

## Annex 1. Social Accountability and Legal Advocacy: The National Center Against Violence<sup>53</sup>

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### BRINGING A SOCIAL PROBLEM OUT OF THE SHADOWS

The National Center Against Violence was initially founded in 1995 by three Mongolian women's organizations: the Liberal Women's Brain Pool, Women for Social Progress, and the Women Lawyers' Association (WLA). At that time it was known as the Center Against Violence (CAV). After CAV became an autonomous organization, it reregistered with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs as the National Center Against Violence in January 1998. During this early period, domestic violence (DV) was a concept that was unknown in Mongolian society; there was little information about or discussion of the widespread abuse of Mongolian women and children. The founding of the Center was an important step to bring DV out of the shadows so that both its symptoms and causes could be legally and socially addressed.

The NCAV's initial mission was twofold: to provide legal and psychological counseling and shelter to victims, and to educate the government and the public on domestic violence. As a result of an internal reassessment in 2002, the NCAV realized that its fight against DV must include the transformation of social structures. To achieve its mission, the NCAV attempts to: 1) raise public awareness and shape the social mindset so that DV is no longer tolerated; 2) build a legal framework that effectively prevents and ultimately eliminates violence; and 3) develop a social protection system that overcomes the consequences of violence (NCAV 2005). Whereas the motto of the organization is "a human life free from violence," the central message in both their public awareness campaign and legal advocacy has been that "DV is not just a private issue," thus requiring the intervention of both Mongolian civil society and the government.

The NCAV is governed by a seven-member board, which includes representatives from the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor (MSWL), the Parliamentary Secretariat, the Ulaanbaatar Citizen Representatives' Khural, the UB Police Department, and associations of women, children, and the elderly. Representatives of elderly Mongolians are included on the NCAV board as one in four Mongolians over the age of 50 is a victim of DV. This statistic is nearly as high as the number for Mongolian women (one in three) who suffer from DV (NCAV et al. 2003; NCAV and TAF 2003).<sup>54</sup>

More than 20 donors, mostly international, including the embassies and aid agencies of the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Germany, Sweden, and Australia, have provided financial assistance to NCAV in its efforts against DV. Four Mongolian donors, both governmental and nongovernmental, have also contributed to the NCAV: the MSWL, the Poverty Alleviation Program Office, the Mongolian Women's Fund, and the National AIDS Foundation. Significant and diverse international funding has allowed the NCAV to pursue legal advocacy and provide services to victims that the GoM has not been able to provide (Finding NCAV-1).

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<sup>53</sup> Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Oyuna Baasanjav, Gender and Participation Specialist, World Bank-Mongolia.

<sup>54</sup> In 1995, a survey involving 5,000 respondents was jointly conducted by the NCAV and the Ministry of Population Policy and Labor. In 1998, another survey involving 3,000 respondents was jointly conducted by the NCAV and the Center for Training and Research for the Population at the National University of Mongolia. In 2003, a survey of 1,000 elderly Mongolians was jointly conducted by the NCAV and the Federation of Senior Citizens (NCAV and TAF 2003).

Currently, the NCAV works in six separate but interrelated program areas: comprehensive client services; gender development and legal reform; child protection; advocacy to change the behavior of male perpetrators; community mobilization and participation; and a shelter network (NCAV 2005). The NCAV implements these programs with a 14-member staff, half of whom have worked for the Center for more than five years.

The NCAV shelter network is composed of two shelters with a total of 20 beds. The UB shelter faced a great deal of resistance when it first opened in 1995. Owing to Mongolian cultural attitudes toward DV, it took two months for the first DV victim to have the courage to come to a shelter. Since then the beds in the shelter have never been empty. This underscores the success of the shelter in responding to DV and the enormity of this problem.

In June 2004, an NCAV set up a second eight-bed shelter, the Gobi Regional Information Center, to serve five neighboring aimags. Filled to capacity since its opening, the Gobi Center receives frequent requests from other surrounding aimags and soums to shelter and assist victims of DV.

The NCAV also operates a transfer facility in UB, a one-room housing unit for a woman and her children who have “graduated” from the shelter and are awaiting permanent housing so that they do not have to return to violence. Since 2004, the Center has also run a toll-free hot line for DV victims. Meanwhile, the NCAV has provided counseling at the Men’s Education Laboratory to prevent DV and rehabilitate male perpetrators.<sup>55</sup> With a grant from The Asia Foundation, the Center began publishing a newspaper, *Helhee*, in 1997 to promote public awareness of DV and the organization’s policy advocacy agenda. Between 1997 and 2002, the newspaper’s circulation reached more than 1,000 copies. However, when funding ran out in January 2002, the NCAV was forced to stop publication; demonstrating that even Mongolia’s relatively well-funded CSOs continue to struggle with a limited and precarious resource base (Finding NCAV-1).

Since 1998, when it first established chapters outside of UB in the aimags of Bayanhongor and Uvorkhangai, the NCAV has expanded to include branches in 13 aimags; the most recent are the Gobi Center and two remote districts of Ulaanbaatar. These local chapters operate with significant and consistent volunteer support. Between one and four times a year, the NCAV consults with these volunteers to provide methodological and professional guidance, and share experiences and strategies.

Despite Mongolian society’s initial misgivings, the Center now enjoys an excellent reputation, a trusted relationship with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor, and regular funding from both foreign donors and the GoM. Relations between NCAV and the government have generally been positive. In 2004, for example, the aimag of Bayanhongor named NCAV’s local chapter as the best NGO in the aimag, recognizing its collaboration with the local government, its cooperation with other NGOs, and its broad inclusion of the population.

Unfortunately, the high turnover of public officials (both civil servants and elected officials) has adversely affected the NCAV’s relationship with the GoM. During an interview in May 2005, the Center’s director noted that despite years of public advocacy work on DV, the NCAV must continually educate new public officials about DV and the organization’s mission and activities. Nonetheless, in contrast with the typically adversarial relationship between CSOs and the GoM, the NCAV has achieved a high level of NGO-government cooperation.

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<sup>55</sup> The laboratory was first established by the Mongolian Open Society Forum in 1998 and has benefited from the support of the UB Police Department since 2000.

Two issue areas in which collaboration with public officials have resulted in impressive accomplishments are the passage of a DV law and government funding for the NCAV shelters. Nevertheless, the Center continues to advocate for the state to assume responsibility for the shelters and the development of additional shelters as stipulated by the new Law Against Domestic Violence.

## LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION

The NCAV has advocated extensively for legal reform on DV, beginning with its campaign to reform Mongolia's Family Law, which had not been amended since its adoption in 1972. The 10 amendments that were adopted in 1999 incorporated various NCAV's proposals, including the redefinition of the family home as shared property between husband and wife despite the tradition of male bias in Mongolian culture. The NCAV along with the WLA, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Watch, and the Center for Human Rights and Development, continued to advocate for specific legislation on DV in the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, which were passed in 2002. NCAV's collaboration with other CSOs was critical to the successful legal advocacy for DV legislation (Finding NCAV 2).

Despite its successful advocacy for reform of family law and criminalization of DV, the NCAV felt that such piecemeal legislative reform could not address such a widespread social problem. Since its inception, the Center had lobbied for the passage of a comprehensive DV law. The idea met with considerable opposition at first since such a law seemed to counter family values and Mongolian culture. Some MPs trivialized the problem by ridiculing, for example, the idea of sending someone "to jail just because of slapping a wife once." Some opponents to DV legislation (especially legislators and legal professionals) claimed that the reforms to the Family Law and Criminal Code had sufficiently addressed domestic violence.

The NCAV and its partners, therefore, took a two-pronged approach to advocate for a DV law. The first part of their strategy was to develop a better conceptual understanding of and support for a DV law among a coalition of nongovernmental partners working on human rights and issues related to women, children, and the elderly. Through their various efforts, the NCAV and its CSO partners provided critical information on DV to public officials as well as the general public (Finding NCAV 3).

The second prong of their strategy was to lobby key public officials in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches at all levels of government. This networking and collaboration with government officials permitted the NCAV greater access to information, ability to voice its concerns about the need for DV legislation, and opportunities to negotiate the content of the legislation (Finding NCAV 4).

Various tools were deployed in their advocacy efforts. These included polling among MPs, appearances on TV talk shows, articles in the print media publicizing international experiences with DV laws, seminar discussions with parliamentarians at the National Human Rights Commission, and collective letters from shelter victims to the president, speaker of parliament, and prime minister.

The NCAV provided extensive studies and surveys to demonstrate the need for a special law on DV. These included a national baseline survey of 5,000 respondents conducted jointly with the Ministry of Population Policy and Labor (1995); a follow-up survey with 3,000 respondents conducted with the Center of Training and Research for Population of the National University of Mongolia (1998); regular surveys of shelter clients and analysis of the NCAV's own records of legal and psychological counseling (1995–2003); a study on the impact of child abuse in the family (2001); a study of forensic hospital records (2003); and a survey of the effect of DV on elders conducted jointly by the NCAV and the

Mongolian Federation of Senior Citizens (2003).<sup>56</sup> With funding from TAF, the results and findings from all of these surveys and studies were summarized in 2003 in a comprehensive fact sheet categorized under five different topics: 1) “DV is a common and negative phenomenon” in Mongolian society; 2) “the consequences and harm of DV [are a threat not only to] individuals but also the national security”; 3) “DV is a specific crime with its distinctive acts, stimuli, and purpose, resulting in specific damages”; 4) “the current legal framework and remedies utilized” to fight domestic violence are inadequate; and 5) “there is a demand to adopt an independent law on the prevention of domestic violence.” The fact sheet, as a centerpiece of the legal advocacy efforts, was widely distributed among public officials and helped build support among them for adoption of a DV law.

In particular, the CSOs targeted MPs to ensure their support of DV legislation. Prior to the 2000 elections, for example, they petitioned parliamentary candidates to include the adoption of a DV law as part of their campaign promises, noting that one-half of all voters are women. Many of the 20 candidates who did endorse this idea were elected. Later, 19 MPs jointly presented the legislation to parliament, apparently the largest number to have ever proposed a bill in the State Great Khural.

Some of the provisions in the DV bill, including separation orders, victim protection, and mandatory training for offenders, were radical innovations to Mongolia’s legal system. Thus, NCAV and other advocates had to overcome initial resistance to their inclusion in the DV law. Moreover, key provisions, relating to implementation costs, threatened passage of the bill in the final stages of legislative debate. Fortunately, the CSOs were well placed to advocate for their inclusion.

In 2003, the State Great Khural set up three specialized working groups composed of key representatives from the police, courts, prosecutor’s office, media, and CSOs. Whereas the group on costs was headed by a MoFE official, the other two working groups were headed by CSO leaders: the director of the WLA headed the group on the drafting of legislation and the director of NCAV headed the group on legislative advocacy. To address resistance to the law, the working groups focused on protection of victims and prevention of domestic violence. They also pushed for legislation for the government to develop a national DV program, thus allowing latitude for later insertion of a more comprehensive set of mechanisms and public funding for DV programs.

Once the draft had been placed on parliament’s agenda, the NCAV and its CSO partners were concerned they would be excluded from the process, and critical issues that remained would be determined without their input. Fortunately, the Legal Affairs Standing Committee formed another working group in March 2004, to develop consensus on “principally differing views on certain provisions” in the proposed legislation. The directors of both the NCAV and the WLA were included in this working group. Thus, they were able to give testimony to the LASC, a rare opportunity for CSOs to speak directly to parliament on pending legislation. The ability of the NCAV and WLA to advocate for the adoption of the DV law illustrates the importance of CSO access to ministerial and legislative forums at key junctures in the formulation of legislation and public policy (Finding NCAV 5).

Following a successful hearing on the DV bill in May 2004, the State Great Khural unanimously passed the law Against Domestic Violence. The adoption of the DV Law was a remarkable success for the NCAV and its CSO partners. In less than a decade, Mongolian society had not only accepted DV as a widespread social ill, but also adopted progressive legislation that established DV as a criminal offense. As a result, a nationwide Civil Society Index Survey conducted by CEDAW Watch in 2005 indicated that

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<sup>56</sup> Research by other organizations included analyses of relevant court rulings conducted by the research center of the Supreme Court (2001–02) and a survey of 300 police officers by the Gender Center for Sustainable Development (2003).

64.5 percent of respondents considered NGO advocacy for the Law Against Domestic Violence to have been highly effective.

### ADVOCACY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DV LAW

Once the Law Against Domestic Violence was passed and the parliamentary resolution on development of a national DV program was adopted, NCAV and its CSO partners successfully lobbied the prime minister's office to form a task force on the DV program. The task force was headed by the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs, but also included representatives of the CSOs and various other ministries and government agencies that had promoted the adoption of the law.

A year later, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs issued a decree to set up a technical working group to draft the DV program. The national DV program is expected to provide detailed guidelines and mechanisms to coordinate enforcement of the DV Law. Recently, members of the technical working group traveled to Korea to learn about the efficient organization and operation of the services that will be provided.

In January 2005, the NCAV and parliament's Social Policy Standing Committee, with funding from the World Bank, held an open discussion on enforcement of the DV Law. They recommended the promotion of public awareness of the Law Against Domestic Violence and the need for aimag governors to educate and guide law enforcement officials on the application of the law. The Standing Committee sent the recommendations to the Ministries of Justice, Health, and Education, along with members of the judiciary, law enforcement agencies, aimag khurals and governors' offices. The NCAV also provided aimag, soum, and bag governors with the text of the law and educational materials on domestic violence and the new Law.

The judiciary's inability to access the legal text has hindered implementation of the DV. For example, the NCAV had to provide a copy of the law to judges in the Chingeltei district court for them to rule on a separation order in March 2005.<sup>57</sup>

In addition, several technical legal issues have hindered the effective enforcement of the law. This includes the need for Supreme Court interpretation of key provisions. For example, the NCAV has proposed that in the case of a separation order, the Supreme Court should clarify that abusers, not their victims, must leave the family home. The NCAV has also proposed several amendments to the Law Against Domestic Violence. For example, the law requires a court decision "within 24 hours after receipt of a domestic violence complaint in order to secure the victim's safety and health" (Article 17.2). As this is clearly impractical and often infeasible, the NCAV recommends that individual judges be authorized to issue such decisions. The Center has secured a verbal commitment from the Legal Affairs Standing Committee to sponsor such an amendment, although this issue has not yet been addressed by parliament. Both the successes and the continuing challenges that the NCAV has faced regarding the implementation of the DV Law indicate the importance of its continued collaboration with public officials and other CSOs (Findings NCAV 2 and 4).

One of the NCAV's highest priorities in insuring implementation of the DV Law is to transfer responsibility for DV shelters to the state. Although GoM has offered some financial assistance officials

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<sup>57</sup> To date, only one other case has gone to court: in Bayanhongor, where the head of the NCAV branch served as an attorney for the victim.

are reluctant to assume full responsibility for running the shelters and for building others for which there is a clear demand.

### ADVOCACY FOR THE PROVISION OF A PUBLIC SERVICE

After learning that the government had allocated funding to the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor to implement the National Program on Promotion of Status of Women, the NCAV launched a campaign in 2000 to obtain government funding for their UB shelter. Senior NCAV officials invited the minister to the shelter where he was shown photographs of battered women and briefed on the legal and practical side of DV. Meanwhile, within the ministry, a NCAV board member advocated official support for shelters based on provisions in the national program. At the same time, the NCAV emphasized the need for the GoM to provide services to DV victims at events such as the roundtable discussions on DV organized with health and social workers in 2000–01. NCAV collaboration with public officials and its encouragement to the GoM to assume its role indicates that the GoM-CSO relationship is not necessarily adversarial nor it is competitive (Finding NCAV 4).

In December 2001, the NCAV signed its first contract with the MSWL for one year of funding worth Tog 2.9 million for the “operation of shelter, legal and psychological counseling and limited health care” for victims of DV. Although the contract was renewed in 2002, only half of the funds were transferred despite persistent efforts by the NCAV. This contributed to a six-month delay in the extension of the contract in 2004. Having learned its lesson, the Center requested that the contract extension for 2005 provide for the transfer of funds in a single installment; the ministry agreed. Although the MSWL contract provides Tog 3 million, approximately 60 percent of the total expenses of running the shelter, the NCAV had hoped for Tog 5 million, the sum necessary to cover all of the shelters’ costs as the ultimate goal is to transfer these facilities to the GoM.

The NCAV has also had problems with the Han-Uul administration in its attempts to create a new shelter specifically for DV victims who are children. Although the District Governor officially agreed to provide accommodations for the new shelter, he reneged on this promise in April 2005. The NCAV contacted the head of the city’s property department, who preferred to lease the space rather than provide it for free to abused children.

In a desperate effort to find funding for the shelters and other DV services, NCAV is analyzing the local government finance laws; exploring various government funds, such as the Crime Prevention Fund, administered by the MSWL; and using participatory budgeting and budget monitoring techniques, especially at the local level.<sup>58</sup>

An obvious precondition to the transfer of shelters to government management is that the GoM must shoulder the full cost of the shelter. According to its director, NCAV’s top priority is to force reluctant officials to accept their legal responsibility to provide shelter to victims of DV, and to manage the NCAV shelters as required under the new DV Law. She noted, however, that when she and her CSO colleagues have confronted officials with their legal responsibility, they put the document aside and indicate that they will study it later. This illustrates the important role CSOs play not only in advocating for but also insuring implementation of legal reforms.

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<sup>58</sup> One of the *aimag* chapter coordinators participated in the Social Accountability Regional Seminar in Bangkok in March, 2005, and is now assigned to lead the local government-sponsored network of *aimag* shelters.

## CONTINUING EFFORTS AT RAISING AWARENESS ABOUT DV AND LEGAL ADVOCACY IN RELATED AREAS

The new Law Against Domestic Violence would not have been adopted without the NCAV's work in raising public awareness. According to the Chair of the NGO Gal Golomt (Hearth), the NCAV's "main achievement is public awareness that DV is a societal issue and that society needs to fight against it." Since the adoption of the DV Law, the NCAV has stepped up its efforts to raise public awareness about DV and provide information about the Law Against Domestic Violence to ensure its implementation (Finding NCAV 3).

Working with the MSWL's Department on Children, the NCAV developed children's educational materials on DV, entitled "My Family." In August 2004, the Minister of Education, Culture, and Science decreed that the DV curriculum be taught at all grade levels in schools across the country, making it the country's first nationwide DV-education program for children.<sup>59</sup>

In December 2004, during a month-long campaign to raise public awareness on the new law, the NCAV conducted 10 programs on national and FM radio, one live program on national TV, and a press conference. The Center also held various training sessions for journalists, NGOs, local-level legal officers, prosecutors, council members, social workers, and police officers.

The NCAV has had a long-term partnership with the police to promote greater awareness of DV and legal protections among Mongolia's law enforcement officers. For example, under a 1998 agreement with the General Police Department, the NCAV conducted training programs for police officers in UB and various aimags on working with abusive men. A specially trained instructor at the Ulaanbaatar detention facility operates the Education for Men Pilot Cabinet, which was also established by the NCAV in 1998. After the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence in 2004, a new course was introduced, "Police Response to Domestic Violence," which is taught by a human rights professor specially trained by the NCAV. Through the Center's work with the Police Academy, a special Men's Education Laboratory on DV was also established in that year.

Building on its successful legal advocacy for the Law Against Domestic Violence, the NCAV is currently working on addressing sexual violence, and specifically, incest.<sup>60</sup> In addition to providing counseling services, the Center is drafting a law that will address the need to reform the criminal code and the provision of services for victims. According to the NCAV executive director, the law should provide a private room for victims in police stations, as well as the opportunity for female victims to speak to a woman police officer. The executive director also claimed that whereas rape victims generally fail to report the crime, incest victims are even less likely to do so as "those convicted of incest are sentenced to death, so their victims do not seek prosecution." Consequently, the NCAV is proposing a reduction in the current punishment for these sex crimes.

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<sup>59</sup> Prior to the curriculum developed in 2004, the NCAV developed a curriculum in 2002 entitled, "Specifics of Working with Victims of Violence" with an accompanying video and manuals for teachers and students.

<sup>60</sup> During a dissemination interview in February 2006, the NCAV executive director indicated that the Center is working with the International NGO "Asia Pacific Women's Law and Development" to improve Mongolian women's access to child support. When asked how this was connected to issues of violence, she noted that many, if not most, of the women seeking child support are victims of DV, citing an analysis of family court cases between 2000-02 in which DV was a factor in 58.6 percent of the divorce cases.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: NATIONAL CENTER AGAINST VIOLENCE

**Finding NCAV 1.** The NCAV's successes are attributable in large part to its access to significant and diverse international funding, even though its staff regularly confronts financial constraints on maintenance and expansion of their activities.

**Recommendation:** Whereas CSOs such as the NCAV should pursue sustainable, independent funding sources, the GoM and international donors should provide CSOs with greater resources (tenders and projects) on a competitive and transparent basis, recognizing the limited resource base currently available in Mongolia.

**Finding NCAV 2.** The NCAV's success in bringing DV out of the shadows and giving Voice to the needs and concerns of its victims is largely attributable to the unusually high level of collaboration among CSOs committed to addressing this and other issues related to women's and human rights.

**Recommendation:** CSOs should pursue collaboration through increased and regular communication (more CSO forums, greater use of list serves and shared Web sites) as well as through jointly funded projects, with technical and financial support from international donors.

**Finding NCAV 3.** NCAV collaboration with other CSOs has been particularly effective and critical in providing Information about domestic violence to public officials as well as to the general public.

**Recommendation:** CSOs should pursue diverse forums for distributing information, and pursue information from public and other sources. Donors should provide start-up funds for CSOs, as well as technical support on achieving self-sufficiency in this area.

**Finding NCAV 4.** The NCAV's collaborative relationship with public officials, including the GoM, MPs, political parties, police officials, and other civil servants, was critical to their ability to voice the needs of DV victims, raise awareness about DV among law makers, and enable the passage and implementation of the DV Law.

