The State Results-Based Management System of Minas Gerais, Brazil

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In 2003, Minas Gerais’s state government (GMG) launched an ambitious plan that gradually introduced a results focus into the public administration and led to the creation of a results-based management (RBM) system relying on performance information generated by monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools. A case study of Minas Gerais’s RBM system offers insights on (i) the role of a facilitating environment and individual government champions for reform; (ii) M&E tools founded on the desire to strengthen strategic planning; (iii) the power of a strong incentive structure; and (iv) the value added of investment in institutional and human capacities.

Starting in the late 1980s, in the context of democratic consolidation after the end of military dictatorship, Brazil began implementing a policy of increasing decentralization in its 27 states. Increasing autonomy in the policy and fiscal realms has been a challenging road unfortunately, and a key issue has been the management of state debt levels. In 1989, 1993 and 1997, the federal government implemented three major bailouts of state governments. In 2003, Minas Gerais (MG) was burdened by a state deficit of US$779.4 million and public debt that totaled 60 percent of state gross domestic product (GDP), double the level of 1998 (Riani and Andrade 2003). Into this crisis situation, a new administration was elected by popular vote in 2003 on a platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and a results focus in public services. Once elected, strengthening GMG’s planning function was the administration’s key strategic goal. This strategy choice was influenced by analysis of MG’s own history, where the lack of strategic planning had left a vacuum, particularly in state budgeting processes, that too often was filled by bureaucratic, personal, and other interests. Various successful reforms at the federal level demonstrated the potential benefits of a strong strategic planning process.

The RBM system in MG during 2003–10 was characterized by M&E of a selection of prioritized policy areas that were defined in the Multianual Plan of Integrated Development (PMDI 2003–20), which was revised in 2007 when the administration was reelected (PMDI 2007–23). The focus of GMG’s reforms differed during the first (2003–6) and the second administrations (2007–10). In 2003, reforms implemented by the GMG focused on increasing efficiencies within the government and restoring the state to fiscal health; these included restructuring GMG’s administrative structure, setting quotas for new civil servant hires, and improving the procurement system. Strategic planning efforts focused on developing a results framework (represented by the PMDI) and basic M&E infrastructure. In 2007, supported by an even stronger mandate and flexibility afforded by GM’s fiscal health, the government escalated its reform efforts and shifted focus toward strengthening the RBM system and the introduction of the “State for Results” agenda.

Overview of the System

In 2003, the first step in the PMDI development process was for GMG to collect baselines...
for social and economic development based on 2000/2002 information and develop scenarios for determining the best way to move forward. This analytical information was assessed by special planning committees set up for PMDI development that included representatives from the executive office of the governor, central ministries such as the planning ministry, relevant sector ministries, academia, and civil society. Committees defined 13 priorities for GMG, approved by the governor, and established the “Areas of Results” as well as a new class of programs, “Structured Programs,” to target these priority areas. The 13 Areas of Results were outfitted with a set of performance indicators (PMDI indicators) and concrete goals to be achieved by 2023. During the first administration, 31 Structured Programs were identified, with the addition of 26 during the second administration, totaling 57 programs representing 11 percent of GMG’s budget in 2009.

The Structured Programs introduced a new way of thinking for GMG regarding policy interventions, namely moving away from concentrating on a single intervention to the implementation of an integral approach, where a logical entity of complementary interventions was established to achieve impact level goals. This programmatic approach created integrated intervention strategies that often involved different ministries and stakeholders within the GMG working together. In 2007, a second class of priority programs was established, Associated Programs; these programs, though not directly linked to achieving the goals of the 13 Areas of Results in the PMDI, were considered to be providing important services supporting the Structured Programs. In 2009, Associated Programs presented approximately 16 percent of the budget.

