An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Support of Regional Programs

Case Study of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program

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ENHANCING DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH EXCELLENCE
AND INDEPENDENCE IN EVALUATION

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Objectives and Methodology</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Criteria</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction and Context</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Challenges</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Program Summary Description</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Relevance: Rationale, Alignment, and Design</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiarity Principle</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Consensus</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Design</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity and Monitorability of Objectives</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Efficacy: Outcomes, Impacts, and Sustainability</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of Objectives</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realized Distribution of Benefits</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risks to Outcome and Impact</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Efficiency: Governance, Management, and Financing</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient Use of Resources</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance, Management, and Legitimacy</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Performance</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. World Bank Performance</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Advantage</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Support and Oversight</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acronyms

CAR  Central African Republic
CAS  Country Assistance Strategy
CSO  Civil Society organization
DDR  Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DRR  Demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
DPKO United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations
IDA  International Development Association
MDRP Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
M&E  Monitoring and evaluation
NGO  Nongovernmental organization
IEG  Independent Evaluation Group
TCG  Technical Coordination Group
UN  United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA National Union for Total Independence of Angola
USAID United States Agency for International Development
Preface

EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

This review of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) in the Great Lakes region of Africa is one of 19 desk reviews undertaken as part of an independent evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of the World Bank’s support for regional initiatives over the past 10 years (1995–2004). Twelve of the reviews, including this assessment of the MDRP, are desk reviews; the other seven reviews are in-depth field studies.

This study draws on core program documentation, program progress reports, and minutes of key stakeholder and advisory committee meetings, as well as related Bank country assistance strategies, Project Appraisal Documents, Implementation Status Reports, aide-memoirs, and back-to-office reports. It also relies heavily on a mid-term review commissioned by the MDRP partners and undertaken by a consulting firm based in Washington, DC, the World Bank’s response to the mid-term review, and the response from partners through the February and November 2005 Partners Meeting. The team conducted interviews with program staff based in Washington, DC, some Bank task team leaders for MDRP national programs cofinanced by the International Development Association, the main author of the mid-term review, as well as two external experts on postconflict operations who are knowledgeable about the program. See Annexes G and H for full list of people interviewed and references, respectively.

EVALUATION CRITERIA

This review uses the following criteria to assess the relevance, efficacy, and efficiency of the World Bank’s support. In addition, the review evaluates the Bank’s and countries’ performances as well as the effectiveness of the program’s monitoring and evaluation.

Relevance

- **Subsidiarity:** To what extent is the program being addressed at the lowest level effective, and either complements, substitutes for, or competes with Bank country or global programs?
- **Alignment:** To what extent does the program arise out of a regional consensus, formal or informal, concerning the main regional challenges in the sector and the need for collective action? To what extent is it consistent with the strategies and priorities of the region/subregion, countries, and the Bank?
- **Design of the regional program:** To what extent is program design technically sound, and to what extent does it take account of different levels of development and interests of participating countries, foster the confidence and trust among participants necessary for program implementation, and have clear and monitorable objectives?


**Efficacy**

- **Achievement of objectives:** To what extent has the program achieved, or is it likely to achieve, its stated objectives, including its intended distribution of benefits and costs among participating countries?
- **Capacity building:** To what extent has the program contributed to building capacities at the regional and/or participating country levels?
- **Risk to outcomes and impact:** To what extent are the outcomes and impacts of the program likely to be resilient to risk over time?

**Efficiency**

- **Efficient use of resources:** To what extent has the program realized, or is it expected to realize, benefits by using a reasonable level of time and money?
- **Governance, management, and legitimacy:** To what extent have the governance and management arrangements clearly defined key roles and responsibilities, fostered effective exercise of voice by program participants and coordination among donors, contributed to or impeded the implementation of the program and achievement of its objectives, and entailed adequate monitoring of program performance and evaluation of results?
- **Financing:** To what extent have financing arrangements affected positively or negatively the strategic direction, outcomes, and sustainability of the program?

**World Bank’s Performance**

- **Comparative advantage and coordination:** To what extent has the Bank exercised its comparative advantage in relation to other parties in the project and worked to harmonize its support with other donors?
- **Quality of support and oversight:** To what extent has the Bank provided adequate strategic and technical support to the program, established relevant linkages between the program and other Bank country operations, and exercised sufficient risk management and oversight of its engagement?
- **Structures and incentives:** To what extent have Bank policies, processes, and procedures contributed to, or impeded, the success of the program?

**Country Participation**

- **Commitments and/or capacities of participating countries:** How have the commitments and/or capacities of participating countries contributed to or impeded the program’s success?
- **Program coordination within countries:** To what extent have there been adequate linkages between the regional program’s country-level activities and related national activities?
Executive Summary

Background

1. Over the last decade, the countries of the Great Lakes region of Africa were in continuous conflict, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the center of the fighting. This conflict had severe economic and social consequences for the region. It is estimated that more than 3 million people have died since 1998, and 2 million more have been displaced, including 400,000 children. Although the roots of the conflicts were internal to the countries, the following transboundary factors exacerbated the situation in the region: a) insurgencies by irregular forces based outside their country of origin and sometimes supported by the host country; b) interventions by governments in support of an ally faced with foreign aggression; c) cross-border warfare for economic rents from resource exploitation; d) large volumes of refugees who were able to be recruited as new fighters and enable fighters to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks; and e) ethnic dispersion across national borders that further complicated the conflicts.

2. After the establishment of peace agreements and cease-fires in 1998–2001, countries faced the need to demobilize ex-combatants and arrange for their reintegration into civilian life as an essential first step in the implementation of peace. The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) was launched in 2002 by the international community in response to this need.¹

Program Summary Description

3. The MDRP is a partnership initiated to coordinate the support of multiple donors and make funds readily available when and where political momentum enabled demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration (DRR) activities to begin. To achieve its overall goal of “enhancing prospects for stabilization and recovery in the Great Lakes region,” the MDRP has three objectives:

- To provide a comprehensive regional framework for DRR efforts for both government and irregular forces.
- To establish a consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization.
- To serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilization and reintegration programs.

4. These efforts are expected to help demobilize and reintegrate about 413,000 ex-combatants in seven countries and provide reintegration support for 370,000 ex-combatants (90 percent of those demobilized). Within this agreed framework of support, the program provides funding and technical assistance for three sets of activities:

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¹ Seven countries actively receive program support: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. Namibia and Zimbabwe are inactive members.
National programs that fund government DRR efforts at the country level and account for some 80 percent of the program budget

Special projects, implemented by international agencies in support of activities in areas not under government control or in areas of urgent need prior to the start-up of a national program

Regional activities implemented by the MDRP Secretariat that provide knowledge, information, and cross-border sensitization campaigns in support of national efforts.

5. The program has two complementary sources of financing: a) International Development Association (IDA) credits of some $200 million, and b) contributions of some $300 million from 11 bilateral and multilateral donor partners to a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), administered by the World Bank. The World Bank also houses and has seconded staff to the program secretariat.

6. The program was initiated as a short-term, five-year effort and was expected to close in 2007, but has been extended by two years, and is now expected to close in July 2009. The program commissioned a mid-term review in February 2005.

Rationale for the Regional Program

7. The MDRP is a relevant and high-risk initiative for advancing regional peace and stability in the fragile post conflict context of the Great Lakes region. Governments and donor partners acknowledge that effectively managing demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is essential to securing peace in the region. They also recognize that the cross-border dimensions of the multiple conflicts make a regional approach to DDR necessary to enable countries to simultaneously undertake national measures.

Quality of Design and Implementation

8. The program’s comprehensive coverage of DRR issues is based on current understanding of best practice. Its set of activities—national programs, special projects, and regional activities—enable its support to match the pace of peace-building in each individual country. Also, its multidonor arrangement helps to coordinate donor assistance to the region.

9. But two significant shortcomings in the program design have become apparent in the course of implementation.

- **Limited program scope.** The program’s demobilization efforts needed to be accompanied by upstream efforts focused on disarmament and downstream efforts on security sector reform (involving both armed forces and police), which could not be financed by the MDTF because of prohibitions on the use of Bank resources or Bank-administered resources for those purposes. Parallel financing by other partners was expected to contribute to this process, but came later than expected.

- **Lack of a structured link to the peace process.** The MDRP was designed to support, not drive, the peace process. But it lacks the means to interact with and influence that process. The Advisory Committee was formally assigned but not adequately constituted
to play this role, and the World Bank and other partners each expected the other to take
major responsibility. As a result, whereas the program has successfully supported
technical disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts, it has not been
able to influence the momentum for DDR activities in the countries.

Program Achievements

10. Although implementation of the program in the first three years was slow, activities are
now underway in all countries in varying degrees:

- Nine special projects have taken place in five countries. The program is committed to
  phasing out this set of activities in 2006 and integrating them into national programs.
- National programs are underway in seven countries, though with considerably more
  progress in Angola and Rwanda with regard to demobilization than reinsertion and
  reintegration.
- Regional activities have been more limited than planned, and the program is only now
  beginning to address the key cross-country issue of combatants on foreign soil, which if
  unresolved, could threaten to reignite conflict.

11. While this progress shows that the MDRP is achieving its purposes of providing a
comprehensive framework for DDR efforts in the region, a mechanism for donor coordination,
and a platform of national consultative processes on DDR measures, there is no reporting on
outcomes and it is not possible to know whether the MDRP will achieve its overall goal of
fostering stabilization and recovery. At this time, the situation in the region remains fragile, and
the risk to sustainable achievement of the program’s objective is high.

Effectiveness of World Bank Performance

12. The Bank’s exercise of its multiple roles in the MDRP—as funder, MDTF administrator,
and Secretariat manager—has improved over time and is now largely effective. Its management
of the Secretariat, which was inadequate in the initial years, is now sound. Until prompted by a
recent mid-term review, the Bank’s senior management was not sufficiently involved in
promoting the aims of the program with the countries’ political leadership.
1. Introduction and Context

Regional Challenges

1.1 Over the last decade, the Great Lakes region of Central Africa has been an area of continuous conflict, with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the center. A number of armed factions operated in eastern DRC, including combatants drawn from the former Rwandan Armed Forces, armed forces from Angola, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and other states that had entered the conflict, as well as an array of local and foreign irregular forces. It has been estimated that the number of casualties in the last 10 years is more than 2 million. In addition, more than 10 million people either have been internally displaced or sought refuge in another country.

1.2 A series of peace deals and cease-fires were established in the region in the late 1990s early 2000s, brokered by African leaders from other countries and supported by the United Nations Security Council, especially following the DRC and Burundi peace processes. At the same time, Rwanda started implementing the first phase of its 1995 Demobilization and Reintegration Program. Prospects for peace in Angola and Republic of Congo also improved following the 1999 Pointe Noire Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and the Brazzaville Ceasefire Accord in Republic of Congo, and after the death of the long-term UNITA leader in Angola.

1.3 A first step in implementing the peace agreements is the disarmament of combatants followed by their demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration (DRR) into civilian life. Box 1.1 provides the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program’s (MDRP’s) definition of these processes. The MDRP is the international community’s response to the countries’ needs for support in implementing their DRR processes.

Regional Program Summary Description

1.4 The MDRP aims to “help coordinate partner efforts” and to “provide specific support during the demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration” in conflict-affected countries of Central Africa. Established in

Box 1.1: Definitions of Key Terms

**Disarmament**: Collection, control, and disposal of heavy and light weapons, small arms, ammunitions, and explosives. MDRP is not involved in this step.

**Demobilization**: Formal discharge of ex-combatants from the armed forces.

**Reinsertion**: Early transition to civilian life, settlement into a community.

**Reintegration**: Completion of transition to civilian life, including access to a civilian job and effective integration into a social community. In some cases, it also includes a) Repatriation: return to the country of origin of ex-combatants on foreign soil and b) Resettlement: transfer to another location or country.

*Source: MDRP Web site.*

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2 These include Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement for DRC and Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.

