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INTRODUCTION

“Prosperity, like peace, must be viewed as indivisible. And even from the narrowest considerations of self-interest, each of us must be concerned with the economic development of the world as a whole. For we shall prosper individually only as we prosper collectively. But there are even larger considerations than material welfare which dictate our recognition of the world’s essential unity. Economic distress is a prime breeder of war; it makes for a desperation from which aggression seems the only avenue of escape. A better standard of living, therefore, is an indispensable condition of peace.”


From its beginnings, the World Bank has seen violent conflict as a profound development challenge. The establishment of the Bretton Woods agencies in the aftermath of the Second World War reflected a belief that reconstructing countries devastated by warfare was an international responsibility: the first World Bank loans financed post-war reconstruction projects in Denmark, France and the Netherlands. Much of the world has made rapid progress in building stability and reducing poverty in the past sixty years, but areas characterized by persistent violence and by fragile institutions are being left far behind, their economic growth compromised and their human indicators stagnant. Violent conflict thus remains a central development concern and an issue for the World Bank’s clients across all regions and income levels.

By analyzing the nature, causes and consequences of violent conflict today, and the successes and failures in responding to it, this World Development Report (WDR) aims to sharpen the discussion on what can be done to support societies struggling to prevent or grapple with violence. Some of the ground that the WDR will cover falls outside the World Bank’s traditional development mandate, a reflection of a growing international policy consensus that addressing violent conflict requires an understanding of the close relationship between politics, security and development. In studying this area, the World Bank does not aspire to go beyond its core social and economic competencies, but rather to improve the effectiveness of its development interventions in places threatened or affected by large-scale violence.

In preparing the WDR, we draw heavily from the stock of international knowledge on fragility and violence (see Appendix 1, WDR Consultative Process and Appendix 2, General Bibliography). Most importantly, considerable knowledge resides in the experience of national leaders, much of which is untapped. The WDR benefits from periodic meetings of the high-level WDR 2011 Advisory Council, which represents a wealth of national and international experience. We include analysis and experience from the United Nations (UN), regional institutions, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD-INCAF), and bilateral actors; and research from the economics, political and social sciences and behavioral fields. Consultations include visits to gather input in countries affected by violent conflict; and with policy-makers at the UN and in regional locations. The WDR will also feature an interactive website which will reach a wider group of interested parties and will make available data gathered for the WDR.

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Section I of the WDR presents the challenges and the WDR framework. While many countries have successfully recovered from serious conflict or prevented violence during testing periods, major challenges remain. The international system created in the 1940s and strengthened after the end of the Cold War assumed that interstate and civil wars were the primary threats to security, and that post-conflict settlements would end fighting and permit reconstruction to take place in a secure environment. These assumptions are called into question by the nature of violence today: analysis reveals how persistent many conflicts are, with a marked increase in fighting after formal cease-fires. It also
illuminates the complex and shifting nature of conflict, and the way in which different forms of violence co-mingle, feed off one another and mutate.

We see countries which have resolved civil wars threatened by gangs and violent criminal networks. The illegal trafficking of drugs, arms, and natural commodities fuels and finances local predatory groups. Localized conflict can escalate into political violence, particularly during tense electoral periods. Violence and criminality frequently spill across borders, and transnational movements make common cause with local movements. These are problems are shared by rich and poor countries alike – but for lower-income countries with few resources and weak institutions, the difficulties of combating violence are compounded, and the development consequences are particularly severe. Even in middle- and higher-income countries, social and economic progress is compromised in areas with high levels of violence. The WDR will explore the links between different types of large-scale violence and their development consequences, and will work with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to strengthen cross-country data coverage of crime and violence.

In the face of these challenges, national and international responses to violence are hampered by three factors. First, an excessive focus on post-conflict recovery, which leaves some countries struggling to prevent conflict unassisted, or trying to follow a conventional reconstruction path amid continuing violence. Second, research and policy has traditionally treated different forms of violence as separate phenomena and has only recently begun to consider the relationships between them. Third, the international architecture is largely geared to assisting individual nation states, and not to addressing cross-border violence.

There are a number of causal explanations for violent conflict, some emphasizing economic motivations, others weak capacity in service delivery and security institutions, impaired social and family cohesion, injustice, and divided ethnic or sub-national identities. Drawing on this research, on country experiences and the views of leaders and reformers, the WDR has developed a framework which is intended to help bring together economic, political and security-based explanations and craft operational responses. This framework is based on three key concepts: stress, capabilities and expectations.

Stress in the WDR context refers to the pressures on societies that increase conflict risk. These may either be external in nature (e.g. economic shocks, external interference, conflict that spills across the border from a neighboring country, infiltration of national space by drug cartels or global terrorist entities), or internal (e.g. legacies of violence and trauma, divisive national leadership, rising inequality, perceived or real discrimination, policies which create rapid shifts in the balance of political and economic power, structural factors like growing youth populations).

Capability refers to the ability of societies to respond to such stresses. Successful responses depend in part on resources and technical capacity (e.g. availability of finance, legal and organizational systems, skilled personnel, equipment) but also, critically, on leadership in the collective interest, shared values and social cohesion. Capability and resilience grow over time, on the basis of repeated success in tackling stresses.

Expectations are important because they help explain why some crises escalate into widespread violence, while others do not. Periods of recurrent conflict and/or high conflict risk are typically characterized by severe external and internal stresses and an insecure future. Where societal capability to respond is weak, and in particular where there have been failed attempts to address problems in the past, expectations of successful recovery can be low and self-perpetuating. Citizens have little reason to expect that the state (or other powerful institutions) will overturn injustices, protect and reward those who try to live within the law, or punish those who break it. This creates a dynamic akin to a financial crisis: once expectations begin moving in a negative direction, a crisis of confidence can develop causing key actors to ‘disinvest’
and withdraw support for cooperative solutions they no longer find credible. - an “expectations trap” which is difficult to reverse.

The WDR will argue that exceptional collective action by national leadership and international actors is needed to confront these negative tides of expectations and shift them in more constructive directions. While specific actions will depend on circumstances, those countries that have managed positive transitions in recent years have generally done so both by tackling disillusion with past performance (through decisive signals and rapid action on a few key issues in the political and justice, security and socio-economic development domains), and by managing to contain expectations within the bounds of what can be delivered. Sustaining positive expectations over time and preventing the recurrence of violence will then depend on the careful cultivation of national institutional capability, thoughtful sequencing of reforms, efforts to build shared interests and values and address structural stresses, and flexibility to adapt to new threats.

International actors can play a pivotal role in this process, in two ways. The first is by taking action at a regional or global level to reduce external stresses. The second is to provide supplementary support to help shift expectations and strengthen national response capability.

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In Section II, this framework will be used as a basis for discussing lessons from experience. We first examine short-term strategies designed to shift expectations and address immediate stresses, in both post-conflict and situations at risk of increasing violence. One key lesson is that expectations can be shifted positively if the opportunities provided by various types of transition are grasped. ‘Transitions’ in the WDR framework include openings that can be used to pre-empt violence or halt it, as well as more familiar post-conflict scenarios. The WDR will identify how countries have successfully managed such transitions by designing strategies and programs across different sectors to meet key political and justice, security and socio-economic goals, and by mobilizing support from national and international stakeholders. We also assess the financial and operational constraints in the international system to supporting such transitions, particularly in preventative phases, and the extent to which important activities (e.g. formal and informal justice provision, policing and job creation) may be under-resourced.

Second, the WDR will identify practical lessons in building institutional capability. A society’s ability to absorb stress is intimately linked to the strength of its institutions. State, traditional, informal, private sector and civil society institutions all play key roles in creating capability in a society. The WDR will explore three key hypotheses: (i) that institutional capability requires both technical capacity (training, equipment, personnel, procedures, etc) and collective cohesion (which comes from professional values and esprit de corps); (ii) there is a danger of premature overloading, where asking institutions to deliver outcomes which are overly ambitious or for which there is insufficient social and political consensus risks undermining their cohesion and legitimacy, and; (iii) that institutional models cannot simply be imported from overseas, but need to be adapted to the local context.

The WDR focuses on lessons from ‘organic learning’ approaches to institution-building, which aim to build capability in stages and to avoid overloading institutions before they have acquired the collective cohesion that comes from repeated success. We will review the literature on comparative state functions and the historical trajectory of the formation of resilient institutions across countries, and compare this to contemporary timeframes and institutional models.

Third, and in close collaboration with other partners with greater expertise in some of these issues, we will assess the difficult political economy considerations involved in sequencing important reforms in fragile settings (e.g. addressing corruption, economic and administrative restructuring, empowering of
disadvantaged groups, bringing parties to account for human rights abuses, the timing of elections and constitutional reforms). In so doing, we will review the extent to which countries have managed to respond to international and internal expectations without provoking further violence or overwhelming fragile national institutions. We will aim to develop from this analysis a simple frame to consider the sequencing of these reforms, smart lessons on approaches, and realistic progress benchmarks based on historical cross-country data.

As countries move past immediate crisis, expectations tend to shift from a primary concern with injustice and security to a greater emphasis on socio-economic progress. The WDR will look at how policies on job creation, access to assets and services, and building collective values can help strengthen a society’s capability, and will also review how the structural stresses of young populations, rapid urbanization and environmental pressure have been handled. The tricky question of broadening leadership, particularly among the younger generation, will also be examined.

Given the WDR’s strong emphasis on external stress, Section II concludes by examining existing international initiatives aimed at tackling natural and economic shocks, illegal trafficking, international corruption, cross-border and transnational forms of violence. This will include a discussion of international anti-money laundering and anti-corruption initiatives; analysis of the overlap of natural disaster and food insecurity projections with areas of conflict risk (with humanitarian partners); and an assessment of how regional and cross-border economic initiatives and administrative integration could be strengthened to impact conflict areas.

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In Section III, the WDR will bring together lessons from experience and will propose new policy directions. There are two primary audiences for this report: leaders in countries exposed to conflict or conflict risk, and regional and international policymakers. For these audiences, a short and practical document is appropriate. The report would be supplemented by various complementary products.

The WDR’s findings will be offered with considerable humility, for two reasons. The first is that there are no magic formulae: conflicts are too individual in nature and too complex to permit template solutions or a ‘conflict cookbook’ approach. In some cases, sheer misfortune is a dominant factor, while exits will always depend on a good number of lucky alignments. The second reason is that the World Bank does not claim expertise in all fields of conflict prevention or resolution, despite its strong commitment to assisting with the socio-economic aspects of these challenges. What we will aim to do, rather, is to develop a lens through which we hope conflict can be more easily understood, and a platform for considering promising ideas and approaches.

For decision-makers at a national level, we will draw together the lessons analyzed in Section II, and assess their transferability to different country situations and evolving threats.

For the international community, including the World Bank, actions and policy directions discussed are likely to focus on two main areas: enhanced action to reduce regional and global stresses and address cross-border violence; and stronger provision of supplementary capacity (technical and financial) to countries attempting to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of violence.

On regional and global stresses, possible policy directions include enhanced coordination and instruments to address international corruption, trafficking and money laundering; mechanisms to protect against the impact of economic shocks and food insecurity in conflict-affected areas; and greater use of regional and cross-border economic initiatives and administrative integration.
Possible actions to strengthen the provision of international supplementary capacity include a greater focus on preventative support; improving the speed, duration and predictability of aid; bridging institutional and financing deficits in the rule of law sector (in particular for justice and policing systems); public-private investment and risk-sharing instruments to foster job creation; approaches to improve coordination and the international division of labor; and better indicators to measure progress in stabilizing fragile situations.

Underlying some of the less satisfactory aspects of international performance is a cultural issue identified by some members of the WDR Advisory Council. The international institutions of today were born of a pact between the larger and wealthier nations at the waning of the colonial era. While the pact has broadened, the process of institutional deepening is not yet complete, particularly insofar as countries with weak bargaining power vis-a-vis the international community are concerned. The world of international donors and institutions is still quite inward-looking; the problems of fragile and conflict-affected states tend to be seen through the prism of external organizations’ own norms, standards, expectations and structures. There is a tendency to push favored solutions; there is also a lack of acknowledgement of how long it has taken to confront violent challenges to development and to create resilient institutions in the North, or of the parallels between current violence in the North and the South. In the process adopted for the WDR we have tried to address one element of this by including experiences of current challenges of conflict and violence and the history of institutional development from wealthier nations; this helps underline the fact that there are no perfect answers and that the problems of global violence are shared.

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War and violence have often played transformative roles in state-building, for all the suffering they have caused. Equally, injustice, exclusion and elite corruption have been standard features in many political dispensations in the past, including in most of today’s developed countries. Today, however, the international community aspires to do better. International agreements now govern the use of force and define standards of human rights and governance behavior, even if they are not always observed. Aggression and repression are no longer seen as acceptable tools of statecraft.

With these global standards come international obligations: to support countries struggling to face violent challenges without recourse to repressive methods.

The regional and international approaches that have emerged since the end of the Second World War demonstrate the potential for positive change, and the way in which such change can deliver results - as the decline in interstate and civil war in recent years shows. Important developments in the international system are underway; these include a reaffirmation by major powers of the importance of multilateral and global solutions, stronger participation by states with a recent history of conflict in the global debate on violence and the growing role of the middle-income countries, who bring new resources and energy to the table along with their own experiences of transition. While policy differences and coordination problems inevitably arise when power structures begin to shift, the international system has already shown an ability to harness the energies of new and established actors alike in response to crises; the challenge now is to translate this potential into forward-looking approaches to conflict and violence prevention. A central message of the WDR is one of hope: where committed national leadership is met by effective international support, violent challenges can be overcome, lives saved, economic hope restored and collective security enhanced.
Section I: The Problem and the WDR Framework

Chapter 1: The Problem: Interlinked and Repeated Cycles of Violence with Serious Development Consequences

The key finding in this chapter is that violence in today’s world is adaptive and resilient, assuming new forms in response to new opportunities. There appears to be a strong continuum between various forms of violence, and strong connections between them. Countries experiencing civil war have a high prospect of relapse or continued fragmented fighting (as indicated by the rise in the number of battle deaths occurring after ceasefires), with evidence of organized crime and gang activity emerging after civil wars. Equally, localized groups carrying out criminal activity can be used for political violence during tense periods such as election cycles. Three other interlinked forms of cross-border violence can be identified: local predatory groups with commercial interests, trafficking of drugs and other commodities and violence which link globalized ideologies and local grievances.

