwo does not acknowledge this, similar vertical ties may have been present in Calabar and helped to build more trusting relations among the rival groups.

30 Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) provide an interesting examination of how racial legal codes only emerged after the slave trade became profitable but threatened relative to other labor sources. "Given emerging Enlightenment ideologies of equality and human rights, oppression needed justification," they argue to explain the onset of laws requiring racial segregation at a time when "Negroes who were free" enjoyed similar rights to whites. (Hoff and Stiglitz (2010, 142).

31 A particularly revealing finding from this case study are survey respondent's perceptions of ethnic domination. In Calabar, around 15 percent of respondents viewed local and state governments to be dominated by a single group, while in Warri this was about 95 percent.
providing refuge for numerous demobilized youth. 32 "A golden rule of gang delinquency common to all groups, however," observed Rodgers (2003, 10), "was not to prey on local neighborhood inhabitants, and in fact to actively protect them from outside thieves, robbers, and pandilleros (gang members)." In his first round of fieldwork in the late 1990s, Rodgers found that some violence had spilled into the neighborhood, but it was relatively contained. And Nicaragua in fact is distinguished from its conflict-affected neighbors to the north in Central America by deeper reforms and institutionalization of its security institutions, by state policies that have stressed prevention rather than zero tolerance in combatting juvenile delinquency, and by more moderate levels of gangs and gang violence (Cruz 2011). When Rodgers returned to the barrio in 2002, however, the gang had shed most of its members and become intimately involved in trafficking cocaine, especially crack, and also much more violent.33 The literature makes clear that when sources of crime and violence are tied to well-organized, well-resourced criminal networks that operate far beyond local levels (and may be condoned or sanctioned by elements of the state), neighborhood capacities to sustain trust networks and provide security can quickly become overwhelmed.

For those who work with community datasets that provide multidimensional information about trends over time, the dynamics of all bad things seemingly reinforcing one another, or alternatively, all good things going together are not unusual. Varshney shows how divisive political leaders, blatantly partisan media, menacing criminal networks, and waves of traumatic violence gave rise to the polarized and "hair-trigger" institutional dynamics in Aligarth. And in the opposite direction, he details the complex set of forces that resulted in greater political, social, and economic inclusion and cooperation in Calicut. While most communities may be somewhere in the middle of a Calicut or Aligarth, the outliers where violence is extensive or practically nonexistent shed valuable light on the underlying mechanisms that shape patterns of violence and also social change and transitions to peace, when that happens.

**Peace and violence in the countryside**

Rural violence differs from urban in that it is usually more limited because societal interactions are more frequent and intimate. Everyone knows one another, and this raises the stakes for deviating from acceptable conducts and risking one’s honor and status. But many exceptions can be found of rural strife that cascades into brutal and widespread violence. Also, because the presence of the state is often weaker in rural settings, villages more commonly feature an array of informal and customary institutions that may be engaged in local governance matters. The literature is full of pros and cons on these overlapping governance systems. The various local structures and norms may variously complement or clash with one another, or some of both.

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32 For a comprehensive report of the nature and costs of crime and violence engulfing Central America, and the central role of drug trafficking, see World Bank (2011).

33 Rodgers describes a surprise local attack by a rival gang that resulted in nearly 100 injuries, some severe, and extensive property damage. Neighbors got the police involved, but much greater fear and insecurity surrounded the neighborhood during the second visit.
Janet Welsh (2010) offers a fascinating case study of a particular form of justice found throughout history in diverse societies around the world, the lynch mob. She combines ethnographic work with a 10-year crime and violence dataset on lynch mob events in four provinces of Indonesia. The dataset reveals mobbing patterns to be concentrated both temporally and geographically. At its peak in 2001, Welsh documented 781 incidents of lynching and more than 1,000 victims during the year; but while the remote eastern district of Bali featured the largest concentration of incidents, cases of lynching were rare in the remote west region of the same province (2010, 126-8). The spike in this type of violence (and many other forms as well) followed in the wake of the 1998 popular uprising that forced Suharto to resign. While acknowledging the wider turmoil that swept across the country, Welsh attributes the strong variance in mob violence primarily to local factors and "the tacit, and sometimes explicit, approval of local elites of the use of mobbing, the acquiescence of local law enforcement to mobbing, and learned behavior of mob violence as conflict resolution (stemming from repeated patterns of violence in specific communities)... (1210, 120).

Moritz (2010) traces a series of herder-farmer conflicts in Burkina Faso and Cameroon to assess why some conflicts escalated into violence while others did not. In his accounts of farmer-herder clashes in Cameroon, longstanding ethnic and gender inequalities contributed to outbreaks of violence, but these factors were also present in the herder-farmer conflicts that did not unleash violence. Instead, Moritz emphasizes forms of interaction among local actors that served to either diffuse or escalate tensions.

In the Grassfields of Northwest Cameroon, herders are typically male members of the Aku (a sub-ethnic Fulani pastoral group) who migrated into herding areas on the outskirts of villages that may also be farmed by women of the local Aghu group. The women farmers enjoy limited land rights, and over time have been pushed onto lands at greater and greater distances from their villages and closer to grazing lands. When herders encroach on women's lands and damage crops, local authorities have generally disregarded the women's requests for help. Instead, when threatened, women in this region resort to a form of collective protest known as "anlu", which involves sizable groups of women confronting individual transgressors face-to-face in their homes and engaging in menacing behaviors until the herder repents. In a few cases, herder-farmer confrontations have become violent. In a conflict in 1980, for instance, 16 women and 2 men were wounded and hospitalized when the women tried to hold three herders responsible for damage. Local authorities were distracted with preparations for a meeting at the time, and Aghem men immediately stepped in and took up the women's protest. The men widened the

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34 Welsh defines lynching as "a ritualized form of violence that involves the practice of an unlawful group, usually ordinary citizens, controlling and punishing crime usually in the form of a lynching or a severe beating" (2010, 121). She created the dataset of lynching incidents from local media reports.

