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Civil Service and Administrative Reform: Thematic Paper


Anne Evans
ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXCELLENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN EVALUATION

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Abstract

This background paper to the IEG’s evaluation of the World Bank’s support for public sector reform presents the thematic analysis for the administrative and civil service area.

Based on the evidence reviewed, generally CSA reform efforts have not been successful. In many cases this can be attributed to challenging political environments, and cultural barriers such as patronage-based bureaucracies. But the Bank’s role has also been an important factor. For instance, Bank analyses of CSA have often focused more on affordability than on performance or accountability; during the 1990s, this emphasis has frequently led to downsizing and pay reforms that were often politically unrealistic. More recently the Bank has had better success where it has focused on personnel management reforms (such as merit-based recruitment and promotion) to improve performance and counter patronage-based systems. The failures of CSA reform have also frequently reflected the lack of a coherent strategy and clear diagnostic tools. In addition, there is growing recognition that ambitious conditionalities subject to short time frames are unrealistic since CSA reforms require longer time horizons before positive outcomes can be achieved.

While these observations could suggest a reduced involvement in CSA, in fact CSA reform is critically important to the realization of the full benefits of improving public service delivery and accountability. CSA reform cannot be viewed in isolation: it affects the incentives and capacities of the people who have to implement reforms in all the other areas of public administration reform. For example, improving public financial management systems to the point where it has real impact on public service performance and accountability has not happened without also improving the civil service. Instead, the paper recommends strengthening the CSA components of PSR by developing a better analytical framework and performance indicators, similar to the role that PEFA has played in PFM reforms. In addition, more modest expectations and careful sequencing are likely to be more productive. Even where support for CSA reform is weaker, the Bank has had some successes in building data systems on staffing numbers, compensation and attendance, which can lay the groundwork for more difficult reforms. Linking CSA reforms to the budget-execution phases of financial management has also shown positive results in many cases.
Civil Service and Administrative Reform: Thematic Paper

1 Introduction

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank has undertaken an evaluation of lending and other kinds of Bank support for public sector reform between 1999 and 2006 in four areas – public financial management, administrative and civil service, revenue administration, and anticorruption and transparency. The main objective of this evaluation is to help the World Bank learn how to contribute more effectively to public sector reform (PSR) in its member countries. It seeks to provide country directors or finance ministers with knowledge of what sort of PSR program is likely to work in their country and what is not likely to work, based on what has been learned from the 1999-2006 experiences. In particular, it is intended to answer the following questions:

- Was Bank support at the country level based on sound analysis and adequate knowledge of institutional and political realities?
- To what extent was the program supported by the Bank tailored to fit the needs of the country and to take account of institutional and political realities? To what extent did the Bank use a prioritized and phased approach? Did the program address the basics first?
- Which entry points for the PSR agenda worked best?
- To what extent did the Bank use lending and analytic and advisory activity (AAA) instruments that were appropriate for country conditions, including the degree of reform commitment?

The evaluation employs three main methods to answer these questions: country case analyses, thematic analyses of the four selected thematic dimensions, and statistical analysis of the pattern of PSR interventions and outcomes in the full set of countries for which data are available.

This background paper presents the thematic analysis for the administrative and civil service area. Civil Service and Administrative (CSA) reform involves all aspects of the management and organization of personnel. It includes programs to downsize the civil service and reforms to the personnel information system (including civil service census), the career paths, the pay grades (decompression), other aspects of the incentive system, as well as the organization of ministries.

The starting point for this review is the 1999 report of the World Bank – Civil Service Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance. Key findings from the report were that:

- Bank-supported CSA reforms were largely ineffective in achieving sustainable results in downsizing, capacity building, and institutional reform. Downsizing and capacity building initiatives failed to produce permanent reductions in civil service size and to overcome capacity constraints in economic management.
- Four factors undermined efficacy – the poor quality of information on CSA reform; the limited role afforded to strategic management and cultural change; the absence

1 Girishankar 1999.
of checks and balances on arbitrary action; and a failure to appreciate labor market and instructional constraints. The Bank’s approach was too technocratic; it relied on small groups of interlocutors within core ministries and promoted one-size-fits-all CSA reform blueprints in diverse country settings.

- The study recommended that:
  - CSA reform activities be "unbundled," monitored, and guided by upstream institutional assessments and labor market analyses in addition to budget scenarios.
  - Capacity building interventions should be linked systematically to job descriptions and monitorable performance.
  - In countries with comprehensive reform programs, the Bank should rely more on stand-alone projects, lending instruments that allow adequate time for implementation, field-based supervision to better monitor institutional change, and participatory processes to nurture broad reform constituencies in government, civil society, and the private sector.
  - Finally, the Bank should explore the feasibility of promoting results-based management by supporting comprehensive reforms of this kind in three to five pilot countries.

The findings and recommendations from this study are still current and relevant. While progress has been made in terms of improving the quality of analytical work on civil service and administrative reform, and efforts to produce and monitor performance measures have been introduced in a few countries, a systematic analytical framework is still lacking.

Similarly, institutional and political analysis is only done to a limited extent. But, the current review has found that in many cases conditionalities are being more realistic, and more flexible lending instruments, complemented by focused technical assistance, are being introduced.

The types of reforms supported by the Bank are also shifting, with more emphasis being placed on human resource management and merit based recruitment and promotion.

While positive outcomes in terms of CSA reform remain illusive, the importance of CSA reform to the realization of the full benefits of improving public service delivery and accountability is clear. The challenge is to develop more tangible and transparent tools for tracking progress on the road to reform outcomes.

The next section of the paper reviews briefly some of the key findings from a literature review of CSA reform. The third section discusses the trends in the Bank’s administrative and civil service interventions drawing from the Bank’s project database, and the fourth section reviews the evidence from 19 country case studies. Finally, the paper lays out the reasons for success or failure suggested by the analysis, and draws conclusions and recommendations.
2 Setting the Scene

2.1 Defining the Civil Service

In examining the experience with civil service and administrative reform, it is important to first touch on definitional issues with regards to the civil service. There is an immediate challenge in identifying who is a member of the civil service. In addition, there are at least three key organizational features of those employment regimes, namely their organizational principles, forms, and specific arrangements that help define the civil service as an institution.

2.1.1 Who is included in the civil service?

In the academic literature, there is no standard definition of civil service or civil servant, with variations in terms of functional category or employment, as well as employment and contractual arrangements. Within the Bank, there have also been different definitions of civil service. Recently, the Bank has followed a general practice in defining the civil service to cover government employees in central government and only in general administrative tasks. This excludes not only the military, but also teachers, health workers, and judges. The World Bank’s Administrative and Civil Service Reform website provides a helpful breakdown of the different categories of public sector employment, as shown in Figure 1.

From the World Bank’s operational perspective, this definition excludes reforms that specifically affect the employment arrangements of health and education sectors. As such, this review does not capture the full extent of Bank activity in reforming public employment arrangements. The Bank supports many reforms in public health and education that have an impact on the employment arrangements and performance of personnel in both sectors and in the rest of the civil service, because personnel of both sectors are a majority within the civil service.

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3 This section draws substantially from a literature review of CSA reforms prepared by Richard Webb and Sofia Valencia for this Public Sector Reform Evaluation Project.

3 See Annex 1 for a fuller discussion of this issue.
of many countries, and because the gains in wages and privileges for one group of employees become the starting point for demands of other groups.

2.1.2 Organizational principles of a civil service

Scholars agree that civil services of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries, as well as some developing countries, have been organized following common principles that, taken together, have made the civil service different from other employment arrangements. Those principles are merit, competence, continuity, political insulation, and accountability, and they underlie the traditional or basic model of the civil service. (See Box 1.)

The logic of that model can be summarized as follows:

- Merit-based system means seeking out the most talented citizens in a fair and open competition. Civil servants are appointed by a public authority according to merit-based criteria for selection as defined in a civil service law. Once appointed, civil servants are granted job security with many legal and administrative constraints on arbitrary dismissal.

- Job security is intended to promote political neutrality by civil servants in service to the current government, to ensure continuity of program administration despite partisan political agendas, and to protect employees from patronage and arbitrary political actions. In particular, job security provisions protect civil servants from political pressure that could lead to inappropriate personnel dismissals and inappropriate behavior by civil servants.

Box 1: Characteristics of Bureaucratic Organization According to Weber

Of functioning:
- continuous administrative activity
- formal rules and procedures
- clear and specialized offices
- hierarchical organization of offices
- use of written documents
- adequate supply of means (desk, paper, office, etc)
- non-ownership of office
- procedures of rational discipline and control

Of functionaries:
- Office held by individual functionaries
  - who are subordinate, and
  - appointed, and
  - knowledgeable, who have expertise, and are
  - assigned by contractual arrangement
  - in a tenured position, and
  - who fulfill their office as their main or only job, and
  - work in a career system,
  - rewarded with a regular salary and pension in money,
  - rewarded according to rank and
  - promoted according to seniority, and
  - work under formal protection of their office.

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5 Traditionally, this model is called the Weberian civil model. In part, because what is regarded as a modern civil service in those countries is closely related to the rational legal bureaucracy that Weber described in Economy and Society, Part III, chapter 6 (1922: 650-78.), Silberman (1993), p. 4 and Raadschelders and Rutgers in Bekke, Perry and Toonen (1996), p. 70.
8 For a fulsome discussion of the political neutrality of civil servants see James (2007).
• Merit, competence, continuity, and political insulation give considerable power to civil servants. Since civil servants are not always committed to the public’s interest, there is a need to limit and constrain that power. Standardized rules and enforcement procedures, qualitatively and quantitatively, define the function of office and circumscribe administrative discretion to monitor and control civil servants, to uphold the legality and propriety of administrative action, and to ensure accountability.  

This basic model characterizes the nature of public service as different from private employment. It defines office-holding as a matter of public law, and the office-holder accountable to a set of formal rules that can be observed and regulated “rather than to the informal and unregulated rules governing patron-client relations in traditional government employment.” The interpretation of ‘job security’ has evolved over the years. What was once equated with absolute tenure is now more commonly considered to mean protection from arbitrary dismissal. In this sense, ‘job security’ does not protect staff who are incompetent or otherwise not meeting job requirements. But making such distinctions has often proven to be difficult in weak institutional settings that do not have a merit-based culture, which is common to many developing countries. In fact, systems with strong job protection provisions but also extensive patronage influences can result in waves of hiring with the incumbents simply moved to other parts of the bureaucracy. Reforms in this area often require a two-pronged approach—a loosening of traditional job protection features and at the same time introducing merit-based recruitment and dismissal features.