Violent conflict has severe developmental consequences: societies experiencing civil war and large-scale violent crime generally achieve lower development outcomes than those able to prevent or avoid it, with vulnerable groups most strongly affected. Fragility and conflict risk are strongly interlinked: WDR analysis indicates that fragility, as measured by weak institutions, is correlated with conflict risk, and the development consequences of violent conflict are more severe when societies lack the institutions to withstand or respond to it. Fragile states consistently lag behind other countries in progress toward the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with not one fragile state tracked by the MDG Monitor having achieved a single MDG. Organized violence can also spill across borders, bringing violence and instability to neighboring countries.

I. Successes and challenges

1. Successes. Committed national leaders have achieved some outstanding successes in stabilizing violent situations and regaining a developmental path to prosperity. International assistance and the post-World War II (WWII) architecture have played a crucial role in many cases. Examples: Colombia; Indonesia/Aceh; Mozambique; Northern Ireland; Republic of Korea; Rwanda; South Africa; Vietnam; Europe post-WWII. Growth and MDG gains. Mapping declines in violence.

2. Challenges. Nonetheless, major challenges remain. Some situations of conflict remain unresolved; countries previously considered stable have faced severe civil conflict; significant violence linked to trafficking and gang activity has intensified in some regions; and a considerable number of “post-conflict” countries face continued or renewed violence. Examples: Afghanistan and surrounding region; Côte D’Ivoire; Kenya; Central America; Horn of Africa; the Sahel region; Middle East. Mapping challenges.

II. Repeated and interlinked cycles of violence

3. Much of the literature and policy debate of the 20th century on conflict and global development focused on interstate and civil war. The incidence and severity of interstate war declined significantly over the course of the last century, a particular achievement given that the numbers of states has doubled over the same period. While the total number of civil
wars also declined in the 1990s, this trend has leveled off in the last five years and civil conflict remains a significant barrier to shared prosperity and gains in poverty reduction.

4. **The focus of the WDR.** The WDR’s analysis focuses on three particular problems which have started to receive greater attention in recent research: repeated cycles of violence, inter-linkages between different types of violence, and cross-border violence.

5. **Repeated cycles.** There is a well-established body of literature on the risk of civil war relapse. Data: Trends in civil war relapse in the last 20 years. More recent research and the WDR’s own analysis draw attention to two other forms of violence occurring in “post-conflict” situations. The first is continued fighting after ceasefires. The WDR’s analysis indicates that more than one-third of all global battle deaths from the late 1990s occurred in countries with recognized ceasefires, up from around five percent in earlier years. In addition to impacts on welfare, which have received relatively little developmental consideration, this phenomenon is affecting the environment for international assistance - from peace-keeping to humanitarian and development aid. Data: Battle deaths after ceasefires and in the presence of peace-keeping missions (qualified by size of peace-keeping deployment and size of country/conflict). Aid in the presence of battle deaths. Data on attacks on peace-keepers, humanitarian and development workers. NGO input on community acceptance. The second is high levels of violence related to organized crime and gang activity following civil wars. Data: El Salvador; Guatemala; to be tested in other regions.

6. **Interlinked forms of violence.** Academy literature and policy debates have tended to treat different forms of violence as separate phenomena, be they civil war, political instability and election violence, urban and gang violence, or sub-national conflicts. Recent research and WDR data analysis suggest a strong continuum between various forms, and strong connections between them, both through cross-border and global dynamics as well as transfer mechanisms within societies. Data and existing research/assessments; organized crime, trafficking, conflict history and current homicides; urban, youth and gang violence, conflict history and trafficking; internationalized grievances and civil conflict; domestic violence and societal violence; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) on local conflicts. Cross-country data limitations on violent crime and WDR work with Governments, UNODC and universities to improve data coverage. Examples to include: Central America, Jamaica, West Africa, Horn of Africa, Sudan, Nepal, Afghanistan, Balkans.

7. **Violence with cross-border and transnational linkages.** Three particular forms can be identified. The first involves local predatory groups with commercial interests and/or ethnic interests which cross borders. Examples: the Lord’s Resistance Army/Uganda; the Sahel region; and the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of Congo; to be tested in other regions. The second is violence linked to organized crime and trafficking, in particular of drugs but also including natural commodities and people. Data on conflict, homicides and trafficking. The third form links global ideologies (some secular, some religious) with local grievances. International terrorism associated with this form has preoccupied policy-makers since the events of September 11th, 2001. Discussion of data on terrorism and internationalized grievances. Links between internationalized grievances and local conflicts.

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1. Although a large number of long-standing conflicts ended, new onsets were actually higher in the 1990s than in previous decades. Data: major conflicts since 1990, and the increase since 2000 in minor civil conflict; violence after ceasefires.
2. Indeed, there are some indications that this trend extends to violence in the private sphere, including domestic violence.
8. **Scope of the report.** The WDR focuses on forms of violence that constitute or prefigure a clear threat to the developmental functioning of state-society relations (civil war, sub-national conflict, conflicts that cross borders, globalized forms of violence, large-scale gang activity and organized crime). Several of these forms of violence impact higher-, middle- and lower-income countries. The WDR will consider lessons learned across countries on approaches to prevent and recover from violence, but will focus particular attention on lower income countries where meager national resources and weak institutions translate into a higher risk of escalation of violence, and more severe consequences for the welfare of the poor.

III. National and local development consequences

*Box: the impact of conflict: Rwanda*

9. **Freedom from violence is a basic human right, and central to poverty reduction.** Security is cited by poor people around the world as a priority for improving their welfare. *Structured Interviews and Opinion Barometers, WDR Witnesses project, Voices of the Poor.*

10. **Conflict and violence have severe consequences for national and local development outcomes.** Societies experiencing civil war and large-scale violent crime generally achieve lower development outcomes than those able to prevent or avoid it. *Data: disentangling pre-existing conditions from the impact of violent conflict poses methodological difficulties: in addition to updating simple country comparators against the MDGs, the WDR will use comparisons between countries that have prevented or avoided conflict with others at equivalent stages of development prior to the onset of conflict and/or large increases in violent crime, as well as reviewing econometric analysis of conflict, violence and development outcomes.*

11. **Vulnerable groups are strongly affected.** The direct impact of violence falls primarily on young males, but women and children often suffer disproportionately from indirect effects. The WDR will study the impacts of violent conflict on men, women, boys and girls⁴. Women are particularly affected by the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and intimidation, although sexual violence has been used against both men and women. *Comparative data on impact of violence on different groups, where available. Violence and private sector development.* Violence dislocates without destroying the private sector, which often remains as one of the sole functioning institutions in times of crisis. Dislocations include the flight of longer-term financial capital (local and foreign), “brain drain” talent loss, the growing importance of remittances and the informal sector, and the introduction of new economic actors (often government, military, rebel or gang leaders who establish and run businesses, legal or otherwise). The WDR will examine the impact of violence on the private sector in two ways: by analyzing the conduciveness of various environments to investment, and - where data is available - by assessing the risks of criminalization of the economy. *Data: doing business indicators; anti-money laundering and linked assessments.*

12. **Violence also stalls development in wealthier countries.** Higher- and middle-income countries have generally managed to avoid nation-wide negative economic impacts when

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⁴ This will include joint work with UN on UNSCR 1325 and its implications, including the role of women as peacemakers.
experiencing sub-national (including urban) violence, due to the relative strength of their national systems and institutions. The WDR will examine the impact of high levels of violence on socio-economic development indicators in affected areas in middle- and high-income countries. Analysis from Asia, Europe, and Latin America.

13. **Fragility and conflict risk are strongly interlinked.** The past ten years has seen significant international debate on fragile states and situations. The WDR analysis indicates that violence and fragility – as measured by weak institutions - are closely correlated (see Box). ‘Fragility’ can therefore be seen as an indicating high conflict risk, actual conflict (including widespread violent crime and insecurity as well as civil war), or repression (“one-sided violence”). Fragile states consistently lag behind other countries in progress toward the MDGs. The MDG Monitor reports that no fragile state tracked by the monitor has achieved a single MDG. Consistently, these countries lag behind non-fragile states on progress towards these goals. For MDGs 1, 5, 6 and 7 (reduce poverty, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases and ensure environmental sustainability) only three percent to 17 percent of fragile states are on track to achieve these goals, versus 27 percent to 48 percent for non-fragile states. The WDR will draw on a range of data sources to estimate the proportion of the MDG deficits accounted for by low-income fragile states and will work with other partners to improve data collection to permit better analysis of links between fragile institutions, civil conflict and other forms of violence.

**Box: Definitions of fragility. Correlations between weak institutions and conflict risk**

**IV. Regional and international spillover effects**

14. **Organized violence may spill directly across borders, in turn sparking violence in neighboring countries.** Examples: West and Central Africa; South Asia. Even where actual violence does not transcend borders, consequences of violent conflict, including refugee flows, can have destabilizing effects for neighboring countries.

15. **Conflict in a neighboring country may affect economic activity by disrupting trade routes and damaging investor confidence.** Data: spillover effects on GDP growth; refugee flows.

16. **The social and economic networks set up by organized crime, trafficking and international grievances often cross borders, with corrosive social and economic impacts in neighboring countries.** Examples: Americas; Europe; West Africa. Data: global patterns in drugs production and transit; the spread of international ideologically-based movements; terrorist attacks.

**V. Linking prevention of, and recovery from, different types of violence**

17. **Interlinked forms of violence.** As noted above, the academic literature and policy frameworks have tended to treat civil war as a phenomenon independent from other forms of violence.
large scale violence, including gang activity, violence linked to trafficking and local, rural or urban violence. The policy literature has focused on “post-conflict” situations more than prevention. Operational experience, input from national reformers and recent qualitative research indicates that these challenges are more closely linked than may previously have been realized.

Chapter 2: The WDR Framework

The WDR analysis draws existing research on the causes of violence into a framework based on stress, capability and expectations.

Stress can be external in nature (global economic shocks, pressure from powerful countries, cross-border trafficking networks, etc), or internal (leadership devoted to the pursuit of personal or group gain through violent means, rapidly growing youth populations and urbanization, rising inequality between groups, etc).

A society’s ability to confront severe stress will depend on its capability, defined as a combination of physical resources and technical capacity (e.g. economic growth, state revenues, legal systems, organizational structures, equipment, skilled personnel) and social cohesion (an attribute which embodies leadership, shared values and collective identity). Capability is what enables a society to carry out rapid and unified action to counter violence or threats thereof. Conflict risks are high when internal and external stresses combine with weaknesses in society’s capability to respond.

Situations of conflict risk possess a dynamic akin to a financial crisis. Where stresses are high and capabilities weak, and in particular where there have been failed attempts to address problems in the past, expectations of successful recovery can be low and self-perpetuating. Individuals have little reason to expect that the state (or other powerful institutions) will overturn injustices, protect and reward those who try to prosper within the law, or punish those who break it. Once expectations begin moving in a negative direction, a crisis of confidence can develop, where key actors ‘disinvest’ and withdraw their support for cooperative pathways out of crisis -- an “expectations trap” which is difficult to reverse. Escaping this trap is possible, though, particularly if concerted efforts by responsible national leadership are strongly supported by international actors.

By emphasizing the need to shift expectations of key stakeholders (including current and potential combatants, domestic elites, foreign governments and investors), the framework indicates that short-term strategies should be based on a few key outcomes which will restore positive expectations of security, justice and socio-economic prospects and can be realistically delivered quickly. To prevent a recurrence of violence, the framework highlights the imperative to develop institutional capabilities and broaden shared socio-economic interests and social cohesion over time.

7 Germane to the discussion of capacity is Napoleon Bonaparte’s oft-quoted aphorism on materiel and morale in war and peace: “The moral is to the physical as three to one.”

8 Expectations are important because they help explain why some situations of high risk escalate into large-scale violence. The behavior of individuals in conflict-prone environments is shaped largely by their expectations of the future. In addition to material well-being, these expectations are affected by values and social identities (which shift over time, and which are influenced by leadership and by experience of shared interests or discrimination).
International parties can play a pivotal supporting role in two ways. The first is by taking action at a regional or global level to reduce external stresses. The second is to provide supplementary support to help shift expectations and strengthen national capability.

I. Existing research: characteristics of violent environments and causal theories

18. Characteristics of violent environments. The table below summarizes characteristics of environments where the risks of violence are high, drawing from qualitative and quantitative literature, and from input to the WDR by national leaders and reformers. It is organized across (i) political and justice, security and socio-economic domains to demonstrate the consistency with which factors in all three domains contribute to the risks of violence; and (ii) into grievances and opportunities, a traditional approach to distinguishing different motivations for violence.

Table 1: Characteristics of Environments with High Risks of Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politics and Justice</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRIEVANCES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of conflict</td>
<td>Perceived or real human rights abuses</td>
<td>Corruption, by both internal and external parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived or real discrimination (ethnic, religious, class, geographical)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Horizontal inequality (between regional, ethnic, religious or other identity groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived or real negative interference by external actors (at the extreme, invasion/occupation)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived or real resource predation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divided or backward-looking identities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OPPORTUNITIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak political and justice institutions</td>
<td>Conflict in neighboring countries</td>
<td>Low growth, low incomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply of arms/financing</td>
<td>Presence of foreign armed movements</td>
<td>Weak revenue generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of foreign armed movements</td>
<td>Weak security institutions and vacuums in security delivery</td>
<td>High unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak security institutions and vacuums in security delivery</td>
<td>Difficult terrain or remote areas, poorly served by roads and infrastructure connections with the national economy</td>
<td>Weak economic and social institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficult terrain or remote areas, poorly served by roads and infrastructure connections with the national economy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Weakly governed natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of youth oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rapid demographic shifts (e.g. youth bulge, rapid urbanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Economic shocks, natural disasters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 The dominant quantitative literature has found economic and physical variables (low growth, natural resource rents and difficult terrain in the case of civil war; unemployment and inequality in the case of violent crime) easier to measure across countries than grievances or expectations. (see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 2004. “Greed and grievance in civil war”, *Oxford Economic Papers*; James Fearon and David Laitin, 1999 “Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945”. *Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association*; James Fearon and David Laitin, 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, *American Political Science Review*; Edward Muller, 1985. “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence”, *American Sociological Review*. Qualitative and case study literature as well as input from national reformers consistently highlight external pressures, political injustice, social exclusion and inequality between social groups as key correlates of conflict. (see Alexis Heraclides, 1990. “Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement”, *International Organization*; Mansoo Murshed and Scott Gates, 2005. “Spatial–Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal”, *Review of Development Economics*; Frances Stewart, 2002. “Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development”, *QEH Working Paper*.) Some of these factors, such as corruption and human rights abuses, are susceptible to cross-country measurement but have been little studied. The WDR will undertake initial work on such correlations. Some, such as perceived or real discrimination, are difficult to quantify both within and across countries: the WDR will draw on qualitative and case study work to examine the impact of these factors.