35 Welsh presents accounts of mobbing in response to adultery, theft, and witchcraft, and evidence of the episodes being highly premeditated, sanctioned by village elites, and forms of violence wielded by the mobs dictated by local codes. Petty theft, for instance, might be disciplined with a public lashing, but witchcraft charges can invite extremely brutal torture and death. Moral codes and legitimating processes that surround mobbing then determined whether such episodes were viewed as community justice or murder, with the latter setting of a chain reaction of deadly revenge mobbing.

36 In protest of a large land sale in 1958 to Nigerian Igbo by the colonial government, the women took their collective action a major step further: "Women from all over the region joined the anlu, which transformed into an active and ongoing force that shut down markets and schools, blocked roads, and disrupted life in the chiefdom for a period of three years..." (Moritz 2010, 143).
conflict from a dispute with three herders to challenging the entire Aku population in the area. A horrific pogrom ensued against the Aku. To explain the escalation into widespread violence, Moritz discusses how the conflict unleashed a set of reinforcing processes, including psychological changes (such as "dehumanization and deindividuation of the other"), aggressive group dynamics, and especially lack of effective mediators, namely police and other authorities (Moritz 2010, 140).

The rural literature on local violence often calls attention to the plurality of formal, customary, and informal institutions that are potentially available for dispute mediation. That Aghu women must come together and resort to risky anlu practices is testament to their exclusion from more established arenas when their livelihoods become endangered. Local conflicts can sometimes be opportunities for local institutional development and innovation, and for leaders to become trusted and gain legitimacy and power. Alternatively, as Lecoutere acknowledges in his study of irrigation conflicts, local institutional responses to conflict can "also reproduce deeply entrenched power imbalances and gender roles" (2011, 252). His analysis of irrigation conflicts in Mufindi district of Tanzania, Lecoutere found more powerful and better off male farmers "forum shopping" to resolve disputes, and benefitting from access to: "Stronger, more authoritative and often more bureaucratic instruments for conflict management..." (Lecoutere 2011, 268). He argues, however, that institutional pluralism can also enable pragmatic and creative problem solving, providing alternative arenas where local farmers successfully forged water sharing agreements that kept them from attacking one another. Women and less powerful community members, however, rely more heavily on customary and informal mechanisms, and these may well perpetuate rather than attenuate power imbalances when conflicts arise.

**Peace and violence in the wake of major political conflict**

As part of the larger global Moving Out of Poverty (MOP) research program, Narayan and Petesch (2010) explore a dataset of 103 mainly rural communities at different stages of conflict and post-conflict recovery in seven countries. The authors find, "Postconflict environments are characterized by a potent mixture of poverty, wide availability of arms, an unleashing of pent-up private conflicts, and a breakdown of social norms that ordinarily serve to curtail outward expressions of violence" (Narayan and Petesch 40). Still, against expectations, the set of communities that were directly exposed to armed political violence had more rapid recovery and poverty reduction than communities that were only indirectly exposed to the political violence (Narayan and Petesch 2010, 19). In communities with the highest poverty reduction, reinforcing combinations of visionary leadership, access to markets, and well designed assistance programs often played valuable roles. These periods were also times when the shock and exigencies of conflict and recovery led to a relaxation of gender norms and some opening of new opportunities for women (see box 2).

Chapter six of Narayan and Petesch (2010) presents a case study of Ramili Qali, a village outside Kabul, Afghanistan that was one of many sample communities reduced to ashes by war but which went on to experience rapid poverty reduction by the time of the data collection in 2006. Two factors are key to the village's rapid recovery. First, Ramali Qali benefited from a community leader with a strong vision of rebuilding the entire village, which was majority Tajik but also home to a significant Pashtun population. During focus groups there, the village's water supply manager, a Tajik, confided that he had refused "to distribute irrigation water to a Pashtun
of the village; a former member of the Taliban who was hated because of the burning of the village houses. The Pashtun appealed to the chief, who forced the manager, a Tajik, to release the water to him" (Narayan and Petesch 2010, 164). The volume is full of illustrations of other leaders who took similarly sensitive but visible steps to build bridges across the fault lines of the war, and this helped greatly to reduce mistrust and risks of renewed violence so common in the wake of major conflicts.  

The second main factor that helped Ramili Qali recover quickly was that the village benefited from strategic aid programs that established security and enabled villagers to resettle quickly and rebuild their homes and livelihoods. After an NGO cleared 12,000 mines from From Ramili Qali's streets and farms, a housing program with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) led to rapid reconstruction of 200 homes in 2002, and in 2003 a small seed and fertilizer program helped farmers begin to plant some crops and vegetables. In 2004, the National Solidarity Program arrived (a participatory community development program), and village members engaged in the study considered this to be the most important aid to their recovery. After electing men's and women's councils, as required by the program, the women chose an electric project, and the men restoration of their irrigation canals. Other aid flowed in for farming and wells. Incentives for renewing violence ease where recovery of housing, infrastructure, and livelihoods make this costly.

In rural Cambodia, several of the MOP research communities struggled with persistent local crime, violence, and illegal economic activities for years after the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements were signed. Especially in remote villages sampled in Cambodia, new forms of violence took hold associated with collusion between state agents and elites in the plunder of fish stocks and logs. Villagers "also reported a breakdown of social morality, manifested in the increased theft of property (such as buffaloes, motorcycles, fishing nets), assaults on women, and emergence of male youth gangs that provoked fights between villages" (Narayan and Petesch 2010, 35). In Cambodian villages where roads were repaired more quickly, and hence more able to access markets, government services, and the flush of postconflict aid, such lawlessness did not always disappear but these villages were less vulnerable. In the village of Sastaing, for instance, farmers sold off livestock to avoid theft, and their farming and fishing continued to be disrupted by ongoing insecurity. Nevertheless, their access to roads, commerce, and new aid-funded local irrigation infrastructure helped households to accumulate assets and transition to mechanized farming. Sastaing, like Ramali Qali in Afghanistan, also experienced rapid poverty reduction.

