The World Bank

PREMnotes

FEBRUARY 2012
NUMBER 17

Special Series on The Nuts & Bolts of M&E Systems

Performance Management in U.S. State Governments

Donald P. Moynihan

U.S. state governments are often referred to as laboratories of democracy. Within the federal framework, states have a great degree of flexibility in adopting different policy and management initiatives, which creates space for experimentation and innovation; however, the overall picture suggests more uniformity than innovation. Within a short period of time, states adopted very similar models of reform that created new procedures of agency performance reporting. As a result, there is now more performance data than ever before. But this does not mean the data are being used. While there was strong political support to adopt performance management reforms, elected officials proved less committed to pursuing the more significant changes needed for successful implementation. This note reviews factors that can make performance management more successful, using examples from states that continued forward and took the next steps.

The Adoption of Performance Management Requirements

The 1990s saw widespread and rapid adoption of performance management requirements in U.S. states. Prior to this decade, such reforms were unusual. But by the late 1990s, 31 states had legislative requirements creating performance information systems, and 16 states had similar administrative requirements (Melkers and Willoughby 1998). The adoption of these reforms continued through the 2000s, albeit at a slower rate. By 2004, 33 states had performance management statutes on the books, and the remaining 17 states had administrative requirements (Melkers and Willoughby 2004). By 2008, a survey of the states found that 39 states had performance-budgeting laws, and 6 other states had some sort of management requirement (Lu, Willoughby, and Arnett 2009). The majority of such laws were adopted in the 1990s and 2000s.

The adoption of such reforms via statute means that they are difficult to repeal, although some states such as Maine, Arkansas, and New Hampshire have done so. The statutes are also difficult for governors to ignore, and ensure a basic level of attention to performance management. In practice, the contents of these laws look quite similar: agencies are required to generate strategic goals and performance data on a regular basis. These data have to be reported to the central budget office, often as part of the budgeting process, and are sometimes required to be reported publicly. The similarity between the laws and their rapid adoption are largely thanks to the existence of a dominant model that the states have followed, the federal Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA, box 1).

It is important to note that GPRA does not directly apply to state governments. In the U.S. system, the constitution gives state governments a great deal of autonomy. The national (federal) government cannot simply order state governments to adopt a common set of management practices. This makes the United States distinctly different from countries where the central government can require states follow a common format or to pursue performance goals that the central government determines are appropriate. In this

Box 1. The Government Performance and Results Act

GPRA was passed in 1993 by the federal government and requires all federal organizations to engage in performance management. More specifically, it requires these agencies to generate three types of performance data on a routine schedule:

- Five-year strategic plans, including mission statements and long-term goals, starting in 1997;
- Annual performance goals starting in 1999; and
- Annual reporting of performance results starting in 2000.

In preparing these documents, agencies were asked to consult with stakeholders and legislative committees in Congress.

GPRA was updated in 2010. The GPRA Modernization Act encourages more active use of performance data. It requires agency officials to be responsible for specific goals, with quarterly reviews by senior agency officials of progress toward those goals. The act also calls for the identification of governmentwide strategic goals, cross-cutting goals of relevance to multiple agencies, and a central government Web site that will present performance data. Strategic plans will now be required on a four-year basis, in tandem with a president's term of office. Finally, the act requires that each agency has a performance improvement officer to lead performance management initiatives. It is too early to tell if state governments will use the GPRA Modernization Act as a model to inform their own performance management system as they did with the original GPRA.

Source: Author's compilation.

respect, the U.S. federal government cannot directly establish a central plan for the performance of lower levels of government.

However, the national government can influence state management practices indirectly, through two processes. First, the national government can adopt a management approach that becomes a model for states to voluntarily adopt. GPRA provided a framework for states to emulate. As described below, states adopted performance reporting requirements that looked very much like GPRA. The second mechanism by which the federal government influences states is via the intergovernmental process of revenue sharing. The federal government provides relatively few direct services itself, devolving much of its spending to third parties, including state governments. To comply with GPRA performance reporting requirements, federal agencies in turn ask state governments to provide performance data on any state activities that involve the spending of federal money (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006). Federal legislation in particular policy areas that provide grants to states, such as welfare reform or education, included additional performance reporting demands from the states. In this back-door fashion, the federal government compelled states to engage in performance reporting, although still leaving states with a good deal of discretion in developing their overall performance management framework.