10 Single-headed households; population movements which break down community and family bonds.
Box: Point-counterpoint: the debate on the importance of political and justice factors
19. Existing research on the causes of violence. The presence of some or all of the factors listed above does not help explain how they interact, or why they precipitate violence in some societies but not in others. Existing literature offers a number of useful theories to help understand how these factors can precipitate violence. One important strand of research focuses on economic motivations,\(^1\) positing that an individual’s decisions are influenced by the economic costs and benefits associated with engaging in violence.\(^2\) This strand of the literature has found little evidence of the importance of political and social grievances, and has therefore focused on decreasing economic incentives for conflict.\(^3\) A second and linked strand argues that countries with significant internal violence are distinguished mainly by the state’s weak administrative and coercive capabilities, which are correlated with per capita income.\(^4\) A third strand, largely based on game theory, focuses on security dilemmas and trust.\(^5\) Part of this literature places more emphasis on the role of collective identities, arguing that in deeply divided societies it is difficult for leaders to make credible commitments to address grievances. A fourth area of relevant research is experimental psychology, which demonstrates how the willingness to inflict violence on others can be rapidly influenced by creating new “collective” groups to which people are told they belong.\(^6\) A fifth strand, particularly evident in the discussion of violent crime, combines individual economic incentives with motivations associated with social and family cohesion.\(^7\) A sixth, which includes many of the statements produced by violent movements themselves, focuses on exclusion and political injustice as justifications for violent resistance or rebellion.\(^8\)

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\(^2\) Costs can be seen as either direct (the chance of detection and punishment, themselves a function of the effectiveness of the country’s security and justice systems, terrain etc) or in opportunity cost terms (availability of and returns to legitimate activities).

\(^3\) A key reason for the exclusion of political, social and economic grievances from this literature is the measurement problem. Discrimination and inequity are important from a welfare economics perspective (if my class, ethnic or religious group is prevented from accessing opportunities, this lowers the opportunity cost of my engaging in violence), but such factors have proven difficult to capture in large cross-country regressions. This has led to a questioning of their importance.


\(^6\) Klaus Abbbink and Benedikt Herrmann, 2009. “Pointless Vendettas”, *University of Amsterdam*.


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20. **Repetitive cycles.** One of the most robust findings in existing research is that a history of civil wars increases the risks of renewed conflict.\(^{19}\) Recent research also indicates a link between a history of civil conflict and vulnerability to wider forms of violence (such as organized crime, urban crime and gang-based violence).\(^{20}\) Discussion on links between different forms of violence.

II. Understanding the causes of violence

21. **The need for a bridging framework.** The existing literature offers few bridges between political, security and socio-economic explanations; or between those explanations which stress individual motivations to take part in violent activity and those which emphasize society’s ability to contain violence and mitigate grievances. All the strands of thought described above have important insights to offer, but they need to be brought into an analytical framework that can use them to drive effective operational solutions.

22. **Stress.** Stress in the WDR context refers to the pressures on societies that increase conflict risk. These may either be *external* in nature (e.g. the impact of global economic shocks, political interference by powerful neighbors, conflict that spills across the border from a neighboring country, infiltration of national space by drug cartels or global terrorist entities), or *internal* (e.g. internal stresses include legacies of violence and trauma, divisive national leadership, rapid shifts in economic power between groups, severe discrimination, an explosive growth in youth populations).

23. **The capability to respond.** Capability refers to the ability of individuals and societies to respond to stress. We use ‘capability’ deliberately: successful responses depend not only on physical resources and technical capacity (e.g. economic growth, revenues, the ability to provide security and services in remote or insecure areas with difficult terrain, legal systems, organizational structures, equipment, skilled personnel) but also on leadership, shared values, social cohesion and collective identity: both types of attributes are needed.

24. **Expectations.** All societies face stress, and are constrained in the abilities to respond. The expectations of individuals are important because they explain why some situations of risk escalate into violent crises while others do not. Periods of recurrent conflict and/or high conflict risk are typically characterized by severe internal stresses and an insecure future. Where societal capability to respond is weak, and in particular where there have been failed attempts to address problems in the past, expectations of successful recovery can be low and self-perpetuating. Individuals have little reason to expect that the state (or other powerful institutions) will overturn injustices, protect and reward those who try to prosper within the law, or punish those who break it.

25. **Analogy to financial crises.** Conflict-risk situations therefore possess a dynamic akin to a financial crisis: once expectations begin moving in a negative direction, a crisis of

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confidence can develop, and key actors can begin to “disinvest”\(^\text{21}\) and withdraw their support for legal solutions they no longer find credible - a process difficult to reverse. Violence can escalate if leaders are unable to restore confidence that the society’s institutions are capable of handling the particular stresses that have emerged.\(^\text{22}\)

26. **Expectations trap.** Risks of violence are more difficult to address than risks of economic crisis because societies generally need to respond to a range of stresses across the political and justice, security and socio-economic spheres simultaneously. Expectations in fragile situations can be disproportionately affected by divisive or antagonistic group identities (regional, ethnic, religious, nationalist), which can make it difficult for leadership to make credible commitments to new directions. There is also an inherent dilemma involved in trying to shift expectations in such situations. On the one hand, it is vital to do so through credible actions and signals of additional changes to come. Experience, however, shows how tempting it is to set up expectations that fragile systems cannot meet, and how quickly credibility can be destroyed by attempting too much too soon.\(^\text{23}\) The WDR argues that these factors can create an “expectations trap” in situations of high risk or in the aftermath of conflict, where exceptional collective action by both national leadership and their international partners is needed to shift and manage expectations and then deliver on commitments.

27. **Advantages of the framework.** The research on grievances and opportunities which correlate with conflict risk, listed in Table 1, serve as an important foundation for our framework. In Table 2, below, they are organized by type of stress (internal or external) and set against capabilities to respond. The framework allows a separation of the large number of risk factors into stresses which help precipitate conflict, and abilities to respond (which include social cohesion, and institutional strength across the political, security and socio-economic spheres). It also enables us to distinguish external from internal stress (many of the stresses which emerge from research, country experience and discussions with national reformers are identified as emanating from the regional or global environment). The division into capabilities and stresses allows for the critical role of human agency, including the impacts of positive and negative leadership. Capabilities also allow us to take account of the supplementary capacity which can be provided by regional and international actors. Finally, the framework helps us understand the dilemmas associated with rapid policy reform: on the one hand, successfully completed reforms correlate with increased resilience to violence; on the other, the process of carrying out reforms, particularly in the early stages, can increase

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\(^{21}\) Leaders need to consider whether it is worthwhile to act with integrity once in office, or seek legal economic opportunities in the private sector – or conversely, to maintain movements of armed followers and persist with violent rent-seeking behavior. Investors will be deciding whether to use their capital internally, or take it abroad; exiles and refugees, whether to return to their country; small businesspeople and farmers, whether to save and invest in increased production; young people, whether to seek legal employment or educational opportunities, migrate abroad, or join violent movements at home.

\(^{22}\) Theoretically, this approach has two important assumptions. First, each individual’s action depends on their expectations of the action of others, in ways that can create multiple equilibria. Second, the underlying dynamics of crises, conflicts and violence are non-linear, such that at some stages seemingly small shifts along a trajectory can cause wildly different outcomes.

The framework is summarized in Table 2 below and will be used throughout the WDR to identify how societal capabilities can be built and stresses managed to prevent or reduce conflict.24

Table 2: Violence Prevention and Recovery: Societal Capability and Stress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRESSES</td>
<td>• Leadership action to use coercion for personal and group gain</td>
<td>• External interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rapid policy changes that shift the economic or political balance of power</td>
<td>• Economic shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rising levels of corruption</td>
<td>• Organized crime and illegal trafficking (drugs, crime, natural resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Growing youth unemployment</td>
<td>• Natural disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rising inequality or real/perceived discrimination</td>
<td>• Corruption by external parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rapid urban growth</td>
<td>• Conflict in neighboring countries (incl. infiltration, arms flows)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Legacy of violence and trauma</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPABILITIES</td>
<td>• Leadership in the collective interest</td>
<td>• Constructive support: aid, technical capacity, security, trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shared values and trust</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical capacity and cohesion in political/justice, security, development institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Equitable economic growth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Labor market absorptive capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revenue and expenditure capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Control of corruption and governance of natural resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accountability for human rights abuses</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

III. Escaping the expectations trap: reducing stresses and increasing societies’ capability to respond

28. **Despite the complexity of the task, it is possible to achieve success.** We know from research and country experiences that expectations can be changed for the better, and that strategies can be developed that either prevent or bring about recovery from violence. An important WDR contention is that it is possible for societies to strengthen their capabilities and address external and internal stress – provided that domestic leaders and international actors act in the collective interest, deliver on promises and foster a positive sense of shared interests and identities. *This will be illustrated in Section II by reference to the experiences of a number of countries previously plagued by conflict or the risk of serious violence.*

29. **Combating violence means more than providing physical security.** Countries that have tackled repeated cycles of violence successfully have done so by combining actions to redress political and social injustice, provide security and economic hope. *Section II will look at shifting expectations across the political, security and socio-economic domains.*

30. **Progress takes time, and compromises will be needed.** Positive outcomes typically require transformation processes of more than a decade. Successful efforts to build state-

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24 The WDR team will continue to test the relevance of the stresses and capabilities below in different country contexts, through quantitative work at both a country and individual level where data is available qualitative case studies and input from country consultations.
society relations involve a balance of idealism, pragmatism and compromise. They also involve restraint: expectations need to be carefully managed, and nascent institutions cannot be asked to take on tasks before they are able to handle them. Section II will look at lessons in institution-building and the trade-offs involved in addressing difficult reforms.

31. **Adaptation over time.** Societies which have drastically reduced the risks of large-scale violence have also remained alert to the dynamic nature of popular expectations and of internal and external stresses, and have adapted accordingly. Section II will review lessons in adapting strategy and building long-term resilience.

32. **International actors can play a vital role, but need to focus on building national capability.** Positive expectations involve a belief in the durability of new policy and institutional arrangements (in part because some benefits only emerge over time). In most cases, international support is short-lived. Domestic actors know this and will be looking to their own national institutions for signs of sustained change. Political, security and socio-economic assistance from outside (including the delivery of functions more normally provided by governments, such as peace-keeping, basic education and health, public financial management) needs to be designed to build national capabilities – and to do so in ways that reinforce national credibility and cohesion. International actors can help reduce external stresses via concerted regional and global cooperation, and create breathing room through supplementary support designed to help governments meet the expectations of key stakeholders while national institutions develop (e.g. through security or humanitarian assistance). In some circumstances they can also help meet a perceived need for impartiality (e.g. through election monitoring).

33. **Exiting the expectations trap.** The process of building capability is iterative. As societal capabilities grow, expectations will increase. Additionally, since the make-up of important stakeholders will change over time, societies must be prepared to expand target constituencies to sustain positive momentum. This cycle is reflected in Figure 2 below. While specific actions are dependent on country circumstances, successfully shifting expectations will generally depend on creating strategies which signal a decisive break with the past (in addressing deficits in expectations relating to politics and justice, security and socio-economic development); and which are realistic (i.e. based on feasibility). Building citizen confidence will then depend on the implementation of commitments, linked to which is the development of capable national institutions and the sequencing of reforms to avoid over-promising. Finally, responses will need to be broadened and deepened over time by strengthening shared interests and values, engaging new stakeholders, and remaining alert to emerging threats. Figure 2 also points to the role of international actors in diminishing external stresses and providing assistance, and to the need for actions to take place at local, national and regional levels as appropriate.
IV. The relationship between the WDR approach and current policy debates

34. **Existing policy debates.** The WDR has not emerged from a policy vacuum, but is built on the foundation of pioneering work by the UN, regional organizations, the OECD-INCAF, and individual member states. This is particularly so with regard to the WDR’s understanding of peace-building and state-building from the perspective of citizen and stakeholder expectations, and its integrated perspective on political and justice, security and socio-economic actions. *Review of seminal policy literature on conflict and fragility.*

35. **Prevention versus post-conflict.** At the same time, the policy debate has been fairly narrowly focused on post-conflict transition, rather than considering the broader question of how societies struggling to prevent situations of rising conflict risk can be assisted. The WDR considers “transitions” as encompassing a broad range of situations, including recovery after conflict as well as reform efforts aimed at averting avoid violence - i.e. prevention efforts.

36. **The relationship between state-building and institution-building.** A society’s ability to absorb stress is intimately linked to the strength of its institutions. As with society as a whole, so with key institutions: capability requires both technical capacity (training, equipment, personnel, procedures, etc) and collective values (professionalism, unit cohesion). The WDR focuses on “organic learning” approaches to institution-building, which aim to build capability in stages and to avoid overloading nascent institutions before they have acquired the collective cohesion that comes from repeated success. The WDR will also discuss the dangers inherent in efforts to import institutional models from abroad without sufficient sensitivity to local context or to the need for adaptation, and the difficult political economy considerations involved in pursuing important reforms in fragile settings. The importance placed in the WDR on expectations and confidence argues for a state-building
approach based on the perspective of key actors and citizens, rather than a technocratic “best practice” vision of how to combat conflict and conflict-risk, and is in line with work at the OECD-INCAF and elsewhere.