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37 Other examples include a leader in Paitatu of Mindando, Philippines, who ensured that each clan received housing assistance despite strong pressures to favor their own clan; or cooperative leader on the outskirts of Cartagena, Colombia who worked to build bonds and support income generation with cash crops among impoverished farmers from different regions who had been displaced by the conflict there.

Out of dire necessity, the period during and after conflict often marks a phase when many women assume a larger public presence in their communities and begin or increase their economic participation. In some cases, both Justino and others (2012) and Petesch (2011, 2012) find that community welfare is higher where women are more active in the local economy and other public arenas of their community. Women's new roles may well invite violent backlash against them, but women still widely report periods during and after conflict to be very empowering.

Across many communities women often intensified or diversified their livelihood activities in efforts to help their households to cope with the consequences of conflict and weak local economies. In some contexts, it was easier for women to work because they were not the primary targets of violence. In addition, due to strong social norms that surround jobs, women are often more willing than men in times of stress to engage in low paying and low status livelihoods like street vending or domestic work. Where available, post-conflict programs in infrastructure development, microcredit, and training also encouraged women to increase their economic initiatives. New electricity, water, and roads eased housework burdens and opened up new livelihoods, such as selling cold drinks and prepared foods. Many households that had relied on solely on agriculture were able to diversify income sources and, in some cases, move out of poverty as a result.

Some local opportunity structures, however, were much more inviting than others for women's economic initiatives. In North Maluku, as explored by Petesch (2011), women had a longer history of owning assets (due to inheritance practices) and also with participating in their local economy than, for instance, women from Tamil communities in conflict-affected regions of Sri Lanka. The women's life stories from North Maluku consistently showed how such assets provided the women with greater independence, productive capital, and resilience in the face of the 2001 violent conflict that engulfed the island. Once peace was restored, women invested in recovering their farming on lands they owned, or some became entrepreneurs for the first time, for instance, launching small shops and bakeries with their own resources and rotating loan funds that became available due to new aid programs operating there after the conflict.

By comparison, the second Petesch study (2012) mostly featured communities with more traditional gender norms where few women controlled major assets or worked for pay. Conflict often propelled women into greater economic participation in these contexts as well, including due to widowhood or men who fled to join armed groups. But the women's increased farming or vending activities resulted in little relaxation of traditional gender norms. Women's overriding obligations remained as their family's caretakers, and, for instance, practices of seclusion continued to be strictly enforced that require women and girls to be accompanied by a male relative when moving beyond their immediate neighborhoods areas. Still, women in both Petesch studies widely reported that their experiences as empowering with bringing their households through difficult conflict periods. In sharp contrast, men across these same communities mainly reported frustration and a sense of emasculation as their economic opportunities deteriorated and disappeared due to conflict, and were slow to be restored in the post-conflict period. These frustrations likely underpin men's resistance to women's growing agency, and sometimes their violence against women in private and public spheres.

In the majority of communities visited in Liberia, women described strong expectations on them to provide sexual favors in exchange for low-end jobs and sometimes for working as informal venders. "Women are now working since the war ended. Sex is part of the deal, and this gives women an advantage in the labor force," remarks a village woman of Suakoko district in Liberia. A young man from a town in Tewor district perceives that sex for work "has become almost a natural phenomena," and men can also be expected to provide sex although this appears to be less common. In Sudan, women described hawking tea as one of the worst jobs that many women do because they could be treated like prostitutes if under age 40, and older women are harassed as well. Unmarried women in Sudan doing domestic work risked sexual advances that "deprived a girl of modesty." Women's jobs cleaning schools and selling in telecom centers and shops are also deemed undesirable for these same reasons. The numerous focus group accounts of the dangers facing working women may be more reflective of cultural views rather than women's actual experiences and risks, but either way such perceptions have the practical effect of

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discouraging women's economic participation and returns. They also prevent a shift in the many gender norms that constrain women's freedom of action and contributions to the recovery of their communities.

Although systematic evidence remains limited, there are many indications in the literature that wartime violence spills into civilian life and intensifies men's resort to violence "as a way of maintaining a sense of power and control" in contexts where their authority and provider roles face great challenges and women's independence is often growing. The studies clearly show that gender norms and women's empowerment do not necessarily change together as a consequence of conflict. Yet somehow, despite pressures to conform to traditional norms and the limited economic opportunities available to them, women across diverse communities report conflict periods as times when they can more easily take initiative and gain more independence. "For women, as for men," Petesch argues (2012, 18), "bad economic opportunities and greater freedom of action seem to be more desirable than lives with scarcely any choices at all."

Regression analysis with the MOP community dataset finds the single biggest explanatory factor of movements out of poverty over the 1995-2005 observation period of the study to be the presence of representative local councils in 1995 (Narayan and Petesch 2010, 87). That is, the set of communities from conflict-affected countries that had somehow managed to construct councils that bridged the most salient local ethnic or religious divides were also the most likely to find pathways for more inclusive recovery after the shock of conflict. This finding is consistent with the presence of local bridging institutions uncovered in the more peaceful communities in many of the case studies discussed above.

Where poverty reduction was limited, the MOP communities often reveal a tight nexus between local insecurity, political exclusion, weak markets, and social division, reinforcing a dense and thorny web of inequitable social relations and norms that both slow and skew local processes of post-conflict recovery. For a whole host of ethical as well as practical reasons, no one should recommend violent conflict as a means to loosen this web and potentially tip communities onto more equitable and just trajectories. But for some communities, as leaders are striving to recover legitimacy, as community members are striving to recover livelihoods and longing for security and normalcy, and as a rush of external reconstruction and development resources become available, these are moments that can provide windows of opportunity for peace building and more rapid and inclusive development on the ground.

III. A Community Lens on State-building Projects

The cases above stressed the role of local leaders and popular networks in shaping prospects for crime and violence. In the sections below we work through five case studies that illustrate the substantial power of state agents operating at national and subnational levels to affect prospects for local peace and violence. The first two cases were constructed on the basis of "natural experiments." More specifically, post-conflict international boundary formations paved the way for sharply different experiences for the same ethnic group populations on either side of the

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40 See, for instance, Sideris (2002). For additional analysis of how gender-based violence and other anti-social behaviors can intensify as men struggle to adapt to their changing economies in conflict contexts, see Bouta, Frerks, and Bannon (2005) and insightful case studies in Bannon and Correia (2006).
The remaining case studies explore community experiences with governmental policing and decentralization programs.