Other factors also encouraged states to adopt GPRA-like performance management requirements. Performance management was actively disseminated and promoted by professional public administration and accounting organizations and other government groups (Moynihan 2008). The effect was to make performance management increasingly important to the professional legitimacy of governments. Credit-rating agencies also began to consider performance management as a criterion for rating the creditworthiness of state governments, providing a further incentive for states to adopt some type of performance reform.

The Nature of Performance Management Reforms

In adopting performance management reforms, states took a largely procedural approach, depending on agencies to generate and disseminate performance data. This approach made it relatively easy for such reforms to be adopted—no substantial costs were involved and there was little opposition—but did little to change the context in which performance management was supposed to occur.

State performance management reforms generally mirrored GPRA. The reforms require that state agencies regularly generate and disseminate mission statements, strategic plans, performance targets, and actual results. The amount of time spent auditing performance data for accuracy and usefulness varied from state to state. Usually, state agencies generated the data themselves, and either a legislative actor or the state treasury was

Box 2. New Public Management

"New Public Management" (NPM) refers to a broad agenda of reform ideas for the public sector that gained attention in the 1980s and 1990s. Proponents of NPM portrayed traditional bureaucracies as overly controlling, and fostering rule compliance rather than performance. Some of the policy ideas of NPM include creating a sense of competition through quasi-markets or outsourcing, emphasizing customer service, and reducing bureaucratic constraints over managerial authority. The emphasis on performance, key to NPM, demanded better performance data on government activities. The exemplars of NPM—countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—were seen as having moved away from bureaucratic constraints and yet able to hold managers even more accountable for performance.

Source: Adapted from Barzelay [2001].

responsible for auditing the data. Performance management ideas drew strongly from "New Public Management" (NPM, box 2) arguments about how governments should be organized.

NPM doctrine argued for encouraging innovation by reducing controls on inputs, while holding bureaucrats more accountable via performance measures. Schick's (2002) summary of NPM illustrates the central focus of performance improvement reforms, which is assumed to occur when:

- Managers have clear goals, with results measured against these goals;
- Managers are given flexibility in use of resources;
- Operational authority is devolved from central agencies and agency headquarters to operating levels and units;
- Government decisions and controls focus on outputs and outcomes rather than on inputs and procedures; and
- Managers are held accountable for the use of resources and the results produced.

Schick's characterization of NPM is interactive, illustrating how NPM concepts depend on one another to work, and are not simply a menu of independent prescriptions; flexibility and operational authority are increased in return for accountability based on results.

Managerial authority and the existence of performance information therefore offer two benchmarks for governments when examining the implementation of reform at the state level. The different configurations of these two variables are presented in table 1, which presents an interpretation of public management history as a gradual and logical transition from pre-bureaucratic spoils systems (cell [1]) to bureaucratic systems (cell [2]), to the NPM-inspired market model (cell [3]). Cell (4) represents a constrained performance system, where managers have limited authority, but are expected to produce results.

Pre-bureaucratic systems are represented in cell (1) of table 1. In this configuration, the combination of high levels of managerial authority with a lack of focus on results creates the potential for public officials to usurp the power of public organizations for goals unrelated to effectiveness,

Table 1. How Managerial Authority and a Focus on Results Create Different Management Systems

	Weak focus on results	Strong focus on results
High managerial authority	Cell 1: Pre-bureaucratic systems Focus on goals other than performance or rule probity (political spoils, personal enrichment).	Cell 3: Market model Managers have clear goals and authority to achieve goals. The goals are program effectiveness, higher technical efficiency and results-based accountability, but may also lead to opportunism, partisan values, and crowding out of intrinsic motivation.
Low managerial authority	Cell 2: Bureaucratic systems Strong focus on inputs and little incentive or authority to increase technical efficiency.	Cell 4: Constrained performance system Demand for results, but managers lack authority to engineer change, limiting performance improvement and results-based accountability.

Source: Adapted from Moynihan (2008).

such as maintaining political power; rewarding political supporters, friends, and relatives; or personal enrichment. The spoils system in 19th century U.S. government exemplified such characteristics, but such misuses of public authority are not uncommon in many poorer countries that lack sufficient controls to prevent mismanagement. In the United States, the spoils system led to the introduction of input controls that limited how public officials could use their human and financial resources. By limiting managerial authority, governments created traditional bureaucracies, as represented by cell (2) of table 1.