3 See Annex A for background information on the program.

4 The World Bank is not mandated to support disarmament that usually precedes DRR activities.
March 2002, the MDRP supports action in nine countries directly affected by or involved in the regional conflict centered in the DRC. Seven of these countries receive active program support: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. The program is inactive in two other countries, Namibia and Zimbabwe, which are no longer involved in the DRC conflict. In all, the program aims to demobilize and reintegrate about 413,000 ex-combatants in seven countries, and provide reintegration support for 370,000 ex-combatants (90 percent of those demobilized).

1.5 The program arose out of the widespread recognition among countries that were party to the conflict in the DRC and their international development partners that the interconnected nature of the conflict required a regional approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Although conflict arose primarily as a result of internal factors such as political rivalry, unemployment, and poverty, several transboundary factors have contributed to conflict. These include:

- Insurgencies from irregular forces based outside the country of origin and sometimes supported by the host country
- Fragile military alliances between governments in the Great Lakes region, leading some governments to intervene when an ally faces foreign aggression
- Cross-border warfare for economic rents from resource exploitation in countries like DRC
- Large volumes of refugees that offer opportunities for recruitment of new fighters and allow fighters to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks
- Ethnic dispersion across national borders that further complicate the conflicts.

1.6 At the same time, there was an assumption among donors that a coordinated international approach would put pressure on the countries to implement the peace agreements and accompanying DRR activities. The MDRP is thus a vehicle designed to coordinate multiple donor efforts and make funds readily available where political momentum exists for DRR.

1.7 The project’s overall goal is to “enhance prospects for stabilization and recovery in the greater Great Lakes region.” To achieve that goal, the MDRP supports three intermediate processes and three sets of activities. The processes are to:

- Provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts of both government and irregular forces.

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• Establish a consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization.
• Serve as platform for national consultative processes that lead to formulation of national
demobilization and reintegration programs.

1.8 The three program activities are as follows:

• National programs. Funds for the preparation and implementation of a national DRR
effort (from the International Development Association [IDA] or the MDTF). It often
includes support for vulnerable groups such as women and children, and HIV/AIDS
prevention and mitigation measures.

• Special projects. Support for activities in areas not under government control or urgent
needs of particularly vulnerable groups such as women and child soldiers, where there is
as yet no national DDR framework or policy.

• Regional activities. Technical knowledge sharing and capacity building, harmonization of
databases, cross-border sensitization campaigns, and knowledge generation and research
on cross-border and cross-sector DDR issues.

1.9 The program partners chose the World Bank as lead partner for the MDRP partly because
some multilateral and bilateral donors were dissatisfied with the handling of prior conflict
situations by the United Nations, and partly because of the Bank’s resource mobilization and
convening abilities (Chapter 6). Within the Bank, staff members who worked on Central Africa
issues championed the Bank’s involvement although the program, at the time, was considered as
being out of mainstream operations.

1.10 Total committed program resources are $500 million. These resources are provided by
two complementary sources of financing: a) IDA credits of some $200 million, and b)
contributions of some $300 million from 11 bilateral and multilateral donor partners to a Multi-
Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), administered by the World Bank (Annex B lists the donors). A total
of $475 million has already been committed. The main beneficiary of the program is the DRC, to
which the almost two-thirds of the support ($300 million) has been allocated.

1.11 The Bank also manages the Secretariat for the program, which is located in the World
Bank headquarters in Washington, DC, and comprises co-terminus staff (Bank staff paid out of
the MDTF) and staff seconded by the Bank to the program. The program was initiated as a
short-term, five-year effort and was expected to close in 2007, but has been extended by two
years, and is now expected to close in July 2009. It commissioned a mid-term review in February
2005.

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6 The mid-term review noted donor dissatisfaction with the UN’s response to conflicts in Angola, Rwanda, and
Somalia; the lack of significant international peacekeeping presence in the DRC; and weak, ad hoc, and
uncoordinated international response in the conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, and West Africa.

7 Annex D contains details of the institutional arrangements of the program.
2. Relevance: Rationale, Alignment, and Design

2.1 **Summary.** The MDRP is a relevant, high-risk initiative in the fragile postconflict context of the Great Lakes region. Governments and donor partners acknowledge that effectively managing demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is essential to securing peace in the region. They recognize that cross-border dimensions of the multiple conflicts make a regional approach to DDR necessary because no one country could have the confidence or capacity to handle the processes on its own.

2.2 The program’s coverage of DRR issues is state of the art; and its activities, which enable its support to match the pace of peace-building in each country, are responsive to the various conditions in the region. Also, its multidonor arrangement prevents problems in the distribution of assistance that could have arisen from differences in donor relations with countries, and in perspectives on the kind of assistance needed. But two assumptions made during program design—financing for disarmament and security sector reform, and mechanisms for working with political aspects of DDR—did not materialize as anticipated and impeded program implementation. Other design issues relating to overly optimistic implementation schedules and resources for program management have been addressed in the course of program implementation.

**Subsidiarity Principle**

2.3 The subsidiarity principle states that a program should be organized and carried out at the lowest level effective. MDRP partners adopted the regional approach to demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants for two reasons. First, the cross-border dimensions of the conflicts in the region meant that a single-country approach to demobilization and reintegration activities likely would have been inadequate. A regional approach was warranted to enable governments and their military forces to downsize armies simultaneously. Second, the migration of hired combatants from one conflict to another and the continuing problem of combatants on foreign soil necessitated coordinated actions on a regional scale. Thus, the program aimed to promote the regional public good of peace and stability in the Great Lakes area. Although the program design anticipated that a regional approach would produce some economies of scale, this was not the motivating factor.

2.4 The program’s geographical scope has been the subject of some disagreement. At the time of design, the eastern DRC was at the center of a “quasi-continental free for all,”8 which involved combatants from nine countries. This determined the relatively large number of countries initially supported by the program. Over time, with the cessation of fighting in several countries, the central regional issue narrowed to the presence in the eastern DRC of domestic and foreign groups allegedly linked to the former Rwandan government. A mid-term review, undertaken in 2005, therefore called into question the program’s continued broad geographical scope, and argued that this may have diluted the focus on eastern DRC. Secretariat staff members disagree with this

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8 Mid-term review, paragraph 38, p. 9.
assessment and note that funding for the DRC ($300 million) far exceeds funding for other countries and therefore does not reflect a dilution of focus. They also argue that DDR activities in Angola, CAR, and Republic of Congo have all benefited from international attention and financing provided by a regional approach, and the program has thus enhanced prospects for regional peace. Rather than streamlining the scope to focus on eastern DRC, partners have extended the program’s geographical scope to include groups such as the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda, which is not directly tied to the DRC conflict, giving some credence to the finding of a shift in emphasis from the DRC to regional peace more broadly.

ALIGNMENT

2.5 The MDRP is aligned with strategies and priorities of all participating countries and the Bank. The immediate circumstances that gave impetus to the program were cease-fire agreements or peace deals in the countries throughout the region. Following those agreements, DDR became a featured issue in countries’ statements of national priority. For example, in the DRC, one of the two elements of the government’s three-year Interim Post-Conflict Program (Programme Interimaire Post-Conflict) for 2000–02 includes “the demobilization and reintegration of ex-militias in an impartial, equitable and balanced manner.”9 In Uganda, where the conflict is between the government and internal fighters, the government has not sought to undertake a DDR program and thus, the program has focused on demobilization of irregular forces.10

2.6 Within the Bank, the program is well aligned with the Bank’s corporate, regional, and country goals. At the corporate level, the program responds to the Bank’s expanded mandate in assisting countries emerging from conflict as laid out in Operational Policy 2.30, which includes assistance for demobilization and reintegration activities. At the regional level, the program is consistent with the Africa Region’s Indicative Action Plan for 2006–08 and with the IDA’s emphasis on postconflict and low-income countries under stress.11

2.7 At the country level, national programs financed by IDA credits and cofinanced by the program’s MDTF are well integrated into Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), interim or transitional CASs, or relevant strategy papers.12 For example, in Burundi, the

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9 Other areas of attention are enhanced access to the country’s interior, provision of basic social services, free circulation of persons and goods with improved security, rehabilitation of dilapidated infrastructure, and re-launch of agricultural and livestock activities, especially agro-industry. DRC CAS 2000.

10 Uganda officially requested to participate in the MDRP in November 2002, but even in 2003, the program was inactive as the persistent conflict between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army showed no signs of abating. Since August 2004, the MDRP has financed a $4.2 million special project implemented by the Amnesty Commission to support resettlement and reintegration of disarmed irregular forces who presented themselves from within Uganda or after returning from neighboring countries.


2005 Interim Strategy Note clarifies that the Bank strategy “will be implemented within the framework of the MDRP. The situation in Burundi itself will be closely monitored (in conjunction with other key donors), so as to adjust the program to the political evolution on the ground (and scale it down if needed).”

In CAR, the Bank’s assistance strategy to support “urgent governance and security issues” includes a $9.8 million special project approved in April 2004 for reintegration of ex-combatants and support to communities and funded entirely through the MDTF of the program.

REGIONAL CONSENSUS

2.8 The MDRP was largely an initiative of donors in support of countries’ adoption of cease-fire agreements and peace deals. At the time of this report, the countries’ commitment to peace, and donor consensus on the program scope and activities, despite some disagreements, has held.

2.9 In the three and one-half years since the program began, the commitment to peace has held, and almost all seven countries receiving program support have formally launched national DDR efforts. Participating countries have varied considerably in the speed with which they have been committed to the program’s objectives (as discussed in Chapter 3). Notably, the DRC peace process and expanded deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) have made parts of the country accessible and subject to government authority. But the situation in DRC remains volatile following the final round of elections in October 2006 (refer to paragraph 3.28). Thus, the continuing fragility of the regional peace process makes the program as relevant today as it was during its conception.

2.10 The mid-term review highlights three areas of disagreement among the partners, which have since been largely resolved:

- **Definition of reintegration.** The strategy explicitly defines the scope of program reintegration activities in economic and social terms. The mid-term review reported that some partners viewed the program’s approach to be too narrow and wanted the program to encompass longer-term reintegration efforts, and recommended that partners agree more precisely on what is expected of the program. In response, the Secretariat is finalizing a paper on the modalities and best practices of reintegration support.

- **Working through national governments.** Partners disagreed on how the program should aim to build national ownership. The program’s emphasis on national ownership is reflected in the fact that 80 percent of total program support is directed

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15 In economic terms, the MDRP aims to provide time-bound support to help ex-combatants attain the general standard of living of the communities into which they reintegrate. In social terms, it supports reintegration of ex-combatants in the vicinity of their extended families, creation of informal networks, discussion groups, associations of ex-combatants, and joint economic ventures. MDRP Strategy Document.
at national programs, managed by national DDR commissions. Some partners argued that the program has equated national ownership with government ownership, and has not considered the views of other stakeholders and program beneficiaries. They also contend that government armed forces are often part of the reason for slow movement on DDR, and that the program has not adequately explored alternate approaches to DDR. These partners questioned investment in government structures such as DDR commissions, which by design a) have a limited time span, b) are not part of government ministries such as the army or security forces, and c) are likely to be hampered by the political dynamics of a transitional government. In response, Secretariat staff members note that national ownership, a key feature of design, is necessary for a) the long-term stability of DDR processes and successful program implementation, (b) it would be difficult to undertake wide-ranging public consultations in a postconflict setting,\(^\text{16}\) [the view of staff – see change?] [and c) government structures are more suitable to handle the many political issues that are inherent in a DDR process. Nonetheless, the Secretariat, at the September 2005 partners’ meeting, agreed to enhance civil society collaboration as part of a fine tuning of its national programs, and partners endorsed this adjustment.

- **Focus on capacity building.** Partners’ views also differed on the closely related point of the extent to which the program should focus on building local capacity. Some partners reportedly fear that the program’s substantive focus on financial assistance may come at the expense of long-term developmental approaches to reintegration of ex-combatants and demilitarization of society at large. Others view DDR as a short-term process that needs to be completed quickly, if necessary by nongovernmental agents, as a precondition for long-term development to occur, and therefore does not require much local capacity building.