**One border, two development trajectories**

Drawing on research by Miguel (2004), Collier (2008) presents a comparative case study of two districts, Busia in Kenya and Meatu in Tanzania, that are divided by an international border but share the same mix of diverse ethnic groups. Within the Kenya district, localities characterized by strong ethnic diversity "had 25 percent less school funding per pupil than the homogenous localities. ... and [head teachers] blamed ethnic rivalries for the unwillingness of parents to support the school" (Collier 2008, 71). Just across the border, in the Tanzanian district, ethnic patterns had no effect on school funding among localities. Collier attributes the low significance of ethnic diversity in Tanzania to an explicit and successful strategy by Julius Nyerere, president from 1964 to 1985, to supplant local ethnic identities with a national Tanzanian identity through dedicated policy action on diverse fronts. Measures included advancing a national language (Kiswahili), a Pan-Tanzanian discourse of the nation's history, and equitable public investments (especially education policies). Collier then contrasts Nyerere's legacy with that of President Kenyatta's persistent and divisive favoritism to his own tribe, triggering ongoing resentment, less effective public services, and persistent problems of ethnic violence.42

Dumitru and Johnson (2011) document with both quantitative and qualitative evidence the contrasting experiences of Jews during the Holocaust residing in the adjacent territories of Bessarabia and Transnistria, which in that period both belonged to Bulgaria.43 The two territories contained Jewish populations of similar size; however, Bessarabian Jews experienced extreme violence from civilians and combatants alike during World War II, while genocidal violence was more constrained in Transnistria. The territories had been part of the Russian Empire, but in 1918 Bessarabia joined Romania while Transnistria became part of the newly established Soviet state. For 23 years Bassarabian Jews faced continuation of strong state-sponsored anti-Semitism, while Jews of Transnistria benefited from Soviet attempts "to reverse a history of interethnic animosity, to fight actively against anti-Semitism, and to encourage equality among ethnic groups and integrate Jews into Soviet society in a way that had never been done previously" (Dumitru and Johnson 2011, 21). Jews still faced discrimination in the Soviet regime, but the authors discuss governmental persecution of public demonstrations of anti-Semitism, campaigns to undo negative stereotypes, and measures to actively integrate Jews into broader society "through radical affirmative action programs." In just a generation, the authors

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41 While these particular cases focus on how national policies reduced risks of violence, it is important to recognize that macro level policies may also exacerbate risks. Responses to structural adjustment policies can illustrate. As cited in Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock (2011, 298, fn 21): "Caffentzis and Federici (2001) provide a long list of examples of violent resistance to structural adjustment programs (SAPs).... In Algeria in October, two hundred people were killed in rioting about price increases and unemployment in the wake of a new SAP. In Bolivia in April 2000, protests against plans by the Bolivian government to privatize water supplies resulted in seven deaths. In Niger in February 1990, between three and fourteen students were killed by police after protesting against reductions in education funding mandated by a SAP...."

42 Collier presents survey evidence of extensive fears and expectations of violence in the run up to the late 2007 elections in Kenya, which in fact triggered major violence over allegations of electoral fraud by the (ethnic based) ruling party. For another thoughtful case study of how state-supported cohesion across ethnic groups can foster support for and improved outcomes for public goods, see historical analysis of Kerala, India by Singh (2010).

43 Today these territories are in Moldova and Ukraine.
argue the policies transformed societal relations that had been marked by sharp disadvantage and extreme risks for Jews; and the new interethnic ties that had flowered across communities in the interwar period helped to protect Jews of Transnitria from state-sponsored genocide during the Holocaust.44

As stressed by Tilly, Bates, and many other conflict experts, violence risks reflect national regimes and their capacities for monopolizing use of force and enforcing rule of law across the national territory. The case studies around international boundaries reveal striking effects on security conditions of coherent and multidimensional policy campaigns to construct a more cohesive society by actively advancing more inclusive and fairer institutions. The policies and programs adopted in Tanzania and the Soviet Union have no doubt been tried and failed elsewhere, and likely have uneven effects on the ground even in the best of conditions. Still, the cases point to rapid positive societal transformations that can sometimes transpire on the ground, and which largely stem from national policy initiatives to serve wider public interests by reducing risky societal inequalities.

**Law and order for whom?**

Other case studies of public action to reduce crime and violence are instructive of the challenges and opportunities on the ground. Rodgers and Satija (2012) trace significant transformations in levels and forms of violence in Patna, one of India's poorest cities in the capital of Bihar state. Patna underwent an aggressive and successful policing campaign against organized crime in 2005, resulting in a sharp drop in the city's homicides levels. Yet, drawing on official statistics, survey data, and focus group accounts, the authors present evidence of persistence of other forms of crime and violence, notably burglaries and domestic violence. Rodgers and Satija show how in the wake of the policing program Patna's crime and violence became more geographically concentrated in slum areas, and also more hidden due to a rise in domestic violence that accompanied a liberalization of alcohol production and sales. Survey respondents reported their biggest sources of risk to be intra-slum conflicts and domestic violence against women, and the biggest trigger of violence to be alcohol use by men. Violence sometimes arises from clashes among slum dwellers over lack of water and sanitation and other missing services; and police do intervene to keep these conflicts from spilling into ethnic riots. Yet, little police protection is available to the hidden victims of domestic violence. The authors acknowledge that policing reforms have reduced violent organized crime and Patna is safer "for those whose lives are more mobile, or living within richer areas;" but they warn that the city has arguably become less safe "for the overwhelming majority living in the city's slums" (Rodgers and Satija 2012, 51).