The basic model has been used to make comparisons among actual civil service systems and to establish how far a country’s public service arrangements follow that model. Reform initiatives for developing countries based on that model need to take into account the underlying assumptions. One assumption is the availability of a minimum level of knowledge, such as accounting and legal skills, that are inherent to government administration. The evolution of civil service in developed countries was made possible by rising levels of education. For many developing countries, this assumption cannot be taken for granted when alternative reform initiatives are considered. A second assumption is the existence of a minimum institutional framework conducive to the enforcement of rules, including, for instance, political parties and an independent judiciary.

2.1.3 Organizational forms: laws and other norms

In the academic literature there is agreement that the basic model described above will have been institutionalized in a civil service law as well as other laws and regulations that

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define the main components of a civil service: the personnel included in the civil service, the employment conditions, and the management systems.

The coverage of civil service legislation varies considerably across countries. However, most include central government and sub-national government employees. Coverage of the terms of employment also varies widely. In some countries civil service laws regulate everything related to employment, while in others, civil service legislation only supplements the general labor law. Similarly, the civil service law can be precise regarding job duties and responsibilities, career conditions, job security, remunerations, disciplinary arrangements, rewards and wage-bargaining conditions, or more general in nature. Provisions for the management of the civil service are included in the civil service law in some countries, while in others such provisions are covered in other legislation.

2.1.4 Civil service organizational arrangements

Most authors agree that diversity across OECD countries is greatest when it comes to civil service legal frameworks and organizational arrangements, such as career structures, handling of political appointees, and executive leadership arrangements. Diversity arises even when countries share the same basic civil service model and principles. OECD country studies point out the way in which such differences emerge, as the basic civil service model is adapted to different cultural, social, political, and historical circumstances. A similar process is documented for some developing countries, which imported or inherited from colonial times the same basic civil service model described above, formalizing it into laws and regulations, but with a degree of variation that reflects a similar adaptation process. How much, how well, and how suitable the process of adaptation has been to specific country conditions is a matter of debate.

A general conclusion from the literature is that adaptation to country conditions in OECD countries has been broadly successful in achieving the original purpose of eliminating patronage and political interference. This has not happened with civil services in developing countries. Second, although the civil services of many developing countries have been legally organized following the basic model outlined above, in practice they perform differently than their developed counterparts. Thus, most developing countries have instituted merit selection rules, but in practice selection continues to be clientelistic and political. In that sense, reform has been only partial, though it could also be

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12 For a discussion of this issue see Synnerstrom, Lalazarian, and Manning (2001).
14 “There appears to be no adequate explanation of why different modes of bureaucratic rationalization occur” Silberman (1993), pp. 19-33. However, there is agreement that adaptation or internalization is the process that accounts for the emergence of hierarchy, specialization and differentiation, career structures and the utilization of formal rules. “This process depending on the point of view produces different organizational shapes.” Silberman (1993), p. 32.
16 Silberman (1993), pp. 421-424 explains why patronage is a pervasive feature in these societies in terms of underdeveloped political parties and the heavy reliance instead on social networks, which in turn are sustained in part through patronage.
interpreted as an adaptation to the very different cultural, political, economic, and historical circumstances of developing countries.

2.2 What is Civil Service and Administrative (CSA) Reform?

Understanding and pursuing CSA reform begins with a broader vision of an effective public sector. Schneider and Heredia see CSA reform as a sub-class of three major models of public sector reform, each defined according to its main objectives and measures. In their view, CSA reforms (or Weberian reforms) were historically a first step towards better administrative performance by governments. Such reforms sought to reduce particularism and politicization in the bureaucracy and to counter the spoils-system administration. These were followed by accountability reforms, designed to make the bureaucracy more accountable, and later, by Managerial Reforms, which aimed to make the bureaucracy more efficient and customer oriented. Nunberg and Kaufman recognize the usefulness of this historical distinction, but see it as more applicable to OECD experience, and point out that the more fundamental nature of civil service problems in developing countries often has required a combination of the three approaches.

Although these broader models of public administration have in turn lead to different strategies of CSA reform, there remains a significant degree of consensus around the core values of a ‘good’ civil service as noted above: merit, competence, continuity, political insulation, and accountability. The lack of agreement is much greater, however, with regard to what the civil service should be doing differently to achieve the broader objectives of public sector reform. Alternative interpretations tend to be associated with the different perspectives brought to these studies by scholars in different scientific disciplines.

Some scholars, especially in the fields of public administration and comparative politics, distinguish among developed and developing country experiences to explain CSA reforms. For developed countries, recent CSA reform experiences amount to improvements in already working civil services and are usually home-grown. For most developing countries, CSA reform means (or at least starts with) more fundamental changes in the direction of the basic model and set of values described above, and is often induced by an external intervention. This distinction is useful when analyzing CSA reform experiences in both set of countries.

18 Schneider and Heredia (2003), pp. 4-8.
19 Schneider and Heredia (2003), p. 3.
22 Barabashev and Straussman (2005) discuss the concept of ‘diffusion of reforms’ coming from three sources – external pressure from international aid organizations, from internationally embraced administrative reform ‘ideas’ – like New Public Management – and from internal change agents that are politically influential. The relative strength of these sources of diffusion and their interaction with the country’s political and cultural context will determine how effective reform diffusion is.
The World Bank among others also considers the staging of public administration reform important. In its World Development Report 2004 (and illustrated in Figure 2 below) it talks about early staging of such actions as enhanced job security to strengthen protection against political interference and adherence to rules, and then moving on to measures providing greater flexibility only once some of the core values of a professional civil service become more entrenched.23

![Figure 2: From Weak Basics to Strong Foundations](image)


### 2.3 The Challenges of Implementing CSA Reform

Knowing what reforms need to be introduced in a particular country is one challenge; perhaps the more difficult challenge is being able to implement the reforms in a meaningful and sustainable way. A number of writers have tried to address this issue, drawing on experience in a range of countries. This issue is relevant to both OECD and non-OECD countries, but the challenges are usually greater in the latter.

CSA reform experiences may share similar objectives and essential components which form the substance of what needs to be done. However, there are implementation issues regarding how to bring about those changes such as: How much needs to be changed and using what tools? How fast should the changes be carried out? What should be the sequencing of individual steps? How should one choose or combine top-down and bottom-up approaches? In some countries, for instance, the answer to the first question means the issuing of a new civil service law, while in others legislation is enacted only after testing new management arrangements. So, there could be important differences in implementation across countries with similar reform designs or objectives.

Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram, writing from the broader perspective of public administration reform, emphasize the conditions necessary for sustainable development, including:

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• ‘ownership’ – the basic prerequisite,
• a coherent, long-term public vision,
• selectivity, focusing on priorities,
• sensitivity with regard to who is affected, and the social constraints,
• stamina, recognizing reform is a long-term investment, and
• implementation capacity.²⁴

But in addition to having the right conditions in place, the issue of responsiveness to local circumstances and adapting reform strategies and actions to work within the local circumstances, is becoming increasingly recognized as a key concern, and a number of writers²⁵ make reference to the importance of this issue. Indeed, the World Bank’s 2000 PSR Strategy recognized the importance of “grounding individual project and broader country strategies in institutional reality.”²⁶

Pollitt and Bouckaert,²⁷ in analyzing OECD home-grown CSA reform experiences, recognize that such systems influence the process of reform. In the case of reforms induced by external interventions, Ozgediz (a World Bank official) was already arguing back in 1983 that prevailing cultural and political environments within the bureaucracy affect the effectiveness of those initiatives. Thus, “they need to be tailored to local realities.”²⁸ In this regard, Pollitt,²⁹ in a subsequent article, proposes a framework for analyzing the degree of difference between the recipient of the reform and the context from which it has been imported. He argues that the greater the differences, the harder it is to implement the reform effectively without modification and adaptation. In particular, he stresses the need to consider:

• national and organizational cultures,
• the structure of the political system (e.g. majoritarian, consensualist, etc),
• management doctrines, and
• primary task characteristics.

An assessment of all of these dimensions may result in design modifications, or pinpoint areas where careful management during implementation will be critical.

A number of writers also cite managing implementation, through careful use of appropriate tactics, as an important element of effective implementation. Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram (2000) discuss the use of tactics at length, with such specifics as adapting the pace of reform, testing society’s readiness for reform through some easy first actions, and use of fact-finding to build awareness of the issues. A recent World Bank-DFID study of reform tactics observed through a number of case studies in three South Asia

countries has attempted to assemble a typology of tactics used by both reforming countries and the donor community.\textsuperscript{30} Table 1 below summarizes the range of tactics identified during the study.

Annex I reviews more specifically the experience of CSA reform in OECD countries and in developing and transition countries, based primarily on case study analysis. Most studies of this nature focus on describing the substance and management of the reforms. But the evidence on the effects of different types of interventions is much less clear. Comparative analysis of CSA reform has been held back by the lack of good-quality information\textsuperscript{31} and by the different meanings attached to key terms. In addition, due to the lack of a single theoretical framework, a review of CSA reform experiences over the last 20 years highlights the issues and factors that are consistently defined as important, without analyzing their validity or explanatory power in all cases.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1: Summary of Tentative Typology of Tactics</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Proactive champion(s) voicing and demonstrating commitment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Extending leadership nucleus to key decision-makers &amp; implementers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Using Finance’s authority to drive reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Managing donor involvement</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Selling Reform to Broader Constituencies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• …to affected civil servants</td>
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<tr>
<td>• …to the media/broader public</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Justifying reform through technical analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Institutionalizing reform through legal instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pace &amp; Timing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Internal pace, specific to the reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Timing vis-à-vis other reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Scale &amp; Political Packaging</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Incremental vs ‘big bang’ approach</td>
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<td>• Bundling reform objectives</td>
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\textsuperscript{30} The results of the study are summarized in Evans (2007).
3 Trends in the Bank’s CSA Reform Interventions

The preceding section has tried to present some contextual information on civil service and administrative reform—what it is, as well as a brief discussion of some key findings coming out of the literature, in terms of experience generally with CSA reform. The central focus of this paper, however, is the World Bank’s own experience with its support for CSA reform, particularly since 2000. This review of the Bank’s activity draws on two sources of information. This section uses the Bank’s project database to look at general trends within the Bank’s Civil Service and Administrative (CSA) thematic area, and the following section looks more specifically at a number of case studies, covering 19 countries.

The analysis presented in this section draws primarily on a list of about 467 PSR lending projects, taken from the World Bank’s larger, master database of all lending projects (known as the Business Warehouse Database). The IEG project team assembled this smaller database and coded the projects according to theme, based on a manual review of available documents for each project. Although this PSR database represents a smaller sample, the coding is more reliable.