37. What is new? The WDR aims to draw together existing research rather than invent new paradigms. It is hoped that the framework described in Section I can offer insights that will help animate operational responses by leaders and by the international community, by:

- Placing the expectations and confidence of key actors and citizens at the center of a search for successful transitions away from violence;
- Reinforcing the need to bring political, security, and socio-economic explanations of violence into an operational response framework;
- Exploring the relationships between different forms of violence (civil war, cross-border violence, crime and trafficking) and the way they mutate and adapt, and emphasizing the need to integrate hitherto separate responses;
- Viewing prevention and post-conflict actions as part of a continuum;
- Emphasizing cross-border violence and regional and global stresses and extending work on how to address those stresses;
- Extending work on collective identities, inequality and violence between societal groups; and
- Adding to the work on state and institution-building an emphasis on the relationship between technical capacity and institutional esprit de corps; and on the dilemmas posed by rapid policy change to meet local expectations as well as international norms, in the areas of security, justice, corruption, political reform and economic and administrative restructuring.
Section II: Tackling Fragile Situations: Shifting Expectations, Reducing Stress and Increasing Response Capabilities

Chapter 3: Strategies to Address Immediate Stresses

Chapter 3 discusses ways in which expectations of key parties can be shifted in the short-term. A critical aspect of this is to identify and make use of transitional opportunities (which may include openings for new government reform initiatives, national plans or compacts endorsed by government, opposition and civil society; as well as peace agreements which end a conflict).

Initial analysis indicates that in most situations where the risks of new or repeated violence are high, shifting expectations requires combining the efforts of political, security and development operations to demonstrate progress to key stakeholders. Successful transitions have balanced the competing interests of powerful stakeholders; they have also taken care to manage expectations carefully, since resources and capacities are often insufficient to meet all popular expectations and priorities.

We also assess the financial and operational constraints in the international system to supporting preventative reforms, and the extent to which some crucial activities, such as formal and informal justice systems, policing, job creation and assistance to remote and insecure areas may be under-resourced.

I. Identifying stresses

38. **Leading indicators.** The WDR will review early warning work, and will analyze data to assess whether useful additional predictors can be employed; this will include further WDR research on the external and internal stresses identified, and assessing the wider implications of localized violence.

39. **Understanding weak responses.** The WDR will examine factors which interfere with effective responses to warnings of impending crisis, including blind spots created by group identities and values, and reasons why international actors tend to observe “business as usual” rather than adjust in time.

II. Seizing transition opportunities to break cycles of violent conflict

40. **Transitions.** Transitions offer opportunities to change the expectations of key parties. While the end of a conflict clearly offers opportunities, transitions can also stem from efforts to prevent violent conflict. *Input from leaders on transitions, opportunities and hindrances. Examples: Preventive and post-conflict transitions in South Africa; The Plurinational State of Bolivia; Colombia; Liberia; Papua New Guinea/Autonomous Region of Bougainville. To include effect of external shocks: Indonesia/Aceh; Timor-Leste (oil windfall).*

41. **Leadership.** Strong national leadership can be pivotal in altering key players’ expectations, and in helping to manage them. At its best, national leadership can broker successful transitions and steer aspirations in directions that benefit the collective interest; at its worst, leadership can exacerbate divisions and foster violence. *Examples: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Mozambique; Rwanda; South Africa; Vietnam.*
42. **Bottom-up demand for violence prevention.** Citizen movements have often played an important role in stopping or preventing violence. In recent times such movements have made creative use of new technologies to shape tolerance and build collective values. *Data and possible examples: Colombia; Kenya; Moldova; South Africa; West Bank and Gaza; USA; Zimbabwe. The Otpor youth movement in the Balkans (from 2007 WDR on Youth). Examples of negative use of communications technologies including Côte d’Ivoire and Rwanda.*

III. Strategies to diminish stress and shift expectations

43. **Identifying priorities for shifting expectations.** Ongoing WDR analysis supports the contention that attempts to shift expectations need to address key actors’ lack of confidence in political/social justice, security arrangements, and socio-economic prospects. *Analysis of existing surveys and polls, additional WDR surveys and in-depth interviews in areas affected by violence, views of regional and international decision-makers; research.*

25 Community perceptions work from Pakistan.

44. **Linking political and justice, security, and socio-economic goals.** Some strategies have explicitly linked political/justice, security and socio-economic goals; others have not. The WDR will examine which approaches have been more effective in shifting expectations in a positive direction. *Examples: Afghanistan; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Colombia; Democratic Republic of Congo; Haiti; Liberia; Nepal; Northern Ireland; Pakistan; Sri Lanka; West Bank and Gaza.*

45. **Balancing the expectations of different actors.** Successful transitions have balanced the competing interests of powerful stakeholders, both domestic and international. *Views from leaders involved in transition pacts on their and others’ expectations. Input from cases that pinpoint specific signals of importance to various elites (political, military, investor, civil society, diaspora, donors).*

46. **Shifting private sector expectations.** Early measures to encourage domestic entrepreneurship, as opposed to prioritizing foreign investment alone, can pay important dividends in creating an economy capable of generating significant domestic employment. The WDR will discuss such measures, and will analyze arguments for “leveling the regulatory playing field” for all comers, versus “creating a domestic private sector.” Efforts to support female entrepreneurs will also be discussed. The importance of the role of the diaspora as an early mover will be emphasized, and successful measures to mobilize diaspora commitments will be reviewed. *Analysis of doing business reform indicators, and sequencing of reforms with investment outcomes.*

47. **Managing expectations.** In countries emerging from conflict and/or at risk of violence, resource scarcities and institutional weaknesses will limit what can be achieved, and expectations need to be managed carefully. Careful communication is at a premium. *Data on national revenues in periods of conflict. Discussion of the role of the national budget process in establishing realistic expectations. Cross-country data on time taken to improve security, economic and justice outcomes. Examples of communication strategies that have helped manage expectations.*

48. **Relationship between sector interventions and shifting expectations.** Key actors and citizens do not judge performance on the basis of individual agency performance, but on the impact of programs on their lives. Social justice, security and socio-economic objectives are interrelated, and changing expectations in one area requires complementary actions in others. Table 3 gives examples of development interventions which can help change security and justice expectations, and of interventions by political or security institutions which can help create economic confidence. Given the importance of cross-border linkages, it also illustrates how these may relate to different sector interventions. The table is not a design template: choices must always be country-specific. The focus here is on short-term interventions; medium-term implications are considered in Table 4 in Chapter 6.

**Table 3: Outcomes from short-term sector programs: signaling change in politics and justice, security and socio-economic development**

*Note: Table 3 illustrates how different sector interventions can be designed to impact outside their own sector (for example, socio-economic development interventions supporting security goals; security operations supporting safe access to markets, key trade routes and workplaces). Boxes in bold are the traditional focus of sector interventions: remaining boxes show their impact on broader political and justice, security and socio-economic development goals. The examples are illustrative: the Table does not indicate that all of these activities are relevant to every country case.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political and constitutional reform</th>
<th>Politics and Justice</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Development</th>
<th>Cross-Border Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on shared vision of representation, including timing of constitutional or electoral reforms and cycles</td>
<td>Agreement on shared vision of short-term security priorities</td>
<td>Agreement on shared vision to restore economic hope</td>
<td>Regional mechanisms for political dispute resolution</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security sector reform</th>
<th>Politics and Justice</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Development</th>
<th>Cross-Border Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vetting and prosecution of human rights abuses in the security forces</td>
<td>Equipment, training and programs to build capacity</td>
<td>Civilian protection: safe access to fields, markets, workplaces</td>
<td>Regional security cooperation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective operation of specialized functions to combat external stresses (drugs, arms trafficking)</td>
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<td>Freedom of movement along main transport routes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration</th>
<th>Politics and Justice</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Development</th>
<th>Cross-Border Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification of ex-combatants and eligibility for benefits; relationship to reparations for victims perceived as fair</td>
<td>Adequate support for ex-combatants in cantonments, where applicable</td>
<td>Initiation of reintegration programs</td>
<td>Managing cross-border flows of ex-combatants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitoring of ex-combatants</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justice sector reform</th>
<th>Politics and Justice</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Socio-Economic Development</th>
<th>Cross-Border Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vetting, appointments, equipment and training designed to create ability to impartially prosecute high level crimes related to immediate stresses</td>
<td>Effective local level dispute resolution to prevent family and community disputes escalating into conflict</td>
<td>Effective resolution of disputes over property rights</td>
<td>Cooperation on extradition; regional justice exchanges</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consideration of transitional justice measures</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border control</td>
<td>Referral of contraveners for prosecution</td>
<td>Control of illegal trafficking at border</td>
<td>Trade facilitation</td>
<td>Regional cooperation on border control</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic, trade and fiscal policy</td>
<td>Ensuring appropriate funding priority is given to political and justice, security and economic hope objectives</td>
<td>Avoid stresses caused by price volatility</td>
<td>Ensure fiscal sustainability, underpin growth, reduce inflation Facilitate ability of Diaspora to send remittances</td>
<td>Cooperation on regional transit and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public finance management</td>
<td>Provide technical basis for political debate on priorities through budget and basic reporting Tax non-contentious revenue streams Demonstrate action on corruption</td>
<td>Shutting off use of public funds or natural resource revenues to support violent activities Ensuring appropriate funding to programs with security objectives</td>
<td>Ensuring efficient and transparent revenue collection, budget execution and reporting</td>
<td>Cooperation on corruption-related information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social protection, community development and job creation</td>
<td>Coverage designed to signal action on inequities (class, geographical, political, ethnic) Reinforce links between communities and local and national state structures Protection for victims of violence Asset restoration programs for the poor</td>
<td>Alternative legal income generation (decrease opportunity cost of illegal activities)</td>
<td>Community driven development in underserved areas (remote rural and insecure urban) and to reach vulnerable households (e.g., female-headed) Conditional cash transfer programs</td>
<td>Cooperation on similar programs on both sides of insecure borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and education</td>
<td>Coverage designed to signal action to tackle key inequities. Special programs for victims and perpetrators: e.g. trauma; anti-violence and cross-associational programs in schools, communities, civil service and security sectors</td>
<td>Health and education provision in underserved and insecure areas: e.g. mobile clinics</td>
<td>Design to address short-term constraints to income generation, e.g. combating malaria; programs for secondary, tertiary and vocational training for youth</td>
<td>Cooperation on similar programs on both sides of insecure borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Linking underserved and insecure areas through transport and communication networks Consider subsidies where justice and environment objective meet (e.g. low carbon fuels for the poor)</td>
<td>Improving ‘built environment’ (e.g. urban power and street lighting, public spaces in urban areas, rural and urban markets)</td>
<td>Clearing infrastructure bottlenecks to trade and private sector development (e.g. telecoms, main trading roads, restoring power) and, where possible, supporting development of local private sector</td>
<td>Management of cross-border natural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector development</td>
<td>Fair access to transitional private sector support mechanisms (i.e. not restricted by political, geographical, ethnic or religious groupings)</td>
<td>Alternate legal employment opportunities for ex-combatants</td>
<td>Transitional support/risk-sharing for domestic entrepreneurs (lines of credit, risk facilities, project finance, training) Simple regulatory reforms</td>
<td>Sponsoring of regional trade exchanges between domestic entrepreneurs, efforts to help Diaspora businesspeople invest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Coverage designed to signal action to tackle key inequities (regions, social groups)</td>
<td>Alternative legal incomes for ex-combatants</td>
<td>Asset restoration for poor farmers and rural communities, access to markets and credit</td>
<td>Cooperation on similar programs on both sides of insecure borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and monitoring</td>
<td>Two-way communication on political vision Civil society and community roles: participation and monitoring</td>
<td>Social networks for violence prevention and monitoring</td>
<td>Two-way communication on socio-economic plans and achievements Civil society and community roles in socio-economic planning, implementation and monitoring</td>
<td>Mechanisms for communication with Diaspora and refugees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IV. Designing programs in situations of risk**

49. **Speed is often essential to grasp transitional opportunities.** Both international institutions and national governments have made progress on developing emergency procedures for program approvals and implementation, but outcomes are still varied. *Discussion of constraints, examples of adaptation and rapid delivery.*

50. **Development programs need to adapt to the political context.** Successful outcomes need to be practically adapted in design and implementation mechanisms to recognize the political economy context. *World Bank Internal Evaluation Group program evaluation.* Examples of budget support, community-driven development operations and road project design that prioritize social justice, security and the provision of legitimate economic alternatives to violence.

51. **Strengthen linkages between peace-keeping and socio-economic development.** Peace-keeping missions often have mandates to facilitate recovery and development; and their sheer size can mean that they bring significant resources into the local economy which can be of significant developmental benefit, but can also cause serious distortions. *Review of existing evaluations of the economic impacts of peace-keeping missions, and of operational experiences of drawing on peace-keeping resources to support socio-economic development.*

*Box: The economic impacts of peace-keeping operations*

52. **Adapt program design to reach underserved and insecure rural and urban areas.** These are often a high priority, and may require innovative program design. *Examples of mobile service provision (courts, libraries, clinics). Examples of inclusion of remote areas in national programs, and tapping local capabilities. Use of new technologies (e.g. cell-phone*
payment systems) to reach remote areas. Use of investment subsidies to address remote area exclusion.

53. Address horizontal inequities. Signaling change to groups with grievances is often a key early priority. Analysis of shifts in horizontal inequity. Experiences of identifying and targeting specific groups of beneficiaries - humanitarian programs, infrastructure, social services, job creation.

54. Development under fire. Section I pointed to the fact that humanitarian and development workers are increasingly being exposed to violence. Taking advantage of transitional windows, moreover, may imply moving closer to the “front line” of insecurity. This raises difficult questions about physical risk for civilians, and the trade-offs involved when security actors deliver development, given the importance of maintaining core humanitarian principles and independence. Experiences of national/international delivery in situations of active insecurity. Security service involvement in humanitarian and development work: cases of Afghanistan; Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo; and Haiti. Incentives and risk management for international actors.

Box: Provincial Reconstruction Teams

55. Multi-sectoral programs. Recent work on urban violence prevention in middle- and high-income countries has focused on multi-sectoral programs to address the links between criminal justice and policing, health, employment programs, the “built environment” and education. The WDR will examine whether such integrated approaches can help address crime and sub-national/local violence in countries with weaker institutions and lower GDP levels. Examples: Northern Ireland; the Balkans; Latin America. Data on program outcomes.

V. External financing

56. The benefits of political, aid and security support. Well-designed and capably managed peace-keeping and development interventions can be crucial in helping countries avoid or exit from conflict. The WDR will discuss the findings of research on the benefits of such interventions versus non-involvement, including, if possible given data constraints, the benefits that can accrue to successful mediation. Econometric analysis of the effects of peace-keeping and aid on the duration of peace and economic recovery. Analysis of the economic benefits of prevention.

57. Post-conflict versus broader transitional assistance. The priority and resources given to high profile “post-conflict” countries far exceeds what is generally provided to countries which do not receive international attention. Cases of successful prevention and of opportunities missed. Comparative data on aid and security expenditures on different countries and regions and facilities for post-conflict and prevention assistance. Review of multilateral and bilateral frameworks for financing post-conflict assistance versus other assistance for prevention and fragile situations.