2.11 These occasional disagreements strained relationships among program partners. The Netherlands, one of the largest contributors to the MDTF (other than the Bank) pulled out a token amount to signal its dissatisfaction with the program and redirected its funding for disarmament in the DRC. But, on the whole, donor and country partners remain broadly supportive of the MDRP’s objectives and explicitly endorsed the program’s work plans at the latest partners meetings in February and November 2005.

**PROGRAM DESIGN**

2.12 There are three positive design features of the program:

- **Clear scope.** The program clearly defined its geographical scope (nine countries); kinds of activities (DRR); the nature of interventions (national programs, special projects, and regional activities); and the modalities for engagement with beneficiary countries (through national governmental structures). There are clear and distinct

\(^{16}\) Specifically, staff noted that the national DDR programs follow wide-ranging country consultative processes that reveal the broad consensus for peace, and thus, one staff member interviewed believed that “there was no need for separate consultations specifically on the MDRP.”
approval processes for national programs and special projects that fit the nature of these activities.

- **State of the art:** The program has used the current understanding of best practice in defining the scope of its DRR efforts, and explicitly focuses on vulnerable populations, especially women, the disabled, and children.

- **Ready financing:** Donor partners indicated not only their total commitment for the program’s five-year period up front, but also made a part of the committed funds available when the program was launched. The ready availability of financing was expected to be an important incentive for the beneficiary countries to speed up the momentum for DDR activities.

2.13 Two major assumptions made during program design did not materialize as expected, and this delayed implementation as discussed in the following chapters. The first assumption related to financing for upstream disarmament and downstream security sector reform activities (see paragraph 3.19). The second assumption related to the mechanisms by which the program’s technical efforts would be linked to the political peace process driving momentum for DDR (see paragraph 4.10).

2.14 A shortcoming of the program design is that it did not adequately factor in the time that would be needed to build national capacity to undertake and complete DDR, given weak initial capacity in several countries. The program was also overly optimistic about staff resources needed for program management, but this was addressed during the course of implementation (see paragraph 4.14).

**Clarity and Monitorability of Objectives**

2.15 The MDRP has accompanied its overall goal of enhancing prospects for stabilization and recovery in the Great Lakes region with three outcome-based performance indicators; namely: a) reduction in the volume of internally displaced people and refugees; b) restoration of free movement of goods and people; and c) the evolution of social expenditures, including those for the security sector. But these performance indicators are described in general terms such as “reduction” or “increases” with no clear articulation of the baselines or targets.

2.16 The program also sets out three intermediate processes, which it treats as program objectives intended to achieve its overall goal, and identifies performance indicators to be used in measuring progress toward these objectives (summarized in Table 2.1). It also identifies three types of inputs or activities; namely, national programs, special projects, and regional activities—with assigned budget and planned output indicators for each. But the results chain and indicators do not amount to a coherent and monitorable pursuit of the overall goal for two reasons. First, the program treats intermediate processes as its

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17 Disarmament typically includes transporting combatants to cantonment areas, registering combatants and weapons, and securing weapons before demobilization.

18 Annex E details this program log frame.
program objectives, and second, it does not specify how these program objectives will link to each of the outcome indicators or overall goal, and how some of its output indicators will contribute to the intermediate process objectives.

Table 2.1: No Links between Goal, Objectives, and Performance Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Performance Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Goal:</strong>&lt;br&gt;Enhance prospects for stabilization and recovery in the Great Lakes region</td>
<td>Reduction in number of refugees and internally displaced people, free movement of goods, evolution of social expenditures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program Objectives</strong>, as defined:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts</td>
<td>Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the MDRP framework compared to total funding for DDR activities in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish a consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization</td>
<td>Percent of DRR resources channeled through the regional MDTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to formulation of national DDR programs</td>
<td>Degree of harmonization of national programs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Efficacy: Outcomes, Impacts, and Sustainability

3.1 Summary. The MDRP has been in operation for three and one-half years. Implementation has been slow but activities are now underway in all active program countries. Nine special projects have been implemented, although the program committed to phasing out these activities in 2006. Seven countries have launched national programs, albeit with considerably more progress in Angola and Rwanda, and on demobilization than reinsertion and reintegration. In early 2006, after initial delays, the large DRC national program, which is at the center of the MDRP, began implementation. But it has made little progress to date because of recent elections and serious fiduciary concerns. Regional activities have been more limited than planned, and the program is only recently beginning to address the key cross-country issue of combatants on foreign soil—which if unresolved, could reignite conflict. Thus, while the program is providing a comprehensive framework for DDR efforts, a mechanism for donor coordination, and a platform of national consultative processes on DDR, there is no way yet to know whether the MDRP will achieve its overall goal of fostering stabilization and recovery. There is no systematic reporting on outcomes, the situation in the DRC remains fragile, and the risk to sustainable achievement of the program’s objective is high.

Achievement of Objectives

3.2 The project is reaching the halfway mark and is not expected to close until July 2009. There is limited evidence of the program’s progress against its goal of stabilization and recovery and its three related performance indicators, listed below. Neither the annual joint supervision reports nor the mid-term review and subsequent progress reports systematically comment on these indicators. The limited reporting suggests spotty progress.

- A reduction in the number of internally displaced refugees has been substantial only in Angola and Rwanda, where reintegration support is underway for demobilized ex-combatants. There is no updated information on the number of internally displaced people in the other countries; the last reports dating to 2004 note an increase in the number of internally displaced people in DRC and Uganda\(^\text{19}\) (see Table 3.4).

- Free movement of goods and people exists only in Rwanda. Dramatic improvements occurred in Angola, although physically impaired infrastructure and land mines pose serious constraints. Burundi and DRC are still volatile with demobilization just underway. Uganda has an increased presence of government troops in the north that pose restrictions on free movement. In the Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, criminal activity and weak infrastructure restrict movement in some areas.\(^\text{20}\)

- Increase in social expenditures relative to defense expenditures. To date there has been little reporting against this indicator. Evidence in Angola suggests that the end

\(^{19}\) Information from the 2003 and 2004 Joint Supervision Mission reports.

\(^{20}\) There are no further updates to the 2004 Joint Supervision Mission.
of the war has not resulted in reductions in defense and internal security expenditures in favor of social sectors. Better financial management systems and capture of unaccounted expenditures has led to an increase in the percentage of expenditures for defense and public order from 13.4 percent of the national budget in 2002 to 36.7 percent in 2003.21 As yet, there is no reporting on whether these levels have reduced over time.

3.3 More evidence is available on the MDRP’s progress against its three process objectives: a) to provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts, b) to establish a consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization, and c) to serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to DDR programs. The following paragraphs discuss progress against these process objectives.

3.4 *A comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts.* The MDRP has succeeded in mobilizing and directing assistance for special projects, national programs, and regional activities in participating countries. There is no systematic reporting on the percent of DDR activities in the MDRP framework in relation to total donor funding for DDR activities in the region, the performance indicator established by the program. The MDRP has successfully established national programs in all seven active countries (Table 3.1), although implementation progress is varied.

### Table 3.1: Summary of Activities by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Programs</th>
<th>Special Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount*</td>
<td>Effective Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>November 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>September 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>No national program</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* US$ million.

3.5 *Special projects* were slow in getting underway because the Bank (and Secretariat) had difficulties in establishing a contractual framework with UN implementing agencies and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In 2005, disbursement increased significantly and is now at 60 percent of commitments. In all, the program has undertaken nine special projects in five countries: Angola, Burundi, CAR, DRC, and Uganda. As intended, they accounted for less than 10 percent of the program budget, and amounted to $34 million as of November 2005.

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21 Includes expenditures on police and judiciary, areas that should logically increase while defense expenditures decrease. 2004 Joint Supervision Mission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Implementing Agency*</th>
<th>Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Reintegration of demobilized soldiers</td>
<td>UNDP/FAO</td>
<td>UNDP estimates indicate having reached 85 percent of the targeted beneficiary group. The project is also credited with effectively launching the review and approval process being used by the national program and for development of an information system for tracking beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Demobilization, reintegration, recruitment, and reintegration of child soldiers</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>91 percent of children targeted have been demobilized, and will likely be demobilized and reintegrated. Support for child soldiers was extended till June 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Reunification and reintegration of former child soldiers</td>
<td>Save the Children UK</td>
<td>Despite nearly 12,000 child soldiers demobilized and half those reunified with their families, and the rest reintegrated in the education system, the issue remains very relevant and objectives are only partially achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Situation assessment, demobilization, reintegration of child soldiers in three provinces</td>
<td>IRC/IFESH/CARE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Rapid Response Mechanism</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Community recovery and reintegration of ex-combatants in east DRC</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Project benefiting 10,723 ex-combatants. No clear statement of progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Family and community reintegration of demobilized child soldiers</td>
<td>Belgian Red Cross</td>
<td>No information available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Recruitment prevention, demobilization, and reintegration of demobilized child soldiers</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Limited information; appears to have been unsuccessful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Repatriation, rehabilitation, resettlement, and reintegration of ex-combatants</td>
<td>Amnesty Commission</td>
<td>Limited success. 8,210 out of 11,200 ex-combatants received delayed reinsertion and resettlement services, due to logistical and security issues. Govt. has requested additional reintegration support. An important issue is clarifying the exact status of the Amnesty Act.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Abbreviations: FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IRC, International Committee of the Red Cross; IFESH, International Foundation for Education and Self-Help.
3.6 The special projects appear to have produced mixed results and the outcomes of special projects have yet to be fully evaluated by the Secretariat. Available evidence suggests that only two countries (Angola and Burundi) have been successful in achieving their intended outcomes (Table 3.2). When the national program was delayed in Angola, the regional program undertook a special project to build capacity to expedite the national program and provide initial reintegration support for soldiers who had already been demobilized. The DRC project was partly successful in addressing the larger issue of demobilization of child soldiers, which is expected to be addressed through the national program.

3.7 The program largely phased out special projects in 2006 and is helping countries absorb them into national programs (except in Uganda and CAR). Some activities may continue, but only within the framework of national programs. So far, only the Angola special project has been fully integrated into the national program. In Burundi, the national program is still nascent and the special project was expected to be folded into the national program by end of 2006. Due to delays in implementation of the DRC national program, two special projects on demobilization of child soldiers have been extended with additional funding of $13 million, but will operate under the framework of the DRC national program.

3.8 The mid-term review noted that the limited progress through special projects may not justify the significant amount of time and resources expended on them and suggested that it may have been easier to achieve the same results using bilateral funding. An ongoing evaluation of special projects is expected to shed greater light on the usefulness of this gap-filler financing through MDTFs.

3.9 National programs, which represent 80 percent of MDRP funding, are, after a slow start, now underway in all seven countries in which MDRP is active except Uganda (Box 3.1). Four of six national programs began only in late 2004 (Burundi, CAR, DRC, and Republic of Congo). To date, less than half the total commitment to national programs has been disbursed and it is too early to determine the extent to which national programs have achieved or will likely achieve their outcomes (Table 3.3).

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22 Following the mid-term review, the Secretariat is undertaking an evaluation of all closed special projects.

23 There is no national program in Uganda. In CAR, the national program has been designed as a special project and is funded entirely out of the MDTF. The Bank would have needed to procure a waiver from the Board of Directors to directly finance the national program out of Bank funds.
Table 3.3: Disbursements for National Programs (amounts in $ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Disbursement (June 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>MDTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>100.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>198.2</td>
<td>231.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.10 Further, as anticipated, there has been more progress on demobilization and reinsertion than on reintegration. The June 2006 progress report notes that 61 percent of ex-combatants have been demobilized, and one-third of those demobilized have been reintegrated (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Summary of Progress on National Programs (June 2006)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Demobilization</th>
<th>Reinsertion</th>
<th>Reintegration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>397.6</td>
<td>239.2</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Target and actual figures are in thousands.