The PMDI, a long-term plan, was complemented by the Mid-Term Budget Plan (PPAG), a four-year budget plan, and the Annual State Budget (LOA). All of these plans adopted the same concepts and logical structures to ensure alignment with the results focus of the PMDI; for example, Structured Program indicators (mainly output level) were documented in the LOA.

Finally, the GMG’s RBM system included monitoring of sector ministry-level results focused on specific lines of action related to areas such as administrative, hiring, or procurement procedures identified as bottlenecks to achieving the PMDI goals and/or hindering institutional effectiveness. These were articulated in Results Contracts developed annually that outlined the targets for a given ministry in four areas: PMDI indicators, Structured Program indicators, rationalization of expenditures, and institutional effectiveness. Figure 1 presents the basic results framework and the M&E information used for RBM.

The focus on priority policy areas and programs allowed GMG to build an RBM system supported by M&E infrastructure led by the executive branches of government: the governor and vice governor, the Ministry of Planning and Management (SEPLAG) and the State for Results Program (EpR), a small executive team created in 2007 specifically to provide support to the States for Results reform agenda. Building an RBM system with carefully defined parameters was part of GMG’s strategy to introduce a results focus into government, which allowed them to channel limited financial, human and political resources to priority policies, and that would initiate a demonstration effect or play the role of a catalyst, convincing others at the ministry level of the merit of adopting basic M&E practices.

During 2003–10, M&E leadership chose to spend its resources on promoting the institutionalization of a results orientation in government in various ways, including by playing an active role in offering training in performance management to ministries, and in specific cases, by paying for people with performance-management skills to serve in ministries through the Public Entrepreneurs Program, an initiative managed by EpR to recruit people with performance-management skills into government service.

GMG’s RBM system—led by the governor, vice governor, SEPLAG, and EpR—incorporated results-based management that emphasized intensive monitoring, particularly at the Area of Results and Structured Programs levels. At the Structured Programs level, program indicators and goals (mainly financial and physical, output-level results) determined during the annual budgeting process and based on the PMDI and any individual evaluations were monitored in standardized monthly meetings between Structured Program managers and representatives of the Superintendence of Strategic Management of State Resources and Actions (SCGERAES) in SEPLAG. SCGERAES members were trained in...
the Project Management Book of Knowledge (PMBoK) methodology. All progress was updated in the SEPLAG online Performance Management Database (SGOPE). In addition, results were summarized in Status Reports by SCGERAES team members and sent to RBM leadership, ensuring that the system was regularly updated. Status Reports were complemented by Panels of Control, summaries of results information created every three months, also sent to RBM leadership, and an Agenda Positiva, developed every two months providing results information focused on highlighting achievements of Structured Programs for dissemination to all staff within a ministry.

SCGERAES was also in charge of aligning results information with budgeting processes; direct performance budgeting was implemented through the release of funds to Structured Program managers only once certain goals had been achieved and activities completed. At the strategic budgeting level, SCGERAES facilitated performance-informed budgeting by being the key information resource for the Superintendence of Planning and Budgeting (SCPPO, also in SEPLAG), which was responsible for the allocation component of the annual state budget. During monthly meetings, the state’s financial management system, SIAFI-MG, was used to monitor financial execution rates and free resources. Gradual increases in execution rates of capital expenses—86 percent in 2004, 98 percent in 2007, 92 percent in 2008, and 92 percent in 2009 (Toscano and dos Santos Barrence 2008, 7)—were presented as evidence of Structured Programs’ efficiency gains that could be attributed to the monthly meetings with SCGERAES. Associated Programs were required to self-report progress on annual indicators and enter these every three months into SGOPE; monthly budgeting decisions were not linked to achievement of results’ goals.