The bureaucratic model reduced corrupt behavior of public officials by limiting their ability to misuse public funds. However, NPM doctrine argued that such a focus on rules to prevent negative behavior drew managerial attention away from effectiveness, as the rules became an end in themselves. Even if managers wished to do well, they lacked the authority to make changes that would improve service provision. Therefore, the next logical stage in the development of public management systems was to convert the bureaucracy into a quasi-market, by replacing controls over inputs or process with the type of managerial authority seen in the private sector, while developing performance indicators that could be used as a public sector substitute for the private sector "bottom line."

The market model of management is represented by cell (3) of table 1. In such a system, incentives can be matched to authority. Employees are left to figure out how to juggle inputs and processes to achieve the outputs the system requires. The market model represents the full implementation of NPM doctrine, and assumes that financial incentives and performance measures are appropriate measures to control behavior. In such settings, spurred by competition and self-interest, employees are expected to deliver enhanced performance for the promise of financial reward.

While NPM concepts influenced state governments, that influence did not result in a market model for the core public sector, although these characteristics are increasingly common in contracted services.[1] Instead, states pursued a constrained model characterized by a strong focus on results, but limited managerial authority (cell [4] in table 1). If states were moving toward a market model (cell [3]), one would expect a basic correlation between the degree of authority and performance management practices in a state, that is, states that focus more on results would also be delegating greater authority. But a cross-state study that scored states focus on results (by looking at the range and quality of performance data generated by performance management systems) and delegation of managerial authority (by looking at the level at which decisions were made on personnel and financial management issues) showed no such correlation (Moynihan 2006).

While reformers drew on NPM rhetoric and ideas, they did not pursue the full NPM recipe for reform. Contrary to NPM arguments, states did little to reorganize administrative authority in ways to facilitate performance. Absent from performance management initiatives were any changes to managerial authority. In terms of personnel and spending authority, state government managers enjoy relatively little discretion. Managers are closely guided by centralized performance appraisal instruments and scoring systems and have little control in determining compensation to reflect performance. Similarly, classification systems that detail the duties and status of employees are largely centralized at the state level, beyond the control of individual managers. Surveys of state government officials similarly suggest little provision of such flexibility. Significant ex ante controls continue to limit agency discretion in procurement, contracting, the ability to switch money between programs, and the ability to carryover unspent funds from one year to another (Moynihan 2008).

This does not mean there has been no change in personnel authority. States such as Florida, Georgia, and Texas essentially did away with their civil service systems, making most if not all of their employees "at will" and therefore lacking any protections beyond those afforded to private employees. More recently, states such as Wisconsin and Ohio have attempted to eliminate collective bargaining processes that shape personnel authority. Drawing on a survey of state government personnel administrators, Hays and Sowa (2006) argue that other governments are using executive authority to weaken public service unions, renegotiate contracts, and pursue outsourcing, but without explicit legislative support. But these battles over personnel authority are conducted separately from, and in practice appear irrelevant to, performance management. They are usually justified in terms of budget needs, although in practice tend to be shaped by partisan beliefs—public service unions generally support the Democratic party, and attempts to curb public employee protections are usually pursued by conservative Republicans. Even after such changes are put in place, new authorities are not connected to the performance management processes.

The point, therefore, is not that managers have no authority to use performance information, but that among U.S. states, the increasing emphasis on performance data was not connected to increases in managerial authority, contrary to the premise of the NPM. This failure reflected a general lack of attention to reshaping the organizational factors in ways that would make performance management more likely to succeed. The next section considers additional factors important for performance management success.

From Performance Information Creation to Performance Information Use

If simple creation and provision of performance data were the entire purpose of performance management reforms in U.S. states, such reforms have been a success. But the reforms were intended to foster behavioral changes within the public sector. Elected officials and central budget agencies were expected to use performance data to make resource allocation decisions. Empowered public managers were expected to use performance data to innovate and improve services.

The limited procedural focus of performance systems did little to encourage such fundamental changes. Performance management essentially became treated as an add-on reporting requirement to the budget process. Examples of state governments using performance information to make smart choices do exist, but such evidence appears to be anecdotal rather than systematic. Surveys have shown that managers do not use performance data at high levels (Melkers and Willoughby 2004).

