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# Leadership for Development Results

## *Country Case Studies*

*from the*

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# Summary of Cases

## I. Introduction

It takes good leadership to achieve lasting results in the drive to reduce poverty and improve lives. Political decision-makers in many developing and transition countries face daunting challenges as they work to deliver on their promises and meet citizens' expectations for improved services and expanded opportunities.

The challenge of leading for results is acutely felt in fragile and conflict-affected states, where the populations' needs are urgent—but where government capacity to deliver critical programs is often eroded, and institutions are weak or dysfunctional. Leadership is just as crucial for newly elected regimes, or for any government starting a large-scale reform effort.

The international donor community, including the World Bank, recognizes the vital role that leadership plays in a country's development. In successive declarations in Monterrey, Marrakesh and Paris, the international community has affirmed the principles of country ownership and accountability for results.

But these principles require greater commitment from, and expanded capabilities for, leadership. Political leaders are responsible for setting goals and priorities, mobilizing consensus, and engaging both government officials and other stakeholders to deliver on results. Leadership development therefore must be supported.

This support, however, should go beyond the individual: It must encompass changes in institutions and the collective behaviors that make up the enabling environment.

Ultimately, it is leadership that accounts for the stability of the state and good governance.<sup>1</sup> Political leaders play the central role in institutional and state formation. And they are the principal forces that drive the institutional change process—a process that

must engage diverse stakeholders with competing and often conflicting interests.

### *The Leadership and Change Forum*

In October 2007 the Leadership and Change Forum in Marseille, France brought together political leaders and leadership development practitioners from across the world. Participants came from Burundi, CAR, Kenya, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Morocco, Rwanda, Sudan and Yemen, with donor representatives from the Bank, Canadian International Development Agency, U.K. Department for International Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France, and United Nations Development Programme.

The conference also included experts in the rapid results approach (RRA), which is increasingly employed as a tool for leadership development, for facilitating institutional change, and for achieving development outcomes.

The event allowed participants to share experiences, and analyze past and ongoing applications of the RRA along three main themes: (a) the importance of context and demand; (b) the changing roles of leaders; and (c) the potential impact and institutionalization of the RRA.

Each country's delegation was asked to prepare and share "case stories" describing their experiences with the application of the RRA as a tool for leadership development. The cases were drawn from a range of difficult political and governance situations, including conflict and post-conflict situations, newly elected government/administrations, and countries undertaking reform programs, such as decentralization.

The cases are a good reference for comparing the experiences of the eight participating countries. They show that leaders must (a) articulate a vision and mobilize stakeholders around priority goals; (b)

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<sup>1</sup> Adrian Leftwich and Steve Hogg. "Leadership for Development: The Role of Leaders, Elites and Coalitions". Research and Analytical Program 2008-2009. Global Integrity Alliance.

translate that shared vision into development results; and (c) attain greater accountability, both to reinforce improved performance and to support systemic changes that scale up or sustain those improvements. These three qualities—vision, effectiveness, and accountability—emerge as the fundamental building blocks of leadership.

Drawing from the Marseille Forum cases, this paper offers an overview of how the RRA on its own—and especially when owned and anchored by strategic and political leaders through high-level consultations—has supported leadership development. It explores the main themes described above, and some of the issues emerging from experience.

The paper also highlights how the RRA has strengthened the capacity of leadership teams to achieve development results and mobilize change through hands-on practical implementation experience.

### *The Rapid Results Approach*

In the context of public sector reform, good leadership means the ability to drive change to achieve ethical and effective results.

When capacity support to government leaders incorporates the hands-on experience of achieving tough goals, this can lead to changes in performance as well as new leadership skills, greater capacity, and learning. By linking leadership with managing for results, leadership development interventions such as the RRA can provide the engine for operationalizing change, supporting project implementation, rallying stakeholders around strategic goals and priorities, and offering a new way of making large-scale change happen.

The World Bank is using the RRA to link leadership to managing for results through practical capacity support to clients. The Bank helps leaders to engage operational teams in government to achieve tangible results in 100 days. In the process the RRA reveals institutional bottlenecks—diagnosing and removing these can help make a government more effective.

The RRA has been applied in about 23 Bank operations in 21 countries since 2002, primarily in Africa, and also in South Asia, Latin America, the Middle East,

North Africa and to a lesser extent in Eastern and Central Europe, with some notable successes.<sup>2</sup>

The RRA has been used by the Bank and its clients to

- Improve capacity for diagnosing institutional constraints
- Improve capacity for project/program planning and implementation
- Increase the results focus of a project/program
- Strengthen a sense of accountability
- Enhance engagement between leadership and other stakeholders across multiple sectors
- Jump-start implementation of difficult or problem projects

## **II. How RRA pilots have been combined with high-level consultations to link leadership to results.**

In Burundi, CAR, Madagascar and Morocco, RRA pilots were combined with high-level consultations to deepen the understanding of senior government officials and political leaders on the benefits and challenges of achieving pilot goals, and to learn from the experiences of their peers in other countries. The World Bank Institute's (WBI) high-level consultations have provided a venue for convening multi-sector leadership teams and political leaders to discuss the constraints to achieving their goals, and to consider strategies for overcoming them.

Participants at high-level consultations learn new competencies and new ways of doing business in the preparation stage and through the follow-up activities. Gaining the commitment and ownership of senior leadership is critical to promoting knowledge and information sharing, as well as for scaling up impact in a sector or replicating the approach in other priority areas.


The WBI team works to engage political leadership by sharing lessons from other countries, often with support from peers. The WBI team and local partners tailor a high-level consultation that addresses the client's specific needs and uses RRA to introduce a stronger results orientation. The more abstract dimensions of the leadership learning program are linked to observable results, thus contributing to operationalizing change.

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<sup>2</sup> World Bank Final Report: An Assessment of the Rapid Results Approach, 30 March 2007, OPCS and HRSLO

The use of high-level consultations in Madagascar, paired with the RRA, illustrates how this can work. The process is diagrammed and described below.

**From leadership to results: The virtuous learning cycle using high-level consultations and RRA pilots.<sup>3</sup>**




Between 2003 and 2006 WBI provided support to four such high-level consultations attended by ministers, permanent secretaries, and chefs de region, and chaired by the president and the prime minister. Each of the consultations was followed by parallel events for representatives from the private sector, civil society, and academia. The main objectives of the consultations were to help governments define the overall vision and development strategy for the country, as well as to strengthen cooperation, and forge a leadership team at the highest level.<sup>4</sup>

The RRA, combined with high-level consultations, can produce the following learning outcomes:

By combining high-level consultations with rapid results pilots, participants were able to go from the abstract concepts of leadership to a concrete understanding of strategy and implementation, linking knowledge directly to the experience of achieving results. The rapid results pilots delivered valuable lessons and, tangible results, while the high-level consultations built the commitment and receptivity of the new government.

- Enhanced skills in setting priorities, diagnosing and solving problems
- Facilitated consensus and teamwork between political and operational leaders, civil society and government, and national and local leaders
- Development of strategy and plans with a results focus
- Increased transparency and accountability
- Delivery of tangible results from the implementation of policies and strategies

**Process of designing & delivering high-level consultations & RRA pilots**



<sup>3</sup> D. Kabell, "Building Leadership Capacity in Madagascar: The Contribution of Cabinet Retreats," May 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Marseille Forum Case on Madagascar, October 2007.