**Recommendation:** Collaborative relations should be encouraged among both public officials and CSO leaders who may typically conceive of their relationship as more adversarial and competitive. Both groups would clearly benefit from opportunities to meet on a regular basis (town meetings; CSO councils to PM, president, or local governors) to discuss common causes and specific areas for potential collaboration.

**Finding NCAV 5.** The NCAV enjoyed an unusually high level of access to public officials and forums through both informal and formal channels. Their participation in parliamentary working groups permitted them to ensure passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence and to ensure that its content responded to the needs of DV victims.

**Recommendation:** To ensure the social accountability role of CSOs in legal advocacy, the GoM, parliament, and local councils should institutionalize their participation in legislation and public policy.

## Annex 2. Social Accountability and Local Governance: Women for Social Progress-Uvorkhangai<sup>61</sup>

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### THE UVORKHANGAI “FRANCHISE” OF WOMEN FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS

In 1997, five years after the NGO Women for Social Progress was first established in Ulaanbaatar, a local branch of WSP was set up in the central province (aimag) of Uvorkhangai. Although the WSP-UV is not registered separately with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, this local chapter of the WSP might be better described as a franchise rather than a branch in that it is “independent in most of its funding, activities (and) projects” (WSP-UV 2003). Although both organizations focus on governance issues, the mission of WSP-UV is to work specifically with impoverished rural households, community-based structures, and family units to: 1) improve their capacities to lobby local government on issues concerning local development; 2) strengthen local self-government and good governance through networking among local NGOs, government, and business; 3) support the development of micro- and small-scale enterprises in the province; and 4) promote the position and role of women in local development.<sup>62</sup>

According to the founder of WSP-UV, the main goal of the organization is to encourage citizen participation in local development, in decision-making processes in local government, and in monitoring government actions to establish democracy at the local level. For nearly a decade, the WSP-UV has educated local citizens about their political, social, and economic rights and promoted communication among local government, citizens, and the business community, while serving as a “watchdog” to ensure that public officials are accountable to the community (WSP-UV 2003:11-14). This broad mission has led WSP-UV to become involved in various local governance issues, including budget analysis and monitoring through a small pilot project financed by the World Bank.

Until 2001, the WSP-UV’s staff included its coordinator and a handful of volunteers. The organization now has three permanent staff members and nearly 50 volunteers, operating in every soum within the aimag.<sup>63</sup> All of the staff have a high level of research skills and experience. As the founder of WSP-UV, the coordinator’s unique professional background have provided the organization with critical human as well as social capital. Trained as a lawyer at the University of Irkutsk (Russia) with a master’s degree from Mongolian National University,<sup>64</sup> she was a criminal prosecutor (1987–90) and then worked for the provincial khural (1990–92) before becoming a legal consultant to the Governor of Uvorkhangai (1992–97). Her experiences in local government provide not only insights into its operations but also important contacts both in the aimag and in Ulaanbaatar. Given her frequent challenges of and confrontations with local government officials, it is difficult, however, to conclude that her previous role in local government has constrained her individual capacity or that of WSP-UV for civic engagement and social accountability (Finding WSP 1).

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<sup>61</sup> Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Linda Beck, Professor of Political Science, University of Maine-Farmington.

<sup>62</sup> Despite occasional references to the promotion and participation of women, the coordinator of WSP-UV stated during an interview in April 2005 that the organization does not have a “gender agenda; WSP is just about women working towards social progress.” In fact, she noted that they consider the absence of male staff members to be a weakness that they are attempting to rectify.

<sup>63</sup> WSP-UV is currently looking to hire a fourth staff member to replace one who recently joined the staff of the Training in Advocacy for NGOs (TAN) project of Mercy Corps. In the past, WSP-UV has also benefited from the assistance of three Voluntary Services Overseas volunteers (VSO-UK).

<sup>64</sup> Appropriately, her master’s thesis was on the improvement of the laws governing local *khurals* (councils).

WSP-UV's coordinator remains in close contact with her former colleagues as the organization's main office is in the aimag government house in the provincial capital of Arvaiheer. In their two-room office, they are equipped with a telephone and fax machine and three computers donated by the WSP-UB after it received a prize of \$20,000 as the recipient of the 1998 Civil Society Award. This prestigious award was given jointly by the European Union and the United States to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan and the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome.

Aside from the WSP-UB contribution, the WSP-UV has relied heavily on international funding. This is a very common phenomenon among active Mongolian CSOs. Since its inception, WSP-UV has implemented projects totaling more than \$70,000 that were entirely financed by grants from foreign donors. Their funders have included British Globalization Fund, Canadian International Development Agency, Gobi Regional Economic Growth Initiative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States, The Asia Foundation, UNDP, and UNESCO-Asian Region. Such significant and diverse international funding has permitted the WSP to encourage citizen participation in local government and to monitor its actions (Finding WSP 2).

Nevertheless, the greatest challenge WSP-UV faces is the dearth of financial resources. In a 2003 Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats analysis, the staff attributed funding insecurity to the lack of a reliable long-term donor (WSP-UV 2003). During an interview in Uvorkhangai, the coordinator sharply criticized the "short-termism" of the donor community as undermining the growth of Mongolian civil society. In 2003, WSP-UV's desire for financial autonomy led to its involvement in the marketing of women artisans' products in foreign countries. Although the WSP-UV noted in its business plan for 2003-04 that it should "seek donations from UB-based companies, gifts in kind" and general fundraising, it concluded that these options "do not look very promising as they will not adequately improve WSP's financial resources" (WSP-UV 2003:20). In this sense, the WSP-UV provides an excellent illustration of the importance of CSO access to resources, particularly foreign, for successful social accountability as well as the fiscal precariousness of the few Mongolian CSOs that do have access to these resources, given the limited opportunities for fundraising in Mongolia.<sup>65</sup>

Perhaps one of the greatest potential sources for self-financing is the WSP-UV's popular newspaper, Gurvalijin Medee (Triangle News), which has been critical to its mission to promote good governance at the local level.

### **PROVIDING INFORMATION THAT PROMOTES SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: TRIANGLE NEWS**

The name Triangle News refers to the trilateral relationship that the WSP-UV seeks to promote among government officials, the private sector, and civil society to enhance local governance and economic development. The WSP-UV began publishing the newspaper in 2002 "to deliver local information to the local citizens" and enhance their participation in local government (WSP 2003).

In 2000, a grant of \$4,600 from the Globalization Fund enabled WSP-UV to publish six issues with a circulation of 9,000 per issue, covering approximately a third of the households in the aimag. The following year, the Mongolian Foundation for an Open Society (now the Open Society Forum) contributed \$10,000 to publish 12 issues. Unfortunately, in March 2004, after these 18 issues had been

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<sup>65</sup> Although this study did not focus on the complex resource issues confronting CSOs in Mongolia, various stakeholders cited the need for improved tax breaks and incentives (for example, on charitable donations) to improve the fiscal autonomy and stability of CSOs.

printed, the WSP-UV ran out of funding and was forced to stop publishing. The experience demonstrates how a limited and precarious resource base may impede even a well-funded CSO's ability to provide an alternative source of information (Finding WSP 2).<sup>66</sup>

Triangle News has published information about government policies and actions, particularly budgetary issues; thus, it has played an important role in promoting civic engagement and social accountability (Finding WSP 3). In each issue, an entire page was devoted to the local budget, where information about local governmental budgets and the budgetary process was presented in simple, accessible language. Articles included "What Is the Budget and Responsibilities of the Aimag Governor on the Budget" (Issue No. 1, 2003); "How Were MT 75 Million Allocated?" (Issue No. 4, 2003); and "Weird Things on the Soum Budget" (Issue No. 11, 2003).

Articles also provided information about government policies and the goods and services available to citizens. For example, in April 2002, an article entitled "Free Disaster Relief Assistance by Soums" appeared in Triangle News, which reported that the GoM was distributing free hay for livestock that were suffering from recurrent drought in the region. When their readers realized that the hay that they had been purchasing for MT 2,000 per bundle from soum officials should be distributed to them for free, they contacted the aimag agricultural department. Though no action was taken against those responsible, by June the illegal practice was stopped.

Triangle News also discussed and influenced nonbudgetary issues. For example, interviews with GoM officials on water pollution led the Governor of Arvaikheer to protect the local river from pollution by prohibiting the washing of cars and clothes in the river, and decreasing the number of dogs living along its banks by "exterminating them in a humane manner" (WSP 2002:5).

Although there are numerous other examples of news articles leading to modification in behavior by government officials, in some instances the publication of critiques of practices by local civil servants and elected officials also resulted in threats of retribution against WSP-UV. In the first issue of Triangle News, for example, an article cited the harassment of local businesses by tax officers; the officer threatened to sue the coordinator of WSP-UV although the issue was never pursued.

Rather than dodging criticisms of their newspaper, however, the WSP-UV conducted research and sought opinions from rural citizens. In 2002, WSP-UV organized six meetings with its readership<sup>67</sup> in which dozens of government officials, business leaders, and CSOs participated and discussed various issues. The meetings were the precursors to the Business Development Consultations (BDCs) organized by WSP-UV.

### **PROMOTING A FORUM FOR NEGOTIATION: BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CONSULTATIONS**

In 2003, TAF provided funding to the WSP-UV for a series of individual meetings with local representatives of CSOs, the business community, and the government, along with a tripartite meeting to discuss a survey WSP-UV had conducted in three soums and the aimag center. According to the TAF

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<sup>66</sup> Following our interview with the WSP-UV coordinator in April 2005, the Ulaanbaatar office of the World Bank provided additional funds through a grant under the regional BNPP for social accountability, so that WSP-UV could publish another 12 issues with a circulation of 6,000 copies.

<sup>67</sup> In addition, the WSP-UV received letters from herders in seven different *soums* who sought more information on reproductive health and family planning (WSP 2002).

program officer, the methodology used in the survey was “simple and unique.” WSP-UV had used its extensive network of contacts to conduct interviews with ordinary people on how they had started their own small businesses. The surveys revealed a great deal of misinformation about Mongolian laws, including poor legal advice at the soum level.

After conducting the survey, the WSP-UV confronted some initial resistance to organizing a joint forum of the various stakeholders in the community. During an interview in May 2005, the TAF program officer reported that they had made several attempts at holding the 2003 consultation. While the WSP-UV described them as “preparatory meetings,” the TAF representative characterized them as failed attempts that reflected the need to convince stakeholders of the value of the BDCs.

The meeting covered various other issues, including the difficulties that businesses faced selling liquor as a result of apparent police confiscation of their licenses for minor infractions.<sup>68</sup> At the meeting, the WSP-UV cited Mongolia’s 2003 Human Rights Report on criminal charges brought against more than 200 police officers who had abused their powers. Subsequently, 18 out of the 19 businesses involved reported that the police had stopped confiscating their licenses. When discussing this with the WSP-UV coordinator, she commented that “the nice thing about working with the police is when they stop doing something, they do so abruptly and for good.” This is just one example of how WSP-UV’s new forum for negotiation promotes social accountability (Finding WSP 4).

After the first BDC, the aimag khural created a Business and Economic Council that included three representatives of the business community, three governmental officials, and three CSO leaders. Although this may be interpreted as a positive outcome of the BDC to institutionalize dialogue among the three sets of stakeholders, the WSP coordinator noted that there has been little commitment to the Council. From her perspective, one of the main problems is that the representatives are mostly “progovernment” (that is, pro-MPRP), including the two other NGOs on the Council (the Chamber of Commerce and the Gobi Initiative). Consequently, they are not interested in taking up controversial issues.

Nonetheless, a subsequent tripartite consultation held in December 2004 contributed to additional changes in local governance, including the breakup of a monopoly on passport photos by an alleged “official” photographer for the aimag’s citizen registration bureau and the dismissal of the official involved; the improved expedition of licensing by the land department; and efforts by the manager of the local market to improve its sanitation by installing toilets and providing garbage disposal. This local market was, in fact, the focal point of an important example of civic engagement in Uvorkhangai the previous year that enhanced the social accountability of the aimag government to its citizenry, and in which WSP-UV played a crucial role.

### **GIVING CITIZENS VOICE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT: STRUGGLE AGAINST MARKET RELOCATION**

In November 2003, the professional inspection agency of the aimag and local police entered the local market and demanded that food vendors move to a newly constructed marketplace. When they refused, the police confiscated their meat and spilled their milk to force them to leave. The vendors complained to WSP-UV about the actions of the inspection agency and the police. Upon further investigation, however,

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<sup>68</sup> The most egregious infraction was flouting a resolution by the *aimag* governor that required businesses that sell liquor to close by midnight to curtail drunkenness, alcoholism, and domestic violence. However, according to a survey conducted by the WSP-UV and financed by the health department, this policy was unlikely to achieve these goals.

it was revealed that the agency and the police were merely acting on the orders of the aimag governor who had issued Resolution 128 on October 15, 2003, to close down the food market.

The previous month the vendors had voluntarily moved to the new location; but they claimed that they had lost customers because of its distance from the town center. Furthermore, although the new market was clean and “modern,” the storage facilities were inferior and thus their products spoiled within a few days.<sup>69</sup> Ironically, the vendors had been asked to leave the old market because the health department had determined that it did not meet basic health requirements. When the vendors then attempted to move back to their old market space, the confiscations and harassments began, ending with the arrest of three of their leaders, who were detained for a few hours and released.

The vendors approached the WSP-UV, asking for advice on their legal rights. After analyzing the governor’s resolution, the WSP coordinator claimed that it contained legal flaws, specifically the violation of the law on fair competition that invalidated the decree. She therefore sent a copy of the resolution to the National Human Rights Commission. The Commission then sent out human rights experts, who investigated the case and wrote a report indicating that there had been a violation of constitutional provisions, specifically in relation to fair competition and the illegal confiscations.

The WSP-UV also advised the vendors of their legal right to demonstrate, which they did in front of the aimag government house for more than three months (November 2003 to February 2004). The governor who was running as the MPRP candidate for a seat in the State Great Khural was greatly concerned. The official campaign did not begin until April 2004, but the market relocation became a campaign issue when the Democratic Party candidate running in a neighboring legislative district broadcast a meeting with angry vendors on a local television station. Given that it is the only private station in the area and had begun broadcasting just prior to the 2004 legislative elections, the WSP coordinator emphasized the important “balancing” role it played in relation to public television, which she claimed is controlled by the MPRP.

The DP candidate from the neighboring district then shared the footage with a colleague in the DP party running against the MPRP governor, rebroadcasting it in the Uvorkhangai district. In the meantime, the vendors collected money for the leader of the local Business Women’s Association to attend a national meeting of the Chamber of Commerce where her speech on Uvorkhangai’s vendors “stole the floor.”<sup>70</sup>

Ultimately, the MPRP grew concerned about electoral fallout and urged the governor to rescind the order. The governor annulled it 10 days before the election, but suffered a resounding defeat in any case.<sup>71</sup> Whereas the case was a decisive victory for social accountability, there were other less tangible benefits as well. In April 2005, the WSP-UV coordinator noted that Resolution 128 had provided an opportunity for the vendors to learn about their rights. She noted that she had been “propagating information about human rights for years, but it was only when this concrete issue arose that people were able to understand the relevance and importance” of what she had been saying all along. Clearly the WSP-UV played a

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<sup>69</sup> Interestingly, the new market facilities are owned by a Democratic Party politician, whereas the governor is a leader of the MPRP. Although this belies the argument that party politics was at play, there are also rumors of “bipartisan” collusion by elites.

<sup>70</sup> A relatively soft-spoken woman, Ms. Dolgorsuren described how she was first thwarted from being placed on the agenda by the local chamber of commerce, which was closely allied with the MPRP governor. Then, at the last minute, she went up on stage, took the microphone from the recognized speaker, politely excused herself and described the current conflict between the vendors and the governor.

<sup>71</sup> When questioned about his stance on the unpopular resolution, the head of the citizens’ representative *khural* in UV also claimed that he and his fellow representatives opposed the forced relocation. Although they had the power to rescind it, they preferred to encourage the governor to do so.

critical role in promoting social accountability by informing local citizens about their legal rights regarding the market relocation, as well as their political rights to voice their objections (Finding WSP 5).

### **WSP-UV AS A MODEL FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: TURNING AN NGI INTO AN NGO**

Clearly one of WSP-UV's greatest strengths is the leadership of its coordinator. On the other hand, one of the greatest risks to the organization is that it may not be able to survive without her. Moreover, the WSP-UV's success cannot be replicated without similarly qualified leaders. This problem has appeared even within the coordinator's own aimag at the soum level, where WSP-UV is run by volunteers who are considered lacking "enough motivation to deal with everyday needs... [and] experience in either training or capacity building" to serve their communities (WSP-UV 2002). The difficulties in replicating the successes of the WSP-UV are clearly tied to the fact that WSP-UV is one of Mongolia's many nongovernmental individuals (Finding WSP 6).

Nevertheless, the coordinator strives for the institutionalization of WSP-UV. Whereas other NGIs operate with one paid staff member, the WSP-UV has expended resources to build a staff, which the coordinator mentors and involves in all of the organization's activities. Moreover, the WSP-UV's mission is to build the capacity of other CSOs. For instance, WSP-UV encouraged Business Women's Association's involvement in the campaign against the market relocation, which bolstered its reputation and overall capacity.

Even if at the moment WSP-UV may be classified as an NGI, it is clearly embedded in and responsive to the local community. As such, WSP-UV represents an important departure from other NGO branches that maintain a dependent relationship with the national NGO (Finding WSP 7). One of WSP-UV's long-term strategies is to transform itself into an autonomous NGO that could serve as a model for grassroots activism across the country, thereby thwarting the current model of UB-based NGOs that dictate the agendas of their financially dependent branches.

Whereas the WSP-UV has undoubtedly been strengthened by its relationship with the WSP-UB, a key feature of this relationship has been the fact that the national director has encouraged WSP-UV to autonomously develop its own priorities and agenda. The benefits of such decentralized relationships should be considered by other NGOs seeking to build networks and by the Mongolian government, seeking to improve the opportunities for social accountability.

### **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: WSP-UV**

**Finding WSP 1.** The capacity of the Women for Social Progress-Uvorkhangai to encourage citizen participation in local government and monitor its actions is attributable in part to both its challenge and collaboration with local and national public officials.

**Recommendation:** Given the typically adversarial relationship between CSOs and public officials, both stakeholders should pursue collaborative relationships in various formal and informal forums while maintaining clear boundaries between political and civil society.

**Finding WSP 2.** Although significant and diverse international funding sources have permitted the WSP-UV to promote citizen participation in local governance and development, a limited resource base has also impeded certain of its social accountability activities such as the publication of Triangle News.

**Recommendation:** CSOs such as the WSP-UV should continue to pursue various sources of sustainable, independent funding. The financial solvency of CSOs must be addressed collaboratively with the GoM, which could provide funding (for example, tenders and projects) on a competitive and transparent basis.

**Finding WSP 3.** The WSP-UV newspaper has provided alternative information about local governance and development issues that are critical to civic engagement and social accountability.

**Recommendation:** As the transition from state to public broadcaster remains incomplete (see annex 5), alternative media outlets should be pursued and expanded by CSOs. International donors should provide initial technical and financial assistance, as well as training in how to make such enterprises self-sustaining.

**Finding WSP 4.** The Business Development Consultations serve as trilateral forums for local officials, CSO leaders, and representatives of the business community to engage in an ongoing dialogue and in negotiations.

**Recommendation:** Such forums may be organized with limited resources and should be pursued by all stakeholders to foster an ongoing dialogue at both the national and local levels.

**Finding WSP 5.** By informing them of their legal and political rights, the WSP-UV played a critical role in giving local citizens voice in local governance. The experience also highlighted Mongolians' general lack of knowledge about their civic and political rights.

**Recommendation:** With the support of the international donor community, the GoM should collaborate with CSOs to develop and implement civic education programs to educate Mongolians about their legal and political rights. These programs should target adult as well as school-age populations through the media (public radio and television advertisements and special programming), as well as special events and competitions (theatrical and essay contests).

**Finding WSP 6.** Although WSP-UV's success is in large part due to its leadership, the organization is building up the size and capacity of its staff to avoid the longer-term perils of NGI status.

**Recommendation:** Both CSOs and the donor community should prioritize CSO capacity building through the training of staff and volunteers, and through practices that further the institutionalization of CSOs.

**Finding WSP 7.** The WSP-UV represents an important departure from the dependent relationship that is common between national NGOs and their branch offices.

**Recommendation:** Whereas CSOs should address the UB-centric nature of CSO, which restricts their ability to represent and provide services to rural Mongolians, the GoM and the international donor community should channel resources to CBOs and other locally based CSOs.

## Annex 3: Social Accountability and Environmental Protection: The Ongi River Movement<sup>72</sup>

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### THE BIRTH, GROWTH, AND MISSION OF A COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATION

The Ongi River Movement began in 2001 in response to the environmental degradation of the Ongi River System in central Mongolia. The river system originally spanned more than 435 kilometers from the Khangai Mountains through the Khangai Steppe into the Gobi Desert, and fed into Ulaan (“Red”) Lake, which covered an area of 175 square kilometers. Historically, the Ongi sustained the lives of more than 100,000 people and more than 1 million livestock (TAF 2004c). The Ongi now flows only 100 kilometers, less than a quarter of its natural length, whereas the lake had completely dried up by 1995.<sup>73</sup> As Mongolia depends largely on surface water (70 percent of its water reserves), the depletion of this river system has serious implications for the region. It has led to a shortage of drinking water for more than 57,000 people and their animals. As a result pastoralists have been forced to herd their livestock in other aimags, causing serious problems for pastureland management in other regions as well.

The driving force behind the movement was the chair of the Citizen Representative Khural in the Saikhan-Ovoo soum. In 2001, he gathered residents of eight soums from the three neighboring aimags through which the Ongi flows in a shared mission to reverse the drying up of the Ongi River System and restore Ulaan Lake.<sup>74</sup> Initially he gathered several dozen people to discuss the matter. This was followed by a broader campaign that drew governors, leaders of other local khurals, and ordinary citizens from all eight soums to a meeting later that year. Local soum governments committed a total of MT 100,000 to support the emerging movement, which then registered with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs as a nongovernmental organization. Today, ORM is at once a community-based organization and part of a growing environmental movement with broad appeal beyond its region.