There is some variation in the implementation of performance management across states. Some states are more comprehensive and prescriptive than others in describing the timing, content, and nature of their performance management processes (Lu, Willoughby, and Arnett 2009). In addition, some states generate more performance information, and/or better quality information, than others (Moynihan 2006).

The quality of state performance management systems has been graded by a team of academics and journalists funded by the Pew Center for the States. Between 1999 and 2008, four such evaluations took place. The results, shown in table 2, underline variations between states, with some states (most notably Missouri, Virginia, Washington, Utah, and Texas) consistently scoring well, while other states score poorly, and sometimes even fall back below previous grades.

What do the grades tell us? A first question might be how many states seem to be doing better over time? If it is assumed that states received a better grade in 2008 relative to their best grade in previous years, 21 states could be regarded as doing better over time. Three states show a pattern of decline in 2008, scoring lower in that year than any previous evaluation. For the balance and majority of the states, the pattern is mixed. Over the course of the four evaluations, their grades have moved up and down.

It is important to note that the grades are themselves imprecise measures. Over time, criteria have changed,[2] but the essential elements have remained the same. States with legislation that requires agencies to generate performance data enjoy higher grades.

Since there is a correlation between having formal performance frameworks and scoring a better grade, it is not surprising that in a period when states adopted performance management requirements, almost half were graded as doing better over time, and very few are regarded as worse off than they were 1990s. At the same time, the high proportion of mixed grades shows that interest in performance management has waxed and waned. States seem to be doing better in performance management on aggregate than they were before, but progress has been uneven. Since there is no direct federal control over these systems, there is no direct punishment if states focus less attention to performance management over time.

Evaluators also seek to capture other factors—such as leadership interest in performance, and whether public officials use performance data to make decisions. Ensuring performance information use is the most difficult part of performance management, but also the most important. After all, what good are performance data systems if no one pays attention to them? The challenge

Table 2. Government Performance Grades for Performance Management Efforts

State	1999	2001	2005	2008	Progress
Alabama	F	D+	C	C	Improving
Alaska	C-	C-	C	B-	Improving
Arizona	B-	C+	B-	B-	Mixed
Arkansas	D	C-	C+	C-	Mixed
California	C-	C-	C	C+	Improving
Colorado	C	C+	C+	C	Mixed
Connecticut	D+	C-	C-	B-	Improving
Delaware	B	B	B	B-	Decline
Florida	B	C+	B	B-	Decline
Georgia	C+	B-	B-	B+	Improving
Hawaii	C-	C	D	C-	Mixed
Idaho	C-	C-	C+	C+	Improving
Illinois	C	B-	C+	C+	Mixed
Indiana	C	B-	C	B-	Mixed
Iowa	B+	A-	B	B+	Mixed
Kansas	C	C+	B-	B	Improving
Kentucky	B	B+	B	B	Mixed
Louisiana	B	B+	A-	B+	Mixed
Maine	C	C+	C+	C	Mixed
Maryland	B-	B	C+	B-	Mixed
Massachusetts	C	C	C+	C	Mixed
Michigan	B	B+	B+	A	Improving
Minnesota	B	B	B+	B	Mixed
Mississippi	C	D+	C+	C	Mixed
Missouri	A-	A-	A-	A	Improving
Montana	C	C	C	C+	Improving
Nebraska	B-	B-	C+	B-	Mixed
Nevada	C	C	B-	B-	Improving
New Hampshire	D+	D	C-	D+	Mixed
New Jersey	B-	B-	C	C-	Mixed
New Mexico	D+	C	B	B	Improving
New York	D+	C-	C+	C+	Improving
North Carolina	B-	B	C+	B-	Mixed
North Dakota	D	C-	C	C+	Improving
Ohio	C+	B	C+	B-	Mixed
Oklahoma	D+	D+	C	C	Improving
Oregon	B+	B	B	B-	Decline
Pennsylvania	B-	B	B	B	Improving
Rhode Island	C	C	C+	C	Mixed
South Carolina	B-	B	B	B-	Mixed
South Dakota	D	D	D	D+	Improving
Tennessee	C	B-	C+	B	Improving
Texas	B+	A-	B	A-	Mixed
Utah	B+	B+	A-	A	Improving

Table 2. *continued*

State	1999	2001	2005	2008	Progress
Vermont	B-	B	B-	C-	Mixed
Virginia	A-	A-	A-	A	Improving
Washington	B+	A-	A-	A	Improving
West Virginia	C	C	C+	C	Mixed
Wisconsin	C	C	B-	C+	Mixed
Wyoming	C	C+	C	C+	Mixed

Source: Pew Center for the States/Governing Magazine.

of fostering performance information use is not primarily overcome by technical solutions. It requires changing ingrained patterns of decision making that people are comfortable with, which in turn requires changing organizational cultures and incentives.

