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Country Social Analysis

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIDS	–	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ASAL	–	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
CAS	–	Country Assistance Strategy
CSA	–	Country Social Analysis
CBK	–	Coffee Board of Kenya
CBS	–	Central Bureau of Statistics
CDF	–	Constituency Development Fund
CRDF	–	Constituency Roads Development Fund
CSA	–	Country Social Analysis
DC	–	District Commissioner
DDC	–	District Development Committees
ERP	–	Economic Recovery Paper
FAO	–	Food and Agricultural Organization
FBO	–	Faith Based Organizations
FGD	–	Focus Group Discussions
FGM	–	Female Genital Mutilation
FPE	–	Free Primary Education
GDP	–	Gross Domestic Product
GOK	–	Government of Kenya
HDI	–	Human Development Index
HIV	–	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HPI	–	Human Poverty Index
IMF	–	International Monetary Fund
IP-ERS	–	Economic Recovery Strategy
KANU	–	Kenya African National Union
KCDA	–	Kenya Coffee Development Authority
KDHS	–	Kenya Demographic and Health Survey
KMC	–	Kenya Meat Commission
KPCU	–	Kenya Planters’ Co-operative Union
KREP	–	Kenya Rural Entrepreneurial Programme
KTDA	–	Kenya Tea Development Authority
KWS	–	Kenya Wildlife Society
LATF	–	Local Authority Transfer Fund
LMD	–	Livestock Management Department
LSMS	–	Living Standards Monitoring Survey
MDGs	–	Millennium Development Goals

MP	–	Member of Parliament
NARC	–	National Rainbow Coalition
NCCK	–	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NDP	–	National Development Plan
NGO	–	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPEP	–	National Poverty Eradication Plan
PBK	–	Pyrethrum Board of Kenya
PCEA	–	Presbyterian Church of East Africa
PRSP	–	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PTA	–	Parent-Teachers Association
SPSS	–	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TI	–	Transparency International
TSC	–	Teachers Service Commission
UNAIDS	–	Joint United Nations Program for HIV and AIDS
UNDP	–	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	–	United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID	–	United States Agency for International Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report outlines the findings and conclusions of the Kenya Country Social Analysis (CSA), the objective of which is to analyze social issues influencing development in Kenya. It focuses on the main challenges facing rural households, their individual and collective responses to these, associated changes in household relations, and growing levels of rural violence. The study is based on qualitative and quantitative research undertaken in six districts of Kenya, complemented by official data and secondary literature.

Over the last two decades, Kenyans have suffered serious reverses in economic and social wellbeing. This study explores the causes and social consequences of economic decline in rural areas. To better understand the processes involved, it adopts a conceptual schema with three levels, one chapter being devoted to each. The first level is that of the driving factors responsible for the erosion of rural livelihood systems: the corruption or collapse of formal institutions, lack of secure access to land, and declining human capital due in considerable part to the impact of HIV/AIDS. The second level considered is the coping mechanisms by which individuals and groups have responded to declining assets, services and opportunities, including economic diversification and new forms of local collective action. The third, and most critical, level with which the study is concerned is the impacts of these processes of change and adaptation on gender and inter-generational relations in rural households, and on social cohesion more generally. Livelihood stress is increasingly reflected in tension and violence, while social disintegration and anomie are signaled in the upsurge of crime, violence and insecurity which have become a recent characteristic of rural Kenya.

Chapter 2 outlines the three sets of factors which have impinged upon livelihood systems in rural Kenya. Most importantly, corruption or collapse of formal institutions has compromised the services provided to rural areas, particularly in the areas of agricultural marketing and services, physical security and education. Secondly, the highly inequitable land distribution system has conspired with population pressure, holding fragmentation, ecological degradation, and a corrupted system of land administration to make access to land problematic and insecure. Third, HIV/AIDS has increased the level of sickness and dependency in rural households, and the burden of caring for the sick and dependant disrupts availability of labor for time-sensitive agricultural operations. HIV/AIDS also impinges on the quality of formal service provision through the loss of staff to the pandemic.

Chapter 3 explores the ways in which rural households have adapted their livelihood strategies in response to these pressures. Common strategies include diversification into

new farm enterprises, off-farm and non-farm activities, and migration, though limited assets (and for women, inferior rights in property) severely limit room for maneuver. Many households are forced into marginal and even illegal activities such as squatting, charcoal production, illicit brewing, and commercial sex work. New forms of local collective action have also emerged, including a vibrant movement of women's groups providing rotational credit services and information/training on income-generating activities to their members, and community-wide initiatives which attempt to supplement the failing services of the state through the provision of, for example, teachers and school buildings. However, the poorer members of communities, and poorer communities as a whole, are often not in a position to participate in local associational life, since they lack the necessary time and resources.

Chapter 4 explores the impact of the changes described thus far on relations between household members, and on social cohesion more generally in rural areas. The livelihood shifts documented by the study have had a markedly gendered character. Those livelihood systems which most severely eroded the driving factors enumerated — cash crop production, pastoralism, labor migration etc. — were those in which the role of men was central (though underpinned by female productive and domestic labour). In contrast, new opportunities such as food crop production, petty trade, informal services, beer brewing, casual labour, domestic service, and the gathering of forest products and firewood often extend what were traditionally female activities. As a result, men find themselves unable to meet their economic roles in supporting the household, and their characteristic response has been one of withdrawal. For women, on the other hand, their burdens in the economic, domestic and collective spheres have all intensified. These shifts in gender roles have had a destabilizing effect on households, which, while not empowering women in any real sense, leave men feeling disempowered. The strain placed on relations between men and women leads increasingly to tension and violence. At the same time, declining opportunities for youth are leading to increasing tension between the generations as educated or semi-educated youth find themselves without employment or assets, and forced to remain within the parental household well into adulthood. As a result, intergenerational conflict over land, family property, income, and resources for education has increased in intensity.

These changes have been accompanied by increasing crime and violence at community and societal level. Statistics show that Kenya ranks among the most crime-infested countries in Africa. High levels of crime and violence have long been a feature of urban Kenya, but one of the main findings of this study is the extent to which crime and violence have come to permeate rural areas over the last five years. Disturbingly, the new wave of rural crime is accompanied by unprecedented levels of brutality. One local response to the ineffectiveness of the police in maintaining public order has been the spread in rural vigilantism. The growing rates of rural crime are also driving out better off rural dwellers, as well as small businesses, thus changing the social and economic composition of some rural communities.

Finally, the study considers briefly the relationship between the social changes documented and subjective states of mind, looking at three indicators of psychological

disequilibrium: the growing problems of alcoholism and substance abuse, depression, and suicide.

Chapter 5 reviews these findings and explores their policy implications. Country-wide social analysis of the kind exemplified in this study brings to the fore the importance of social structures and institutions as the indispensable moral foundation of society itself, as well as demonstrating that, far from being taken for granted, this foundation is subject to erosion as a consequence of economic policy and institutional change—erosion that is costly in human and economic terms, and difficult to reverse. Second, the study also suggests that, given the extent of state failure, a radical overhaul of Kenya’s institutions is in order. Where appropriate, this should be built on the strengths of indigenous institutions as much as through the importation of institutional models from outside. A third conclusion of the study is the need for more a in-depth understanding of the social implications of a number of issues, including those of corruption, access to land, decentralization, the rights of women, the changing role of men, and the nature of rural crime and violence.

Moving on to specific recommendations, four areas of concern are identified. These are:

1. Access to land

The need for a national land policy, which would address equity and security, especially for customary land holders and women.

2. Governance

A renewed focus on attacking corruption through the implementation of social accountability mechanisms; together with the introduction of a more meaningful system of decentralization.

3. Policing and access to justice

Restoring public trust in the police through improved accountability and dialogue between police and the public; and a focus on community policing in rural areas.

4. Gender, masculinity and youth

Addressing the assemblage of customary, legal and administrative barriers, that restrict women to the petty and informal economy; rethinking approaches to gender as they pertain to men; a focus on the specific needs of youth; and improving public awareness of gender violence, alcohol abuse and mental health issues.

1. INTRODUCTION TO KENYA AND THE CSA

KENYA TODAY: SOME SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS

In its early years of independence, Kenya was the most prosperous country in East Africa, its GDP per capita rising by 38 percent between 1960 and 1980. The following two decades to 2000, however, recorded a zero increase in per capita GDP, while per capita income in 2003, at US\$360, was lower than in 1990. Poverty incidence rose from 49 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2001. Kenya's social indicators have declined in tandem with the economy: infant mortality rose from 63 (per 1,000 births) in 1990 to 78 in 2002. Life expectancy declined from 57 to 46 years, in part due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The persisting hunger of children is evidenced in the 19 percent of under-fives who are underweight, and almost one in three (31 percent) who are wasting (CBS 2004). These are averages, but Kenya is a highly unequal society, with exclusion and disadvantage reflecting stratification by class, gender, and region. Kenya's Gini coefficient for household income, at 0.57, is much higher than that of its East African neighbors, Uganda and Tanzania, whose coefficients stand at 0.37 and 0.38 respectively (GoK 2003; UNDP 2005). This ranks Kenya as one of the ten most unequal countries in the world, and the five most unequal in Africa. Inequality has been increasing, especially since 1994, when Kenya's Gini coefficient was 0.45. As a result, the richest 10 percent of Kenya's households now control more than 42 percent of the country's total income, while the poorest decile make do with well under one percent. Regionally, more than twice the proportion of children die in the first year of their lives in Nyanza Province compared to the Rift Valley (133 vs. 61 deaths per 1000 live births), while a person born in Meru district can expect to live twice as long as one born in Mombasa (67 vs. 33 years) (SID 2004).

While these dismal statistics are relatively well known to those concerned with Kenya's troubled path to development, they represent the outcomes of social processes which are less well understood. It is only through institutions and social systems that public policies, programs, and resources are translated into development outcomes at the individual or household level. Yet, despite their essential role, this dimension of development is often taken for granted by policy makers and analysts. The present study, which explores the causes and social consequences of economic decline in Kenya, especially as these have affected rural households, is offered as a preliminary contribution towards a better understanding of the ways in which such social factors operate and their importance in setting the context for development. The report presents the findings of the Country Social Analysis (CSA), which was undertaken for the Government of Kenya and financed by the World Bank in order to identify and analyze the key social issues that shape the context for development in rural Kenya.

KENYA'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND THE WORLD BANK CAS

On December 27, 2002, Kenyan voters elected their first new president in 24 years, ending the political dominance of the party that had ruled Kenya since independence. With the new government's promise of a bold stand against corruption, and the launching of a program to fight graft and restore the rule of law, this shift was generally regarded as a sea change in Kenyan politics, and an opportunity to put Kenya firmly on the road to economic and democratic reform (Barkan 2003). One of the early steps taken to improve public sector strategy was the formulation of the Investment Program for the Economic Recovery Strategy (IP-ERS: Government of Kenya 2004a), which articulates Kenya's development objectives in terms of three interlinked pillars: strengthening economic growth, enhancing equity and reducing poverty, and improving governance.

The IP-ERS lays out a broad range of measures for promoting these ends. Of particular relevance to the present study are its focus on universal primary education, improved access to basic health, expanded productive capacity in agriculture, development of the arid and semi-arid lands, judicial reform, strengthening of the rule of law and security, and implementing reforms in public administration to achieve increased transparency and accountability. The joint World Bank-IFC Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is closely aligned with the government's IP-ERS, focusing on four basic areas of support for the government's strategy. These are: (a) strengthening public sector management and accountability; (b) reducing the costs of doing business; (c) reducing vulnerability and strengthening communities; and (d) investing in people (including an improved understanding of poverty).

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS CSA

Country Social Analysis is a relatively new analytical instrument within the World Bank which is directed at providing a macro-level understanding of the socioeconomic, cultural and institutional context for development. The Kenya CSA seeks to inform the World Bank's program in Kenya both by improving the design of specific investments, and in enhancing the social development perspective in policy dialogue on key development issues. These wider issues include institutions, governance, human security, and gender.

The objectives of the Kenya CSA are to:

- (a) Analyze key social issues providing the context for development in Kenya. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the following questions:
 - What are the main conditions (including those in the economic and institutional environment and the status of human capital) driving socio-economic change in rural Kenya?

- How have households and communities responded to these changing circumstances through individual and collective means?
 - What impact have these processes and responses had on intrahousehold (gender and intergenerational) relations?
- (b) Explore the operational and policy implications of these findings for the Government of Kenya and the World Bank.

The CSA focuses largely on Kenya's rural communities. There are four reasons for this. First, rural areas are home to two-thirds of Kenya's population, and to 12 million of Kenya's 14 million poor (FAO 2005). Second, the priority given by the CAS in nonlending programs on expanding poverty analysis lays particular emphasis on the rural sector.¹ Third, other World Bank analytic work on *urban* poverty and social exclusion was already underway.² Finally, the emphasis on rural areas enabled the wide mandate of the CSA to be focused on a more manageable range of phenomena.

The operational relevance of a deeper understanding of processes of social change in Kenya is grounded in the pervasiveness of social and institutional factors in the World Bank's portfolio. Such factors emerge clearly from the four basic areas of support for the government's IP-ERS strategy laid out in the Country Assistance Strategy (cited above). The priority given to *public sector management* makes governance and corruption, and the state of health of Kenya's public institutions, central to the Bank's program. Social analysis reveals the impact of institutional functioning (or failure) at a local level, and the way in which institutions are perceived by those most directly affected by them, while our macro perspective links these insights to processes of social change across rural Kenya. Crime and violence in Kenya are now adding immensely to the *costs of doing business*, although they have only relatively recently come to be considered as development issues. These constitute a second major theme of this report. The CAS' focuses on *vulnerability*, and on *investing in people*, place issues of gender and youth to the forefront, along with the need to understand the social implications of the delivery of health and education services and the impact of HIV/AIDS. The aspiration of *strengthening communities* reflects a growing appreciation of the importance of social capital to sustainable development, and the potential of working through local organizations, both formal and informal, to strengthen their capacities to respond to the needs of the poor. Associational life in contemporary Kenya is changing, and understanding the strengths of limitations of local institutions enables them to be assigned a constructive, equitable, and sustainable role in, for example, demand-driven community development. Finally, underlying the processes of societal change considered here are the transformed dynamics of gender and intergenerational relationships within households which, as we shall see, have consequences not only at family and community levels, but for society as a whole.

¹ CAS paragraph 85 (World Bank 2004).

² Under the rubric 'Serving the Slums: Poverty, jobs and service delivery in Nairobi's low-income settlements'.

THEMES OF THE STUDY: INSTITUTIONS AND VIOLENCE

The study focuses on two aspects of recent social change in Kenya: institutions and violence. The pervasive impacts of institutional decline on the one hand, and crime and violence on the other, on the lives and livelihoods of rural communities were identified as key concerns during the pilot fieldwork which preceded the main study. The failure of institutions has been one of the main factors responsible for the decline in access to services and infrastructure on the part of rural households, thus compromising their assets and livelihoods. At the same time, a marked rise in crime and violence has enveloped rural Kenya. This violence takes a number of forms: social violence such as gender-based and domestic violence; institutional violence in schools, by the police, etc; economic violence accompanying property crime; and political violence manifested in thuggery and ethnic clashes.³

The two themes of the study are linked in a number of ways. Moser (1996), in documenting the impact of economic crisis on urban communities, has argued that their ability to cope depends not only on their material well-being, but also on their social capital – the trust, networks, and reciprocal arrangements that link people with their communities. Up to a point, such social capital may be strengthened by economic crisis, but beyond that threshold, networks become overwhelmed and social systems break down with disastrous consequences. Under conditions of social breakdown, crime and violence grow, and physical insecurity in turn exacerbates the breakdown of social capital due to economic crisis (Amuyunzu-Nyamongo & Ezeh 2005, Rakodi 2002). Growing crime and violence under conditions of economic decline have been described in many urban environments, mainly in Latin America. However, the current report turns attention to Africa, and the origins and consequences of the phenomenon of growing rural violence.