The chair of the ORM has held his post since his election in 2001. In addition to the chair, the organization has four other paid staff positions: an executive director, a manager, a program officer, and a driver. ORM’s home base remains Saikhan-Ovoo soum. It is headed by the executive director who served as a volunteer until the end of 2004. In this and the seven other soums where the ORM operates, there are a total of eight branch offices run by volunteers. The organization also has a small, one-room liaison office in Ulaanbaatar to facilitate public campaigns, advocacy, policy dialogue, and fundraising. The chair operates from this office but commutes frequently to the river basin. The movement further benefits from assistance from the director of the Center for Land, Forest and Water Resource Management at the Mongolian State Agriculture University, who acts as both an adviser and researcher for ORM on a pro bono basis.

Over the last four years, ORM has expanded its objectives to achieve its initial mission to revive the Ongi River Basin. As part of its efforts to promote the restoration and rehabilitation of the Ongi River System, its 2004 program included several other objectives: 1) sustainable community-based organizations that care for the environment; 2) informed and committed local citizens who monitor and protect the environment; 3) transparent local government structures that ensure a healthy environment; and 4) an interactive relationship between local governments and CBOs that cooperate with and support each other.

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<sup>72</sup> Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Jeff Thindwa, Senior Social Development Specialist, World Bank.

<sup>73</sup> In Saikhan Ovoo, for example, the river no longer runs, although a World Water Action report recorded its water flow at 1.8 cubic meters per second in 1950.

<sup>74</sup> The three *aimags* in which the ORM works are Uvorkhangai, Umnigobi, and Dundgobi; the eight *soums* are Uyanga, Zuunbayan-Ulaan, Taragt, Arvakheer, Bayangol, Saikhan-Ovoo, Bulgan, and Mandal-Ovoo.

## GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY

Foreign donors have provided significant assistance to the ORM. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF) provided initial start-up support and continues to provide training in strategic planning and organizing. The training was vital as this kind of social activism was new for rural Mongolians in both sociopolitical and cultural terms (Finding ORM 1). After decades of authoritarian rule, Mongolians find it difficult to challenge the state. Even the leaders of Buddhist monasteries see a restricted social role for themselves (see section 2). On the other hand, the head lama at a local monastery in Uyanga was quick to point out that Buddhist teachings about respect for nature and the environment inspired people's involvement in the campaign.

In addition to KAF funding, ORM has received financial and technical support for projects, training, publications, and administration from various other international NGOs and donor agencies, including The Asia Foundation, Mercy Corps, the United States Agency for International Development, the Japanese Government, and the Open Society Forum. These international sources are critical as local resources are limited, particularly in impoverished rural areas. In 2004, the ORM budget exceeded \$72,000, at least 90 percent of which was from international sources. This raises concerns about the sustainability and autonomy of ORM (Finding ORM 1). Currently, the organization receives \$2,000 per year from membership fees. The amount may be impressive for a rural-based organization, but it is still a small fraction of its operating budget. Asked if financial dependence compromises their autonomy, ORM leaders stated that they try not to give way to donor pressures and priorities, and that donors have to date been more flexible and deferential than they had expected.

ORM has also enjoyed a high level of support from Mongolia's political class, beginning with the participation of soum governors and khural leaders at their first meeting in 2001. In 2004 ORM created an "interest group" of MPs who act as advisers and help improve the organization's engagement with government. Initially, the movement had an 11-member board of directors, also referred to as the steering committee, which boasted several soum governors and a mining company director. The board was subsequently reduced to five members, including the former khural chair of the Saikhan-Ovoo soum who founded and currently leads the ORM.

Despite close collaboration with public officials, the ORM leadership understands that to promote social accountability, they must have a certain amount of detachment from political vested interests (Finding ORM 2). After the current chair was nominated to head the ORM board, he resigned his position as chair of the local khural and focused on the goals of the movement. In 2002, when the ORM leadership sent a letter to the prime minister and members of parliament, calling on them to halt mining activities in the Ongi Basin and ensure rehabilitation of mining sites, other local politicians made a similar choice between their dual roles in local government and civil society. One of the board members explained that "we felt a lot of pressure from the aimag and central government, and some of the governors struggled whether to sign the letter or to leave the ORM." The board member claimed that he was "safe" because as khural chair, he had been elected by the people. The fact that he was not a member of the ruling party undoubtedly helped as well, as the MPRP reportedly put pressure on its members not to be associated with the letter.<sup>75</sup>

The soum governors of Taragt, Arvakheer, Zuunbayan Ulaan, and Bayangol, along with the chairs of the soum khurals, succumbed to political pressure and refused to sign the letter. The Uyanga governor resigned from the movement when he failed to be reappointed as governor. Two governors and two

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<sup>75</sup> Similarly, the governor of Mandal *soum* in Umnugovi *aimag*, who was a founding member of the movement but not a member of MPRP, has also remained an active board member.

khural chairs who served on the ORM board gradually withdrew from the organization, and were subsequently replaced at the annual ORM meeting that followed, thus freeing up the organization to press its demands for government action to protect the Ongi River system from further decline. Curiously, the governors of Dundgovi and Umnugovi aimags, who also belong to the MPRP, maintained their support for the organization. They may have realized the political implications of opposing such a groundswell of support from among their local constituencies. Moreover, the ORM had, by this time, established a rapport with highly placed MPRP leadership in UB.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF CSO ACCESS TO AND PROVISION OF INFORMATION

Although there are other environmental factors, such as desertification and overgrazing, mining practices in Mongolia have had devastating environmental implications. In 2002, the leadership of ORM successfully lobbied the Ministry of Nature and the Environment to investigate the causes of environmental problems in the Ongi River Basin. The study determined that mining had caused environmental damage in the basin (Finding ORM 3). Heavy mining had diverted the Ongi waters from their natural course, and the lack of effective restoration measures had impacted the drying up of the river. Furthermore, the study revealed that 28 rivers in the 8 aimags were in danger of drying up (Ongi 2004:3).

Although the GoM study was critical to the ORM mission, the movement sought in 2002 to gain further independent information about the current condition of the river system (Finding ORM 4). A study conducted by ORM's consultant at Mongolia State University concluded that as a result of the seven ponds built along the Ult River by mining companies, the river could no longer flow into the Buruljut River, one of the tributaries of the Ongi River. He also found 10 other examples of mining activities that had diverted rivers flowing into the Ongi. Although there has been no formal response to these findings, which were presented to key parliamentarians and the Deputy Minister of Nature and the Environment, the study provides further documentation of mining company practices that adversely affect the environment.

In Mongolia, 625 mining companies are registered to explore and mine mineral resources, Among the 307 that mine gold, 32 mining companies are licensed to operate in the Ongi River basin. Together, they use 20 percent of the region's water resources (World Water Actions, 2004). The main environmental issues surrounding mining in Mongolia are 1) no regulation of water use in the establishment of gold mines; 2) use of antiquated technology by gold mining companies that involves creating dams and ponds; 3) weak monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws, notably provisions on diversion of rivers, requirements for rehabilitation measures after mining, and sanctions for noncompliance by mining companies; and 4) mining practices that attract artisanal "Ninja" miners along the rivers, whose activities are unregulated and therefore difficult to control by local government authorities.

"Ninjas" wear metal gear that earned them their name from the popular Ninja cartoon characters. They dig ponds and deep shafts to divert river water and then use mercury to filter the gold, polluting the land and water. Some public officials claim that the Ninjas alone are to blame for current environmental problems. The chair of an aimag khural remarked that mining companies rehabilitate the land after extraction, but Ninjas dig up this land looking for remnants of gold deposits. Aimag authorities, however, may be complicit. For example, in Arvakheer they allegedly permitted, perhaps even encouraged, the Ninjas to dig up shafts that a mining company had filled in as part of a restoration project. Aimag authorities maintained that the Ninjas also have rights to mine and that this was "a complicated human rights issue." As a remedy, Ongi representatives recommended that regardless of whether the companies or Ninjas were responsible, soum governors should be authorized to stop companies from operating the following season if they fail to rehabilitate a mining area.

In its efforts to monitor environmental compliance over the last few years, the ORM has approached the Ministry of Nature and the Environment for information on Environmental Impact Assessment reports, protection plans, and monitoring plans as they relate to the Ongi River watershed.<sup>76</sup> Under the Environmental Protection Law, these documents must be publicly available. The ORM chair noted, however, that “ministry officials prevaricated on these requests and in some cases gave implausible excuses for not releasing the documents.” In a few incidents ORM leaders were prevented from seeing the appropriate ministerial officials. The experience underscores the urgency of a freedom of information law to guarantee access to information, require officials to respond, and thus render government more transparent and accountable (Finding ORM 3).

On the other hand, the movement has had some positive responses to its demands for information. In addition to its request in 2002 for an environmental study, ORM requested in 2003 that the Mineral Resource and Petroleum Authority (MRPA) provide the names of companies operating in the Ongi Basin and maps showing the location of their operations. They also requested information on the volume of mining activities and the assessed environmental damage. The ORM confirmed that the MRPA provided this information “in a timely manner.”

In May 2004, the ORM and the MRPA conducted a joint tour of gold mining sites. They were joined by the governors of three affected soums and representatives of the mining companies. As a result, the MRPA commissioned a comprehensive study into the causes of the depletion of the river and lake. The MRPA sought a financial contribution from ORM for the study; but unfortunately the ORM did not have the resources. Such financial participation would have increased ORM’s stake in the study and enhanced the report’s objectivity and credibility. This illustrates that the capacity of CSOs to generate, as well as to gain access to, information is contingent on sufficient financial resources (Findings ORM 1 and 4).

In comparison with the GoM, the movement has had less success obtaining information from mining companies. For example, in 2004, Ongi leaders requested information on the volume of earth removed by the mining company Erel in order to know the level of water diverted and monitor the company’s rehabilitation activities of their sites in Uyanga. The company declined to release the information, whereupon the team went to the local environment inspector, who said he did not have the information. They then contacted the soum governor, who should have had this information but did not. The governor directed them to the inspector at the aimag level, who said he had the report but that it was in the possession of someone else. The inspector referred them to the Environment Ministry in Ulaanbaatar, to whom the Ongi leaders submitted an official request letter but have yet to receive a response.

To monitor the GoM’s performance, ORM has also sought information under the government’s international treaty obligations. The MoNE informed ORM that there are 11 such treaties and 4 protocols. The ORM leadership complained that the environment ministry only gave a partial response that did not cover all the conventions.

Based on its studies and those requested of the GOM, the leaders of the ORM have demonstrated that mining companies are not being held accountable for damaging the river basin. The ORM and observers from various INGOs, the media, and donor agencies maintain that the Environmental Impact Assessments demonstrate a lack of compliance with the applicable laws, and that the GoM’s environmental monitoring

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<sup>76</sup> During a discussion of the preliminary synthesis of the study with the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Nature and the Environment in February 2006, he indicated that under the Environmental Impact Assessment Law, adopted in 1998, there are 40 specialized agencies authorized to conduct EIAs, including Mongolian NGOs. The secretary noted that this is because “the government cannot control or monitor its own activities.” He added that over the last two years MoNE has monitored 61 entities, of which only 4 percent have carried out restoration activities on sites as required by law.

is inadequate. Part of the problem is that some companies go bankrupt and disappear, and cannot be held accountable for rehabilitation. In other cases, mining companies bribe local officials to escape their responsibilities.

In proving these allegations and ensuring that they are redressed ORM faces an uphill battle. Its mixed experience in seeking information demonstrates the need to address deferred requests and incomplete responses, as well as outright refusals to provide information (Finding ORM 3).

### **VOICING THEIR CONCERNS: A MULTIFACETED STRATEGY IN PURSUIT OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY**

Ongi leaders have employed a variety of approaches to achieve their objectives. For example, in April 2003, ORM submitted a petition to the prime minister. The petition was signed by 1,200 people, mostly residents of the eight affected soums. They requested that the prime minister take the following actions: 1) stop mineral extraction in and around the source and outflow of the Ongi River; 2) ensure the rehabilitation of lands after gold extraction; and 3) include Ongi River and Ulaan Lake Basins in the State Special Protected Areas. In May 2003, Ongi leaders also presented a letter to the President of Mongolia outlining these requests. The president personally acknowledged the letter, but authorized no immediate action.

Ongi leaders also requested a meeting with the prime minister, but were received by the deputy prime minister instead. Unsatisfied with the meeting, they called a press conference and issued a press release on April 15, 2003, “to provoke a response from the prime minister.” Their concerns were carried in several media outlets, including the UBS television, Eagle, Channel 25 TV, the Udriin and other daily newspapers.

The chair of ORM then presented the movement’s concerns and demands at a workshop to commemorate the year 2004 as Mongolia’s “Water Policy Reform Year” (internationally, the “Year of Fresh Water”). The Deputy Minister for the MoNE, who attended the workshop, invited the chair of the Ongi board to address a cabinet meeting. Although he submitted a statement in March, 2004, the Ongi leader maintains that the Environment Ministry’s real motive in inviting his submission had been to garner support for a water law amendment the ministry was pursuing, which required it to show specific interest in environmental protection measures.

In May and June 2004, the ORM leadership also organized an ecology protest march to raise public awareness. The 478-kilometer march traced the entire span of the river. More than 2,000 people participated, mostly residents of the river basin. The march provided a rallying point for participants to air concerns about the plight of the Ongi River, and served as an educational forum for citizens and public officials. During the walk, Ongi leaders held 12 rallies, including a protest rally at a gold mine. Buddhist priests conducted religious ceremonies, offering prayers for the preservation and protection of the Ongi ecosystem. Extensive media coverage, both broadcast and print, ensured wide publicity for the event and greater dissemination of the movement’s message.

Like other savvy Mongolian NGOs, Ongi leaders invite the media to all their major events, using radio, television, and the print media to convey their message to both the public and policy makers. The media also appears to have a genuine interest in ORM’s environmental agenda, as evident in the Mongol Radio journalist who has extensively covered the movement’s programs. The movement’s activities have been covered extensively in both radio and television programs, illustrating the importance of a collaborative relationship between CSOs and the media (Finding ORM 5). With a grant from TAF, the organization

also created its own Web site ([www.Ongi.mn](http://www.Ongi.mn)) in November 2003 to promote awareness of the problems of the Ongi River Basin, as well as broader environmental and natural resource management issues in Mongolia.

### **ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING: CHALLENGES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT**

The ORM work with public officials has borne mixed results in terms of concrete political actions to improve the environment. Some public officials have been fairly responsive to inquiries by the organization. For example, Ongi leaders submitted a compendium of laws to MRPA that it allegedly had been flouted by mining companies operating in the Ongi River Basin (Ongi 2004e). While they responded to each charge, MRPA officials shifted responsibility to local governors and inspectors, who they suggested had not effectively discharged their duties.

For example, one allegation by the ORM was that Khaangarid LLC had violated Article 15 of the Environmental Protection Law requiring restoration of its mining site on the Buyant River. The MRPA responded by citing Article 20.2.4 of the law on Subsoil, which holds local authorities responsible for verification. ORM also claimed that contrary to Articles 31.2 and 31.4 of the Environmental Protection Law, mining companies have not allowed public access to site-restoration schedules or completion reports of restoration activities. The MRPA responded that Article 30.6 of the law on mineral resources legislated only that companies must deliver these reports to local authorities. Similarly, the movement claimed that GoM had not ensured efficient utilization of natural resources and protection of nature in accordance with Section 38, Article 2.4 of the Constitution. The MRPA retorted that the specialized inspection agencies and local authorities had not taken the necessary actions against violations by gold mining enterprises.

However, as one soum governor observed, local government structures are not conducive to social accountability as they are responsive to their superiors in GoM and not to the citizenry (Finding ORM 6). This is attributable to the legal code by which a soum governor is nominated by the local khural but appointed by an aimag governor, who is nominated by the aimag khural but appointed by the prime minister. Furthermore, as the central government licenses mining operations, local governors are powerless to enforce compliance or penalize offences. As an illustration of the powerlessness of local officials, one Ongi board member cited an incident where local environment inspectors had stopped mining in Uyanga, but aimag authorities had superseded that order and allowed the company to proceed.

Similarly, the ORM submitted a letter to a local khural in 2002, requesting action against two mining companies that were allegedly conducting harmful extractive practices. Khural leaders admonished company officials, but to no avail. The khural then passed a resolution to stop mining activities but was ignored. It then requested that the governor shut down the mines. He did so initially, but the mines were reopened through the intervention of the central government.

In yet another incident, a local khural passed a resolution to stop the mining activities of Erel if it did not rehabilitate a former mining site by July 2004. When the company failed to comply, the site was initially shut down. However, it was subsequently reopened by order of the aimag authorities. One soum governor noted that this was “a very complicated political situation” in which vested economic interests often dictate outcomes. Indeed, local members of ORM complained that aimags do not enforce compliance as they, themselves, benefit from tax revenues from mining operations.

Even ministerial support does not ensure compliance. According to Ongi leaders, two mining companies, Seligdar Mongolia and Erel, were ordered by the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in 2003 to halt operations until they had implemented restoration plans. The companies never implemented restoration

plans, but there was no follow-up action taken by the GoM. According to the ORM, only 10 percent of sites have been restored following mining operations. The only response offered by the MRPA is that its Mining Department has set out an annual schedule of sites needing restoration and a list of the associated costs, while conceding that implementation has been weak (MRPA 2004).

## REPLICABILITY

Currently Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia, Inc., and the GoM are negotiating a stability agreement to mine the massive Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposit. Hence, the issues affecting the Ongi River Basin are likely to extend to other regions of the country, which are also beginning to organize themselves in social movements and community-based organizations.

One such organization is the Uuguul (“Native”) movement, established by dwellers of the South Gobi region in 2005 to oppose the government’s Stability Pact with Ivanhoe Mines, which allows Ivanhoe to retain 95 percent of extracted minerals. Uuguul also advocates reform of the Mongolia Mineral Law to include stricter environmental standards for the mining industry. The “movement for Giving Half of Oyu Tolgoi to Mongolians” (or the 50/50 Movement) is pressing for the equitable distribution of mineral resources in Oyu Tolgoi. Toson Zaamar is a movement formed by herders to defend the sacred Barjin Mountain against the activities of the Mongolian-Chinese mining company, AshB.<sup>77</sup> These organizations have explicitly stated that they want “to bring their voice to the government and demand [that] ... the government leaves ... their land alone” (interview with Liberty Center, April 2005).

During this study’s dissemination, the ORM chair listed several new and important developments in the growth of the Mongolian environmental movement. He cited the creation of “Calls for Khongor Aimag” to protect the aimag’s lakes and rivers in 12 soums; “Holy Stupor” [sic.] to protect Aokhon, Tamir, and Tarniliin Rivers in Arkhangai aimag; “Huvsgul Lake Dalai Movement” to protect Huvsgul Lake; “Ardin Elch Peoples Missionaries” to protect rivers in Selenge aimag; and “GToson Daamar” in Tuv aimag to protect the Tuul River.

The leaders of the ORM deserve much of the credit for inspiring these movements, many of which they advise informally and several of which they hope to incorporate into an umbrella organization of environmental protection for Mongolia’s river systems. Their emergence indicates the urgency of environmental concerns affecting Mongolia’s watershed and the perception that if citizens do not act, mining activities will cause serious environmental decline. Whether these organizations achieve ORM’s level of social accountability will depend upon their capacity to tap into political and financial resources, as well as their ability to network and coordinate their activities (Finding ORM 7).

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE ONGI RIVER MOVEMENT

**Finding ORM 1.** Although access to significant and diverse resources, including extensive pro bono contributions, have been critical to the success of the ORM, there are continuing concerns about its sustainability and autonomy, especially in light of the limited resources they have been able to raise through membership dues.

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<sup>77</sup> It has been suggested by various observers that the Zaamar movement’s campaign may be rooted more in economic concerns and the anti-Chinese and anti-Russian sentiments of disaffected Ninja miners than in purely environmental concerns.

**Recommendation:** Although the ORM, and CSOs in general, should pursue sustainable, independent funding sources, the GoM and international donors should continue to provide financial and other material resources, recognizing Mongolia's limited resource base.

**Finding ORM 2.** The ability of the ORM leadership to balance collaboration with and cooptation by public officials has been critical to its social accountability initiatives.

**Recommendation:** Whereas CSOs should expand their collaboration with public officials (for example, joint research studies and fact-finding missions), the autonomy of both stakeholders must be sustained through formal or informal regulations on the behavior and appointment of officials, as well as internal CSO regulations regarding board membership.

**Finding ORM 3.** Although the ORM's close relationship with public officials has allowed it to lobby for research and obtain information from the GoM, the ORM has nevertheless faced difficulties in obtaining information in a timely manner.

**Recommendation:** Public officials should adopt a Freedom of Information Law to ensure the timely access to information that renders government more transparent and accountable. Donors and CSOs working in this area can provide technical support and comparative insights into international standards and best practices.

**Finding ORM 4.** ORM-sponsored research has been an important alternative source of information that has confirmed or elaborated upon GoM's records and data.

**Recommendation:** Given the costs of such research, CSOs should collaborate with the GoM and other national and international actors on related issues, while donors should fund both data collection and analysis in policy areas critical to social accountability.

**Finding ORM 5.** Compared to other Mongolian CSOs, the ORM has been particularly effective in collaborating with the media, allowing it to voice its environmental concerns and offer its recommendations.

**Recommendation:** CSOs should be encouraged to cultivate a collaborative relationship with broadcast and print media at the local and national levels through joint programming and other activities (for example, training journalists about the role of CSOs) that may initially be supported by international donors.

**Finding ORM 6.** Social accountability is weak at the local level because local governors lack downward accountability to their constituents and lack the capacity and the mandate for enforcement. Hence, mining companies are responsive only to the central government.