At the strategic policy level, results-based management was also incorporated into the Committees of Results, meetings chaired by the vice governor that monitored the progress in each of the PMDI’s Area of Results by reviewing the performance of all Structured Programs. These meetings were conducted by EpR and assisted by the Secretary of Planning; the Executive Director of EpR; secretariats that housed Structured Programs; representatives from the SCGERAES and EpR team working with Structured Programs; and the managers of Structured Programs. Committees would begin with EpR’s general presentation of results backed by Status Reports and available evaluations of Structured Programs. The vice governor would question and listen to presentations on wide-ranging issues including operational details, policies, cooperation between state organs, and budgets. The final result of the meeting was a plan of action in which the vice governor mandated specific actions for Structured Programs to implement. This plan of action was drawn up and monitored by EpR, who was in charge of communicating directly with Structured Program managers and ministers and responsible for keeping the vice governor updated on progress toward plan goals. Committees of Results, because of the presence of the vice governor, played an important role in fostering a relationship of accountability.
between executive and other stakeholders. Indeed, an interesting characteristic of the RBM system was that the managers of Structured Programs were quite often either ministers, vice ministers, or Public Entrepreneurs that had been hired by EpR; this further solidified the direct accountability to the vice minister sought in the Committees of Results. There was no rule regarding scheduling of Committees of Results for a particular Area of Results; an annual planning exercise was conducted, but stakeholders could request for a committee to be scheduled if they felt an important issue needed to be addressed. In 2007, 20 Committees of Results were held; this number increased to 69 in 2008, and declined to 60 in 2009.

Results Contracts, the third and final key component of the RBM system, served a variety of important purposes. First, the tool brought the three levels of results together (program, sector ministry, and strategic policy), communicating to all civil servants the results logic behind their contributions. Unlike the Committees of Results and Status Report meetings, which were focused on elite actors directly involved with Structured Programs, everyone in the public sector was well acquainted with the Results Contracts. They were negotiated annually between the Superintendence of Institutional Modernization (SUMIN) in SEPLAG and ministries (sometimes the vice governor and EpR became involved) and set goals in four different areas; PMDI indicators, Structured Programs, sector agendas, and rationalization of expenditures. Within the latter three areas, the goals, targets, and weights of each area were unique for each ministry depending on the outcomes of the negotiation process. The weight of the PMDI indicators, however, was required to be a minimum of 30 percent in all ministries. Secondly, the Results Contracts provided a positive incentive to public servants—meeting targets resulted in monetary compensation. However, this compensation represented limited amounts in terms of percentages of salaries, calling into question their final impact. That said, during the first administration ministries were not required to sign Results Contracts and could opt out of the system, but the vast majority decided to participate; between 2008 and 2009, R$6 million were paid out to civil servants as compensation. Finally, Results Contracts also played an important accountability role for ministries vis-a-vi the executive. The ministerial accountability in particular was further strengthened by the “Book of Commitments” (Caderno de Compromissos). This was an informal contract presented by the governor to appointed ministers at the beginning of each year and contained the expectations for a minister’s annual performance, as articulated by relevant PMDI indicators and targets.

For all of the these results-based management tools, the majority of performance information used stemmed from indicators. Progress toward the PMDI indicators was updated annually and managed by EpR. This information was included in the LOA. Progress toward Structured Program goals was documented by SCGERAES in the SGOPE and formed the basis for decisions by SCPPO, articulated in the LOA. Annual targets for Structured Programs and Results Contracts for ministries were developed mainly on the basis of this infrastructure. The evaluation agenda only became a priority during the second administration, and its development was assigned to the EpR team. EpR introduced a variety of evaluation methodologies to respond to the different information needs within the GMG. Based on the experiences of other governments (such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Mexico) and international organizations (the World Bank), EpR created a portfolio of evaluation methods that included impact evaluations, process evaluations, public infrastructure quality evaluations, evaluations of indicators, evaluations of PMDI goals, and executive evaluations. Between 2007 and 2010, all Structured Programs underwent a formal evaluation of some type; the majority were evaluated in 2009 using the executive evaluation methodology. EpR, preparing for the end of the administration and transition to the new government, decided that this rapid evaluation methodology focusing on providing an integral picture of program performance in three key areas—design, management, and impacts—was crucial to ensuring a smooth transition for GMG. Also in 2009, EpR implemented an external evaluation of all PMDI indicators focused primarily on the processes underlying the production and dissemination of indicators.

