

# Citizenship and Social Guarantees in Latin America

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# Citizenship & Social Guarantees

## The purpose of social policy

- **Build integration – beyond compensating for shocks**

## Challenge

- **Reduce the need to support the poor as a separate class through a range of interventions**
- **To promote...**
  1. **...broad membership in a variety of institutions in society**
  2. **..'good' inequalities, that spring from differences in effort (Ferreira 2007)**

# Democratisation & Social Policy

**Social integration is undermined where  
inequality**

- **Is categorical in nature**
- **Becomes exclusive to fixed groups (Tilly 2007)**

## **CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

**How to minimize categorical inequalities**

- **Inclusiveness of individual institutions**
- **How institutions interact in shaping social mobility**

# Minimising categorical inequality

## 1. Institutionalisation of a basic framework of income security

Institutional stability and reach remain important issues

## 2. The use of institutions to redistribute opportunities

Greater market dynamism has a tendency to

- \* reinforce existing inequalities
- \* put accumulated gains at risk

# Governance Principles

Societies that have minimised categorical inequalities have designed their institutions with reference to two principles

## **1. Principle of differentiation**

Applies to pre-market goods – access unconditional

Access differentiated from economic status, as universal as possible.

Eg: in education a minimal quality differential between public & private

## **2. Principle of integration**

Applies to effort goods – that distribute rewards conditional on effort

Institutions that structure opportunities in the economy

Enable individuals at diverse levels of the income and occupational scale to make a stable link between reward & effort

Eg: Raising education is not enough

- > As education levels grow, institutions needed to absorb diverse skills
- > Falling returns to middle-range schooling → ↑ organise opportunities
- > Certification of skills to ↑ tradable value, involvement private sector
- > Employment in social sectors needed for development

# CHALLENGES

1. Secure the tax base to sustain these institutions  
an important long-term administrative and political challenge
2. Think about institutional designs: focus of today  
International experience holds important lessons
  - \* Societies where poverty has become fixed devised institutions for specific groups rather than complementary institutions for all groups

## Key lesson

To think about multiple policy instruments with wider coverage


- \* In the case of income protection, unemployment insurance and income supplements fulfil two different functions

- i. a long-term basic guarantee or supplement
- ii. source of protection of gains during shocks

BOTH functions are becoming important to a growing number of people, as returns to education and effort are otherwise put at risk

Market enabling instruments

# CITIZENSHIP = a set of institutions




Inclusiveness of each institution depends on inclusiveness in the others

- Institutions to support mobility (4) will not be inclusive without diverse occupational choices for young people
- Young people's choices (3) depend on equal quality schooling (2)
- Equal quality schooling is only effective in conditions of basic material security (1)

# Problem in Latin America historically

- State has primarily been occupied with institutions 3 and 4 for privileged sectors
- Latin American countries right to focus on building institutions 1 & 2
- Need to ensure that the designs chosen are as universal and simple (non-selective) as possible

# Governance & the Relation between Institutions



At the bottom, institutions governed by simple universality

To the left, institutions that should be differentiated from work and schooling

On the right, institutions to be linked through active policies of integration

FOCUS: 1. Consolidating institution (# 1). 2. Relationship between institutions

# How selective ought targeting to be?

**Rationale** is clear:

To target scarce resources to those in need

**Very important as a transitional measure**

- Has helped build central administrative capacity
- Has formally recognized isolated households

# Next Phase..

**Consider individual, more simplified entitlements**

**May demand a change to thinking on 2 points**

- 1. The diagnosis of poverty**
- 2. How institutions shape incentives**

# Diagnosis of poverty

Developed economies have diversified and stabilised institutions of income supplement

For **2 REASONS**

1. Recognition of the greater uncertainty of modern economies

- > the administrative need to find simple ways to support individuals

2. Awareness of counter-productive effects of intrusive means-tests

- > the perceived need to depersonalise support
- > diversified incentives seen as better way to support economic activity

# In a Latin American context

1. To think about cash grants as needed temporarily rather than as permanent market institutions may be unrealistic.
  - > May fail to acknowledge the element of complex uncertainty in modern poverty.
2. Latin American economies have high informality and high turnover.
  - > Add to the uncertainties about income measurement.