3.1 Overall Trends in CSA

Figure 3 shows that the number of projects with significant PSR funding and also with a significant CSA component has grown over time, particularly since 2000. On average, about 10.8 PSR projects with a CSA component were approved per year up until 1999; in the period 2000-2006, the average number of projects with a CSA component rose to about 21.9 per year.

![Figure 3: Number of Projects with CSA Theme by Year of Project Approval](source: IEG Database)
However, this trend is a result of an increasing number of PSR projects overall rather than a greater share of projects with a CSA component. Figure 4 shows this same growth in the number of PSR projects with a CSA component, but in comparison with the other major PSR themes: public financial management (PFM), anti-corruption and governance (ACG), and tax administration (TAX). In fact since 2000, the share of PSR projects with a CSA component has actually fallen slightly, from 57.8 percent during the 1990-1999 period to 54.6 percent between 2000-2006. This trend contrasts with both the ACG and PFM themes, where the share of projects with these components has gone up significantly over the same time period (see Figure 5.)

![Figure 4: Number of Projects with Significant PSR Funding, by Theme by Year of Project Approval](source: IEG Database)

![Figure 5: Share of PSR Projects Covering One or More Themes](source: IEG Database)

However, focusing strictly on the number of projects does not take into account the relative value of projects. By looking at CSA funding as a percentage of total PSR funding in the 467 PSR lending projects, the share attributable to CSA funding has held constant at 21 percent for both the pre and post 2000 periods, presenting a slightly more positive picture than focusing solely on the number of projects.

### 3.2 Policy Based Lending and Conditions

While looking at the overall commitment to the CSA theme is an important measure, it is also valuable to consider the components of that lending. In particular, an important consideration is how the Bank distributes its lending portfolio.

The Bank’s portfolio of loans falls into two general categories: (1) policy-based (adjustment) lending, in which receipt of funds is contingent upon meeting conditions, but once the conditions are met the funds are not ear-marked in any way; and (2) investment lending, in which the funds must be used for specific purposes, whether project or program based. In terms of the 467 PSR lending projects with a CSA component, about 56.5 percent were policy-based loans during 1990-99; this increased to about 74.5 percent during the years 2000-2006.
The total number\(^{32}\) of CSA-related conditions attached to the policy-based loans in the PSR lending projects list increased from 274 over the period 1990-99 (or about 27 per year) to 324 over the period 2000-06 (about 46.3 per year). Figure 6 gives a breakdown of conditions over time for the 467 PSR lending projects, by theme.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the number of policy-based loans has also gone up in recent years, so that an increase in total conditions is to be expected. In fact, the average number of legally binding CSA conditions per PSR lending project declined from 3.7 during 1990-1999 to 2.7 during 2000-2006.\(^{33}\)

But it is not just the numbers that matter. The nature of the conditions themselves is just as important: are they reasonable and achievable within the timeframe? In fact, there is evidence to suggest that many conditions have become somewhat more general in nature, giving client countries more flexibility. This shift is a response to earlier criticisms that in many cases conditions had been too ambitious or out of line with political realities, effectively setting up the loan program for failure.

In addition, within the CSA theme conditions can focus on a number of different reform elements. As part of the more in-depth review of PSR projects, an analysis was done of the CSA conditions by categorizing them by type of CSA reform. Most of the conditions fell into one of four groups: downsizing, compensation reforms, human resources (HR) and merit-related reforms, and operational efficiency reforms. Figure 7 shows that there has been a substantive increase in the number of HR and merit-based conditionalities, and a more

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\(^{32}\) Excludes ‘desired action’ conditions which are not legally binding.

\(^{33}\) For all World Bank projects the average number of legally binding conditions per project is even lower: 3.1 during 1990-1999 declining to 2.5 during 2000-2006.
modest increase in conditionalities focused on operational efficiencies. And although there is some reduction in downsizing-related conditionalities, they remain a significant feature in many CSA projects.

3.3 Regional and Income Trends within the CSA Theme

On a regional basis, Figure 8 shows that in terms of absolute number of projects, there has been a relative shift in CSA support since the 1990s away from African countries (AFR), and towards countries primarily in the South Asia region (SAR) and Europe and Central Asia region (ECA). Figure 9 also looks at the regional distribution of the Bank’s lending, but using total value of lending at the measure. Still the conclusion is the same—that attention has been shifting towards the SAR and ECA regions, in terms of CSA reform.

The Bank’s lending activities have also been shifting in recent years in terms of economic capacity. As shown in Figure 10, the relative share of projects with a CSA component going to poorer countries has been falling somewhat, and a larger share of projects is now going to lower-middle income countries. Similarly, CSA activity is shifting away from IDA countries. This trend is consistent with the view that the poorest countries, and
countries with the lowest civil service capacity, are less likely to benefit from CSA reforms.

3.4 Conclusion

Taken together, these various data do point to certain trends in the Bank’s support for CSA reform. Since 2000, the Bank’s activities in this area have been growing, along with a growing focus on public sector reforms generally. But along with this growth, shifts have been taking place. While downsizing and other financially driven reforms are still pursued in a number of countries, there is also a much greater focus on more general HR and merit-based reforms. The Bank has also been shifting its efforts to countries that are likely better positioned to take advantage of these reforms. And this is reflected in the regional shifts in lending patterns as well.

The next section turns to a review of the case studies, which provides a more detailed assessment of the Bank’s CSA reform activities.
4 Findings from the Case Studies

This section reviews the findings from 19 country case studies where the Bank has been involved in public sector reform programs (see Table 2). The evaluation team conducted desk reviews drawing on Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) findings and Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPARs), where available. The team also made field visits to Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, India, Russia, and Tanzania. The 19 countries represented different regions, sub-regions, and income groups, and all of the countries received substantial Bank support in PSR.

Each country-level review examined the role of public sector reform within the country assistance strategy. (It should be noted that not all case studies involved a substantial civil service and administrative reform component; in some cases PSR activities were focused primarily or even exclusively in other areas.) Each review also explored how the strategy was implemented and what contribution Bank support made to achieving the PSR objectives. The evaluation considered whether the Bank took appropriate account of the economic, political, and institutional capacity conditions in the design and implementation phases of its support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Low Income</th>
<th>Lower Middle Income</th>
<th>Upper Middle Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa (AFR)</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific (EAP)</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia (ECA)</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean (LCR)</td>
<td>Bolivia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa (MNA)</td>
<td>Yemen, Rep.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia (SAR)</td>
<td>Bangladesh, India</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Development Indicators

The balance of this section is organized into three main parts—a comparison of the reforms in each country, a focused discussion on the Bank’s role in supporting these reforms, and lastly, a discussion of successes and failures from the cases.

4.1 Comparing the Different Reform Strategies

4.1.1 Reform Objectives

As discussed earlier in the paper, while there is general consensus around the principles underlying the civil service—merit, competence, continuity, political insulation, and accountability—there is less consensus around how to get there. CSA reform objectives are usually driven by a broader vision of public sector reform, which can change over
time and circumstance. Historically, many reform strategies have reflected the desire for improved performance, meaning skilled and professional bureaucrats protected from political interference or corruption. More recently, many reform strategies have emphasized accountability and transparency. While improved performance is an underlying goal of accountability reforms, the sequencing of reform initiatives can be quite different.

In reviewing the case studies, different reform objectives were identified, reflecting different timing and circumstances. Significantly, however, many of the CSA reform strategies supported by the Bank are also driven by affordability concerns. Regardless of how well or poorly a civil service performs, how much it costs has major implications for financial management, in that the public sector wage bill is invariably one of the largest components of any government’s budget. And unlike accountability and performance objectives which are at least generally compatible, affordability concerns can call for actions that contradict and even undermine other CSA reform actions. In particular, if affordability is driving actions to downsize the number of civil servants and/or control wages, it will be very difficult at the same time to attract and retain skilled resources in order to improve performance.

These competing objectives can result in a lack of consensus around the ‘right’ CSA reform strategy for a particular country. This can be challenging for the providers of advice as well as for political leaders who may not be convinced of the benefits in face of the risks involved.

Table 3 summarizes the stated or inferred objectives underlying the CSA reforms being implemented in each of the case study countries. It is worth noting that many of the case studies reported more than one objective, often including affordability. However, in several cases, this is due to a shift in priorities over time. Many of the affordability reforms, and downsizing in particular, were attempted in the earlier years of reform, and in many cases during the 1990s. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Tanzania, and Uganda focused early on downsizing and controlling the wage bill, but have more recently shifted to other areas of CSA reform, such as improved efficiencies, restructuring and capacity building.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Country</th>
<th>Affordability</th>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.1.2 The Components of Reform

The review of the case studies identified a wide array of civil service and administrative reform activities that have been implemented or at least attempted. These reforms can be grouped into several components:

- **Measures to track the existing staff**—for instance, developing computerized payroll and HR databases—are usually an important early reform action, without much controversy. Pay and employment data are often missing, and these data are essential to diagnosing civil service issues and designing reforms.
- **Measures to contain and reduce the number of staff**—via retrenchment and layoffs, early retirement and hiring freezes—are usually the most controversial components of CSA reform.
- **Compensation reforms** deal with pay structures and pensions.
- **Human resource management reforms** deal with management of cadres generally and the senior civil service particularly. This includes merit-based recruitment, promotion and discipline, performance management, and appraisal systems.
- **Organizational reforms** deal with issues like contracting out, creation of delivery agencies, and process engineering and organizational restructuring. They are usually based on functional and program reviews and aim to improve operational efficiency.
- **Demand-side reforms** focus on the users of services, through service standards, e-government, etc.
- **Training and capacity building**.

Table 4 summarizes the reforms in terms of the extent to which they have been implemented in each of the case study countries. To assemble this table, reforms were categorized as one of: implemented (Y); partially implemented or progress underway (P); stalled or no impact or ineffective (X), or proposed but no implementation (N).34

Based on this data, the areas of reform that have been undertaken most frequently have been the development of HR and payroll databases, redeployment and layoff provisions, pay reforms, and reforms involving merit recruitment and promotion, as well as programs focused on specifically on training and capacity-building. Of these, a greater degree of success has been achieved with payroll and HR databases, merit-based recruitment and training. Much less success has been achieved in implementing redeployment schemes and pay reform (in particular, the former). This data underlies a shift in the Bank’s focus in the past few years with regards to CSA reform, away from a narrow focus on retrenchment and salary decompression, to a greater emphasis on human-resource management reforms such as merit recruitment and promotion.