The Patna case is part of a larger four-city investigation (Moser and Rodgers 2012), which finds similar trends of increasingly concentrated violence in poorer areas across the cities covered. The case studies document how forms of and trends in violence vary significantly across the localities sampled, and how the local institutional context shapes these patterns and gives rise to what they call "violence chains." The research particularly tries to identify strategic openings for weakening violence chains and tipping cities and their violent neighborhoods onto more peaceful trajectories. Their data also indicate that even the better off areas that are now safer may well

44 Unlike in Besarabia where numerous pogroms are well documented, the authors were unable to find evidence of single wartime pogrom in Transnitria in survivor testimonies, government records, or secondary sources.
not be safe for women due to extensive problems of domestic violence. Among their conclusions, the authors find that violence and crime prevention strategies focused on law and order alone are unlikely to be adequate.

Lonergan (2004) provides an encouraging assessment of local council (LC) experiences with dispute resolution and community policing activities in two urban and two rural communities of Uganda. The system of local governance and policing was introduced during the civil war and became consolidated when the war ended in 1986. In Luziga Zone of Kampala, for instance, the LC oversees court cases involving domestic disputes and illegal building structures, and has mobilized community patrols and collaborated with local police to deter petty crimes. Importantly, Lonergan describes how the LC is composed of members from the diverse ethnic groups that reside in the Kampala neighborhood. "Because they deal effectively with these issues their occurrence has declined and there have been no incidents of mob justice..." reports Lonergan (2004,5). She cautions that women and migrants report less satisfaction that the LC's address their concerns, and LC activities must rely largely on volunteers and may well lose effectiveness over time. Still, Lonergan (2004, 3) concludes that the LCs "have had a remarkable ordering effect on social life and have acted as a first line of protection against disorder and crime and the first point of call when it does occur."

### Community Development as Conflict or Cooperation?

With a large sample covering 16 subdistricts, Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2011) provide a finely grained analysis of experiences with a community-driven development (CDD) program in the Indonesian countryside. The program was known as the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) when launched as a pilot by the World Bank in the late 1980s. With promising early results, the government took over and scaled up KDP to a national program during the tumultuous years of the financial crisis and democratic transition in the late 1990s. KDP operates as a competitive community block grant program, and requires broad-based participation of community members in selecting and monitoring their own projects. The program is widely popular, and continues to be the country's flagship initiative to alleviate poverty. As of 2011, quite remarkably, KDP is responsible for:

- Km of farm/rural roads built: 68,821
- No. of bridges built: 8,142
- No. of irrigation systems built: 6,527
- No. of clean water systems built: 29,701
- No. of public toilets and washing facilities built: 16,101
- No. of school buildings built or rehabilitated: 21,855

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45 With KDP, decisions on use of funds are decentralized directly to community groups, typically for productive infrastructure or economic activities. KDP requires community members, including women and poor community members, to reach consensus on development projects for their village, and then compete with surrounding communities on getting their project proposals funded.
• No. of health facilities built or rehabilitated: 10,839
• No. of village electricity units built: 1,401
• No. of education activities supported: 120,590
• No. of health activities supported: 1,301
• No. of women revolving loan fund activities supported: 258,578

CDD models have been applied in myriad settings, including those affected by conflicts and disasters.46 A major meta review of CDDs (Mansuri and Rao 2013) finds their impacts to be highly uneven due to problems of elite capture, weak local capacities, and poor program designs that are not informed by political and social analysis or adequate monitoring and evaluation systems. KDP, however, has benefited from strong multidisciplinary analytic and management inputs in both design and implementation phases. And findings by Barron, Diprose and Woolcock as well as others point to the potential of well designed and implemented CDD models to reduce poverty48 and foster social inclusion and local democracy.

The fieldwork for the KDP study was conducted in East Java and East Nusa Tenggara (NNT). The two provinces are similar in that both struggled with problems of local conflict in the late 1980s, but otherwise they vary strongly, with East Java the more populated, homogenous (in ethnicity), and prosperous of the two.49 Within each province, 8 districts were selected, with each district including three KDP communities and a "control" village where KDP had yet to arrive.

The authors report that on the whole KDP alone had little spillover effects in containing violent conflict in the program communities relative to the communities without KDP. When comparing violent incidents among KDP communities that have been participating for at least three or four years, however, then "rates of violent conflict [are] noticeably lower" in East Java and less so in NTT (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2011, 146). Significantly, the research uncovered just a single case of violence induced by conflict over a KDP intervention (or 2 percent of all conflicts), compared to 38 violent disputes (or 5 percent) associated with development interventions by other providers operating in their research communities (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2011, 136). Violence in non-KDP interventions included, for instance, riots and property destruction in 2001 in Central Kalimantan in response to funds running out for

47 Fearon and others (2009) assess a post-conflict CDD program in Liberia and find that communities that participated in the program displayed higher levels of cooperation to address community needs than communities which did not participate in the program.
48 A KDP evaluation (Voss 2008) finds no impact overall on household consumption, but a 5 percent rise among the bottom quintile.
49 As Barron, Diprose and Woolcock explain (2012, 17), "The rationale for selecting such different provinces was that if we found similar patterns in very different contexts, it was more likely that those findings reflected broader trends across other locations." The leading types of conflict in both research areas included conflicts over physical resources, service delivery, political office and influence, and vigilantism and retribution (by far the most prevalent).
promised food aid to displaced Madurese. By contrast, the authors detail cases where problems with KDP disbursement of funds triggered quick interventions by program facilitators to keep local tensions from escalating. The authors conclude that KDP's success:

... was largely because KDP projects, by virtue of emerging from a consultative process whereby communities define their needs, are imbued with a sense of legitimacy and equity, meaning that they are less likely to clash with local priorities and hence reduce conflict. KDP also has a battery of in-built mechanisms (both people and procedures) that allow tensions to be addressed as they arise. (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2011, 19).