The Institutional Framework

GMG’s RBM system benefited from the clear definition of the different roles and responsi-
bilities between the three leaders; the executive (governor and vice governor), SEPLAG, and EpR (figure 2). At the helm stood the governor and the vice governor acting as champions; the first, the public face of the focus on results, the latter intimately involved with the management and implementation of the system through the Committees of Results. SEPLAG and EpR supported the executive: SEPLAG had the highest concentration of human and financial resources devoted to the RBM system, it housed three key teams—the SCGERAES team responsible for the monitoring of Structured Programs, SUMIN, responsible for Results Contracts, and SCPPO, responsible for integrating results information into budgeting processes. During 2003–10, the coordination between the three groups was gradually refined by, for example, eliminating overlaps in responsibilities (Melo and de Miranda 2008). New responsibilities were added as the RBM system developed. The SCGERAES group, in accordance with the vision of the leadership of the PMDI-focused RBM system, responded to direct requests from ministries and started providing results-based management training during the second administration so that these ministries could set up their own RBM capability.

The EpR team, in contrast to SEPLAG, which had been part of the leadership team since 2003, was only created in 2007, and in 2009 had a total of 24 staff members. EpR was created because the second administration, based on their experience during the first administration, believed that, complementary to the existing RBM infrastructure within SEPLAG, there was a need for a new kind of institution, which would be small, temporary, possess specific technical M&E capacities needed to make the RBM system sustainable, and have the ability to work across sectors with the overall guiding vision of the PMDI. An interesting characteristic of MG’s

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**Figure 2. Organizational Chart of the RBM System**

- **Governor**
  - vice governor
  - EpR
    - Unit of Strategic Management
    - Unit of Indicators
    - Unit of Public Entrepreneurs
  - Sumin
- **SEPLAG**
  - Subdirection planning & budgeting
    - SCGERAES
    - SCPPO
  - Subdirection management
- **network of research institutes**

*Source: Author’s illustration.
Note: this is not a true representation of the administrative structures of each organ; this figure was structured to provide a visual aid to understanding the key actors involved in the State for Results initiative*
States for Results agenda was the explicit, formalized vision of the RBM system surrounding the PMDI becoming a catalyst; this is confirmed by the fact that EpR was not created as a permanent structure and ceased to exist in 2010 when the administration ended. Underlying the creation of EpR is a specific political context where legal mandates had historically been poor predictors of institutionalization and laws have been known to be randomly created, overruled, and ignored by different administrations. The ambitious and far-reaching mandate of the EpR was to:

(i) Facilitate coordinated action in the 13 Areas of Results defined in the PMDI.
(ii) Align the strategic actions of the different organs responsible for the Structured and Associated Programs.
(iii) Incentivize the achievement of the objectives and goals of the Areas of Results and Structured and Associated Programs.
(iv) Monitor and evaluate the results of public policy.
(v) Contribute to social accountability through informing the public of the goals and results of the government’s strategic agenda.

The EpR was split into three different units: the Strategic Management Unit, the Indicators Unit, and the Public Entrepreneurs Unit. The Strategic Management Unit was responsible for preparing and leading the Committees of Results and monitoring the action plans developed during the meetings. The Unit of Indicators coordinated development of PMDI indicators as well as the evaluation agenda. The Public Entrepreneurs Unit focused on the recruitment and accompaniment of the entrepreneurs.