For administrative reforms, the bulk of activity has centered on functional reviews, at times to support downsizing efforts, but also as a means to improve operational efficiencies. In Russia, some redundant or duplicative functions were eliminated; and in

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34 Categorizing reforms in this way is challenging and to some degree subjective; in fact the reality of a particular reform may fall somewhere between two categories. Therefore the value of the table lies more in the overall trends, and the details in the table should be used with caution.
Ghana, some minor process improvements have been reported. However, in other case studies, these reviews generally did not lead to real process changes. There has been some reform effort focused on restructuring, including agency automation, such as in Tanzania. On demand-side reforms, citizen charters, standards of service or other mechanisms like client service units and surveys have been introduced in some countries, such as Ghana, India, Russia, Tanzania, and Uganda, with favorable results starting to show in some places.

Table 4: Summary of Reforms Identified in the Case Studies

|                           | Albania | Argentina | Bangladesh | Bolivia | Bulgaria | Burkina Faso | Cambodia | Ethiopia | Ghana | Guatemala | Guyana | Honduras | India | Indonesia | Russia | Sierra Leone | Tanzania | Uganda | Yemen |
|---------------------------|---------|-----------|------------|---------|----------|-------------|----------|----------|--------|-----------|--------|----------|-------|-----------|--------|-----------|---------|--------|
| **Pay and employment data** |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          |       |           |        |         |        |
| Censuses/ ghost worker issue | Y       | Y         | Y          | Y       | Y        | Y           | Y        | Y        | Y      | Y         | Y      | Y        |       | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Payroll & HR data bases    | P       | X         | P          | P       | Y        | P           | P        | Y        | N      | P         | Y      | Y        | N     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| **Retrenchment/downsizing** |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          |       |           |        |         |        |
| Staffing freeze            | Y       | P         | X          | N       | P        | Y           |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | X        | N      |
| Redeployment/layoff        | P       | Y         | N          | X       | N        | X           |          | X        | P      | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y     | X         | N      | Y        |        |
| Retirement schemes         | X       | X         | Y          | Y       | Y        | Y           |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        |        |
| Tracking studies and re-hiring |     |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        |        |
| **Compensation reforms**   |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Pay reforms                | Y       | Y         | Y          | X       | P        | X           | X        | N        | Y      | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Pension reforms            | N       |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| **HR management reforms**  |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Improving merit recruitment and promotion | P   | P        | P          | Y       | Y        | P           | P        | X        | P      | P         |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Strengthening discipline, incl. Code of Conduct | X   |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Appraisal reforms and annual confidential reports | Y | P       | P          | P       | Y        | N           |          |          | Y      | Y         |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Individual performance management (performance contracts) | P   | X        | N          | P       | P        | X           |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Senior Executive Service   | Y       | Y         |           |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Cadre reforms              | N       | Y         |           |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| **Organizational reforms** |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Functional reviews         | X       | Y         | X          | Y       | Y        | X           |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Agency autonomization and accountability provisions | P |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Contracting out            |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Process re-engineering     | Y       |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| **Demand side reforms**    |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Charters and service standards |     |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Facility-level oversight   |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| E-government approaches    |         |           |            |         |          |             |          |          |        |           |        |          | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |
| Training/capacity-building | N       | Y         | Y          | Y       | Y        | P           | Y        | Y        | Y      | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y     | Y         | Y      | Y        | Y      |

CODE: Y – implemented; P – partially implemented or progress underway; X – Partially implemented but stalled or no impact or ineffective; N – proposed but no implementation

These results are also reflected in Table 5, which attempts to assess the different reform areas in terms of ‘doability’ as evidenced in the experience from the case studies. The table identifies, for each area of reform, the relative importance of political risk, financial cost and capacity requirements, each of which can greatly influence the likelihood that a particular reform will be implemented. The table suggests that measures to track existing
staff, and general training and capacity building, tend to be ‘safer’ reforms in terms of political risk and cost, and can more easily be implemented in low-capacity countries, where as reforms such as containing or reducing staff numbers can carry great political risk and (at least short-term) cost. Other reforms, such as pay reform and merit-based recruitment, can be politically risky if there is a strong patronage-based culture, which is common among many low-income countries. Pay reforms can also be very difficult to implement where the culture is very egalitarian, or strong labor unions are present—examples include Burkina Faso, Guatemala, Honduras, and Pakistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Political Risk</th>
<th>Costly</th>
<th>Demanding of Capacity</th>
<th>Successfully Implemented Reforms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pay &amp; Employment Data</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Yes – but capacity building is part of project</td>
<td>Guyana, Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downsizing</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Significant one-time costs for retrenchment and volunteer options. Then ongoing savings if successful.</td>
<td>Yes, to do it right (targeted)</td>
<td>Russia, Tanzania, some Indian states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation reforms</td>
<td>Yes in egalitarian cultures, where lower ranks are politicized, or existence of strong unions</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Albania, Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resource Management Reforms</td>
<td>Yes, especially in patronage-based systems</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Albania, Bolivia, Bulgaria (pilots)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Reforms</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>India, Russia, Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand side Reforms</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>India, Tanzania, Uganda,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Russia, Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having said this, however, it is important to distinguish between implementation and effectiveness in achieving outcomes. Even though some reforms may be implemented, they may not result in improved outcomes. Capacity building in particular is an example of this—training does not necessarily result in improved capacity. But in many cases there is little evidence that specific reforms do lead to improved outcomes. This issue is discussed in more detail later in the paper.

But even if ‘successful’ CSA reform is measured by the degree of implementation, only a few of the case study countries have achieved significant progress thus far, in particular Albania, Bulgaria, India, Russia, and Tanzania. Others have made some progress in limited areas, and some, like Argentina, have fallen back after some early successes.
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the case study findings, the next section considers the specific role of the World Bank in supporting these reform efforts.

4.2 The Role of the Bank

The World Bank provides support to public sector reform activities through a combination of analytical support (referred to within the Bank as ESW—or Economic and Sector Work) and lending programs.

4.2.1 Analytical Support

The evidence from the case studies indicates that, with some important exceptions, both the quantity and quality of ESW in the area of CSA reform has been poor. In recent years this trend has been shifting, with an increase in the number of reports that contain analysis on civil service issues, but the case studies suggest there is still substantial room for improvement.

Because of the historical focus within the Bank on public financial management, many of the ESW reports that contain CSA analysis deal primarily with financial issues, such as the public expenditure reviews (PERs) and Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) reports. Although there are some reports that focus primarily on CSA reform, there is no standard report structure geared specifically to CSA reform. Instead, much of the CSA reform analysis is done as a chapter in a PER or other financial report and usually looks only at cost and affordability considerations. Drawing from the case studies, of the 68 reports that contained analysis on CSA reform, 39 were primarily financial reports, and only six were focused primarily on CSA reform (see Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of ESW Report</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000-Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PER/PEIR</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFAA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Financial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Stand Alone analysis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Going beyond these statistics, a number of the case studies identified problems where, even though analysis on civil service issues was done, the lack of good quality and timely ESW has at times hampered CSA reform efforts. One example of this is Indonesia: civil service reports were launched in Indonesia both in 1999 and 2000, but these reports contained conflicting advice regarding pay levels, and neither report was ever published. In most of the cases the ESW simply fell short in terms of contextual political and institutional analysis, and tailored implementation strategies.

There are a few reasons for the poor quality of ESW products on civil service issues. One has been the shortage of staff with expertise in CSA. But the more fundamental issue goes back to the origins of the Bank’s interest in civil service and administrative reforms, which evolved out of the need to address the affordability of the wage bill as a significant component of public sector expenditures. This is why so much of civil service
ESW is contained in PER reports and looks almost exclusively at wage-cost issues. In addition to this, or perhaps because of this, the Bank has not yet developed an effective analytical framework for assessing civil service issues that could form the basis of a standardized reporting approach analogous to the PERs.

Since 2000, the quality and quantity of ESW has been slowly improving, with a greater volume of analysis and more focus on institutional issues, as evidenced by an increasing number of PEIRs. And there are some examples where the ESW on civil service issues has been extremely valuable—Russia in particular being a case in point. The Bank has also been increasing the number of staff with civil service expertise, and with this, work is progressing on more systematic ways to diagnose and analyze civil service issues. (But staffing remains low in many regions compared to financial positions—see Table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7: Public Sector Staffing in the WB’s PREM Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREM Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by functional area:*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Expenditure and Financial Management**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticorruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by grade:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level E/F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level H</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IEG survey and calculations.
* Some staff cover more than one area so numbers do not add to total
** In addition, many staff in Operations Policy and Country Support (OPCS) work on FM and procurement.

In Albania, for example, as well as Macedonia and Romania, some good work has been done to develop and track performance measures for key areas of CSA reform. Table 8 provides a set of indicators that has been developed out of that work. This type of analysis needs to be extended in a systematic way to a larger number of countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: Civil Service Management Actionable Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depoliticization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnover unrelated to changes in political leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit-based civil service (CS) management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Attract and retain qualified staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competitive remuneration</th>
<th>Increases in average CS total remuneration relative to average economic sector wages suggest increasingly competitive CS remuneration.</th>
<th>Average CS total remuneration as a % of average economic sector wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A CS salary structure</td>
<td>A CS salary structure that yields a consistent ratio of CS to private sector comparator salaries across Titles enhances capacity to recruit and retain qualified staff within all CS skill sets.</td>
<td>Ratios of average CS to private sector total remuneration by Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A higher vertical</td>
<td>A higher vertical compression ratio provides a reasonable indicator of opportunity for salary growth over a CS career.</td>
<td>Ratio of average Secretary General total remuneration to average Junior Officer total remuneration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compression ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Attract qualified staff | As CS positions become more attractive, the average number of qualified applicants per advertised CS opening should increase. | Average number of qualified (long-listed) candidates per advertised CS opening |
| Continuous weed         | As CS management practices improve, poorer performing civil servants should exit the CS at non-trivial rates, thereby improving average quality of CS incumbents over time. | % of civil servants receiving the lowest performance rating in two successive years who have left the CS within the following year. |
| out poor performing     |                                                                                                                                |                                                                            |
| staff                   |                                                                                                                                |                                                                            |

Fiscally sustainable wage bill

| Civil service wage     | CS wage bill as a fraction of GDP should be consistent with Government’s fiscal program | Actual CS wage bill as a percentage of GDP. |
| bill is fiscally        |                                                                                                                                |                                                                            |
| sustainable            |                                                                                                                                |                                                                            |
| Budget-financed wage   | Overall budget-financed wage bill (covering not just the civil service, but all budget-financed public employees) should be consistent with Government’s fiscal program | Actual budget-financed overall wage bill as a percentage of GDP. |
| bill is fiscally        |                                                                                                                                |                                                                            |
| sustainable            |                                                                                                                                |                                                                            |

Source: Reid 2007.