This Country Social Analysis explores not only the connections between the key themes of institutions and violence, but also their links these to the wider processes of social and economic change occurring in rural Kenya, mediated in large part through the transformation of livelihood systems and of household dynamics. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the main phenomena considered, and serves as a kind of map for the report. The schema distinguishes the key factors which have driven change, the coping responses of rural households, and the impacts of these responses on intra-household relations. At the top level of the figure are the factors most responsible for driving changing conditions under which rural households operate: declining access to land, widespread institutional degradation, and diminishing human capital. The middle level consists of the responses of rural households and communities to the consequent pressures placed on their systems of livelihood. The third and lowest level represents the social impacts of livelihood adaptation. These impacts impinge at both micro and macro levels. The predominant focus of analytic attention is on the household, and the strains which shifting circumstances and livelihood strategies have put both on relations between men and women, and between generations. At the societal level, the alarming upsurge in

³ The classification of violence as political, institutional, economic and social follows Moser and McIlwane (2005).

crime and violence, accompanied by other signs of social dislocation and distress, is linked to these processes of social change.

PROCESS AND METHODS

The report is based on research undertaken in six Kenyan districts representing six of its seven provinces: Isiolo District (Eastern Province), Nakuru (Rift Valley), Bungoma (Western), Kisii (Nyanza), Kiambu (Central), and Kwale (Coast) between February and May 2005. Some key features of these sample districts are given in table 1.

The main phase of research was preceded by informal consultation with a range of stakeholders, and by pilot field exercises in two districts. The purpose of this preliminary work was to sketch out hypotheses for the study and inform its design.

In the main phase of fieldwork, a range of participatory tools were used to gather qualitative data including in-depth interviews with key informants, focus group discussions (FGDs), social and institutional mapping and participant observation. These tools were complemented by quantitative data collected through a questionnaire administered to 710 households by interviewers. Annex 1 gives details of the methods used in the study, while annex 2 lists the members of the six district research teams.

In a number of respects, the Kenya CSA exemplifies an innovative approach to the application of social knowledge to development ends. While participatory data collection methods such as PRA are well established in development practice, they are often concerned with the micro level and, at that level, focused on with the elucidation of local priorities and perceptions rather than with the social analysis as such. Even where, as in country-wide participatory poverty assessments (PPAs), the remit is a national one, the tendency is to aggregate experiential and subjective aspects of poverty rather than analyze the social structures and processes which underlie change. This is an area which quantitative poverty analysis, being mainly on the measurable outcomes of these processes across the population, also neglects.

The present study contributes to our understanding of poverty not simply as a statistic, or even as an experience, but as the outcome of social processes. It seeks to construct a systemic, if preliminary, account of social change across Kenya's rural areas as a whole by combining a micro with a macro approach, within a holistic analytic framework informed by social theory. The holistic approach enables the relationship between a range of social and economic phenomena, including of formal institutions, changes in livelihood systems, household dynamics, and psychological well being. Analytic frameworks drawn upon include livelihoods analysis, asset-based social policy and gender analysis.

The methodological counterpart to this approach is a pluralist one in terms of the methods and sources used, and the levels of society interrogated. By combining qualitative and

quantitative data collection at the local level with enquiries and sources at sub-national and national levels from both primary and secondary research materials, local voices and social dynamics are put into the context of national social and economic trends.

STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report is structured as follows: Chapter 2 outlines the key factors impinging on rural livelihoods. Chapter 3 examines the coping mechanisms of rural households and communities in response to these changing conditions and pressures. Chapter 4 describes the gendered nature of these responses, in changing the respective roles of men and women, and their impacts on household relations. The chapter also deals with inter-generational relations. It goes on to explore the theme of growing violence, both at the domestic level and within rural society as a whole, as economic decline and social dislocation have resulted in an upsurge in crime and violence, accompanied by other symptoms of social and psychological distress. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and implications of the study.

Figure 1: Driving factors, coping responses and social impacts: a conceptual schema for social change in rural Kenya




Table 1: Key characteristics of sample districts

<i>Province</i>	<i>District</i>	<i>Population density</i>	<i>Main Agro-Ecology Features</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Livelihood systems</i>	<i>Major economic features / challenges</i>
Central	Kiambu	562	Fertile highlands	Kikuyu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash crop production (coffee, tea) • Dairy farming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inequality (land/estates /village reserves) - Infrastructure - Marketing
Nyanza	Kisii	758	Mixed high potential and marginal uplands	Kisii	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash crop production (coffee, tea, pyrethrum) • Small scale mixed farming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Land fragmentation - Infrastructure - Marketing
Western	Bungoma	424	Mixed high potential and marginal uplands	Luhya (Bukusu) Tachioni	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash crop production (sugar, tea) • Small scale mixed farming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure - Marketing - Land fragmentation / degradation
Rift Valley	Nakuru	164	Mixed high potential, semi-arid and agropastoral	Maasai Kikuyu Kisii Kipsigis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash crop production (tea, coffee, pyrethrum, wheat, cut flowers) • Small scale mixed farming • Tree planting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political and land clashes (ethnic dimension) - Inequality (land/estates /village reserves) - Marketing - Infrastructure - Natural disasters – droughts
Coast	Kwale	60	Marginal agricultural land	Digo Duruma	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fishing • Small scale mixed farming • Migration (Mombasa) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Infrastructure - Soil fertility/degradation - Tenure conflict (customary vs. formal) - Inequality (local versus up-country people) - Formal and informal leadership - Literacy
Eastern	Isiolo	4	Semi arid and arid rangelands	Borana Somali Meru Gabra	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pastoralism • Very small-scale farming 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Natural disasters (drought) - Conflict with agriculturists - Infrastructure (social, roads) - Land/ethnic clashes - Banditry/cattle rustling

2. FACTORS ERODING RURAL LIVELIHOODS

Most rural Kenyans still depend on the agriculture for the main part of their livelihoods. The performance of the agricultural sector over the last 25 years has been very poor. Growth in agricultural GDP declined in the 1980s compared to the previous decade, averaging 4 percent. In the early 90s, agricultural growth actually turned negative, for the decade as a whole averaging a dismal annual rate of 2 percent (one of the lowest growth rates in the world), before turning negative again in 2000 and 2001 (Nyangito et al. 2004, GoK 2004b). In spite of anticipated improvements, these growth rates have been far below the population growth rates, estimated at 2.9% over the period 1989-99. The per capita production of maize, the main source of food calories in Kenya, has declined from 129 kg in 1970 to 72 kg per capita in 2000, a drop of 44 percent. Production of the major cash crops (sugar, coffee, etc.), stagnated or declined over the same period (FAO 2005).

This chapter considers the three main driving factors have been responsible for the erosion of rural livelihoods in Kenya: the widespread decline or collapse of institutions and services; the pressure on natural resources and particularly on access to land; and the depletion of human capital due especially to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. These factors are related and mutually reinforcing.

INSTITUTIONAL DEGRADATION AND COLLAPSE

Corruption

Many of institutions which were established to serve rural Kenyans have, under the predatory political economy of the last two decades, collapsed or turned against them. The system of neo-patrimonialism, which combines weak formal institutions with informal networks of clients and hierarchies based on personal ties between leaders, subordinate leaders and followers, has permeated Kenyan institutions, especially since the 1980s (Barkan 2003). Deepening corruption combined with other factors such as physical insecurity has led to the dysfunction or collapse of institutions, and the resulting effect on services has been one of the main factors responsible for impelling rural households into poverty.

Transparency International publishes an international index of perceptions of corruption, according to which Kenya's performance has been consistently very poor. A CPI score of 2 or less (out of a maximum of 10) indicates severe, endemic or pervasive corruption, and Kenya's rating has hovered around this level since surveys began (table 2).⁴

Table 2: Time series of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for Kenya

<i>Year</i>	<i>CPI Score (max = 100)</i>	<i>Ranking</i>	<i>No. of countries ranked</i>	<i>Ranking in percentage terms</i>	<i>No. of countries ranking worse</i>
1996	2.2	52	64	81	2
1997	<i>n.d.</i>	<i>n.d.</i>	<i>n.d.</i>	<i>n.d.</i>	<i>n.d.</i>
1998	2.5	74	85	87	10
1999	2.0	90	99	91	7
2000	2.1	82	90	91	7
2001	2.0	84	91	92	4
2001	1.9	96	102	94	5
2003	1.9	122	132	92	10
2004	2.1	144	158	91	9
2005	2.1	144	158	91	9

Notes: n.d. = no data

* = ranking / number of countries ranked x 100

Source: Adapted from Transparency International CPI reports: 1996-2005

<http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi>

National surveys of the incidence of bribery in Kenya suggest that there was some improvement in the early 2000s, at least at the more petty levels. The overall level of corruption recorded by the public declined in 2003, and again in 2004, though by significantly less than in the previous year (the Aggregate Indices were 25.6 for 2002; 18.2 for 2003; and 14.9 for 2004). There was also a substantial increase (from 25 to 42 percent), in the proportion of people who declined to pay bribes. These positive changes seem related to the change in government in late 2002. However, recent developments cast serious doubt on how genuine the pursuit of transparency by the new administration has been. Further, while the number of bribes paid per person declined, their average size increased to almost Ksh 5,000 (\$67).⁵ This seeming trend towards the centralization of

⁴ Kenya fares equally poorly in other indicators of transparency. The country ranks 23rd out of 25 on the Public Integrity Index, ranking lowest of all 25 for Oversight and Regulatory Mechanisms. Other areas with 'very weak' ratings include Administrative and Civil Service, Judiciary, and Law Enforcement. Center for Public Integrity, 2006 <http://www.globalintegrity.org>

⁵ 1 US\$ = Ksh 74.7 (1 April 2005)

corruption was most clearly exemplified in law enforcement, where the average size of bribes paid increased by a factor of 3, reflecting a sharp escalation in the level of bribes paid to police in rural areas (Transparency International 2002, 2004, 2005).

The six organizations (out of 34) ranked by the public as the most corrupt in the Transparency International Kenya surveys were, in order: Kenya police, Teachers Service Commission, Local Authorities, Judiciary, Ministry of Lands, and Provincial Administration. Since all of these institutions impinge regularly on rural households, this ranking underlines the part that corruption has played in the declining quality of public services and wellbeing in rural areas. In the CSA survey, only 11 percent of respondents considered that their roads were in reasonably good condition, while the equivalent figures for other services were 11 percent for markets, 13 percent for health facilities, and 28 percent for schools. The following paragraphs briefly consider the key institutions to which rural dwellers look for services: agricultural market organizations, school, the police and courts, local government and nongovernmental organizations.

Agricultural marketing services

Many rural Kenyan households rely for their cash income on the sale of export and food crops. Agricultural marketing in Kenya has since the colonial period been dominated by the state, typically through monopolistic marketing boards twinned with local marketing cooperatives. There were fifteen such parastatal boards for agricultural produce, included those for meat, cereals, coffee, and dairy products, though there has been a gradual trend since the 1990s towards liberalization. Households included in the study had depended on state marketing organizations for the marketing of coffee, tea, pyrethrum, cattle and milk. However, the services provided by these institutions were seen as having grown increasingly unreliable and inefficient over the last two decades, and this had seriously compromised livelihoods in many areas. The poor performance of the agriculture sector in the 1980s and 1990s owes much to the ineffectiveness of marketing systems.

In the case of coffee, for example, the mismanagement, politicization, and uneconomic fragmentation of cooperatives due to local factionalism, combined with huge levels of indebtedness, have made the transaction costs of marketing very high. According to Nyangito (2001b), the decline in coffee production was a reflection of the neglect of coffee farms, the low use of inputs because of high prices and lack of credit, and the poor management of coffee cooperative societies due to wrangling among members and management coups. As a result, the break-up of large societies into smaller, often uneconomic, units has been widespread. Farmers are locked into this inefficient system by their obligation to sell through their village cooperative societies.⁶

Kenyan smallholders continue to receive less than one-half of the auction price of coffee – a measure of marketing efficiency which compares unfavorably with other countries such as India (around 80 percent) or Tanzania (65 percent). As a result, coffee does not

⁶ While recent legislation liberalized the sale of partially processed coffee, this does not appear to apply to the disposal of the unprocessed cherry produced by smallholders.

provide an adequate livelihood for smallholders: a family with an acre under coffee, or about 500 trees was estimated to make only Ksh 1,900 (\$25) in 2002 (Karanja and Nyoro 2002). Coffee output declined from about 128,700 tonnes in 1988 to 51,700 tonnes in 2002 (GoK 2004b). The worst decline was on smallholder farms which account for 70 percent of the production area of coffee and produce some of the highest quality crop, but whose yields are about 2.5 times lower than those on estates (Nyangito 2000).

Smallholder tea production, which expanded rapidly after independence (accounting for a mere 1.7 percent of production in 1963 and 60 percent in 1998), has also stagnated or declined over the last two decades.⁷ Data from six major tea-producing districts show that the average green leaf tea yield on smallholder farms has fallen from an estimated 8,300 kg per hectare to around 5,500 kg per hectare because of low inputs use, poor husbandry practices, tea collection problems at buying centers, and payment problems. Collecting green leaf from farms was until 2000 a Kenya Tea Development Authority monopoly, and the KTDA still dominates input supply and tea collection. However, the collection of tea from farms by KDTA is riddled with problems and a parallel system has emerged in which farmers sell green tea leaf directly to private factories or to intermediaries. The price farmer receive in the parallel markets, an average of about Ksh 6 per kilogram of green leaf, is much lower than the annual average of about Ksh 22 per kilogram paid by KTDA (data for 1997/98). Neither do the parallel markets offer smallholders farmers input supplies or services. The main advantage for farmers is that they are paid immediately instead of through the monthly or semi-annual payments made by KTDA. Farmers' lack of bargaining power, leaves them open to predatory pricing and payment arrangements. The informal system also seems to provoke theft of green tea leaves from farms, especially at night.

Even more dramatic than the decline in coffee or tea has been the collapse of the pyrethrum economy. National production of pyrethrum declined from a high of 17,710 tons in 1992/93, to 7,000 tons in 1997-98, despite favorable prices in the international market (GoK 1998). In 2002, the parastatal Kenya Pyrethrum Board virtually ceased functioning, suspending marketing activities, and leaving many long-term growers of the crop stranded and still unpaid for several earlier years of production.

The marketing vacuum for many commodities left by underperforming public agencies has increasingly drawn informal private buyers into rural areas. For example, informal buyers now account for 80 percent of sales of milk (Karanja 2001). The market in milk has been formally liberalized; in the case of many commodities, though, such buyers operate illegally. In the face of poor physical infrastructure and absence of effective regulation, many farmers alleged such buyers to engage in sharp practices, and voiced a sense of powerlessness at being forced to be price takers. Nevertheless, as we have seen, even if they offer lower prices, informal traders deal in ready cash, especially important for households with precarious incomes.

⁷ This paragraph draws extensively on Nyangito (2001a).

Education

Schooling has long been seen by Kenyan families as a path out of poverty, and in the past, given the relatively small numbers who benefited from formal education, the quality of teaching, and the prospects of employment for school graduates, this was a realistic assessment. However, as all of elements of this calculation have shifted unfavorably in the last two decades, growing numbers of educated and semi-educated youth have been left unemployed and frustrated, and parents have begun to show ambivalence about investing in education. Fees for secondary schooling have risen relative to rural incomes, while unemployment rates for 15-19 year olds and 20-24 year olds in Kenya are as high as 24 percent and 27 percent respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999). At the same time, state-sponsored boarding schools have largely collapsed, and the bursary (scholarship) system is now regarded as subject to politicization and abuse. Two important avenues of social mobility for gifted but poor children have thereby become closed.

The policy of Free Primary Education (FPE), implemented from 2003 by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government and which increased school enrolment from 87 to 104 percent, was widely welcomed in all sample communities. Textbooks and learning materials provided through the FPE program were to be seen in most primary schools visited. Nevertheless, the popular view was that this expansion had come at the expense of teaching quality. Classes have become unmanageably numerous and large relative to the number of teachers. To cite just one example, in one Nakuru primary school, there were 14 streams, but only seven public service teachers. These were supplemented by three teachers whose salaries were paid by the community. Large classes, combined with the age of some of the new recruits were said to have led to disciplinary problems.⁸ The search for more lucrative employment combined with the depredations of the AIDS pandemic have together meant a decrease in the number of teachers in post, yet the freeze on teacher recruitment since 1999 meant that it was impossible to redress the question of class size without putting further strain on already stretched community resources. These trends were seen as reinforcing a longer-term decline in the quality of schooling: parents complained of teacher absenteeism and the inadequate preparation of their children for exams. Teachers, in turn, faced increasing workloads on inadequate salaries. Dilapidated, crumbling facilities put a brake on learning, especially during the rains. Poverty and distance from the school meant that many pupils went all day without eating, leading to inattentiveness in the afternoon. In spite of the policy of notionally free education under FPE, the costs of uniforms, building levies and other school development charges was prohibitive for the poorest.