**Recommendation:** To promote CSO capacity to negotiate with public officials, the GoM should reform the legal code on the structure of political and administrative authority to promote greater downward accountability. To transform the political culture of centralization, senior officials should send clear signals that downward accountability is an important component of good governance and critical to economic development.

**Finding ORM 7.** Although the proliferation of environmental organizations is a sign of growing civic awareness and engagement, the large numbers may also pose a challenge to effective coordination and cooperation among these various CSOs.

**Recommendation:** Effective CSO collaboration should be promoted through increased and regular communications (forums, list serves, and shared Web sites and UB offices), and encouraged by donors through jointly funded forums and projects.

**Finding ORM 8** (based on overall assessment). Effective community-based organizations such as the ORM are relatively uncommon in Mongolia.

**Recommendation:** The GoM, INGOs, and donors should channelize resources to CBOs and expand training programs for these and other local CSOs.

## Annex 4. Social Accountability and Service Delivery: Community Involvement in Mongolian Schools<sup>78</sup>

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One of the more positive legacies of Mongolia's socialist past is its high level of literacy, which remains at 98 percent despite a relatively high level of poverty. Primary school enrollment has also been sustained at a nearly universal rate. However, secondary school enrollment dropped dramatically in the mid-1990s, but recovered to more than 93 percent by academic year 2004–05 (United Nations Statistical Yearbook 2004).<sup>79</sup> Although public expenditure on education has been higher than in most transition countries, total spending has fallen and remains below the 1990 level of 12 percent of GDP, declining to 5.5 percent in 1995 before gradually increasing to 9 percent by 2002 (Dung et al. 2006). Stakeholders nevertheless indicate that education remains a high priority. In the opinion poll conducted in May 2005, nearly one-quarter of the respondents said that education was their highest priority, although only 40 percent thought that public officials were providing sufficient access to education, and 23 percent indicated that they were able to ensure the quality of education (annex 7, Questions C and K).

This case study on community involvement in kindergarten through secondary school is based largely on data collected at two public schools, one in Ulaanbaatar and the other in Uyanga soum, Uvorkhangai aimag, in central Mongolia. Interviews were held with stakeholders at the national and local levels, including representatives of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (MoECS), local government officials, parents, and leaders of education-related NGOs. Whereas the schools were chosen to provide both an urban and a rural perspective, the school in Ulaanbaatar was selected for its location along the “border” between the city center and the Ger District, which is composed largely of recent migrants.<sup>80</sup> Although it is difficult to draw general conclusions about the Mongolian education system from just two examples, the case study provides insights into issues related to social accountability in the education sector.

Over the last decade, the MOECS' reforms have varyingly supported and undermined civic engagement and social accountability in Mongolia's education sector. Although reforms were intended to ensure local input into the management of public schools, it has been difficult to achieve the appropriate balance between community involvement through the school boards and stability in the management of public schools. As a result, effective participation of parents and the broader community in the education sector appears weak. The need for community involvement in schools is illustrated by concerns about mismanagement of funds and allegations of corruption in the private tutoring by public school teachers.

### LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY: FROM SCHOOL BOARDS TO SCHOOL COUNCILS

In 1995, the State Great Khural passed a new Law on Education that established local School Boards for preschool, primary, and secondary schools. Pursuant to Article 30 of the Law, the Boards were given a

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<sup>78</sup> Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Alison Dong, a graduate student at Teacher's College, Columbia University and Bilge Byambaa, a consultant with The Asia Foundation, with guidance from Charles Abelmann (Lead Program Coordinator, World Bank).

<sup>79</sup> An OSF education program officer noted that GoM statistics tend not to include disabled children, mostly mentally but often physically disabled, who are not enrolled in school.

<sup>80</sup> *Gers* are traditional tents commonly used in rural Mongolia and increasingly by migrants whose *gers* circle much of the perimeter of Ulaanbaatar. In the Ger district as well as the countryside, household incomes tend to be lower and social services, less accessible.

wide mandate to manage and monitor the operations of schools. In 2000, MoECS adopted Regulation 92 to clarify the role of school boards, specifying their authority to: 1) hire and dismiss school principals; 2) approve and amend school budgets and investment schedules; 3) approve salary funds and number of employees; 4) approve the development of policy, mission, curriculum, and business plans; and 5) develop their own internal procedures.

Initially, the boards were to be composed of 17 members, with only teachers, students, parents, and representatives of local organizations to serve on a board. In 1998, however, an amendment extended representation to include alumni and representatives of the *aimag* governors as “the founders” of public schools.<sup>81</sup> Under this new amendment, the representatives of the founders were not elected to the board like other members, but were usually the *soum* governors or their designees. Moreover, the amendment stipulated that the founders were to hold a majority of 51-60 percent of the seats on the board.

In May 2002, a new law on education was adopted in which the role of the now highly politicized boards was essentially reduced to an advisory one (Finding EDU 1). These changes were adopted in the broader context of recentralization, which stripped the boards of their fiscal responsibility. The boards lost their power to approve school budgets and were left only with the right to comment on proposals submitted by school principals to representatives of the Ministry of Education.

In addition to their lost fiscal authority, school boards lost their power to hire or dismiss principals; they could merely propose candidates for the positions. The governor of Uyanga *soum* acknowledged that under the new system, boards could technically “block” a candidate nominated by a governor, but ultimately the governor could override their veto and hire or dismiss a principal over the board’s objections. Consistent with the new more limited advisory role of school boards, in 2002 Regulation 230 changed their name from school boards to school councils.

The 2002 Law on Education also changed the process for appointing members to the councils. The changes were deemed necessary to depoliticize the boards and to enhance continuity. In addition to reducing the council’s number to between 9 and 11, the new law stipulates that all members are to be elected at a general meeting (an annual meeting of stakeholders), although representatives of the other organizations are nominated by the founders and merely approved at the general meeting. These representatives retain a majority on the councils even though there is no legal stipulation for this.

### THE REDUCED BUT CONTINUING ROLES OF SCHOOL COUNCILS IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Public officials and community members both perceived the reduced authority of the school councils as undermining their role. The two parent representatives on the Uyanga School Council, for example, noted that unlike the former school boards, the councils have no real authority to monitor the principal or the school budget. At the national level, a member of the Standing Committee on Education of the State Great Khural also noted that school councils have no real authority, as they can merely suggest how to support school activities, improve the quality of services, and maintain parent involvement. Various stakeholders in both Ulaanbaatar and Uyanga echoed these critical assessments of the new school councils.

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<sup>81</sup> Under Mongolian Education Law, the *aimag* or city governors have the authority to create, transform, or disband a local school. As such they are characterized as the “founders” of public schools.

On the other hand, the initial legal code vested inordinate power in the school boards, which exercised more power than community school bodies in other countries. Various stakeholders indicated problems that were created by the boards' exercise of their full powers. For example, stakeholders said that boards would replace principals according to their political affiliation when a new government took office. According to the director of the Mongolian Association for Primary and Secondary School Development (MAPSSD), the changes in 2002 were a result of "founders" politically appointed to the councils asserting their right to hire and dismiss principals. The principal of the Ulaanbaatar school confirmed this practice, noting that 10 principals in one UB district alone were fired in rapid succession in 1997–98, only to be reinstated by the courts.<sup>82</sup> Such practices were obviously disruptive and destabilizing, but could possibly have been remedied by curtailing political appointments to the council rather than disempowering them.

Although the new councils serve only in an advisory capacity, they still play a role in school governance. They make proposals on policy and development, review budget documents, supervise principals, and recommend their hiring or dismissal. Although their powers are markedly reduced, the councils can nonetheless continue to play a role in promoting civic engagement and social accountability.

Nevertheless, the significant reduction in the power of the councils has reinforced the popular perception that they are not relevant. This perception is problematic and needs to be addressed because to be effective, bodies such as the school councils must have the support and trust of the community (Finding EDU 2).

### **NEED TO CHANGE POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN MONGOLIAN SCHOOLS**

Community involvement in the education sector has been limited even when the boards held extensive formal powers. According to a representative of the NGO, Mongolian Education Alliance (MEA), the general citizenry lacks the sense of public schools being "public." Parents feel that they "just need to send their kids to school and worry about their getting good grades; that is enough." She noted that parents rarely attend meetings where their representatives to the school council are elected, because these meetings are "boring" and teachers publicly denounce poorly performing students at these meetings. Moreover, parents believe that principals and those above them have "all the authority" and set the rules of school governance.

These attitudes may well be linked to Mongolia's socialist legacy in which schools had top-down structures of authority, which characterized them as state rather than public institutions. Such authority structures are difficult to reform through legal processes; they require outreach programs that encourage community involvement in the education sector. The need for civic education at the local level was stressed not only by NGOs working in this sector but also by public officials such as the chair of Uyanga's soum-level Khural, who observed that parents are oblivious to the importance of their participation in school councils.

The MEA is collaborating with the Open Society Forum to improve parent and community involvement in schools by setting up a grant competition to which school and local government officials can apply. The MEA/OSF project has sent out questionnaires to 80 schools in all aimags and the Ger district of

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<sup>82</sup> Although there was insufficient time to ascertain the grounds for either the dismissals or the court rulings, the principals' terminations occurred shortly after the election of a new ruling party in 1996.

Ulaanbaatar, asking them to identify their needs and make specific requests to enhance collaboration with the community.

Although more than 40 percent of the respondents to the CSO Survey indicated that their organization works in the area of education (annex 6, Question G), there are relatively few NGOs dedicated specifically to education, most notably MAPSSD and MEA. Both NGOs are spin-offs from the OSF and work to increase community involvement in Mongolia's schools. MAPSSD in particular specifically supports school councils. In addition, whereas unions in the education sector are instrumental in promoting social accountability in many countries, in Mongolia they are, in the words of a CSO leader, "just kind of sleepy" (Finding EDU 3).

### **ENHANCING THE PROFILE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SCHOOL COUNCIL ELECTIONS**

Enhancing the profile and significance of school council elections may be an effective way to change popular perceptions about community involvement in local schools. Although the majority of council members are typically nominated by the governors, the law now stipulates that the remaining council members must be elected. The implementation of this important provision, however, has been problematic (Finding EDU 4).

Not all members of the community or even those elected to the councils are aware of the elections. The governor of Uyanga soum related that a parent had visited him to discuss a matter unrelated to the school. During their conversation, the governor had mentioned that the parent had been "elected" to the local school council. The parent had neither solicited nor accepted his nomination before he became a parent representative on the council.

According to the Uyanga governor, it is not uncommon for parent representatives to school councils to be elected in absentia. Indeed, another parent representative at the school in Uyanga mentioned that she had not known of her election to the council until she was contacted by the school social worker who serves as the chair of the council. According to the social worker, the election took place at the first parents' meeting at the beginning of the school year, which this parent, like many others, did not attend.

Moreover, the director of MAPSSD noted that council members are often chosen by principals. Not only is this contrary to the rules and the purpose of the elections, which is to ensure that council members are accountable to the community, but it seriously undermines the capacity of councils to objectively evaluate the performance of principals or to recommend their dismissal.

### **THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION FOR COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR**

Another factor that undermines community involvement in the education sector is the inadequate access to the information necessary for activism in and monitoring of school governance (Finding EDU 5). Preliminary results from the World Bank-sponsored Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) project indicate that parents characteristically have no information on the school budget processes. Although the representative of MEA noted that it is easiest to gain access to information "at the bottom" (soum level), she indicated that officials typically refuse at the aimag level. Currently, the law on education does not require that school finance or fiscal information be available to the public, a legal lacuna that clearly undermines the capacity for social accountability in the education sector.

Gaining access to budgets is a critical first step in addressing complaints about the mismanagement of resources to public schools. In one instance, local officials allegedly colluded with those delivering heating fuel to schools to supply less than the amount budgeted but then charge the full amount, and pocket the rest.<sup>83</sup> According to the principal, however, the funds that were “skimmed” off were used to cover teachers’ salaries. Regardless of the accuracy of the allegations, they indicate a need for greater transparency and local involvement in the management of schools.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is implementing a Public Administrative Reform Program to assist educational institutions to adhere to the Public Sector Management and Finance Law adopted in 2002. The ADB’s focus is on budgetary bodies and public institutions, as opposed to the participation of local communities or CSOs in budget formulation or monitoring. Moreover, various stakeholders, including education specialists, noted that the PSMFL has reinforced upward rather than downward accountability to institutions such as school councils and local communities (Finding EDU 6). This trend is reflected in the reduced role of school councils.

### THE LOCAL INITIATIVE FUND: A COMMUNITY INITIATIVE?

The Uyanga school was selected for this study from among a group of schools that have received funding from the Local Initiative Fund.<sup>84</sup> A key goal of LIF is to “facilitate community prioritization, selection, cofinancing, and execution of investments in basic infrastructure and social services provision” (World Bank 2005a). LIF provides financial resources to bag and soum communities for a small-scale sustainable livelihood project to empower local governments. For this reason LIF seeks to empower local government and communities and strengthen their capacity to improve the potential for sustainable livelihoods by making financial resources available to bag and soum level communities for a small-scale sustainable livelihood project that they deem to be their highest priority. Priorities are identified at a bag-level meeting and then voted upon by the soum khural. The decision is forwarded to the aimag khural and ultimately to the LIF project office in Ulaanbaatar that coordinates these projects.

The LIF project is being conducted as a pilot in Bayangol, a duureg (neighborhood) in Ulaanbaatar, and in 8 aimags (provinces), where 143 soums (districts) were initially eligible to receive grants of up to \$8,000, subsequently raised to \$16,000 in January 2005. With the exception of Bayangol, LIF targets mostly rural areas. A LIF project can fund anything that is not on a “negative list.”<sup>85</sup> As of January 2005, however, more than 730 projects had been approved to enhance the infrastructure of educational institutions, representing approximately 60 percent of the total number of grants awarded. In addition to enhancing local control over public resources, these education-related LIF projects enhance community involvement in Mongolian schools and empower school councils. The evidence from the Uyanga school, however, suggests that this potential is not being realized.

According to the local SLP secretary in Uyanga soum, meetings were held in the local bags to identify priority sectors for LIF funding. After the bags identified education as the priority for LIF funding, the school authorities selected the actual project. However, parent representatives on the local school council who were questioned about this, were uninvolved in the process and unaware that their school had even received funding from the LIF program (Finding EDU 7).

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<sup>83</sup> Heating and electricity costs account for 20 percent of the money spent on education in Mongolia (World Bank 2002c).

<sup>84</sup> LIF projects are a component of the World Bank-financed Sustainable Livelihoods Project, funded through an International Development Association loan.

<sup>85</sup> The negative list includes projects that would benefit only a few households, may have a negative environmental impact or social consequences, or are financed by another World Bank project or funding source.

Moreover, after a World Bank Supervision Mission in September 2004, the team reported that “a worrisome trend has emerged in which aimag Household Livelihoods Capacity Support Councils appear to be taking away responsibility for subproject design, costing, procurement, and financial management from soum and bag communities.” In a worst-case scenario, these projects designed to empower local communities and governments may actually undermine the authority and role of preexisting bodies such as school councils.

## FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: SCHOOL COUNCILS (EDU)

Participation in school governance through school councils and parent-teacher associations is one of the most effective forms of civic engagement in countries around the world. Education is a matter of great importance to Mongolians: it represents one of the largest public service delivery sectors in Mongolia. Although school councils offer an important opportunity for communities to affect school governance, active community participation has been negatively impacted by certain cultural and legal factors.

The 2002 Law on Education has significantly curtailed the capacity of Mongolian school councils either to demand social accountability of public officials in the education sector, or to be socially accountable to the local community or a constituency of students and parents. Although the initial draft of the PETS report on the education sector indicates that this legal reform has enhanced school councils' capacity to ensure that allocated resources are delivered in a timely fashion, the report does not consider the role of councils in monitoring budget formulation or expenditures, or the need for this important aspect of social accountability.

**Finding EDU 1.** The 2002 Law on Education transformed School Councils into advisory bodies and thus, radically reduced their capacity to promote social accountability.

**Recommendation:** With technical support from the international community, the GoM and education-related CSOs should reevaluate the role of school councils to increase community involvement and social accountability in the education sector. Stakeholders should avoid another pendulum swing such as occurred when the powerful school boards were transformed into the anemic school councils with limited authority to negotiate with the public officials who control school budgets and administration.

**Finding EDU 2.** There is a general lack of knowledge about the role of school councils. This ignorance is reinforced by the sociopolitical context in which school council members, ordinary parents, or community members are unlikely to challenge figures of authority, including school principals.

**Recommendation:** The GoM and education-related CSOs should undertake a civic education program in schools and among the adult population to explain the role of local school councils, specifically, and social accountability in general.

**Finding EDU 3.** Relatively few CSOs are actively engaged in the education sector and even fewer promote community involvement in the local schools and their councils.

**Recommendation:** More CSOs, particularly CBOs at the local level and education-related unions at the national level, should monitor the education sector through targeted capacity-building programs sponsored by the international community and by NGOs working in this area.

**Finding EDU 4.** As legal provisions for school council elections are not typically implemented, councilors who are unaware of their appointment and responsibilities may be designated. This undermines their capacity to voice local concerns when advising the ministry and other government officials about the budgetary and managerial needs of the schools.

**Recommendation:** For school councils to effectively serve as local representatives, at least the majority of the school council must be directly elected in regularly scheduled, well-publicized elections. Ideally, these should be held across the country on the same day along with other local elections.

**Finding EDU 5.** Local communities, parents of students, and representatives on local school councils lack information about school management and governance.

**Recommendation:** In addition to the adoption of an access to information law, the GoM should revise the current law on education to ensure public access to information about school finances.

**Finding EDU 6.** The education law, as well as the PSMFL passed in the same year, has reinforced upward accountability toward the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science rather than downward accountability to institutions such as school councils and local communities.

**Recommendation:** Public officials must redress the lack of downward accountability through legal and regulatory reform while senior public officials must send clear signals about the importance of downward accountability and the important role of local representative institutions such as school councils.

**Finding EDU 7.** Specifically designed to promote community control over the selection and implementation of projects, the Life Initiative Fund presents an invaluable opportunity for local communities (particularly school councils) to become involved in school governance.

**Recommendation:** The experience of the school in this study shows that more could be done to realize the potential of the LIF Program, including the notification, if not the involvement, of local stakeholders.

**Finding EDU 8** (based on overall assessment). Given the dearth of rural CSOs that engage in social accountability, the school councils represent an important and underdeveloped mechanism or forum for social accountability at the local level both outside and within Ulaanbaatar.

**Recommendation:** Public officials should empower school councils through legislative and regulatory reform. Meanwhile, CSOs should enhance the capacity of these local councils through workshops for their members and other public officials, which may be sponsored by the international community.

## Annex 5. Mongolian Media: Overview of Constraints and Opportunities for Social Accountability<sup>86</sup>

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The Mongolian media sector is characterized by lively, if sometimes not very professional, reporting from outlets that represent the full range of political viewpoints, although few outlets are politically neutral. In many respects, the challenges facing the Mongolian media are similar to those facing the media in other countries emerging from the oppression that characterized the period of socialist rule, although progress toward a free and responsible media has been hampered by Mongolia's relative poverty.

The media play a key role in giving voice to the views and demands of citizens, as well as providing information to both ordinary citizens and decision makers. A free and effective media acts as a two-way conduit for communication between government and the citizenry. As such, the media play a crucial role in facilitating civic engagement for social accountability.

This study provides an overview of the media sector and the various constraints and opportunities for media in Mongolia. In addition to legal constraints on the media, the study outlines some of the informal and internal challenges that the media confront. In this manner, the study provides a framework to identify priorities for reform that can promote an environment in which the media maximizes its role in facilitating social accountability.

### MEDIA OVERVIEW

A survey by the Press Institute in 2004 found that there were six dailies, 25 weeklies, and numerous less frequent newspapers, along with 69 magazines, 43 radio stations, 36 television stations, and 13 cable operators (Press Institute 2005a).

All six dailies are alleged to have political biases. The allegations were confirmed by media monitoring of the 2005 presidential election campaign by Globe International, a prominent NGO based in Ulaanbaatar that works on media-related issues (Globe International 2005a and 2005b). All of the daily newspapers are privately owned, with daily circulations ranging from just under 3,000 to almost 12,500 copies in 2004.

There is only one national radio broadcaster, the state-owned, Mongolian Radio. Of the 15 Ulaanbaatar-based stations, 12 were privately owned and three were state broadcasters. In contrast, the state owns the largest share of the province-based stations (10 out of 25), followed by NGOs, which own eight, mostly community radio stations. Another five are privately owned and two are classified as other.<sup>87</sup> The 2005 Globe International project only monitored the national radio, which was found to be relatively nonpartisan in its coverage of the presidential candidates.

There is only one national television station, the state-owned Mongolian TV. There are five television stations operating in Ulaanbaatar, although four more have recently been licensed,<sup>88</sup> bringing the total to

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<sup>86</sup> This note was primarily researched and written by Toby Mendel, Law Program Director, Article 19.

<sup>87</sup> Figures for provincially based stations come from the Press Institute survey for 2003 (Press Institute 2004a). In a more recent report (Press Institute 2005a), the Press Institute indicates that there are now 27 province-based stations, but it does not separate them into different categories.

<sup>88</sup> Two were due to start in August 2005, and the other two must start operating by April 2006, or lose their licenses.

nine.<sup>89</sup> Of the 28 province-based television stations, 20 were state-owned, seven were private, and one was classified as other.<sup>90</sup> As part of its 2005 election media monitoring efforts, Globe International covered the five Ulaanbaatar-based television stations, as well as the national broadcaster. The first round of monitoring found serious biases in all but one station. although this had improved significantly during the period covered by the second report (Globe International 2005a and 2005b).