In the absence of a consistently applied analytical framework for civil service issues, as exists for PFM, the effectiveness of ESW in this area will continue to be an issue.

4.2.2 The Bank’s Lending Program

The case studies present a varied picture with regards to the Bank’s approach to lending, in part due to timing and circumstances. The more successful cases, in terms of CSA reform, tend to be those countries where a combination of policy-base lending and technical assistance through investment loans is employed. Cambodia, Honduras, and Tanzania are examples where this two-pronged approach to lending has been a positive feature. On the other hand, countries where only policy-based lending has been provided, and thus rely solely on conditions as incentives for stimulating reforms, tend to fail—particularly where capacity levels and resources are low. Providing complementary technical assistance can help provide guidance on approaches, and fund training or other resource needs.

Uganda offers a useful case in point, where the use of poverty reduction support credits (PRSCs) without investment lending was not successful. Starting with PRSC II, ‘prior actions’ repeatedly called for the delivery of a strategic framework on public sector reform (particularly in the social sectors) by the Government of Uganda. Effectively, this
condition was rolled over several times to subsequent PRSCs. Prior actions in later PRSCs were vaguely phrased, leaving room for flexible interpretation. A similar pattern emerged regarding pay reform. As a result, the government failed to allocate adequate funding to reform activities. The Uganda Public Service Performance Enhancement Project (UPSPEP) was started in 2006 to address this issue. The UPSPEP is a two-part investment-type facility that will more directly support reform initiatives (see Box 2).

The cases also provided insight into the value of short versus longer term instruments. The growing recognition that achieving positive outcomes through CSA reform takes a number of years has influenced the use of lending instruments. Ambitious CSA reform conditions tied to short term lending instruments generally have been unsuccessful. The case studies give examples in recent years of more flexible lending instruments. Conditions have in many cases become more realistic, and longer term, flexible instruments such as sector-wide approaches (SWAs) that are programmatic rather than project based has been more suitable to CSA reforms.

Although the cases do underline the importance of supporting policy-based lending or equivalent grants with critical technical assistance and targeted resources through investment lending instruments, they also provide examples where the technical support is not necessarily provided by the Bank directly. In the case of Bulgaria, the main lending instrument used by the Bank was a programmatic adjustment loan (PAL). Through this instrument, the Bank provided a detailed roadmap of a public sector reform strategy, but the technical assistance was provided by other donors. In this case the Bank played the role of facilitator, rather than driving and supporting reform activities directly.

**Box 2: Using Investment lending creatively to support PRSCs**

The Uganda Public Service Performance Enhancement Project (UPSPEP) consists of two components:

1. Support for the implementation of the Government of Uganda’s Public Service Reform Program (PSRP), and
2. A Performance Enhancement Facility (PEF) that provides grants to public sector organizations on a demand-driven basis.

The first component is a SWAp that uses pooled funding. IDA allocated $15 million to the SWAp, while DFID, DANIDA, and Irish Aid put in another $10.5 million, $6 million, and $70,000, respectively. It has three broad, strategic objectives: 1. Enhanced management capacity, performance, and accountability; 2. Efficiency in organization and management; and 3. Leadership and Management Development. The first strategic objective has further sub-objectives: Performance and Accountability, Human Resources Capacity, Enabling and Empowering of the Work Environment, and Pay and Pension Reforms. More concrete examples from this objective are: the integration of ROM with the planning and budgeting system, and the phased implementing of the computerized IPPS. Funds are allocated to build human capacity and to install systems, not to physical capital and equipment.

The second component is a facility that will provide grants to public sector organizations, enabling them to enhance their capacity to improve their performance. It has been conceived as a comprehensive, flexible, and programmatic approach to enhancing the performance of public sector organizations. Thus far, the PEF involves 3 projects (covering 85 percent of the facility): 1. Capacity development for improved national statistics, especially relating to the monitoring and evaluation of government programs; 2. Support to the new Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA); and 3. Support for financial sector upgrading. Mostly, the PEF is allocated to build human capacity and to install systems, and to a lesser extent to physical capital and equipment like computers and software.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that there is an emerging trend among countries that are relatively better off, and are in less need of financial support, but still can benefit from the Bank’s technical expertise. This presents challenges for the Bank in terms of its more traditional approach, whereby it has used financial incentives to encourage countries to undertake needed reforms. In some cases, a particular country may still take a loan with conditions in order to access technical support, or even to be able to ‘blame’ the Bank where government needs to take painful actions in order to implement some reforms. Russia, on the other hand, presents a situation where no financial resources have been accessed, and the only role of the Bank has been to provide analytical support. Russia showed leadership in promoting its CSA reform agenda and is seeing positive results, in part due to this productive partnership. Increasingly countries, especially middle-income ones, are choosing to take World Bank support on the primary basis of technical quality, with little or no need for the financing per se.

4.3 Assessing Results

Despite some improvements to the Bank’s approach, CSA reform has been relatively unsuccessful—either through a poor record of implementation, or lack of evidence of improved outcomes. To a large extent, this conclusion is not surprising. Given the complex nature of CSA reform and political challenges, achieving real outcomes is a long-term prospect. Moreover, measuring those outcomes is not a simple task, either. The main governance indicator used in this evaluation is the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index. Table 9 summarizes the CPIA data for indicator 15 (quality of public administration).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CPIA (15)</th>
<th>CSA Project after 1999?</th>
<th>CPIA (15) Quality of Public Administration in 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2 2 2 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2 2 2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: /////// = improved; \\\\\ = worsened.
Source: World Bank CPIA scores.
Out of 57 countries where the Bank provided CSA assistance after 1999 (and for which CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) data is available in 1999 and 2006), 25 (44 percent) showed an improvement by 2006 in CSA performance,\textsuperscript{35} 22 (39 percent) showed no change, and 10 (18 percent) showed a deterioration.\textsuperscript{36} However, there is evidence that some of this improvement may stem from broader forces leading to improvements in weak performers. For example, out of the 33 countries with 1999 CPIA 15 scores at or below 3.0 where the Bank did not provide CSA assistance, 16 (48 percent) showed an improvement in CSA performance, 11 (33 percent) showed no change, and 6 (18 percent) showed a deterioration. On the other hand, there were six countries that received Bank lending for CSA and improved by a full point—showing that improvement is possible, although not common.

Based on a simple OLS (ordinary least squares) regression, the presence of Bank CSA projects is not significant in explaining movements in CPIA 15 between 1999 and 2006 after controlling for the initial CPIA level. However, one should not, at this stage, interpret these as the lack of a causal impact of CSA projects. These results are confounded by a long list of factors, including difficulty in capturing the timing of the impacts of the programs, nonrandom selection of countries for CSA programs, bias that results from the selection of the countries that do not receive CPIA ratings, omitted factors, and the fact that many of the observed gains were already showing in the lead-up periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: WBI Governance Indicators</th>
<th>Comparison of Case Study Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulatory Quality</strong> (Percentile Rank)</td>
<td><strong>Government Effectiveness</strong> (Percentile Rank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Fed</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: \textit{Bold}=increase from previous period; \textit{Italics}=decrease from previous period.
Source: WBI

\textsuperscript{35} As measured by CPIA 15 – Quality of Public Administration.
\textsuperscript{36} Several countries do not have CPIA data in both years. These are excluded from all totals and percentages.
variable biases (e.g. changes in incomes, governments, and so on), and the lack of information about CSA reforms supported by other donors, and other considerations.

There are other indicators that track aspects of civil service effectiveness. Table 10 details two World Bank Institute (WBI) civil service related indicators—regulatory quality and government effectiveness—for the case study countries. Although most of the countries from the case studies that have had a relatively positive record on CSA reform, such as Bulgaria, Albania, Russia, Tanzania and Ghana, also rank relatively high in terms of these indicators, the change over time does not show any clear trends.

Similarly, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ratings provide a measure for bureaucracy (see Table 11) but the data offer little insight.

Despite the inconclusive nature of these data, these measures do have the potential to provide useful insights over a longer time frame, and work in this area should continue. However, there is more immediate value in focusing efforts on developing shorter-term output measures, as discussed above. Not only do such measures provide more effective analytical and diagnostic tools, but also they act as tangible indicators of progress—important for both the reforming countries, and for the lenders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11: ICRG Ratings for The Quality of Bureaucracy</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: Bold=increase from previous period; Italic=decrease from previous period.
Source: ICRG
5 Reasons for Success or Failure

The case studies show that reform in the area of CSA has been extremely challenging, even in a relatively supportive environment. The cases highlighted a number of country-specific reasons why implementation of these reforms—particularly downsizing, pay decompression, and merit-based reforms—failed. First, and most common, there can be a lack of political commitment to reform or a discontinuity over the implementation period. In some countries, the government may adopt reform strategies, and even pass new legislation. But then as implementation starts up, momentum slows, delays occur, and projects can completely stall. These challenges were evident, for example, in Argentina, Ghana, and Yemen. This issue of political commitment can affect even the most uncontroversial measures, such as the introduction of new data systems, by reallocating resources or simply delaying projects because of staff turnover. Changes in political leadership can also result in decisions to terminate, reverse, or dilute more controversial reforms such as downsizing. In a number of countries, such as Bangladesh, Yemen and Ethiopia, the persistence of patronage systems and politicization of the bureaucracy directly undermined implementation in the review period, particularly those reforms that affect pay, recruitment, promotion and downsizing. In addition, the strength of trade unions, particularly within the public sector, can subvert downsizing, pay, and merit-based reforms in an otherwise supportive political regime. Concerted government effort partly overcame this in Burkina Faso and Guatemala, but not in Honduras.

Box 3: Argentina : Political Roadblocks to Reform

This excerpt from the Institutional Governance Review (IGR) report for Argentina gives an example of political pressures stalling or undoing reforms, sometimes in a less than transparent way:

Despite the early advances, there is still an absence of strategic direction, a high degree of politicization, and an entrenched formalistic and bureaucratic culture. The initial vision on which the human resource reforms operated (the creation of a single, unified civil service with standardized merit appointments and career development) appears to have reached its limits in the face of Argentine reality – the legal, cultural, economic, and political environment to which it is applied. External events, as much as active opposition, simply prevented the expansion of the measures adopted, and also eroded the logic of trying to introduce some of the new legally required practices. Following initial drastic cuts in the last decade, employment levels in the national executive have not increased, but the composition of the workforce and the rules under which it operates remain diverse, with an increasing reliance on the largely unregulated use of contracted staff.