Drawing on systematic documentation of 68 cases of local conflict and other qualitative evidence, the authors present accounts of how varied actors and mechanisms intervened to diffuse KDP conflicts, and over time these interactions helped to improve relations between state agents and community members and between competing ethnic groups and other identity cleavages (such as class and political affiliation). Groups that are typically marginalized from public decision making, such as women or very poor minority ethnic groups, are more likely to attend their village meetings in communities with KDP. The authors also provide a careful analysis of how KDP impacts vary depending on levels of district and village institutional capacities, and they conclude that the state's capacities at the district level play the most important role in program success (Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock 2011, 242). Their findings are broadly consistent with recommendations by Mansuri and Rao (2013) on the need for both effective redress systems on the ground and governmental capacities at higher levels to keep CDD projects on track with their objectives.

IV. Reflections on Policy Lessons from the Case Studies

"It is in and through equitable processes of contestation that the content, legitimacy, and effectiveness of institutions emerge." (Barron, Diprose, Woolcock 2011, 9)

Most assessments of community violence stress that it arises where local leaders frame conflicts in divisive terms and mobilize violence specialists to enforce their might, overwhelming individual and collective interests in the wider community for security and justice. Contexts that are peaceful, by contrast, are marked by leaders and associational life that reach across contentious social divides and embody a normative environment that, when the inevitable conflicts arise, largely constrain abuses of authority, political extremism, and the costly resort to violent tactics. When, where and why bridging ties, and ever larger "trust networks" that embody wider societal interests sometimes emerge--and then gain traction and influence on the ground--is still not well understood. These networks, however, appear to be critical for meaningful democratic processes to unfold, especially in societies characterized by large inequalities (Tilly 2003). The case studies also show that national and subnational leaders and policies committed to reducing risky societal cleavages can play powerful roles in shaping prospects for local crime and violence.
World Development Report 2011 poses the challenge for states facing cycles of conflict as one of needing to transition from conditions of violence and fragility to a normative climate that restores confidence and to authority structures able to deliver citizen security, justice and jobs. The community case studies reaffirm this holistic framing of the policy agenda. There is also growing evidence, as highlighted below, of high payoffs for communities that access strategic multisectoral interventions with crime and violence reduction objectives.

But most communities struggling with great violence lack access to these comprehensive approaches. And in too many contexts, local peace building champions may themselves become targets of extreme violence. Narayan and Petesch (2010, 89) found that communities directly affected by conflict had weaker recoveries where "they had councils, elections, and even fair elections." Local democratic structures misbehave in lawless and threatening contexts. But there is also extensive evidence that predatory and excluding institutions are not immutable. Civic leaders and networks that envision and aspire to better futures sometimes mobilize successfully to contest and change the structures and norms that disadvantage them. The policy challenge is whether and how external interventions can potentially tap into and nurture these champions and networks. The record on this remains mixed and cries out for greater learning and more careful experimentation to reduce the strong potential of decentralized interventions to fuel more rather than less violence.

The case study literature consistently demonstrates how communities feature varied and overlapping networks, of more or less formality, that when tensions and threats arise function alternately to discourage or encourage rumors, fears, and extremist perceptions. Where these networks embody interactions of trust across key ethnic, socio-economic, and village or neighborhood areas, depending on the context, this seems to provide a powerful protective force for more principled norms of conduct and more effective institutional functioning, both in everyday life and in times of shock. Varshney equates these processes to institutionalized peace systems as opposed to institutionalized riot systems. Moser and Rodgers (2012) adapt the concept of tipping points to cast a spotlight on locally constructed innovations that disrupt violence chains and lead to safer slums. Petesch (2011 and 2012) assesses the gender dimensions of these dynamics, and shows how periods during and after political conflict may sometimes provide openings for women to gain more autonomy and freedom in their households, local markets and other public spaces, thereby contributing importantly to more inclusive and rapid recovery.

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50 As discussed above, where councils included members that were broadly representative of social group differences in the community, then the councils were associated with significant poverty reduction.

51 Appadurai (2004). Charles Tilly identifies three processes that have underpinned large-scale democratization processes across the ages: "increasing integration of trust networks into public politics, increasing insulation of public politics from categorical inequality, and decreasing autonomy of major power centers from public politics" (Tilly 2007, 23).

52 Siegle and O’Mahoney (2006) find that rural violence and instability intensified in Colombia after the onset of a major decentralization program as armed groups muscled their way into public office or local procurements. Nordholt and van Klinken (2007) similarly conclude that decentralization led to increased resource capture by elites in post-Soeharto Indonesia, sometimes resulting in violent conflict (as in the case of North Maluku) between elites and the different ethnic groups they represent.

As Lecoutre argues, "Problem solving and the processes of institutional evolution happen in a socially embedded way. This means that responses to emerging conflicts depend on who is involved, on who is intervening, on actors' gender and on actors' involvement in other incidents" (2011, 268). Local leaders use their power to frame the normative discourse on the sources of risk and the quality of cohesion and trust across their communities. This discourse, nevertheless, has to be broadly congruent with understandings of and experiences with risks and social interactions in the wider community. In short, the case studies reveal a world where risk management capacities at the community level have both supply- and demand-side dimensions, which interact and reinforce one another for better or worse. Whether and how external actors and interventions may (or may not) tip the scales towards more security, justice and jobs cannot be readily predicted.

As Barron, Diprose and Woolcock argue, facilitators for the Indonesian CDD program, KDP, did not only need an understanding of the local contexts, but also a "a capacity to adjust to some local norms and resist others" in order to create decision-making arenas where marginalized groups could begin to gain a voice in the affairs of their community (2011, 266). This is not an easy mission. And project frameworks and evaluations that stress measurable short-term outcomes make this challenge all the harder. Understanding and building capacities for managing risks requires a different lens that can better capture both formal and informal local governance systems and the uncertain dynamics of change processes on the ground. Institutional transitions take time and require well-grounded and specialized interventions, especially in contexts endangered by extrajudicial killings and other crime and violence.

Taken together, these realities point to five broad areas of good practices that may help communities struggling with crime and violence to move onto more secure pathways.