## **JOB TENURE, years.** (ILO, 2005)

<b>Country</b>		<b>Tenure Average Years</b>	<b>% &lt; 1 Year</b>	<b>% &gt; 10 Years</b>
<b>Argentina</b>	<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Brazil</b>		<b>5.3</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Chile</b>		<b>5.5</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Honduras</b>		<b>3.9</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Peru</b>		<b>6.3</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>USA</b>	<b>ANGLO-OECD</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>		<b>8.2</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>OTHER-OECD</b>	<b>8.3</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Germany</b>		<b>10.6</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>France</b>		<b>11.2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>Italy</b>		<b>12.2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>EU- 14</b>		<b>10.6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Japan</b>		<b>12.2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>43</b>

Table compares tenure rates in Latin America with other regions.

The regions' average is low. However, we know these figures to be unrealistic.

They are based on company data in the formal economy. Urban labour market surveys point to 2 years as a more realistic average.

Yet we know that the measures used can exaggerate employment, and it cannot tell us if the jobs are full-time.

## EMPLOYMENT INSECURITY, São Paulo, Brazil, 2004

Months	Duration of last employment		Duration of last unemployment	
	Centre	Marginal area	Centre	Marginal area
1-3	22 %	12 %	25 %	4 %
4-7	15 %	15 %	18 %	6 %
8-11	7 %	10 %	18 %	4 %
12-20	16 %	25 %	18 %	33 %
21-24	10 %	15 %	9 %	24 %
25 -	30 %	25 %	12 %	41 %
TOTAL	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

These figures report findings from two surveys in São Paulo, one at a job centre in the city, the other a household survey in marginal areas. They suggest that very few jobs, 30 percent in the city, and 12 % in the slums, last more than 2 years.

Only half of household heads in marginal areas were able to obtain more than 4 hours of paid work a day.

# Employment Complexity and Measurement

## Employment complexity

- Makes it very difficult to measure income poverty fairly and correctly
- Means that the attempt at very precise measurement can have some negative side-effects on:
  1. **Poverty and fairness:** In conditions of insecurity it will exclude some people unfairly.
  2. **Integrity:** The narrower the criteria, the longer the list and checks, the more intrusive the role of state officials, potentially.
  3. **Legitimacy:** As a result of what may appear arbitrary exclusions and bias, the stronger the controversy and potentially the lower the legitimacy of the institution and its value in creating a sense of citizenship and trust
  4. **Institutional stability:** This will also be affected where changes to means-testing rules are also frequent and linked to electorally-determined changes in social administration staff.

# Why precise targeting?

It may be rational in the medium-term if...

- the gradual building of social guarantees is necessary due to fiscal constraints
- It allows for the gradual building of administrative learning capacity

**BUT**, we need to bear in mind that...

- the core objective of cash grants is to reduce poverty and uncertainty – enable calculated risk
- this is a permanent task, which requires the building of stable institutions
- There is a danger of losing capacity

# Work Incentives

The universality and stability in income supplement rules required

- Need not have in itself have perverse effects on incentives
- Only arises if set so high that there is no additional benefit from working
- This is not the case in Latin America, where grants only secure part of the expenditures of a poor household, in Brazil around 50 %, and in Mexico around 20 %.
- Several studies show a negligible or positive effect (IFPRI)
- Have avoided some design flaws of classical assistance

# TIME ALLOCATION – PAID WORK

By type of grant and district (São Paulo), odds

	Near-city vulnerable district				Remote vulnerable district			
	6-9 hours	1-5 hours	%	Odds	6-9 hours	1-5 hours	%	Odds
<b>Grant Holders</b>	<b>69 %</b>	<b>31 %</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2.23</b>	<b>52 %</b>	<b>48 %</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1.08</b>
<b>Non-Grant Holders</b>	<b>55 %</b>	<b>45 %</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1.22</b>	<b>53 %</b>	<b>47 %</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1.13</b>
<b>Total Odds</b>				<b>1.83</b>				<b>0.96</b>