The relations between Mongolian media and civil society are generally sound. Most CSOs, particularly Ulaanbataar-based NGOs, are able to attract news coverage of their work. Several CBOs, such as the Ongi River Movement (annex 3) have worked closely with the media over a number of years to build better relationships and thus ensure better coverage. Many CSOs have complained, however, that they are often required to pay for coverage that may be tied to the structure of the media discussed below. Furthermore, NGOs must pay to broadcast their own productions, including various public interest programs, though they have effectively relieved the media of the responsibility to produce it themselves.. Consequently, several stakeholders described CSO-media relations as adversarial. In response to a wave of media criticisms at the CSO forum during the study's dissemination, a representative of PRTV commented that "it is easy to accuse the media."<sup>91</sup>

## **THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

The constitution guarantees basic human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article 16.16). These rights may not be used to harm national security or the rights and freedoms of others, or to violate public order (Article 19.3). The 1998 Law on Freedom of the Media supports these constitutional guarantees, prohibiting censorship and the adoption of laws that restrict media freedom (Articles 2 and 3.1). In practice, however, neither of these documents is consulted in legal cases involving the media such as defamation cases (discussed below). As the president of Globe International observed, Mongolia has "good [media] laws but bad governance" in terms of weak enforcement, as well as the journalists' lack of awareness of their rights.

## **BROADCAST REGULATION**

All broadcasters are required to obtain a license from the Communications Regulatory Commission (CRC), ostensibly an independent body with its own oversight committee. The CRC is appointed by the prime minister and staffed almost entirely by senior civil servants. Licenses are awarded through a competitive tender process. A group composed of staff from the CRC and other related ministries (such as finance and justice) assesses applications and makes recommendations to the CRC oversight committee, which makes the final licensing decision. There is a methodology for rating competing applications, which is based on technical factors such as financing, broadcasting expertise, and equipment rather than more general public interest considerations such as proposed program content.

It is unclear whether or to what extent there is political interference in the licensing process at the CRC level. None of the broadcasters interviewed registered any complaint, although as successful applicants

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<sup>89</sup> Mention should also be made of Eagle TV, formerly a terrestrial broadcaster that now goes out on cable. Channel 8 is apparently being held in reserve for Eagle TV, should it be able to resolve internal differences that led it to cease terrestrial operations in 2003.

<sup>90</sup> As these figures are from 2003, for reasons noted in footnote 2, there are now in fact 30 province-based television stations.

<sup>91</sup> While one CSO leader interviewed during the dissemination phase indicated that CSO-media relations are "not so good... not very developed" in Mongolia because "the media doesn't think the CSOs are important," another criticized the media for "not appreciating democratic values."

they would be unlikely to do so. CRC staff members stated that the working group's recommendations are usually accepted by the oversight committee.

Aspirant broadcasters must receive permission from the relevant local governor (Law on Radio Waves, Article 10.1.4). In many cases governors have delayed applications for political reasons, sometimes until significant pressure has compelled them to provide the requisite permission as was attested to by members of the CRC staff during the dissemination mission. The purpose of requiring the governor's approval is unclear.

License fees are the same for all similarly placed broadcasters without regard to either the management/ownership structure or the content. The fee structure penalizes broadcasters that aim to provide higher quality (and therefore more costly) content. It also jeopardizes sustainability for community broadcasters that are operated by NGOs on a nonprofit basis.

The number of licenses awarded in a given sector is determined by the frequency capacity and interest, rather than public interest considerations or market-carrying capacity. As noted above, nine terrestrial TV licenses have now been issued for UB. The disparity between demand and supply results in a serious incapacity on the part of the market to support these broadcasters (Finding MEDIA 1).

## GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING OF NEW PUBLIC BROADCASTING

The 1998 Law on Freedom of the Media formally prohibited state control over the media (Article 4)), though this was never put into effect. However, a new public service broadcasting law, which came into effect on July 1, 2005, aims to implement that law. It provides for an independent governing board, the National Council, for the new public radio and television, which replaced the old national state broadcaster.<sup>92</sup> The new law provides that the 15 members of the board be nominated by the president (four members), prime minister (four members), and State Great Khural (seven members), from a list of nominees proposed by NGOs. Appointments are made by the State Great Khural from these, although this last step would appear to be more or less a formality.<sup>93</sup>

The first National Council was appointed in October 2005, albeit with certain difficulties (Finding MEDIA 2). The Mongolian Press Institute oversaw the participatory process that led to 34 nominations by civil society for the National Council. However, only eight of the appointees were drawn from this list; the other seven were nominated in ways that remain unclear. The chair of the Council, an MPRP member of parliament until 2004, is viewed by some as too partisan for this position.<sup>94</sup> The Council was divided over the appointment of the new general director of PRTV. Some members lodged a court case to challenge the appointment. However, the case was withdrawn and the appointments ratified.

During dissemination of the study in February 2006, some of the director's critics complained that he was less qualified than the other candidates, describing him as "untrustworthy" and "totally close to the MPRP." During a subsequently televised "open debate" at which members of the National Council were permitted to pose one question to each of the other three finalist for the position, he was asked to explain a 6-year-old charge of having embezzled MT 125 million from the national television to produce his own

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<sup>92</sup> The law originally proposed by the State Great Khural was vetoed by the president on two grounds, namely appointments to the governing board and advertising. The president's proposals, described below, were accepted by legislators and are reflected in the adopted law.

<sup>93</sup> The State Great Khural would presumably not review its own nominations.

<sup>94</sup> The Public Service Broadcasting Law prohibits the appointment of elected officials and members of political party management to the National Council, but not former officials or former members of management.

movies. The Council member who had raised this question indicated during a dissemination interview that she was subjected to “black PR” when she tried to sue to prevent the new director from taking office, with newspaper articles accusing her of being of Chinese ancestry, which in Mongolia is considered slanderous.

As of July 1, 2005, the new law also significantly reduced PRTV’s access to advertising to 2 percent of airtime and completely eliminated it from January 1, 2006 (Finding MEDIA 2). In their original budget estimates for 2005, PRTV estimated that it would raise 12.9 percent of its total revenues from advertising, almost all of which was targeted toward programming. As a result, the new system will make it particularly difficult to maintain program quality, although the precise implications of these changes remain to be seen. Under the new arrangements, the transmission system will be split off from PRTV, leaving the former to be managed by the government.

According to an MP interviewed during the dissemination of this study, there is some discussion of reintroducing advertising on public broadcasting. The MP attributed the elimination of advertising to heavy lobbying by commercial broadcasters of political leaders, in particular the former president who vetoed the bill in February 2005, because he objected to provisions for limited advertising.

Various stakeholders also noted that the PRTV has an exceptionally large staff in comparison to independent broadcasters, who use digital technology. Although this could be redressed through an initial outlay by the GoM, a National Council member also recommended that state funding for PRTV be stabilized through five-year budgets as annual submissions that are time consuming and make it difficult to plan programming in advance. This would also enhance the autonomy of PRTV as it makes its transition from state to public broadcasting.

There is no provision in the law on Radio Waves to address content issues in broadcasting, despite serious problems relating to quality (see below), and to political bias in the media. Although CRC staff members claimed that local broadcasting was not an issue in Mongolia, given the large number of radio stations outside of Ulaanbaatar, a leader of the Press Institute noted that there is a need for local public media, which is not covered by the new legislation, save one minor reference. She believes that this could be readily addressed through legislation parallel to the new law on national public broadcasting.

## **REGISTRATION OF NEWSPAPERS**

Print media outlets are required to register with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. Applications are considered by the board of the ministry, a high-level internal body—and a recommendation is then made to the minister, who makes the final decision. Ministry staff indicated that ultimately no applicant has ever been refused, although MoJHA does review proposals to ensure that they do not pursue illegal goals. Proposed names have been rejected on the basis that they are either already taken, or that they fail to conform to rules on the use of the Mongolian language.

This process, however, is open to political abuse and numerous allegations have been made that the registration system is used as a means to control newspapers (Finding MEDIA 3). In at least one case, during the 2005 presidential election, a newspaper was closed due to a dispute over ownership and over a special requirement for all newspapers to reregister (see box 3.2.3, section on Voice). Nonetheless, various stakeholders expressed during dissemination interviews the need to maintain media registration to identify publishers so that they may be held accountable for the content and quality of their reporting. As the president of Globe indicated, “the public should know who is behind the media, who is the ‘real owner.’” To avoid having registration become a means to restrict content and further self-censorship (see

discussion below), the director of the Press Institute suggested that registration be done through a nongovernmental agency.

## ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE LEGAL REGIME OF SECRECY

The media's access to information determines the extent to which they can provide information to the public. A 2005 study by the Press Institute revealed that media workers identified problems in accessing information held by public bodies as one of the most serious constraints on their work (Press Institute 2005b). General publication practices in the public sector are improving slowly.<sup>95</sup> A more fundamental issue, however, is that Mongolia does not have an access to information law, though the need for general legislation of this sort was identified as a key priority by all stakeholders. In 2005, the coalition government made a clear commitment to adopt such a law, including it in the Ten Steps to Intensity: The Implementation of the National Program to Combat Corruption. More recently, a working group set up by the MoJHA, which includes representatives from CSOs, has been developing a draft of the Access to Information Law and is currently seeking comments from other ministries.

Given that the Convention on Corruption recently signed by the GoM requires passage of an access to information law, it is likely that a draft of this law will be considered during the spring 2006 parliamentary session. Failing this, an opposition MP indicated during a dissemination interview that opposition leaders are willing to put it on the agenda themselves. Nonetheless, Globe International, which prepared a Draft Law of Mongolia on Freedom of Information in 2002 in collaboration with the INGO ARTICLE 19, was skeptical since the issue was on the parliamentary agenda in the fall of 2005 as well and was never addressed (Finding MEDIA 4).<sup>96</sup>

While there are a number of specific disclosure provisions in various laws, there is also a draconian State Secrets Law that establishes broad categories under which information may be classified, and grants individual bureaucracies the power to develop their own lists of secret documents based on these categories (Finding MEDIA 5).<sup>97</sup> The government, however, made a commitment in its 2005 anticorruption document to replace this law with a more narrowly drafted one. More recently, a prominent MP indicated that "there is no talk yet of modifying the state secrecy laws either within the government or among the MPs." When the question was put to a representative of the MoJHA, he responded that "this is not within [their] purview but the responsibility of the State Intelligence Agency."

The history of secretive government and bureaucratic obstacles dating from socialist rule reinforces the legal regime of secrecy. As one journalist put it: "We have to sneak around almost like thieves to get information." Obstacles include rules specifying that information may be obtained from only one central contact point; officials causing delays in providing information; and fear among lower officials of the consequences of disclosing information. Consequently, the president of Globe International indicated that reform of the state secrecy laws and introduction of a freedom of information law, although critical, would only be a first step toward changing the culture of secrecy in Mongolia.

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<sup>95</sup> In the legal area, for example, many laws are still not available online, and it is difficult for nonlawyers to access them in hard copy. Moreover, only a small number of leading court decisions is published. On the other hand, court archives are generally well maintained and accessible, albeit for a fee. Mongolia's extremely ambitious plans for new technology, and particularly e-government, may help address this problem.

<sup>96</sup> The director of Globe International also indicated that they have not yet analyzed the new draft, which would require them to obtain additional outside funding.

<sup>97</sup> For example, Article 36 of the Law on State and Local Property requires publication of information prior to a process of privatization: all laws of the State Great Khural, orders of the President, and ministerial resolutions must be published (ARTICLE 19 and Globe International 2002:103).

## DEFAMATION

The Defamation Law is regularly employed in response to critical reporting in the media; the vast majority of suits are initiated by politicians and other officials (Finding MEDIA 6). The Defamation Law was repeatedly cited in interviews and various studies as a serious impediment to free reporting.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, there have been high-profile cases of imprisonment for defamation in recent years (see box 3.2.1, in the section on Voice).<sup>99</sup> Although the poor quality of reporting is a very serious problem in Mongolia, the necessity of criminal defamation laws has been seriously questioned.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, both the criminal and civil defamation laws do not provide internationally recognized defenses, but do provide special protection to public officials contrary to international standards.

During dissemination, various stakeholders, including MPs and a representative of the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, expressed their support for reform of the criminal code on defamation. One legislator indicated that “if CSOs push for this, we could get the government on board.”

## INTERNAL CHALLENGES

### *Poor Quality and the Structure of the Media*

The poor quality of the media content remains a very serious problem in Mongolia despite the numerous training programs offered by both local and international groups. Factors affecting quality include funding constraints, the extent of politicization, the lack of an authoritative standard-setting body, and weak ethical and professional traditions among journalists.<sup>101</sup> At the same time, some excellent work is being produced. For example, TV Forum, a weekly show broadcast on national television under the sponsorship by the Open Society Forum was widely praised as opening up the debate on issues of national importance.

As to the lack of ethical or professional standards, a study by Globe International identified a number of common failings in media coverage, including a failure to check the reliability of sources or to obtain more than one source; failure to update stories with more current information; copying stories from other media sources without assessing their accuracy; and publishing stories to increase circulation without regard for their accuracy or relevance (Press Institute 2005b:15). Stakeholders noted that the problem exceeds a simple lack of commitment to ethics or professionalism and that the structure of the sector is such that ethical behavior is not rewarded by either financial reward or career advancement (Finding MEDIA 7).

According to the Globe International study, poor training also undermined professionalism. One journalist related that he was required to take a course on agriculture as part of his journalism degree, although the subject was irrelevant to his work (Press Institute 2005b:15). In another study, Globe surveyed 200 journalists, half of whom felt that journalists as a group needed to increase their professional knowledge (Globe International 2004).

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<sup>98</sup> A 2001 study by the Mongolian Open Society Forum found that of the 79 civil defamation cases studied from the three preceding years, only four were decided in favor of the defendants (Mongolian Open Society Forum 2001b; see also ARTICLE 19 and Globe International 2002:110-115).

<sup>99</sup> There were no cases of imprisonment for defamation during the Democratic Party government tenure: 1996–2000 (Press Institute 2005b).

<sup>100</sup> One interviewee described the phenomenon of journalists’ negative reporting on one person as a form of character assassination.

<sup>101</sup> The Press Institute survey rated distribution of false information, journalists’ professional irresponsibility, and their political affiliation or dependence as the leading constraints on media quality in Mongolia (Press Institute 2004b:26).

Social and cultural considerations also affect journalistic standards. For example, sports writers find it difficult to criticize players because they are personally familiar or socially connected with many of them. A mutual acquaintance may request that the journalist refrain from a negative or unflattering account, as is also the case with politicians.

Moreover, media owners, who are all politically linked, exercise close control over political content, which results in systemic biases in coverage. There are numerous accounts of editors who either refuse to carry content or insist on a certain slant to a story. Thus, even highly qualified journalists may face obstacles from their editors or the owners of the media outlet. In light of this, stakeholders have proposed trainings for owners and editors as well as journalists.

Despite political slanting in the media, both major political parties are supported by outlets from each media subsector. As a result, stakeholders repeatedly stated that they had to read numerous newspapers to get a composite picture. There are, however, signs that the political polarization of the broadcast media has decreased since the 2004 parliamentary elections and that Mongolia Radio and Television, now PRTV, in particular, is becoming less biased toward the government and ruling party. Monitoring of the media during the 2005 presidential election campaign indicated that MRTV had become far more balanced (Globe International 2004, 2005a, and 2005b; Press Institute 2004b:25-26). It should be further noted that politicization extends to various civil society actors in the media sector, who may, as a result of their own involvement, fail to protest abuses of media freedom.

Another concern is the concentration of the media such as the vertically integrated media empire controlled by Mongol News, as well as Igel's growing network of local (aimag) newspapers (Press Institute 2004a). At present, there is no specific regulation on the concentration of ownership in the media sector or any proposal for such a legal reform.

The criminal and civil laws are the primary means for redressing harmful media content. However, this form of redress is inaccessible for most Mongolians as it is a lengthy, expensive, and unreliable process. On the other hand, when powerful economic or political actors initiate cases, the consequences are oppressive for the media outlets and for the journalists. In many countries, self-regulatory or statutory but independent bodies receive complaints from the public who claim to have been adversely affected by media content. The idea of a self-regulatory press council has been discussed for some time in Mongolia, but the serious divisions within the media community have prevented any sustainable initiative from emerging.<sup>102</sup> There is also discussion about a statutory press council, although there are some concerns regarding the possibility of official interference or control because, as one CSO leader noted, it is "the GoM and politicians who have politicized the media, resulting in the poor quality of the media."

A major obstacle to establishment of such a council is the serious lack of solidarity that permeates the media sector, which also hinders the ability of journalists and media owners to stand up for freedom of the press and their rights as media workers. In a 2004 Globe International survey, 50 percent of journalists indicated that the sector needs a strong organization to project its rights and interests. A lack of such an organization was cited as the most common cause of self-censorship.

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<sup>102</sup> In the 2004 Globe International survey, 47.5 percent of journalists called for a system of self-regulation to improve ethical reporting. In that same year, the Open Society Forum and Globe International worked with various media groups to establish a temporary press jury to hear complaints about coverage of the 2004 parliamentary elections for the three months leading up to the elections.

### *Media Self-censorship*

All of the factors discussed here, as well as the financial constraints and incentive structures noted below, place pressure on journalists to practice self-censorship (Findings MEDIA 7 and 8). There are also a number of informal restrictions that result in self-censorship. For example, critical media coverage may attract telephone calls or threats of investigations under the media registration or tax regimes. The intelligence services also allegedly monitor media output, with obvious implications for self-censorship. In addition, public officials use access to official information as a lure to mute criticism, so that friendly media outlets receive better access (Press Institute 2005b:4-10). Moreover, government funds have reportedly been channeled to the media, in particular to the yellow press that focuses on pro-government and anti-opposition “reporting.” As a further reward, ministries and other public bodies are strongly encouraged to subscribe to the tabloid, *News of the Century*, a significant advantage, given the low circulation rates in the country.

One of the best examples of self-censorship identified by the study occurred in 2005 under the UNESCO-sponsored project “Media for Transparent Government.” The president of Globe International recounted in a dissemination interview that 20 journalists had worked in teams of four to write 12 anticorruption articles. These were then published in the newspaper *People’s Right* under the name of the team, as the journalists had refused to publicly reveal their identity for fear of reprisal. One of the teams even refused to publish an article it had investigated on corruption in the education sector, preferring to take the safer though still risky path of writing on the difficulties they faced during their investigations and the need for media legal reform. Further evidence that self-censorship is a widespread phenomenon is provided in the 2004 Globe International survey: Each of the 200 journalists polled identified self-censorship as a problem in Mongolia.

### *Consequences of Inadequate Funding*

Inadequate funding for the media sector adversely affects the quality of output in various ways. The 2005 Survey of Civil Society Organizations (annex 6 Question HH) indicates that 43 percent of the CSOs surveyed thought that lack of funding was a significant contributing factor to the lack of investigative journalism in Mongolia. As noted above, the underlying problem is the existence of more outlets than the market can support. As a result, almost all media operate at a loss and can only survive with the financial support of a patron that contributes to politically biased coverage (Finding MEDIA 8).

As competition for sales is based on short-term returns, the media are pressured to provide sensationalist stories, regardless of their veracity. For example, one newspaper reportedly published a story about Mongolians in Saudi Arabia; the actual story had concerned Russians, but was adapted for the local audience.

“Financial journalism”—reporting a particular view in exchange for cash—is widespread and precipitated by the poor wages that journalists receive. This point was repeatedly raised in interviews with various stakeholders, while journalists complained that they were forced to write stories they did not believe to keep their jobs.

The media in any democracy have a crucial role to play in informing the public, transmitting popular views to officials, providing a forum for public debate, and monitoring public performance. A combination of legal, informal, and internal constraints undermine the media’s ability to fulfill these roles. Since the end of socialism, Mongolia has made significant advances in the legal framework and in the diversification of the media sector. More is currently required to refine the legal framework, to improve implementation of progressive laws, to address the financial constraints facing the media, to build a culture of tolerance among political figures, and to promote professionalism in the media.

### *Findings and Recommendations: Mongolian Media (MEDIA)*

**Finding MEDIA 1.** The current licensing regulations enable political distortions by requiring a letter of support from the local governor; failing to promote public interest broadcasting by disregarding content; and undermining the capacity of broadcasters by licensing more than the market can currently support.

**Recommendation:** The GoM in consultation with media-related CSOs should 1) remove the licensing requirement of a governor's signature from the law on Radio Waves; 2) regulate licensing by considering diversity of content and ownership, including nonprofit and community broadcasters; and 3) reduce the number of television licenses to reflect the capacity of the market.

**Finding MEDIA 2.** The full potential of the national public broadcaster (PRTV) to produce public interest programming is threatened by dramatic reductions in its sources of funding and the politicization of its new governing body, the National Council.

#### **Recommendations:**

- 1) In collaboration with the PRTV and media-related CSOs, the GoM should promote the capacity building of the PRTV to ensure more efficient management and resource mobilization. International donors should provide initial support for such a program, which should include investigation of cost-saving measures within broadcasting operations and exchanges with other public broadcasters who have been forced to cut back on operations (for example, the Georgian public broadcaster).
- 2) PRTV should monitor the impact of eliminating access to advertising resources, keeping the GoM and the public informed about adverse consequences. Should this seriously undermine the ability of PRTV to provide public interest programming, public officials should amend this restriction and establish a five-year budget to promote the autonomy of the PRTV.
- 3) With initial technical and financial support from the international community, media-related CSOs should monitor the implementation of the Public Broadcasting Law and initiate inquiries with the agencies or the judiciary should any shortcomings be identified.
- 4) The international community should provide technical assistance for the capacity building of National Council members to enable them to operate effectively and in accordance with best practices around the world.

**Finding MEDIA 3.** The registration system for the media threatens its independence by permitting politicization that causes delays or obstructions for those wishing to enter the market.

**Recommendation:** In consultation with the media and media-related CSOs, public officials should revise the registration system for the media to ensure it does not pose obstacles to potential entrants. They may transfer this responsibility to a nongovernmental agency to avoid undue political influence in the registration process. International donor agencies, INGOs, and interested CSOs should actively advocate for these changes by, for example, providing comparative materials on other countries' experiences.

**Finding MEDIA 4.** Although a Draft Law of Mongolia on Freedom of Information was prepared in 2002, parliament has not passed legislation to ensure access to information required by the media.