The gross enrollment rate in **secondary** schools in Kenya is now around 30 percent, though there is considerable variation between districts, and overall, rural rates are lower. Enrollment has been declining since the 1990s (UNDP 2005). Measured in terms of actual attendance, access to secondary schooling looks considerably worse, especially for rural areas: net and gross attendance ratios for rural secondary school attendance were

⁸ In 2004, an 84 year old man enrolled in Kapkenduiywa primary school in the western town of Eldoret, sparking a debate in the national press.

only 10.3 and 20.3 percent respectively.⁹ A number of sources of gender bias operating against girls emerged from the focus group discussions. Girls face a real risk of sexual abuse (both on the way to and from school, and in school itself). They also bear greater burden of domestic chores compared to their male siblings when they arrived home. In some districts (e.g. Nakuru and Isiolo), it was common for girls to be taken out of school for early marriage, most often following circumcision.

Secondary schools are relatively few and far between in rural areas, and the reverses in the rural economy have made the costs of secondary education high relative to incomes. While high value is placed on education both by parents and children, given the considerable risk of unemployment facing school leavers, parents are beginning to question the value of the sacrifice required to put their children through secondary school. Parents are in any case generally unhappy about teaching standards and lamented widespread indiscipline, alcohol and substance abuse.

The ambivalent attitude to education and migration is captured in the views of one elder from Rapsu (Isiolo District), who remarked that the current education system was creating misfits:

‘Young people cannot obtain jobs because of their low level of education. At the same time, they are not willing to become herders, since going to school changes their expectations.’

More generally, it was felt that formal education offered little to prepare young people for self-employment or working in the informal sector, making it decreasingly relevant to the adult lives of most school leavers.

Local government

The poor performance of public services in rural areas is in part owed to the structure and functioning of Kenya’s local government system, which remains too weak to play an effective role in the oversight and coordination of investments and services. As seen above, the public ranks local authorities as among the most corrupt of public institutions, but there are also clear organizational reasons for this poor performance. Local government in Kenya is fragmented in structure, is granted very restricted devolved powers, and receives only limited resources. While, with the advent of the NARC government, increasingly substantial resources have been made available at the constituency level, these are not coordinated with any process of district planning and are thus open to use for political patronage.

The fragmentation of local government stems from the parallel operation of several distinct systems. Provincial and District Commissioners, who head the administrations at

⁹ Net AR = percentage of secondary-school-age (14-17 years) population that is attending secondary school; Gross AR = total number of secondary school students as percentage of official secondary-school-age population. (2003 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey – CBS 2004:20)

these levels, are appointed by the Office of the President. At the same time, key sector line ministries operate through de-concentrated District Offices, while elected local councils, which have very limited resources and a marginal role in planning and service delivery, fall under the purview of the Ministry of Local Government. These structural constraints inhibit coordinated local administration, and a recent assessment describes Local Authorities as operating with a ‘lack of financial resources, weak financial management discipline, insufficient planning and implementation capacity, ineffective monitoring, oversight and disciplinary action, and a relative absence of effective citizen participation’ (World Bank 2002).

The resources at the disposal of elected local councils were significantly augmented in 2000 with the introduction of the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF).¹⁰ However, these resources have since been dwarfed by the funds being channeled through Members of Parliament (MPs) at the constituency level. In 2004, the Constituency Development Fund Act was passed, establishing Constituency Development Funds (CDF), under the control of MPs, of Ksh 20 million (\$270,000) *per constituency* in 2004-05.¹¹ Subsequently, MPs were granted control of further substantial sums: an annual Ksh 5 million (\$67,000) Bursary Fund for secondary school scholarships, and a Ksh 5-7 million Constituency Roads Development Fund.¹² These funds completely bypass all branches of the local government system, which plays no role in their planning, appraisal, implementation or monitoring. The constituency, on the other hand, being an electoral rather than a local administration unit, lacks any significant administrative or technical infrastructure. One District Commissioner remarked that as a result of the non-involvement of the district level in CDF initiatives, and the scarcity of funds flowing through the district, staff in district offices was being paid to be idle most of the time.

Overall, it is too early to reach a conclusion about the likely impact of the LATF and CDF funds on rural wellbeing. However, because of its scale, and the lack of correspondence of the constituency with any administrative unit or capacity, the CDF raises particular concerns.¹³ MPs themselves appoint the Constituency Development Committees, which are supposed to administer the CDF: a clear potential conflict of interests, to which, researchers were told, the interests of transparency and equity had sometimes succumbed. On the other hand, the publicity surrounding the use of constituency funds is increasingly leading to constituents’ publicly questioning their MPs

¹⁰ The overall size of LATF is linked to national income tax, and at present constitutes 5 percent of the revenue from this tax.

¹¹ The Constituency Development Act (no 10 of 2004) requires the Minister for Finance to allocate not less than 2.5 percent of all Government ordinary revenue collected every financial year for development programs in the constituencies. This translates to approximately Ksh 5.2 billion (\$79 million) per annum at the current revenue collection levels. The allocation for 2004-05 of Ksh 20 million (\$270,000) per constituency, is set to increase for 2005-06.

¹² The Constituency AIDS Fund, once under the control of MPs has now been placed under Constituency AIDS Control Councils.

¹³ The performance of LATF, too, has raised concerns. Oguiyi (2005) concludes in his study of the Local Authority Transfer fund that “LATF has not met its objectives of improving service delivery, financial management and debt reduction; and that the performance of the programme has been constrained by a number of factors such as flawed regulations, low revenue realization, inadequate capacity, lack of a coherent monitoring and evaluation framework, and politicization of the programme.”

about the funds' allocation. In one constituency in Nakuru District, a systematic and transparent process had been institutionalized for broad participation in decisions about the CDF through local subcommittees. In another, water supply, road repair and projects had been instituted, and a stalled secondary school project revived and completed. In other cases, researchers were told that MPs used the fund to continue the culture of occasional, personalized, politicized, and developmentally arbitrary largesse on their infrequent visits to their constituencies which had been so characteristic of the previous political era. The suitability of the CDF to purposes of political patronage and ensuring reelection was put simply by one of a discussants in Kiambu: '*CDF ni rungu wabunge wamepewa kugonga wapinzani wao*' ('CDF is a weapon MPs have been given to beat their opponents').¹⁴

At the community level, the fragmented nature of local government was reflected in the three-way division between elected councilors, chiefs (the local representatives of the provincial and district administration system), and the local clients and agents of MPs. Since decisions about neither LATF nor CDF are guided or constrained by any process of district level planning, the politicization of decisions over their allocation could result in inequity or lack of transparency in their allocation, or a form of political paralysis as each group of local political actors seek to frustrate the plans of its rivals. This was especially the case where these actors were affiliated with different political parties, or where the allocation of benefits was used to reinforce the fault lines of populist political mobilization, exacerbating clan and ethnic divisions in the process. With little information about the funds available or the rules governing their allocation, ordinary citizens remain open to manipulation.

Police and access to justice

With growing levels of crime and violence, security and access to justice are increasing concerns in rural Kenya. Yet both police and Administrative Police (their local authority counterparts) in rural areas are held in such great distrust that they are considered part of the problem of crime, rather than its solution.¹⁵ Allegations that police assisted, protected, and armed criminals, hired out their uniforms, received stolen goods, and even undertook crimes themselves were so regular as to be commonplace. Because of their knowledge, networks, and unemployment, former police who had been retrenched were also said to be active criminals. In one Kiambu research site, the community, observing the assiduousness with which a certain Criminal Investigation Officer collected inventories of stolen goods from crime scenes grew suspicious that he was using it to cross-check goods received from thieves. Taking the law into their own hands, they

¹⁴ A number of these reservations are borne out by recent articles on the Constituency Development Fund in *Adili: A News Service from Transparency International-Kenya* Issue 68 (<http://www.tikenya.org/documents/adili68.pdf>). These articles also raise numerous concerns about the role of the National CDF Management Committee in ensuring accountability, CDF financial and auditing procedures, the conflict of interests with which the CDF faces MPs, and the very legality of MPs' legislating, controlling and monitoring the use of CDF given the principle of separation of powers.

¹⁵ A finding consistent with the ranking of the police as the most corrupt institution in the country by the Transparency International survey reported above.

ransacked his house and found stolen goods there. When the community protested to the police department, the offender was allegedly promoted and transferred to Nairobi. This story illustrates several themes which emerged consistently in local discussion: the perception that police actively colluded with criminals, the sense of frustration at their impunity, even after evidence had been revealed, and the increasing tendency of communities to take matters into their own hands.

The links between police and the formal justice system are also tenuous: even when criminals were arrested, they were said to be released without action being taken against them if they had the means for a bribe. In Gesonso (Kisii) the assistant chief (the appointed representative of the district administration at the sub-location level) said he found it was impossible to control illegal activities such as the sales of illicit alcohol because as soon as the culprits are apprehended they bought their way out of the police cells.

Nongovernmental organizations

One response to the decline in the provision and quality of public services in Kenya has been the burgeoning of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The number of NGOs increased from a few hundreds in the early 1990s to about 3,000 by 2003. The civil society sector has an expenditure of some US\$ 267 million, accounting for about 2.5 percent of GDP. Notwithstanding the enormous contributions of the NGOs and civil society organizations to the development process, there are some disquieting trends in the sector. A recent survey shows that corruption, nepotism, authoritarianism and other features characteristic of certain state institutions are now also increasingly found among civil society organizations (CSOs) in Kenya (Kanyinga, 2002). Despite their large numbers nationally, the presence of NGOs in the study communities was surprisingly sparse, suggesting, albeit unsystematically, that their outreach to poor rural areas may not be particularly effective.

Even where evident, NGO activities remain poorly coordinated with each other and with government programs, and this can result in the duplication of activities. While, formally speaking, NGOs are required to coordinate their activities through District Development Committees (DDCs) the weakness of local government institutions means that NGOs generally operate with only minimal official guidance, coordination or constraint. Further, driven by the imperative of obtaining and sustaining external funding, NGOs may feel obliged to change their program priorities in line with those of international donors rather than the needs of their clients.

Among NGOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs) have been particularly active in Kenya. Being founded upon a particular denomination and often centered on a long-established local membership, FBOs are liable to be more stable and rooted in communities than other organizations, and to be linked by networks to the most remote and marginal areas. FBOs have a long history in the provision of education and health services all over Kenya, and this role continues to be important in marginal areas such as Isiolo. However, FBOs faced two challenges in their community development efforts. The first is the

limited level of inclusion, with benefits sometimes restricted to the membership of the denomination. This phenomenon can be especially problematic given the plurality of religious life in Kenya even at the local level. The second challenge is one of dependency, as some FBOs give insufficient attention to the building of local capacity to manage initiatives after their departure (a number of major FBO-funded initiatives in Isiolo district, for example, including an irrigation scheme, had collapsed when the sponsor withdrew). A specific challenge said to be affecting the work of Islamic NGOs in districts like Isiolo is that recent US pressure on the Kenyan government was believed to have obstructed the flow of funds supporting legitimate social development programs.

Despite heroic achievements, then, and considerable international support over the last two decades, NGOs suffer from systemic weaknesses and have not been able to fill the yawning gap that has opened in the provision of public services. Indeed, the dependence on external support and management may only add to vulnerability when outside organizations withdraw or change their priorities.

ACCESS TO LAND

Rural livelihoods depend critically on access to land and other natural resources, and ninety percent of rural residents derive a least a proportion of their livelihood directly from land (KLA, undated, GoK, 2002a). However, a combination of demographic pressure, highly unequal distribution, and a problematic and corrupted tenure regime have made access to land increasingly scarce and inequitable. The ratio of land under crop cultivation to agricultural population in Kenya (a rough proxy for mean per capita farm size) halved in between the 1960s and the 1990s (from 0.46 to 0.23 ha/person). Available land is very unequally distributed: the Gini Coefficient of land per capita in 1997 was 0.56, with the lowest two quartiles owning 0.08 and 0.17 hectares of land respectively, according to a survey of small-holders in agricultural (i.e. excluding pastoral) districts (FAOSTAT and Kenya Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis 1997 quoted in Jayne et al. 2001). These figures exclude the 13 per cent of households that own no land at all, but indicate that many households that *do* own land are functionally landless (i.e., their endowment of land is insufficient to contribute significantly to household livelihood). The figures further underestimate inequality by excluding large farms and estates. More than half the arable land in Kenya belongs to 20 percent of the population, and a small number of families, mainly members of the political elite and their relatives, own vast tracts of land. Kenya's two former first families, and the present one, are among the biggest landowners in the country, according to research undertaken by the Kenya Land Alliance. With tracts widely distributed across the country, it is difficult to establish their exact extent, but one of these families is estimated to own 500,000 acres, an area roughly equivalent in size to Nyanza Province.¹⁶

While figures on mean areas of land owned per household give an indication of the diminishing areas of land to which households have access, and its unequal distribution,

¹⁶ *The Standard*, Nairobi, October 1, 2004.

they fail to capture other important dimensions of access to land and natural resources. There is enormous variation between areas. Only 12 percent of Kenya's land is 'high potential land' (the remainder divided between 6 percent 'medium potential' and 74 percent 'low potential'), and 87 percent of this is concentrated in Central, Eastern and Nyanza Provinces where agriculture predominates, and in Rift Valley, a mixed area. In the extensive arid and semi-arid peripheries of the country, the distinctive dynamics of pastoral land use systems predominate. Similarly, statistics on mean area per household lend no insight into land quality, although in many areas degradation and erosion are serious constraints on agriculture and grazing.

Importantly, household statistics on land access obscure the severely disadvantaged terms under which most women are obliged to gain access to land, which lock them into inferior relations with their husbands' kin groups. Women are likely to be disenfranchised on widowhood or after divorce or separation.

If there is one generalization that does hold about land across Kenya, it is its intense level of politicization. Land has been at the heart of Kenya's political economy at least since the Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 established a dual society in which the colonial government set aside 3.1 million acres of the most fertile lands in the colony for 3,600 European farmers expropriating its indigenous users (Kariuki 2004). During the lead up to independence, the colonial strategy switched to the creation of a class of yeoman farmers through the intensification of agriculture, stabilized by the consolidation, conversion and registration of customary land to freehold tenure, while trust lands not so transferred became vested in county councils. However, both the registration process, and the fiduciary duties of county councils were open to abuse. From the 1980s, fraudulent allocations of public land, including forest reserve, increasingly became a central element in the system of political spoils in all parts of the country. The courts are clogged with land disputes, and resort to violence between rival claimants is an everyday occurrence (Cross 2002). While land reform is an urgent matter, there is little consensus as to its objectives or how they can be achieved. The issue was broached in the new draft constitution, and was uppermost in the debate that preceded the referendum on the document in November 2005. However, the rejection of that constitution leaves the future of land policy less certain than ever.

In the meantime, under the influence of traditional inheritance systems by which land is divided equally between sons on the death of the father, plot sizes in the agricultural areas continue to diminish generation by generation and increasingly are too small to be workable. In the survey areas, land pressure and fragmentation were found to be particularly intense in the districts of Western Kenya (Kisii and Bungoma). However landlessness was perhaps more striking where it was combined with gross inequality. In the Central Province district of Kiambu, largely landless rural slums are squeezed between some of the largest tea and coffee estates in the country, some of which cover thousands of hectares. The livelihoods of the landless of Kiambu have now been further undermined by the enforcement of forest legislation which precludes them from what had become an established practice of cultivating temporary plots on land formally within forest reserves. In Nakuru district, similarly, squatters lived in miserable conditions,

forced to rely on casual labor or scavenging for their livelihoods on the borders of expansive farms belonging to the political elite that often lie idle. Since the taxation system provides no disincentive to leaving agricultural land idle, land hoarding is effectively encouraged.

Pressure on land is one of the main sources of tension, and often violence, within households. As an assistant chief in Bungoma observed:

Land is becoming small, yet there are too many people who depend on it as the main source of income. Several families have fought due to land. Last night, a woman and her children killed a man because of land. He had two wives and he was in the process of applying for an Agricultural Finance Cooperative loan. Fearing that she would lose the land, the woman organized for the murder. Most fights come from land.