These results from the 2004 survey of household heads in marginal areas of São Paulo suggests that

- there was no effect on labour supply in the most marginal area
- a slight increase in working hours in the neighbourhood that was closer to job opportunities

Interaction effects: Incentive effects: cash grants ↔ opportunities

## GRANT STABILITY EFFECTS, São Paulo, 2004.

Recipient evaluation of cash grants' expected and actual effects. Positive answers, %.

WAYS GRANTS CAN HELP	Control group	Short-term Grants (6 months)	Long-term Grants (2 years)
To gain stable/formal work	59	48	<b><u>60</u></b>
Plan professional life	76	<b><u>55</u></b>	<b><u>78</u></b>
Eat better	70	45	<b><u>61</u></b>
Take better care of health	55	36	42
OTHERS WHO HELP WITH CHILDCARE			
Other children	<b>67</b>	52	53
Spouse	<b>19</b>	43	45
TASKS CHILDREN HELP DO			
Clean	37	<b><u>46</u></b>	<b><u>29</u></b>
Cook	52	23	25

In this table we can see that households with longer-term grants were more likely to experience positive changes

\*Respondents were more likely to feel they could plan their work, at 78 % for long and 55 % for short-term grants

\* They were more likely to feel they could eat better, at 61 % compared with 45 %.

# Other institutions and incentives

Failure to take account of other institutions that shape motivation

- Can lead to over-design of cash grants with perverse results, including
  - A too limited period of support may entail a negligible impact on poverty
  - Too low levels of grant can entail negligible effects on health or nutrition (Moore 2008), as in the Honduran case where less than 10 % of a poor family's subsistence is covered,

Work motivation and access is best understood through the combined effect of several institutions

# INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF WORK MOTIVATION, São Paulo, Brazil.

What is the most important thing about work? Job-seekers, São Paulo, Brazil, 2004.

	Low schooling				High Schooling			
	Uninsured		Insured		Uninsured		Insured	
	Short jobs	Long jobs	Short jobs	Long jobs	Short jobs	Long jobs	Short jobs	Long jobs
<b>High income</b>	<u>9</u>	-	9	2	24	-	3	5
<b>Stable income</b>	64	34	73	18	30	48	53	23
<b>That work is challenging / interesting</b>	27	66	18	<u>77</u>	38	52	45	<u>67</u>
<b>That you can work closer to home, other related</b>	-	-	-	<u>6</u>	8	-	-	<u>5</u>
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

S – short jobs - > 12 months. L – long jobs - 13 months < . Low schooling - > 8 years. High schooling 9 years < . Years completed.

**In this table we can see that individuals with a combination of sources of security and opportunity –education, stable jobs and unemployment insurance – were more likely to view work as a source of personal development**

# KEY FACTORS IN WORK MOTIVATION, São Paulo, Brazil.

**PREFERENCE FOR PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT OVER FIXED ADVANTAGE**  
 (defined as either high pay, job stability, or an occupation for life). Logistic regression.

Sample and variables		Wald	Sig.
<b>-Whole sample Chi square 61.155, sig. .000</b>			
<b>SCHOOLING</b>	Low/high	18.579	<b>.000</b>
<b>VULNERABILITY</b>	Length N/UnN - High/low	8.143	<b>.004</b>
<b>UNEMPLOYMENT</b>	Short/long	6.137	<b>.013</b>
<b>EMPLOYMENT</b>	Short-Long	5.770	<b>.016</b>
<b>INSURED</b>	Yes/ No	5.511	<b>.019</b>
<b>OCCUPATION</b>	Less to more defined	4.580	<b>.032</b>
REGISTERS in WORK BOOK	Less to more	3.823	.051
HAPPINESS IN OCCUPATION	Happy to less happy	1.019	.313
ADVANTAGE of INCOME GRANTS	Guarantee/ other	.094	.759
GENDER	Female/ male	.063	.802
Constant		1.400	.237