**Recommendation:** Public officials should take immediate action to adopt an access to information law that is in line with constitutional and international standards. In collaboration with CSOs and the media, and with initial funding from the donor community, the GoM should then promote its implementation through training and publicity.

**Finding MEDIA 5.** A culture of secrecy, reinforced by several broad secrecy laws, is inconsistent with open government and obstructs the media's access to information.

**Recommendation:** Public officials should amend secrecy laws to bring them in line with international standards. To ensure implementation, senior officials should send clear signals against undue secrecy, such as disciplining officials and civil servants who withhold information unlawfully. The GoM, with initial donor funding, should also provide ongoing training for both civil servants and politicians on the negative effects of secrecy and the benefits of open government to socioeconomic development.

**Finding MEDIA 6.** Defamation laws unduly restrict freedom of expression and exert a chilling effect on media reporting.

**Recommendations:**

- 1) In collaboration with other stakeholders, public officials should comprehensively review and reform the criminal and civil defamation regimes to bring them in line with international standards. At a minimum, the provision of imprisonment for defamation should be removed. International donor agencies, INGOs, and interested CSOs with an expertise on defamation laws should actively advocate for these changes by, for example, providing comparative materials on defamation laws in other countries.
- 2) Given the norms that have developed under the current defamation regime, stakeholders need to undertake explicit actions to ensure the implementation of reforms to the legal code. With technical and financial support from media-related CSOs and the donor community, they must revise the legal text and provide training on its implications for both journalists and the judiciary.

**Finding MEDIA 7.** The poor quality of media output in Mongolia is a product of inadequate funding and the related phenomenon of self-censorship, which threaten both freedom of expression and the public's right to diverse and reliable information.

**Recommendations:**

- 1) Media-related CSOs, public officials, and media representatives should have a broad social consultation to analyze the factors that influence the quality of media reporting, such as the politicization of the media, funding constraints, weak ethical or professional norms, and the concentration of media ownership. They may also consider possible actions to enhance incentives to improve quality and reliability. Special consideration should be given to the establishment of a media council that offers country-specific recommendations to address the problem of poor media reporting.
- 2) There should be additional training for media workers, including editors and owners, that focuses not only on promoting professional reporting, but also on enhancing the financial viability of media outlets by promoting efficiency and fundraising.
- 3) Senior officials should take the following measures to address the widespread phenomenon of self-censorship: Prosecute threats and acts of violence against journalists to the fullest extent of the law and publicly expose the perpetrators; stop pressure to subscribe to particular media outlets; and instruct intelligence services workers to restrict monitoring of media output to a limited set of legally defined issues related to state security.

**Finding MEDIA 8.** Inadequate resources contribute to the poor quality, politicization, self-censorship, and ownership concentration of media in Mongolia.

**Recommendation:** As the primary underlying problem is that the number of outlets exceeds the market, broadcast licensing and print registration should reflect this concern, while the concentration of media ownership should be regulated.

## Annex 6. Survey of Civil Society Organizations on the Enabling Environment for Social Accountability in Mongolia

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The Mongolian CSO Survey was conducted to assess the opportunities for and constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence the policies of the Government of Mongolia. The study was conducted in April-May 2005 by The Asia Foundation.<sup>103</sup> Almost 100 CSOs were surveyed in two categories of respondents: a sample of randomly selected NGOs (35) registered with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MoJHA), and a list of “active” CSOs (61) identified in consultation with various NGOs, INGOs, and members of the donor community.

The team decided to take a dual approach because a survey of active CSOs would not reflect Mongolia’s larger CSO environment, where access to resources (human and financial) and public officials is markedly reduced. On the other hand, a random sample of registered NGOs would not reflect the dynamic involvement of Mongolian CSOs in civic engagement and social accountability. Moreover, the team was uncertain at the outset whether TAF would gain access to the MoJHA list, and if it could, whether it would be able to locate most of these organizations and obtain their participation in the survey.<sup>104</sup> In the end, the survey is heavily dominated by CSOs located in Ulaanbaatar (93 percent). This does not reflect a bias in the survey, however, because according to the MoJHA 90 percent of registered NGOs are based in the capital, although only 50 percent of the population resides there. A greater number of respondents would have enhanced the survey, particularly respondents from the underrepresented provinces as well as informal organizations. Nevertheless, the findings from the survey have been very informative, confirming and clarifying the qualitative research conducted for the study.

### I. ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION

To assess the scope of civil society organizations involved in civic engagement, we need some basic information about your organization.

#### **In what year was your organization established?<sup>105</sup>**

Prior to the 1990 Transition	6%
1990–96	29%
1997–2004	55%
No response	9%

#### **Location of main office (city or province)<sup>106</sup>**

Ulaanbaatar	94%
Other	6%

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<sup>103</sup> Recent Politobarometer polls conducted by Sant Maral are available at the Open Society Forum Web site [www.sorros.org.mn](http://www.sorros.org.mn).

<sup>104</sup> In fact, the refusal rate for the randomly selected NGOs was nearly double the rate for active CSOs. Moreover, the list of NGOs provided by the MoJHA frequently had outdated or insufficient information, forcing TAF to take the next NGO on the list.

<sup>105</sup> We also asked the year in which CSOs were registered, but given that responses closely corresponded to the reported date, and a third of the respondents gave registration dates prior to the 1997 legislation that set up NGO registration, this question was dropped from our analysis.

<sup>106</sup> The UB-bias reflects that the category of pre-identified “active” NGOs, which constitute more than 60 percent of the respondents, is based in the capital. It is also a product of incomplete or outdated contact information from the MoJHA on NGOs outside of UB, as well as the fact that most NGOs are based in UB.

**In which parts of the country does your organization operate? <sup>107</sup>**

Hangai	45%
Central	47%
Eastern	38%
Western	44%

**Is your organization membership-based?**

Less than 10 members	4%
11-25 members	5%
26-50 members	6%
51-100 members	7%
101-500 members	8%
More than 500 members	12%
No members	10%
Don't know	1%
No response <sup>108</sup>	47%

**How many people work each week at your organization?**

Paid full-time (20+ hrs)	68%
Volunteer full-time	29%
Paid part-time (<20 hrs)	28%
Volunteer part-time	55%

**Which of the following activities is your organization involved in?**

Legal services	19%
Monitoring government services or performance	18%
Training and capacity building	72%
Provision of services	28%
Research/publications	39%
Other	43%

**What areas does your organization work in?**

Education	41%
Environment	27%
Economic development	22%
Social development	43%
Human, political, or civil rights	40%
Media/information	22%
Women/family	29%
Other	37%

## II. INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The questions in this section of the survey are intended to assess the opportunities and constraints on the ability of your organization to influence public policy and conduct.

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<sup>107</sup> A total of 57 percent of the respondents reported operating in a region outside of UB.

<sup>108</sup> As the survey did not include "no members" as a response, which some respondents added, a significant number of those who did not respond (47 percent) undoubtedly do not have members.

**How frequently has your organization been involved in the following activities?**

At least monthly:

Comment publicly on official conduct or policy	23%
Undertake advocacy for a change in public policy or legislation	26%
Meet or correspond directly with public officials (informally)	56%
Participate in a public hearing/meeting	61%
Participate in state commission or advisory committee	21%
Monitor government expenditure	7%
Monitor the performance of public services	22%
Analyze budgets or explain them to citizens	8%
Other	11%

**In your opinion, which of the activities described in the previous question are likely to result in changes in public policy, legislation, or conduct of public officials?**

Often to Almost Always:

Comment publicly on official conduct or policy	53%
Undertake advocacy for a change in public policy or legislation	60%
Meet or correspond directly with public officials (informally)	66%
Participate in a public hearing/meeting	40%
Participate in state commission or advisory committee	35%
Monitor government expenditure	42%
Monitor the performance of public services	58%
Analyze budgets or explain them to citizens	50%
Other	0%

**J. In relation to the activities listed above, how frequently have you received the following types of responses from public officials?**

At least sometimes:

Your recommendations were incorporated and policy or conduct changed	44%
Public official(s) were held accountable for wrongdoing	4%
Received direct feedback (for example, in the form of a letter or telephone call)	41%
Received negative feedback (for example, in the form of criticism or sanction)	35%
Received no feedback or response	34%
Other	1%

**Rate the following types of public officials according to the degree to which they are receptive to the activities listed in Questions H and I.**

At least usually receptive:

National officials	45%
Local officials	48%
Senior officials	37%
Middle- and low-ranking officials	40%

**Are public officials working in certain ministries or policy areas more or less receptive to the activities listed in Questions H and I?**

Some are more receptive	8%
Some are less receptive	26%
No difference between ministries or policy areas	18%

**Over the last 12 months have public officials become more responsive to efforts by civil society organizations to influence public policy or conduct?**

Much more responsive	17%
More responsive	33%
No change	30%
Less responsive	4%
Much less responsive	6%
Don't know	8%
No response	1%

**In your opinion, are there sufficient opportunities for civil society organizations to influence policy, legislation, and conduct of public officials in the following areas?**

At least somewhat sufficient:

Voice views on public policy, legislation, and conduct of officials	64%
Monitor implementation of policy, legislation, and conduct of officials	32%
Monitor public allocations and expenditure	13%
Monitor performance of public services	28%
Negotiate with public officials to influence policy and legislation	43%

Question on the ability of CSOs to influence public policy, legislation, and the conduct of officials dropped due to mistranslation.

**In your opinion, is the relationship between the government and CSOs cooperative or confrontational?**

Very cooperative	3%
Somewhat cooperative	57%
Somewhat confrontational	19%
Very confrontational	7%
None of the above	2%
Don't know	3%
No response	8%

### III. ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES

To assess the opportunities as well as the constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence the policies and conduct of public officials, in this section we seek to determine the level and types of resources that your organization has at its disposal.

**Does your organization have an office?**

Own a building	25%
Rent an office	57%
Use someone's home	3%
No office	10%
Other	2%
No response	2%

**Does your organization own or have access to the following (check all that apply)?**

Vehicles	41%	up to 7 vehicles, 71% only 1
Telephone	91%	up to 10 telephones, 46% only 1

Computer	95%	up to 40 computers, 21% only 1
Internet	80%	
Other	31%	

**What was the size of your organization's annual budget in 2004?**

< 1 million MT	16%
>1-5 million MT	8%
>5-10 million MT	6%
>10-15 million MT	9%
>15-20 million MT	1%
> 20 million MT	43%
Don't know	1%
No response	16%

**Does the size of your budget vary greatly from year to year?**

Varies dramatically	12%
Varies somewhat	43%
Varies little	29%
Never varies	4%
No response	13%

**Please indicate the percentage of your 2004 budget that came from the following sources:109**

	Mean of No. of responses:	reported:
Member fees and contributions	38	33%
Local private contributions	33	24%
Profit-making activities	41	31%
Funding from Mongolian public sources (GoM)	11	24%
Funding from international donors	43	64%
Cooperation with international NGOs	34	44%

**If your organization has received government funding, please indicate the terms, and which ministry disbursed the funds.<sup>110</sup>**

Contract with a government office	10%
Other form of funding	3%
No funding received	62%

**In your opinion, is the allocation of public resources (funding, contracts) to CSOs sufficiently transparent and fair?**

Transparent and fair	9%
Transparent but not fair	12%
Fair but not transparent	6%
Neither fair nor transparent	58%
Don't know	9%
No response	5%

<sup>109</sup> The varying level of "no response" suggests that those who do not have this budget source did not respond, which of course influences the mean. This is one indication why a face-to-face interview would have been preferable had there been more time.

<sup>110</sup> The percentage of CSOs that reported receiving government funding in Question U (12 respondents) is almost identical to those who reported having a GoM contract or other funding in Question V (13 respondents).

**If you do not believe that the allocation of public resources is transparent and fair, which of the following are factors?**

Contracts are often given to CSOs with links to GoM	24%
Contracting is too bureaucratic	34%
Funds provided are insufficient to deliver quality products	26%
Instructions on how to obtain GoM awards are not available to the public	30%
Information about who was awarded is not disclosed	37%
Very few CSOs meet requirements to access public resources	54%
Other	7%

**In your opinion, which of the following pose a significant constraint on the ability of your organization to raise or obtain funds?<sup>111</sup>**

	At least somewhat significant:
Laws and regulations	55%
The policies of international donors	47%
Political interference	47%
CSO is unknown	47%
Too few sources of funds	65%
Lack of time for fundraising	30%
Don't know	5%
Other	7%

**In your opinion, which of the following pose a significant obstacle to CSOs obtaining funding from international donors?<sup>112</sup>**

	At least somewhat significant:
Funding processes are not competitive enough	51%
Funding processes are not transparent enough	57%
Funding is too short term	43%
Funding is too focused on project work rather than overheads	62%
Funding is limited to a one-time grant for a project	46%

#### IV. INFORMATION

To assess the opportunities as well as constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence policies and conduct of public officials, we need to establish the types of information sought, received, and disseminated by your organization.

**How many times has your organization requested documents or other information from public authorities?**

Very rarely	4%
From time-to-time	52%
Frequently	37%
Never	6%

<sup>111</sup> There was a wide range of “no responses” on Question Y, ranging from 19 percent on limited sources as a constraint on ability to raise or obtain funds to 37 percent for lack of time to fundraise. It is unclear as to whether the lack of a response reflects disagreement about the significance of the factor or lack of knowledge.

<sup>112</sup> There was also a wide range of “no responses” on Question Z, ranging from 24 percent on funding that was too project-focused to 37 percent for funding that was limited to a one-time grant. It is unclear as to whether the lack of a response reflects disagreement about the significance of the factor or lack of knowledge. One response noted a “language barrier.”

No response 1%

**BB1. If you have requested information, was it provided?**

Almost always	13%
Sometimes	56%
Rarely	13%
Almost never	10%
Not applicable	4%
No response	4%

**BB2. If you have never requested information, why not?<sup>113</sup>**

Did not expect to receive the information	1%
Did not know how to request information	3%
Concerned about reaction a request would generate	5%
Government information is not relevant to our work	3%

CC. Question on GoM openness to civic engagement/social accountability committed due to mistranslation.

**DD. Through which of the following sources does your organization receive information from the government?**

Government publications (journals, newsletters)	87%
Government Web sites (specify)	49%
Independent Web sites	18%
Informally from officials (private meetings)	63%
Informally from other individuals	31%
Public TV/radio	74%
Private TV/radio	58%
Newspaper(s)	73%
Seminars, conferences, other events	63%
Other	10%

## V. VOICE AND MEDIA

To assess the opportunities as well as constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence the policies and conduct of public officials, we need to establish the autonomy of the media, its relationship your organization, and other mediums at your disposal to voice concerns and opinions as well as disseminate information.

**EE. In your opinion, do any of the following influence media coverage in Mongolia?**

At least some influence:

Political pressure	83%
Legal pressure (for example, threat of defamation or libel suit)	75%
Economic pressure (writing for pay)	83%
Sociocultural pressures (for example, impropriety of airing dirty laundry)	59%

<sup>113</sup> The 20 responses to Question BB2 were made by respondents who had either not responded to Question AA or stated that they never requested information (6), very rarely (2), and from time to time (7). However, there were also several respondents to Question BB2, who answered as to why they did not request information but had in fact stated that they frequently requested information (4).

**FF. Question on factors that make media more dependent omitted due to mistranslation. In your opinion, is the media conducting sufficient investigative journalism (for example, exposing corruption or violations of law)?**

Sufficient	2%
Somewhat sufficient	26%
Insufficient	56%
Don't know	1%
No response	15%

**If there is insufficient investigative journalism, which of the choices below are significant impediments to this?**

	At least somewhat significant:
Fear of reprisals (for example, from the government)	68%
Lack of training	38%
Lack of commitment to this	64%
Lack of funding	43%

**II. Has your organization ever received media coverage for any of the following?**

An activity or event organized by your organization	69%
Interviewed/profiled your organization	72%
Referred to your organization in a story or program	60%
Covered issue in response to request from your organization	49%
Other	6%
Don't know	3%

**JJ. In the last year, has your organization used any of the following means for disseminating information?**

Produced radio or TV programs	58%
Written articles for publication in a magazine or newspaper	65%
Produced a regular publication (for example, a newsletter)	26%
Written or published books or research papers	54%
Maintained a Web site	39%
Contributed to a Web site	28%
Disseminated information via e-mail	47%
Issued press releases	42%
Given media interviews	71%
Bought advertising	14%
Other	4%

## VI. NEGOTIATION

To assess the opportunities as well as constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence the policies and conduct of public officials, we need to establish the ability of civil society organizations to negotiate with public officials, including the availability of forums for negotiation.

**KK. Over the last year, how frequently has your organization participated in the following?**

At least monthly:

National government/ministry/national council meeting	26%
National public forum or hearing	14%
Legislative hearing	26%
Local council (aimag, soum, or bag)	20%
Other	4%

**LL. How effective were these activities in influencing public policy?**

At least somewhat effective:

National government, ministry, or council meeting	30%
National public forum or hearing	40%
Legislative hearing	50%
Local council	26%
Other	2%

**MM. In your organization's particular field, please indicate the extent to which you feel you have an adequate opportunity to present your views to the government**

Sufficient opportunity	27%
Quite a lot of opportunity	29%
Some opportunity	32%
No opportunity	5%
Don't know	2%
No response	4%

**VI. INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENT**

**NN. Your position in the organization:**

Director	67%
Staff member	16%
Volunteer	1%
Board member	3%
Other	10%
No response	3%

**OO. Your gender:**

Male	49%
Female	49%
No response	2%

**PP. Your age:**

21-30	12%
31-40	24%
41-50	41%
51-60	15%
>60	7%
No response	2%

## Annex 7. Opinion Poll on Government Relations with Mongolian Civil Society

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The purpose of the opinion poll was to gauge popular views on the relationship between the Government of Mongolia and Mongolian civil society. The study was conducted in May 2005 by Sant Maral, a Mongolian NGO with extensive experience in opinion polling.<sup>114</sup> There were slightly more than 600 randomly selected respondents to the poll; half of them reside in Ulaanbaatar, while the rest reside in three other randomly selected aimags. One of the aimags is Uvorkhangai, where we conducted interviews to confirm our findings from the capital and strengthen the case studies.<sup>115</sup>

In evaluating Mongolia's political economy, the two most important issues identified by respondents were economic issues, although they generally considered the economy to be better than the political situation in Mongolia today (Questions A-C). After unemployment (53 percent) and poverty (38 percent), the third most important issue cited was corruption (24 percent), which nearly all respondents consider to be a serious political obstacle (Question G).

One of the most significant findings from the poll was that the overwhelming majority of respondents (92 percent) indicated that they knew little to nothing about civil society organizations (Question Q1). This may explain why the level of confidence in CSOs was extremely low (29 percent), especially when contrasted with the prime minister (60 percent) and the president (69 percent), though not nearly as low as either the judiciary (24 percent), or political parties (14 percent), with which the ordinary citizens presumably have greater familiarity (Question I). The respondents' assessment of the role and influence of CSOs should be considered in this light.

### **A. What is your opinion of the current economic situation in Mongolia?**

Very good	.3%
Good	7%
Mixed	54%
Bad	33%
Very bad	5%
Don't know	1%

### **B. What is your opinion of the current political situation in Mongolia?**

Very good	.2%
Good	8%
Mixed	39%
Bad	42%
Very bad	7%
Don't know	4%

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<sup>114</sup> Recent Politobarometer polls conducted by Sant Maral are available at the Open Society Forum Web site [www.soros.org.mn](http://www.soros.org.mn).

<sup>115</sup> Although several NGOs in Uvorkhangai responded to our questionnaire, the overwhelming majority of respondents to the CSO survey are based in Ulaanbaatar (see annex 6).

**C. What are the most important sociopolitical or economic issues in Mongolia today?<sup>116</sup>**

Education	23%
Health	21%
National economy	21%
Unemployment	53%
Corruption	24%
Poverty	38%
Environment	6%
Other(s)	2%

**D. Are public officials concerned about the issues you identified in question C?**

Very concerned about these issues	3%
Somewhat concerned about these issues	37%
Little concern for these issues	43%
Not at all concerned about these issues	14%
Don't know	3%

**E. Are these issues being effectively addressed by government officials and politicians?**

Very effective in addressing these issues	10%
Somewhat effective in addressing these issues	20%
Not very effective in addressing these issues	41%
Totally ineffective in addressing these issues	18%
Don't know	11%

**F. What are the greatest political obstacles to addressing economic issues?**

Insufficient financial resources	32%
Insufficient technical expertise	13%
Lack of political will	20%
Political instability	35%
Political dominance of a single party	14%
Corruption	36%
Other	5%

**G. If you consider corruption to be a serious political obstacle, which of the following sociopolitical and economic factors are the most important sources of corruption?**

Weak political institutions	18%
Political legacy of the previous socialist regime	6%
Inadequate anti-corruption laws	42%
Inadequate access to information about GoM activities	16%
Low incomes	36%
Informal economy	22%
Weak or disempowered CSOs	9%
Weak or politicized media	7%
Other	9%
Corruption is not a serious obstacle	.5%

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<sup>116</sup> For Questions C, F, and G respondents were asked to list up to two issues. Consequently the responses total more than 100 percent.