Researchers point to a variety of factors that are consistently associated with the success of performance management systems in the United States. While these studies generally suggest employees who enjoy more authority are generally more likely to report higher use of performance data (Moynihan and Pandey 2010), managerial authority is not the only, or even most dominant, factor that predicts performance information use.

Leadership commitment

While there might be political support to create performance management systems, there may not be enough to ensure that leaders are committed to full implementation. This matters because gubernatorial or agency leader's commitment to performance systems increases the chances that public managers actually use performance data. Across U.S. states, gubernatorial power has been found to be associated with performance information use among bureaucrats (Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008). Even if performance reforms are more likely to be successful when in statute, they need gubernatorial support to be taken seriously within the executive branch. A series of studies suggest that if employees believe that their agency leader is committed to performance management, they are more likely to use performance information. By committing time, resources, and symbolic reward to specific management issues, leaders communicate their importance (Berry, Brower, and Flowers 2000; Dull 2009; Moynihan and Ingraham 2004; Moynihan and Lavertu 2012).

It is also possible for leaders to actively and directly engage in performance management processes (box 3). But this level of personal dedication to performance management is unusual among elected officials, and it is unrealistic to expect it will be a norm. It is still possible for governments to look for ways to institutionalize the basic principles of the "stat" movement. In 2010, when the GPRA Modernization Act was passed, it called for federal agency managers to engage in regular routine dialogues similar to the stat approach.

Administrative capacity

The presence of basic bureaucratic competence and expertise in performance management are associated with the use of performance data (Bourdeaux and Chikoto 2008; Dull 2009). This is because measuring performance is often difficult for many public sector tasks. The capacity to create useful measures that are timely and reliable is important. Because the agencies that implement the performance management reforms are not typically provided additional resources to do so, the reforms are often considered an unwanted burden, and so agencies with sufficient resources and existing capacity are more likely to make good use of performance measures (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001; Moynihan and Landuyt 2009). Agency staff that lack resources appear to be less able to build up the capacity to pursue the implementation of performance management beyond meeting basic reporting requirements.

The state of Virginia, which has been consistently ranked as one of the top states in performance management, understands the importance of administrative capacity and consistency. Because Virginia governors are legally limited to one term, the state needs to have strong central administrative capacity to provide continuity

Box 3. Stat Approach to Performance Management

The stat approach was first used by the New York City Police Department; it required precinct captains to routinely and publicly explain changes in crime patterns in their areas to senior managers and identify what actions they were taking to fix problems.

The basic ingredients of the stat model remained when it was applied elsewhere: accurate and timely data, rapid response of resources to fix problems, the proposal of new tactics and strategies, and follow-up to review actions taken. These principles changed performance management from being an annual reporting exercise to a much more frequently utilized management tool.

Some state government leaders have shown a willingness to invest the full commitment to performance management that the stat approach demands. The state of Maryland's governor, Martin O'Malley, is an example of a leader in stat implementation. Prior to becoming governor, O'Malley was the mayor of Baltimore, where he applied the stat approach at the city level. As governor, O'Malley often attends the frequent "StateStat" meetings with agency heads to discuss performance and ask pointed questions in front of the media.a Washington state has also pursued a similar approach with its Government Management and Accountability Performance tool.b

The key benefit of the stat approach—communicating that the government leader cares about performance and is willing to devote personal time and attention to hold managers accountable for it—makes it impossible for lower-level managers to ignore.