Table 12: Factors that Contribute to Success or Failure of CSA Reform: Case Study Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal to Country</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political leadership/commitment</td>
<td>Quality of technical and institutional analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of politicization of civil service/pervasiveness of patronage system</td>
<td>Willingness to be opportunistic in prioritizing reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of strong unions</td>
<td>Degree of realistic external expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriateness of lending instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective donor coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Availability of tangible performance measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28
Despite these political, cultural, and institutional challenges, the cases give some examples of successful CSA reforms. Six additional factors seem to have contributed to these successes—and in their absence, likely contributed to reform failures—analytic diagnosis and advice, pragmatic opportunism in selecting reforms to support, realistic external expectations, appropriate packages of lending instruments, tangible indicators of success, and effective donor coordination.

**Strong and coherent technical and contextual analysis.** As discussed in earlier sections, the Bank’s analytical tools in the area of CSA reform are relatively underdeveloped and underused. There is no standard Bank diagnostic instrument or report for the analysis of the civil service, such as PERs, in the case of PFM. The absence of a standard analytical tool is partly a consequence of the lack of international consensus around the “right” CSA reform model for developing countries, or indeed for developed countries. There continues to be debates about the objectives of civil service and administrative reform—whether it is affordability, performance, or accountability—and in particular their sequencing and fit with political realities. Moreover, the diagnostic work done by the Bank on CSA reform is normally relegated to one chapter of a broader piece of analysis, most often a financial report of some type. As a consequence, the CSA analyses tend to focus on affordability issues rather than performance or accountability.

The Bank has rarely analyzed the political considerations that make CSA reform so difficult, with the IGRs in Bangladesh and Bolivia being notable exceptions. As a result, many of the case studies attribute part of the failure to make headway in CSA reform to the narrow scope of the Bank’s analytical work.

Effective analysis of CSA issues is made more difficult by the scarcity of standardized data, such as numbers of staff by grade and occupation group, as well as data on the wage bill. Nor are there standard measures of performance or indicators of reform implementation. Recently, there has been some progress in this area. For instance, the CPIA question on quality of public administration has four subcomponents—policy coordination and responsiveness, service delivery and operational efficiency, merit and ethics, and pay adequacy and management of the wage bill. WBI governance indicators also measure bureaucracy quality. Although there is no civil service equivalent to PEFA (Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability) indicators, there have been a few diagnostic pilots in the Europe and Central Asia Region (Albania and FYR Macedonia, for instance) and in some Indian states—measuring rates of turnover, shares of personnel recruited through competitive exams, and so on—but these have not been widely applied in other countries. Often even basic data are lacking, and initial reforms may involve personnel inventory and information systems; this is sometimes a good opportunity for an entry point to the CSA reform agenda. However, the Bank has not (with other stakeholders) developed and promoted an adequate framework and tools to incorporate civil service and administrative issues into the standard diagnostics.

Russia is an example of the Bank providing good quality analysis and advice on CSA reforms that was well received and valued by the client, and helped to support their reform agenda. Bolivia and Honduras are other examples where contextual analysis was
carried out to good effect. Understanding labor market conditions has been an important part of successful contextual analyses. Unfortunately, the more common experience from the cases has been the opposite—where the absence of good diagnosis and analysis can lead to inappropriate reforms or failure to convince governments to take action. This issue was highlighted in a number of case study countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana (in the 1990s), and Indonesia.

Taking a pragmatic and opportunistic approach to CSA reforms where the institutional environment is challenging. Engrained systems of patronage and political appointments are often at the root of problems with the civil service, which successful diagnosis has understood. But the Bank’s traditional tools, especially lending conditions, are ill-suited to addressing this fundamental challenge. Some positive results are being achieved where the design of reform measures are more pragmatic, by trying to shift existing practice rather than advocating all-or-nothing change. Russia, for example, has started to require that new hires meet certain minimum qualifications even if the final selection is politicized, keeping track of absentees, and making it easier to fire them. In Cambodia, selective, enhanced pay schemes have been used: at first the Bank and IMF staff were unsupportive, concerned that a two-tier salary system would cause friction, but in the end it was recognized that an informal two-tier system was already in place due to ad hoc donor arrangements, and that this program would encourage consistency and a better targeting of resources. Implementation of reforms through pilots—as in Russia—when a more comprehensive approach would likely fail, can also be more effective in riskier environments.

Realistic expectations by the donor community. It is now well acknowledged that CSA reforms take time to implement, as well as produce tangible results. Tanzania provides a good example of a reform process where the Bank and other donors have let the government take the lead in terms of pace and direction, and have shown patience for building capacity. In this case, the Bank has used a longer-term, and more flexible lending instrument (Adaptable Program Loan), and pooling funds with other donors, to respond to this reality. However, other cases show that Bank and other donors can have expectations that are overly ambitious, which inevitably set the reforms up for failure. Yemen offers an example of this. It is also true that unrealistic expectations can be created by the political leadership within the country (such as Ghana), where broad and ambitious strategies are at times promoted and approved, but implementation stalls as vested interests coalesce.

Appropriate package of lending instruments. The case studies show that technical assistance funded with investment loans has been a particularly important tool for encouraging reform in the area of CSA reform, especially in poorer countries where capacity levels are usually very low. In some of the cases, such as Cambodia, Honduras, and Tanzania, the combination of policy-based lending supported by technical assistance was a positive feature, particularly in countries with low capacity for implementation. In other cases where only adjustment lending supported CS reform, the lack of supporting technical assistance was cited as a hindrance to progress. Learning from such experiences led sometimes to the revival of investment lending to support CS reforms. In Uganda, the
government did not initially allocate enough budget resources to the CSA reforms; in response, the government has now initiated an investment loan with the Bank to address this issue.

**Tangible indicators of success.** Unlike tax reform, where leaders see obvious benefits, the political leadership cannot easily identify tangible benefits of CSA reform. Linking CSA reforms to more concrete PFM reforms where possible is one way to address this. Most conducive to this is the development of payroll and HR databases, as well as training and capacity building in support of PFM. Another strategy is to develop measurable indicators of results. The Albania case study points to some progress in this area, with the Bank supporting the development of a number of civil service related measures, such as the percentage of recruitment done by merit, which the government is now tracking on a regular basis. These are not final outcome measures, but they provide a more transparent method of demonstrating progress in implementation. A few other countries are tracking similar measures, such as FYR Macedonia and some Indian states, but there is no standard set of indicators or wide adoption, similar to the PEFA indicators. Further effort in this area is certainly worth pursuing. The case study of Russia offers additional insights. Its reform agenda began with economic reforms and then fiscal reforms. Russia has more recently reached the stage where poor capacity is now holding back other reforms, and with realization at the political level, there is now a growing acceptance of the need for CSA reform. Not only has this case shown the importance of building demand for CSA reform through identifying tangible benefits, it also shows that it is possible to proceed with some elements of reform in the absence or in advance of a comprehensive strategy.

**Box 4: Ghana – An example of Donor-Country Cooperation**

The Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) was launched in 2006, building on the 2005 Ghana Partnership Strategy (GPS). The G-JAS involves the majority of Ghana’s Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) development partners (representing about 95 percent of official development assistance flows), and consists of five interlinking elements:

(i) A joint assessment of the current country situation (political, economic, social)
(ii) A joint description of the major challenges facing Ghana in its quest to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and middle-income status;
(iii) A statement of principles and commitments on how G-JAS partners will work with each other, with Government, and with civil society and private stakeholders;
(iv) Priorities for the joint partner response at the GPRS II pillar and sector level
(v) Arrangements for results monitoring and risk mitigation.

The G-JAS should be seen as a milestone in an on-going process, which provides a framework for continued action over the next four years. Concrete actions for moving forward are therefore presented as part of the G-JAS conclusions. The timeframe for the G-JAS is the four year period starting in 2007 and ending in 2010. This timeframe has been adopted to take into account national cycles in Ghana.


**Effective donor coordination.** In some countries, reform strategies have become joint efforts with the donor community, to more positive effect. Bulgaria, Guyana, and Tanzania provide good examples, as does Ghana with its joint CAS process. In some of the cases the Bank has shown itself to be an effective facilitator and results have
generally been more positive than when the Bank has tried to drive reforms (such as downsizing) in the absence of political commitment. Interestingly, Tanzania’s reform agenda suffered in the early years because an uncoordinated approach by donors resulted in conflicting advice and multiple agendas; this changed as a result of the government’s successful demands for better coordination among donors.

These various strategies used by the Bank to support CSA reforms in the case study countries are consistent with and reflect a number of the recommendations from the 1999 IEG evaluation. For instance, the 1999 report emphasized the need to preface reform design with institutional assessments of administrative systems and analyses of labor market trends in addition to budget scenarios. However, this type of analysis is still the exception not the norm. Another recommendation proposed that the Bank engage in a more participatory approach to reform design and implementation. This is now happening in countries like Tanzania. The Bank has also made progress on the report’s recommendation to coordinate better with other donors and focus its input where it has a comparative advantage. In Bulgaria, for example, the Bank provided a roadmap for reform, but other donors provided the technical assistance for specific reforms. The development of standardized performance measures, as is being tried in Albania, was also a recommendation from the 1999 report.
6 Conclusions

This paper has reviewed the Bank’s performance in the area of CSA reform, particularly since 1999, when the last review was done. The approach has been threefold—a review of the literature, an assessment of trends as evidenced by the Banks project database and a review of case studies from 19 countries.

Based on the evidence reviewed, it is clear that CSA reform efforts continue to face major challenges, and in most cases reform programs have not been successful. The reasons for this outcome are complex, and the issues identified from the 1999 review are still largely relevant. The analysis presented in this paper point to a number of factors that contribute to success or failure. Some of these factors can be internal to the country:

- Lack of political commitment to reform, or more often a lack of sustainable commitment that ends in stalled implementation. This can result from a change in government in midstream, or simply lack of staying power once the impacts of implementation take hold.
- Ingrained patronage systems that can directly undermine implementation, particularly those reforms that affect pay, promotion and employment status.
- Presence of strong public sector unions that subvert reforms even in an otherwise supportive political environment.

While these factors are not necessarily insurmountable, they do require careful and strategic implementation strategies.

The review also identified several factors that speak to the World Bank’s role, and their presence or absence can greatly influence the likelihood of successful implementation:

- Strong and coherent technical and contextual analysis, including the political reasons for the status quo and implications of reform options.
- Taking a pragmatic and opportunistic approach to CSA reforms where the institutional environment is challenging.
- Realistic expectations by the donor community of what is achievable.
- Appropriate package of lending instruments.
- Availability or creation of tangible indicators of success, and
- Effective donor coordination.

Based on the findings, a number of recommendations can be made.

First, the Bank needs to develop an analytical framework that can guide Bank staff to undertake better quality diagnostics and identify appropriate strategies that are tailored to specific country contexts. This framework would include a standard set of performance indicators, similar to the PEFA analytical framework.