### III. Context and Demand

Where country-readiness and pressure to produce tangible results is high, the RRA, with its tools, strategies, and accompanying teamwork, can open the door for engagement across a range of difficult development situations.

In Kenya and Madagascar, new elections created high expectations among citizens. Newly elected leadership teams responded to the political imperative for change by breaking away from business as usual to launch early reforms. Each government sought to institute new national strategic plans that would improve the quality of life for citizens, produce more inclusive growth and opportunities, and build ownership for these plans.

New leadership teams must inspire and engage administrative leaders, persuading them to carry out new agendas and adopt new roles, including new ways of doing business and new attitudes and/or changes in behaviors.

This was the case in CAR, where civil servants had stopped reporting for work. An important aspect of RRA here was building ownership and commitment and mobilizing support for implementation—from the senior leadership and mid-level managers to the local level and beyond to ordinary citizens.

In Madagascar, the Bank's leadership development interventions helped the new president build ownership for the country's five-year Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), first among his Cabinet and then across the country for the Madagascar Action Plan, an annualization of the government's PRS.

In Morocco, Sudan and Sierra Leone, leadership workshops/seminars and the RRA pilots were instrumental in helping to build the local government's capacity to jump-start implementation in support of decentralization.

Sudan, CAR, Sierra Leone, and Burundi share the challenges and constraints of countries in post-conflict transition. Sierra Leone and Sudan turned to decentralization as a means of bringing the government and service delivery closer to the people, with a bottom-up approach. By contrast CAR

and Burundi used top-down approaches, relying on the strong personal commitment of high-level government officials and their willingness to act as champions to break down barriers to change.

The RRA appears to be well suited for dealing with the conditions of fragile and conflict-affected states, where there is an acute need for implementation capacity, along with human resource constraints. These and other challenges call for learning on the job.

The Yemen case examines sector-level reforms and the process of getting reforms unstuck when there is a sense of urgency and high-level political support.

RRA has been valuable in helping achieve project results across a range of difficult development circumstances. When WBI first recommended the use of RRA in Burundi, it met with some skepticism. In response, WBI brought in RRA coaches from CAR to share their experiences, describing both the successes and challenges of managing ambitious change initiatives in the security and customs sectors. The government of Burundi then agreed to initiate two pilots using RRA in the Ministries of Education and Public Health.

RRA has subsequently been used in pilots across eleven ministries. RRA coaches from CAR, Madagascar, Kenya, and Yemen have traveled to other countries in the region to share their experiences and, in a few cases, to help implement RRA pilots.

### IV. The Changing Role of Leaders

The link between leaders and results is powerful. Leaders gain enhanced credibility, greater legitimacy, and valuable political capital by showing visible and strategic results quickly.

RRA helps government leaders conceptualize and communicate *what* they plan to do and *how* they will do it.<sup>5</sup> RRA also helps mobilize change throughout an organization, as evidenced in the case of Kenya, where RRA has helped mainstream a government-wide policy of results-based management. In Kenya, political leadership at the highest level emerged as the main driver in the implementation of reforms.

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<sup>5</sup> Perrin, Bruce. "Moving from Outputs to Outcomes, Practical Advice from Governments around the World." Based on the Roundtable "Moving from Outputs to Outcomes: Implications for Public Sector Management," December 15-16, 2004. Sponsored by the World Bank and the IBM Center for the Business of Government.

These eight cases describe how RRA has helped political leaders unbundle the change process and demonstrate their central roles in achieving tangible results. Outstanding examples include Sierra Leone, where the former president sought to decentralize budgetary and decision-making authority and rekindle local government traditions, with the intention of gaining legitimacy for his new government. This moved local government leaders to work harder, creating a virtuous cycle of learning, results, and innovation consistent with the diagram shown above. While this led to significant capacity for implementation among local councils, it did not guarantee the president's re-election.

In Morocco, national leaders set an ambitious agenda for improving the quality of life in targeted communities through the National Human Development Initiative (INDH). The goal was to give greater voice to the poor and develop new relationships between civil society and the national, regional and local governments. This has spawned new demands for greater capacity to manage for development results.

In CAR—striving to recover from repeated military and political crises, macro-economic malaise and social stagnation—RRA was introduced in 2005.

The mandate for change came from the prime minister, a former official of the African Development Bank. He drove the initiative by endorsing it and promising to take necessary action to achieve results. At the same time, the president set the time frame for results in three months.

Later, Codes of Conduct and Codes of Practice, embodying principles of prioritization and collaboration, and focusing on results, were endorsed by the Cabinet and became part of the formal rules of the game.

The Sudan case, by contrast, describes real momentum and the desire for change at the local level. However, high-level government leadership will be critical for moving beyond the pilot, or demonstration phase, to a more sustainable model.

This case offers a glimpse into the early stages of transformational change, and reminds us that some impressive results on the ground are not enough to drive the large-scale change initiative needed in Sudan.

Incentives motivate leadership. And the cases show us that results themselves can be an important incentive and a motivating factor for political leaders. Results allow leaders to tell their narratives about how change was brought about. Visible results draw public attention to key issues and successes and bring stakeholders together around shared goals.

However, results can be difficult to measure and attribute. This is especially true in countries in transition, where multiple donors are active, and many factors are at play. In fragile and conflict-affected states, modest intermediate-level results may be the only option.

These cases show the acceleration and achievement of results at various levels—including gains in project disbursement and investments, and activities meant to unblock stalled projects, as in Yemen. Intermediate gains may contribute to impact, while new project spin-offs can result from scaling-up or replicating the process, and taking on new ways of doing business. This was the case in Sierra Leone and Sudan.

Results-producing incentives include soft results, such as new confidence, changes in behavior and attitudes, enhanced motivation, empowerment and ownership—as happened in CAR, Madagascar, and Morocco—as well as greater collaboration among stakeholders, increased access to and exchange of information, and more confidence in the ability to achieve results.

New business practices and processes that also empower leadership include the delegation of responsibility and accountability, more systematic frameworks for collaboration and for sharing information, enhanced monitoring of implementation and feedback, process decentralization, and participation.

As an experience-based learning tool, RRA requires leadership teams to be flexible, adaptive, and opportunistic as they work to achieve objectives amid unanticipated constraints and changing conditions. The methodology relies on learning-by-doing, and an experimental approach, where lessons are drawn from both successful and unsuccessful results in the short term, and applied more broadly.

In this way the RRA provides tools for mitigating risk, which allows leadership teams to take limited risks without investing beyond the pilot. Should the

gamble pay off, then the government may opt to scale-up the results. A successful pilot also produces a demonstration effect, which may enable a new leader to deliver on a few campaign promises quickly.

## V. Impact and Institutionalization

In institutionalizing the impact of the RRA, the results achieved are more a means to an end than an end itself. Vertical scalability of the RRA works best in sectors where there are tangible products, services and benefits, as in the case of Burundi's education sector, where—for the first time—textbooks reached schools on the first day of class. This was piloted in one area and eventually scaled up throughout the country.