3.11 Angola and Rwanda have made the most progress; about 70 percent and 63 percent of combatants in these countries, respectively, have been demobilized. These two countries, which have relatively well-established governments, had committed to DDR before the MDRP was created. Angola had launched demobilization activities before the advent of the MDRP even before its national program was formalized in March 2003. The Rwanda national DDR strategy had already been put in place, and so the MDRP national program was approved by the Bank’s Board of Directors along with the original MDRP strategy document. In DRC, despite significant delays, the large $200 million national program was put in place in 2004. However, in 2006, implementation slowed due to the elections and to serious fiduciary concerns related to program expenditures (see paragraph 4.5).

24 Mid-term review, paragraph 58.
Box 3.1: Status of National Programs

**Angola:** As of May 2006, the government estimated that more than 33,000 of the 97,138 ex-UNITA combatants demobilized were receiving reintegration assistance, and about 50 percent of beneficiaries were being targeted by 84 reintegration assistance programs. Reintegration of vulnerable groups (children, women, and disabled individuals) was delayed, but is getting underway. The government is working to demobilize 33,000 more forces, and final preparations are underway for demobilizing about 50 percent of them.

**Burundi:** Program progress has been slow. Initial efforts to dismantle Gardien de la Paix were stymied due to a lack of credible beneficiary lists. As of March 2006, 19,739 ex-combatants, including 3,000 child soldiers, had been demobilized. This created an environment that was conducive for elections. In its second phase, the program aims to demobilize 5,000 FDN forces. Although 16,681 troops received reinsertion benefits, only 2,653 have received reintegration assistance.

**Central African Republic:** The national program has been slow pending elections and weak administrative and fiduciary arrangements. As of May 2006, half the target ex-combatants had been demobilized. The mid-term review highlighted weak performance, significant cost overruns, and higher than expected reintegration costs. Twelve percent of the estimated 7,500 ex-combatants were reintegrated, and half the program funds have been disbursed.

**Democratic Republic of Congo:** Demobilization is underway, but the DDR process is linked to the integration of ex-combatants into the DRC national army and the program has faced several implementation difficulties. Overall capacity of the DDR commission for reporting and coordination has improved, but reintegration has just begun.

**Republic of Congo:** The national program has yet to become fully operational. Approved by partners in Feb. 2005, it took time for the grant agreement to be signed. The grant is not effective, pending recruitment of the financial management agency and external auditor. Preparatory work financed by the country is underway. The MDRP is coordinating with a national disarmament operation implemented jointly by the government and UNDP, using a €2 million grant from the European Union.

**Rwanda:** The national program demobilized 24,000 people in a second phase. In all, 37,000 received reintegration support; 15,911 (including 1,130 former child soldiers and women) were trained under Vulnerability Support Window grants and 5,000 more are expected to receive such support. Repatriation of combatants of armed groups from DRC remains slow; 138 ex-combatants were demobilized in 2006.

3.12 In four other countries—Burundi, DRC, CAR, and Republic of Congo—national programs are getting underway and it has taken time for those governments to establish institutions to carry out DDR activities. In contrast to Angola and Rwanda, just one-third of the targeted population has been demobilized in Burundi, and demobilization of some national combatants, such as the Gardiens de la Paix, remains a challenge. Reintegration efforts in Burundi have just begun. In the DRC, although demobilization is underway, the latest Supervision Mission reports note uncertainty in further progress, given the elections.

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25 Including delays in census of military, regrouping of troops for disarmament, information technology equipment issues, limited movement of troops in time, low numbers of weapons being registered, the absence of heavy weapons surrendered to date, and treatment of dependents for those opting for army integration.
In July 2006, pressure from national actors for the departure of four international consultants working on the project, and mounting fiduciary concerns. In the CAR, the mid-term review of the national program has raised significant concerns over cost and time overruns. In the Republic of Congo, although the national program was prepared and approved by partners in February 2005, it has yet to become fully operational. Despite this slow progress, the mid-term review credits the MDRP with providing much needed momentum for the establishment of national DDR programs, especially in the DRC.

3.13 Regional activities (i.e., cross-country) were initially focused on knowledge sharing between technical DDR staff in the participating countries. Since 2005, there has been increased attention to more strategic cross-country issues, notably the issue of combatants on foreign soil.

3.14 At the time of design, regional activities were expected to account for $5.5 million, or about 1 percent of the program budget. As of March 2006, the program had disbursed about $1.2 million.

3.15 In the early years, the program’s regional activities funded study tours, knowledge dissemination, and information sharing activities between technical staff in the national DDR commissions. For example, MDRP funded joint study tours for national DDR commissioners within and outside the Great Lakes region. There is anecdotal evidence to support cross-country learning as a result of these activities. Secretariat staff members point to the Technical Coordination Group’s joint activities on reintegration, gender, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for demobilization and reintegration operations. They report that cross-country learning from these activities is reflected in improvements in the technical design and management of national programs, as well as in increased trust among technical personnel, but no data exist on the outcomes of these activities.

3.16 The mid-term review criticized the program for not paying adequate attention to strategic regional activities critical to peace and stability; in particular, to the issue of combatants on foreign soil until 2004, despite demand from the countries. Combatants on foreign soil are often outside the purview of national security forces, and a multicountry approach could serve as forum to help countries to work with relevant agencies such as the African Union to identify mechanisms for repatriation or amnesty. In its November 2005 progress report, the Secretariat identified the demobilization of combatants on foreign soil as central to its regional activities and is preparing the terms of reference for a strategy to manage this. It has also initiated several actions that address foreign

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26 The program is coordinating closely with a national disarmament operation to be implemented by UNDP and the Congolese government using a €2 million grant from the European Union.
combatants in other program countries, including support for a) bilateral discussions between Angola and Rwanda for the return of 44 Rwandese ex-combatants from Angola, and b) discussions on the repatriation of Congolese soldiers from Angola and 21 Ugandan ex-combatants and their families from the DRC. It is too soon to assess these efforts.

3.17 The mid-term review also highlighted the following missed opportunities for program cross-country support:

- The contribution to developing policy guidance, synthesizing lessons, enhancing understanding of thematic or geographic problems, proposing innovative approaches to DDR, providing linkages to other related regional issues such as the Great Lakes conference on small arms initiative or related reform areas such as security sector reform and national poverty reduction strategies.\(^{27}\)

- The relationships among Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda as they relate to eastern DRC

- Engagement of relevant players in security sector reform in the DRC, notably Angola, South Africa, and the African Union

- The changing context and DDR challenges in Liberia and Sudan

- Contributions to intra-UN discussions, such as the United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO and UNDP rationalization of its global approach to DDR.

3.18 While the last two points above were not directly within the mandate of the program as envisaged in the strategy document, the mid-term review emphasized that the some bilateral donors had expected the Secretariat to provide policy guidance and describe lessons it had learned to promote a better understanding of thematic or geographic issues and propose innovative solutions. There has been greater attention to all the issues listed above since the mid-term review. The MDRP has begun discussions with a wide range of partners on joint analytical work\(^ {28}\) and activities\(^ {29}\) to improve the

\(^{27}\) According to the mid-term review, the MDRP published two papers on sector security reform and reintegration in 2003, but although the papers were useful in framing the issues, they were neither innovative nor did they offer an action-oriented analysis.

\(^{28}\) The Secretariat is collaborating with the International Center for Transitional Justice in New York to analyze linkages between transitional justice and DDR. It is participating in a review of the Cape Town Principles, led by UNICEF. Other activities include collaborating with the World Bank on the specific needs of ex-combatants with disabilities, and preparing concept notes on HIV/AIDS, linkages between DDR and security sector reform, gender, and youth in postconflict situations.

\(^{29}\) The MDRP is consulting with governments and partners, particularly MONUC in Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda, to identify opportunities for programmatic support. In consultation with MONUC, it launched a cross-border information and sensitization strategy to encourage voluntary demobilization in January 2006.
efficiency and impact of MDRP-supported programs, and to share lessons with a broad audience.\textsuperscript{30}

3.19 \textit{A consistent mechanism exists for donor coordination and resource mobilization.} The partnership has been successful in mobilizing resources from various donor partners and providing a mechanism for partner coordination at the broad strategy and oversight level. Donor partners meet regularly to discuss program progress and issues, and annual joint supervision missions include several international and bilateral partners. Noncontributing partners such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are invited and attend annual general body meetings. Donor partners have made all financial contributions as promised. Initial coordination during implementation was impeded by three factors, which have been or are now being addressed:

- \textbf{Early disagreements on roles and responsibilities in post conflict situations between the United Nations and the World Bank.} In the late 1990s, many representatives of UN agencies active in the region, including UNDP, DPKO, and MONUC believed postconflict reconstruction to be their comparative advantage and expertise. UNDP favored a global division of responsibilities outlined in a memorandum of understanding. In contrast, the World Bank preferred to assign responsibilities on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{31} Although UN partners ultimately became signatories of the MDRP strategy document, the mid-term review noted that these disagreements strained relationships in Burundi and DRC. Successive mission reports and the mid-term review point to the need for improved coordination within MDRP, led by the World Bank and its UN partners. In February 2005, the MDRP committed to determining an appropriate division of labor between the MDRP, the United Nations, and other multilateral partner agencies. MONUC was extended a special invitation to the November 2005 partners meeting to inform participants on the status and progress of its activities in the region.

- \textbf{Association of other nonprogram donors.} Although the partnership has been credited with engaging some noncontributing donors such as USAID, other important regional actors such as the African Union and South Africa have not been included, even as observers, despite their direct role in regional and country-specific settings. This shortcoming is being remedied. The African Union was invited to make a presentation of its activities at the November 2005 Advisory Committee Meeting and the Secretariat has committed to engaging South Africa and other regional players such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

- \textbf{Lack of parallel financing for disarmament and security sector reform.} Donor partners did not mobilize resources outside of the Bank-administered MDTF for

\textsuperscript{30} The Secretariat is working with the African Union and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to harmonize efforts.

\textsuperscript{31} There were disputes about audit procedures; for example, the Bank’s policy of annual external audits was in direct contrast with the UN’s single audit policy.
financing disarmament activities as part of the MDRP \(^{32}\) and security sector reform activities. World Bank resources and Bank-administered resources (such as the MDTF) are explicitly prohibited from financing these activities. The MDRP recognized the importance of these activities and expected to finance them from in-program, out-of-MDTF donor resources or parallel financing, but such financing did not materialize in a timely way. In interviews, Secretariat staff members stated that greater clarity at the outset on how these activities would be financed and by whom would have been useful. One informant suggested that donors could have established clearer criteria for program participation that included a commitment for such financing. The mid-term review noted that the program faced growing pressure from some partners to steer resources in ways that would facilitate security sector reform, without directly funding it. Partners subsequently endorsed this approach in February 2005, and called for improving the interface between DDR and security reform measures.

3.20 As of April 2006, the Secretariat estimated that about 75 percent of all DDR financing in the region had been channeled through the MDTF and that about 90 percent of DDR activities in the region (including parallel and out-of–Trust Fund financing) had been undertaken under the MDRP framework. MDRP staff members also reported that USAID financing for reintegration activities in the DRC, and the European Commission’s financing in Angola and the Republic of Congo, had been linked to the MDRP framework.

3.21 A platform exists for national consultative processes that lead to the formulation of national demobilization and reintegration programs. Most of the program’s interventions are at the country level where relevant stakeholders are involved in project design and implementation. But the mid-term review and some donors argue that the program has not provided for a systematic way to engage nongovernmental stakeholders and civil society at large in the design of national programs. The Secretariat has noted that national consultative processes usually involve national governments, all relevant bilateral and multilateral donors, interested embassies, UN agencies, and the World Bank. In a postconflict context, the Secretariat notes that large-scale participation of beneficiaries and civil society organizations (CSOs) in program planning is unrealistic and not feasible. They also note that NGOs and CSOs are more directly involved in program implementation as implementing agencies for the reintegration components, which is in line with best practice. \(^{33}\) For instance, in Rwanda, communities into which ex-combatants are reintegrated set priorities and determine the nature and scope of reintegration activities. Since the mid-term review, the Secretariat has committed to fine-tuning national programs to the extent possible so that they include greater civil society engagement and involvement.