The inequitable pattern of land allocation also has serious environmental consequences. Poor farmers in districts like Nakuru and Kiambu are forced to cultivate lands in marginal areas where soils are thin, slopes steep, and farm plots minuscule, while productive lands on large estates are left idle. The activities of squatters on illegal plots in gazetted forest leaves critical watersheds vulnerable to damage. Without adequate land to insure a rural livelihood, the landless and near-landless pursue environmentally destructive activities, such as charcoal making. Tragically, the poor frequently are trapped in circumstances where they pursue unsustainable farming and resource use practices that further undermine their own welfare, as well as the sustainability of the environment.

HIV/AIDS AND THE EROSION OF HUMAN CAPITAL

Health indicators in Kenya remain poor (see page 1) Kenya. There are many reasons for this: 70 percent of the population is at risk from malaria, which kills an estimated 34,000 children under five each year (that is, some 93 each day) and accounts for about one in three outpatient visits. Children are also vulnerable to diarrhea and pneumonia. There was anecdotal evidence of a rise in typhoid in several of the sample areas, due to increasingly difficult access to clean potable water, poor sanitation and overcrowded housing conditions.

The impact of HIV/AIDS on Kenya's health is particularly pernicious: 7 percent of adults, and 6 percent of rural residents, are infected with HIV. Rates of infection amongst women are almost twice as high as those of men (8.7 percent to 4.6 percent), reflecting the particular vulnerability of young women to HIV infection compared with young men (CBS et al. 2004).

The devastating effects of HIV/AIDS on households is indicated by the statistic that in Kenya one child in nine is orphaned (i.e. has lost one or both biological parents): 9 percent of children under 15 years of age have lost their fathers, 4 percent have lost their mothers, and 2 percent have lost both of their parents. Only 58 percent of children live with both parents (CBS et al. 2004). In 2003, there were 650,000 AIDS orphans in

Kenya (UNAIDS 2004). There is considerable regional variation in this as in other social statistics: in Nyanza province, almost one in five (19 percent) of children are orphaned. In rural areas (as to a large degree in urban), the fostering of children is largely a family responsibility. However, researchers came across a few faith-based initiatives providing support to orphans.

There is clear evidence that orphaned or fostered children are disadvantaged in schooling compared with children of non-HIV-infected parents. Fostered children also tend to be more undernourished than children of non-HIV-infected parents. Children of HIV-infected parents are more likely to be underweight and wasted, less likely to be attending school, and less likely to receive medical advice and treatment when suffering from acute respiratory infections or diarrhea than children of non-HIV-infected parents, according to analysis of the Kenya DHS data by Mishra et al. (2005). AIDS also has an impact on labor productivity. Under the relatively controlled conditions of a Kericho tea estate, AIDS sufferers show significant declines in productivity in the three years prior to demise (Fox et al. 2004).

HIV/AIDS has had multiple and compounding effects on rural households: decreasing the income and productivity of household providers; creating extraordinary needs for the care of the sick; increasing the burden of dependency as able bodied working adults suffer illness and die; increasing household expenditures on health and related costs; necessitating withdrawal of children from school both to provide care and because of diminishing household income; occasioning neglect and abuse of foster children. The pandemic is creating growing numbers of households headed by children or grandparents. As a result, women and children may be the victims of sexual exploitation. Among the secondary effects of HIV/AIDS on rural households is the impact on the quality of schools and other services as trained personnel fall to the epidemic.

Within the study communities, the spread of HIV was linked to poverty. In two sample communities, Bongoloa (Nakuru) and Bula Pesa (Isolo), commercial sex work was widespread, while in several others, multiple sexual partnerships were said to be common where women had no other means of supporting their families (see further Chapter 4).

HIV/AIDS, then, takes its toll both through the human suffering of its direct victims, the depletion of human capital, and the additional burden of care which the pandemic imposes on families and society. At the same time, it is inextricably tied through social relations to the erosion of livelihoods, and to changing gender relations, which are central themes of this study. This nexus can be illustrated in three ways: first, in adding to women's workload under conditions of time poverty, HIV/AIDS, along with malaria and other diseases, disrupts the level and timeliness of agricultural labor inputs, especially in the subsistence sphere, for which women are largely responsible, thus contributing to the precariousness of household food supply and nutrition. Second, because of the inferior nature of women's property rights, widows are liable to lose all of their property on the death of their husbands, as this is taken away by their husband's kin, especially, but not only, if they have born only daughters. Widows may also be subject to 'cleansing' rituals

which involve ritual unprotected sex, and to leviratic sexual relations and remarriage.¹⁷ The third link is through sexual governance: women, because of their social and economic status, are subject to coercive, predatory, or transactional sex, with the accompanying high risk of infection. Those subject to physical or sexual violence (a phenomenon correlated with HIV/AIDS incidence) are unable to escape abusive partnerships, because divorce would mean their losing all rights to property.

¹⁷ Human Rights Watch (2003) documents many cases of this growing phenomena.

3. RESPONSES

The impact of the poor performance of rural institutions on well-being has taken many forms. Evidence on the rural poverty headcount is ambiguous. LSMS surveys show a decline in rural poverty from 59 percent in 1993 to 52 percent in 1998 to 44 percent in 2003. Panel surveys reported by Gamba and Mgenyi (2004), in contrast, show rural poverty rising from 46 percent in the 1980s, to 47 percent in 1997 and 57 percent in 2000. The same the cheerless story can be read in the declining indicators of food security: Kenyans consumed only 1,965 calories per capita per day in 2000, 11 percent less than the 2,211 calories consumed in 1970, and 13 percent below the recommended 2,250 calories per day. Protein consumption fell more steeply, by 22 percent, from 64.9 to 50.5 grams per capita per day. Significantly, food insecurity is more severe in rural than urban areas: 38 percent of rural children are stunted, compared to 29 percent in urban areas. Food insecurity also affects all areas of the country: incidence of stunting was high in all provinces, ranging 42 percent in Coastal province to 35 percent in Rift Valley province.¹⁸

This chapter turns to the ways in which individuals and households have sought to adapt to the pressures imposed on their livelihoods by declining access to land and services and the AIDS pandemic. It also considers the ways in which collective responses by communities and groups have supported household actions, as well as some of the constraints facing collective responses in contemporary rural Kenya.

LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION

Perhaps the main response by households to the challenges outlined in the last chapter has been to diversify their sources of livelihood. Livelihood diversification has been a widely recognized phenomenon in Africa in recent decades as households have sought to sustain themselves through a wider array of economic activities (Ellis, 2000). Thirty-six percent of the income of rural Kenyan households now comes from off-farm sources, this is roughly equally divided between salaries and remittances on the one hand and informal activities on the other. Notably, the *proportion* of incomes from these sources (though not, of course, the absolute amounts) is very similar between food secure and food insecure households (FAO 2005). Often, diversification may be a positive response to new opportunities. For poor rural Kenyan households, however, diversification has often involved a forced shift into more marginal, and even illegal, activities as earlier

¹⁸ Stunting refers to the number of children aged between 6 months and 5 years who are short for their age. Figures are based on surveys of 1,540 households undertaken by Tegemeo in 2004 (FAO 2005).

livelihood systems have become unviable. Forms of diversification recorded in the study include shifts to new farm enterprises, to off-farm sources of income, and to non-farm activities.

In Nakuru and Kisii, the crisis of the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya (PBK) and the resulting nonpayment for the crop, had caused many farmers to uproot their pyrethrum and look for substitutes. The case of a farmer from Kisii district illustrates the dynamic adaptation of household livelihood strategies against the background of institutional instability, physical insecurity, and resource scarcity which have faced so many rural Kenyan households:

‘I used to plant pyrethrum on 2 acres of my land from which I earned Ksh 3,000 a month together with an annual bonus of Ksh 10,000. With this income, I was able to purchase a half-acre plot at Masimba [the local market] and 12 acres of farmland in Molo [Nakuru District]. On the land in Molo, I grew pyrethrum and maize, but I have not been able to go there since the clashes [i.e. the inter-ethnic violence surrounding the 1992 elections and particularly marked in Nakuru district]. With the income I gained from pyrethrum, I was able to buy four cows and was also able to marry. I used to run a kiosk [small food store], but since the collapse of the pyrethrum market, I have had to close it. I have since uprooted the pyrethrum and now grow tea, maize, sorghum, beans, bananas and sweet potatoes. However, life has become hard without pyrethrum. Many men no longer have access to cash income and cannot grow tea because their plots are too small or not suitable’ Farmer, Ramacha, Kisii district.

One standby for farm households in Nakuru after the collapse of PBK had been milk sales, but the instability of the Kenya Cooperative Creameries left this, too, an unreliable option. Increasingly, farmers were obliged to rely upon growing food crops such as potatoes, maize and tomatoes. However, these alternative crops are both bulky and perishable, and roads and market infrastructure very poor, making transportation and marketing problematic. For sales of these crops, and for such marketing of pyrethrum and milk as continued, farmers were now largely reliant upon small, private traders. While these often paid cash up front, many farmers voiced their sense of powerlessness at being forced to be price takers, and also at the sharp practices in which they alleged informal buyers to engage. Farmers in Chemaner and Tiloa (Nakuru) said that they felt cheated by ‘middlemen’ who bought pyrethrum for just Ksh 20 per kilo and sold it for four to five times the price. They advocated changes in purchasing policies and prompt payment by PBK if the industry were to continue. In some circumstances, though, farmers could obtain better prices from informal buyers than were being paid by cooperatives. In Ngecha (Kiambu District) dairy farmers were paid Ksh 14 per kilo for milk by the cooperative, but could get Ksh 20 from itinerant buyers.

In Kisii District, some former pyrethrum and coffee farmers had switched to tea production, but the scarcity of suitable land, together with the time taken for the crop to establish, meant this option was not viable for most. However, because of continuing plot subdivision, younger men in Kisii rarely have access to plots sufficiently large to make tea viable.

In both Kisii and Kiambu districts, farmers had begun tree farming – most commonly planting Eucalyptus, which is fast-growing, can be used as fuel or building material, and for which there is a ready market. Stall fed cattle were a new enterprise for many households, especially in densely populated districts such as Kiambu. Poultry also required little land or capital, but yielded meager returns. Options for diversification, of course, are limited by land availability and quality, climatic factors, access to capital and markets, labor availability, and technical knowledge. Since these are unevenly distributed, actual patterns of diversification varied widely within as well as between communities, depending on factors such as the nearness of a road, membership of a credit group, the number of able-bodied adults in the household, the presence of buying agents, or access to extension advice. For example, although the proximity of Nairobi meant a ready market for vegetable production, in areas such as Kiambu, the lack of cultivable land (and competition from other producers) meant that this was not a viable option for poorer households.

While work on their own plots remains an important activity for many rural dwellers, given problematic access to land, infrastructure and marketing, it has become increasingly difficult for households to sustain themselves from their own farms alone. In more remote settlements, casual labor on the land of better-off neighbors was one of few stand-bys. For youth in Kisii, for example, the main form of casual labour is tea picking, although young men considered this a last resort in the absence of other sources of employment. Where distance allowed, household members commuted daily to urban settlements for work. Rates of pay for casual labor are low, especially for women, and tend to be inversely related to distance from urban or trading centers. Typical rural daily wage rates for rural women were Ksh 50 to 60 per day (\$0.67 to \$0.80) – hardly sufficient for a meal.

The growing importance of non-farm income for African rural households has been described as ‘de-agrarianization’ (Bryceson 1996). Increasingly, rural Kenyan households look beyond farming to occupations such as petty trading (most commonly in foodstuffs and second-hand clothes), retail kiosks or eating-places. In land-poor Kiambu district, many young men had taken up the itinerant hawking of household goods. Although low purchasing power in rural areas limits the market for services, other increasingly common niches include *boda boda* (bicycle ‘taxis’), brick making, brick laying and water sales. Beer brewing has become an important source of income for rural women.

Boda-boda has emerged in recent years as an important small-scale enterprise for young men in the Western and rift valley regions. In some areas, such as Nakuru, *boda-boda* operators have come together to establish cooperatives and credit schemes which lend to members for bicycle repair or replacement or investment in other ventures. Other entrepreneurs purchase bicycles which they hire out to youth who lack the capital as taxis. The case of a young man in Bungoma illustrates how income from non-farm activities may be reinvested in agriculture:

I now have a *shamba* [farm] and I have started growing maize. But this growing maize is not easy because I don’t have a reliable source of income to buy seed. So I am forced to

hire a bicycle and work as a *boda-boda* rider in order to get the money for seed (male youth, Namasanda, Bungoma District).

Unemployment and the differences in land availability between regions have resulted in out-migration to both rural and urban areas. Often these movements follow long established patterns. From Kisii district, the most densely populated rural district in Kenya (758 persons per km²), people have migrated to Nakuru, Narok and Bomet districts where farmland could still be obtained. Young people from all areas migrate to urban areas in search of employment, for example from Kwale to Ukunda or Mombasa. Some young men had been able to go overseas – a goal to which many now aspire.¹⁹

Migration strategies vary from district to district, often depending on the networks of information and contacts established by earlier waves of migration. The unqualified go into domestic service, join the urban casual labor force, or work on larger farms or estates (tea, coffee, horticulture), while those with some education hold out for better opportunities. While some migrants emerge as successful farmers and entrepreneurs, in other cases, they may become economically marginalized in their host communities. In Kiambu district, for example, migrants from Western Kenya working on tea and coffee farms earned between as little as Ksh 30 per day and lived in deplorable conditions. In Isiolo, networks of migrants seem largely restricted to low-paying jobs as night-watchmen in urban areas and out-migration was seen as a strategy for those who are unable to farm or find an alternative means of survival nearer home.

While migration may result in new employment, and often remittances for those left at home, it also has negative impacts, reducing labor available for agriculture, and adding to the vulnerability of residual rural households headed by women or the elderly. The situation is exacerbated by the breakdown in many rural areas of the traditional collective and reciprocal labour arrangements which used to protect widows' and other vulnerable households. As we discuss below, this is particularly the case in the poorest communities, where these mechanisms are most critical to wellbeing.

According to one young woman in Kisii, her husband, a casual laborer in Nairobi sends her occasional sums of around Ksh 1,000 when he is in employment. Although important to their survival, this cash is irregular, and, she said, does not go far in meeting the needs of three children and other extended family members who depend on her.

Diversification and migration are widely documented responses to stress on livelihoods in Africa. However, as pressure on livelihoods continues to intensify under the influence of the factors considered in the last chapter, two implications of these shifts which have emerged in Kenya deserve particular emphasis. First, responses to changing livelihood systems are highly gendered. Male-centered livelihood systems, such as cash cropping, pastoralism and migrant labor have tended to be eroded, while new opportunities (food crop production, petty trade, beer brewing, etc.) tend to fall into women's domain. This

¹⁹ According to *The Nation* (December 8, 2005), between 0.5 and 1.8 million Kenyans work overseas, many of them professionals, making the country one of the most heavily drained in Africa. Of the 30,000 Kenyans who leave the country for higher education yearly, less than 9,000 return home on completion.

differential in ‘livelihood space’ has far-reaching consequences. Second, as poverty drives desperation, there is a marked trend towards the criminalization of livelihoods. This is so in two senses: there is, first, a rise in activities such as robbery and assault, which would readily be classified as crimes. Second, often the only activities to which household members can turn are themselves often formally illegal. Examples include, forest exploitation, charcoal burning, commercial sex work, and the brewing, distillation and sale of alcohol. These two points will be explored further in the next chapter.

COLLECTIVE RESPONSES TO LIVELIHOOD EROSION

The shifting livelihood strategies described above have often been facilitated by local collective action. Community-based organizations have a long history in Kenya. They vary in size, form and function, and include women’s groups, welfare associations, youth groups, communal self-help groups and savings and credit associations (Wanyama 2003). Table 3 shows membership of different types of groups in the study areas.

Table 3: Membership of types of group by district (percent)

Type of group	Kiambu (n=118)	Kwale (n=90)	Isiolo (n=85)	Kisii (n=57)	Nakuru (n=84)	Bungoma (n=96)
Self-help	23	7	19	12	17	22
Micro finance	39	9	4	12	29	7
Religious	25	2	-	30	9	34
Clan/ethnic based	17	10	7	-	10	55
Farmers groups	36	9	9	17	6	23
Age-set groups	52	-	3	21	-	24
Vigilante	44	6	17	22	-	11

Source: Survey data

The table indicates that group membership is quite widespread, but also variable, both in the types of groups to which informants belonged, and between districts. For example, while participation in micro-finance groups is widespread, only a minority are members in any district. Membership of such groups is higher in the relatively wealthier districts of Kiambu, Nakuru and Kisii, compared to the poorer districts of Bungoma and Isiolo.