In other examples RRA has been a way of mainstreaming a greater results culture. The cases of Kenya, Madagascar and Morocco, cited below, illustrate the high transferability and rapid horizontal spread of the approach.

The cases present a range of experiences related to institutionalizing the RRA, both vertically (scaling up the RRA pilot results) and horizontally (learning from the RRA pilot and scaling up the process within government organizations for purposes perhaps unrelated to the original pilot). This horizontal application of the RRA may hold the most promise.

Consider the case of Kenya: In 2003, the new government of President Mwai Kibaki launched the Economic Recovery Strategy on Employment and Wealth Creation (ERS) 2003–2007 in an effort to deliver on campaign promises. One of its main objectives was to improve service delivery as an urgent priority.

The government adopted the rapid results approach as an implementation tool to jumpstart the program, and quickly produced results in a handful of sectors.

Seeing RRA's potential for instigating reform within the government, the Office of the President set up the Public Sector Reform and Development Secretariat (PSRDS) in 2004 to apply results-based management practices throughout the public service. The PSRDS took the RRA to scale, adopting it as a tool for institutional review, to facilitate and implement organizational work plans and performance contracts, and enable the delivery of ERS targets.

Since 2003 rapid results initiatives have been implemented in over 53 public service institutions, a national performance framework has been developed, and a capacity development program for transforming the public service has trained 350 rapid results coaches from ministries, departments and government agencies. A recent report (by Transparency International, (2007) found a 42 to 36 percent drop respectively in law enforcement bribes and service related bribes. According to the report the RRA contributed to this outcome by reducing the "scarcity premium"—that is, improved the supply of drugs in public health facilities, improved service delivery of water and electricity, and reduced the delay in administrative services such as the passport application process.

In Morocco in 2006 the World Bank Institute (WBI) responded to a request from the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Social Development and Agriculture for leadership development support for central, regional and local level government officials engaged in the design and delivery of the INDH. The INDH delegated responsibilities for improving service delivery to ministries, governors and walis (mayors). The program aimed to strengthen their implementation capacity despite its large reach.

In Casablanca alone there were 1,000 small projects under the INDH. In four target prefectures where the RRA was piloted, 53 percent of the projects achieved their objectives, compared to only 12 percent where the RRA was not applied. Scaling up the RRA in Morocco required more than high level engagement. It required consistent engagement and commitment and a willingness of political leaders to address the systemic obstacles and constraints to change that emerged from the pilot. This process of reviewing lessons and incorporating feedback in new policies and processes will become more important as the nation moves toward decentralization of service delivery.

Madagascar's case illustrates how combining the RRA with high-level consultations can accelerate change within a wider set of leadership development support services.

In Madagascar the initial RRA pilots aimed to mitigate the effects of a significant shortfall in rice production, importation and distribution. Rice production increased significantly in two of the four pilot regions; and an independent review of the RRA

pilots conducted in 2005 concluded that 89 percent either partly or fully achieved their objectives.

In 2005, the Minister of Health and Family Planning decided to scale up the use of RRA across 22 regions of the country. This has been extended to other central ministries such as Justice, Public Security and Mining.

There are drawbacks to applying RRA that must be considered in working to institutionalize its benefits. First, leadership teams can become unstable from the high turnover of trained government personnel who serve as RRA coaches. It may be difficult to find enough personnel to keep teams on track with the additional workload required of the RRA. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems may be inadequate because of poor metrics, and project M&E systems have at times failed to link with national M&E systems, creating parallel or stand-alone systems in support of RRA pilots.

There is also the risk of poor donor coordination, and, at the other extreme, the use of sector-wide approaches may make it more difficult to apply RRA.

Though there are few if any cases where RRA has been used in a sector-wide approach, or multi-donor initiative, participants in the Marseilles Forum raised the possibility. The problem of parallel project support structures is cited in the Sudan case. In this regard RRA may have some of the drawbacks of a project implementation unit (PIU), such as the downside risk of tying up the best people for months at a time. Needless to say, this makes a clear exit or handover strategy imperative.

## VI. Conclusion

For public sector reform, good leadership means the ability to drive change toward achieving the right results. The Marseille Forum cases document how RRA has been used to strengthen the capacity of government leadership to make change happen in countries in transition, including those in post-conflict situations, in newly elected governments, and in governments undertaking large-scale reforms.

As a methodology for leadership development, RRA has helped leadership teams set goals and priorities, mobilize consensus, engage and inspire their governments to implement change and deliver on promised results.

With the help of RRA, political leaders have learned how to make institutional change happen. The cases illustrate that when capacity support to government leaders incorporates the practical, hands-on experience of achieving tough goals, this can lead to changes in performance, as well as the development of new leadership skills, greater capacity, and learning for leaders at all levels.

By linking leadership with managing for results, the approach has been instrumental in prompting change, both in scaling up broader governmental reform initiatives and in targeted small-scale interventions. This is reinforced by the lessons from experience outlined below.

### *Lessons from Experience*

Some of the important lessons gleaned from the cases include:

- 1. RRA is as much about the “how” as it is about the “what.”** In Kenya’s results-based management reforms, participants found that by achieving the rapid results goals aligned and derived from the Economic Recovery Strategy, the results on the ground became a leading indicator of a deeper aspiration—namely, to enhance capacity in the ministries/departments for making change happen. This is as much about “how” these results are being achieved as it is about “what” is being achieved.
- 2. Although managing for development results may improve governance, as well as trust between leaders and the governed, it does not ensure re-election.** In Sierra Leone, the former president championed the decentralization process, as a means of bringing the government closer to the people and improving their quality of life. The virtuous cycle that links learning to results was enabled by the RRA pilots, which became the proving ground for leadership skills and capacities. In spite of these gains, the president was not returned to office.
- 3. Every change initiative has an entry point and change agents** committed and open to leadership development. In Madagascar, the president provided this; but as the cases show, it takes multiple champions at multiple levels to achieve and sustain results.

**4. Overcoming constraints to change often produces the most powerful learning opportunities,** bringing organizational and institutional change through the development of codes of conduct, changes in policy and new plans, as well as new ways of doing business. In Morocco, and Yemen the application of the RRA led to a review and reformulation of project development objectives. In Morocco they became more focused on human development and aligned with the needs of stakeholders; in Yemen, more results focused.

In CAR the leadership decided to address changes in attitudes and behaviors within the civil service by institutionalizing new codes of conduct. In Sudan, the application of the RRA within the context of decentralization contributed to changes in learning and behavior of local community leaders in terms of determination and persistence, greater collaboration, problem solving, innovation, and new standards of discipline and responsibility.

**5. Linking leadership with results clarifies roles, fosters transparency, and builds ownership.** In Yemen, clear responsibilities were assigned to component managers, which increased accountability, made progress measurable, and increased the sense of ownership. The RRA methodology helped managers understand what was expected, helped the Bank to know

where the bottlenecks were, and helped the ministry leadership monitor and intervene where necessary. Tensions between stakeholders (including government agencies) often subsided as unexpected results proved the value of collaboration.