The Public Entrepreneurs Program was an integral component of the RBM system and was important in ensuring the integration of EpR into the RBM system at the Structured Program and ministerial levels, although EpR did not have the planning and budgetary power of SEPLAG. Inspired by a program used in the Chilean government that aimed to stimulate professionalism and meritocracy within the public sector, the Public Entrepreneur Program was established in 2007 as part of the State for Results initiative. During 2007–10, EpR, via the Public Entrepreneur Program, managed and funded 90 positions. Although all positions had to be directly linked to achievement of PMDI goals, the detailed content of positions was not predetermined, functioning as a pool of open positions to which ministers were free to apply for support. In 2009, the Public Entrepreneurs Program was operating in 13 different ministries, 18 percent of the positions were managers or adjunct managers of Structured Programs or Associated Programs, 7 percent of the positions were other strategic positions related to the PMDI within ministries, and 21 percent of the positions were within the EpR team.

The Public Entrepreneur Program attracted a wide variety of individuals; ages of entrepreneurs ranged from 24 to 63 years, in 2009, 52 percent had come from the private sector and 48 percent were recruited from within the public sector. The selection process included skills and psychological testing and final approval by the vice governor. An annual work plan was developed by EpR, the ministry, and the individual entrepreneur; the work plan was monitored by the Public Entrepreneurs Unit. The Public Entrepreneur Program attracted high caliber people due to status and monetary incentives, which included salaries that on average were higher than other civil servants and end-of-year performance-based bonuses (that had to be below one month’s salary).

Crucial for providing performance information to the RBM system, GMG was fortunate to have access to a substantial supply of qualified researchers through a network of universities and other research institutions with capacities in M&E tools. A key partner was the Joao Pinheiro Foundation (Fundação João Pinheiro), a state agency created in 1969 to provide statistical support. During the State for Results initiative, it conducted a number of evaluations and implemented the first household survey completed at the state level in Brazil. GMG has depended on a number of private sector institutions for statistical data on PMDI indicators.10

Finally, important stakeholders and beneficiaries in all RBM systems are the public and legislature. In MG, the RBM system and the M&E tools supporting it empowered the state legislature by giving state deputies tools that allowed them to assess government performance and thus hold the government accountable. In particular, the state legislature’s Fiscal and Budget Commission actively used M&E information in its daily operations. In addition, the RBM system produced performance information used in biannual public hearings conducted throughout
MG where the legislature, in cooperation with the executive branch of government, presented progress on PPAG. The public hearings involved in-depth discussions on Structured Programs and their results and were both informative and participatory in nature. Citizens, represented primarily by organized civil society groups, had the opportunity to share concrete proposals for new programs, budget reallocations among existing programs, expanded services, and others. A concrete example of how this participatory process influenced the GMG occurred in 2003, when one of the proposals submitted at a public hearing led to the creation of an additional Structured Program. These, though significant, were limited points of engagement between the results-based management system and the public and legislature. The second administration that started at the beginning of 2011 made communication of results and interaction with citizens a high priority; one initiative to increase communication was the creation of a virtual platform where citizens could communicate their ideas with the Office of Priorities (Escritorio de Prioridades). The Office of Priorities was created to replace the EpR, which legally ceased to exist at the end of 2011.

**Success Factors in Overcoming Obstacles to RBM**

An important part of GMG’s success was that the external context in 2003 was advantageous for introducing a results focus to government. The administration came to power at the right time and with the right ideas; due to mismanagement of public resources and the failure of public services, no one was able to argue convincingly that change in the business of government was not necessary. As such, the elected administration was able to take advantage of a strategic moment and implement what were for GMG revolutionary reforms to realize its vision for a results-based government. In this way, the MG experience stands apart from governments trying to introduce RBM in the context of an inadequate but comfortable state of affairs, where opposition from the public sector is stronger.

The strategic decision by GMG to focus on a selection of priority policies and the ability of the RBM system to act as catalyst for other initiatives was also important to the success of the system. By limiting its scope, GMG was able to channel limited resources and build RBM infrastructure that used a variety of M&E tools to ensure that the performance information produced was used for planning, budgeting, and management purposes. The GMG was able to acquire a number of “quick wins,” showing both the public sector and the populace that the RBM system improved governance. The administration was also successful in its quest for the RBM system to act as a catalyst; by the end of the second administration, five sector ministries had or were in the process of building Project Management Units that, though heterogeneous, shared a mandate to introduce a results focus into the decision-making processes at the sector ministry level and mirrored many of the components of the PMDI-focused RBM system.