1. **Provide crime and violence monitoring systems that can meet local level needs for relevant and timely information.** The first order of business in any community facing crime and violence is to establish security. Given that patterns of violence are so varied and dynamic on the ground, information systems are needed that can report the different forms of violence and crime, and emerging hotspots, in real time and in ways that are both authoritative and widely accessible. In seven cities of Colombia, for example, the Institute for Peace Promotion and Injury/Violence Prevention and the Colombia Program at Georgetown University have collaborated in 21 "observatories" to document violence and unintentional injuries. This information was then used to inform prevention strategies that resulted in dramatic declines in homicides (Willman and Makisaka 2010, 51).

In the digital age, inexpensive crowd sourcing technologies enable eyewitnesses to send reports of violence and crime by email and text message, and web-based software can then register these reports geographically to identify hotspots. An initiative based in Cairo, Egypt, called HarassMap, is a mobile phone-based reporting system for cases of women encountering harassment while moving about city streets, which is raising awareness of the problem and warning women of trouble spots.

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54 Joseph Bock (2012) documents how communications technologies have helped to avert violence in Africa, Asia, and the United States. Ushahidi software, for instance, was used to develop an early warning system prior to elections in Kenya, and in the development of a Crisis Map in Haiti after the earthquake. His book also addresses limitations with these information systems, such as concerns for accuracy.
Blair, Blattman and Hartman (2012) tested an early warning system in Liberia based on applying various forecasting models to survey data, and accurately predicted 40 to 70 percent of all incidents of conflict (while generating only three to five false alarms depending on the model used). The authors argue that possibilities for data-driven forecasting are promising and cost-effective, and more attention should be paid to anticipating and preventing future conflicts.

2. **Advance policy frameworks to reduce societal fragility and social group inequalities.** "In divided societies," Horowitz warns, "ethnic affiliations are powerful, permeative, passionate, and pervasive" (1998, 12). Rather than policies centered on group preferences or affirmative action, Horowitz calls on policymakers to consider location and investment policies specifically designed to reduce social inequalities. These could be expensive initially, but they "may cost less a short way down the road and yet bring great benefits in both productivity and ethnic harmony" (Horowitz 1998, 680). In somewhat similar fashion, World Bank (2012a) calls for and highlights experiences with measures specifically designed to reduce risky social group cleavages.

In his conclusions, Varshney (2002, 252-4, 292-3) provides accounts of how in Ahmadabad, India, SEWA's 55,000 members --which bring together Hindu and Muslim working and poor women in that city--were able to work for and keep peace in their neighborhoods when communal violence broke out. He also closes his book with discussion of a forward looking police chief of Bhiwandi, India who successfully tackled his town's history of violence by creating neighborhood committees with memberships that bridged Hindu and Muslim neighborhoods. When tensions rose in the late 1980s, committee members of both groups joined together to patrol the streets "for nights on end" and keep rumors from flying (Varshney 2002, 2945). Activist unions, government champions, and a broad range of other actors on the ground need to be supported in building more cohesive and peaceful communities.

OECD (2011), in partnership with UNDP and Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development conducted a mapping exercise on major armed violence reduction and prevention programs (AVRP) in six countries. And these are showing promising results. They report that the most promising activities "are multi-sector, operate at multiple levels, and rely on extensive partnerships among many actors" (OECD 2011, 14). A mapping exercise of crime and violence protection programs in Brazil uncovered nearly 200 activities, about half of which involve some level of government participation; half of the activities target domestic violence, and about a third address problems of youth, gang and school violence (OECD 2011,46). A program in Diadema, Brazil combines enforcement of restrictions on alcohol and gun sales, creation of mediation centers, and a public education campaign on preventing crime and violence; and these interventions were followed by a 44 percent drop in homicide rates between 2002 and 2005. A similar drop in homicide rates ensued after the *Fica Vivo* (Stay Alive) program in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, which encompassed stepped up policing in hotspot areas, police training on

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55 Out of 60 potential risk factors, they found four common variables across their models: higher population, more ethnic and religious diversity, larger presence of ex-combatants or exposure to wartime violence; and greater intra-communal wealth and assets.

56 Varshney also discusses how SEWA was intimidated by militant groups (who threatened violence) and refrained from more visible demonstrations of peace activism in the city.

and dedicated units for working in communities, monthly community meetings, and a range of community youth programs providing social support, education, and sports.58

It is important to acknowledge that policy agendas that cut across sectors and engage diverse actors do raise great challenges for program design and implementation. But the literature is nevertheless full of promising and innovative models making headway.

3. **Strengthen local institutional capacities to provide law and order and mediate disputes.** Ideally governments provide strong and independent systems of law and order for all citizens regardless of their ethnicity, gender, or socio-economic status. This core government function is central for leaders to be able to claim legitimacy and for citizens to gain confidence in their leaders. But the reality on the ground is often far different, and communities rather often provide their own brand of law and order through their local authority structures. The case study literature indicates that external support for swift and effective justice through these and other alternative routes is tricky territory in the best of circumstances. Too many cases are documented of community leaders and their "self-defense" militias that over time turn against their own community members. "Bottom-up" law and order programs that provide for some official participation and oversight may be more accountable, if not at least provide for more interactions between community members and representative of their state.

Formal community policing programs have flowered in hotspots around the world. These programs are valuable because they build networks between police and communities, foster civic engagement in areas where this is weak, and provide "institutionalization of forums for input and social control by citizens" (Sampson 2004, 11). In recent years, the justice sector has also experienced a flowering of innovative programs that provide communities with alternative arenas for resolving disputes. Several Latin American governments have created Casas de Justicia, which resolve everyday conflicts (such as over alimony agreements). And many NGOs around the world now provide alternative legal services. TIMAP for Justice, an NGO in Sierra Leone, trains paralegals who work both in the formal justice system and with traditional dispute mechanisms, such as community elders (Willman and Makisaka 2010, 28). Many of these programs employ restorative justice approaches which reach out to and engage families of victims and perpetrators of crime and violence in resolving disputes, including problems of domestic violence and juvenile delinquency.