**6. Where pressure to produce tangible benefits is high, the availability of the RRA tools and accompanying support can open the door for engagement and convert the pressure into momentum.**

**7. Solving problems jointly under time pressure builds trust** as well as confidence for future outcomes.

**8. RRA serves as a leadership development tool** by helping to unbundle the change process and exercising leadership's role in getting results in real time.

**9. Greater accountability sharpens the results chain,** both upward and downward.

**10. By achieving even modest results, teams and leadership learn to appreciate the power of information, and the benefits of increased transparency.** In some cases, this has led to improvements in monitoring and evaluation systems.

# Burundi

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Problem: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change

In August 2005, at the end of a devastating political and economic crisis that lasted over 12 years, newly elected President Pierre Nkurunziza pledged — as part of a five-year plan — to provide free primary education, child care, and health care. He also called upon the international community to step up its support to help the country preserve the peace, assure a level of political and economic stability, and work together toward development.

The government of Burundi appealed to the World Bank Institute (WBI) for help in strengthening the capacities of leadership to implement policies and programs that would achieve measurable results. The new government needed to make tough decisions on competing priorities, including allocating an estimated US\$12 billion to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and carrying out reforms to ensure efficient allocation of public resources.

The government understood it would need to invest in leadership development in order to drive change at the institutional level and achieve results and that this would require more than the traditional classroom method of leadership training. Instead, the following approaches were needed:

- training programs adapted to the needs of leaders
- a learning-by-doing approach to capacity development
- a participatory approach to action planning, work planning, and defining modalities for resource management

### 1.2 Context: Background for the intervention/initiative

In the (2005–2010) five-year plan, the president stated his commitment to improving the economic situation brought on by the conflict, which destroyed the socioeconomic infrastructure and devastated the capacities of surviving Burundian leadership.

The civil conflict of 1993 threw the country into a downward cycle of impoverishment and insecurity. During the conflict, 300,000 citizens lost their lives, and about 1.2 million were either internally displaced or made refugees. This brought with it a decade of economic decline, and by 2003 Burundi's GDP per capita was about US\$83.

In 2002 a peace and reconciliation accord was signed and a new government formed. The period of political transition came to a close in 2005 with the approval of a new constitution by national referendum (February 2005), successful local elections (June 2005), and parliamentary elections (July 2005).

The government decided that the donor roundtable planned for May 2006 should be preceded by a cabinet retreat, where political leaders would meet with leaders from civil society to examine the barriers to institutional change and set clear objectives for change.

### 1.3 Change agent/entry point

When WBI first recommended use of the rapid results approach (RRA) to help advance measurable development outcomes, the suggestion met with considerable skepticism. To address this, WBI brought RRA coaches from the Central African Republic to meet their counterparts in Burundi.

The coaches shared their experiences, describing both the successes and challenges of managing ambitious change initiatives in security and customs sectors. On the basis of this, the government of Burundi agreed that it would initiate two pilots, one each in the ministries of Education and Public Health.

The first government retreat took place in May 2006, in Bujumbura. The main objectives of the retreat were to:

- Lead the government team to a better understanding of the roles and responsibilities of leaders in terms of driving and promoting change
- Elicit consensus among various political and social groups, including civil society
- Develop more effective methods for the implementation of strategies and programs

The event was deemed a success from the start. There was high-level participation from the government team, including the president, his two vice presidents, and most government ministers. In addition, representatives from Parliament, including the presidents of the Senate and the National Assembly took part, and there was wide representation from civil society.

The results of the first 100-day pilot RRAs were shared at the retreat. The government began to show greater ownership. On the basis of the two successful pilots, the government gave the go-ahead to begin 12 new pilots in 10 ministries. One of the vice presidents agreed to be the champion of the large-scale effort.

## 2. Leadership and Change

### 2.1 How leaders emerge as drivers of the process

At the highest level, political leadership left its mark: the personal involvement of the head of state at the roundtable was central to the success of the RRA pilots. Beyond this, the involvement of strategic leaders in various stages of the process was also a precondition for successfully translating the large-scale vision for development into short-term (100-day) goals.

The RRA pilots worked to identify strategic leadership within the ministries, leaving aside the involvement of the minister himself. One of the RRA coaches remarked, “When you have the right level of general direction that you want, it is as if you had the whole ministry behind you” (Neuron Global 2007). The second stage of the RRA application had the full backing of the president, the vice presidents, and the whole government. Strategic leaders were found at the director general level.

## 3. Results Matter

### 3.1 RRA process: Desired outcomes

In November 2006 two RRA initiatives were launched and implemented on a pilot basis. The pilots, using the leadership skills and other learning from the government retreat, set about implementing key tangible results on the ground in education and health care.

#### Education

The goal of the education pilot was to help the government distribute 250,000 first-year textbooks to primary schools in 60 days. In the past it had sometimes taken an entire school year to distribute the books.

**Table 1. Changes in the roles of leadership: Using the RRA as a catalyst**

Before RRA	After RRA
People intervened on all topics, no delegation.	Delegation takes place at the level of implementation.
Many meetings, talks, and speeches by the political leaders without any measurement of results.	Political leaders are accountable to the parliament, and their constituents.
Budgets itemized per activity, leading to difficulty in assessing the situation.	Budgets are now divided by program.
People waited for orders, and rarely took initiative.	Some initiative is taken as outcomes are programmed and assessed.
Decisions made in a discretionary manner; people were not involved at the strategic or operational levels.	Emphasis has shifted to learning by doing, which interested people.
Lack of motivation, because the results were not properly assessed.	Performance is assessed, and this motivates various stakeholders, at operational, strategy and individual levels; there is now more initiative at all levels evident.
Unless political leaders gave orders, nothing was done; people thought only political leaders made decisions.	Leadership competencies are recognized in both hierarchical and horizontal structures, which generates decision making at all levels.

Source: Neuron Global 2007, p. 34.

The RRA teams soon learned that the logistical and transportation challenges to achieving this were significant. Available resources proved inadequate to transport the books to the towns and villages beyond the capital.

The RRA teams decided to tap the community work program, whereby each Saturday morning citizens engage in voluntary work for the country. Taking advantage of this, the RRA teams engaged village men and women to move the books (by foot) from distribution centers in the towns to remote village schools. The diagram below illustrates the innovative distribution network used to move primary-level school books from the capital out to Bubanza. Because many of the men and women transporting the books were also parents of school children, they were enthusiastic supporters of the plan.

### Health Care

The goal of the health care pilot was to increase the number of pregnant women who visited health centers and were screened for HIV/AIDS. However, the RRA teams soon learned that many women were not using these services because of their beliefs and fears, primarily a fear of stigmatization and social ostracism.

A successful communications campaign was launched to convince women that the services would be confidential. Once the women accepted this, their fears were allayed. They soon realized the value of the service (if they tested positive, antiretroviral drugs were provided), and the project's success grew

by word of mouth. The number of pregnant women who visited health centers exceeded 482 in the first month, as compared to 71 in the month before the pilot began.

### 3.2 Final outcome and impact


The two RRA pilots achieved tangible results. With the help of the RRA, the government distributed 250,000 first year textbooks to primary schools in the country in 60 days, which was a big improvement over past years when delivery sometimes took the entire school year.