Men in Nakuru said that most of the farmers associations to which they used to belong had been disbanded since the collapse of the pyrethrum industry. Farmers groups are more widespread in Kiambu, reflecting the membership of dairy, coffee and tea cooperatives, and in Bungoma, where sugar production groups are common.

Clan-based associations continue to exert considerable influence in Bungoma, where they are responsible for land adjudication, funerals and male circumcision rituals. The high proportions of people engaged in vigilante groups in Kiambu and Kisii reflects the relatively higher levels of insecurity in these districts, discussed in Chapter 4. Religious associations are formed around a particular denomination, and are particularly

prevalent in Bungoma, Kisii and Kiambu, where church groups are organized along gender and age lines. Women's church groups tend to be particularly active.

Indeed, the gendered nature of associational life is a marked feature of the Kenyan rural world. Single-sex groups tended to predominate over mixed groups, and female over male. Vigilante groups are a solely male affair in most communities, and men are also involved farmers groups, age-set and clan-based groups. A male welfare group encountered in Kiamburi was formed in 2000 initially to assist in the funeral expenses of a destitute man. Members continue to come together during funerals or to answer particular needs in the community, as in an emergency which followed a fire. Micro-finance groups may be mixed in membership, but their female members tend to outnumber male.

Women's groups have been a hallmark of social organization in Kenya. Traditionally, these groups served as collective self-help organizations, providing economic and labor assistance to women during childbirth and family crises. In the 1980s and 1990s, the government advocated the formation of women's groups as a development strategy, promoting their registration under the program *Maendeleo ya Wanawake* ('Development for Women') through which some official funds were channeled. By the early 1990s there were estimated to be 24,000 to 30,000 such groups in Kenya (Boulay and Valente, 1999), while today, the official count is 133,135 with a membership of over five million individuals (GoK, 2005). However, not all registered groups are active nor are all active groups registered.

The present study found women's groups to be quite prevalent in some districts (Bungoma and Kiambu) but much less so in others (Kisii, Nakuru and Kwale). Two factors seem to account for this. The first is the relative freedom, under local patterns of gender relations and authority within the household, of women to associate and make decisions. The second, related, factor is the extent to which women control the resources necessary for the necessary to group life. Where they were found, women's groups supported quite a range of income-generating activities (dairy cows, tree planting, and in some instances collectively-farmed agricultural plots), as well as promoting educational activities in areas such as health, family planning and agriculture, and providing assistance to their members during illness and bereavement. The comments of a member in Bungoma District, where women's groups are particularly active and successful, highlight some of the many advantages which women see in group membership – including moral and financial support as well as access to information and knowledge :

'These social groups, like women's groups, have helped us a lot, because through merry-go-rounds women have reduced poverty and in the groups we also share ideas. Our contributions are used to provide for our families' needs, such as buying school books, soap, and other things. We have also used our savings to make some investments – for instance when you buy a chicken and it hatches, and the chicks grow, you can sell and buy a sheep and in the end even buy a cow. So we have small investments that benefit us in times of need' (Bungoma Adult woman).

'Merry-go-rounds', as referred to by this respondent, are rotating savings and credit associations which are a common format for female (and to a lesser extent male and

mixed) groups. Members meet regularly (weekly, biweekly or monthly – petty traders tend to meet more often), to contribute money, paying the total proceeds to each member in turn. The contributions vary according to the resources of members. In one Kiamburi (Kiambu District) group, each member contributed Ksh 50 weekly, while another group in Bungoma (which had constructed and managed a primary school) contributed Ksh 1,000 monthly. A variant on this arrangement is known as ‘table banking’ where funds contributed by the membership may be borrowed by either individual members or outsiders at an interest rate set by the group. Some groups combine systems of ‘merry-go-round’ and ‘table banking’ or petty collective enterprises. One such group in Kiamburi reported that:

‘We are 40 members. We contribute Ksh 115 per month. Ksh 100 is pooled and shared among 6 members, and of the remaining amount, Ksh 10 is used to buy cooking pots and Ksh 5 utensils. These items belong to the group and are rented out for a fee —Ksh 2 for a plate, Ksh 50 for a kettle, Ksh 2 for a cup, Ksh 100 for a *sufuria* [large metal cooking pot]).’

In some groups in Bungoma district, contributions are used to buy a livestock (typically a dairy cow or goat) for each member in turn. Smaller sums fund purchases such as clothes and kitchen utensils.

In summary, then, these informal groups provide rural women with access to credit which is quick, and cheap, and flexible, and would not be available to them through formal channels (Atieno, 2001). Money may be drawn upon by member for purposes such as paying school fees or meeting emergencies, while profits accrued by the group from lending out money or group assets are shared out periodically or reinvested.

The international focus on women’s empowerment, affirmative action and the girl child have raised consciousness of gender issues at the community level, often through NGO or donor sponsored programs. To a degree, they have helped to raise the status of women. However, the response of men to these changes has been ambivalent. As one man in Isiolo said:

‘Women have become too strong. In the past they never used to talk in a meeting. They had to wait until they reached home for their husbands to explain the issues. But things have changed.’

Communal activities

Frequently, communities come together to supplement the failing services of the state through the provision of infrastructure or personnel: building or refurbishing schools, dispensaries, houses for teachers and health workers, and tea or coffee buying centers. Even in relatively poor communities, contributions are made by all households to hire teachers to supplement the inadequate numbers of government staff. For example, in Chemaner (Nakuru) the community had recruited three teachers to support the seven Teachers Service Commission teachers in the local primary school and was paying their salaries. In Ndavaya (Kwale), the community had hired a community health worker to

support the government-paid nurse. Such initiatives are usually managed by Parent-Teachers Associations (PTAs) or locally formed health committees. While able to mobilize resources in the short run, taking on responsibility for recurrent expenditures and for the management of facilities often proved a challenge, especially given falling rural incomes.

This account of community groups and initiatives suggests a fairly dense network of social capital in some rural communities. However, as table 3 demonstrated, there is considerable variation between areas. Communities that have been impoverished by the collapse of livelihood systems may not be able to contribute to communal activities, leading to a more individual approach of addressing pressing needs. In Chemaner (Nakuru), for example, contributions towards the construction of the dispensary and primary school had slowed to a trickle since the collapse of the pyrethrum market. As a member of the village health committee expressed it: ‘you call people for a *harambee* [community fundraising event] and they come empty handed because they have no source of income.’

Further, even where there is an abundance of associations, systems of solidarity and reciprocity do not necessarily encompass the whole of the community. The membership of most of the groups encountered consisted of peers of similar socio-economic status or religion and existed for the purposes of mutual support. In fact, while there was general recognition of the level of need in the community, and while the adoption of orphans was quite widespread, interviews revealed that the level of material transfers between better off and poorer households was relatively modest. A growing social differentiation is emerging within and among rural communities as the ties of extended kinship are attenuated, and differences in class and status emerge based on incomes and patterns of consumption. The increasing use of private schools and health facilities by the better off is an important facet of this social differentiation. Declining social solidarity is also reflected in increases in criminal behavior, while growing insecurity has lent a spatial dimension to social stratification as the better-off move to the relative safety of towns (Chapter 4).

These observations lead us to consider the relationship between levels of poverty at the household and community levels, and the strength of community organization. Reference has already been made to the breakdown of traditional mechanisms of reciprocity and support for the vulnerable. In Isiolo, the well-defined traditional arrangements by which wealthier herd owners would lend cattle to assist the less fortunate in establishing herds, especially after droughts, have now fallen into disuse. More generally, the growing number of widows, widowers and orphans in rural communities has strained to breaking point traditional mechanisms of support, such as the tilling of land for widows, as in Kwale and elsewhere.

While collective local action is often a response to the combination of need and state failure, the poorest, lacking any surplus (including time to participate in group activities), may simply be unable to take a part in associational life. Hence something of an inverted ‘U-shaped curve’ exists in the relation between wealth and group activity, with the

poorest and wealthiest communities and individuals being less involved in communal life than those in the middle range. The reason for the dearth of women's groups in Rapsu, Isiolo district, women said, was that they could not afford to sustain group activities and financial obligations. Similarly, in Bongoloa (Nakuru) women reported that such groups were only active when food was plentiful but tended to disintegrate during droughts as funds became scarce and attention was focused on household survival. Even in communities where solidarity groups are common, many, especially the very poor, the chronically ill and the disabled, cannot depend upon collective succor.

As diversification and migration intensify, 'time poverty'²⁰ and spatial dislocation to hamper support for the vulnerable at the very time at which their numbers and needs increase. In these respects, poverty, like diversification, acts as force for individualization, social exclusion, and isolation.

²⁰ The result of growing demands on women's labor from the productive and reproductive spheres. See Blackden and Wodon 2006a.

4. SOCIAL IMPACTS

This chapter turns to the social consequences of the decline of the rural economy, in particular on relations between household members. Despite the widely differing ways in which crisis has impinged different parts of rural Kenya, a similar pattern emerges across the country. Declining services and livelihood opportunities have put increasing strains on social roles and obligations, in particular on relations between men and women and between parents and children. Sometimes, indeed increasingly, these strains spiral into a pathology of abuse and violence.

GENDER RELATIONS AND GENDER VIOLENCE

The context for the shift in gender relations is that sketched in the preceding sections: the decline of established sources of income from cash crops such as coffee, pyrethrum and sugar, the deterioration of the pastoral economy for political, security and ecological reasons, and the falling off of earlier forms of labor migration established during the colonial period.

To generalize rather broadly, the aspects of livelihood systems which have been most severely eroded by these changes have been those where men are most engaged. In the case of cash crop production, the control by men of women's labor was secured through patriarchal land tenure systems reinforced by colonial and post-colonial policies and the customary norms controlling the disposal of cash income. Incomes from pastoralism, especially the sale of cattle and camels, were also largely a male preserve, although women did benefit from small ruminant sales and dairy marketing. Likewise, men were the main agents and wage earners in labor migration.

Concurrent with the marginalization of the male role in the rural economy, new opportunities often extend what were traditional female roles. These include food crop production, petty trade, informal services, beer brewing, casual labour, domestic service, and the gathering of forest products such as wild fruit or firewood.

These factors have conditioned the very different ways in which men and women have responded to change: that is to say, the responses outlined in the last chapter have been markedly gendered. Men, with unreliable markets for traditional produce, crumbling niches for migrant employment, and (for pastoralists) their herds in decline, have increasingly found themselves unable to live up to their economic roles in the household. Their characteristic response has been one of withdrawal. Women, finding themselves responsible for filling a growing gap in household provisioning, have sought to ensure their own and their children's survival through multiple means: a combination of

intensification, diversification and cooperation. As a result, women have become not only the domestic but the economic core of households, while men have moved to the periphery, both in real and ideological terms. This phenomenon is reflected in patterns of residence: more than one-in-three rural households are now headed by women (CBS 2004). It is also significant that, according to a recent survey on geographical dimensions of well-being in Kenya, there is now no significant difference in poverty incidence between female-headed and male-headed households (GoK, 2005). This suggests that women's adaptation to the changes in the rural economy has been successful, even if achieved at the cost of 'self-exploitation'.²¹ The finding is also consistent with the increasingly marginal economic role of rural men.

Findings from Isiolo district illustrate some of these points. In Manyatta Demo, where the pastoral economy has never recovered from the brutal government counter-insurgency activities in the 1960s and raiding by ethnic groups from the east in the 1980s, men are engaged in relatively few economic activities. In fact, for those without either stock or other capital (which is most), about the only available occupation is the precarious, low return, and illegal activity of producing and selling charcoal. Women, on the other hand, have a much wider set of pursuits: collecting and selling of firewood, selling *miraa* (*khat*), milk, eggs and honey; gathering wild fruits, herbal medicines and incense; weaving baskets and mats; and making bread. While most of these activities are small-scale and low-return, they nevertheless amount to a portfolio on which their households survive.

Similarly, in Nakuru, pyrethrum production for export on plots controlled by men has been replaced by the cultivation of food crops for the domestic market, for which women are mainly responsible. One Nakuru woman put it very simply: 'the children have to eat and attend school'. In some districts, including Bungoma and Nakuru, it was said to be easier for women than men to get casual jobs – either because the employment available was in the domestic sphere (cooking, child-care, etc.) because women could be paid less, or because they are considered more compliant and trustworthy.

Alongside the rising demands placed on women by changing livelihoods systems, the burden of domestic care has also increased. The high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, as well as other health problems such as malaria and tuberculosis, and the lack of access to health services, mean that most care for the sick is 'home-based'. This burden falls largely on women and girls, along with the already demanding set of chores which include childcare, cooking and the collection of water and firewood. Urban-based adults who are terminally ill or debilitated often return to their rural communities of origin, increasing the rural burden of care still further (Macharia 2000).

Socio-economic change has undermined the social value, identity and self-esteem of men, leading to what Silbershmidt (2005) has termed their 'disempowerment'. For women, on the other hand, the ubiquitous triple burden – in the economic, domestic and

²¹ Data on male vs. female headed households tells us nothing about the distribution of work and consumption *within* those respective types of household, and is therefore not a suitable general indicator of female wellbeing compared to male.

community spheres – has intensified in all three dimensions. However, these processes do not translate into the empowerment of women, since, despite their growing responsibilities, the recognition of the feminization of the rural economy is obscured and muted by patriarchal ideology. Although women are increasingly the generators of household income, men still control land and other property, and seek to retain decision making power over the disposal of income. As one Bungoma man put it:

‘If she [my wife] buys sugar, I have bought it. If she buys a cow, it is mine because she lives in my house and tills my land free of charge.’

The increasing divergence between the patriarchal ideology reflected in this view and the material reality of household provisioning leads to tensions that more and more often overflow into violence. Half of all Kenyan women have experienced violence since they were 15, and one in four in the twelve months prior to being interviewed (three in ten in the case of currently married women). There is substantial regional variation in these figures, with domestic violence most endemic in the west of the country: proportions of women having experienced violence were 73 percent in Western and 60 percent in Nyanza Provinces, compared to the lowest figure of 30 percent in Coast province. Husbands (58%) are the main perpetrators of this violence, followed by teachers (26%), mothers (24%), fathers (15%) and brothers (8%) (CBS 2004).

Focus group discussions revealed that these regional variations in domestic violence were associated with differing cultural norms, but, importantly, also with increasing pressure on land and livelihoods. In Bungoma and Kisii the ‘disciplining’ of wives was described as if it were an elemental component of local culture. A typical view expressed by a Bungoma man was that ‘a woman must be beaten by the man to instill respect and a sense of discipline.’ For their part, women saw it as inevitable that, once bridewealth has been paid and they have borne children, there was little that could be done to avoid being beaten. In general, given the nature of the economic dependence cemented by bridewealth, land tenure relationships, and other social, cultural and economic norms, women have few options but to remain in the marital home.

Men’s expressions of timeless patriarchy aside, there are indications that, far from being a hangover from a primitive past, domestic violence in Kenya is in fact increasing not only in incidence but in severity.²² Women consistently stated that this was the case. In particular, women emphasized the connection between increasing alcohol abuse by men in their communities and domestic violence. Women in Nakuru specifically traced the escalation in domestic abuse to rise in drinking which followed the collapse of the pyrethrum industry. There is evidence that customary norms, while in some cultures permitting a man to beat his wife, also circumscribed these rights: if he used violence without pretext, drew blood or broke a limb, he would have to answer to, and compensate, his in-laws. With the fragmentation of extended family ties, these limited protections have largely broken down. A second, though inconclusive, indication that wife-beating is not simply an aspect of tradition comes from the KDHS statistics: by many measures, the incidence of gender-based violence is lowest among the social

²² Since the 2003 Health and Demographic Survey, is the first survey in which gender-based violence in Kenya has been systematically surveyed, there is no statistical evidence on trends in domestic violence.

groups with no education. Indeed, the fact that of all education groups gender violence is most prevalent in households where men have incomplete primary education, suggests a link between frustrated aspirations and violence in the home. Consistent with these findings, a study by the International Federation of Women Lawyers, Kenya (FIDA 2002) showed that women with secondary education were more likely to be subjected to domestic violence than women with primary education alone (25% vs. 18%).

Growing violence against women is also manifested in the escalating incidence of rape in Kenya, which also increasingly accompanies other crimes. Twenty-four percent of women in Kenya (17-77 years) have been raped at least once as adults (Johnson 2002). Rural women interviewed in the survey spoke frequently mentioned the risk of rape when they went to the forests to collect firewood, or to fetch water (which they were often obliged to do at night).