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\(^{32}\) Disarmament typically includes transporting combatants to cantonment areas, registering combatants and weapons, and securing weapons before demobilization.

3.22 The MDRP expected to measure its progress against the success of the national consultative process in terms of the degree of harmonization of national programs. While it is not clear how harmonization links to progress against the objective of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, Angola and Rwanda and, more recently Burundi and DRC, have all adopted similar approaches to DDR in their national programs.\textsuperscript{34} The IDA program documents for national programs (and technical annexes accompanying them) in all these countries have followed a similar template. Although the mid-term review contended that a standardized approach deters the MDRP from seeking innovative ways of dealing with DDR issues, the Secretariat argues that program design is adapted as necessary to country contexts, especially as it relates to reintegration strategies.

CAPACITY BUILDING

3.23 The most specific capacity building achievement is the creation of national DDR commissions as part of national programs. The MDRP provided necessary technical support in Burundi and DRC, and in the DRC, helped build political momentum to push legislation for appointment of a national DDR director. In CAR, the MDRP helped establish a DDR commission and recruit staff through a special project in advance of the national program. Some partners have, however, questioned the appropriateness and sustainability of the MDRP’s capacity building efforts (refer paragraph 2.14).

3.24 One project in the DRC focused explicitly on building the capacity of governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders to establish national guidelines for demobilizing child soldiers (see Annex F). The results of these efforts have not yet been evaluated.

REALIZED DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS

3.25 The MDRP explicitly focused the bulk of its assistance in the DRC, which is at the center of the regional conflict, and made repatriation of foreign and irregular forces a related goal. In addition, the MDRP also supported demobilization and reintegration in neighboring states to ensure sustainable regional peace. The program acknowledged that some countries may benefit more quickly than others because the availability of technical assistance, financing, and capacity building support is dependent on the pace of individual national programs. Thus, not surprisingly and as anticipated, Angola and Rwanda, with relatively stable government structures, benefited from MDRP activities more quickly than countries with less established government structures, such as Burundi and the DRC.

3.26 The MDRP also aims to focus on the most vulnerable groups; namely, women ex-combatants and child soldiers. Many implementing agencies believe that a central achievement of the MDRP in Burundi and the DRC has been its support for demobilization of children even when overall demobilization had not started. The program supported five special projects in the DRC focused on demobilization and

\textsuperscript{34} 2003 Joint Supervision Mission.
reintegration of child ex-combatants.\textsuperscript{35} Three of these grants have been completed successfully and additional funding was approved for their extension until June 2006 pending implementation of the national program. Many children associated with armed factions in the DRC as yet remain beyond the scope of these special projects.

3.27 Although some countries such as Angola and Rwanda have worked to incorporate appropriate gender sensitivity issues in their demobilization and reintegration activities, a workshop of the Technical Coordination Group on gender issues held in Kigali, in October 2005, highlighted the need for enhancing the access of women to MDRP-supported programs, ensuring gender sensitivity in reintegration processes and receiving communities. An action plan has been proposed that includes enhancing gender sensitization in national programs and strengthening program capacity in this regard.

**RISKS TO OUTCOME AND IMPACT**

3.28 The risk to program outcomes remains high. At the time this report was being written, there was consensus that volatility in the eastern DRC could lead to re-escalation of conflict in the DRC and the region.\textsuperscript{36} A July 2006 political report noted that “there remains a significant risk that the country will revert to large-scale conflict.”\textsuperscript{37} There is widespread consensus among Bank and Secretariat staff, as well as donors (according to the mid-term review), that the MDRP remains relevant and should continue because the program presents a unique opportunity for helping to achieve regional peace and the potential benefit is seen as worth the risk.

\textsuperscript{35} Delays in finalizing grant agreements with UNICEF in Burundi and DRC delayed disbursement. This led one donor to channel its funding directly to UNICEF.

\textsuperscript{36} The Economist. Intelligent Unit’s DRC country report for September 2006 notes: “The current president, Joseph Kabila, is expected to win the second round of presidential elections, scheduled for October 29th, and he is likely to appoint a government drawn from across the political spectrum. The new administration will face the same challenges to its authority as the transitional government, particularly in some eastern areas where armed groups hold sway.”

\textsuperscript{37} Oxford Analytica Report, July 2006.
4. Efficiency: Governance, Management, and Financing

4.1 Summary. Despite a slow start, the pace of implementation of program activities accelerated in 2005. The governance and management arrangements have been reasonably effective in dealing with the multicountry and multidonor nature of the program. But the Advisory Committee has not served effectively as a mechanism to help catalyze and maintain political momentum for DDR. The World Bank and bilateral donor partners each expected the other to take major responsibility for this. The Advisory Committee also does not benefit from independent technical advice to guide program management. Several management shortcomings identified in the early years such as lack of a framework for providing grants to UN implementing agencies, staffing issues in the Secretariat, and level of the Secretariat’s field presence were recently addressed. Yet, recent supervision reports have raised fiduciary concerns on the proper use of funds in the DRC. On the basis of current levels of donor funding, the MDRP was likely to have faced a cash flow shortfall of $90 million beginning at the end of 2006 based on current financing levels, and MDRP staff members have been working to mobilize committed donor resources.

Efficient Use of Resources

4.2 Donor partners were troubled by the slow pace of program implementation in the first two years as reflected in the low disbursement rates for 2003 and 2004. But the pace of disbursement for both national programs and special projects accelerated in 2005 (Table 4.1). Overall program disbursements have increased to 59 percent of total commitments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total Commitment</th>
<th>Cumulative Disbursements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National programs (IDA &amp; MDTF)</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special projects (MDTF)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional activities (MDTF)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MDRP Quarterly Progress Reports, last dated June 2006.

4.3 The mid-term review highlighted several factors contributing to the slow pace in the early years, notably lack of political commitment in the conflicting countries and lack of progress on the political peace process at the regional and national levels. Nevertheless, there were some obstacles in program administration that also delayed disbursements. These included: a) the lack of prenegotiated agreements with UN implementing agencies (UNICEF and UNDP), b) delays caused by Bank administrative procedures and inefficiencies as a result of the “inordinate amount of resources expended on special projects that was not commensurate with their size or likely impact,”38 and c)

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38 Mid-term review, p. iii.
the lack of World Bank experience among the highly competent technical staff in the
Secretariat.

4.4 Using international DDR experience, the MDRP estimated the total cost of
demobilization and reintegration to be about $1,500 per ex-combatant—$200 for
demobilization, $400 for reinsetion, $800 for reintegration, and $100 in operating costs.
The exact amount was expected to vary in individual countries, and the MDRP
anticipated higher logistics costs in the DRC and Angola. The Secretariat’s periodic
progress reports indicate actual costs by activities (national programs and special
projects) are well within the norms. At an aggregate level, a rough calculation suggests
that the program has committed $480 million in national programs and special projects
(excluding administrative costs) for about 413,000 beneficiaries, which amounts to
$1,162 per beneficiary. But the recent progress reports note that the delays in the DRC
program have led to an overcommitment of resources (in the order of some $90 million),
and the program is expected to face cash flow problems in 2007, assuming current levels
of donor funding.

4.5 Given the weak capacity in the program countries, the MDRP has used externally
managed units located in the national DDR institutions to maintain fiduciary (financial
management and procurement) control. For instance, a fiduciary unit managed by KPMG
was located in the Angola DDR commission, IESEM. While the fiduciary procedures
have delayed implementation in some instances and do not contribute to sustainable
improvements in national capacity, they have led to better assurance on the use of funds.
Recently, there have been serious fiduciary concerns regarding the DRC national
program, as noted in the November 2006 supervision report. The Bank is considering
suspending the project if the government does not take specified actions to improve
financial management practices and reimburse the Bank for ineligible project
expenditures.

4.6 Initially, the Secretariat was envisaged as a small unit and the program’s
administrative costs were estimated at 2–3 percent of the total costs. Commitments to
increase MDRP presence and the size of the Secretariat resulted in greater management
costs for fiscal 2005 and fiscal 2006. At the advisory committee meeting in February
2005, partners noted that these increases were commensurate with the work program.

GOVERNANCE, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGITIMACY

4.7 Institutional arrangements have been reasonably effective in managing the
multicountry and multidonor nature of the program, albeit with shortcomings. The
program’s governance structure comprises an advisory committee and a trust fund

39 Costs are not divided by processes (demobilization, reinsetion, and reintegration) in quarterly progress
reports.

committee. The Advisory Committee acts as a forum for stakeholder representation and comprises several multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, other nonprogram partners active in the region, and representatives of participating governments. It is mandated to “help ensure the MDRP’s links to the overall peace process and to facilitate the participation of key stakeholders in the program’s planning and implementation.”

The Trust Fund Committee comprises contributing program partners and is responsible for authorizing the use of the program’s trust funds. Box 4.1 briefly describes the governance and management structures, and Annex C provides greater details.

**Box 4.1: Governance and Management Structures of the Program**

*Advisory Committee:* The main governing body comprises representatives of national governments, key UN partners and regional institutions, bilateral donors, and international financial institutions. Its role is to a) ensure coordination of the overall peace process, b) facilitate participation of key stakeholders in program planning and implementation, c) approve the proposed work program and oversee its progress, and d) determine the eligibility of proposed national programs for support.

*Trust Fund Committee:* Comprises all donors contributing to the MDTF. Meets in conjunction with the Advisory Committee to a) review utilization of MDTF resources, b) assess distribution of resources between national programs, and c) raise additional resources as required.

*MDRP Secretariat:* Responsible for program management, administration of the MDTF, and oversight of program resources. It reports to the Advisory Committee, Trust Fund Committee, and World Bank management.

*Technical Coordination Group:* Comprises senior technical and management staff from participating countries who oversee the technical aspects of national programs. Meets semiannually to review implementation status of the MDRP, share information on progress of national DDR activities, exchange lessons learned, and explore opportunities for technical cooperation.

4.8 The Advisory Committee has served as a broad stakeholder forum and has engaged stakeholder participation in the program, but it has had two shortcomings. First, the Advisory Committee has not been able to play the role originally envisaged for it; that is, in linking the program to the overall peace process. Secretariat staff members contend they expected program partners, especially bilateral donors, to help maintain political pressure for DDR on participating states through their individual interactions with countries and collectively through meetings of the Advisory Committee. While they noted that partners did not fully live up to this expectation, donor partners expected that as the lead partner for the MDRP, senior-most levels of World Bank management would be spearheading this effort. There was, however, no clear plan of action or assigned responsibility for this, and the Advisory Committee was also not adequately constituted to perform this role. Informants note that the level of national representation on the Advisory Committee is varied and comprises counterparts working on development issues in the countries. Their ability to encourage political decision-making on DDR

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41 Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration, paragraph 130, p. 46.
cannot be assumed. In an interview for this report, an external expert knowledgeable about the program noted that the MDRP was able to successfully undertake technical DDR activities, nor could it bring to bear its significant political and financial influence on the larger political environment in order to catalyze and maintain momentum for DDR in the countries because it lacked a mechanism (such as a high-level ambassador) to facilitate interaction with the senior political leadership in participating countries.

4.9 Second, the Advisory Committee has not benefited from the views of an independent technical group of experts insulated from the views of donors or member countries. MDRP national programs benefit from the Bank’s technical advice, but this does not extend to its regional activities or to its work plan as a whole.