Source: Author's compilation.
a. For more information, visit http://www.statestat maryland.gov/.
b. For more information, visit http://www.accountability.wa.gov/.

and structure for each new government. New governors do no reinvent the state performance system, but largely work within the confines of the existing strategic planning and performance measurement processes. Virginia was an early adopter of information technology to distribute measures in a timely fashion, both for internal use by managers and externally to the public. More recently, it was one of the first states to create online "dashboard" summaries of key performance measures, a practice that the federal government is seeking to follow.[3] For example, the Virginia Department of Transportation tracks completion of large-scale projects, which has led to dramatic increases in on-time project completion. State data are generally trusted thanks to a strong performance audit capacity, and agencies are pushed to ensure that specific measures are relevant and linked to broader strategic goals. The Virginia example illustrates that stewardship of a sophisticated performance system requires resources, continuity, and capacity.

Organizational culture

Research has shown that organizational culture matters in a variety of ways for performance management in the United States. First, organizations with a strong mission orientation—that is, where employees strongly believe in the goal of the organization—use performance data at higher levels (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001; Moynihan and Landuyt 2009). Second, organizations with cultures characterized by openness and innovation tend to be more willing to engage in dialogue about performance (Moynihan and Pandey 2010).

Finally, a supportive organizational culture helps to embed a focus on performance as an appropriate norm (Broadnax and Conway 2001; Franklin 2000). Washington state does what many other states have done in terms of processes, but observers have focused on how performance management "has permeated the bureaucracy.... the state has built a strong culture of performance measurement" (Pew Center for the States 2008, 5–6). This culture has been fostered by the continuity and connectedness of performance initiatives. Agencies are not just required to report data as part of the budgeting process, but a statewide strategic planning process seeks to realize gubernatorial priorities by creating implementation teams made up of agency staff.

Finding a role for citizens

While much of the research on performance information use focuses on organizational factors, there is also some evidence that citizen involvement matters. Research suggests that perceived citizen demand for performance-based accountability encourages performance information use

(Moynihan and Ingraham 2004; Poister and Streib 1999). De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) find that support for performance management among external interest groups (in the form of elected officials/citizens) also fostered use. Citizen involvement in performance measurement practices increases the perceived usefulness of data in the eyes of elected officials (Ho 2006).

Despite this research, states have struggled to involve citizens. Stat initiatives (box 3) have allowed citizens and media to observe, but not participate in, meetings. The role of citizens is usually no more than that of consumers of performance data provided online. This is not an unimportant role if data are communicated in an easily understandable format, since public employees are concerned with the reputation of their agency (Gormley and Weimer 1999).

The Oregon Progress Board, a nonpartisan board of prominent citizens, is an example of a state organization making effective use of citizen input. The Progress Board drew upon wider citizen input to set high-level societal goals for the state via a series of strategic plans. State agencies then linked their performance measures to the goals. However, this connecting process was not always easy, agencies tried to link everything they did to the very broad goals of the plan, which led to an excessive number of measures.

The Oregon approach created a broad public conversation on its strategic goals, fostered continuity in the state's strategic focus, and won national acclaim. But it was also a lesson about how fragile any performance management success story can be. Despite its nonpartisan design, the Progress Board was resented by conservative legislators who viewed it as a mechanism to expand government spending. In 2009, the state chose not to re-fund the Progress Board, effectively ending the experiment.

Conclusion

The U.S. states are different from other federal systems, which limits the potential to generalize lessons from their experiences. While this note points to the unwillingness of states to delegate authority to facilitate performance management, such delegation may not work well in countries where it is at risk of being abused. Even in the U.S. context, delegation of personnel authority has its own risks, given the highly partisan nature of politics.

Other lessons do seem relevant for other governments pursuing performance management. Adopting performance reporting requirements should be seen as, at best, a good first step toward actual performance management, but not as a substitute for it. For performance reporting routines to matter, they must occur in a context where government has the capacity to ensure data are reliable and timely; where leaders commit to the values of performance; and where organizations see performance data as an opportunity to learn—not a compliance burden.

Acknowledgments

For their comments, the author thanks Jonas Frank (PRMPS), Philipp Krause (PRMPR), and Keith Mackay (PRMPR). The views expressed in this note are those of the author.

About the Author

Donald P. Moynihan is *Professor* at the *La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison*. He is a *fellow* of the *National Academy of Public Administration*. His work on public sector performance management has won a number of awards, including best public and nonprofit book from the *Academy of Management*.

Notes

1. See Heinrich and Marschke (2010) for a review of the experience of contracted services.
2. The most recent criteria can be found at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/template_page.aspx?id=35360; innovations identified by the graders from the most recent round of analyses can be found at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_detail.aspx?id=57708.
3. For more on dashboards, see Ganapati (2011).