**H. To what degree are the following institutions or sets of actors responsible for reducing the corruption of public institutions?**

At least somewhat responsible:

Prime Minister	81%
President	79%
Parliament	76%
Judiciary	73%
Political parties	60%
Local governors	62%
Local khurals	58%
The media	71%
Civil society organizations	54%
Mongolian citizens	73%

**I. What is your level of confidence in the following social and political institutions?**

Confident or very confident:

Prime Minister	60%
President	69%
Parliament	37%
Judiciary	24%
Political parties	14%
Local governors	31%
Local khurals	30%
Media	28%
Civil society organizations	29%

**J. Are coalition governments more likely to improve the government's performance through political consensus or increase corruption through political conspiracy between members of the coalition government?**

Improve GoM performance through political consensus	28%
Increase corruption as result of political conspiracy	33%
Improve GoM performance in some areas and corruption in others	34%
Neither improve GoM performance nor increase corruption	5%
Don't know	17%
No response	.8%

**K. Are public officials effective in the following areas?**

Effective or very effective:

Providing access to education	40%
Insuring the quality of education	23%
Reducing poverty	7%
Protecting the environment	8%
Providing access to natural resources	13%
Addressing women's issues	15%
Reducing domestic violence	15%

**L. How much influence do citizens have on public officials in the following areas?**

	At least some influence:
Policy making	32%
Policy implementation	31%
Legislation and legal reform	20%
Budget allocations and expenditures	18%

**M. Have you ever attempted to influence public officials in any of the following ways?**

	At least occasionally
Write to a public official	7%
Attend a public hearing	14%
Meet with a public official	14%
Participate in call-in radio program with a public official	7%
Petition a public official or government agency	18%
Lobby for the passage, reform, or elimination of legislation	3%
Participate in a demonstration or rally	24%

**N. Do you know your representative to:**

The national khural	84%
The aimag khural	40%
The soum khural	29%

**O. Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections?**

Yes	87%
No	13%
No response	.3%

**Which party do you support? (optional)**

MPRP	41%
Motherland-Democratic coalition	37%
Other party	3%
No response/missing	20%

**P. Do you plan to vote in the upcoming presidential election?**

Yes	92%
No	4%
Don't know	3%
No response/missing	.9%

**P1. Which candidate are you supporting? (optional)**

Enkhbayar (MPRP)	36%
Enkhsaikhan (MDP)	18%
Erdenebat (Motherland)	3%
Jargalsaikhan (Republican)	12%
Don't know	20%
No response/missing	12%

**Q1. How much do you know about civil society organizations in Mongolia?<sup>117</sup>**

A lot	.3%
Enough	8%
A little	51%
Nothing	41%

**Q2. How much influence do civil society organizations have on Mongolian public officials and politicians in the following areas?**

	At least some influence:
Policy making	49%
Policy implementation	47%
Legislation and legal reform	36%
Budget allocations and expenditures	25%

**R. Are CSOs making an important contribution to Mongolia in the following areas?**

	At least some influence:
Mobilizing resources for their members, constituents, or community	47%
Organizing social activities for members, constituents, or community	49%
Providing information to citizens about budget revenues and expenditures	33%
Monitoring performance of government	34%
Engaging public in discussion over issues of public concern	49%
Gathering opinions to communicate to public institutions or officials	44%
Communicating government positions on issues of public concern	50%
Assisting government in policy implementation (for example, GoM contracts)	37%

**S. How effective are CSOs at addressing the needs of their members or constituents in the following areas?**

	Effective or very effective:
Representing their political interests	35%
Promoting their political awareness	36%
Promoting their political activism	37%
Representing their economic interests	32%
Promoting their economic activities	32%
Promoting their sociocultural interests	36%
Providing them with a social community	35%

**T. Have you personally benefited from the assistance of a CSO in any of the following areas?**

Representing your political interests	5%
Promoting your political awareness	8%
Promoting your political activism	14%
Representing your economic interests	8%
Promoting your economic activities	11%
Promoting your sociocultural interests	12%
Providing you with a social community	11%
Other	6%

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<sup>117</sup> After testing the survey, Sant Maral discovered a significant number of respondents could not respond to Questions S through W. Question 1 was, therefore, added and pollsters were instructed to move on to Question W if respondents indicated that they knew nothing about CSOs (41 percent). Consequently, the number of potential respondents for Questions 2 through W was reduced from 606 to 355.

**U. Are most civil society organizations autonomous of public officials and politicians?**

All are autonomous	7%
Most are autonomous	8%
Some are autonomous	16%
Few are autonomous	12%
None are autonomous	3%
Don't know	11%

**V. Which of the following are important roles for the Mongolian media to play?**

	Very important:
Reporting on national events	76%
Reporting on local events	67%
Informing the public about major issues and debates	72%
Providing competing views of major issues and debates	60%
Engaging the public in discussion over issues of public concern	66%
Communicating government's positions on issues of public concern	71%
Reporting on the performance of government institutions and officials	61%
Gathering public opinions to communicate to public institutions/officials	70%
Reporting on international donor activities in Mongolia	62%

**W. What types of information in the Mongolian media are important to you?**

	Very important:
Information about government policies	54%
Information about political debates	45%
Information about the economy	49%
Information about civil society organizations and their activities	31%
Information about international events	33%
Information about sports and other leisure activities	32%

**X. Are most members of the media autonomous of public officials and politicians?**

All are autonomous	4%
Most are autonomous	15%
Some are autonomous	26%
Few are autonomous	20%
None are autonomous	10%
Don't know	20%
No response/missing	7%

**Y. What is your gender?**

Male	43%
Female	57%

**Z. How old are you?**

< 21	9%
21-30	24%
31-40	27%
41-50	21%
51-60	12%
>60	7%

**AA. What is your profession?**

Public sector employee	14%
Small business owner	17%
Large business owner	.3%
Private sector employee	19%
Student	7%
Housewife	11%
Unemployed	22%
Other	9%

**BB. Education**

None	.5%
Primary <sup>118</sup>	15%
Secondary	38%
Vocational	22%
Higher	25%

**CC. Location**

Ulaanbaatar	51%
Uvorkhangai	17%
Sukhbaatar	16%
Khuvsgul	17%

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<sup>118</sup> Also includes those who did not complete secondary school.

## Annex 8. Stakeholders' Map

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Agriculture Risk Management Center	Ms. Oyun, Coordinator risk@agronet.mn jemr@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-323230	Risk assessment		May 2, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Association Against Alcoholism and Drug Addiction in Uvorkhangai Aimag	Mr. Enkhtsogt, Head Cell: 976-99-712656	Support services for reforming alcoholics and drug addicts		April 28, 2005
Association of Employment	Ms. Oyunchimeg, President			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
CEDAW Watch and Democracy Support Group	Ms. Zanaa Jurmed, Director zanaa@magicnet.mn www.iowc.org.mn/cedaw Tel/Fax: 976-11-328798 Tel: 976-11-328823 Cell: 976-99291777  Mr. Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhn, Enkhee53@yahoo.com Icsf-200@magicnet.mn www.icsfd.org Cell: 976-99-162908  Ms. T. Undarya undarya@mobinet.mn Cell: 976-9927-3230 Suite 09, Bagatoiruu-44 Sukhbaatar District P.O. Box 636 Ulaanbaatar-46A	Monitors implementation of CEDAW convention on status of women  Promotes CSOs and democracy  Implements CIVICUS Survey and Democracy Index	Civil Society Partnerships for Democracy ICSF (2003) Violence Against Women and Legal Framework in Mongolia (2002)  Civil Society Index, Preliminary Report (January 2006)	Feb. 14, 2005 May 2, 2005 March 1, 2006  Focus Group: March 3, 2006
Center for Citizen Education	Dr. R. Narangerel, Dir. cce@magicnet.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-313619 Tel: 976-91911799 (H) P.O. Box 1165 Ulaanbaatar-11	Education	Mongolian NGOs Blueprint for Development (2000)	Feb. 17, 2005

### ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Center for Human Rights and Development	Dr. Urantsooj Gombosuren, Chair chrd@mongolnet.mn urantsooj@mongolnet.mn www.owc.org.mn/chrd Tell/Fax: 976-11-325721 Cell: 976-99-192857 P.O. Box 551 Central Post Office Ulaanbaatar-13	Research, training, documents violations, helps capacity building of NGOs on report writing, lobbying * Co-authored courses with National Legal Center	Violence Against Women and Legal Framework in Mongolia (2002) Political Participation of Women in Mongolia: An Outline of Country Report (1999)	April 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Center for Rural Women's Empowerment	Ms. Otgonbayar, Director			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Center for Women's Development	Ms. Oyunsan, Director			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Center of Female Lawyers	Ms. Nyamjav, Executive Director			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Confederation of Mongolian Journalists	Ms. Sarangerel, Head Tel: 976-11-330948 Assistant's Cell: 976-91188017	Media union		Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Consumer Rights Protection Association	Mr. D. Togtokhbayar, Director www.owc.org.mn Tel: 976-11-329783	Protects interests and rights of consumers		Focus Group; May 3, 2003
Democracy Education Center	Ms. Undral GoMbodorj, Director demo@magicnet.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-310560 Cell: 99164419 P.O. Box 308 Ulaanbaatar-13  Ms. Oyungerel	Strengthens civil society through education on democracy and promotion of active citizenship  NGO capacity building; democracy education; school for young political leaders, volunteers		Feb. 17, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Employers' Union	Mr. Baatar			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Federation of Private Universities and Colleges	Mr. Avir, Chief of Chancellery			Focus Group: May 3, 2005

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	<u>INTERVIEWS</u>
Gandan Monastery	Mr. Choijamts, Hamba Lama  Mr. Purevbat, Buddhist monk, mibapur@yahoo.com www.mibart.org Tel: 976-11-362008 or 363831 Fax: 976-11-360354 Cell: 976-99194670	Buddhist religious institution		Feb.18, 2005 April 26, 2005
Gandantsemnel Monastery	Mr. Tugs, Head Lama and Mr. Yangiv, Ven Gesgui Lama  Uyanga Soum, Uvorkhangai Aimag	Buddhist religious institution		April 29, 2005
Gender Center for Sustainable Development	Ms. Amgalan, Executive Director terbish_amgalan@yahoo.com, www.wirc.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11325627	Promotes women's role in and benefits from development	Survey Report on NGO-Implemented Assistance in Social Sector in Mongolia (2000)	April 28, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
General Committee of the Pioneers	Mr. Samdansuren			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Globe International	H. Naranjargal globe@magicnet.mn http://www.globeinter.org/en/index.php Tel: 976-11-324627  D. Munkhburen, Executive Director Cell: 976-11-99189576  J. Tuul, Law Program Coordinator tuulj@mongolnet.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-324764 Sukhbaatar duureg, City Cultural Palace, Tower A, #334	Media  Draft of Freedom of Information legislation  Independent media project that led to Public Service Broadcasting legislation  Currently pursuing 1 percent rule, parallel to Hungary's, to set aside 1 percent of the 10 percent income tax for charities	See Bibliography	Feb. 18, 2005 April 24 and 28, 2005, March 2, 2006.  Focus Groups: May 3, 2005, March 3, 2006

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Inforum NGO	Mr. B. Lutaa, Director and Editor of Info newspaper and New Times online magazine nomad_lut@yahoo.com , www.newtimes.mn, www.mongoliatoday.com  Lutaa@adonline.mn Tel: 976-11-312919 (O) Cell: 976-99113306			
Japan-Mongolian Information Technology Association	Mr. B. Erdenesuren, President and MP erdenesuren@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-266457 Fax: 976-11-322866  Cell: 976-99113468  Assistant's Cell: 976-99883222	ICT  Distribution of Japan-donated computer equipment in schools		May 3, 2005
Just Society (or Healthy Society)	Ms. Ichinnorov lclsr@magicnet.mn www.olloo.mn www.owc.org.mn/lclsr Tel: 976-11-329895 Fax: 976-11-327898 Cell: 976-99153273  Mr. Batzandan, Leader www.entik.net Cell: 976-99111403	Corruption  Rallies and sit-ins in Spring 2005		Feb. 15, 2005        April 25, 2005 March 2, 2006
Kyokushuzan Development Foundation	Mr. Tumurbaatar, Deputy Director			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Lawyers' Center for Legal Reform (or Just Society)	Ms. Ichinnorov, Head lclsr@magicnet.mn www.olloo.mn www.owc.org.mn/lclsr Tel: 976-11-329895 Fax: 976-11-327898 Cell: 976-99153273	Legal reform  TV programs to educate on legal rights  Legal cases to challenge system		February 2005

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Liberal Women's Brain Pool NGO	Ms. P. Baigalmaa, Executive Director pbaigal@leos.mn leos@magicnet.mn www.leos.mn Tel: 976-11-319774 Fax: 976-11-312865 Cell: 976-99820871	Promotes political and socioeconomic development in Mongolia	Mongolian NGOs Blueprint for Development (2000)	
Liberty Center	Ms. Oyungerel, Advisor to PM oyunlta@yahoo.com www.liberty-center.org Tel: 976-11-304387 Fax: 976-11-322727 Cell: 976-99175324  Ms. A. Ariuntuya, Director Tel: 976-11-321297	Human rights, especially legal and political  Engages judicial system with goal of systemic change: success in 20 out of 40 cases	Environmental Movements Burst as Mongolian Mining Industry Booms. <a href="http://www.liberty-center.org/">http://www.liberty-center.org/</a>	Feb. 15, 2005 April 27, 2005
Mamba Datsang Monastery	Mr. Amgalan, Abbot			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Mining Association	Mr. Alagaa, Head mongma@mobinet.mn Tel: 976-11-314877 Fax: 976-11-319563 Cell: 976-99127929  Mr. P. Ochirbat, President Tel: 976-11-327233 Cell: 976-99117505	Promotes mining industry		May 2, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Mobile to Mongolia	Mr. Bilegsaikhan			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Mongolian Association for Local Governance Authorities	Mr. D. Manaljav, Head Cell: 976-99172152  Mr. M. Mandakh, Deputy Director Cell: 976-91914003	Promotes local governance and decentralization	The Manifesto on Local Self-governance of Mongolia (2001)	April 26, 2005
Mongolian Association for Primary and Secondary School Development	B. Jadamba, Director jadamba@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-311588 School of Education Studies, Room 29 Ulaanbaatar-48	Education		

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Mongolian Association of Higher Educational Schools	B. Erdenesuren, President and MP erdenesuren@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-266457 Fax: 976-11-322866 Cell: 976-99113468	Education		
Mongolian Bar Association	Ms. Orkhon, Desk Officer			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Mongolian Democratic Socialist Women's Association	Dr. Dulbaagiin Altai, Chair and former MP Mdswa94@yahoo.com mmatsfl@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-51-262249 Fax: 976 11-321136 Room 506, Central Building of MPRP	Women's wing of the MPRP though registered as an NGO		Feb. 17, 2005
Mongolian Development Gateway	Ms. Tsetseg-Ulzii Yadamshuren, Executive Director tsetsegu@magicnet.mn www.gateway.mn Tel: 976-11-319367 Cell: 99091156 P.O. Box 349 UB 210646-A Suite 109-B National Information Tech Park Baga Toiruu-49 List Serve: demongos@gateway.mn	ICT  Provides Internet forums and sub-portals for discussion on policy issues	Current Status of ICT Development in Mongolia (2003)	Feb. 16, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Mongolian Education Alliance	Ms. Enkhtuya, Executive Director Tel: 976-11-329285 Cell: 976-99283618  Ms. Baasanjav, Implementation Manager	Promotes education sector, focusing on teacher training and curriculum development	MEA Pamphlet List of MEA Partner Schools  The Class Monitor: Product and Producer of a "Darga Mentality" in the Classroom	April 26, 2005 March 1, 2006  Focus Group: March 3, 2006
Mongolian Information Development Association (MIDAS-MONITA)	S. Enkhjargal, Executive Director secretary@ict.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-329902 Cell: 976-99129385  Ms. Ariuntsetseg			April 26, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2003

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Mongolian Information Network Media and Strategy NGO	Mr. Bat-Orgil, Executive Director info@mn.org.mn www.min.org.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-324632 Cell: 976-99116632	Media		April 29, 2005
Mongolian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Mr. S. Demberel, Director chamber@mongolchamber.mn www.mongolchamber.mn Tel: 976-11-324620 or 324489 Fax: 976-11-312707 Cell: 976-99112509  Ms. Zolzaya, Director (UV) Tel: 976-01322-23858	Promotes business	Corruption in Business Sector (2000)	
Mongolian Women's Association	J. Erdenechimeg, President Tel: 976-11328336 Fax: 976-11320790 Cell: 976-99095474  Ms. Ariunaa, Executive Director www.owc.org.mn/mwa Tel: 976-11328336 Fax: 976-11320790	Women		Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Mongolian Youth Federation	Mr. Zorigtbaatar, President Zorig68@yahoo.com http://Mongolianyouth.org Tel/Fax: 976-11-322046 Baga Toiruu-44 Ulaanbaatar  Ms. Oyuntsetseg	Youth		Feb. 17, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
National Association of the Elderly	Mr. Tserendorj, Director Tel/Fax: 976-11-326138 Cell: 976-91115353  Mr. Odonchimeg, Social Worker	Elderly		Focus Group: May 3, 2005
National Center Against Violence	Ms. D. Enkhjargal, Head mongolcav@magicnet.mn www.ncav.org Tel: 976-11-329850 Fax: 976-11-318087  Cell: 976-99194012  Ms. Purevsuren, (Uvorkhangai aimag) Tel: 976-01322-23737(H) 976-01322-22884 (O) Cell: 976-99240762	Worked on recent legislation on: -Domestic violence - Violence against women and the legal framework in Mongolia	Violence Against Women and Legal Framework in Mongolia (2002)  With TAF, Fact Sheet on Domestic Violence (2003)  With Amnesty International, Catalogue for Photo Exhibit on Gender in Mongolia,	April 27, 2005 March 2, 2006  Focus Groups: May 3, 2005 March 3, 2006
National Network of Mongolian Women's NGO	Ms. D. Baljinnyam, Head Tel: 976-11-328263	Women		
Ochirbat Foundation	Mr. P. Ochirbat, Head First President of Mongolian Republic, Former President of the Mining Association Tel: 976-11-327233 Cell: 976-99117505			May 2, 2005

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
<p>Ongi River Movement (ORM)</p>	<p>Munhbayar, Head Tel: 976-11-327781 Cell: 976-99823551</p> <p>Mr. Amarsanaa, Executive Director ongii@chinggis.comm www.ongiriver.mn P.O. Box 264 Ulaanbaatar 210535</p> <p>Mr. Chandmani. Advisor chandmani@chinggis.com Tel: 976-11-341918 (O) Tel: 976-11-368466 (H) Cell: 976-99132604</p> <p>Gendentogmid, Mr.Davaasuren, and Tumurchudur, members of Ongi River Movement, Uyanga Soum, Uvorkhangai Aimag</p>	<p>Environment (mining) - Education of population and public officials - Conducted 8 soum town hall meetings - Conducted letter drive targeting 76 MPs, GoM, and the President - Campaigned to get MoNE to assess causes of river's disappearance - Lobbying to change and implement environmental protection laws - Inspired creation of other watershed-based CBOs with which it is currently seeking to form a union under "Rivers at Risk"</p>	<p>Letter to N. Enkhbayar, Prime Minister, April 14 (2002)</p> <p>Invitation Letter to Director of Retona Ink Mongolia Co., Ltd. (2002)</p> <p>Invitation Letter to Mr. Badamdorj, Director of Baket Co., Ltd. (2002)</p> <p>Letter to N. Enkhbayar, Prime Minister (2003)</p> <p>Letter to N. Bagabandi, The President of Mongolia and Head of National Security Consul, #10 (2003)</p> <p>Some facts about the violation of laws and regulations by mining entities operating in upstreams of Khangai mountain range, and by national and local policy makers</p> <p>Letter to N. Enkhbayar Leader of MPRP, #46 (2004)</p> <p>Request letters to N. Enkhbayar, Leader of MPRP; M. Enkhsaikhan, Leader of MDP; and B. Erdenebat, Leader of Mongolian New Socialist Party, #46/47/48 (2004)</p> <p>Request letters to the Head of the Citizens' Representative Khural and Governor of Soum (2004)</p> <p>Introduction letters to the President of Mongolia and Standing Committees of Parliament (2004)</p> <p>See Bibliography for additional documents produced by ORM</p>	<p>April 25, 29 2005; May 2, 2005; March 1, 2006</p>

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Open Society Forum	<p>Ms. P. Erdenejargal, Executive Director jargal@soros.org.mn , www.forum.mn Tel: 976-11-313207 Fax: 976-11-324857 Jamiyan Gun Street-5/1 Sukhbaatar District Ulaanbaatar- 48</p> <p>Ms. Gerelmaa, Social Sector Manager</p> <p>Mr. Delgertsogt, Research Fellow</p> <p>N. Dorjdari, Manager dorjdari@soros.org.mn www.forum.mn Cell: 976-99-199594</p> <p>Ms. Bayartsetseg, Rule of Law Program Coordinator bayar@soros.org.mn</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Election campaign-financing project,</li> <li>- Access to justice project</li> <li>- NGO legal regulation</li> <li>- Freedom of information</li> <li>- Open and transparent budget</li> <li>- Ethics of politicians</li> <li>- Information and communication technology policy</li> <li>- Role of media during elections</li> </ul>	<p>School 2001, Evaluation Project Year 1 (1999)</p> <p>School 2001, Evaluation Project Year 2 (2000)</p> <p>Report on Internet for Project Rural Schools (2001)</p> <p>Survey Report 2003, Internet and Information Needs of NGOs (2003)</p> <p>Directory of Mongolian NGOs (2003)</p> <p>Evaluation Report: First Project Phase 2000 –2004, Rural School Development Project in Mongolia (2004)</p> <p>Striking Balance Between Central and Local Government (2005)</p>	<p>Feb. 18, 2005</p> <p>Feb. 18, 2005 April 28, 2005 May 3, 2005</p> <p>Focus Groups: May 3, 2005 March 3, 2006</p> <p>Feb. 18, 2005 April 28, 2005 March 2, 2006</p>
Political Education Academy	<p>Dr. D. Ganbat, Executive Director ganbat@apemongolia.org info@apemongolia.org pecademy@mobinet.mn www.apemongolia.org www.owc.org.mn/pea Cell: 976-99119112 P.O. Box 337 Ulaanbaatar 210620</p> <p>Ms. Pagma Ariunjin, (UV) Tel: 976-01322-23440</p>	<p>Governance and decentralization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Training and seminars</li> <li>- Applied research</li> <li>- Publishing periodicals, brochures, and textbooks</li> </ul>		<p>Feb. 15, 2005 May 3, 2005, Feb. 28, 2006</p> <p>Focus Group: March 3, 2006</p> <p>Focus Group: May 3, 2005</p>