In the health care pilot, 482 pregnant women visited health centers and were subject to HIV/AIDS screening in one month, a large increase from the average of 71 such screenings in the months leading up to the pilot.

Based on these experiences, the value of investing in leadership development became clear to all those attending the government retreat. The retreat also enabled participants to develop a vision for the country. Despite the constraints and challenges, decision-makers were able to prioritize and reach a consensus regarding the allocation of public resources.

It was the way the RRA teams dealt with the constraints to making change operational that produced some of the most striking and important improvements in performance. This practical hands-on learning resulted in greater leadership capacities and gave participants new tools and the experience of putting them into practice.

### Education Project: Transporting school books to Bubanza



Source: WBI

## 4. Lessons from Experience

- It is possible to achieve targeted results that are above current national performance levels.
- Results build on results when capacity is unleashed and participants become motivated and confident.
- Leaders play a critical role in articulating the strategy that translates development vision into rapid results.
- RRA coaches play an important role in moving the process forward.
- Peer-to-peer exchange among government leaders can be an effective modality for sharing experience and stimulating behavioral changes and creativity.
- Leaders at all levels should engage in leadership development (from the highest level in the hierarchy to the operational level — that is, the level of those who manage programs and projects) and should work toward a collective leadership.
- The success of RRA first requires the stability of political leaders and continuity of operational leadership.
- All stakeholders should be accountable.
- Pilots must have targets and a strategy.
- Stakeholders can avoid frustration by focusing on gaining good results.
- Team work is key!

### 4.1 Role of capacity building in achieving change and results

At the government retreat, the RRA methodology was introduced, and the leadership team reviewed the results achieved in previous pilots. Participants explored the benefits of applying the RRA methodology to other programs, projects, and sectors.

The retreat also showed how the methodology could be replicated in other ministerial departments. Through their exposure to the RRA methodology participants began to change the way they addressed problems. This led to changes in behavior among civil servants, and new ways of doing business.

The first retreat made it possible to set clear goals, adopting RRA methods to jump-start project implementation:

- During the closing ceremonies of the first government retreat, the president committed to expanding the use of the RRA and referred to its successful use for the Donor Roundtable in May 24–25, 2007.

- Setting 100-day goals changed the way people approached project implementation and developed a sense of personal challenge, which communicated to the implementing agencies that this was a departure from business as usual.
- The president's speech at the 2006 government retreat led participants to raise their expectations and seek rapid, concrete, and tangible results to meet their priority needs.

### 4.2 Sustainability and demand

In order to expand and build on the past RRA experience, the steering committee for the leadership program organized a workshop in September 2007 to sensitize, inform, and raise awareness about the methodology and results of the first generation of RRA initiatives among a number of ministries. Following this workshop, the government committed to launching RRA initiatives in 12 ministries, including programs in planning and development, civil service, national solidarity, environment, health, national defense and former combatants, information, agriculture, transport, and trade.

The next government retreat which took place at the end of 2007 aimed to expand the number of initiatives. The government also planned to increase ownership, starting with studying the lessons learned, sharing experiences, and developing a monitoring and evaluation plan.

## 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

The government is committed to scaling up the use of the RRA in twelve ministries, as described above. More details are forthcoming. Currently, no institutional or regulatory obstacles exist that would restrict the scope of applying RRA in Burundi.

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# Central African Republic

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Problem: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change

The Central African Republic has been afflicted by violent conflict since independence in 1960, with flashpoints in 1996 and 1997 and a military coup in 2003.

Recently, security has improved somewhat in the capital Bangui, and a new constitution was ratified by referendum in 2004. In addition, presidential and legislative elections in May 2005 were judged to have followed a satisfactory process.

Unstable politics, in combination with the country's landlocked position, contributed to weak economic performance through 2005. Despite potentially rich mineral resources and farming conditions, the economy is hampered by a limited transport system, an unskilled workforce, poor health, unsupportive economic policies, and weak public administration and financial management. Instability, violence and displacement in neighboring countries adds to the challenges.

Yet, with the change in governance arrangements and high commodity prices, growth in 2006 reached 4.1 percent, the highest in a decade, and this was expected to continue through 2007.

Striving to recover from repeated military and political crises, macroeconomic malaise, and social stagnation, the rapid results approach (RRA) was introduced to help build the capacity of government leaders and their teams to mobilize change, bring stakeholders together despite their differences, re-examine long-standing implementation challenges, and build confidence among stakeholders that visible results would be achieved as a result of the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

After the conflict, the government wanted the people to return to Bangui; therefore it was necessary to signal that things were changing for the better. The government turned to RRA to demonstrate that people could get micro-credit, send their children

to school, and go to health-care centers for vaccines. With these results the people of Central African Republic started to see that government's actions were in their interest.

### 1.2 Context: Background for the intervention/initiative

At the conclusion of presidential and legislative elections in May 2005, which marked the end of a two-year transition period and the ratification of a new constitution, the government began a national dialogue focused on three main priorities:

1. Safety and peace consolidation
2. Macroeconomic and financial stabilization
3. Basic infrastructure reconstruction

Making headway would require a major public sector reform initiative. Change was needed not just at the macroeconomic level, but also at the micro or community level and at the individual level. People's attitudes would have to change. Civil servants had abandoned their work for lack of salaries, state authorities had disappeared in response to the security situation, and the country had become dysfunctional.

Recognizing the importance of demonstrating leadership at the highest level, in 2004 the transition government requested support to strengthen national leadership capacity for implementation of this new government policy. Seminars on leadership for results were organized by the World Bank Institute, the United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Programme UNDP, in September and December 2005 in Bangui.

Two RRA pilots were launched, which aimed at restoring the confidence of the population in vulnerable areas by boosting community-based initiatives, and increasing customs revenue from imports from Douala, Cameroon. The pilots achieved results in three areas: (i) security, (ii) social services (health and education), and (iii) public finance (including positive developments in customs revenues).

Collaboration was presented as the new norm for doing business. New edicts were issued and cross-sectoral committees were set up. The major interlocutors were the government (state institutions), the private sector, civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the donors (the World Bank, European Union, and agencies of the United Nations), local governments, and communities. The government defined the policy and set the framework for actions. The government engaged the private sector and the civil society and the donors provided support.

### 1.3 Change agent/entry point

The mandate for change came from the highest levels of government. The prime minister, who was a former official of the African Development Bank, drove the initiative by endorsing it and promising to take necessary action when needed to get results. The president asked for results in three months.

Once the government was able to show some results, people started to believe in its legitimacy. Some directors became champions of the projects, saw the initiatives as important, and worked for change. The entry point was the implementation of the General Policy of the Government statement (Déclaration de Politique Générale du Gouvernement — DPG), based on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

Two leadership seminars were convened. The first in November 2004, on the eve of the presidential and legislative elections, brought together the president, vice president, prime minister, and 17 other top officials, along with 20 non-governmental leaders. The goal was to build commitment among national leaders for a transitional results framework, and to foster stability in the pre- and post-election period. The seminar was supported by United Nations agencies, and a World Bank LICUS trust fund grant.