Another success factor in the MG experience was that the RBM system was underwritten by a developed and relatively balanced incentive structure; this helped ensure participation of both elite officials (ministers) and nonelite civil servants. In the case of the former, the active involvement of the executive branch in different components of the RBM system, such as the Committees of Results and the Book of Commitments, provided an important accountability-based incentive. Crucial for the entire RBM system was the relatively harmonious and productive cooperation of SEPLAG and EpR. Their very different natures, based on institutional histories, resource levels and interests for performance information, could have led to an imbalance of power and various implementation bottlenecks. Because of the convening power of the executive, this was not the case and both had equal decision-making power regarding the RBM system. Focusing on the nonelites, one highlight was the monthly meetings between Structured Program managers and SCGERAES; these meetings provided a direct accountability link between program implementers and budget officials. Additional important success factors were the positive incentives—monetary compensation to ministries participating in Results Contracts and to individuals in the Public Entrepreneurs Program—and the RBM training provided by SCGERAES to ministries’ staff.

Leadership’s continuing focus on the gradual build-up of institutional and individual RBM capacity was an important factor in overcoming the lack of capacities in the public sector in 2003. Leadership demonstrated its strong commitment
to improving institutional capacity its establishment of EpR in 2007 as a high-level technical body with the resources and mandate to significantly increase the quality of the PMDI-focused RBM system and the M&E tools it depended on. EpR’s three units each provided key support to the RBM system that had been lacking during the first administration. The Unit of Indicators, for example, led a large-scale review of PMDI indicators in 2008 that found important structural challenges such as the absence of goals and calculation methods in 67 percent of the initial group of PMDI indicators (Guimarães and Campos 2009). The review founded on this analysis led to the publication of an official guide in 2009 that included detailed information about each PMDI indicator. Similarly, the Strategic Management Unit, which was responsible for leading the Committees of Results, commissioned an external evaluation of the committees that indicated they should be streamlined and focused more on strategic issues as opposed to operational details; accordingly, efforts were made to reduce the number of committees and opening presentations were adjusted (MacroPlan 2009). Finally, the Public Entrepreneurs Program provided an influx of motivated and skilled individuals to the RBM system.

Sustainability

The continued prioritization of a results focus in government in MG for the foreseeable future is likely. In 2011, the architects of the RBM system between 2003–10 were re-elected, a good indication that the current RBM system will thrive until 2015. Though there is still limited information, it is clear that in the new administration the basic infrastructure of the RBM system is the same, with the addition of a new priority area: the communication of results and citizen engagement. This area is being led by SEPLAG, with the participation of the Escritorio de Prioridades. In the longer term, there is also reason to expect some form, perhaps less rigorous, of a results focus to continue. The reforms of 2003–10 changed expectations. The executive, SEPLAG, and the leadership of sector ministries now expect to have access to timely monitoring information for evidence-based decision making. Similarly, civil servants in sector ministries expect to have a vehicle to increase their salaries, and the legislature expects performance information for accountability purposes. The MG experience demonstrates how a change in public sector culture driven by higher expectations of effectiveness can be an important and powerful tool for the institutionalization of a results focus in government.