58. Gaps in financing. The WDR will assess patterns of sectoral financing, with particular attention to possible gaps in the financing of justice sector activities, police development, security sector reform, remote and underserved area development, programs to address trauma on a major scale, job creation, and cross-border and regional initiatives. Data: review of sectoral financing flows; input from national counterparts on priorities and gaps.
59. **Speed and flexibility.** The WDR will review international facilities and procedures for disbursing assistance flexibly and quickly. *Flexibility of multilateral and bilateral rules, financing facilities.*

60. **Private sector financing.** The WDR will evaluate current programs of finance and risk-sharing in support of private sector development in high risk environments, including mechanisms designed to draw in diaspora financing, efforts to hire local companies in early recovery phases, provide credit, facilitate trade and reduce the cost of remittances. *Data: scale of current risk sharing mechanisms in conflict-affected countries.*

61. **Trade-offs.** The potential for distortions caused by aid flows will also be discussed, including their potential for increasing the volume of corruption. This in turn can have powerful delegitimizing impacts, as can situations in which government or civil society efforts are seen as internationally rather than nationally-driven. *Case examples.*

**VI. Processes for strategy-setting and coordination**

62. **Between government and other citizen groupings.** The inclusion of the political opposition, private sector actors, civil society and traditional and informal institutions in debates on national goals can be particularly important in shifting expectations. *Examination of different approaches to harnessing broad societal support for objectives, including state-citizen compacts. Examples: Afghanistan; Haiti; South Africa; Tanzania; National Conferences in Francophone Africa.*

63. **Between the political, security and socio-economic domains.** The WDR will review existing research as well case study findings on “whole of government” coordination at national and local levels, and by/between international partners. The implications for multilateral action will be considered.

64. **Between national and international actors, and between international actors.** Paris and Accra have led to improvements, but duplication and gaps are still common. *Experience with internationally-supported needs assessments, recovery planning and aid compacts. Discussion of culture, incentives, capacities and mandates in multilateral and bilateral organizations.*

65. **Differing degrees of government leadership.** Many countries affected by violence and conflict are fortunate to have strong leadership prepared to work in the collective interest. Others are not, and some leaders pursue policies which shift expectations in negative directions. *Strategy-setting in imperfect contexts: approaches adopted by reformers and international partners, discussion of engagement versus withdrawal.*

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26 At the extreme, apartheid South Africa, Rwanda 1994.
Chapter 4: Building Institutional Capability

The WDR places national institution-building at the center of its approach, since stakeholders know that international support is temporary, and shifting expectations therefore means strengthening the capability of national institutions to deliver. State-society trust is central, and state, traditional, informal, private sector, and civil society institutions all play key roles.

In Chapter 4, the WDR will identify practical lessons in building institutional capability. Three key hypotheses with regard to institution-building are that: (i) institutional capability requires both technical capacity (training, equipment, personnel, procedures, etc) and shared values (professionalism, esprit de corps); (ii) there is a danger of premature overloading, where asking institutions to deliver outcomes which are overly ambitious risks undermining their legitimacy in the eyes of the population; and (iii) institutional models cannot simply be imported from overseas, but need adaptation to local context.

We aim to draw lessons from specific country-institutional examples of “organic learning”, or the repeated accrual of successes leading to institutions able to handle progressively more challenging mandates with confidence. We will also review the literature on comparative state functions and priority state-society relations, including analysis of cross-country commonalities and differences in functions to help consider how to adapt models across countries. We analyze the time taken to form resilient institutions in countries that are now stable, compared to contemporary expectations in fragile situations. Finally, we will identify examples of successful local innovation and adaptation; and lessons on policies and program design to build the technical capacity and esprit de corps which characterize resilient institutional performance over time.

With other partners, the WDR will explore whether similar tenets are pertinent to institution-building across the political, justice and security domains (the assumption is that they are, not least because on esprit de corps and repeated cycles of institutional learning directly reflects security experience). Here, though, the WDR will draw on partners with greater expertise.

I. State-society relations, local context and the problem of imported models

66. State-society compacts. Trust between the state and society, and citizen trust in national institutions is critical to capability to manage internal and external stresses. Research on trust and citizen perceptions of national institutions

67. Core state functions and institutions. Efforts to build institutional capacity in fragile situations are sometimes dictated by an over-ambitious desire to create ‘best practice’ state functions and attendant institutions, loosely based on current Western institutions. The WDR will review literature and research on the core functions of the state, and on the comparability of institutional arrangements across different societies. Cross-country comparison of different institutional forms and their ability to meet specified functions including similarities and differences in the expectations of political, social and religious movements on state functions and structures.

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68. **Imported models.** The WDR will discuss the tendency to import models from outside without sufficient acknowledgement of local context and the need for adaptation and customization, and the negative impact that transplants can have on local innovation. *Examples of public finance and other sectoral arrangements which have encountered serious difficulty.*

69. **Local innovation.** In contrast, we will discuss examples of institutional arrangements which fall outside “standard” models of state institutions and which have successfully tackled conflict risk, and of models which have been successfully exported and/or adapted. *Examples: Indonesia; Northern Ireland; Portugal; Rwanda; South Africa; the Balkans.*

II. **Phasing outcomes as institutional capabilities develop**

70. **Organic learning.** The WDR will examine lessons from countries which have built strong institutions through “organic learning” – whereby nascent institutions take on realistic goals, focus their technical capacity on meeting them, and build unit cohesion through repeated success. *Historical analysis of the time taken to build strong institutions. Examples of well-paced institution-building that delivers the outcomes needed (political transitions, macroeconomic policy, public financial management, infrastructure maintenance, service delivery). Examples: Mozambique; Rwanda; Vietnam.*

71. **Technical capacity plus professional cohesion.** Institutions which inspire and retain confidence are those which develop both technical capacities and shared professional and unit cohesion. The WDR will examine approaches to building professional cohesion and shared values and objectives in the public finance institutions and service delivery organizations.

72. **Administrative support for managing and monitoring implementation.** An issue which has received inadequate attention is the vital process of directing and tracking implementation in countries with weak institutions. *Examination of efforts to ensure that political and senior civil service leadership have adequate administrative capacity in their offices to direct and track implementation efforts.*

III. **National and local capabilities**

73. **Bottom-up versus top-down.** The WDR will discuss the relative contributions of national and local institutions to shifting expectations and creating confidence. *Discussion of the track record of deconcentrated and decentralized approaches, including wealth-sharing agreements and fiscal decentralization.*

*Box: Wealth-sharing agreements and fiscal decentralization*

74. **National-local programs.** National programs which use local delivery and accountability mechanisms under a national policy-setting frame can serve as useful mechanisms to bring the state close to remote communities. *Data: World Bank Internal Evaluation Group evaluation of national programs using local accountability mechanisms. Examples: Afghanistan National Solidarity Program; Nepal schools; Indonesia PNPM.*

75. **The special case of peripheral violence in stable states.** The WDR will also discuss peripheral violence in stable states, and the role of national and local institutions. *Examples: Indonesia; Philippines.*
IV. Civil society and private sector institutions

76. Civil society as a bridge. The WDR will review the role of civil society institutions in conflict prevention and recovery, including the work of cross-associational institutions (which bridge different regional, class, ethnic, political or religious groups).\footnote{Ashutosh Varshney, 2001. “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond”, World Politics.} \textit{Examples of the role of cross-associational institutions in conflict prevention and recovery: trade unions, women’s groups, cross-associational peace organizations.}

77. Traditional and informal institutions. The WDR will discuss the comparative advantage of traditional and informal institutions in the delivery of services and in ensuring accountability in situations of conflict, conflict risk and recovery. \textit{Examples: Afghanistan; Rwanda.}

78. Private sector institutions. Private sector institutions can play an important role in enhancing national capability, and the WDR will explore contributions made in this area in different countries. The focus will be on ways to strengthen the formal private sector to ameliorate conflict; this will generally mean strengthening investment (local, diaspora and foreign), the provision of credit, especially for micro-enterprises and small and medium enterprises, the simplification of regulations, containing corruption and securing property rights. \textit{Examples: Lebanon; Nepal; West Bank and Gaza.}

V. The role of international support

79. Technical assistance and capacity-building. International technical assistance (TA) at its best helps create breathing room by meeting the expectations of key stakeholders while national institutions develop, and by supporting their healthy emergence. However, at its worst, TA can disempower and undermine capacity, and can establish institutional expectations that cannot feasibly be met once it has been withdrawn. \textit{Data on volume of technical assistance; evaluations of effectiveness. Examples: Afghanistan; Liberia; Sudan; Timor-Leste; the Balkans.}

80. Successful transitions from international to national capacity. The WDR will review examples of successful transitions from international to national capacity and the role of international partners in the creation of strong national capability. \textit{Examples: Afghanistan; Timor-Leste health.}

81. Civil society institution-building. Institution-building in the NGO sector also warrants attention. \textit{The WDR will discuss support for civil society, from government and from international NGO sources. Examples of good practice.}
VI. Do the same principles apply to political, justice and security institutions?

82. The WDR will explore whether the same issues are pertinent to institutions across all key domains, drawing on inputs from partners with greater expertise in these areas. The tension between the need to deliver and the need to build for the future will be discussed with reference to specific experiences. Case examples to include security development in Bosnia and Herzegovina; West Bank and Gaza; Colombia; Haiti; Timor-Leste; election reform in Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan; justice institutions in Sierra Leone and the Solomon Islands.

Chapter 5: Sequencing and Trade-offs

If governments are able to deal quickly and convincingly with issues like illegal trafficking in drugs or natural resources and corruption, this represents a potent way to counter the ‘expectations trap’ and to signal substantial and convincing change. However, the timing and sequencing of these types of reforms is one of the trickiest issues in re-framing expectations for two related reasons.

First, reforms that touch on the interests of powerful leaders and groups (e.g. corruption, trafficking, administrative restructuring) can provoke political backlashes and can thereby bring into question a society’s capability to manage the associated stresses. Second, issues arise in relation to the timeframes within which national institutions can realistically deliver.

The WDR identifies five types of reform that fall in this category: anti-corruption initiatives; economic and administrative restructuring; security sector reform and security actions against trafficking or infiltration by foreign fighters; constitutional and electoral reforms and election timing; and transitional justice and accountability for human rights abuses.

The WDR will look at expectations of reform in countries affected by conflict in relation to the time taken to achieve successful reforms in more settled country situations, in order to underline the frequently excessive expectations of speed and complexity. We will also identify successful attempts to undertake difficult reforms under trying conditions. Some of these involve a strategic approach to developing reform roadmaps that mix achievable steps with measures that need longer gestation. The drivers of donor expectations will also be discussed.

The aim is to develop a simple framework to consider the sequencing of these reforms, smart lessons on approaches, and realistic progress benchmarks based on historical cross-country data.

I. The difficult political economy of certain reforms

83. There is a particular difficulty associated with the timing and sequencing of reforms which bring long-term benefits, but carry risks of a violent political backlash. The initial WDR review of case studies and inputs from national reformers indicates the importance of timing and sequencing of efforts to address corruption; economic and administrative restructuring; the empowerment of disadvantaged groups; security sector reform and security efforts to combat trafficking; transitional justice and initiatives to hold key actors accountable for human rights abuses; and constitutional and electoral reforms.
84. Current international expectations in these areas are for fast reforms. The WDR will examine the time taken to effect successful reforms in these areas in recent history and will contrast this with the benchmarks set in donor dialogue. In close liaison with the UN Secretariat, the WDR will discuss the expectations inherent in UN mission mandates and Security Council benchmarks.

II. Corruption

85. The risk of ignoring corruption. Corruption corrodes economic efficiency, investor confidence and government credibility, and can prevent any positive shift in expectations in relation to social justice. Corruption can also play a corrosive role in financing violence and can reduce the effectiveness of service delivery (including security services). WDR quantitative analysis on the role of corruption in perpetuating violence. Examples of efforts to address corruption risks. Data showing correlations between investment and perceptions of corruption, and between corruption and conflict risk. Examples of countries where perceptions of corruption have overwhelmed confidence.

86. Historical benchmarks. The WDR will examine the track record of countries which have successfully coped with legacies of conflict as a basis for discussing realistic timeframes for creating anti-corruption cultures and control systems. Data: Country Performance and Institutional Assessment trends; Governance Matters (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi); Transparency International trends. Quantitative analysis of progress in countries in conflict or at high risk of conflict.

87. Incentives driving international expectations. An understanding of the nature and drivers of international expectations on corruption is vital if a constructive balance is to be achieved between expectations and realities. So too is an understanding of how international assistance can itself feed corruption and how this can be controlled. Discussion of the trade-offs between perfect fiduciary procedures and sufficiently timely delivery. Data: coverage of corruption in the international press.

88. Successful anti-corruption initiatives. The WDR will review initiatives that have managed to achieve peace-building outcomes while reducing corruption. Techniques used include rapid vetting, focused oversight and the adoption of achievable controls, an emphasis on local accountability, targeting grand as opposed to petty corruption, and selective exemplary prosecutions. Examples of different mechanisms: Chad College; Liberia Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program; Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund. Data: costs of intensified supervision.

III. Economic and administrative restructuring

89. The benefits of restructuring – and the costs. The WDR will discuss the role economic and administrative restructuring can play in capacity building, with impacts ranging from increased domestic revenues to labor-intensive growth in the medium term. However, such restructuring can also create severe stress if mishandled. Examples of reforms that have undoubted technical promise but ask major questions of societies include trade reform, state-owned enterprises (SOE) reform, deregulation of monopolies and downsizing in non-productive areas of public administration. The WDR will review examples of reforms with long-term promise which carry the risk of short-term stress. Data on time taken to accomplish such reforms. Examples of sequencing both rapid action and postponement, and
of transitional mechanisms to cushion impacts. Examples: Afghanistan; Côte d’Ivoire; Haiti; Mauritius; Nepal; Sri Lanka.

90. **Regulatory and private sector reform.** Private sector development is essential to any sustained trajectory of economic growth, and can help create local confidence, enhance participation and lead to greater security. However, orderly private sector development is difficult in situations featuring physical insecurity, illegal ‘taxing’ of businesses, high political risk and weak market signaling. The WDR will discuss the experience of efforts to bring about regulatory reform, improve access to credit, support domestic entrepreneurs (including women) and give priority to agriculture – as well as the damage that can be done by favoring economic ‘clients’ over economic efficiency in fragile business environments. Examples: Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mozambique; Rwanda; West Bank and Gaza; ECA countries. Quantitative analysis of sequencing of business reforms and the conditions which appear to have created successful stabilization together with strong economic outcomes.