4.10 At the February 2005 meeting, partners agreed on the need to dovetail the program’s technical and political dimensions. Specifically, partners committed to ensuring “the most appropriate division of labor between government agencies (both in donor and recipient countries), UN and other multilateral agencies, and the MDRP Secretariat.” 42 They noted that the program needed a better tool to bring the comparative technical and political strengths of the different partners into play. A subsequent statement on roles and responsibilities describes the joint responsibility of partners and the Secretariat in analyzing and presenting information on the broader political context. It also notes that donors and bilateral partners are expected to provide strong support to the overall peace process; identification and resolution of political issues prior to and during implementation of the MDRP strategy; and sharing of information on an informal basis, through appropriate coordination mechanisms, and in the Advisory Committee. But the statement falls short of specifying the means by which partners, either individually or collectively through the Advisory Committee, would coordinate with the political environment at the highest levels. 43

4.11 Measures by the MDRT to build trust and confidence are based on interpersonal interactions at the technical level through the Technical Coordination Group and through interaction among country representatives on the Advisory Committee. Secretariat staff members report that good interaction exists at a personal level between country participants on the Advisory Committee and that this in itself is an achievement in a postconflict context. But trust and confidence building measures have been limited to government counterparts working on development issues, with no supporting measures for decision-makers and high-level political leadership in the countries. The mid-term

42 February 2005 meeting in Paris, p. 5.
43 An April 2005 report noted specifically that donors, bilateral partners and relevant UN agencies are expected to provide “strong support to overall peace process; help in the identification and resolution of political issues prior to/during implementation of the MDRP Strategy; and sharing of information on informal basis, through appropriate coordination mechanisms, and in the Advisory Committee.” A subsequent roundtable on MDRP in the wider context of peace and security in the Great Lakes region in November 2005 also articulated the need to work on both technical and political dimensions of the DDR process.
review noted that “lack of sustained political networking in program countries, at the level of national decision-makers, is a drawback for the program.”

4.12 The program is managed by a Secretariat based at the World Bank in Washington, DC, with representatives in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kigali, Rwanda. Supporting structures include a) a Technical Coordination Group that provides cross-country interaction among technical staff, b) focal points from each donor agency and country to facilitate information sharing, and c) a lead donor agency that serves as the main interlocutor for the host government on program issues (see Box 4.1 for details).

4.13 Early problems related to the Secretariat’s limited size and level of field presence has been addressed over the past year.

- **Size of the Secretariat:** The design of the MDRP envisaged a total of eight program staff to carry out program activities (a manager; an assistant; four DDR specialists—two each in Washington, DC, and the field—a trust fund manager; and a communications specialist). It also underestimated the resources needed to manage World Bank administrative procedures and reconciling them with the interests and practices of multiple implementing agencies, notably UNICEF and UNDP. The design was also overly optimistic about the extent to which regular Bank staff would be able to contribute to and assume responsibility for program activities. The Secretariat now comprises 12 staff, including a third field-based DDR specialist and a monitoring and evaluation specialist. Secretariat staff members note that the Secretariat’s size also grew due to the greater than anticipated challenges in Burundi and DRC that required dedicated staff effort.

- **Level of field presence:** The roles and responsibilities of the Secretariat have been expanded. Whereas the strategy document expected the Secretariat to provide nonresident support from Washington, DC, with just two field representatives,45 country counterparts and donors lobbied for greater and longer-term field presence to “provide the constancy, contact and basis for trust considered critical to the processes underway.”46 Technical assistance provided by program staff was believed to be especially critical to national commissions in Burundi, DRC, and Rwanda. The Secretariat expressed concern that given its limited capacity, more field presence would mean greater donor rather than national ownership of the DDR process, and would create an excessive reliance on the technical capacity of the Secretariat at the expense of building the capacity of national agencies. However, in February 2005, partners agreed to shift the focus and presence of the Secretariat to the field.

4.14 It took the MDRP time to establish a contractual framework for providing grant funds to UN implementing agencies, notably UNDP and UNICEF. There was no

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44 Mid-Term Review, paragraph 73, p. 19.
45 The Secretariat’s role was to manage the trust fund, provide oversight, facilitate the partnership, and supply technical assistance, either directly through staff or consultants, but mostly on a nonresident basis.
46 Mid-Term Review. Page iii.
precedent or framework agreement that could be used as a template for this,\textsuperscript{47} and some procedures such as the UN’s single audit policy were in direct contrast to the Bank’s requirement that audits be performed annually. Therefore, it took time for the organizations to agree on the terms and conditions of the contracts.\textsuperscript{48} Ultimately, a memorandum of understanding on financial management requirements for all Bank–UN agency agreements and with the UNDP was signed. The UNICEF agreement took about two years of negotiation.\textsuperscript{49} While these delays caused considerable frustration among donor partners and implementing agencies, new memoranda of understanding are being used as the framework for Bank–UN relations in other postconflict environments.

4.15 The mid-term review pointed to three other management shortcomings:

- The MDRP has had three Secretaries and one acting Secretary, signaling the failure of the Bank to provide adequate stewardship.

- The emphasis on strategic issues has been inadequate, due to a greater focus on implementation of day-to-day program activities.

- Communication between the Secretariat and donors has been poor.

4.16 Since the mid-term review, the Secretariat has set out its new strategic directions and emphasized greater focus on implementation along with an emphasis on regional issues by undertaking country and regional analyses of DDR and security sector reform efforts, and analyzing and monitoring the political pulse at the regional level.\textsuperscript{50} It has also revised its staffing structure a) to focus on quality enhancement and monitoring and evaluation, b) by assigning specific staff with multicountry responsibility to increase the focus on regional activities, and c) by developing a new communications strategy and an enhanced Web site.

4.17 Legitimacy. Through its Advisory Committee, the MDRP has been able to bring postconflict countries together to interact with each other on technical issues and to undertake DDR simultaneously. Although the role of the Advisory Committee is limited, inclusion of national authorities has added legitimacy to the MDRP.

4.18 The Secretariat has committed to improve stakeholder participation in the design of national programs. In expanding regional activities targeted to combatants on foreign soil, it has also begun to engage not only participating governments, but also relevant out-of-program countries, UN agencies, and civil society both directly or indirectly.

\textsuperscript{47} Secretariat staff members noted that this was the first time the Bank sought to provide MDTF resources directly to UN agencies through grant agreements with the Bank in postconflict environments, instead of negotiating these separately with individual donors.

\textsuperscript{48} Arrangements under the Post Conflict Fund could not be applied.

\textsuperscript{49} Secretariat staff members noted that the agreement with UNICEF took longer to negotiate than it did the regional program on river blindness, which stalled in January 2004.

\textsuperscript{50} Proceedings of the MDRP Advisory and Trust Fund Committee Meetings, November 21-23, 2005: London, UK.
FINANCE

4.19 The use of multidonor trust funds for postconflict activities is common practice and a proven method of financing DDR efforts. The Bank has successfully mobilized $215 million out of the planned $300 million commitments to the MDTF. The MDRP had a ready source of funds at the time of its creation and this was an important incentive for warring countries to participate in the MDRP and undertake national DDR efforts. The important financing concern is the projected shortfall in programmatic funds of $87–90 million at the end of 2006, on the basis of current donor commitments.

DONOR PERFORMANCE

4.20 Refer to paragraph 3.19 for a discussion of the MDRP’s performance on the objective of establishing a consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization.
5. Monitoring and Evaluation

5.1 The MDRP has three specific quantitative indicators for inputs and outputs related to its process objectives. The joint supervision missions and mid-term review do not explicitly comment on progress against the goal of stabilization and recovery or the related three outcome indicators. They report on activities and, at best, on process objectives. Moreover, the quality of information contained in joint supervision mission reports has been characterized by the mid-term review as general and voluminous, and not informative or linked to specific work plans and schedules set at partner meetings. There was no candid reporting on donor relations and areas of disagreements between partners. Donors noted the need to improve consistency and comparability of reporting across various national programs to enhance transparency and “take full advantage of the regional nature of the partnership.”

5.2 There has been quarterly progress reporting by the Secretariat on input and output indicators (i.e., performance of national programs, special projects, and regional activities). The monitoring of national programs cofinanced by IDA, for all countries except for CAR, benefit from supervision missions undertaken by task team leaders that are co-terminus staff financed by the MDRP. The Bank’s Implementation Status and Results Reports document progress against specified objectives. But monitoring of special projects has been on a project-by-project basis; there is no systematic monitoring of achievements and outcomes of special projects or regional activities as a whole or on their contribution to the program overall.

5.3 The program design recognized that weak M&E increases the risk of moral hazard. Secretariat staff members note that program activities used extensive screening and verification processes to determine the number of ex-combatants and target benefits accordingly. Interviews with MDRP staff members and external experts suggest that the program has taken care to track the flow of reinsertion benefits, yet there have been periodic reports of reinsertion benefits not reaching intended beneficiaries, including some recent fiduciary concerns in DRC, which the Secretariat is working to address.

5.4 Interviews with Bank and MDRP staff members confirm that since the mid-term review, the Secretariat has placed greater emphasis on M&E. The Secretariat has committed to improving the form and substance of its M&E activities by hiring an M&E specialist, instituting standardized reporting systems, and devising plans to conduct periodic external evaluations of its activities.

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51 Mid-Term review.

52 The Secretariat is currently undertaking a review of closed special projects.

53 The risk that allocating reinsertion benefits on the basis of the number of registered ex-combatants could unduly escalate the numbers of registered ex-combatants. Generally, as payment for DDR reduces the cost of conflict to governments and individuals, the risk is that this is seen as a potential benefit of violence.
6. World Bank Performance

6.1 Summary. The Bank’s exercise of its multiple roles in the MDRP—as funder, MDTF administrator, and Secretariat manager—has improved over the course of implementation and is now viewed by its partners as reasonably effective. The Bank used its convening power to build the support of countries and partners for a regional approach, and successfully mobilized MDTF financing. It also effectively cofinanced MDRP activities and linked them to the CAS and other Bank operations in the countries. But senior management involvement in the program was minimal until recently, and this limited the Bank’s ability to influence the political momentum for DDR in individual countries.

Comparative Advantage

6.2 UN agencies had experience with postconflict operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone. Although UN agencies such as UNDP and DPKO were already present in the Great Lakes region the Bank was asked by donors to lead the MDRP, for the following reasons:

- At the time the MDRP was designed in the late 1990s, there was widespread disillusionment with the work of UN agencies in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Somalia.
- Donor partners and the countries viewed the Bank as being more neutral in political and programmatic issues than bilateral donors and UN implementing agencies.
- The Bank was able to commit large amounts of IDA resources for national programs.
- The Bank’s modus operandi of working with national governments was seen as critical for getting participating countries to view the MDRP as a legitimate development effort, and was expected to ensure that key political decisions kept pace with DDR implementation.
- The fiduciary safeguards of the Bank were considered to be superior to those of the UN agencies, leading donors to choose the World Bank as the MDTF administrator.\(^{54}\)

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\(^{54}\) This view is supported in a recent article that notes increasing donor preference for the World Bank (rather than the United Nations) as manager of trust funds for several reasons: strong fiduciary control, capacity to mobilize additional resources including its own, donor perceptions of greater Bank political influence on conflicting parties, and greater donor influence on the World Bank than on the United Nations. Nicole Ball, and Dylan Hendrickson, Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, Phase 1 Report Working Group of Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (SIDDR). May 16, 2005.
QUALITY OF SUPPORT AND OVERSIGHT

6.3 As the program manager, the Bank has been responsible for the MDRP Secretariat’s performance. While the Bank has ensured high-quality staff and brought state-of-the-art thinking on DDR to the program, its overall stewardship of the program was poor in the early years. The Secretariat leadership changed four times in three years, the management of the program lacked adequate strategic vision, and supervision reports commented on implementation progress and challenges, but not on achievement of objectives or donor relations. By the end of 2005, these weaknesses had been largely addressed.

6.4 In choosing the Bank as lead partner, the program donors expected that pooled funding along with the World Bank senior management’s political influence and access to national governments would help maintain political pressure for moving the DDR agenda forward in the countries. This expectation was not met. There was inadequate involvement by the senior-most levels of Bank management in a program that was inherently political in nature and recognized as high risk from the outset.