However, to maintain the gains of 2003–10 and move even further along the results focus path, there are a number of important areas where improvement could enhance long-term sustainability of GMG’s results-based management. During 2003–10, the RBM system was limited in scope and interaction with ministries primarily emphasized accountability to the executive, SEPLAG, and EpR. The internal needs within a ministry for performance information were not prioritized. Though SEPLAG was involved with training and ministries counted with Public Entrepreneurs, these were complementary initiatives. Further evidence that limited interaction is a potential risk factor is that ministries that depended primarily on federal transfers rather than the state budget were less keen to engage with the state RBM system and did not, for example, take on Results Contracts. That said, it is important to acknowledge that many federally funded programs such as the well known Bolsa Familia have M&E systems of their own that are managed by the federal government. In sum, at the end of 2010, there was some substantial evidence that the catalyst vision of the RBM system was achieved; five ministerial RBM units had been set up, and, interestingly, the private sector had developed a cottage industry offering RBM training. The new GMG leadership should take advantage of these effects and take a more active stance supporting the establishment and/or strengthening of ministry RBM units and ensure that, when possible, the M&E tools developed during 2003–10 are aligned with and integrated into ministerial budgeting, planning, and program management processes. A new World Bank DPL, AEGEIS, is being implemented to provide support in this area.

A second area for improvement is the evaluation portfolio. During 2003–10, the RBM system focused on performance information collected through monitoring, with relatively little evaluative information. Though EpR laid the foundation for an enhanced evaluation portfolio, in 2010, there was still much to accomplish. A key issue during 2003–10 was that well-developed evaluation planning was not a strong function; evaluations were driven by a variety of factors including
EpR’s own ideas and the advice of academics and international organizations. Consequently, evaluation implementation during this period suffered from disagreements between the different actors involved; for example, one contentious issue was whether the appropriate evaluation methodology had been chosen for a particular program. In the interest of sustainability, GMG should prioritize development of the evaluation planning process, ensuring involvement of different stakeholders, including the executive, ministries, and evaluation experts. Another benefit of a strong evaluation function is increased ownership in sector ministries, who would be key users of evaluative information for program improvement.

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About the Author

Gita Busjeet has six years of experience working with national governments, NGOs, and international financial institutions in the area of M&E systems; her experience is mainly in the Latin America and Caribbean region. She is a graduate from the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies and the University of Sussex.

Notes

1. The governor was elected in 2002 with 57.68 percent of valid votes; in 2006, he was reelected with 77.03 percent of valid votes (www.tse.gov.br).
2. www.escritorio.mg.gov.br.
3. Examples include Quality of Education, Investment and Value-Added in Production, and Quality and Innovation in Public Management.
4. A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide) is a project management guide developed by the Project Management Institute (PMI) used predominantly in the private sector; it is an internationally recognized standard that provides the fundamentals of results-driven project management. In MG, the PMBOK Guide was tailored to fit the purposes of the public sector.
5. During 2003–10, the budgetary policy was to gradually increase allocations to Structured Programs, therefore results-informed budgeting decisions made by SEPLAG were focused on increases and reallocations. GMG also has a Ministry of Finance, which is responsible for managing state receipts and was significantly involved in the state RBM system.
6. In 2010, 19 ministers and vice ministers were also managers of Structured Programs.
7. This only came into effect at the end of the second administration in 2009.
8. www.acordoderesultados.mg.gov.br.
9. In addition to updating the LOA, there was also the annual revision of the PPAG. Part of GMG’s vision for strengthening planning included “Double Planning,” which sought to ensure that medium- and long-term planning instruments did not lose their relevance over time. The PPAG was revised at the margin in response to fiscal and policy realities each year, although final targets articulated by the PMDI were not changed.
10. IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), CRISP/UFMG (Centro de Estudos de Criminalidade e Segurança Pública da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais), CAED/UFJF (Centro de Políticas Públicas e Avaliação da Educação da Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora), CEPEA/USP (Centro de Estudos Avançados em Economia Aplicada Universidade de São Paulo), NESP/FJP (Núcleo de Estudos em Segurança Pública da Fundação João Pinheiro), and CNT (Confederação Nacional dos Transportes).
12. GMG has a total of 15 sector ministries.
13. Caderno de Indicadores, Governo de Minas Gerais.
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References