IV. **Empowering disadvantaged groups**

91. **Actions to empower disadvantaged groups.** Addressing actual or potential grievances in groups traditionally disadvantaged can be a powerful way of mobilizing support for transitional opportunities. The WDR will discuss measures that have been introduced to address the specific circumstances of women, ethnic, religious and political groupings in violent and fragile situations, and will examine the trade-offs between appropriate safeguards and rapid action to target the most disadvantaged. Data on progress in addressing horizontal inequalities and resilience to conflict and violence. Examples of sequencing of reforms which have addressed disadvantaged groups. Sequencing and realism of benchmarks and timelines. Examples: Nepal; South Africa.

92. **Balancing the interests of winners and losers.** Balancing the empowerment of the disadvantaged at the expense of those in power can, however, be highly contentious. Experiences in cushioning the impact of reforms to address exclusion on those who stand to lose.

V. **Rule of law and security sector reform**

93. **The benefits.** Numerous case study examples point to the importance of effective action in the security sector, including the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, the assimilation of armed groups/factions into one national force, and early security sector reform. Security action against insurgency or other forms of violence can play a determining impact in shifting expectations – provided it is combined with the protection of vulnerable civilian groups. *The WDR will examine the possibility of using quantitative data on security sector reform to inform analysis of conflict risk and recovery.*

94. **Trade-offs in security sector reform.** Security sector reform raises difficult questions about how quickly to proceed with changes in practices such as security sector expenditures, security force “right-sizing”, internal reforms that can increase accountability and control abuses, demobilization and disarmament, and the timing of action against insurgents or traffickers. The WDR’s specific focus will be on budget and expenditure planning, financial control and demobilization and reintegration, while consulting with expert partners on other germane issues. *Comparative analysis of the relationship between security expenditures and the risk of violence.* Examples: Afghanistan; Democratic Republic of Congo; Guinea-Bissau; Nepal; West Bank and Gaza.
95. **Justice and corrections.** It is important that justice and corrections system development maintains pace with growing capability in the security forces, or it will not be possible to fairly prosecute and punish those guilty of infractions. The WDR, in consultation with other partners, will assess important lessons on sequencing and the linkages between security, justice and corrections actions. *Examples: Bosnia and Herzegovina; Haiti; Rwanda.*

VI. Do similar principles apply to politics, justice and human rights issues?

96. **Constitutional reforms and elections.** A striking feature of the past twenty years has been a process of national enfranchisement in fragile and conflict-affected states. *A comparison of the number of fragile states with national franchise procedures in 1980, 2008.*

97. **Trade-offs.** The first opportunities for all citizens to vote in multiparty elections have been emotional and powerful moments, in countries as diverse as South Africa and in Eastern Europe, but enfranchisement does not guarantee a working democracy, and electoral and constitutional reform processes can place strains on fragile national institutions. The WDR will draw on the experience of partners with greater expertise in this area to consider issues over the timing and scope of political reforms. *Econometric data: the relationship between elections and conflict risk, and the issue of timing. The cost of internationally-supported elections (UN Department of Political Affairs). Case experiences comparisons of political timelines, socio-economic status and security conditions: Afghanistan; Democratic Republic of Congo; Liberia; Portugal after 1975; South Africa.*

98. **Transitional justice.** The WDR will review experience with various approaches to transitional justice and other collective mechanisms for processing trauma and wrong-doing. The issues of balancing justice outcomes with the level of stress that a society can bear at a particular point in transition will be discussed. *Examples of international and local transitional justice and efforts to address traumatic histories: Argentina; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Colombia/Medellin; El Salvador; Germany; Guatemala; Portugal; Rwanda; South Africa.*

VII. Summary of lessons on sequencing

99. **Sequencing.** The WDR will discuss lessons from the preceding analysis on the sequencing of reforms, with a view to balancing desirable outcomes, the management of difficult political economy contexts and the need to avoid over-stressing institutional capability.

100. **Timing.** Based on historical and comparative analysis, the WDR will discuss the extent to which timeframes commonly established for various types of reform appear realistic.
Chapter 6: Sustaining the Process over Time: Broadening and Deepening Shared Interests and Values

Sustaining constructive processes requires agility and an ability to adapt to new challenges and forms of violence, to the emergence and demands of new groups, and to changing popular expectations. As countries and regions stabilize, expectations and demands will tend to shift from an initial preoccupation with justice and security to a greater focus on economic development, jobs and livelihoods. The history of transitions shows how important it has been for governments to remain alert to changing stresses and to the need for smart adjustments.

The WDR will discuss several important issues that arise from such experiences. The first is the importance of the budget process as a tool for adapting to new priorities and for transparency and inclusion. A second is the need to continue prioritizing job creation in environments of high unemployment, large youth populations and histories of violence. Third are attempts to broaden access to socio-economic benefits, both service provision and more equitable ownership of assets. And fourth is the constructive role that can be played by education and cultural programs in helping forge common identities and shared public values. Leadership remains a key driver of positive change, but many countries over time confront the difficulty of an orderly leadership transition, the need to develop leadership capabilities in the younger generation, and the requirement to adapt legal and constitutional structures to respond to citizen needs.

Finally, to avoid repeated insecurity, there is a need to attend to the deep-set structural stresses of rapid population growth, urbanization and increasing competition for scarce natural resources.

Aid responsiveness and rigidities will also be discussed; a key point here is the tendency for aid programs and mission mandates to operate on political cycles of much shorter duration than the objective requirements of the task. The growing importance of measurement and monitoring as a communications tool and to permit citizen accountability will be reviewed, together with the application of the Millennium Development Goals to conflict-affected situations, and the importance of additional monitoring indicators which directly relate to peace-building.

I. The shifting nature of threats and expectations

101. Forms of violence and threats to stability mutate over time and new internal and external pressures emerge. At the same time, expectations will also change, and sustaining positive processes will mean taking account of both these dynamics. This can be a painful and contentious process; some powerful individuals and groups will resist, while others may choose to evoke popular grievances to bolster their claims and trigger demands that fragile systems are unable to immediately satisfy. The best arrangements are sufficiently flexible to manage emerging pressures and respond to changing expectations. Examples: Mozambique; Nepal; Rwanda; South Africa; Vietnam; the Balkans; post-WWII Europe. Data from surveys on shifting popular expectations.

II. Adapting planning and resourcing approaches

102. Planning and budgeting systems – national. The WDR will examine the ability of planning and budgeting systems to respond to changing threats and expectations. Comparative review of flexibility in national planning and budgeting systems.
103. **Planning and budgeting systems – international.** International financing systems also have rigidities in the way in which aid is committed, and the possibilities of reacting to changing circumstances. *Examination of international mechanisms to commit aid and flexibility to re-gear priorities over time.*

104. **Aid duration.** While external assistance is understood by its nature to be a temporary phenomenon, aid programs are often of inadequate duration. *Examination of timelines of special assistance in conflict-related situations, and discussion of incentives to remain engaged over time.* Aggregate aid patterns in conflict-affected countries vs. more stable situations.

### III. Developing a medium-term focus

105. **Broadening and deepening shared interests, addressing new stresses.** The WDR will assess whether experiences of successful stabilization and recovery have generally involved a shift from the immediate goals which were the focus of Chapter 3 (politics/justice, security and socio-economic development) towards a greater focus on socio-economic goals (jobs and occupations, broadening access to assets and services, collective identities and social cohesion). Achieving smooth leadership transitions is of significant importance to medium-term stability in many countries. Care also needs to be taken to act on long-term structural stresses (such as population growth), and not to lose focus on justice and security or the ability to counter new forms of violence. Table 4, which will be anchored to specific country case examples in the WDR itself, provides examples of how expectations can shift and how governments have responded.

**Table 4: Shifts in Expectations and Objectives**

*Specific country examples to be provided in final WDR*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Short-term goals: fulfilling political and justice, security and socio-economic expectations</th>
<th>Medium term goals – catering to emergent socio-economic demands</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and constitutional reforms</strong></td>
<td>Build consensus on actions to address immediate stresses and signal positive continued process for inclusion</td>
<td>Consolidate through national debates that enhance constitutional and legal frameworks</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Macroeconomic, trade and fiscal policy</strong></td>
<td>Stabilize inflation; address any impacts on consumer prices with great care</td>
<td>Policies that generate private sector employment&lt;br&gt;Increase revenues through fuller suite of tax instruments</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Public finance management</strong></td>
<td>Prioritize budget execution efforts on programs which meet political and justice, security and socio-economic goals&lt;br&gt;Demonstrate improvements in countering corruption and waste</td>
<td>Prioritize expenditures to help create jobs and shared economic interests across societal groups&lt;br&gt;Strengthen performance management and corruption controls&lt;br&gt;Bring donor funds on-budget; shift from humanitarian provision to longer-term investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social protection, community development and job creation</strong></td>
<td>Reach remote or insecure areas and protect victims of violence&lt;br&gt;Generate temporary labor opportunities in both private and public sectors&lt;br&gt;Provide rural microcredit in affected areas</td>
<td>Increase links between community-based activities and the state&lt;br&gt;Shift job-creation emphasis to supporting emergence of private sector&lt;br&gt;Include NGO activity within national programs, expand coverage by line agencies</td>
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</table>
| **Health and education** | Prevent breakdown of services, reach remote or insecure areas  
Health services to protect victims of violence  
Education and training: access to former or potential combatants | Access policies and quality initiatives developed to ensure inclusion of disadvantaged/minority groups (class, regional, social etc) and to manage rural-urban shifts  
Include NGO activity within national programs, expand role of line agencies  
Education curriculum adjusted to support positive collective identities |
| **Infrastructure** | Emergency repairs to electricity and water systems, improve “built environment”  
Ensure maintenance of key assets | Link remote and insecure areas  
Remove bottlenecks to provision of power, transport  
Create national maintenance systems |
| **Private sector development** | Encourage rapid investment from domestic entrepreneurs and Diaspora  
Provide legal income generating opportunities for former or potential combatants | Regulatory reform and investment incentives to increase domestic and foreign investment, including from region |
| **Agriculture** | Restore agricultural assets and ensure access to markets | Improve markets and transport connections with continued emphasis on the poor and disadvantaged, particularly in insecure areas  
Incentives to add domestic value |
| **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration** | Ensure fair treatment of ex-combatants and carry out initial programs for reintegration into civilian life with a focus on training and employment | Monitor and follow-up ex-combatants and receiving communities, provide additional support |
| **Security sector reform** | Decrease abuses in security forces  
Improve security in remote and insecure areas | Legislation and organizational reform for civilian oversight and effective, non-competing mandates; focus on adapting to evolving threats  
Strengthen focus on economic crimes  
Avoid ‘privatization’ of militias |
| **Border Control** | Appropriately balance border security with flow of goods and people  
Focus on control of arms, drugs, other major trafficking issues | Strengthen detection systems and improve regional and international cooperation; greater focus on trade facilitation  
Ensure that effective border control does not become additional source of corruption |
| **Justice sector reform** | Address short-term bottlenecks to permit fair prosecutions and corrections for abuses and serious crime  
Support existing mechanisms for local dispute resolution | Increased emphasis on improving access to justice, particularly for civil and administrative law remedies and local criminal justice mechanisms |
| **Communications and monitoring** | Two-way communication: develop a clear and consistent message of inclusion and accountability  
Encourage civil society and community monitoring mechanisms | Continue governmental efforts to report on and debate progress with national population |
IV. Jobs

106. **The importance of jobs and legal occupations.** A key aspect of social stabilization is the ability of citizens of all groups to find productive occupations which confer respect and offer a reason to invest in a stable order. *Review of evidence on connections between unemployment, idleness and violence. Emphasis on key role of male youth unemployment and female participation in the labor force, including opportunities and structural obstacles.*

107. **Policies to foster labor intensive growth.** The WDR will examine how countries that have successfully sustained transitions away from conflict and insecurity have managed to help create job and livelihoods opportunities. *Bank regional study findings on labor intensive growth policies in Europe and Central Asia; East and South Asia; the Middle East.* Examples: post-1949 China; Rwanda; Mozambique; post-WWII Europe.

V. Broadening access to assets and services

108. **Access to services.** A number of countries that have consolidated peace-building efforts have developed socio-economic policies that aim to address (horizontal) inequities between groups and build shared interests in service provision. The WDR will examine the impact of policies which foster more equal access to services on collective identities. *Literature on socio-economic policies and shifts in voting patterns over time.*

109. **Access to assets.** Similarly, a number of countries have sought to broaden access to assets over time. These policies, like those covered in Chapter 5, sometimes involve difficult political economy choices – in particular if land reform is at issue – but can also have considerable impact on grievances and on the creation of a stake in the future by those who benefit. Access of women to assets will also be examined. *Analysis of land access and conflict prevention.* Examples: Republic of Korea, Latin America.

VI. Strengthening broad collective identities and social cohesion

110. **Educational initiatives.** The WDR will examine the use of initiatives within the educational system to foster an awareness of history, civic values and the risks of violent conflict. *Data: expansion of the 2007 WDR “Development and the Next Generation” on Youth analysis of education on civic values; Germany’s post-45 and post-89 education systems; Latin American initiatives in schools.*

111. **Initiatives to foster national identity.** State-building and nation-building are linked, but distinct. The WDR will discuss efforts to create new positive values through common identities. *Use of symbols. Role of national leadership. Dangers of backward-looking identities. Relationship to broader regional and global identities.* Examples: Bosnia, Tanzania; Kenya.

112. **Addressing trauma.** Traumatic legacies of conflict are a powerful driver of social dysfunction, sour communal relations and a continued propensity for violence. The WDR will look at examples of countries that attempted reconciliation initiatives and broad-based programming to deal with trauma, and cases where societal trauma has received less attention. *Examples: Cambodia, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, Poland, West Bank and Gaza.*

113. **National versus local cultures and identities.** Reassurance that local identities and culture will be respected can be essential to broadening and strengthening national identities.
There is debate on the circumstances under which decentralized participation, as opposed to national/federal action on rules and rights, can succeed in broadening collective identities and enhancing social cohesion. Examples: Brazil rural rights programs; Indonesia; United Kingdom; U.S. civil rights.²⁹

VII. Sustaining and regenerating strong local and national leadership

114. Constraints to the renewal of leadership. Conflict challenges often bring out strong leadership, but a subsequent challenge is how to broaden leadership over time, and achieve peaceful leadership transitions. Examination of research on how highly factionalized and/or corrupt environments work against the emergence/survival of responsible leadership.

