



THE WORLD BANK

Annual Bank Conference on Land Policy and Administration

CAP8: Improving Natural Resource Tenure

Tuesday, April 27, 2010 | 3:30-5:00PM | MC9-100

Session notes by Fred Oladeinde

Chair: J. Hatcher, Manager, Global Programs, Rights & Resources Initiative

Presentations:

Micro-effects of forest tenure reform in China

X. Jintao, Professor, Peking University

Presentation focused on collective forest tenure reform in China from 1981-86, phase one and 2000-2007 phase two. Empirical data analysis was used by presenter to show that reform resulted in benefits across; individual; partnerships; village clusters in the provinces where reforms were adopted, Specific benefits presented include; increased land tenure contract, with certificate from 5-7 years to 30, 50, 70 years, strengthened forest tenure rights, increased forest resources, increased farmland income, increased forestation, social stability, increased harvest, which attracted more provinces to adopting collective forest tenure. De centralization of governance and increased grass root, stakeholder participation in forest tenure administration, i.e., from provincial government, using logging to village representative committee, is responsible for the gains and the spread across 14 Provinces. The Presenter used Fujian province as the model to show the efficiency and effectiveness of forest tenure reform in China. The result of the econometric model used by the presenter showed that higher alternative income from “off farm jobs” reduced the demand for forestland and resulted in increased social capital within the community. The issues raised by the discussant include; providing more details on forest certificate, specifics around longer contract length and need for more information on performance under the increased tenure contracts particularly the benefits, advantages and the challenges.

Presentation;

Improving land tenure security in Uganda: Initial evidence

R. Meinzen-Dick, IFPRI and C. Doss, Yale University

Presentation focused on land tenure security in Uganda in Kapchura, Kibale and Luwero Provinces. Study looked at customary tenure in rural communities, and leasehold in urban areas. The study used survey of households and individuals, male and female in targeted provinces. Study showed the following;

Men ownership of land tenure comes mostly from inheritance while women, through purchase,; men feel more secure than women for this reason, while women are more renters than men; widows feel mostly insecure because of death of husband, single men because of marital status, also feel insecure, married women feel more secure than single women, particularly customary

marriages. Study also showed that married women are more inclined to hide assets from husbands for control and noted changing cultural values in study areas i.e., non-traditional marriage arrangements. Question was raised around the Male female comparison of the study given the fact that traditionally women work better in forest communities than men and the impact of social institution to tenure security.

Presentation:

Natural resource tenure reform in the context of climate change; Evidence and emerging hypotheses

M. Kirk, Professor, University of Marburg, Germany

S. Prediger, University of Marburg

Discussants:

Mekonnen, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

Study focused on natural resource tenure reform in Namaland, Southern Namibia, study looked at how resource scarcity (water) can shape preferences. The study compared behavior among livestock keepers in resource (water) poor communities ---- Bad area and resource (water) rich communities ---- Good area. The study used the joy of destruction game theory, unsocial behavior as ubiquitous as social behavior, putting to test Adams Smith and Maslow theories between 120 selected livestock farmers half in the bad area and half in the good area and each livestock farmer was paid Namibia 10 dollars about twenty five percent of average daily livestock farmer income to participate in the study. The study showed that in the bad area --- resource (water) poor community, 43% of the farmers decide to burn the other farmer income out of spite as against 23% in the good area --- resource (water) rich community.

The study shows positive correlation between spiteful behavior and resource scarcity.

And that external and internal enforcement does not always work to reduce spiteful behavior, as well as social and moral enforcement. Discussant raised the issue of the efficiency of the internal and external enforcement institution on the effectiveness of their intervention, and wonder what effect low incentive given to farmers to participate in the study --- twenty five percent of farmers daily income on the farmers, have on the result of the study.