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Press Institute	Munhmandah, Managing Director munkhmandakh@pressinst.org.mn pim@pressinst.org.mn www.pressinst.org.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-350002  Ms. Oyuntsetseg, Teacher of "Journalist" College and Deputy Director of Training Department ravidano@yahoo.com , www.owc.org.mn/Press_Institute Tel: 976-11-353476 Cell: 976-99238768	- Supports median transparency program by Globe International along with the Zorig, Foundation and UNESCO	Freedom of Information in Mongolia: Case Study Report (2005)	April 28, 2005 Feb. 27, 2006  Focus Group: March 3, 2006
Red Cross	MP Odonchimed, President redcross@magicnet.mn www.redcross.mn Tel: 976-11-311941 Fax: 976-11-320934	Public service delivery: Health - Blood donor program funded by Govt		Feb. 14, 2005
Rivers at Risk		Environment - Umbrella organization for environmental organizations focused on rivers		
Sant Moral Foundation	Mr. Sumati, Director lsumati@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-350543 Fax: 976-11-350542 Cell: 976-99116373	- Conducts surveys including political polls and is involved in World Bank business survey	Politbarometer (2004-06) <a href="http://www.opensocietyforum.mn/res_mat/SMPBM04.6_eng.pdf">http://www.opensocietyforum.mn/res_mat/SMPBM04.6_eng.pdf</a>	Feb. 17, 2005 April 25, 2005 May 3, 2005 Feb. 27, 2006
Social Development Center	Mr. Gantumur, Director csd@mongolnet.mn Tel: 976-11-329607 Cell: 976-91911926			April 26, 2005

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Supreme Council of Condominium Associations of Mongolia	Ms. Shatarkhuu Jargalsaikhan, Executive Director, Tsognyam, Chief sccam@mobinet.mn www.owc.org.mn/sccam Tel/Fax: 976-11-323106 Khvsgalchdiin Avenue Ulaanbaatar-38	Owners association/ public service delivery - Mediation - Builds capacity of associations - Attempts to get action by local officials on issues and unlawful constructions		Feb 18, 2005
Suvd	Bolorchuluun, Director suvd615@yahoo.com Tel/Fax: 976-11-318529 Cell: 976-91910615	Provides legal service		April 29, 2005
Tseh	Mr. Lamjav, Lawyer Cell: 976-99118804	Protects human and constitutional rights		May 2, 2005
Union of Savings and Credit Unions	Ms. Munkhtuya			Focus Group: May 3, 2005
UNMENGO	Dr. Jamsran Batbold, President umengo@magicnet.mn batbold@magicnet.mn www.umengo.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-315306 Cell: 976-99113499 P.O. Box 192 Ulaanbaatar-46	Environment - Umbrella organization for CSOs involved in environmental issues	A. Bolat, Deputy Minister of Nature & Environment, Request letter to D. Odbayar, Governor of Dornod Aimag, # 4/1400 (2002)  D. Odbayar, Governor of Dornod Aimag, Reply letter to A. Bolat, Deputy Minister of N&E, #1/674 (2002)  N. Ekhbayar, Prime Minister of Mongolia, Submission of Proposal to S. Tumr-Ochir, Parliament Speaker (n.d.)	April 26, 2005
Voters Education Interest	Ms. Burmaa (also WSP), Director wsp@magicnet.mn www.mol.mn/wsp Tel: 976-11-328291 Cell: 976-99117596	Citizen and voter education		Feb. 18, 2005 May 2, 2005 March 1, 2006  Focus Group: March 3, 2006

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

CSO NAME	CONTACT INFORMATION	CORE ACTIVITY AREAS	DOCUMENTS	INTERVIEWS
Women For Social Progress, (Ulaanbaatar Headquarters)	Ms. Burmaa (also VEI), Director wsp@magicnet.mn www.mol.mn/wsp Tel: 976-11-328291 Cell: 976-99117596	Citizen and voter education	Report on Issues of Soum Government Budgets (2001)	Feb 18, 2005 May 2, 2005 March 1, 2006  Focus Group: March 3, 2006
Women For Social Progress, Uvorkhangai	Ms. Byambaa, Director uvwsp@chinggis.com Tel/Fax: 976-01322-22667 Cell: 976-99182189	Citizen participation in governance and decision making, monitoring government actions. Operated 40 projects, 90 percent of which involved citizen monitoring (see annex 2 for list of activities)	Report on Issues of Soum Government Budgets (2001)	April 29, 2005 March 1, 2006  Focus Group: March 3, 2006
Women's Leader Fund	Ms. Bolormaa, Head wlfound@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-328263 Cell: 976-91197177	Promotes women in leadership positions		April 26, 2005 May 3, 2005
World Wildlife Fund	Ms. Chimeg, Director wwfmon@magicnet.mn , chimeg@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-318447 Fax: 976-11-310237			April 26, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Zorig Foundation	Ms. Oyun, Chair and MP oyuna@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-323645 Fax: 322866 Government House 251 Ulaanbaatar-12  Ms. Naranzul, Executive Director naranzul@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-315444	Governance and corruption  - On board of Transparency International  - Supports Globe International project on media transparency	Final Report on the project "Monitoring of the Implementation of the Government's National Anti-Corruption Program (NACP) in Mongolia and the Role of the Open Society in Fighting Corruption (2004)	Feb 17, 2005 April 26, 2005 Feb. 28, 2006        Feb. 29, 2006

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
<b>PUBLIC OFFICIALS</b>				
Prime Minister	<p>Mr. Ulaan, Deputy Prime Minister, Tel: 976-11-304387 Fax: 976-11-322727 Cell: 976-99175324</p> <p>Ms. Oyungerel, Advisor to PM oyunlta@yahoo.com www.liberty-center.org</p> <p>Mr. Enkhbat, PM's Office responsible for LIF Bloc Grant, Cell: 976-99860741</p>		<p>Liberty Center, "Project Implementation Manual" for the Local Initiative Fund (2003)</p>	<p>April 25, 2005</p> <p>April 26, 2005</p> <p>April 30, 2005</p>
President	<p>Mr. Bayasgalan Gungaa, Legal Advisor bayasgalan@presi.pmis.gov.mn State House Ulaanbaatar-12 Tel: 976-11-324419 Fax 976-11-311121</p>			<p>Feb 15, 2005</p>

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
<p>State Great Khural (Parliament)</p> <p>Mongolian Standing Committee on the Economy</p> <p>Mongolian Standing Committee on State Structure</p>	<p>Mr. B. Erdenesuren, MP erdenesuren@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-266457 Fax: 976-11-322866 Cell: 976-99113468 Assistant's Cell: 976-99883222</p> <p>Mr. Batuul, MP and Leader of the Mongolian Democratic Party</p> <p>Ms Oyun, MP Civil Will oyuna@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-323645 Fax: 322866</p> <p>Nadine Kreisberger, Advisor Nadine@inmongolia.com Cell: 99175015 Government House 251 Ulaanbaatar-12</p> <p>D. Idevkhten, MP</p> <p>M. Sharavdorj, MP</p> <p>Mr. Damiran, MP and Committee Chair Tel: 976-11-260749 or 262569 Fax: 976-11-322569</p> <p>Mr. C. Batbold, MP and Committee Chair batbold@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-320382, 976-11-320385 Cell: 976-99117130 Fax: 976-11-322866</p> <p>Gavaagiin Chagnaadorj, Coordinator</p>		<p>Chair, Zorig Foundation</p>	<p>May 3, 2005</p> <p>Feb. 28, 2006</p> <p>Feb. 26, 2005 April 30, 2005; Feb. 27, 2006</p> <p>Feb. 27, 2006</p> <p>Feb. 28, 2006</p> <p>May 2, 2005</p> <p>April 25, 2005</p>





**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
Mongolian Standing Committee on Budget	<p>Mr. R. Badamdandin, MP and Chairman badamdandin@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-329758 Fax: 976-11-311798 Cell: 976-99114609</p> <p>Baigalmaa, Assistant Tel: 976-11-312346 Cell: 976-99199593</p>			<p>May 2, 2005 Feb. 28, 2006</p>
Mongolian State Auditing Control and Inspection Committee	<p>Mr. Javzmaa, Chairman Tel: 976-11-264653</p>			<p>May 2, 2005</p>
Mongolian State of Democracy Conference	<p>Hulan, Manager Tel: 976-11-319603</p>			<p>May 3, 2005</p>
Mongolian State Property Committee	<p>Mr. N. Enkhbold, Chairman enkhbold@spc.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-312460</p>			<p>April 28, 2005</p>
National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia	<p>Mr. S. Tserendorj, Chief, s.tserendorj@nhrc-mn.org Tel: 976-11-320284 Fax: 976-11320284 Cell: 976-99115421</p> <p>Jadamba Dashdorj, Commissioner j.dashdorj@nhrc.mn www.nhrc.mn Tel: 976-51-266717 (O) Tel: 976-11-366547 (H) Fax: 976-11-262971 Room 503 Government Building 11, Liberty Square, Ulaanbaatar-38</p> <p>Ms. G. Zoljargal, Public Affairs Officer g.zoljargal@nhrc-mn.org Cell: 976-9159794</p>	<p>Human rights</p>	<p>Human Rights and Freedoms in Mongolia: Status Report 2003</p> <p>Human Rights and Freedoms in Mongolia: Status Report 2004</p>	<p>Feb. 17, 2005</p> <p>April 25, 2005</p>

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
National Legal Center (Judicial Research, Training and Information)	<p>Dr. Jugnee Amarsanaa, Director Tel: 99186759 Fax: 976-11-315735 amrsna@yahoo.com</p> <p>D. Orosoo, Researcher Tel: 976-11-315734 Cell: 976-99193620</p> <p>Dr. Dorjdamba Zumberellkahn, Head of Sector for Criminological Research Tel: 976-11460997 Ulaanbaatar-46</p>		<p>Assessment of the Mongolian Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (2000)</p> <p>Regulation on registration of legal entities (newspapers, religious organizations, NGOs) (n.d.)</p> <p>Regulation on visiting parliament (2004)</p>	Feb. 15, 2005 April 27, 2005; March 1, 2006
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education, Culture and Science	Mr. B. Erdenesuren, MP and Chairman erdenesuren@mail.parl.gov.mn Tel: 976-11-266457 Fax: 976-11-322866			May 3, 2005
Ravisher Soum, Uvorkhangai Aimag	<p>Ch. Chinbat, Aimag Deputy Governor</p> <p>Togtokhsuren (MPRP), Secretariat of Khural Tel: 976-01322-22354</p>		Report on the investigation on legality of the resolution issued by O. Batmunkh, Governor of Uvorkhangai aimag, #128 (2003)	April 28 and 29, 2005
Supreme Court Justice	Baasan Tsognyam, Chief Justice			April 25, 2005
UB School # 2	Mr. Yadamsuren, Director of School # 2, Principal			May 2, 2005
Uyanga Soum, Uvorkhangai	<p>Mr Mishigdorj, Soum Governor</p> <p>Mr Baatar, Head of Citizens Representative Khural Tel: 976-01322-22200</p> <p>Mr. Dorjsuren, State Environment Inspector at Uyanga Soum Mr. Ganhugel, School Principal</p> <p>Ms. Tungalag, Social Worker</p> <p>Mr. Tungalag and Bold, Parent Representative Council, Schools #1 and #2, Uyanga Soum</p>			April 28 and 29, 2005 May 5, 2005

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
<b>MEDIA</b>				
Eagle TV	Mr. Tom Terry, General Director tom@eagletvmongolia.com Tel: 976-11-457431 Cell: 976-99113967	Media		April 25, 2005
Inforum NGO	Mr. B. Lutaa, Director and Editor of Info newspaper and New Times online magazine			
Mongol Times (weekly) Newspaper	Uynga former Editor-in-Chief Tel: 976-99193467			April 27, 2005
Mongolian Info Network Media and Strategy NGO	Mr. Bat-Orgil, Executive Director info@mn.org.mn www.min.org.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-324632 Cell: 976-99116632	Media		April 29, 2005
Mongolian National Television	Chonai Kulanda, General Director mrtv@magicnet.mn ckulanda@magicnet.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-328939 Cell: 976-99-112531 P.O. Box 365 Huvisgalyn Zam-3 Ulaanbaatar-11	Media		

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
Mongolian Radio and TV Broadcasting	<p>Mr. Batbayar Sharavjams, Vice Chair mrtv@magicnet.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-32-72-57 Cell: 976-11-65-02 P.O. Box 365 MRTV Huvisgalyn Zam-3 Ulaanbaatar-11</p> <p>Mr. Purevdash Baaran, Director General mrtv@magicnet.mn Huvisgalyn Zam-3 Ulaanbaatar-13 210524</p> <p>Mr. Batzorig Tuvshintugs, Head of Foreign Relations batzorig@fastmail.fm Tel: 967-11-326663 Fax : 327234 Cell: 91166888 Khuvisgalyn Zam-3 Ulaanbaatar-11 21524</p> <p>Mr. Nyamaa Tungalag, Director, Financial Department Tel/Fax: 976-11-327257</p> <p>Mr. Myagmar, Executive Director of PRTV 323801 mrtv@magicnet.mn</p>	Media	Budget of Public Service Broadcasting (2004 and 2005)	<p>Feb. 5, 2005 April 27, 2005</p> <p>Feb. 28, 2006</p>
Steel Pen Rural Newspaper Association	Mr. Lhvagasuren, Director			
TV 9	<p>Mr. Enkhbat Tsend, General Director enhbat@tv9.mn www.tv9.mn Tel/Fax: 976-11-343647</p>			
TV 25	<p>Mr. Altai, Executive Director and journalist Tel: 976-91197913 or 976-11330796 or 9919123 or 95258625</p>			

### ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
UB Post	Ms. Bulganaa			Focus Group : May 3, 2005
Wind FM 104.5	Mr. Batjargal, Owner and operator windfm@mongol.net Tel: 976-11-461045 Fax: 976-11-461212			April 29, 2005
INTERNATIONAL DONORS				
Asian Development Bank	Mr. Barry J. Hitchcock, Country Director The Honorable N. Altanhuyag, Minister of Finance, Governor for Mongolia, ADB adbmrm@adb.org <a href="http://www.adb.org/MNRM/">http://www.adb.org/MNRM/</a> Tel/Fax: 976 11 313 440/323507 Fax: 976 11 311 795 MCS Plaza, 2nd Floor, 4 Natsagdory Street Ulaanbaatar-46  Ms. Tsagaach, Education Expert of Public Administration Reform Program tsagaach@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-260325. Fax: 976-11-329877		See Bibliography	April 26, 2005
AusAid	<a href="http://www.ausaid.gov.au">www.ausaid.gov.au</a>			
Canada Fund	<a href="http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca">www.acdi-cida.gc.ca</a>			
Danida	Tel: 976-11-361299 Fax: 976-11-361245			
Japanese Government (JICA)	Tel: 976-11-325939 Fax: 976-11-310845 <a href="http://www.jica.go.jp/mongolia/english/index.html">www.jica.go.jp/mongolia/english/index.html</a>			

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
UNDP	<p>Mr. Tur-Od, Governance Program Officer Tel: 976-11-330597</p> <p>Ms. Seema Tikare, Senior Urban Poverty Expert seema@ulaanbaatar.mn seema@cape.com Tel: 976-11-330597 Fax: 976-11-330598 Ulaanbaatar Municipality Building, Room 225, Sukhbaatar Square-11 Ulaanbaatar</p> <p>Ms. Bolormaa, Urban-Rural Poverty Program 319177 Bolormaap2001@yahoo.com</p> <p>Mr. Joachim Nehem, Governance Program</p>	<p>Key themes: democracy, governance, poverty reduction, economic transition, and environment</p> <p>* social audit and citizen report cards</p> <p>* funding Democracy Index and CIVICUS</p>	<p>“The Guide: UNDP in Mongolia: A Partnership for Progress, Poverty Eradication, Environment, Governance” (1997)</p> <p>Mongolian NGO Capacity Survey to Support Sustainable Human Development (1997)</p> <p>Report on “NGOs Needs Assessment Study in China, Mongolia, and ROK” (1999)</p> <p>Survey Report on “NGO- Implemented Assistance in Social Sector in Mongolia” (2000)</p>	<p>Feb. 18, 2005</p> <p>Feb. 28, 2006</p> <p>March 1, 2006</p>
UNICEF	<p>Richard Prado, (Philippines) Representative unicef@magicnet.mn <a href="http://www.un-mongolia.mn/unicef">http://www.un-mongolia.mn/unicef</a> Tel: 976-1-312185, 312183, 312197 312201, 312213, 312217 Fax: 976-1-327313</p>	Youth		
USAID	<p>Mr. Leon S. Waskin, USAID Representative LWaskin@usaid.gov Tel: 976-11-312390 Fax: 976-11-300440 Cell: 976-99119946</p> <p>Robert La Mont, Judicial Reform Project rlamon@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-327696 Fax: 976-11-310335 Cell: 976-99114390</p>	Judicial reform project		<p>March 3, 2006</p> <p>April 26, 2005</p>

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
INGOS				
Adventist Development and Relief Agency International (ADRA)	Mr. Richard Sandell, Education Coordinator webmaster@adra.org.mn www.adra.org.mn info@adra.org.mn Tel: 976-95151251, 976-11-315730 Fax: 976-11-311458, 976-11-311970	Education		May 4, 2005
Asia Foundation	Mr. T. Layton Croft, Country Rep (through May 2005) William Foerderer Infante, Country Rep (from Jan. 2006) lcroft@asiafound.mn laytoncroft@yahoo.com Cell: 976-9911-3339 Tel: 976-11-330-524, 323-413 Fax: 976-11-311-497 UN Street 18 P.O. Box 1003 UlaanBaatar-13 210613	Development	See Bibliography	April 24 and 26, 2005  Focus Group: May 3, 2005
Friedrich Ebert Foundation	www.fesdc.org	Development		
Konrad Foundation	Dr. Thomas Schrapel, Country Representative kasmon@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-350544, 976-11-350546 Fax: 976-11-350542 Erhuugiin Gudamj 5 P.O. Box 337 Ulaanbaatar 210620  Mr. Batmunkh, Program Manager kasmon@magicnet.mn www.kas.de Tel: 976-11-350-544, 350-546 Fax: 976-11-350-542 Cell: 976-99094082 Erchuugiin Gudamj 5 P.O. Box 337 Ulaanbaatar 210620	Focus on political parties, parliament, media, and civil society		Feb. 18, 2005

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
Mercy Corps	<p>Mr. Silas Everett, CS Program Manager (2005) silas@mercy corps.org.mn Tel: 976-11-460968 Cell: 976-99131299</p> <p>Mr. Sean Granville-Ross, Deputy Chief of Party and Rural Economy Advisor sean@mercy corps.org.mn</p> <p>Mr. Sam Kane, Rural Agribusiness Support sam@mercy corps.org.mn Tel: 976-11-460905 Fax: 976-11-40967 P.O. Box 761 Ulaanbaatar-49</p> <p>Ms. Olena Burian olena@mercy corps.org.mn</p> <p>Ms. Mandal mandal@mercy corps.org.mn</p>	<p>Training, advocacy, and networking program</p> <p>Service improvement manual results for My Aimag 2005</p>	<p>“Civil Society Development in Mongolia” (2002)</p> <p>“Training, Advocacy, and Networking Program: Program Guide, 2004/2005” (n.d.)</p> <p>Service Improvement Manual Results for “My Aimag 2005: A Management Framework for Local Service Providers” (2005)</p> <p>“Rural Government Procurement Assessment” (Training in Advocacy for NGOs 2005)</p>	<p>Feb. 14, 2005 May 3, 2005</p> <p>March 1, 2006</p>
Pact	<p>Mr. Steven Buxt, Senior Technical Advisor- Information for Development stevan@gob.initiatine.org.mn Tel: 976-11-460901 Fax: 976-11-461048 Cell: 976-99119618</p> <p>Mr. Ganhuyag, Editor-in-Chief www.pactworld.org , www.rbn.mn Tel: 976-11-460901 Cell: 976-99117922</p>	CSO capacity building		April 26 and May 4, 2005
Save the Children	<p>Mr. Stephen Morrow, Interim Program Director mons cf@magicnet.mn www.savethechildren.mongolia.mn Tel: 976-11-329371, 329365 Fax: 976-11-329361</p>	Development and relief work for children		

**ANNEX 8. STAKEHOLDERS' MAP (CONTINUED)**

AFFILIATION	CONTACT	Civic Engagement/ Social Accountability ACTIVITIES	CSO COLLABORATION	OTHER
World Bank	<p>Mr. Saha D. Meyanathan, Country Manager and Resident Representative smeyanathan@worldbank.org Tel: 976-11-312347, 976-11-312654 Fax: 976-11-312645</p> <p>Ms. B. Oyunbileg, Consultant (Gender and Participation) obaasanjav@worldbank.org www.worldbank.org</p> <p>Mr. D. Bayartsogt, Rural Development Operations Officer dbayartsogt@worldbank.org</p>	Development	See Bibliography	May 5, 2005 Feb. 28, 2006
World Vision	<p>Mr. Warren Ferdinandus, Country Representative Tel: 976-11-345323, 345464 Fax: 976-11-345322 warren_ferdinandus@wvi.org</p>	Development		
<b>ACADEMIA</b>				
Academy of Management	<p>Mr. D. Tserendorj, Director of School of Public Administration, Former Head of "Good Governance" UNDP project mmatsfl@magicnet.mn Tel: 976-11-342152 Fax: 976-11-343037 Cell: 976-99115825</p> <p>P. Darisure, Professor Tel: 976-11-342190 Fax: 976-11-343037</p> <p>Ms. Otgontuya, Professor Tel: 976-11-342190 Fax: 976-11-343037 Cell: 976-99167565</p>	Public management and policy		April 25, 2005
National University of Mongolia	<p>Dr. S. Narangerel, Director, School of Law</p> <p>Ms. Selengee, Director, Global Consensus</p>	Education	<p>A Micro Study of Internal Migration in Mongolia (2001)</p> <p>In-Migration Survey Report (2004)</p>	<p>April 27, 2005</p> <p>Focus Group: May 3, 2005</p>