115. Broadening leadership. The WDR will examine promising national and local approaches to building leadership and managing leadership transitions, as well as national and international incentives for positive leadership and peaceful leadership transitions. Cross-country comparisons. Evidence from the 2007 WDR on youth participation in local politics and decentralization processes. Data on participation of women in political processes.

116. Development of structures for representation and inclusion. While individuals often play an important role, broadening and deepening the ability of societies to manage conflict has involved the emergence of accountable institutions that respond to shifting popular expectations, which can cope with new stresses, and can regenerate new leadership. Working with other partners with more expertise in this area, the WDR will note key factors in the development of constitutional and legal arrangements (e.g. political parties, interest groups, tripartite platforms, etc.) in countries emerging from conflict, different approaches that have been taken in various political systems to broaden accountability and foster new leadership, and how long-standing legal and constitutional arrangements have adjusted to accommodate emerging demands and to counter new threats.

VIII. Acting on internal structural stresses

117. Population. Large youth populations will continue to place heavy pressure on societies in which labor markets are unable to absorb large numbers of new entrants. The WDR will examine the potential for and constraints to implementing population policies in countries recovering from conflict, cognizant of the suspicions that this can give rise to in divided societies.

118. Urbanization. Rapid urbanization is commonly associated with economic development, but brings severe stresses due to urban migrants’ vulnerability to crime, the pressure on services, inadequate urban infrastructure, and the breakdown of community and family ties. The WDR will review experiences in managing rural-urban migration.

119. Environment and resources. Environmental pressures can exacerbate local resource disputes. The WDR will review experiences in mitigating environmental damage in areas affected by violence and conflict.

IX. Measuring progress

120. **The MDGs and conflict.** The WDR will discuss the strengths and limitations of MDG benchmarks as monitoring tools in conflict-affected situations. *Evaluation of benchmarks used in different conflict situations.* Divergence between benchmarks used by political and security institutions and benchmarks used by economic institutions. *Discussion of indicators that directly measure violence (battle deaths, homicides, local conflict events) as well as those which measure perceptions of stakeholder confidence.*

121. **Building national monitoring capacity.** Experiences in building up capacity to monitor performance over time will also be discussed, including the challenge of limitations on data availability. *Data on coverage.*

#### Chapter 7: Regional and Global Action on Regional and Global Problems

*The WDR approach emphasizes the importance of reducing external stresses, which are regional and global problems and require regional and global action. This chapter discusses experiences to date as well as unfulfilled agendas.*

*The most effective response mechanisms are those that have been designed to deal with natural disasters, including emergency, relief and insurance arrangement. Important responses to cross-border and multi-country financial and corruption threats have also emerged, and their coverage and coordination will be reviewed (Anti-Money Laundering programs, the Stolen Assets Recovery scheme, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Plus Plus (EITI++), national laws and multilateral guidelines on corruption by OECD countries abroad).*

*International and regional cooperation on cross-border violence and trafficking is an issue of pressing concern and great complexity. The WDR will review progress in instruments and coordination and the strengths and weaknesses of different policy responses.*

I. **Shocks from economic and natural disasters**

122. **External shocks include natural disasters and regional/global economic crises.** When such stresses overwhelm local institutions in conflict-prone countries, the risk of violence can increase.30 This discussion will encompass WDR analysis (with humanitarian partners) of the possible impacts of climate change and resource scarcity on conflict risk. *Analysis of rainfall shocks and conflict.* *Data on the geographic impact of the food/fuel and financial crises, links with conflict.* *Mapping of areas at risk of external shocks and conflicts.*

123. **International and regional responses.** The WDR will discuss international and regional responses to mitigating the impact of such shocks. *Discussion of natural disaster insurance systems (Caribbean, Pacific) and of adaptation mechanisms.* The role of external parties in cushioning economic shocks: global financial and economic policy coordination; food security, and humanitarian aid facilities.

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II. International approaches to trafficking

124. Types of trafficking. The areas of trafficking of greatest international concern are drugs, natural commodities, arms and human trafficking. Focus in WDR on areas of trafficking with strongest economic links: drugs and natural commodities. Data on extent and value of various forms of global trafficking and on links to violence.

125. Link with violence. The WDR will examine the evidence for how illegal trafficking is related to violence (criminalization of economies during conflict; competition between operations; enforcement of transactions; financing flows to political violence).31 Anti-money laundering (AML) assessments: indicators of risk, cross-country/regional comparisons.

126. Drugs. The WDR will summarize work on the global trade in drugs from the points of production through transit to final consumption destinations, and will assess the violence and threats to governance associated with the trade. As a global phenomenon, solutions by definition need to be global in nature. Current and potential remedial strategies will be discussed. Data on relationship between drug production and trans-shipment with areas of existing/pre-existing conflict, and low institutional capacity. Case studies along the trade trail. The role of UNODC.


III. International approaches to corruption

128. International corruption and conflict links. Corruption in countries at risk of, or recovering from conflict, is often fuelled by external sources, and can be inadvertently fuelled by external assistance. Data on corruption/conflict links and international dimensions of corruption. Case examples.

129. International initiatives to stem corruption. The WDR will discuss current initiatives to stem corruption in developed countries, including measures directed at international commercial concerns and at preventing development programs from “doing harm”. Discussion of OECD guidelines, AML initiatives, individual country laws, the Stolen Assets Recovery (STAR) initiative, EITI ++.

IV. International approaches to cross-border and transnational violence

130. Economic and administrative integration and diminishing security stresses. Although the role of economic integration in diminishing security stresses was widely discussed in the aftermath of WWII, it has received relatively little attention in recent times. The WDR will review the potential for a greater role for regional neighbors and organizations in helping address cross-border forms of violence, building on shared security and economic

interests (the latter includes trade, the climate for foreign investment, the exploitation of common resources, shared administrative functions and shared infrastructure and institutions/infrastructure harmonization). Mapping of benefits of regional economic initiatives and cross-border violence. A discussion of initiatives to pool resources and share security and economic institutions in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. Research on trade frictions and conflict. Examples of initiatives to diminish external stresses at a regional level and links to national strategies and outcomes: EU accession experience, Afghanistan-Pakistan, Central America.

131. Internationalized grievances. Globalized forms of violence which tap local grievances (e.g. Al Qaeda’s operations) represent a potent and elusive form of globalization, and require new forms of international cooperation. While political and security concerns dominate discussions of internationalized movements, the economic and financial aspects involved in dealing with internationalized grievances are also important. Discussion of economic, political and security approaches to engaging with transnational violence; cases.

132. Implications for other actors: security guarantees. The UN Security Council and regional institutions have been charged with oversight and prevention of inter-state conflict and interference. In practice, sub-regional and bilateral arrangements have also played a significant role. Examples of regional and sub-regional action to address cross-border violence: Afghanistan-Pakistan; Great Lakes; Central America. History of security guarantees; theoretical economic interpretations of security guarantees.

V. Strengthening approaches to reduce external stresses

133. Coordination. Discussion of scope, coverage and links between the various initiatives to address corruption and trafficking; current mechanisms to address cross-border violence.

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SECTION III: Doing Better – An Action Agenda

In outlining a practical agenda for action and potential reform, the WDR will discuss three levels/types of action. Chapter 8 will summarize practical operational lessons for approaches at a national level. Chapter 9 will examine international actions that can provide more efficient supplementary support to national actors seeking to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of violent conflict. Chapter 10 will discuss the regional and international action necessary to reduce external stresses leading to cross-border forms of violence and to mitigate the conflict risk arising from external shocks.

Chapter 8: Building Capability at Local and National Levels

This chapter will draw on the WDR’s findings on successful approaches taken in different contexts to build and sustain confidence and cohesion in transitions. It is intended to be of practical use to the leaders and governments of countries at risk of conflict or emerging from episodes of violence as well as to their international partners; as such, the suggestions will be grounded in solid experience.

While certain lessons emerge, we will not be proposing checklists of things to do, since specific context is so important to the validity of any policy or program. There are no magic formulae: conflicts are too individual in nature and too complex to permit templated solutions or to follow “conflict cookbooks”. What we will aim to do, rather, is to develop a ‘lens’ through which we hope conflicts can be more easily understood, and remedial options rationally considered. What we do believe is applicable more broadly is the optic of stress, capability and expectations as an approach which can be used to evaluate particular actions.

I. Key lessons from cross-country experience

We will aim to draw out experiences that help to answer the following key questions:

134. Creating strategies that can overcome violence. How can governments best obtain rapid, accurate knowledge of citizens’ and groups’ concerns, and use this to head off violence, recover from conflict and/or combat further threats? What do cross-country lessons tell us are the policies and programs most likely to help shift political and justice, security and socio-economic expectations in a positive direction? Which of them can be delivered quickly and effectively in low-capacity environments? What kinds of national processes best support the development of strategies which can win widespread public support?

135. Planning, budgeting and coordination. What types of planning and budgeting mechanisms are effective in supporting transitions? What types of planning, budgeting and coordination approaches are most effective in generating buy-in and coordination between key national actors and international partners?

136. Multi-sectoral initiatives to address interconnected types of violence. What types of initiatives have proven effective in addressing the linkages between different types of violence (local, urban, gang-based, political)? How can low-income countries currently facing interlinked forms of violence learn from successful approaches in middle- and high-income countries?
137. **Sequencing and trade-offs.** How do the politics of fragile environments affect the trade-offs made between development choices? For example, how can efforts to control corruption, tackle human rights abuses and undertake vital economic and administrative restructuring be squared with the need to maintain the support of key elites whose interests are at stake? Do similar trade-offs apply in security sector reform, justice development and representational politics? How can considerations of economic efficiency be balanced against the likely need for public sector job creation and investment in peripheral areas? When, or under what conditions, should issues with difficult political economy implications be addressed quickly, and when should these be postponed?

138. **Institution-building, time horizons and benchmarks.** What cross-country lessons exist that can be applied to an institution-building approach which focuses on increasing the professional capability of national institutions over time, and which targets *esprit de corps* as well as technical capacities? What does historical experience suggest about the time it takes to develop strong institutional capabilities in fragile environments? What can be done in the interim to meet expectations, without undermining the credibility of governments? What factors affect these timescales, and to what extent are they amenable to acceleration? What are the implications for key institutional transitions such as the transfer of service delivery from non-government to government providers, or the control of corruption? Do similar considerations apply to policing and justice systems, and constitutional and electoral transitions?

139. **Balancing local and national actions.** How important are deconcentrated and/or decentralized approaches to delivering government services across the political, security and socio-economic domains? Is there a “middle way” that avoids an excessive focus on top-down reforms or an over-reliance on fragmented local initiatives? Do national programs with strong local delivery mechanisms and accountability potentially fill this space? How can capacities of local and traditional systems be used effectively? How should community-based programs be adapted over time as formal institutions increase their capabilities?

140. **Building resilience and confronting structural stresses.** What approaches have been important to building long-term resilience? What successful attempts to help generate jobs and livelihoods and increase the access of the disadvantaged to assets and services are worth adapting more widely? To what extent have successful approaches included broadening access to assets and services, and fostering broad collective identities and values? What lessons can be learned from efforts to tackle rapid population growth, urbanization and mounting pressure on the environment?

II. **Peer-to-peer learning and support for leadership**

141. **Leadership.** National leaders (both government and civic) who face the prospect of trying to change expectations may profit more from the experience of their peers than from the advice of analysts and development practitioners who have no hands-on management experience. Leaders in conflict-prone environments sometimes come to office with little previous governmental experience, or with experience of military structures or resistance rather than of civilian government. In some situations the administrative systems needed to support political decision-making will be weak or missing. The WDR will review approaches to supporting responsible leadership action, and will examine the potential for greater use of cross-country support and peer reviews organized at a regional level to supplement capacity.
142. **South-South learning.** South-South learning has particular salience given the broad similarities of stresses and capacity constraints among lower-income countries. This can include exchanges between countries that have faced similar challenges, or involving successful regional technical agencies in the peer learning process. Regional organizations are well-placed to foster these exchanges.

143. **North-South and South-North learning.** Lessons can also usefully be shared across country income categories. WDR analysis indicates that, while not all experiences are transferable, lessons are more comparable than generally believed. Fostering a deeper sense of a shared challenge in tackling some forms of violence can also provide strong political underpinnings for further progress. The WDR will examine mechanisms within international institutions to strengthen peer-to-peer learning between higher-income, middle-income and lower-income countries.

### Chapter 9: Providing Supplementary International Support

While local and national actions are determinant, international stakeholders have an important part to play in providing supplementary support to help capitalize on transition opportunities, and to promote the strengthening of national institutions.

Significant progress has been made in recent years, but to do a more effective job, the international community needs to invest more in understanding specific country and social contexts. In this chapter, the WDR will explore recommendations stemming from the analysis in Section II of international support for strategies to address immediate stresses, institution-building, the timing and sequencing of difficult reforms and efforts to sustain progress and prevent the recurrence of violence.

Actions to be explored in order to strengthen provision of international supplementary capacity will include enhancements to the framework of assistance for preventative reforms; improving the speed, duration and predictability of aid; bridging institutional and financing deficits for justice systems and other under-resourced sectors; public-private investment and risk-sharing instruments to foster job creation; approaches to improve international division of labor and coordination; and better indicators to measure progress in stabilizing fragile situations. Lastly, we will consider mechanisms to gain greater genuine consensus amongst aid recipients, OECD countries, regional institutions and middle income countries on the delicate balance between national ownership and innovation, and regional and international norms and standards.

#### I. Recent policy changes

144. **The track record.** Considerable thought has gone into developing policies to combat conflict and strengthen fragile states, by the OECD-DAC, the UN, key bilaterals and regional institutions. As a result, there is a growing international understanding of the specificity of fragility and conflict as a development challenge, including that business as usual will not suffice. This has led to the deployment of additional staff to the field, efforts to speed delivery of assistance and a better sense that “global-local” balance is needed to create successful interventions. There is also a greater appreciation of the primacy of political awareness in technical project design, of the need to coordinate across domains, and awareness of the dangers of stove-piping political, security and developmental programming. Yet, as described in Sections I and II, considerable challenges remain.
II. National ownership, international norms and standards

145. **National ownership.** Ownership is crucial not for philosophical reasons, but because without it strategies will not work: international actors do not possess sufficient understanding of societies and sources of authority or legitimacy to implement strategies without strong local and national sponsorship. The WDR will discuss ways in which international actors can foster local ownership and accountability.