Much of this sexual violence is perpetrated on children. In one study, one in four survivors of sexual violence were below 12 years of age, while almost a half (48 percent) were 18 years or younger.²³

For adults and children alike, the consequences of rape can be fatal as well as traumatic:

‘There is growing evidence that a large share of new cases of HIV is due to gender based violence in homes, schools, the workplace and other social spheres. Not all young people have sex because they want to. In a nationwide study of women 12-24 years old 25 percent said they lost their virginity because they had been forced. A recent Nairobi study indicated that 4 percent of HIV infections in the adolescent 13-19 year age group were a consequence of rape’ (GoK 2002b:2).

Rape generally goes unreported for many reasons, not least because of the limited seriousness with which it is taken by the authorities, and so official statistics are of limited utility in establishing trends. However, police statistics show that 2,800 cases of rape were reported in Kenya in 2004, an increase of 500 compared to the previous year, and over five times higher than in 1990, when only 515 cases were reported. Estimates as to the rate of reporting, and hence the actual incidence of rape vary widely. According to Opala (2002), 70 percent of cases go unreported to police, while Kenya’s Coalition on Violence against Women estimates a rate of reporting of 8 percent, and FIDA 18 percent (FIDA 2002). Amnesty International and the Coalition of Violence Against Women respectively estimate that 60 and 600 rapes occur every day in Kenya (quoted in Kilonzo 2003).

²³ Of 700 survivors attended to in seven district hospitals and one provincial hospital between 2004 and 2005 (Liverpool VCT, forthcoming, and Dr. Nduku Kilonzo, personal communication).

INTERGENERATIONAL CONFLICT

Tension between the generations is high in many rural Kenyan households,. Levels of unemployment among young people are such that many lack the resources to establish their own households and are forced to remain in the parental home well into adulthood. Unemployment, combined with the expectations created by education, breeds hopelessness and frustration. Youth, and even adults, wishing to farm are often constrained by the limited land available and its control by the older generation. Young men in Nakuru, for example, complained that the lack of employment, and the delayed apportioning of family land by their parents obliged them to stay in their parents' home, sometimes even after marriage.

Frustration is not restricted to the younger generation. On their part, parents complain that their grown-up children make little contribution to household expenses. A woman in Bungoma told us that she used her income from a women's group to care for her own family and for her sons' children, too, because none of them was employed. Parental disapproval of their children's lifestyles and anxiety about the risks of their engagement in risky behaviors, such as substance abuse and crime, adds further tension.

An analysis of the coverage of violence between parents and children in Kenyan newspapers revealed that the phenomenon is far from uncommon, was most often driven by conflict over resources and substance abuse.²⁴ Members of the survey communities were asked what caused intergenerational violence in their communities. Results are given in Table 4.

Land was the leading cause of tension in densely-populated Kiambu (562 persons per km²) and Bungoma (424 persons per km²) districts, as well as in Nakuru (164 persons per km²) where land shortage is compounded by severe inequity. By custom in many groups, land is not transferred to children until the death of the father. Thus access to land on the part of sons may remain provisional for many years, leading to their reluctance to invest in agriculture. Tradition is only one reason for parents' reluctance to apportion land: in the three most land-short districts, there were complaints of children, typically those with some education and little interest in agriculture, selling off family land to offset debts or simply for immediate consumption. Land was much less of a source of intergenerational conflict in coastal Kwale (60 persons per km²), and pastoral Isiolo (4 persons per km²). Interestingly, in Kisii, the most densely populated of all rural districts (758 persons per km²), the leading cause of contention was school fees, rather than land. It would seem that the fragmentation of land has by now proceeded so far in that district that agriculture is no longer considered a viable livelihood, so that education is seen as the only route out of poverty (though, as seen above, it has become an increasingly tenuous one). In Kwale,

²⁴ The media survey examined coverage of rural violence in Nation Newspapers between 2000 and 2004. 53 cases of intergenerational violence were reviewed from this period. Over 75 percent of these had resulted in murder. Victims ranged from one to seventy years in age.

tensions between generations were mostly said to be fueled by alcohol, and the same was true of Bulla Pesa in Isiolo.²⁵

Table 4: Reasons for intergenerational violence (percentage of respondents)

Cause of violence	Kiambu (n = 120)	Kwale (n = 109)	Isiolo (n = 121)	Kisii (n = 119)	Nakuru (n = 118)	Bungoma (n = 123)
Lack of food	8	17	32	30	25	11
Inadequate access to livestock	1	4	12	8	15	7
Access to land	65	9	4	49	33	33
Alcohol consumption	53	22	35	52	25	28
Lack of school fees	23	17	26	56	11	13
Money/finances	21	17	26	43	14	8
Arranged Marriages	2	3	27	10	3	1
Parents fighting	11	5	10	14	88	2

Source: Survey data

One specific manifestation of violence between generations occurs outside the home: violence against children, which is endemic in schools. As already noted, for 26 percent of women, the perpetrator of violence experienced during the last twelve months was a teacher. According to a Human Rights Watch:

For most Kenyan children, violence is a regular part of the school experience. Teachers use caning, slapping and whipping to maintain classroom discipline and to punish children for poor academic performance. The infliction of corporal punishment is routine, arbitrary, and often brutal. Bruises and cuts are regular by-products of school punishments, and more severe injuries (broken bones, knocked-out teeth, internal bleeding) are not infrequent. At times, beating by teachers leave children permanently disfigured, disabled, or dead (1999: 2).

It is well established that children subjected to violence are liable to repeat the same patterns of behavior in their adult lives.

²⁵ Bulla Pesa is an ethnically mixed settlement on the edge of the district capital, which contains a large number of bars and illicit liquor sellers. In the other two sample points in Isiolo district, where Islam is predominant, both alcohol abuse and intergenerational violence were reportedly minimal.

CRIME, VIOLENCE AND INSECURITY IN RURAL AREAS

As a United Nations report notes, crime:

impairs the overall development of nations, undermines spiritual and material well being, compromises human dignity and creates a climate of fear and violence, which endangers personal security and erodes the quality of life (1992:6).

According to the most recent 'Afrobarometer' Survey, Kenya ranks highest of the fifteen African countries surveyed in terms of the proportion of citizens who have been victims of burglary, with a full 40 percent having suffered theft from their homes in the last year. Kenya is second highest in Africa (after Nigeria) with regard to physical assault, with almost one in five Kenyans saying that they, or a member of their family, have been physically attacked over the past year (17 percent once, twice or several times, and 2 percent many times). Fifty-nine percent of Kenyans said they lived in fear of crime in their own homes, the highest among all countries surveyed (Bratton et al. 2004).²⁶

Recent years have seen steep rises in the crime rate in Kenya, which rose by 51 percent between 1994 and 2000.²⁷ Between 2003 and 2004 alone (the most recent year for which figures are available), crime reported to the police increased by 8.4 percent (GoK 2005). Assault, break-ins, robbery and allied offences, and other forms of theft accounted for 53 percent of the reported cases (GoK 2005). High levels of crime and violence have long been a feature of Nairobi and other urban areas, but perhaps the most striking finding of this study is the extent to which crime and violence have now permeated rural areas. The trend towards rural criminality is a relatively recent phenomenon, traced by most respondents to the last five years. More disturbingly, the new wave of rural crime is also associated with unprecedented levels of brutality, robbery increasingly being accompanied by murder, rape, and the wanton destruction of property. Sometimes such acts of violence are not even accompanied by theft, suggesting that they are driven by frustration, anger and resentment rather than economic motives. In Bungoma district shortly before fieldwork, a gang had attacked ten households, gang raping women and girls, assaulting men and destroying property, but stealing nothing. One informant observed that 'it is as if they wanted to humiliate their victims'. A district officer in Bungoma admitted that violent crime had increased so rapidly over the last five years that his officers could no longer ensure community security.

²⁶ As well as their impact on psychological, material and physical security of citizens, crime and violence have a considerable effect on the wider economy by discouraging investment and increasing the costs of doing business. In Investment Climate Surveys of nine African countries, a far higher proportion of business people in Kenya reported that crime was a 'major constraint' on doing business than in any other country (70 percent compared to 49 percent for Zambia and 36 percent for Nigeria in second and third places) (World Development Report, 2005). Kenya also ranks 54th of 59 countries evaluated for their safety for foreign business by the Economic Intelligence Unit's 'Riskwire' service (<http://riskwire.eiu.com>). The impact of security on the economy is especially marked in the case of tourism: In 2005, the Kenya Tourism Board estimated that adverse travel advisories had cost the country nearly US\$200 million in recent years (<http://allafrica.com/stories/200501101273.html>). Crime and violence are also factors in the outmigration of professionals (skills flight) (UNODC 2005).

²⁷ Joint Statement of the United Nations System in Kenya at the Consultative Group Meeting, Nairobi, 11-12 April, 2005. Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Kenya.

Changing patterns of rural crime are associated with changing weaponry. In the past, as researchers were told in Kiambu, thieves used sticks or stones, but now they came with guns, making resistance by victims or neighbors futile or fatal. Decades of instability in surrounding countries, as well as in much of Kenya's pastoralist periphery, have made small arms cheap and readily available.²⁸ Increasingly, thieves act with an arrogance born of impunity:

'they come during the day and some even give notice of their intended visit, and there is nothing anyone can do' (Bungoma informant).

In Ngecha (Kiambu) a woman commented that:

We are producing clever thieves. Young people are educated up to university level but they are jobless. Such people will use their knowledge to steal or they become so frustrated to the extent of venting their anger on innocent community members.

Instances of petty theft (stealing food from farms and minor items from houses) had increased at all sites as poverty had intensified, local enforcement systems and sanctions declined in authority, and the effectiveness of formal policing and justice systems deteriorated. In Nakuru, researchers were told that food might be stolen while still cooking on the fire, or clothes filched while drying. That these instances were said to be seasonal suggested that they were driven by immediate needs during hungry periods. In Kiambu, Kisii and Bungoma, on the other hand, petty theft was generally blamed on the need of young men to feed their alcohol and substance abuse habits. The increase in petty theft reported in Kiambu, Bungoma, Kisii and Nakuru seems to reflect a collapse in traditional mechanisms of social control at the community level. In the more traditional cultures of Kwale and Isiolo, such norms and sanctions were said still to be effective. In the former, religion contributes to social control, while in the latter, a belief in mystical sanctions is still apparently restrains behavior.

Stealing property from the government, such as forest products from reserves or water pipes from government stock, was not locally considered to carry the same degree of culpability as stealing from individuals. In fact, as noted above, one aspect of the buckling of livelihood systems has been recourse to activities which are formally illegal, such as charcoal production, beer brewing and prostitution. Given the lack of alternatives, the illegality of these activities, while exposing people to extortion from police, local government or forestry officials, tended not to reduce their incidence, but only their profitability. In Nakuru, men and women would set out at dusk with their bicycles walking 20 or more km into the forest to collect a load of charcoal and transport it under cover of darkness to Nakuru town. Being caught by officials would mean a fine, a beating, or both.

²⁸ Between 10 and 15,000 deaths per year in Kenya are caused by firearms. The firearm homicide rate is between 5 and 10 per 100,000. There are estimated to be between 500,000 and one million small arms in the country. (Muggah and Berman 2001). An analysis produced by the U.S. State Department declared that arms proliferation in Kenya had reached crisis proportion and quoted Kenya's country's top firearms licensing officer as stating that "seventy-five percent of the country is awash with illicit arms" (US Department of State 2001).

Commercial sex work was well established in two of the sample communities, Bulla Pesa (Isiolo) and Rongai (Nakuru). In Bulla Pesa, a suburb of Isiolo town in which there is a high military presence, prostitution has become a source of livelihood for the poor. Clients are said to prefer young girls: children as young as 8 years old are involved in the trade and command the highest prices. This is reflected in slang usage: girls aged from 8 to 12 years are known as “*nice*”, teenagers as “*coca cola*” (‘sweet but not as good as “*nice*”’) and girls 19 and over as “*mitumba*” (second hand). The drawing of children into commercial sex work at such a young age is a reflection both of the extreme desperation of the situation which many households face, and of a breakdown in the moral fabric of the community. The ravages of HIV/AIDS could be seen in the number of households consisting only of the children and the aged. Commercial sex workers complained that their clients were often unwilling to use condoms, and were prepared to pay higher prices for unprotected sex. Despair is echoed in the words of one young woman: ‘it is better to live now rather than worry about a disease that will kill you in ten years.’

The exchange of sexual favors for food or money is not limited to a class of commercial sex workers. Many women, researchers were told in Sirisia (Bungoma), Karia (Kiambu) and elsewhere, had to resort to extra-marital relations to meet their household needs. Such statements may to a degree reflect deep-seated fears about moral breakdown, and in particular the control of female sexuality under conditions of changing household relations, but they nevertheless seem also to have a basis in reality. One man in Karia (Kiambu) described his own humiliation in these words: ‘As a jobless husband you watch and eat the food knowing well that another man paid for it. You have no alternative.’

The failure of the government to provide security to its citizens (the corruption and ineffectiveness of the police was discussed in chapter two), has led many rural communities to safeguard their lives and property by forming vigilante groups. In Bogiakumu (Kisii), for example, where levels of crime had risen to unmanageable levels, the community formed groups to patrol at night, systematically ostracized suspected criminals, and on occasion went as far as destroying their property. Most people considered the response to have been at least partially successful in restoring security to the community.

Quite often, community vigilantes go further than destroying property. Lynching has become an established practice in all districts as communities’ frustration at the unwillingness or inability of the government to control crime and violence in the rural areas mounts (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2003). This was particularly true in the districts of Kiambu and Kisii (in the latter, lynching was sometimes justified in the idiom of witchcraft). Lynching was considered not only to purge the community of persistent troublemakers, but to serve as a disincentive to others. It also appeared to contain an element of protest against the authorities at their failure to act more decisively, and their perceived role in facilitating or actively assisting criminal activities. Most considered the effectiveness of mob action to outweigh its fundamental injustice and the inability of the victims to defend themselves.

Community policing, and even the excesses of vigilantism, are generally tacitly condoned by the authorities. Nevertheless, the organization of bands of youth to protect the community has created its own problems. Service is generally on a voluntary basis, and hence it is hard to sustain interest among young people, who are in any case a mobile group in search of employment. Sometimes, once created, vigilante groups have turned to crime and extortion themselves, or been manipulated to pursue goals unrelated to crime prevention, such as to settling grudges or political scores.


In Isiolo district, self help for community security took a still more radical form. After years of cattle raiding from their neighbors to the east, alleged to have been actively assisted by the national armed forces, the Boran communities of Isiolo district in the early 1990s systematically armed themselves, obtaining small arms from a neighboring country for the purpose. More recently, recognizing the problems which the circulation of guns in the community was causing, communities in Isiolo district have established peace committees, facilitated by the provincial administration and an NGO, that oversee security among clans with a history of violent relations. The success of these measures testifies to the resilience of social capital at the clan level despite pressures the vicissitudes which communities have faced in recent decades.

The epidemic of crime and violence in rural areas is influencing the social composition of rural communities, as the better-off are increasingly unwilling to live in, invest in, or even in some cases to visit, their home communities. Many rural communities had witnessed this phenomenon, though it was most remarked upon in Kiambu and Kisii, where the incidence of crime was highest. Persistent gang attacks in Karai (Kiambu) have driven better-off members of community from their houses in the village to the nearby towns of Kikuyu and Limuru. Although these towns are themselves far from being crime-free, houses are clustered together in a way that facilitates joint security arrangements not feasible in dispersed rural settlements. In Kisii, middle-class migrants increasingly avoid even staying overnight when visiting their communities of origin for fear of becoming the target of robbery and violence.

Retail and other businesses are also being driven by crime from smaller rural communities to the relative safety of towns. Crime compounds the costs of doing business enormously, through direct losses to criminals, the costs of evasive and protective measures, and the physical, psychological and health costs of violence. A women store-keeper in Karai (Kiambu) told us that she had twice been robbed in the last year on her way to the bank. She now varied her patterns and means of transport, hoping to avoid another incident, but was considering abandoning her store as her profits had been decimated.

Rural insecurity often has a seasonal dimension, peaking at times when payments are made for tea, coffee or sugarcane crops, and it is common knowledge that farmers have money in the house. A seasonal calendar produced by residents of Kimabole (Bungoma) showed relationships between crime and violence and the climatic cycle, food availability and cultural activities such as Easter and Christmas holidays, as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Seasonal calendar of crime: Kiambole community, Bungoma district



The figure shows that crime and violence peak during the hungry season (in April-May, during the rains, when food availability is low), during the traditional festivals in August, and in the December holiday season.