LINKAGE TO BANK COUNTRY OPERATIONS

6.5 National programs, which are cofinanced by IDA credits, are systematically built into Bank CASs and interim or transitional support strategies, and are closely linked to other Bank operations in the participating countries. Bank country directors for Angola, Rwanda, and the Central African States\(^{55}\) are involved in preparation and approval of IDA projects supporting MDRP national programs. Field-based Secretariat personnel also work closely with the Bank country team. The national programs in Angola and Rwanda supplemented national DDR financing from other sources, and coordination between the program and nonprogram DDR activities has been effective. In the Central African Republic, the program is central to the Bank’s re-engagement strategy. Only in Uganda, where the program has played a limited role, have program staff reported limited interaction with the country team.

STRUCTURES AND INCENTIVES

6.6 The Bank’s structures for program implementation are clear. The program was initiated by the Country Director for the Central African States at the time and was designed largely by Bank staff working on social development in central African states. The Secretariat has remained located in the Agriculture and Rural Division for Central African States and is overseen by the sector manager heading the division. Some staff members noted that had the Secretariat been located in the Vice-President’s Office, it could perhaps have contributed to greater senior management engagement.

\(^{55}\) The country director for Central African States manages DRC, Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda.

31
THE BANK’S COORDINATING ROLE WITH OTHER DONORS

6.7 Although the Bank successfully mobilized financial support from bilateral and multilateral donors for the program’s goals and activities, as lead partner the Bank was unable to get donors to collaborate and resolve substantive issues that affected program implementation in the early years. Secretariat staff members and the mid-term review noted that whereas donors as a group failed to work together, there was also no concerted pressure from the senior-most levels of Bank management. Some informants have noted that such high-level backing from senior management could have facilitated quicker resolution of issues relating to collaboration with UN agencies.

DISENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

6.8 At the outset, the MDRP was designed to last five years, and has since been extended for two more years. The program recognized the high risk of involvement and clearly laid out a transparent and flexible strategy for disengaging from all or individual countries should conflicts in the region re-escalate. The program planned to disengage incrementally on the basis of severity of setbacks using options ranging from revisions in the schedule of planned interventions to partial or full suspension of activities. The Advisory Committee would recommend the level and timing of disengagement. At the level of national programs or special projects, factors to withdraw support were expected to be linked to nonfulfillment of the eligibility criteria. Parallel IDA funding would be suspended or cancelled in accordance with the Bank’s legal agreements.

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56 The strategy document notes that the program would consider disengagement if there is “(i) a collapse of the regional peace process, (ii) withdrawal of the international community from regional political and security stabilization processes, (iii) lack of political will among countries in the region to proceed with DDR activities, and (iv) lack of commitment by the international community to utilize the MDRP framework.”

57 Criteria include “(i) lack of political will to support regional peace processes; (ii) breakdown in security that undermines program activities and endangers implementation; (iii) a lack of political will to initiate or continue DDR activities; (iv) actions undertaken by governments that put achievement of DRR objectives at risk; (v) significant beneficiary targeting leakages; and (vi) significant financial management failures.” MDRP Strategy document. Page 26, paragraph 110.
7. Country Participation

7.1 In Angola and Rwanda—where stable governments and national DDR strategies and commissions were in place even before the MDRP—the program facilitated the implementation of existing national programs for DDR. In other countries with newly created transitional governments following international peace agreements the MDRP was instrumental in establishing national DDR commissions in Burundi, CAR, the DRC, and most recently in the Republic of Congo.

7.2 Although there has been no explicit reporting on the level of commitment in each participating country, evidence suggests that the commitment of most participating countries to peace has held. Despite the generally successful implementation of the national programs in Angola and Rwanda, both countries continue to maintain large armed forces. The creation of new national programs in Burundi and DRC are seen as positive developments. And in Uganda, government representatives provided a brief proposal for a national demobilization and reintegration program at the November 2005 Advisory Committee meeting. But program documents note that DDR in Uganda must be part of “a comprehensive and sustainable reform of the defense sector. There has been no indication of a downsizing” of the Ugandan Defense Forces.58

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58 November 2005 Advisory Committee meeting.
8. Conclusions

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

8.1 While partners recognized the MDRP as a high-risk venture, they believed that the benefits of engagement outweighed the risks of nonengagement. Despite early problems and delays implementation has accelerated in the last year, and the Bank and other donors agree that the program remains relevant and should continue, albeit with some restructuring and strengthening. The program is well aligned with country goals and Bank operations, but it has not complemented its technical efforts with ongoing high-level interactions with the political leadership in the countries to ensure a DDR-conducive environment. It is still too early to know whether the program will accomplish its objectives because most national programs, especially the large DRC program, have just begun implementation.

8.2 Early program management issues have been addressed over the last year. The Bank used its considerable convening power and financing to establish the MDRP, but the quality of its support both as lead partner and as manager of the Secretariat have not fully lived up to partner expectations. In particular, there has been until recently inadequate engagement by the senior-most levels of Bank management and this, in the view of the partners, made resolution of early interagency challenges more difficult and limited the MDRP’s influence on the momentum of postconflict processes in the countries.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE SUPPORT

8.3 The main lessons from this experience arise from the multidonor, postconflict nature of the program, and the regional nature of the program.

- Postconflict settings are inherently difficult contexts in which to undertake regional operations because of the underlying distrust among neighboring countries and the potential for country instability in one country to spill over into other countries. A technical DDR solution in such a context needs to be complemented with an ongoing, high-level political process to foster a sufficiently stable environment in which DDR efforts can be sustained. The experience of the MDRP suggests that:

  a. Program design should go beyond recognizing political requirements to determining the roles and responsibilities of participants in advancing them and establishing the necessary mechanisms.

  b. The Bank’s engagement in such programs will likely require the attention and involvement of the highest levels of Bank management, and program design should clarify the modalities for such involvement.

- Funding for administrative costs of a regional partnership should factor in the time and resources needed for coordination and dialogue across countries and among partners.
The experience of the MDRP demonstrates the value of having committed resources and readily available financing in getting neighboring countries in conflict to undertake DDR efforts simultaneously.
### Annex A: Basic Information on the Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Program (or project) number</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td><strong>Program dates</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Completion date (estimated and actual)</td>
<td>July 1, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td><strong>Sectoral or thematic areas</strong></td>
<td>Postconflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td><strong>Regional or subregional</strong></td>
<td>Subregional program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td><strong>Regional partnership or project</strong></td>
<td>Regional partnership: A partnership among governments of the region, donors, the United Nations and its agencies, regional organizations and international financial institutions (more than 40 in total); a program aimed at supporting the demobilization and socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does it comprise country projects? If yes, do the country projects:</td>
<td>A series of national projects are funded by IDA loans and grants worth $200 million under the MDRP. These include (a) Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP); (b) Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project; (c) DRC: Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project; (d) Burundi: Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration project; (e) CAR: PRAC; (f) Angola: Emergency Multi-Sector Recovery program, Phase I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conform to a template</td>
<td>Yes, national projects conform to a standard template. The most recent Angola project addresses similar issues and the format of the template is slightly altered. National projects include demobilization, reintegration, program management, target group support including an HIV/AIDS component, and an institutional strengthening component.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Address the same problem(s)</td>
<td>Yes, they address similar problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regularly interact with each other (e.g., through information sharing, research, M&amp;E)?</td>
<td>Yes, the TCG described below is expected to ensure periodic sharing of information on various DDR activities in the countries and the Secretariat’s DDR specialists are expected to liaise with the national program people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rationale for the regional program</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Strategic focus: regional commons, transboundary problems, regional integration, or other cooperative actions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cross-border issues. The conflicts in the region are the result of internal factors (such as demographic changes, unemployment, poverty, feasibility of predation of natural resources, exclusionary policies and discrimination, mismanagement of economic rents, erosion of the state, and easy access to small arms) as well as factors that transcend the boundaries of sovereign states. The external factors include:

(a) *Insurgencies from irregular forces* based outside their country of origin and often supported by origin and sometimes by host country forces, leading countries to intervene outside their territory in neighboring countries thereby risking interstate disputes.

(b) Several formal and informal *military alliances* between governments in the greater Great Lakes region may lead them to intervene if an allied government faces foreign aggression or insurgency. These fragile alliances complicate conflict resolution efforts in the region and realignment of previous allies may further escalate conflict.

(c) *Warfare for economic purposes*. Several governments and armed forces are said to have commercial interests in DRC. Such economic rents may be an incentive for some groups to perpetuate conflict and increase political resistance to withdraw foreign forces.

(d) *Refugees*. The presence of large uprooted populations outside their country of origin provides opportunities for armed groups to use refugee camps as shields against military attacks, to profit from humanitarian aid, and to recruit new members, by force if necessary.

(e) *Ethnic dispersion*. Significant populations of different ethnic groups across national borders complicate the conflicts.

The main policy implication drawn from the cross-border factors that underlie the conflicts in the region is that a solely country focused approach to resolving conflict and planning DDR activities is likely to be inadequate. Because the continuation of the conflicts taking place in any given country’s territory depends on the actions of neighboring governments as well as of armed groups that ignore state boundaries, a long-term strategy to restore security in the region needs to address the linkages. The regional DDR strategy forms an integral part of this overall approach.
A2. Description of the Regional Program (such as genesis, size, scope, evolution, and main activities)

Components
The MDRP supports three broad areas of activities59:

(i) National Programs

(ii) Special Projects

(iii) Regional Activities http://www.mdrp.org/overview/activities.htm - ra#ra

National Programs

Peace and cease-fire agreements contain clauses calling for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of regular and irregular forces. In supporting the preparation of national demobilization and reintegration (D&R) programs, the MDRP aims to make this aspect of peace agreements operational and thus contribute to regional stabilization. National programs are prepared and overseen by the national or governmental agencies with the support of the MDRP partnership and in collaboration with a wide range of implementing agencies.

These five components generally feature in the design of D&R programs: demobilization, reinsertion, reintegration, support to special groups, and implementation arrangements. While the mandate of the MDRP does not include disarmament—a critical step that needs to take place in advance of D&R activities—it works with partner organizations to help coordinate the implementation of this aspect and ensure cohesiveness with other parts of the process. The actual composition of national programs is determined by the nature of the conflict, how it was resolved, the socioeconomic profile of ex-combatants, and the environment in which the program is to be implemented. HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation measures are included during both the demobilization and reintegration phases.

Special Projects

The MDRP provides assistance for D&R activities in the absence of a fully formulated national program, with the understanding that these activities will be integrated into the national program once it has been prepared and launched. The MDRP also facilitates provision of assistance in areas not controlled by national authorities. Assistance under the Special Projects window includes:

- Support to special target groups: child soldiers, repatriation of ex-combatants to their country of origin or resettlement in third countries, women associated with armed groups, etc.

- Activities carried out in parts of a participating country outside the control of the relevant government.

These activities are designed and implemented according to local needs, but in consultation with national authorities. UN agencies and NGOs able to operate in areas beyond state control are encouraged to develop and execute relevant activities within the framework of the MDRP. These activities are financed through the MDTF. In both cases, the guiding principles for national programs apply, to the extent possible, in order to retain consistency, build confidence, and ensure transparency. However, these activities often require greater flexibility in design and implementation. A focus on reintegration aspects, as well as on information and communication, may also be required.

59 Source: www.mdrp.org
Activities in areas outside government control may be required in some instances. This case applies in particular to the eastern DRC. Emergency community-based reintegration activities may be necessary for groups that are not signatories of the Lusaka Agreement. The demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers in these areas is also a priority. However, these activities are not expected to negatively affect the Inter-Congolese Dialogue process.

Ex-combatants settling in third countries: The MDRP supports the settlement in other African countries of ex-combatants who do not return to their countries of origin but are not wanted by any international court or tribunal. Countries for settlement are identified in consultation with interested governments and regional bodies—for example, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. The resettlement may be undertaken by specialized agencies, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the International Committee of the Red Cross. Relevant national and international authorities would be involved in screening these ex-combatants to prevent perpetrators of war crimes from benefiting.