This regression suggests that

- schooling was the most important factor in shaping intrinsic work motivation,
- followed by other sources of security, including low vulnerability on the labour market – defined as the period of unemployment relative to the period of employment, and
- having an unemployment insurance

Combinations of guarantees and opportunities enhances motivation

# Micro- and Macro-institutions

We can observe an important coincidence between

- factors supporting individual motivation and
- the macro-institutions that support social integration by redistributing opportunities across populations and time

In the countries in the developed world that have the highest social mobility, broad principles of redistribution shape the four key institutions that govern welfare and work

# INEQUALITY TYPE

## SCHOOLING INEQUALITY and SOCIAL MOBILITY

	DENMARK	UNITED KINGDOM
<b>INEQUALITY TYPE</b>	<b>FLUID AND LOW</b>	<b>FIXED AND HIGH</b>
Percent of children in private school	13 %	7 %
Average Fee (in British Pounds)	80 £pm	1000 £ pm
Fees as a percentage of cost (approx.)	15 %	95 %
State/Private student-teacher ratio	12 / 13	19/ 7
Private share of funding/students	2 / 13	14/ 7
Share of lawyers who are privately educated*	10 %	73 %
Social mobility (elasticity)	0.071 / 0.15*	0.306 / 0.50*

\* Jääet al (2006) /Corak 2006.

Can be illustrated in the contrast between Denmark and the United Kingdom.


- Denmark has equal quality schooling, with more independent schools, but a reduced role of fees. Private fees are nearly 13 times higher in the UK.
- 44 % of school leavers enter a long-term tradesman apprenticeship, compared w. at best 4 % in the UK.
- Denmark has both an assistance and an insurance system to protect against unemployment – so it has two layers of security, with 88 % of the population belonging to both, whereas Britain only effectively has an assistance system.
- Denmark spends 42 times as much in GDP on training, and 25 % of the unemployed receive full re-education.

# Public /Private Education Students and Spending

## SCHOOLING Ratio of public to private spending

### SCHOOLING

Ratio of state pupils to private pupils




This graph shows the extent of inequality in the distribution of schooling resources in different countries. It shows that resources inequality in basic education is very significant still in Brazil and Chile.

# Public/Private Schooling, and Resources by Student

## SCHOOLING SPENDING Proportion of public to private spending

### SCHOOLING

Student-to-teacher ratio in private schools in relation to publicly-funded schools



X: Percentage. 1.Primary, secondary post-secondary non-tertiary. Y: 1.Lower secondary. Counting government-dependent private schools as public.

This graph shows specifically how this divide is expressed in teacher to student resources, often argued to be a core determining factor in educational outcomes (and certainly if this ratio is unequal within a given educational context (eg a country).

\* High inequality will continue to limit the inter-generational impact of cash grants.

\* Helps explain the unequal integration of those with lower secondary schooling.

# SCHOOLING RESOURCES & EMPLOYMENT EQUALITIES

## SCHOOLING RESOURCES EQUALITY (public/private)



## INTEGRATION

Level, equality and quality of employment integration

Source: Elaborated from OECD data, 2007

X: **Overall private/public schooling resources inequality**: Ratio of teacher to pupil in state over private schools plus state pupils' share of total resources (per student). Higher score = greater equality in resources (financial and direct teacher resources) to state schools. 200 = perfect equality. Over 200 = resources favouring state pupils. Under 200 = resources favouring private pupils.

Y: **Level, equality and quality of employment integration**: Lower secondary education employment rate. Lower secondary employment rate as percentage of tertiary education employment rate, and female employment rate at all levels of education.

This graph shows the relationship between equal quality schooling and equal employment integration of those with lower secondary schooling.