In Kisii, crime was said to be high at the end of the year, specifically when bonus payments are made for tea and when those urban migrants visit home for the festive period. Members and treasurers of womens groups in Bungoma reported that burglaries often occurred after their meetings.

ALCOHOL ABUSE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ANOMIE

In the final part of this chapter, attention is briefly turned to the ways in which the economic and social changes outlined above – ineffective and corrupted institutions, increasingly marginal and precarious livelihoods and a growing culture of violence – have affected states of mind. Development literature has given little attention to the relationship between social structure and subjective states of mind and feeling, and yet there are at least two strong reasons for doing so. First, from the point of view of society as a whole, and especially for those likely to be the victims of violence, one of the main impacts of insecurity is a psychological one – that is, fear. In other words, freedom from fear is in itself an important aspect of wellbeing. Second, the explanation of spiraling violence appears to lie not only in part in the rational calculation of economic ends on the part of perpetrators – that is in crime as a livelihood strategy. More and more, violence in Kenya has taken on an expressive aspect – the acting out of emotional states of despair, frustration, anger and resentment. With this in mind, three indicators of psychological disequilibrium in Kenya are briefly considered: alcohol abuse, depression and suicide.

Alcohol abuse is a very widespread problem in Kenya, affecting 70 percent of households according to the Kenya Medical Research Institute.²⁹ In rural areas, drinking is predominantly, though by no means exclusively, a male activity. Problem drinking as a social phenomenon seems to have become entrenched relatively recently, and to be associated with the unemployment and demoralization of men. In Nakuru, for example, opinion was quite specific about dating the onset of alcohol abuse to the collapse of the pyrethrum market and the resulting underemployment of men. Locally brewed beer was customarily consumed at festivals and celebrations, and was generally the preserve of older men. Today, drinking has increasingly become an everyday activity, starting early in the day, and locally distilled spirits have increasingly replaced beer. Youth have taken over from elders as the most diligent drinkers. Discussions with teachers showed that drinking by both primary and secondary school children is now a widely recognized problem. A recent survey for the National Agency for the Campaign Against Drug Abuse showed that of a sample of 10 to 24 year olds, 60 percent of non-students and 9 percent of students had used alcohol within the last month. Other common intoxicants used by young people include tobacco, marijuana, *khaat* and inhalants such as glue and petrol (of these, only marijuana is illegal) (NACADA 2004). Locally distilled spirits are often adulterated with chemicals, and the consequences of drinking can be fatal. Over the last five years there have been regular occurrences in Kenya of death and disablement after drinking illicit liquor.³⁰

In most survey areas (Kwale on the coast and Isiolo are exceptions) women are responsible for the brewing and sale of alcohol. Often brewing was the most profitable of the limited sources of livelihood open to women. Yet, as the main victim of its consequences (lost household income and productivity and aggravated domestic violence), women are at the same time vocal in condemning the epidemic of alcohol abuse which has beset so many rural communities. In Kiambu, women considered alcohol abuse to be the greatest problem facing their community, above infrastructure, land, credit and services. The tension between women as brewers and as wives at times

²⁹ 'Officials worried by rising alcoholism'. Panafrican News Agency (Dakar) 3 March, 2001. (<http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/36/210.html>)

³⁰ For example, in November 2001, over 140 people died and scores of others lost their eye sight or were hospitalized in Nairobi after consuming an illegal ethanol-laced alcoholic drink. In June 2005, illegal brew laced with industrial alcohol caused the deaths of 49 people in Machakos district, with more than 174 people hospitalized after drinking the homemade '*kwona mbee*' (literally: "see the way ahead") brew containing methanol, a toxic wood alcohol added to the concoction to give it more kick. (Simon Barasa 'Kenya, the Drinking Country'. G21net, 24 January, 2006 (<http://www.g21.net/africa112.html>)). Alcohol abuse is also partly responsible for Kenya's road fatality rates being one of the highest in the world in relation to vehicle ownership. Nearly 3000 people are killed on Kenyan roads annually, equivalent to 68 deaths per 10,000 registered vehicles, 30-40 times higher than in highly motorized countries. Road traffic crashes are the third leading cause of death after malaria and HIV/AIDS, and present a major public health problem in terms of morbidity, disability and associated health care costs. A survey of patients hospitalized for injury treatment in Eldoret, Western Kenya, showed that 40 percent of drivers and 20 percent of pedestrians were intoxicated at the time of the crash. (Surprisingly, alcohol is almost never reported as a contributing factor in police accident reports, partly because of lack of technologies and faculties to measure it, and the difficulties in getting doctors to examine drivers involved in crashes and take blood samples for analysis. Odero et al. 2003).

emerges as social conflict, with women acting collectively to pour away alcohol and isolate the brewers in protest at the damage that drinking does to their families.

The case of James (Box 1) illustrates the impact of alcohol on a household in Kisii, and its long-term consequences for the wellbeing of the whole family.

Box 1: Case study on the effects of alcohol

James was born in 1976, the eldest of seven children. His father died in 1996 of causes related to his habitual over-consumption of *chang'aa* (a locally distilled spirit). As a result of his drinking, James' father was unable to provide for his family's food, clothing, shelter or educational needs. The whole family shared a two-roomed leaking grass thatched hut. After his father's death, James' mother, too, began to drink heavily. The situation resulted in constant conflict between her and her children. His mother left all household responsibilities to James, who himself grew increasingly depressed and anxious. James' mother subsequently abandoned her family and went to live in Kisii town with a drinking companion from a neighboring village. James married early, in an attempt to get help in caring for his siblings. He now has three of his own children in addition to his five siblings to care for. He has himself now begun to drink in order to cope with his feelings of depression and frustration.

According to WHO, depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide in terms of years lost to disability, and the fourth leading contributor to the global burden of disease (the second in the 15-44 age group).³¹ Given the low state of development of mental health services in Kenya, evidence on the prevalence of depression is patchy and inconsistent.³²

The quantitative survey included several questions on depression and hopelessness, and the results, summarized in table 5, indicate that an average of 37 percent of respondents had been depressed, varying between 59 percent in Kiambu and 28 percent in Kwale. Poverty and money matters were the main reasons given for being depressed, followed by health, unemployment and domestic violence.

Other sources indicate high rates of depression among young people in Kenya, with 10 percent of young men and 7 percent of young women reporting being depressed nearly all the time to the point of giving up (Centre for the Study of Adolescence 2003). These

³¹ If current trends continue, depression is set by 2020 to become the second leading cause of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost for all age groups and both sexes.

³² Ndeti and Muangi (1979) found a 20 percent incidence of psychiatric illnesses, especially depression and anxiety, among 140 rural medical walk-in patients in Kenya, while Sebit (1996) found a prevalence rate of psychiatric disorder of only 0.43 percent among 186 patients at primary care facilities. Dhadphale et al. (1989) found a prevalence of depressive disorders of 9.2 percent, about a third having moderate to severe depression, among a sample of 881 primary health care patients. Other research in Kenya and elsewhere (Maj et al.) has shown a significantly higher rate of depression in symptomatic seropositive individuals than in matched seronegative controls.

rates of depression — especially for males — are significantly high relative to global rates, which are generally higher for females than males.³³

Table 5: Proportion of informants reporting depression by district (percent)

<i>District</i>	<i>Presence of depressed people in the community</i>	<i>Ever been depressed</i>	<i>Household member ever been depressed</i>	<i>Know someone who is depressed</i>
Isiolo	65	41	33	53
Nakuru	62	28	28	48
Bungoma	56	34	31	46
Kisii	68	34	28	55
Kiambu	90	59	61	74
Kwale	57	28	26	36
Total	66	37	35	52

Source: Suvey data.

Young people in Kenya also have an alarmingly high rate of attempted suicides. Official statistics for actual suicide are unreliable: because of the intense social stigma, cases are rarely reported or even mentioned. However, in a recent survey, 7 percent of males and as many as one in ten young Kenyan women reported having attempted suicide at least once (Centre for the Study of Adolescence 2003).³⁴ In sample communities, suicides were said to be due largely to economic causes: inability to access land or to make a living. This seemed especially true of young people. It is also probable that some of the suicide cases are a result of HIV/AIDS.

The issue of mental health is of developmental relevance not only as a central aspect of well-being, but also because of its link with other phenomena documented in this study: domestic violence, HIV/AIDS, and alcoholism.

As regards domestic violence, a recent study conducted in Kenya by FIDA (2002) established that, of the 51 percent of women surveyed who had suffered some form of

³³ Globally, it is estimated that the point prevalence of unipolar depressive episodes (i.e. those sufferings depression at any particular time) is 1.9 percent for men and 3.2 percent for women, and that 5.8 percent of men and 9.5 percent of women will experience a depressive episode in a 12 month period. (Global Burden of Disease surveys 2000, quoted in WHO 2001).

³⁴ Based on countries for which complete data is available, the global age standardized-suicide rate for 1996 was 15.1 per 100,000. The rate for males was 24 per 100,000, and that for females 6.8. The rate of suicide is almost universally high among men compared to women by an aggregate ration of 3.5 to 1. Male suicide rates are also rising much more rapidly than female (WHO 2001).

abuse, the commonest form of injuries sustained were ‘psychological injury, depression and emotional stress’ (accounting for 28 percent of reported injuries). This suggests that depression and psychological trauma are more prevalent than is often acknowledged.

Also relevant to this study is are the mental health consequences of AIDS/HIV, which are ‘substantial’, according to the World Health Organization (WHO 2001).³⁵ Mental disorders associated with HIV/AIDS can result from the psychological impact of having a fatal disease, or stem from the effects of psychosocial stressors associated with the illness, such as stigma and discrimination. Psychiatric conditions may also result from HIV-related neurological changes. In addition to general emotional responses of ‘anger, guilt, fear, denial, and despair,’ 38 to 73 percent of HIV/AIDS patients will have at least one psychiatric disorder in their lifetimes, with up to 20 percent of people living with AIDS exhibiting psychiatric symptoms as their earliest medical symptoms of AIDS (Gallego, Gordillo and Catalan, 2000). Treisman et al. (2001) estimate that as many as 60 percent of HIV/AIDS patients suffer from major depression at some point during their illness (Ciesla and Roberts 2001). Moreover, people living with HIV/AIDS are twice as likely to suffer from major depression as the general population (Warren and Stern 1995). Research shows between 20 to 73 percent of HIV/AIDS infected individuals have substance abuse disorders (Gallego, Gordillo and Catalan, 2000). Mental health and HIV/AIDS are entwined in a two-way manner, since cognitive disorders, substance abuse, and disorders of personality can influence behavior in ways that lead to greater risk of HIV infection (Baingawa 2005). Alcohol abuse increases the probability of a variety of risky sexual behaviors, including sex with multiple partners, sex with strangers, the possibility of rape, failure to use condoms, and sex with intravenous drug users.

The phenomena considered in this chapter — violence, crime, insecurity, substance abuse and mental ill-being — are related to each other in a complex but seemingly inexorable knot. Both these and the corruption which has eroded the institutions which ostensibly serve them could be seen as manifestations of anomie, defined as the absence of rule, law, principle or order, as accepted social norms break down under the impact of social and cultural change but are not replaced by common understandings or agreed constraints. This study has shown that a culture of violence has increasingly taken hold of Kenya, expressed not simply in crime, but permeating social and political life more generally: in domestic violence, rape, the violence of teachers against school children, the violence of under-aged prostitution, the violence of political thuggery, and the violence of clashes over land. Finally, violence in Kenya is turned inwards on the self, in the form of substance abuse, depression and suicide. Kenya has been fortunate compared to its neighbors in not having suffered civil war, perhaps because poverty is spread across ethnic groups, rather than being regionally concentrated. However, this vertical stratification has also perpetuated political patronage and inequality. Rather than overt conflict, violence has taken a pervasive form, introjected within social institutions, families and individuals themselves.

³⁵ This paragraph draws heavily on Baingana et al. 2005.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

DISCUSSION

As sketched in the conceptual schema presented in the Introduction (figure 1), the process of immiseration in rural Kenya has been driven by three main factors: the corruption or collapse of the formal institutions which provide services to rural areas; constrained access to land; and the impact of HIV/AIDS. Population pressure and the inequity of the land tenure system have reduced access to key livelihood assets and resulted in environmental problems, while institutional malfunction has debilitated agricultural marketing, health, education and other services. HIV/AIDS has increased the burden of sickness and dependency in rural households, as well as impinging on service providers through the loss of staff.

Faced with these circumstances, rural households have been obliged to adapt their livelihood strategies, at times forced into marginal and even illegal activities. Widely adopted strategies include diversification into new farm enterprises, off-farm and non-farm activities, though limited assets severely limit engagement in lucrative options. New forms of local collective action have also emerged, yet these often fail to include the poorest and most marginal.

Livelihood shifts have had a markedly gendered character. Those facets of livelihood systems which have been most severely eroded by changes in the economic and institutional environment – cash crop production, pastoralism, labor migration – were those dominated by men (though underpinned by female productive and domestic labour). In contrast, new opportunities such as food crop production, petty trade, informal services, beer brewing, casual labour, domestic service, and the gathering of forest products and firewood often extend what were traditionally female activities. As a result, men find themselves unable to meet their long-established roles in supporting the household while women's burdens in the economic, domestic and collective spheres intensify. These shifts in gender roles have had a destabilizing effect on households, which, while not empowering women in any real sense, leave men feeling disempowered. The strain placed on relations between men and women leads increasingly to tension and violence. At the same time, declining opportunities for youth have increasingly put pressure on relations between the generations.

This report has mainly been concerned with tracing the causes of livelihood erosion at the household level and the links between the resulting decline in opportunities and increasing social dislocation, crime and violence. However, it is clear that these socially

destructive outcomes are also a reflection of factors operating at the macro, or societal, level. The increasingly violent character of rural intra-household relations can be seen as a facet of the spread of violence at all social levels – against women, against children, against political opponents, in disputes over land, in schools and on the street as well as in the home. Similarly for crime: for the marginalized, not only has crime become a livelihood but their very livelihoods have become criminalized. The pursuit of marginal activities such as charcoal burning, beer brewing and commercial sex work leaves the poor open to harassment. For the wealthy and politically-connected, the criminalization of public life which is the life blood of the political spoils system of neo-patrimonialism is pursued with relative impunity. Corruption reduces access to public services, as well as their cost and quality, thereby further intensifying poverty and imposing fewer and increasingly stark options on the poor. In addition, and critically, the manipulation of public institutions for individual ends, in eroding values and standards promotes more widespread antisocial behavior. As corruption infects from the top downwards, the transgression of norms becomes increasingly routine and expected, creating a climate of anomie that has contaminated and demoralized the society as a whole. In this way, corruption corrodes the terms of the wider social contract: the very conditions which make society possible.

Further, the increasingly brutal nature of violence in contemporary Kenya, which is becoming its defining characteristic, is expressive of extreme anger, frustration and resentment, and bears witness to a psychological anomie. The devastating impacts of lack of opportunity, inequality and corruption are mediated by destructive states of mind as much as rational coping strategies, and that these have damaging social consequences, including those which result from alcohol and substance abuse. Perhaps, indeed, these responses could be characterized, rather than as coping strategies, as an inability or refusal to cope.

The gaping inequalities in power and resources that have come to characterize Kenyan society, and with which this report opened, can now be seen as both the start and the end point of the processes of social dislocation traced in this study. Inequality, of power as well as income and assets, in itself facilitates corruption by centralizing power and stifling accountability, closing opportunity, and adding to the climate of despair and desperation amongst the poorest.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE COUNTRY SOCIAL ANALYSIS

What are the implications of these findings? The social impacts of economic policy and management, and the distortion of institutions for the ends of patronage and corruption, have been devastating, and have reached deeply into the foundations of society itself. Even discounting the moral values of equity, fairness, justice and peace, and the social and psychological costs enumerated in this paper (as if that were possible or desirable), the sheer economic costs of the rending of Kenya's social fabric in the last two decades

has been incalculable. Further, once established, processes of social fragmentation are difficult to reverse.