A second leadership seminar took place in December 2005, after the establishment of the newly elected government, and also supported by a World Bank LICUS trust fund grant. Peers from Mozambique and Senegal worked with the CAR leadership team to design a general strategy document, and to agree on lessons to be incorporated into the country's PRSP. Both seminars agreed on short engagement notes with behaviors and principles that participants would follow.

Pilot results were reviewed after 90 days and presented during the second seminar. Based on the results, participants adopted a final document stating their commitment to observing and implementing the framework, and listing guiding principles for achieving poverty reduction.

## 2. Leadership and Change

Senior government officials assumed the leadership of teams and took responsibility for mobilizing across departments, the private sector, and civil society. Officials also took charge of monitoring and following through to reach an outcome. Recognizing the potential value of RRA for increasing the collection of revenues, politicians introduced permanent measures to institutionalize its application.

Codes of conduct and practice embodying principles of prioritization, collaboration, and focusing on results were endorsed by the cabinet. The president issued an edict that drew together a committee of highly respected public figures that conducted monitoring and public advocacy, and appealed to the accountability of politicians and bureaucrats.

## 3. Results Matter: Getting leaders to think about results

The prime minister drove the initiative to bring visible changes to the civil service as he set out to lead the government in rebuilding itself. At the time there were 24 months of unpaid salaries, and much of the civil service was not reporting for work. The needed reforms were extensive and included (i) restoring all laws and regulations; (ii) reorganizing the accounting system; (iii) ensuring that all departments, services, and people know their jobs; and (iv) ensuring that the public is satisfied with the service provided.

### 3.1 RRA process: Desired outcomes

The two 90-Day RRA pilots sought the following outcomes by the end of 2005:

For RRA pilot 1 (In the subprefecture of Bossangoa conflict area):

- Increase primary school enrollment rate from 28 to 50 percent
- Increase the anti-polio immunization rate among children under five from 80 to 100 percent
- Increase the number of households benefiting from community-based micro projects to 50 percent

*Some of the questions we focused on were “What do we want to change? What are we trying to influence?” “Whatever the program is, the government asks, what are the results we are aiming for?”*

*- World Bank Official, High Performance Development, Conference Insight Report, October 7–9, 2007*

For RRA pilot 2:

- Increase the monthly average customs revenues of CFAF 1.8 billion by 10 percent on imports transiting via Douala

### 3.2 Final outcome and impact

The combined results of two cycles or waves of RRA (that is, after 180 days) led to tangible and measurable results — some of which were very satisfactory, others mixed. In the case of immunization of children under five, the goal to increase the immunization rate to 100 percent was achieved. The pilot’s target for school enrollment achieved only 25 percent, and the target for households benefiting from community micro projects reached 30 percent.

Results were most positive in public finance, and were brought about by better collaboration between customs and the Bureau d’Affrètement Routier Centrafricain (BARC), better monitoring of stocks, and the dismantling of illegal barriers (such as that of the Bangui-Béloko corridor). As a result, the government increased customs tariffs to CFAF 2

billion in November 2005, exceeding the pilot target of a 10 percent increase over the year before.

However, recent reforms underway in customs administration are proving very difficult to implement, and therefore these achievements may not be sustained.

In addition to the tangible and measurable results described above, the RRA pilots also contributed to new leadership capacities. The government now considers the RRA a learning process generating change through the following:

1. Creating a culture of performance
2. Applying a results orientation
3. Strengthening teamwork
4. Practicing innovation
5. Encouraging collaboration

In addition, these new capacities created spin-offs of new activities in other departments, thereby adding greater impact to the government’s reform/change initiative. Table 1 presents some examples:

**Table 1. Spinoffs from enhanced leadership capacity**

Leadership capacity	Spin-off actions of other departments (also known as the “ripple effect”)
1. Creating a culture of performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dismantling of illegal barriers</li> <li>• Actions towards enhancement of public revenues</li> <li>• Improvement of performances at routine performance evaluations</li> </ul>
2. Results orientation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Keen interest among local actors to move forward</li> <li>• Better appraisal of field realities by central officials</li> </ul>
3. Teamwork	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mutual understanding thanks to better knowledge of respective activities and shared issues</li> <li>• Willingness to take the initiative in an unplanned situation</li> <li>• Motivation through shared commitment</li> </ul>
4. Innovation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of communication technology</li> <li>• Data exchanges through the Internet</li> <li>• Transmission of information through radio messages along the corridor</li> <li>• Use of existing local radio stations to send information to the central government</li> </ul>
5. Collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutionalization of customs/BARC collaboration, based on recognition of mutual benefits from information exchanges</li> <li>• Involvement of professional corps of Inspection Générale des Finances (IGF) in customs revenue recovery</li> <li>• Strengthening of physical security in the regions of Bossangoa following the actions led by the forces of order in the northern part of the country</li> </ul>

Spin-offs have also been observed within the sectors where the pilots were implemented, creating greater impact for the government's reform/change initiative (table 2):

**Table 2. Spinoffs in RRA pilot sectors**

Sector	Spin-off actions of other departments (also known as the “ripple effect”)
Education	<p>Presence of people in charge of women's organizations in sensitization meetings for school enrollment (previously, only fathers attended such meetings)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The impact of recovered security on the social educational sector, including:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– School schedule observed in the area (school year 2005–06) despite strike by teachers</li> <li>– Report on status of educational system drafted and handled within one year (February 2006–February 2007)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Health	<p>Actions associated with pilot 1 from September to December 2005, which coincided with the 5th round of NID, (National Immunization Campaign) had a positive impact on mass immunization campaign (anti-polio and anti-measles), which experienced a high coverage rate of 91.12 % (2006) versus 54.4 % (2005)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regarding child survival day in 2007, there was a multi-sector approach in the countryside with involvement of women's associations, schools, the army (collaboration between the physician officer, head of the health prefecture Ouham-Péndé, and elements from the garrisons stationed in the area to provide immunization coverage)</li> <li>• Opening of WHO and UNICEF office in the towns of Bossangoa and Kaga-Bandoro</li> </ul> <p>With return of civil servants to the area, resumption of basic social service activities (such as health facilities, schools, and maternity clinics)</p>
Security	<p>Improvements in security in vulnerable areas measured after 90 days through the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Return of populations to the land</li> <li>• Maximum coverage of immunization campaign</li> <li>• Less mortal epidemics in the Bossangoa zone</li> <li>• School enrollment of children</li> <li>• Resumption of agricultural activities</li> <li>• Increase in road traffic, trade (weekly market days) in Bossangoa zone and surrounding area</li> <li>• Actual presence of administrations and state institutions</li> <li>• Resumption of activities by humanitarian organizations (such as COOPI, Caritas, MSF, CICR, HCR, FAO, UNICEF, WHO)</li> <li>• Rehabilitation of cotton factory in Bossangoa</li> <li>• Payment of arrears to cotton growers in the Bossangoa zone and its surrounding area (decision made by the government on creating a new cotton company for boosting the cotton industry in the area)</li> </ul>
Customs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Illegal barriers dismantled and defense and security force patrols enforced to gradually secure the Douala-Bangui corridor and improve international traffic fluidity on this axis, thanks to the involvement of prefects, subprefects, and local authorities</li> </ul>

After working through the RRA manual at the beginning of the pilots and establishing the provisional timeline, the monitoring and evaluation system was adopted during the review process. Periodic meetings were held for assessing pilot progress and the outcome of the meetings were recorded. At the meetings, results teams reviewed the measurable progress toward the objectives, reviewed progress compared to the work

plan, and discussed next steps. Progress was reviewed according to the following schedule:

- Team leader/steering committee: once a week
- Midterm review with teams: midway through the 90 days
- Review of syntheses by the RRA teams: at the end of 90 days

Progress was tracked on charts comparing the results, activities, and budgets with targets and actual achievements by the due date. After this, the gaps were analyzed, and on-going action plans were evaluated and adjusted to reach expected objectives.