Regional Activities

The MDRP deals with regional issues that cannot be approached solely through country-specific efforts. Regional activities are thus essential in helping to move the region closer to peace. These include:

- Regional technical knowledge sharing, capacity building, and joint analysis among participating national programs through semiannual meetings of the regional Technical Coordination Group
- Harmonization of databases for national programs and special projects to avoid the risk of ex-combatants crossing borders to benefit from other D&R operations. This would include harmonization with MONUC’s DDRRR database
- Cross-border information and sensitization campaigns to apprise combatant groups of the options being developed under the MDRP and associated national programs and special projects that are relevant to them
- Timely and action-oriented knowledge generation and research to deepen the understanding of cross-border and cross-sector D&R issues (for instance, access to land, gender dimensions, mutual impact of MDRP and national programs and special projects).
Annex B: Program Partners and Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Program Level</th>
<th>Institutional and Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Programmatic</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governing Body—Advisory Committee</strong></td>
<td><strong>MTDF Steering Committee</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International/ regional organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donor countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Developing countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Coalition for Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, Burundi, CAR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, Burundi</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR, DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rep. of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Annex C: Governance and Management Arrangements

### Governance Body

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Name, location, internet address, etc.</td>
<td>The governing body is the Advisory Committee that was established to ensure that the MDRP is well linked to the overall peace process and to facilitate the participation of key stakeholders in the program's planning and implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Current size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Current membership</td>
<td>The Advisory Committee is composed of national governments, all interested donor representatives, key UN partners, representatives of regional bodies, and international financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Membership criteria</td>
<td>MDRP participant country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Minimum annual financial contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Functions of governing body</td>
<td>Review progress under MDRP, review work program for the upcoming period, and discuss the eligibility of new proposed national programs for MDRP support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Meeting frequency</td>
<td>Annually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Decisions (vote proportion/by consensus)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Chair(s) of governing body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Legal status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Written charter and date</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Approved by</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Other constitutional-level documents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Management Body

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Name, location, internet address, etc.</td>
<td>See Annex D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Current size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Current membership</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Membership criteria</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Membership responsibilities</td>
<td>The MDRP Secretariat at the World Bank includes four DDR specialists from interested donors and agencies. It coordinates international efforts under the MDRP and administers the MDTF. It reports to the MDRP/Advisory Committee and to World Bank management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Minimum annual financial contribution</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 20. | Functions of regional organization | (i) Organize meetings of MDRP/Advisory Committee, Trust Fund Committee, and Technical Coordination Group.  
(ii) Organize identification, supervision, and evaluation missions by focal points.  
(iii) Mobilize resources for national programs and special projects within the MDRP framework. To this end, an MDRP financing database would be established to facilitate the tracking of resources.  
(iv) Establish a comprehensive database on |
beneficiaries of national programs and special projects.  
(v) Provide guidelines and technical advisory services for national planners.  
(vi) Recruit consultants for regional activities.  
(vii) Coordinate with security and political stakeholders represented on the MDRP/Advisory Committee to ensure complementarity with MDRP activities.  
(viii) Consolidate progress reports of DDR activities to enable stakeholders to assess MDRP progress.  
(ix) Develop and execute a communication and sensitization strategy for the MDRP.

| 21. | Reports to | Advisory Committee |
| 22. | Meeting frequency |  |
| 23. | Decisions (vote proportion/consensus) |  |

**Advisory Body – Technical Coordination Group (TCG)**

| 24. | Name(s) | The TCG comprises senior technical and management staff from participating national programs and special projects as well as the MDRP Secretariat. The TCG reviews the implementation status of the strategy and regional program, shares information on progress on DDR activities, exchanges lessons learned, and explores opportunities for technical cooperation. |
| 25. | Proportion from developing countries |  |
| 26. | Tenure | Meets semiannually |
| 27. | Members appointed/removed by |  |

**Others**

| 28. | Name, location, internet address, etc. | See Annex D |
| 29. | Current size and composition |  |
| 30. | Functions | Interested partners have identified technical focal points that are responsible for ensuring communication. They inform partners about their respective agency’s activities in the region. Focal points undertake joint supervision missions, prepare reports to the MDRP/Advisory Committee, and carry out a mid-term review and a final evaluation mission. |
Chart C.1: Institutional Arrangements for the MDRP

- Donor 1
- Donor 2
- WB managed MDTF
- MDRP Secretariat
- MDTF Sub-committee
- Focal Points of donor agencies
- National Programs – DDR commissions
- IDA/IBRD
- Technical coordination group
- Implementing agencies for Special Projects
## Annex D: The World Bank’s Role in the Partnership

|   | Name of Task Manager/team, location (within the Bank), internet address, etc. | Maria Corriera, MDRP Secretariat  
Greater Great Lakes, Africa Region  
MSN J6–603 The World Bank  
1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433 USA  
Fax: +1 202 473 8229  
info@mdrp.org  
Roisin de Burca, MDRP Regional Representative  
Greater Great Lakes – West  
The World Bank, Avenue Wagenia, no. 4847  
Kinshasa-Gombe, DRC  
Fax: + (243) 880 7817  
info@mdrp.org  
Gregory Alex, MDRP Regional Representative  
Greater Great Lakes – East, The World Bank  
Blvd de la Revolution, SORAS Building  
Kigali, Rwanda  
Fax: + (250) 57 63 85  
info@mdrp.org |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Name of Oversight Manager or equivalent, location (within the Bank), phone, internet address, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Founder of the partnership? [yes/no]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Chair of governing body?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>If yes, who?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Member of the governing body?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>If yes, who?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>In-house secretariat? [yes/no]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Implementing agency? [yes/no]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Funding?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>TF trustee? [yes/no]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Funder to the sector(s)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Could be a sector manager, country director, or department director.  
2/ May involve responsibility for oversight and management of how trust fund resources are utilized.
### Annex E: Goals, Objectives, Outcomes, Outputs, and Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Intended Outcomes</th>
<th>Process Objectives</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Inputs/Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Strategy: Enhance prospect for stabilization and recovery in the greater Great Lakes region. | • Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees  
• Restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries  
• Evolution of social expenditures in participating countries, including in relation to security spending | 1. Provide a comprehensive regional framework for DDR efforts for both governmental and irregular forces (percent of DDR activities undertaken in the region within the framework of the MDRP).  
2. Establish a consistent mechanism for donor coordination and resource mobilization (percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF).  
3. Serve as a platform for national consultative processes that lead to formulation of national programs (degree of harmonization of national programs). | 1. National programs prepared and implemented (number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs).  
2. Special projects prepared and implemented (no. of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects).  
3. Regional activities carried out in support of national programs and special projects (effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities).  
4. MDRP/MDTF implemented in coordination with all partners (efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports). | National programs ($446.5 million)  
2. Special Projects ($37.5 million)  
3. Regional activities ($5.5 million)  
4. Program Management ($10.5 million) |
## Annex F: Summary Description of Special Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name and Brief Description</th>
<th>Cross-Border Component, if any</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td><strong>Support Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers:</strong> Subsistence agriculture support and piloting of economic reintegration activities. Capacity building of government's counterpart agency for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Final audit by September 2005. The Bank will carry out an ICR* by December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td><strong>Support Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention of child Ex-Combatants:</strong> (a) Demobilize 90 percent (2,700) of child soldiers that are currently part of Burundian national army, Gardiens de la Paix, and two rebel factions with which the government signed cease-fires; (b) reintegrate all demobilized child soldiers into their communities within 18 months; and (c) establish and implement mechanisms to exclude children from recruitment practices by all parties to conflict within 18 months.</td>
<td>$1.7 out of $3.5 million disbursed. Grant extended by a year to June 2006. External review by September 2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td><strong>Reintegration of ex-combatants and support to communities:</strong> (a) Disarmament and reduction of small arms by providing individuals with economic alternatives to the use of arms; (b) demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; (c) strengthened capacities of communities of return to ensure sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants; (d) security for development where local civil society and administration will receive technical, logistical, and operational support to identify, prioritize, and implement interventions that will help to re-establish security in targeted communities.</td>
<td>Provide technical/logistical assistance to civil society and local administration in targeted communities to enable them to identify, prioritize, and implement reintegration. Cross-personnel to work with demobilized child soldiers at transit centers and to mediate with their families and conduct sensitization activities in communities.</td>
<td>$3.3 million out of $9.77 million has been disbursed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td><strong>Support for reunification and reintegration of former child soldiers in DRC:</strong> (a) Improve understanding of children’s needs and promote their rights during transition from military to civilian life; (b) create and strengthen institutional capacity in NGOs and government to ensure protection of child</td>
<td></td>
<td>Full $2.5 million disbursed; extra funds, $2.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
soldiers; and (c) reintegrate child soldiers through transitional support, family reunification, and enhanced community capacity.

| DRC | Situation assessment and pilot projects for demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers in three provinces: a) Assess armed groups’ willingness to demobilize children; b) conduct sensitization/training activities at community level; c) develop provincial plans for demobilization; and d) reintegrate child soldiers. | Community-level training | $2.6 of $7 million disbursed. Additional funds worth $2.17 million |
| DRC | Rapid response mechanism to support the DDR of ex-combatants in DRC: (a) Facilitate the national DDR program; and (b) respond to other contingencies and programmatic and operational urgencies. | Full $4.6 million disbursed. Approval of extra $8 million |
| DRC | Community recovery and reintegration of ex-combatants in eastern DRC: (a) Create a favorable environment for project implementation; (b) restructure and develop communities; and (c) reintegrate ex-combatants through financing of micro projects. | Full amount of $5 million has been disbursed. |
| DRC | Family and Community Reintegration of Demobilized Child Soldiers: (a) Train Red Cross personnel to work with demobilized child soldiers at transit centers, mediate with families, and conduct sensitization activities at the community level; (b) undertake sensitization activities aimed at different groups to increase understanding of the need to better protect children; and (c) reintegrate and demobilize child soldiers back into their families and communities. | Create and strengthen institutional capacity of government/NGOs to ensure protection of child soldiers in the framework of the national program. | Self-evaluation reports note lack of success. | $0.6 out of a $2.15 million disbursed |
| DRC | Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Reintegration of Children Associated with Armed Forces: (a) Help transition government develop and implement a Programme de Désarmement, Démobiliation et Réinsertion (PDDR) with specific reference to children; (b) establish coordination mechanisms at national and provincial levels for implementation of demobilization and reintegration programs; (c) establish and support | Train government and NGO personnel in approach, mechanisms, and tools of the national DDR program. Develop training capacity of governmental and nongovernmental partners. | Self-evaluation reports note that this effort has not been very successful. | $2.78 million has been disbursed out of a total of $4.997 million |
M&E mechanisms; (d) train government and NGO personnel in the PDDR approach, mechanisms, and tools; (e) support national NGOs for family and community reintegration of demobilized child soldiers; (f) develop and assist implementation of information and sensitization activities; and (g) establish a rapid response mechanism for demobilization and reintegration of children from the armed forces.

| Uganda | **Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Reporters in Uganda**: Assist approximately 15,300 ex-combatants in their reintegration into civilian life, within the context of Uganda’s Amnesty Act of 2000. | Institutional strengthening of Amnesty Commission | Underway since January 2005. $3.3 of $9.7 million disbursed |

* ICR, Implementation Completion Report.
Annex G: Persons Consulted

Mathurin Gbetibuou, Prior Program Secretary

Maria Correira, New Program Secretary

Victor Tanner, author of the MDRP Mid-Term Review

Ríosín de Burca, Kigali MDRP

Ingo Wiederhofer, Rwanda and Burundi MDRP (by telephone)

Ian Bannon, Sector Director, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction Team

Bernard Harborne, Regional Post-Conflict Advisor, Africa Region

Nicole Ball, external expert on postconflict operations and published author

J.C. Alden, Professor, London School of Economics
Annex H: References


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MDRP Advisory and Trust Fund Committee Meeting (November 2005), Brussels, Belgium.


Angola Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration project. (P7580-ANG), 2003.


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