# SCHOOLING-EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

## SCHOOLING RESOURCES EQUALITY (public/private)

### LEVEL AND QUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT

#### Level and distribution of employment and training

Source: Elaborated from OECD data, 2007



X: **Overall private/public schooling resources inequality**: Ratio of teacher to pupil in state over private schools plus state pupils' share of total resources (per student). Higher score = greater equality in resources (financial and direct teacher resources) to state schools. 200 = perfect equality. Over 200 = resources favouring state pupils. Under 200 = resources favouring private pupils.

Y: **Level and quality of employment integration**: National employment rate, plus percentage of labour force receiving publicly funded training (youth, unemployed and employed).

In this graph is included different indicators if integration, the level of employment combined with the level of public investment in training. The relative position between countries does not change much.


# COMPOSITE OF SECURITY & EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

## SCHOOLING RESOURCES EQUALITY (public/private)

### LEVEL AND QUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT, TRAINING and INCOME SECURITY

Level and distribution of employment, training & unemployment insurance

Source: Elaborated from OECD data, 2007



X: **Overall private/public schooling resources inequality**: As above. Y: **Level and quality of employment integration**: National employment rate, plus percentage of labour force receiving publicly funded training (youth, unemployed and employed), plus level of universality of unemployment insurance.

In this graph is also included the inclusiveness of unemployment insurance. The difference between Brazil and Chile grows, and the position of the UK falls.

Overall these graphs suggest that institutions transmit inequalities. Where inclusiveness in one institution is weak, it is likely that inclusiveness will be weak in other institutions as well, because the second institution is unlikely to be able to absorb the inequalities of the first.

# Evaluating institutions in Latin America

- Is not easy with national data, because the reach of most institutions is limited.
- High centralised and decentralised administrative capacity makes Chile an interesting case
- In this case some categorical inequalities still persist where institutions reflect more than counteract existing inequalities.

# Evaluating Institutions - Chile

EXAMPLES, also relevant for other countries, include


1. High resources inequality in schooling, not unique to Chile
  2. The redistribution of most training resources through companies, giving minimal scope for devising market-based apprenticeship institutions, or devising middle-range occupations
- > Chile's lower secondary education employment rate is unusually low for the economy's level of formalisation, at 27 % compared with 48 % in Mexico, and 59 % in Korea.

# More examples - Chile

3. In the case of unemployment insurance, the neutral design of the system – it is an individual more than a social insurance – has meant the most vulnerable workers have weak access.
  - For workers on fixed contracts the average cover even after the long contribution period, is 1 month and about 29 % of the previous wage
  - Effectively this is not an insurance, but an individual savings system.
4. Meanwhile, Chile's assistance programme, Solidario, is very heavily targeted and modest.
  - This institutional combination means that although Chile's static poverty rate is very low for the continent, many families among the poor and middle are not protected from intermittent poverty.
  - This can exacerbate the effects of resources inequality in education and occupational opportunities.
  - We can see in this case how low inclusiveness can be transmitted from one institution to another

# Institutional inequalities

**PRINCIPLE OF INTEGRATION**  
Composite index of employment integration



## PRINCIPLE OF DIFFERENTIATION

Universality dimensions in schooling, further education and unemployment insurance

Source: Elaborated from OECD data, 2007


- X: 1. Lower secondary education employment rate. 2.1 / tertiary education employment rate. 3. Female employment rate
- Y: 1. UI inclusivity: Replacement rate (average start)+ UI type (redistributive features), max. duration. 2. Schooling equality: Ratio of publicly funded students to overall education resources, and ration of teaching resources to students in public over private schools. + 3. Public spending on training in GDP \* 10.

This graph plots the inclusiveness of the three core institutions of schooling, income support and training, on the one hand, and the employment integration of more vulnerable groups, eg women, and those with lower levels of education on the other hand.

Again we see a distinct pattern, in which Chile is grouped on this measure with the UK. Korea, on the other hand, is in the middle-range of social inclusiveness.