Second, this analytical framework needs to incorporate political and institutional analysis so that the findings and recommendations reflect the practical realities on the ground.
Third, the Bank needs to strengthen its staff resources focused on administrative and civil service issues, so that it can deliver high quality technical analysis in a timely and consistent way.

Fourth, the Bank should ensure that lending programs for CSA reform include adequate technical assistance to ensure capacity gaps do not hinder reform implementation. This technical assistance may be provided directly by the World Bank, or facilitated through the involvement of other donors.

Fifth, lending instruments need to be appropriate to the particular features of CSA reform initiatives. Specifically, this may call for longer time periods, but also flexible mechanisms that can accommodate changing circumstances. In addition, the evidence has shown that an approach of adjustment lending with conditions combined with targeted technical assistance is more likely to achieve positive results.

Ultimately, administrative and CSA reform is essential to achieving the full benefits of broader public sector reforms. The challenge is making the path to reform more pragmatic, tangible, and transparent.
Annex I: Literature Review: Defining ‘Civil Service’

There is no standard definition of civil service or civil servant in the academic literature. A comparative study of civil service systems asserts that “civil service is differentiated from public service” [Bekke, Perry, Toonen 1996], and indeed, in every case found in the literature the civil service is defined as a subset of persons employed to provide a public service. However, authors diverge when it comes to an exact definition of the term. The differences arise in two respects. One concerns the composition of that subset, that is, the categories of public service employees that are considered “civil servants.” Thus, military personnel are generally excluded, but many categories of civilian employment are also excluded, such as those in local government, state enterprises, judges, teachers and health professionals. In addition, most authors choose to exclude elected officials, and, though rarely mentioned, police appear to be excluded along with the military. A common approach is to apply the civil service concept to central administration employees, including administrative personnel in the military and social services sectors. Often, however, authors fail to specify which public service workers are included in their discussion.

A second source of definitional variation arises when the term “civil service” is applied not to a specified category of employees but rather to the institutional arrangement under which they are employed. In practice, public service can be carried out under a variety of contractual and managerial arrangements, but many authors reserve the term “civil service” for career employees working under an explicit “civil service” law. Such laws differ not only from private labor legislation but also from a variety of contractual arrangements used for particular public services. Under that institutional definition, the principal subject of analysis is the functioning of the legally defined civil service regime, paid out of tax revenues in the form of budgeted posts, rather than the broader human resource management problem of the public sector since the latter can include a variety of employment regimes with a variety of sources of finance. In most studies reviewed here the explicit or implicit subject is the former, that is, public employment under a formal civil service regime, a subject that is more bounded than the totality of public employment, even within the more strictly administrative category of general government functions. However, one study of CSA reform in the OECD differs from most authors in that it opts to cover the “totality of public employment,” but “only when the latter is given in certain institutional contexts,” such contexts being those that assure professional independence and impartiality and protect against political sponsorship and patronage.

Historically, civil services evolved gradually in most developed countries parallel to their political development. According to Raadschelders and Rutgers (1996:67-68), the first civil service arrangements were closely associated with the decline of feudalism and the

38 A review of the various approaches to the definition of CS is provided in Longo (2001), pp. 4-5.
growth of national autocratic states. The civil service system was meant to “assure impartial (mainly uniform) application of personnel policies, to professionalize public service cadres, and to rout out patronage and corruption.” At the same time, “successful professionalization and sanitation of the civil service in many countries … also coincided with rising levels of education attainment, legal and constitutional reforms, wider suffrage and the strengthening of mechanisms of parliamentary oversight and accountability.” However, the term “civil service” was first used in designating the British administration of India, and its first application elsewhere was in the mid-nineteenth century in England.

40 In Prussia, as early as the mid-17th century, Frederick William, elector of Brandenburg, created an efficient civil administration staffed by personnel chosen on a competitive basis. In France similar reforms preceded the Revolution, and they were the basis for the Napoleonic reforms that transformed the royal service into the civil service. For a discussion on the evolution of CS systems in western countries see Raadschelder and Rutgers, in Bekke, Perry and Toonen (1996), pp. 67-99.
Annex II: Literature Review: Experience with CSA Reform

Experience in OECD countries
Civil Service and Administrative (CSA) reform in the OECD has been driven by diverse political, economic and social conditions. Among reasons cited by scholars are: fiscal crisis and excess staffing (and effort to save money), dissatisfaction and declining confidence in government and a perception of poor performance, citizens’ demands for changes in the government, particularly more responsive public organizations; the presence of new reform models; revolutionary developments in information technology, and political devolution. Comparative studies by Pollitt and Bouckaert, Eduardo Lora, Bernard Silberman, and others do not find any systematic pattern to explain the relative importance of each of those factors across countries.41

Proponents of New Public Management (NPM, elaborated below and in Table 13) have claimed that since the early 1980s, this paradigm has driven the reform experiences at least to some degree in most OECD countries, and that inevitably most countries will follow that path.42 Though there is debate on the extent to which OECD countries have adopted NPM,43 most authors agree that recent reforms in OECD countries have been inspired by NPM ideas.44

Objectives and components
The most common objectives for CSA reform in OECD countries are: more efficiency and responsiveness, strengthening of accountability for results; and greater variety and flexibility in the provision of services.45 In particular, “politicians wanted civil service which were more flexible and responsive, more focused on getting results, more capable and, if possible less numerous.”46 However, Ingraham has noted that along with these objectives, some countries also seek to limit the policy role of civil servants and to introduce political direction more frequently and intensively into public organizations.47

There are many different ways to categorize the reform paths taken by OECD countries. Schick distinguishes four different strategies that have been pursued by OECD countries: market-driven reform that relies on competition, prices and contracts; managerial reforms that rely on the professionalism, skill, and public service ethic of managers; program review which relies on policy analysis and evaluation; and incremental deregulation that

42 Notably Osborne and Gaebler (1992) supports this view.
43 For a discussion of this issue see Pollitt (2002).
44 The definition of NPM is a source of debate, from a group of administrative doctrines to a new paradigm or theoretical approach in public management. For a description of the NPM see Rainey (1990), Pollitt (1990), Pollitt (2000), and Aucoin (1990).
relies on an ongoing review of rules and practices to streamline management and remove wasteful controls.\textsuperscript{48} It is important to note that this classification applies to public sector management reforms in general, but their basic intention applies to CSA reform.\textsuperscript{49}

Ingraham establishes a different set of four reform strategies: budgetary and financial, structural, procedural or technical, and relational reforms. Her analysis helps in identifying the interdependency of measures in different areas of public administration and the effect of changes in other areas on the civil service.\textsuperscript{50} For instance, structural reorganizations at the center have precipitated the reorganization of the management of the civil service system. Countries like New Zealand and United Kingdom have created new organizations to administer and monitor their civil services. Ingraham recognizes that most countries have pursued more than one reform at a time. Some of them have adopted many of those reforms at the same time, like the U.S., but not all of which were compatible. In these cases, there is a risk of inconsistencies in the reform implementation.\textsuperscript{51}

Some of the most important measures pursued by OECD countries following on the lines of New Public Management (NPM) have focused on changing essential features of the basic Weberian model, in particular, those that make the civil servant different from other employment arrangements.\textsuperscript{52} The three most salient features of the Weberian model are:

- Job security and career appointment, with the goal of giving civil servants neutrality and ensuring continuity by protecting civil servants from patronage and arbitrary political actions.
- Promotions based on qualifications, knowledge, and seniority, with the goal of inducing specialization and career motivation.
- A unified civil service, within a distinct national legal framework, with the goal of ensuring a unified set of rules to motivate and sanction civil servants.

The most common actions taken to introduce changes in those features are listed in Table 13 below.\textsuperscript{53}

Other measures that do not directly address these three features include downsizing of personnel. But downsizing is fundamentally related to the goals on New Public Management—increased flexibility to achieve outputs in the most efficient way—as well as the often related goal of shifting non-essential functions to the private sector.

\textsuperscript{48} See Schick (1999), p. 9. Underlying these strategies there are different conceptions of the future of the state: the market strategy focuses on the state as policy maker rather than service provider; the managerial model allows a broader role for government in providing public services but with more flexible tools; the program review strategy is driven by achieving desired social outcomes within severe resource constraints; and the incremental model endorses the status quo but less burdened by old rules and requirements.

\textsuperscript{49} Pollitt (2000), Bekke Perry, and Toonen (1996).

\textsuperscript{50} Ingraham in Bekke, Perry, and Toonen (1996) pp. 253-262.


\textsuperscript{52} See Pollitt (2000) pp. 72-73 for a discussion of these features.

### Table 13: Implications of the New Public Management for Civil Service Arrangements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features of the Basic (Weberian) Model</th>
<th>New Public Management Measures</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tenure and career appointments</td>
<td>• Introduction of performance based-pay and of fixed-term contracts for top officials; flexible procedures for recruiting, compensating, and classifying personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Promotion based on qualifications, knowledge, and seniority | • Changes in the management of compensation, and performance appraisals that include linking promotions and pay to the achievement of specific results\(^{54}\) that are specified in agreements or quasi-contracts.  
• The establishment of some form of a specific senior executive service for developing and remunerating top managers is a development link to these changes. These senior executive services could bring to the top management posts individuals from outside the civil service, in which case the concept of career changes. |
| A unified civil service, within a distinct national legal framework | • Normalization of the civil service, that is, unification of labor regimes (public and private regimes unified into one system).  
• Changes in the delegation of management and authority over personnel away from central units to other units in the government and to managers. |

**Implementation and results**

Even though the broad objectives of reform in OECD countries have been similar, actual reform processes have differed according to country-specific economic, political, and administrative conditions that are harder to change.\(^{55}\) The political-administrative conditions include organization of the political and administrative systems, political-administrative institutions, values and traditions. As a consequence, reforms have been implemented with different degrees of intensity, not in all countries, and with a variety of results. A comparative study edited by Hellmut Wollman concludes that “reforms never work exactly as intended.” A major lesson from that study is the importance of contexts: “We should be rather suspicious of all comprehensive models with deceptively simple, cookie-cutter approaches.”\(^{56}\)

One effect that is reported is that implementation difficulties arise when reform measures collide with a civil service system in place.\(^{57}\) Also, reforms—and especially NPM—sometimes mean an increase in administrative discretionality, endangering the ethics of public service and increasing the opportunities for opportunistic behavior and corruption if strong accountability is lacking. This implementation risk is part of the debate on the degree of success or failure of CSA reforms in OECD countries.\(^{58}\) Some authors point out that, specifically, there are problems with measuring performance, abuse by managers in the recruitment of new personnel, and the potential loss of the specific values and ethical attitudes of the civil service.