#### 4. Lessons from Experience

##### 1. Understanding the country context is key to designing realistic goals and ensuring ownership.

RRA implementation in a post-conflict country must take into account organizational, material, financial, and human constraints.

##### 2. A successful RRA initiative requires resources.

In order to ensure good implementation of RRA initiatives, (i) the target must come out of a participatory and collaborative process and gain the cooperation of competing stakeholders; (ii) sufficient resources, both material and financial must be available and in sync with the 90–100 day rapid result project cycles; (iii) RRA coaches and team members must not be transferred or lost to the implementing agency, as they can be valuable in providing support for future RRA initiatives.

**3. The power of synergy across sectors to overcome obstacles is the key to achieving sustainable results.** All stakeholders (including government, civil society, the private sector, grassroots community representatives, and beneficiaries) should participate in all stages of the RRA initiative, from design to project implementation to monitoring and evaluation.

**4. To appreciate the impact of RRA, it is important to note the spin-off, and ripple effect.** In measuring the full impact of the RRA, one must take into account not only the tangible results, in terms of changes in the lives of target beneficiaries, but also the spin-off, or ripple-effect from changes in leadership capacity. Leadership capacity enhancement results from the government's own efforts to adopt the RRA on a wider scale and their improvements in implementation, management practices, and the new way of doing business that contributes daily to achieving results.

##### 4.1 Constraints met and overcome

During pilot 1, some partners did not adhere to the principles of sector-wide planning. There was also a lag in administrative procedures and a teacher strike. These constraints were resolved through an awareness-raising and sensitization campaign and

through greater collaboration and cooperation. Other challenges included developing a joint commitment among stakeholders at the local level, and capacity transfer toward the grassroots community (that is, the local monitoring committee).

During pilot 2, the main constraints included insecurity in the corridor, lack of logistical support and communications for controls, and a “wait and see” behavior among operators. These were managed by (i) strengthening collaboration between customs and BARC, hence ending compartmentalization; (ii) assimilation and ownership of approach by customs services and BARC, hence behavioral change; and (iii) adopting a spirit of innovation and initiative to attain results.

##### 4.2 Sustainability and demand

RRA contributed to new dynamics in changing behaviors and actions. Teamwork was strengthened, and innovation capacity was boosted by introducing new communications devices and Internet-based solutions. The synergy that came from collaborating across sectors to overcome obstacles to change left a lasting impression on all involved.

##### Customs

The RRA contributed to the adoption of reforms and resolutions (institutional capacity) by encouraging a multi-sector approach in government actions, namely through the following activities:

- Collaboration between customs and BARC materialized through an interministry order of September 2005. The order addressed the regulation of collaboration between customs and BARC in processing statistical data linked to the inflow and outflow of goods from Central African Republic territory.
- A decree was adopted that established the interministry Committee for Surface Transport.
- A framework was set up for consultations on the transit chain of Central African interstate countries (TIPAC) between the Central African Republic and Cameroon.
- An order was issued establishing a national committee for assisting trade and transport in the Central African Republic.
- Création de la Cellule mixte d'investigation financière (CEMIFI) was established, replacing the Mixed Customs and Tax Unit (Cellule mixte douane et impot (CEMIDO)).

## Security

Results of the pilot have been incorporated into the security policy developed by the government, and are being consolidated through the following activities:

- A project for reforming the security sector (Reform du Secteur de Securite — RSS) was started. This program intends to reform the army by establishing defense zones and constructing barracks over the whole territory in order to clear Bangui from overcrowding.
- Local populations are encouraged to seek ownership of the security concept through the involvement of local authorities, namely administrations, municipalities, and grassroots community organizations. The idea is a common project for overall peace and security, as well as personal security.
- Peace agreements were signed recently between political authorities of the Central African Republic and rebels.
- Preparation of an inclusive political dialogue is planned in the coming days.
- Implementation of decentralization policy is planned.
- CEMEFI was established.
- Next holding of general justice meeting.

## 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

Despite its progress and contribution to enabling government leaders to drive change, the program for extending RRA was sidelined by the Bank in favor of pursuing arrears clearance and aid to heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC). The core teams, however, are still there and stand ready to restart the process.

But the security situation in the Central African Republic remains precarious. Active rebel movements are clashing with government forces in the northern part of the country, forcing some residents to flee into neighboring Cameroon and Chad. Conflict in Sudan and Chad persists. Highway bandits (“coupeurs de route”) make travel on major highways risky, and recently aid workers and other expatriates have been murdered. While there is some support from a small international peacekeeping force, local security forces are undisciplined; and there are security risks everywhere in the country and particularly outside of Bangui.

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# Kenya

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Problem: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change

Kenya had long suffered from corruption, poor service delivery, and a lack of transparency and accountability that undermined economic growth and the well-being of its people. A turning point came on December 27, 2002, when President Mwai Kibaki was elected on a platform that promised major reforms leading to growth and prosperity.

In 2003, with few results to show for previous reform efforts, the new government proposed the Economic Recovery Strategy on Employment and Wealth Creation (ERS, 2003–7) to implement the president's platform. The rapid results approach (RRA) was adopted to expedite the ERS, based on its successful piloting in six ministries. During 2003–5, the Ministry of Health, for example, achieved improvements in malaria eradication, reproductive health, antiretroviral therapy, community child health, support systems, and sanitation, using the RRA to jump-start project implementation.

The ERS noted that overall the government's wage bill was too high in relation to GDP and levels of services provided. Previous efforts to reduce this skewed expenditure and enhance service delivery were constrained by the weak link between planning and budgeting, lack of an integrated performance management framework, and poor human resource management systems. Addressing these challenges would require the following actions:

- Improve the enabling environment for businesses
- Direct resources towards wealth and employment creation
- Improve public sector performance and service delivery

### 1.2 Context: Background for the intervention/initiative

In July 2004 the government recognized that past reform initiatives had not improved service delivery.

This was partly due to a lack of ownership for the reform strategies and an inability to complete the implementation. While the initiatives were, in some respects, well formulated, they produced few results.

Political leadership came from the Office of the President as well as ministers and assistant ministers for Provincial Administration and National Security, Public Service, Defense, Immigration and Registration of Persons, and Special Programs. The overall sponsor was the secretary to the Cabinet and head of the Public Service, and the overall results leader was the permanent secretary, Public Service Reform and Development Secretariat (PSRDS). Strategic leaders included the permanent secretaries of the participating ministries.