# Schooling – Employment Equality of Opportunity

## EQUALITY OF SCHOOLING RESOURCES (public/private)



X: **Overall private/public schooling resources inequality**: Ratio of teacher to pupil in state over private schools plus state pupils' share of total resources (per student). Higher score = greater equality in resources (financial and direct teacher resources) to state schools. 200 = perfect equality. Over 200 = resources favouring state pupils. Under 200 = resources favouring private pupils.


Y: **Social mobility** (Intergenerational income elasticity)  $100 - (\text{earnings elasticities} * 100)$ . Sources of raw data: Corak 2006, and IADB 2008 (Chile and Brazil).

Using a more standard indicator of social integration – social mobility – confirms the importance of inclusiveness within institutions, in this case schooling. Chile and Brazil – with the UK – are at one extreme, with more unequal education and low social mobility.

# Schooling and Income Security Equalities and Social Mobility

## EQUALITY OF SCHOOLING RESOURCES (public/private) and INCLUSIVENESS OF UI

**SOCIAL MOBILITY**




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Here is included in addition to schooling equality also inclusiveness of unemployment insurance. The distance between countries grows.

# Schooling, Income Security & Training Equalities & Social Mobility

## EQUALITY OF SCHOOLING RESOURCES (public/private), INCLUSIVENESS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, and RATIO of WORKERS on PUBLIC TRAINING

**SOCIAL MOBILITY**



X: **Overall private/public schooling resources inequality**: 1. Ratio of teacher to pupil in state over private schools plus (2) state pupils' share of total resources (per student). Higher score = greater equality in resources (financial and direct teacher resources) to state schools. 200 = perfect equality. Over 200 = resources favouring state pupils. Under 200= resources favouring private pupils. 3. 3. UI type: As above. Y: **Social mobility**: as above

As more indicators of inclusiveness within institutions are added, the relative position of countries stays quite similar, but the distance between countries continues to grow.

# SUMMARY

Latin American governments have made remarkable advances in social protection and  
In particular have strengthened administrative capacity.

By not making cash grants conditional on non-earning, they have avoided a key design flaw of early income assistance schemes – the so-called unemployment trap – which developed economies now have to address

# REMAINING CHALLENGES

International comparisons show the need to shift to using institutions not just to manage the effects of inequalities, but also to prevent them.

Latin American countries must simultaneously

- strengthen social guarantees and initial capacities  
AND
  - expand institutions of structured progression
- > Concentrating on just one area will generate a low return



# OUT

Slides

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
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





- To 38



Figure 1. Compensation regimes, developed economies.



Here we have different measures of social insurance commitment to income support and training. We can see there is a pattern of convergence in degrees of universality between institutions. For example the variables pointing to the level, length and redistributive elements of the insurance (income, stability and allocation) tend either to be consistently high or low, high in Nordic countries, and low in the UK and New Zealand, taking these examples. UI institutions absorb and transmit inequalities. Where inequality is transmitted from one institution – eg schooling, the pressure on other institutions grows. The cost of inclusiveness grows.



These figures show the level of redistribution of income insurance and assistance in some Asian and Latin American countries (and South Africa), using slightly different variables. We also see a tendency of convergence.

The countries where both insurance and assistance institutions are more inclusive are Brazil and Barbados, followed by South Korea.

# Employment and Security

These institutions do not in themselves

- solve the problem of the informal sector, or investment and employment.
- For this other policies are needed


BUT, nor is there any consistent evidence that these institutions set at the right level are an *impediment* to employment

- Recent evidence from Europe suggests better protection leads to more stable employment

We DO know that where income protection is weak, inequalities arising from education or the labour market are likely to be exacerbated.

## Chart C.2.2 Enrolment rates of 15-to-19-year-olds (2005)

Full-time and part-time students in public and private institutions



1. Excludes the German-speaking Community of Belgium.
2. Excludes overseas departments for 1995 and 2000.
3. Year of reference 2004.

Countries are ranked in descending order of the enrolment rates of 15-to-19-year-olds in 2005.

Source: OECD. Table C.2.2. See Annex 3 for notes ([www.oecd.org/edu/eag2007](http://www.oecd.org/edu/eag2007)).