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\(^{54}\) Performance pay schemes have been implemented in many countries with mix results. See Pollitt (2000), p. 75.


\(^{57}\) See Pollitt and Bouckaert, in Wollman (2003), p. 22.

During implementation and management of CSA reform, many authors recognize that the following factors have been important in OECD experiences:

- The definition of the pace and sequence of proposed changes
- The establishment or delegation of authority to the units/organizations that should be entrusted with the tasks
- The political cast given to the reforms
- The extent to which the government associates or distances itself from the changes
- The extent to which the reform should proceed by administrative fiat or through legislative authorization.

Their relative importance varies and there is not a causality validated in all cases.

Perhaps the clearest message that emerges from the literature on OECD reform experience is a cautionary note regarding the inseparability of managerial systems from politics, values, and culture. Thus, a review of lessons on capacity development by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee states that “a good understanding of context is fundamental. Donors and their partners are increasingly moving towards an approach to capacity development that asks, not ‘how to do it,’ but ‘what might work here?’”\(^{59}\) A paper by Evert Lindquist for the OECD’s Public Management Service (PUMA) states that “reform had proceeded in different ways in each country—incremental, selective, and comprehensive—even though all jurisdictions were wrestling with similar challenges.”\(^{60}\)

A historical account of state development in France, Great Britain, Japan, and the USA by Silberman explains bureaucratic and administrative diversity as a fallout of political struggle. “The rationalization process was essentially a political process that redefined the nature of the modern state. It was not a product of a general social systemic process directed toward the maximization of social utility.”\(^{61}\) The primacy of politics as a determinant of bureaucratic form is echoed in other country studies, such as a comparative analysis of civil service systems by Bekke, Perry, and Toonen which concludes that, “civil service systems tend to persist because they are over-determined, perpetuated by the operational, collective choice, and constitutional systems in which they are nested… civil service systems are … natural outgrowths of their context; in some respects organic parts of their surroundings.”\(^{62}\) An especially powerful argument regarding the role of values and culture, and their implications for bureaucratic behaviors is made in a study of “Wasta”—or culture of compromise—in Middle Eastern society.\(^{63}\)

A major implication for civil service operations is to create doubts regarding the transferability of managerial models across borders. This question is addressed directly by Minogue who notes that managerial reform efforts were stymied in France by the weight of interest groups and legal traditions, and that the transfer of civil service models

\(^{60}\) Lindquist (1999), p. 3.
\(^{63}\) Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993).
to China is being hampered by specific “Chinese characteristics.” An account of CSA reforms in four Anglo-American countries points up the specific character acquired in each reform despite the broad agreement on objectives, and the common cultural roots which facilitated diffusion. Japan was a heavy borrower of institutions from the 19th century, and an enforced borrower during the postwar occupation, yet its civil service model retains a highly “Japanese” character which is congruent with human resource management in its private sector. Evidence on the limits to transferability in the historical development of civil service systems in the OECD is echoed in, and helps to explain, the difficulties encountered in the CSA reform experience of developing and transition countries.

Another lesson of the OECD experience is that CSA reform has never been a “once-over” exercise; rather, it has happened in an accumulative way over long periods with occasional major steps forward but also reversals. In that sense, “reform” may be a misleading term since what is required is continuous adaptation and improvement and also vigilance against the return of group interests that are negatively affected by the introduction of merit and transparency. A striking object lesson in that regard is the United States, now considered a “reform laggard,” where major reform efforts since 1978, to a great extent, have been frustrated by group politics and by growing politicization. The frustration of reform in France, for similar reasons, has already been mentioned.

Experience in Developing and Transition Countries

There are few studies, outside the Bank, that compare developing and transition country implementation of CSA reform in recent years. Some reform initiatives in those countries have tried to implement different elements of NPM with varying degrees of failure and success.

Causes of reform

Most authors agree that the factors that have driven reform in developing and transition countries include one or more of the following: fiscal crisis and excess staffing, dissatisfaction with government services, declining confidence in government and citizens demands for changes in the government, growing international competition, the presence of new reform ideas – most notably NPM – revolutionary developments in information technology, concern with patronage and corruption, low qualifications of personnel, low salaries, and weak management systems. Studies of transition countries confirm the obvious pressure for reform created by the collapse of authoritarian regimes starting in 1989. External pressures from donors, especially in Africa, and from the

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67 Radin (1992) p.59 describes the CSR experience in the USA in terms of the Sisyphus myth.
70 Verheijen and Kotchegura (2000).
European Union, in the case of transition countries, should be added to the list of causal agents.

In view of the diversity of factors and the many differences among countries in this category, it is not surprising that there is no consensus by scholars on the relative importance of each of these reasons across countries and regions. At the same time, it is evident that many of the above-mentioned factors, whether once-over (like changes of regime) or continuous (like information technology, international competition and the growing power of public opinion), are exogenous sources of pressure for reform agendas to which governments are responding with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

**Objectives and components**
Some of these developing and transition countries have attempted to introduce various elements of NPM over the last number of years, while others have pursued a mixed strategy in which there are elements of the basic model and NPM. As noted in section 0 above, a number of writers have categorized three reform objectives: affordability, improved performance, and accountability. And as country context has become increasingly important for the design of reform, expectations and performance measures, diagnosis, and the package of specific reform proposals all differ to quite a degree as a result.\(^71\)

The introduction of NPM has been urged, in many cases, by international organizations.\(^72\) There are some critics regarding the role of these organizations in influencing the reform agenda of these countries. For some authors, like Ingraham, there has been an imposition of “western reform models as a condition of international aid.”\(^73\)

**Implementation and results**
Scholars agree that CSA reform efforts in developing and transition countries over the last 20 years have been difficult to implement and sustain over time, and that those difficulties probably explain the high incidence of failure. But there are differing explanations on the reasons behind these difficulties.\(^74\)

Some reasons are related to the political process behind CSA reform implementation.\(^75\) CSA reform implementation threatens the status quo and alters the balance of power within society. It creates winners and losers within and outside the civil service. The greater the threat to the status quo, the greater is the opposition and the difficulties in implementing CSA reforms. As Schneider and Heredia point out “CSR appears to be the one [public sector reform] most difficult to implement and institutionalize”. The difficulty arises from the loss of power and influence politicians face as they move from discretionary to merit-based management.\(^76\) But this difficulty is increased by the

\(^71\) Ingraham in Bekke, Perry, and Toonen (1996), p. 249.
\(^72\) Pollitt and Bouckaert in Wollman (2003), p. 22.
\(^73\) Ingraham in Bekke, Perry, and Toonen (2003), p. 262.
\(^74\) Schneider and Heredia (2003), p.21.
\(^75\) Ozgediz (1983), pp. 66 and 73.
\(^76\) Schneider and Heredia (2003), p.22.
technical and administrative complexities embedded in designing and managing a merit-based personnel system. In many developing countries, there is no technical and managerial capacity within the civil service to manage that system and there may not be other supporting organizational arrangements that make implementation of CSA reform more feasible.\textsuperscript{77} Many past CSA reform interventions have assumed that both the capacity and organizational arrangements were already in place.

Other scholars argue that implementation difficulties and lack of sustainability of CSA reform interventions in developing countries arise from CSA reform designs. Designs that either use a single template to address highly heterogeneous institutional settings or introduce recent OECD managerial models that may not be suitable.\textsuperscript{78} This opens the question on how much of the OECD recent managerial reform experience could be transferred and be suitable for developing countries.

There is considerable debate on the issue of transferability, and particularly on NPM applicability and suitability, for developing countries.\textsuperscript{79} Some scholars caution against directly transferring managerialist models to developing countries, pointing out the risks of misdiagnosing the problem. In countries where patronage and informality still dominate, managerialism may not be the most suitable solution.\textsuperscript{80} As Gaebler noted, “You have to invent government before you can reinvent it.”\textsuperscript{81}

This position echoes the need to sequence reform measures suggested by scholars like Schick. Under this view, managerialist measures could mean increasing risks of patronage temptations for the sake of efficiency benefits derived from increased autonomy in personnel management. But if sequenced poorly, these measures could contradict concurrent efforts to reduce patronage and informality in the civil service. So there is a need for a logical sequence for measures that address informality and patronage practices, and measures that build managerial and technological capacity and experience, both of which are considered prerequisites for managerial measures.\textsuperscript{82} The key issue is what this logical sequence for each country is. Other scholars argue that the differences between Weberian reforms as defined by the basic model outlined above, and managerial reforms, are more relevant to developed countries than to Latin America and Eastern Europe. In their view, combinations of measures from both approaches could work together in dealing effectively with patronage practices. Thus, Kaufman points at the way in which merit-based standards that govern hiring and promotions can be supplemented with those that establish performance goals that can be credibly linked to rewards.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{77} Ozgediz (1983), p. 73.
\textsuperscript{78} For interesting and challenging propositions relevant to the application of the basic model to CSR in developing countries see Shepherd (2003), p.3.
\textsuperscript{80} See Figure 1 above and the importance of staging reforms as noted in World Bank (2003).
\textsuperscript{81} Schneider and Heredia (2003), p. 8.
\textsuperscript{82} Schneider and Heredia (2003), p. 9; Stallings in Schneider and Heredia p. 81; Schick (1998) p. 129.
\textsuperscript{83} Kauffman in Schneider and Heredia (2003), p. 284.
Complementing the discussion on transferability, there is a discussion on the degree to which CSA reform needs to be indigenous. In particular, developing countries should perhaps devise “home-grown” personnel management systems, since these are especially sensitive to local values, attitudes and behavior patterns. Ozgediz cites the case of Japan, which adopted certain US management techniques “while developing a management style consistent with its own societal values and attitudes.” He concludes that “transferring Japan’s management practices to a Western environment is as difficult as using Western practices in the Japanese setting. Since most individuals raised in Western countries do not share the values embedded in Japanese practices, such transfer attempts would require considerable adaptation.” According to this view, reducing implementation difficulties and making CSA reform in developing countries more sustainable may require that those countries devise their own civil service and associated management systems, with features that reflect the values and traditions of their own societies. There is some initial evidence of home-grown CSA reform versions in developing countries that are capturing the attention of scholars, notably: Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Mauritania. However, we found no studies that explain these experiences in a systematic way. Additionally, some authors have begun identifying “home-grown” reforms in developing countries that have been successful where there has not been presence or pressures from outside donors, although these cases have involved specific sectors and not for all the civil service. Interestingly, this work focuses on public officials, on what they think and how they are motivated in their specific areas of performance.

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85 Tendler (1997), pp. 8-10.
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