This study has brought together findings from the wide range of environments, ecologies, livelihood systems, social groups and cultures which make up rural Kenya. It has sought, in reflecting the multidimensional and experiential natures of poverty, to allow rural voices to speak on the range of issues that concern them. At the same time, the attempt has been made to cast the study's findings in terms of a single analytic schema which both explained the relationship between a range of economic, social, institutional and psychological phenomena, and linked local with macro-social processes. Inevitably, given this approach, a wide range of sectoral issues are touched on, but not in way that allowed the exploration of their technical dimensions.

The purpose of this phase of social analysis is to raise awareness and stimulate public debate on the range and severity of the consequence of Kenya's recent development path – the negative social externalities of widening inequality and institutional disarray – as much as to generate technical or sectoral recommendations. This should not be seen as a limitation. With the benefit of hindsight, the shortcoming of earlier generations of, often externally inspired, strategies and targets can be seen at least in part to be due to the scant attention given to the socially embedded nature of development. Social structures and institutions are essential not only to the generation and distribution of development benefits, but also constitute the indispensable moral foundation of society itself. In the haste to define sectorally phrased objectives, inputs and outputs and abstracted from their social context, the very nature of the society in which they are to be implemented can become invisible.

For Kenya's policy makers and development partners, a fuller understanding of the social context of policy implementation will allow its importance to be taken into account in future policy development, even if only not to aggravate social problems further, according to the maxim 'do no harm'. For society more widely, a social analysis perspective connects current development debates with the deepening concerns of Kenyans that are reflected in the media and everyday discussions regarding the kind of society in which they wish to live – one characterized by inclusion and compassion, or by inequality and violence? This approach is consistent with Sen's capability approach to social ethics, as well as notions of the importance of 'deliberative democracy' (Sen 1999, Rawls 1999).

A second, and related implication of this work is that, given the extent of state failure in Kenya, and the deeply entrenched nature of patrimonial culture from which this failure flows, some form of overall reform of the rules of the game for governance and political economy needs to precede tinkering with specific sectoral problems. This observation is consistent with much of the government's own recent analysis around issues of governance and transparency, yet it needs also to ask why its objectives in this area are so limited in their realization. The evidence of this study does not tell us exactly what form institutional and governance reform should take. However, it may well be that the imposition of a prefabricated institutional solutions to Kenya's complex governance

problems could be as much part of the problem as the solution (c.f. Evans 2004). This study does highlight the institutional issues which concern rural Kenyans most. Beyond that, the formulation of solutions should be founded upon public debate and deliberation.

A third general insight from this overview of social trends in rural Kenya is that a number of areas warrant considerably more in depth analysis than this modest study allowed. These include detailed assessments of (1) the ways in which rural populations access justice and judicial institutions; (2) the operation of decentralized institutions (including at the constituency level) in development planning and implementation, (3) the changing social and economic role of men, and (4) the nature of crime and violence in rural areas.

Fourthly and finally, there are four areas where the evidence presented from this study has clear implications for policy directions (summarized in table 6). Each of these areas is itself complex and already subject to policy debate. In several cases (for example gender, youth, legal reform and social accountability), relevant analytic work has already been undertaken supported by the World Bank itself.

1. Access to land

Existing land policies, established in the 1950s, have failed to secure the rights of land users, especially the poor who depend on land for their livelihoods. New foundations for national policies on land and have been on the agenda for decades, but have been unable to command the necessary political traction because of vested interests and limited public understanding: the most recent attempts to root a new approach to land policy in the constitution foundered when the document was rejected in the referendum of November 2005.³⁶ This suggests that the process of building a constituency for reform, identifying champions for the change process, and educating the public on the issues will be as vital to success as the content of the reform itself. An understanding of the complex political economy of reform, and of its likely winners and losers can be promoted through consultations and action research at community level.

Regarding the substance of the reform, the evidence of this study reinforces the importance of developing a national land policy which addresses the following issues:

- the inequity of distribution of land and concentration of land ownership;
- the hoarding of land not being put to productive use;
- the status of customary law vis-à-vis formal law, given the persistence of customary systems, and their reconciliation in a manner consistent with equity, justice, security in both systems;

³⁶ The following are landmarks in the recent efforts to develop a new land policy for Kenya: *Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Land Law Systems* ('the Njonjo report'), 2002; *the Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public Land* ('Ndungu Commission'), 2004; the National Land Policy Formulation Process (NLPPF); Chapter 7 of the Constitution Bill 'Land and Property'; and the National Land Policy Secretariat's draft *Issues and Recommendations Report* of November 2005.

- the provision of secure access to land for women, including widows;
- the illegal expropriation of public land through administrative corruption.

2. Institutions and governance

(a) Renewed focus on corruption

The focus on attacking corruption delineated in the IP-ERS needs to be followed through with renewed commitment at both national and local levels. Given the mixed results of attempts to control corruption to date, efforts to harness the voice to citizens and users should now be made central. Examples of such social accountability mechanisms include:

- participatory budgeting to give citizens voice in the allocation of budgets;
- budget tracking to introduce transparency into the actual pattern of expenditures;
- citizens' score cards for evaluating public services;
- grievance mechanisms and processes of restitution (e.g. ombudsmen);
- use of community radio and other relevant public information systems to publicize information on government budgets and activities.

Most importantly, institutional innovations should be built upon existing mechanisms, and designed through a process of public debate.

(b) Decentralization

The introduction of a more meaningful system of decentralization will be an essential condition for the improvement of local services. In order to promote improved synergy and accountability, the new system should be designed so as to:

- clarify and integrate the roles of elected district councilors, the provincial administration and line agency staff at district level so as to promote a system which is locally, democratically, and technically accountable.
- give a stronger role to existing technical and administrative capacities in overseeing the planning, appraisal and monitoring of projects supported by constituency development funds
- empowering citizens groups (such as village associations, women's groups etc) as a mechanism for consultation and accountability at community level, and a bridge between community and local government.

3. Policing and access to justice

Given the growing importance of human security concerns, improvements in policing and access to justice would do much to improve rural welfare. An essential condition for this must be the restoration of the trust of the public in the

police. Key elements in this approach from the community point of view would be:

- improved dialogue and cooperation between the public and the police;
- training in civic responsibility for the police;
- establishment of mechanisms of transparency and accountability at local level;
- given the growing prevalence of vigilantism, establishing a more consistent guiding framework for community policing.

4. Gender, masculinity and youth

The evidence shows that something is seriously amiss in the state of intra-household relations in Kenya, relating not only to the inferior status and role of women, but the simultaneous ‘disempowerment’ experienced by men and youth. While central to both social and economic development, these are complex and sensitive issues. However, this study has pointed to several key areas where change is urgently needed.

For women, the assemblage of customary, legal and administrative barriers,, which restrict them to the petty and informal economy needs to be swept away. These include: land and property rights and inheritance, access to finance, access to justice, business registration and licensing.³⁷

For men, policy makers and practitioners should be prepared to rethink their approaches to gender to address the special needs of men, recognizing the destructive impacts which thwarted masculinity can make on alienation, family and social dislocation, substance abuse, mental health, HIV/AIDS, crime and violence. Empowerment programs should therefore consider the needs men as well as women. One potential way of going beyond the zero sum of gender conflict may be a new focus on the empowerment of the family unit as a whole. While relatively rare, there are successful precedents for engaging men in promoting gender equality, including involving men in primary health care, or specialized reproductive and sexual health clinics, education, group discussions, support groups around the theme of fatherhood, promoting positive images of men’s involvement in the lives of their children through the media, and support groups for HIV-positive men (Correia and Bannon, forthcoming)

Domestic and gender violence, along with alcohol abuse and mental health problems, are areas where there is considerable scope for improving public awareness and understanding. Responses should include programs of public education, the development and implementation of appropriate intervention

³⁷ Barriers to the economic emancipation of women, and recommendations aimed at addressing them, are considered in more depth in the *Kenyan Strategic Country Gender Assessment* (World Bank 2003), and especially in the *Kenya Gender and Economic Growth Assessment* (World Bank, forthcoming).

strategies, the training of police, justice, and public health workers, and the sensitization of school children.

For youth, this study reinforces the findings of the recent analytic work on *Youth and Development in Kenya* (World Bank 2005b) regarding the marginalization and alienation of large sections of Kenyan youth³⁸ This report endorses the policy responses recommended in that study regarding education, the school-to-work transition, HIV/AIDS prevention and youth-friendly health services, community and neighborhood support for youth, and the development of youth organizations and institutions.

Experience in implementing programs on these issues (gender, masculinity, gender violence, mental health etc) lies largely within the NGO sector, and advocacy work undertaken by NGOs in these areas should be supported. In addition, there may be scope for piloting such approaches within Community Driven Development (CDD) operations (for example in the forthcoming Western Kenya CDD project, and the ongoing Arid Lands Resource Management Project Phase II (ALRMP), and in HIV/AIDS MAP projects, which also adopt community-level approaches working with formal institutions.

³⁸ This report contains detailed recommendations on prospective youth policies and programs.

Table 6: Policy and operational implications of the Kenya Country Social Analysis

<i>Theme and issue</i>	<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Priority</i>		
		Urgent	Medium	Low
Access to Land				
Promoting equity, justice and efficiency in national land policy	ESW, TA, future lending operation [?]	v		
Governance and Corruption				
Social accountability mechanisms	TA	v		
Decentralization: integrating democratic, technical and administrative aspects	Lending operation [?]	v		
Providing technical support to constituency funding mechanisms	TA		v	
Empowering local citizen's groups	TA through NGOs		v	
Policing and access to justice				
Improved public-police dialogue	TA, Legal reform operation [?]		v	
Training for police in civic responsibility	Policy dialogue		v	
Framework for community policing	TA/operation		v	
Gender, masculinity and youth				
Removing barriers to women's participation in the formal economy	Operations: integration as pilots into CDD, HIV/AIDS MAP projects, etc.	v		
Rethinking masculinity	Support for NGOs	v		
Youth	Support for NGOs, ongoing JSDF operation	v		
Domestic and gender violence, alcoholism, and mental health	Pilot initiatives through NGOs		v	

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Annex 1

STUDY APPROACH AND METHODS

Defining the issues and conceptual development

In the preliminary phase of the study, government, members of civil society and the World Bank Kenya country team were consulted on the key themes and design of the study. Pilot fieldwork was undertaken in two districts to further refine key themes and develop research questions and methods.

Site selection

The study was conducted in six districts in six of Kenya's provinces, namely Isiolo (Eastern province), Nakuru (Rift Valley), Bungoma (Western), Kisii (Nyanza), Kiambu (Central) and Kwale (Coast). These districts were purposively selected to represent the different social and ecological zones of the country. Nairobi Area and North Eastern Province were not included in the study because they had been covered by recent studies supported by the World Bank and other development partners (in particular the slum study, and research on arid lands). Within each district, three clusters were selected in consultation with district leaders and research teams. These clusters were chosen so as to include the main livelihood systems within the district (such as crop versus livestock production), ecological zones and accessibility. Given the study's focus on rural areas, only one urban area was included in the study. This was Bulla Pesa, on the outskirts of the administrative centre of Isiolo district, which was selected because a significant part of its population consisted of pastoralists rendered destitute by the security situation.

Methods:

Data was collected through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. A range of participatory tools were used to gather qualitative data, including in-depth interviews with key informants, focus group discussions (FGDs), social and institutional mapping and participant observations these are described in outline below. Primary quantitative data was collected through an interviewer-administered questionnaire of 40 households in each district/cluster. Secondary sources consulted including district-level

and national statistics, existing surveys (such as the Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2003)), and official statistics on crime and violence.

Participatory data collection tools

Social mapping: At each cluster, a cross section of representatives of the community was asked to construct a social map of the community. This was done in a public space, on the ground, using locally available materials. The maps provided a visual representation of the community including the locations of households, natural resources (range land, agricultural land forests, water sources, common property and contested areas), social infrastructure (health centers, schools, churches, roads, telephone, and electricity lines), as well as institutions such as projects or local government offices and commerce and trade facilities.

Pairwise matrix ranking: This method involved listing and ranking of the most pressing problems as perceived by the study participants. The participants generated a list of their main development needs and members of the research team facilitated the comparison of each of these with all of the others, thus generating a matrix of the responses, and an overall ranking in order of significance.

Historical timeline: This tool was used to link dates with historical events and show trends in social, political, economic phenomena such as crime, ethnic conflict, drought and famine.

Institutional Venn ('chapati') diagrams: Participants were asked to enumerate the institutions found in the community – or those important to it – and to assign each a circle roughly proportional to its relative importance in community life. The resulting Venn diagrams were used as the basis for discussing the criteria according to which institutions were assessed and evaluated, as well as to identify gaps in service provision.

Seasonal calendars: Participants were asked to describe the annual cycle of seasons and its impact on food supply, employment, and other dimensions of vulnerability experienced by their communities. For example, participants in Kimabole (Bungoma) developed a seasonal calendar linking the seasonality of rainfall, hunger, crime and cultural festivals. Such seasonal calendars are helpful in counteracting biases caused by the timing of the research, and in showing links between diverse aspects of community life (e.g. crime and the agricultural cycle).

Focus group discussions: Groups of respondents with similar social attributes (e.g. gender, age, education, residence and occupation) were brought together for group discussions. Generally, it was culturally appropriate to meet separately with men and women, though some topics were addressed in mixed groups. The discussions were aimed at capturing community perceptions rather than individual experiences. In each cluster, FGDs were held of adult men, adult women, female youth and male youth each comprising eight to ten participants, supplemented by specific interest groups, as

applicable (e.g, pyrethrum growers). All discussions were conducted in the local languages so that all participants could contribute.

In-depth interviews: One-to-one discussions with key informants explored key issues in more depth depending on the informant's position in the community or his/her particular circumstances. At district and provincial headquarters, interviews were held with local government officials, officials of marketing boards, Members of Parliament, etc. In communities, individuals were tapped for their specialist knowledge, for example chiefs on local governance, security and livelihood issues.

Recruitment and training of research teams

Field data was collected by twenty-four research assistants – four for each district – under the direct supervision of the lead researcher. All research assistants were native speakers of main local language in the district, and had close knowledge of the district as well as previous research experience. Each district team consisted of two men and two women. A four-day training seminar in Nairobi brought together the research teams from the six districts in a participatory learning process that allowed the researchers to master the research tools, discuss issues of translation into their local languages and develop a common conceptual, methodological and logistical approach to fieldwork.

Data collection

Field work was conducted between February and May, 2005, and was organized sequentially so that the lead researcher directly supervised research in all districts. Prior to the main data collection phase, each research team visited its respective district headquarters. Based on information obtained there, secondary data, and consultation with the lead researcher, a selection of the three cluster sites was made so as to capture the main social, economic and ecological variations of the district. The team then paid preliminary visits to the proposed sites in order to explain purposes of the study and seek the permission of the communities to involve them. The main phase of data collection lasted for some eight days in each district (the precise period depending on accessibility and travel time). The first day was spent in discussions with the District Commissioner, other district staff, as well as NGOs and other development agencies active in the district, to gather an overview of development and social issues in the district. At the fieldwork sites themselves, the first day was spent collecting qualitative data. This began with an open meeting with the community and its leaders at a central public place (e.g. school, dispensary, tea factory or church). The open meeting was followed by an extensive series of focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and the other participatory data collection methods.

On the second day in any community, the research teams conducted the quantitative survey. Forty questionnaires were administered at each site, with interviewers going from house to house using a simple sampling procedure of selecting every tenth

household at random, and conducting one-on-one interviews. On this day, the research teams were also able to follow-up on issues that had arisen during the qualitative data collection process, and to also collect or complete case studies, illustrating key trends and phenomena emerging from the data.

In both the quantitative and qualitative components of the study, the consent of all respondents was sought before inviting their participation. Informants were assured of the confidentiality of the study as regards individuals providing information. Participants were also asked to consider any information shared during group discussions as confidential to the groups. All the focus group discussions were recorded, after seeking the permission of the participants, and the recordings later transcribed and translated into English.

In September 2005, a synthesis workshop held in Nairobi brought together the teams again to discuss, compare and synthesize findings.

Quantitative data was processed using SPSS.

Challenges of conducting a social study

Though successful and effective in its outcomes, the process of data collection was a demanding one for the field teams in a number of respects. Challenges included the logistics of reaching and living in remote rural areas given the condition of rural infrastructure; the difficulty of working in communities where political factionalism between local sources of power and authority existed; the inevitability of raising expectations in the community through our enquiries; and the psychology of listening to stories of severe hardship while being able to offer very limited succor in return.

Annex 2

THE RESEARCH TEAMS

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