References

Barzelay, Michael. 2001. *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berry, Frances S., Ralph S. Brower, and Geraldo Flowers. 2000. "Implementing Performance Accountability in Florida: What Changed, What Mattered and What Resulted?" *Public Productivity and Management Review* 23(3): 338–58.

Bourdeaux, Carolyn, and Grace Chikoto. 2008. "Legislative Influences on Performance Information Use." *Public Administration Review* 68(2): 253–65.

Broadnax, Walter D., and Kevin J. Conway. 2001. "The Social Security Administration and Performance Management." In *Quicker, Better, Cheaper: Managing Performance in American Government*, ed. D. Forsythe, 143–75. Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute Press.

de Lancer Julnes, Patria, and Marc Holzer. 2001. "Promoting the Utilization of Performance Measures in Public Organizations." *Public Administration Review* 61 (6): 693–708.

Dull, Matthew. 2009. "Results-Model Reform Leadership: Questions of Credible Commitment." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 19(2):255–84.

Franklin, Aimee L. 2000. "An Examination of Bureaucratic Reactions to Institutional Controls." *Public Performance and Management Review* 24(1): 8–21.

Frederickson, David G., and H. George Frederickson. 2006. *Measuring the Performance of the Hollow State*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Ganapati, Sukumar. 2011. *Use of Dashboards in Government*. Washington DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government. www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/Use of Dashboards in Government.pdf.

Gormley, William T., and David Leo Weimer. 1999. *Organizational Report Cards*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hays, Steven W., and Jessica E. Sowa. 2006. "A Broader Look at the 'Accountability' Movement: Some Grim Realities in State Civil Service Systems." *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 26(2): 102–17.

Ho, Alfred Tat-Kei. 2006. "Accounting for the Value of Performance Measurement from the Perspective of City Mayors." *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 16(2): 217–37.

Lu, Yi, Katherine G. Willoughby, and Sarah Arnett. 2009. "Legislating Results: Examining the Legal Foundations of PBB Systems in the States." *Public Performance and Management Review* 33: 266–87.

Melkers, Julia E., and Katherine G. Willoughby. 1998. "The State of the States: Performance-Based Budgeting Requirements in 47 out of 50." *Public Administration Review* 58:66–73.

——. 2004. *Staying the Course: The Use of Performance Measurement in State Government.* Washington, DC: IBM Center for the Business of Government.

Moynihan, Donald P. 2006. "Managing for Results in State Government: Evaluating a Decade of Reform." *Public Administration Review* 66(1): 78–90.

——. 2008. *The Dynamics of Performance Management: Constructing Information and Reform.* Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Moynihan, Donald P., and Patricia W. Ingraham. 2004. "Integrative Leadership in the Public Sector: A Model of Performance Information Use." *Administration & Society* 36(4): 427–53.

Moynihan, Donald P., and Noel Landuyt. 2009. "How Do Public Organizations Learn? Bridging Structural and Cultural Divides." *Public Administration Review* 69(6): 1097–1105.

Moynihan, Donald P., and Stéphane Lavertu. Forthcoming. "Does Involvement in Performance Reforms Encourage Performance Information Use? Evaluating GPRA and PART." *Public Administration Review.*

Moynihan, Donald P., and Sanjay K. Pandey. 2010. "The Big Question for Performance Management: Why Do Managers Use Performance Information?" *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 20(4): 849–66.

Poister, Theodore H., and Gregory Streib. 1999. "Performance Measurement in Municipal Government: Assessing the State of the Practice." *Public Administration Review* 59: 325–35.

Pew Center for the States. 2008. Washington. http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PEW_WebGuides_WA.pdf.

Schick, Allen. 2002. "Opportunity, Strategy, and Tactics in Reforming Public Management." *OECD Journal of Budgeting* 2(3): 7–35.

PREM network
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management

This note series is intended to summarize good practices and key policy findings on PREM-related topics. The views expressed in the notes are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the World Bank. PREM*notes* are widely distributed to Bank staff and are also available on the PREM Web site (http://www.worldbank.org/prem). If you are interested in writing a PREM*note*, email your idea to Madjiguene Seck at mseck@worldbank.org. For additional copies of this PREM*note* please contact the PREM Advisory Service at x87736.

This series is for both external and internal dissemination