146. **International norms and standards, institutional models.** National ownership can clash with international concerns over compliance in the areas described in Chapter 5 (e.g. corruption, economic and administrative restructuring, accountability for human rights). Drawing on inputs from leaders with experience in these different areas, the WDR will discuss the application of international norms and standards in different country contexts, as well as the possibility of devising mechanisms that can better manage the balance between local and global expectations and risk.

147. **Technical assistance.** As discussed in Chapter 4, international actors can diminish local capability by promoting inappropriate models, working without coordination or hiring large numbers of local experts away from national structures into better paid international agencies. Breaking such habits requires a hard look at institutional incentives. The WDR will also examine ways in which international technical assistance can better support the growth of national and local capability.

148. **Differing levels of government ownership and dealing with isolated regimes.** The WDR will examine the extreme cases of regimes which are largely isolated from international engagement. The WDR will discuss lessons learned, possible ways forward and holding patterns.

III. Fast and well-targeted supplementary capacity

149. **Speed of assistance.** Quick disbursement and deployment of technical capacity can be essential to seizing moments of political opportunity, but conventional rules on bidding, anti-corruption and oversight may inhibit quick disbursement. The WDR will review what can be done to accelerate responses.

150. **Prevention.** A wide set of international strategies and tools have been developed to address post-conflict situations: special financing mechanisms, political and peace-keeping missions etc. Less attention has been spent on developing strategies, tools and financing mechanisms to help countries at high risk of increased violence, where opportunities exist for pre-emptive action. The WDR will explore the possibility of developing a more comprehensive set of instruments and financing for prevention.

151. **Under-resourced sectors.** As noted in Section II, initial WDR work points to institutional, technical and financial gaps in support for justice sector activities, police development, broader security sector reform, remote and under-served area development, programs to address trauma on a major scale, and job creation. The WDR will explore potential policy shifts to facilitate institutional, technical and financial support in these sectors.

152. **Duration of assistance and consistency of programming.** Donor strategies and project life-cycles are often related more to domestic realities (political cycles, staff turnover)
than to the long period needed to build solid and credible institutions. There are many examples where discontinuities in programming have undermined institutional or programmatic development. Aid also still tends to follow new crises rather than provide sustained support, in particular in countries which do not receive international attention. The WDR will examine the possibility of improving consistency in aid provision.

153. **Integration across domains/disciplines.** Coordination across domains and between programs is difficult to achieve. Political, security and development actors have different planning time-frames, and measure success differently, resulting in goals which can easily undermine one another. A coherent cross-disciplinary approach is rare, particularly in low-income countries, although recent experiences offer useful lessons. The WDR will aim to draw out some important ingredients of successful cooperation across functional boundaries.

154. **Risk management for the private sector.** The WDR will assess the extent to which current private sector risk-sharing mechanisms are adequate to mobilize sufficient local, Diaspora and foreign private flows in different conflict-affected situations, and will look at opportunities for mobilizing new funding sources in situations of high conflict risk.

155. **Measurement.** The international system lacks rigorous and consistent data gathering and monitoring mechanisms for many aspects of fragility and conflict. Additional mechanisms and capacities to address these gaps will be proposed, to include more effective real-time monitoring of violence and of citizen expectations in transitional situations.

**IV. Institutional issues**

156. **Mandates and competition.** Universal commitment to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action masks the stickiness of old institutional behaviors. Admitting to the reality of incentives in donor and international institutions is important in order to move beyond them. The WDR will examine the potential for improving incentives for coordination and effective division of labor at regional and country levels.

157. **Growth in the number of international providers.** The WDR will review data on the number of international actors and the scale of external engagement in fragile contexts, and will discuss whether the sheer number of international actors is diverting limited national capacity and undermining the prospects for national ownership and effective cooperation – and how this can be addressed.

158. **Overcoming “conflict typologies”**. The WDR will highlight the problem of viewing and treating different forms of violence in isolation, and will discuss options for overcoming a “silo” approach.
Chapter 10: Reducing External Stresses

The growing importance of cross-border forms of violence underscores the need for action at a regional and global level to reduce external stresses. Economic shocks, trafficking, corruption and transnational violence are regional and global problems, which require regional and global action. There is relatively little consensus on the role of regional economic initiatives in mitigating conflict, or how to best design them. The WDR will identify and discuss promising initiatives. They include enhanced international action to combat trafficking and corruption, the development of regional programs of economic and administrative cooperation, better approaches to dealing with the impacts of natural disasters and food insecurity, and the importance of protecting fragile states from the predatory presence of globalized criminal and terror networks.

I. Trafficking and corruption

159. **Trafficking.** In consultation with other partners, the WDR will explore mechanisms to strengthen international security, financial and economic cooperation to combat illegal trafficking, in particular of drugs and natural resources.

160. **Corruption.** The WDR will explore mechanisms to strengthen international instruments to counter corruption. This will include consideration, with other partners, of ways to strengthen coordination between various anti-corruption and anti-money laundering initiatives already underway – on international corruption, asset recovery, terrorism financing, trafficking in drugs and other commodities, and enforcing standards of probity by national companies working overseas.

II. Regional integration and peace-building

161. **Regional integration and peace-building.** Greater attention to regional economic integration offers a promising avenue for strengthening the economic resilience of conflict-prone states – in particular of small states that lack internal market possibilities and are unable to benefit from scale advantages. The WDR will analyze the potential benefits for peace-building of regional trade, transit and infrastructure harmonization (including better market access for landlocked countries), initiatives for the management of common resources and harmonization of investment regimes to facilitate access to larger markets.

162. **Cross-border violence and developmental cooperation.** The WDR will analyze the potential for developing programs that span border areas affected by violence, and will consider how such programs would need to be designed and financed.

163. **Regional administrative capacity and service provision.** The WDR will review experiences of sharing administrative capacity and services, including for monetary authorities, higher education institutions, justice and regulatory functions, and will suggest potential policy directions that could facilitate such capacity sharing.

III. Responses to natural disasters and food insecurity

164. **Natural disasters.** Given the relationship between natural disasters and conflict risk, the WDR will review mechanisms for international and regional responses to natural disasters as well as insurance mechanisms. This will encompass results of the analysis of impacts of
climate change on conflict risk, and a discussion of mechanisms that might mitigate this impact.

165. **Food insecurity.** The WDR will discuss the impacts of economic shocks and food insecurity on conflict risk, and will work with partners in this field to consider ways to mitigate the impacts of natural disasters and food price volatility. This work will include consideration of possible mechanisms to mitigate against future risks linked to resource scarcity.

IV. **Globalized forms of violence**

166. **Internationalized grievances.** Transnational terrorism is not the primary focus of the WDR, but the connections between internationalized grievances and local conflict is an important source of stress in many countries. Even when the main target of a terrorist organization lies outside the “host” state, its presence has three potential adverse consequences: it may offer an identity and value system which competes with national values; it is often associated with criminal networks that prey on state weakness; and its presence can influence, for better or worse, international attitudes to intervening in and/or providing assistance to the country. We will examine the extent to which the core tenets of the WDR on stresses, capabilities and expectations can be used to protect fragile countries from the adverse effects of transnational movements.

**Conclusion**

War and violence have often played transformative roles in state-building, for all the suffering they have caused. Equally, injustice, exclusion and elite corruption have been standard features in many political dispensations in the past, including in most of today’s developed countries. Today, however, the international community aspires to do better. International agreements now govern the use of force and define standards of human rights and governance behavior, even if they are not always observed. Aggression and repression are no longer seen as acceptable tools of statecraft.

With these global standards come international obligations: to support countries struggling to face violent challenges without recourse to repressive methods.

The regional and international approaches that have emerged since the end of the Second World War demonstrate the potential for positive change, and the way in which such change can deliver results - as the decline in interstate and civil war in recent years shows. Important developments in the international system are underway; these include a reaffirmation by major powers of the importance of multilateral and global solutions, stronger participation by states with a recent history of conflict in the global debate on violence, and the growing role of the middle income countries, who bring new resources and energy to the table along with their own experiences of transition. While policy differences and coordination problems inevitably arise when power structures begin to shift, the international system has already shown an ability to harness the energies of new and established actors alike in response to crises. The challenge now is to translate this potential into forward-looking approaches to conflict and the prevention of violence.

A central message of the WDR is one of hope: where committed national leadership is met by effective international support, violent challenges can be overcome, lives saved, economic hope restored and collective security enhanced.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: WDR Consultative Process

Given the wide range of stakeholders involved in the debate on conflict, several complimentary approaches will be used to ensure that the WDR benefits from the widest possible range of voices over the 18-month WDR cycle:

- **Country and Regional Engagements:** The WDR is undertaking case studies and consultations on fragile and conflict-affected countries and regions, featuring a series of in-country roundtables and colloquia, including with government officials, civil society, the private sector and local media, to capture a broad spectrum of informed local experience and opinion. Countries and regions of focus include:
  - Afghanistan and its Neighbors
  - Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes
  - Haiti
  - Mali and its Sahelian Neighbors
  - Nepal
  - Pakistan
  - Sudan
  - West Bank and Gaza
  - Central America and surrounding region
  - Melanesia: Papua New Guinea/Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu

- **Expert Consultations:** A series of expert brainstorming sessions are being held to gather prominent academics, policymakers and civil society representatives to share their knowledge and experience, to contribute to emerging WDR perspectives, and to generate new research. The focus will be on learning from the experience of leaders from conflict-affected and fragile states. This will include an innovation fair in partnership with the World Bank Institute to connect experts and ‘innovators’ from different regions with development practitioners to discuss opportunities for new research on the causes and consequences of conflict.

- **WDR Advisory Council:** A WDR Advisory Council has been formed to offer guidance on emerging WDR thinking and to generate momentum around WDR recommendations. The Council consists of leaders and individuals of global repute from countries and organizations across the globe, including representatives from emerging economic powers, regional organizations as well as leaders from conflict-affected countries.

- **Regional Consultations:** The WDR team is working in partnership with regional fora to hold sessions that gather policymakers, experts, and civil society, to discuss the regional implications of WDR findings and recommendations as well as the particular role of regional initiatives in managing conflict. Consultations are scheduled for February 2010 in cooperation with the African Union, and in April 2010 in cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Sessions are also being planned for Latin America and the Middle East.
• **Bilateral and Multilateral Outreach:** Over the WDR cycle, the team will conduct regular consultations with multilateral and bilateral partners involved in peace-building and development. Particular attention will be given to close consultation with the United Nations system and reaching out to political, security and development communities.

• **Civil Society:** The experience and views of nongovernmental organizations, from both North and South, will be sought through civil society involvement in the above consultations as well as NGO-focused dialogues.

• **Private Sector:** Private sector perspectives will be taken account of, both through the International Finance Corporation’s direct involvement in the WDR, and through a series of consultations with global and national entrepreneurs.

• **Internal World Bank Consultations:** The WDR team will consult with diverse operating and research units within the World Bank, as well as with Executive Directors and their advisors.

With the Report itself as the centerpiece, this WDR is aiming to stimulate a wide-ranging debate, and to capitalize on the current surge in attention to conflict and fragility. Key to this will be an intensive communications strategy, designed both to help the WDR team access a range of emerging thinking and to increase popular access to the subjects under discussion. To enrich the WDR’s empirical base and to communicate important insights to diverse audiences, the WDR will make use of the web and social media, conduct and broadcast/publish interviews with leaders and individuals impacted by conflict, and use video and film to underline the realities of conflict and the development challenge it poses.
Appendix 2: General Bibliography

The 2011 World Development Report is drawing from a wide variety of published and unpublished work by academics and practitioners, international organizations, donor countries, and countries affected by conflict. The review process has pointed to other areas in the theoretical literature which may be useful in the preparation of the WDR, including:

A. Selected list of Relevant Literature


Bhavnani, Rakhi 2006. “Natural Disaster Conflicts.”


Conflicts Challenge Papers.


http://www.upenn.edu/pennpress/book/14522.html


B. Selected List of Relevant Policy Frameworks

The WDR is also building on years of policy and strategy development work on conflict prevention, management, and peace-building by bilateral, regional, and multilateral institutions. Included below are examples (rather than an exhaustive list) of relevant policy frameworks and strategy documents. Through its consultative process, the WDR team seeks to learn from additional national, regional and multilateral initiatives.

Multilateral Organizations

African Union

Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (2007)
Special Session on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa (2009)

African Development Bank

Strategy for Enhanced Engagement in Fragile States (2007)

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASEAN Regional Forum Concept and Principles on Preventive Diplomacy (2001)
ASEAN Charter (2005)
Economic Community of West African States

The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (2008)

East African Community


European Union

Council Conclusions on EU Response to Situations of Fragility (2007)

Inter-American Development Bank

Social Exclusion and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean (2007)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Alliance's Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament (1989)
The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)
Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States (2005)
Ensuring Fragile States are Not Left Behind (2009)

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe


Southern African Development Community

Organization of American States


The World Bank

Operational Policy 2.30 – Development Cooperation and Conflict (2001)
Fragile States – Good Practice in Country Assistance Strategies (2005)

United Nations and Agencies

Reports

An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy and Related Matters (1992)
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (1995)
Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General (2001)

Security Council Resolutions

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (adopted 31 October 2000), also UN SCR 1820 (19 June 2008)
UN Security Council Resolution 1265 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (adopted 17 September 1999), also UN SCR 1612 (26 July 2005)
UN Security Council Resolution 1261 on Children and Armed Conflict (adopted 30 August 1999), also UN SCR 1674 (28 April 2006)

Pacific Island Forum

In addition, a number of donor countries have developed policy and strategy frameworks, including the following examples:

- Fragile States and Situations of Fragility: France’s Policy Paper (2005)
- Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States, DFID (2005)
- 'Stabilisation: the UK Experience and Emerging Best Practice, DFID, (2007)
- Eliminating World Poverty, Building Our Common Future, DFID White Paper, cpt 4 Peaceful States and Societies (2009)
- Building the State and Securing the Peace, Emerging DFID Policy Paper (2009)
- Fragile States Strategy, USAID (2005)
- Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, United States (2008)