A two-year program begun in 2009 by Mercy Corps established a large Network of Iraqi Negotiation Experts and provided the network with capacity building and mentoring. Members are leaders from across Iraq, and include Sunni and Shia, Arab and Kurd, tribal elders, religious leaders, government officials, politicians, and civic actors from all regions of the country. An evaluation found these leaders to have resolved nearly 130 major disputes during the brief program, "including tribal conflicts over land, tensions between citizens and government over services, election disputes, and clashes between rival factions of the Iraqi Army and police."

58 See Box 10, page 41 of Willman and Makisaka (2010). Box 12 in Willman and Makisaka (page 46) details a comprehensive program undertaken in Bogota to fight crime and violence, including provision of public web-based information about violence and crime in the city, disarmament campaigns, and restrictions on alcohol consumption), urban upgrading interventions, community policing and the Casas de Justicia, which resolve everyday conflicts (such as over alimony agreements).
(Mercy Corps n.d. iii). Their activities have received widespread press, and government authorities have backed their agreements with monetary and other support.

Blattman and others (2012) evaluated an intervention in Liberia that trained 15 percent of residents of 85 towns in mediation, and advocated informal resolution practices and forums. In the short-term, there is little evidence that overall levels of disputes declined, and this may in part be because the program likely encouraged old disputes to resurface. Still, the evaluation found higher land dispute resolution, and property disputes are an endemic problem there; and qualitative work suggests the program was successful in strengthening local mediation skills and legitimacy of informal dispute resolution processes.

There is a host of other innovative community-based responses to problems of violence across the world. An arms-free project for municipalities of El Salvador has made it illegal to carry firearms in public spaces of the participating communities (Eavis 2011, 9). Communities in diverse conflict contexts have declared themselves to be neutral peace zones, prohibiting all armed actors from using their communities to wage violence.

4. Prioritize local men's and women's economic opportunities. Microfinance and community-driven development models have yet to demonstrate a strong track record for delivering economic gains in targeted communities. Newer programs are showing more promise, however, that are combining generous assistance, meeting diverse needs for building skills and social and psychological support, and also attaching fewer strings to access resources.

As discussed in World Bank (2012b, 303) 54,000 ex-combatants from Rwanda's civil war received "cash assistance, counseling, vocational training, education, support for income-generation activities, and social reintegration activities involving community members." Surveys of this group found high levels of satisfaction with their reintegration and good relations with their neighbors, although some psychological and social hardships persist for this group as would be expected.

The government of Uganda launched a program in 2008 to provide unconditional and unsupervised cash transfer program (averaging $7,108 per group) to encourage entrepreneurship among young people in the north of the country, a region fraught with diverse forms of collective violence. Applicants had to form groups of 15 to 25 young adults interested in a vocation, who then cooperated in submitting a proposal for purchasing skills training, tools, and other materials to start an enterprise. The evaluation found little leakage, and a very rapid doubling of employment and cash earnings in the region, as well as modest improvements in social stability (Blattman, Fiala and Martinez 2011). The evaluators also found that participation in the program reduced stress and aggression among men. To the extent that programs with economic growth can reduce gender-related violence, this seems to have been the case.

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59 See, for instance, Gray (2012) for discussion of peace communities in Colombia, and Hull and Echavez for examples from Mindanao (2010).
60 Females, however, reported more engagement in physical fights (rising from 3 to nearly 5 percent of female respondents) and especially more quarrelsome and threatening. The authors speculate that this is due to greater engagement in the public sphere and greater targets of unwanted male aggression. It may, however, also be related to more generalized hardships and frustrations that young women especially face with breaking gender norms, which would be required to have a larger role beyond their households, control their new assets, negotiate greater economic independence to manage their enterprises, and balance their overriding domestic responsibilities.
objectives are reasonably generous, and linked to wider strategies for inclusion and justice for key social groups, there may be more traction on the ground.

As more women have joined labor markets and become active in other arenas of their communities, they have faced problems of harassment and violence in both public and private domains. In New Delhi, train services provide women-only cars to remove them from overcrowded train cars that invite harassment. An intervention in rural South Africa, the IMAGE program, combines microfinance with education sessions on gender awareness and HIV/AIDS. An impact evaluation found that women benefited economically from microfinance whether or not they participated in the education program, but only those who also received the education program were associated with gains in empowerment and reductions in intimate partner violence and HIV/AIDS risks (Pronyk and others, 2006). Studies also show that women's asset ownership is associated with reduced risks of domestic violence (Panda et al. 2006; Panda and Agarwal 2005). Periods after conflict and disasters, as well as resettlement and titling programs, can provide rare opportunities to reduce violence and large gender inequalities in ownership of major assets if they provide women along with men title to land or housing.

5. **Require timely redress mechanisms for community development interventions.** Both scholars and practitioners have struggled for decades with the fact that projects --whether intended to build infrastructure, create jobs, deepen democracy, reduce violence, or whatnot -- can often go awry and sometimes cause harm. Such realities call for community projects to include transparent and accountable mechanisms for community members to be able to lodge complaints and have them meaningfully addressed throughout the cycle of an intervention. Barron, Diprose, and Woolcock (2011) stressed that KDP's rapid redress system and skilled facilitators were indispensable for shutting down opportunities for its interventions to cause more harm than good. These measures, however, have been recommended components of community programs for decades now. It's past time for program designs and service providers—whether public, private or civic—that require community participation be effective, to be strictly accountable to risk management and rapid problem-solving.

Petesch (2012a) discusses a pilot project in community health in rural Ghana where some men were resorting to violence against their wives for seeking contraception to delay and space out their childbearing. Because village leaders had been hired as facilitators in the project, they were able to move quickly to persuade the men in their community to refrain from the violence; and community leaders also increased their public awareness campaigns about the health and other benefits of more widely spaced childbearing. This vital outreach component of the health program that engages local leaders, however, was never well understood or supported by the health ministry when the pilot project later went to scale. Even seemingly straightforward and beneficial community projects may be risky, and require well functioning redress systems. But an ounce of prevention is often difficult medicine to swallow.

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61 This note was drafted in a month when the murder of 27 educators and small children in Newtown, Connecticut, and the rape and murder of a medical student in New Delhi have triggered public outcries in those countries and expectations for meaningful policy responses.
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