An Office of the President Inter-Ministerial/Departmental Task Force was formed to steer the planning and implementation of the RRAs. There were eight external (national) coaches that assisted in the RRAs (trained by R.H. Schaffer and Associates with funding from the World Bank). The closely related results-based management (RBM) policy team was led by Hon. Ntimama, then Minister for Public Service. The PSRDS incorporated their recommendations into the development of this program as well as into the draft Human Resource Management Reform Strategy.

### 1.3 Change agent/entry point

The major entry point was the launch of the ERS. To ensure its implementation, the government in 2004 adopted a RBM approach across the entire public service. It was understood that this would be a long-term endeavor, but since improvements in service delivery were urgent, the government adopted the RRA as an implementation tool to jumpstart this major change effort and to produce results on the ground. Institutionalizing the RRA meant embedding it in the participating organizations through an iterative process of capacity building.

The PSRDS was established in 2004 to institutionalize the use of RBM in the Public Service. PSRDS quickly adopted RRA as a tool for institutional review and the institutionalization of RBM, and for advancing the ERS.

The RRA was also useful in implementing organizational work plans and performance contracts.

The main responsibilities of the PSRDS are:

- Results tracking on a quarterly basis
- Compliance with objectives of the National Performance Management Framework (NPMF) in management of public service institutions
- Adherence to the program/project cycle management policy and ensuring that program implementation is focused on achieving set targets and budgets
- Ensuring that ministries/institutions implement the recommendations and findings from service delivery surveys
- Ensuring efficiency and waste-free management gains, and that government offices and facilities improve and maintain their public image

The PSRDS provides “Planning and National Developmental” reports and annual reports to the Cabinet Standing Committee on Public Service Reforms through the Performance Management Steering Committee.

## 2. Leadership and Change

### 2.1 How leaders emerge as drivers of the process

Each RRA was launched under the leadership of the president, with the respective minister, permanent secretary, and department heads in attendance. The permanent secretary serves as the sponsor of the RRA initiative, and the department heads are in charge of results.

The RRA works by assigning specific responsibilities to individuals during the 100-day cycle. The line management must support the temporary governance

**Table 1. Roles and responsibilities in a RRA initiative**

ROLES	WHO	RESONSIBILITY
Sponsor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual jointly accountable for overall goals of the strategic plan</li> <li>• Individual responsible for various components of the strategic plan</li> <li>• Individual who has authority to influence the overall direction of the effort</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides overall leadership to the implementation effort</li> <li>• Shapes and adapts the implementation strategy</li> <li>• Periodically assesses implementation challenges, identifies critical ones, and designs portfolios of RRA projects to address them</li> <li>• Designates strategic leader or co-leader for each focus area</li> <li>• Realigns large-term project implementation strategy, based on lessons emerging from each wave of RRA</li> </ul>
Results leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual responsible for coordinating activities in ministries/departments</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinates the alignment of all pilots</li> <li>• Holds strategic leader accountable for results</li> </ul>
Strategic leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Member of leadership group</li> <li>• Typically, individual whose accountability aligns most closely with the area of focus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recruits team leaders for RRA initiatives</li> <li>• Mobilizes support for RRA initiative</li> <li>• Works with team leader to recruit the RRA team</li> <li>• “Pulls the plug” on RRA initiative if necessary</li> <li>• Ensures that lessons from the RRA initiative inform/advance the strategic plan</li> </ul>
Team leader	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual from the core area of chosen goal</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Works with strategic leader to recruit RRA team</li> <li>• Works with RRA team to sharpen goal and develop work plan for RRA initiative</li> <li>• Leads RRA team in achieving the goal</li> <li>• Accountable to strategic leader for achieving RRA goal; makes expansion recommendations</li> </ul>
Team members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individuals involved in the implementation steps or processes</li> <li>• A mix of functions and stakeholders needed to achieve results</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use their knowledge skills and background to help the RRA initiative succeed</li> <li>• Complete action steps thoroughly and on time</li> <li>• Take part in goal setting, planning, reviewing progress, and documenting</li> </ul>
Coach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical expert well versed in methodology</li> <li>• Typically not directly involved in the focus</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Helps the strategic leader identify learning goals and opportunities for urgent improvements within a strategic focus area</li> <li>• Coaches strategic leaders, team leader, and members to optimize team energy and participation</li> <li>• Ensures that team goal and work plan are clear and powerful</li> <li>• Helps team leader plan effective meetings</li> <li>• Works with team leaders to plan expansion of pilot’s achievements</li> <li>• Helps the strategic leader shape an executable challenge to the RRA team leader</li> </ul>

*Government of Kenya 2006b, p. 8.*

structure for it to deliver results. The roles and responsibilities of the major players in participating organizations are outlined in table 1.

The Interministerial/Departmental RRA Task Force carries out the following tasks:

- Develops work plans for ministerial/ departmental interventions to fight corruption
- With permanent secretaries, refines thematic areas to be included in presentations at the RRA leadership seminar in July 2006
- Jointly develops a work plan for the RRA launch, midterm review, and celebration of 100 days
- Develops a monitoring and evaluation program
- Defines roles and responsibilities of key players, including permanent secretaries, heads of departments, staff members, and stakeholders
- Plans logistics for the implementation of the RRA initiatives
- Develops rollout plans for the RRA initiative of the Office of the President
- Develops an information, education, and communication strategy

The government adopted the RRA as one of the tools for implementing RBM in the Public Service with the focus on results, capacity enhancement, and ensuring the delivery of the ERS targets. The premise of the RRA was to promote organizational learning and build implementation capacity by helping ministries, departments, and other public institutions work on well-defined 100-day initiatives that dovetail with annual workplans, strategic plans, and performance contracts, and accelerate their implementation. In this way, the RRA challenged leaders to continually adapt, based on what works and what doesn't work on the ground.

Desired outcomes included a shift from process to results orientation and from a bureaucratic to an entrepreneurial public service. It was also hoped that the RRA would be used as a work planning tool.

Another desired outcome was reduced corruption. For example, when the Office of the President (which includes the Office of Provincial Administration and Police) received one of the lowest ratings on corruption, the president responded by ordering an RRA initiative.

### 3. Results Matter

#### 3.1 RRA process: Desired outcomes

Institutionalizing RBM throughout the government led to expectations that public service delivery would improve. This required developing a systematic way to deliver results within the organizations, bringing the whole organizational structure into play, from the minister to the rank and file. In turn, this meant redirecting the delivery system, where the RRA became a tool for doing business within the organization, and making sure that the whole organization was using it.

#### 3.2 Final outcome and impact

RRA initiatives have been implemented in over 53 public service institutions. A national performance management framework has been developed, and there has been a capacity-development program for transforming the public service, a long-term public service reform strategy, and the training of 350 new RRA coaches, drawn from ministries, departments, and government agencies.

A recent report (Transparency International, 2007) found that, although the overall level of corruption in Kenya is about the same as in the previous year, there was a 42 percent and 36 percent reduction respectively in law enforcement bribes and service-related bribes. According to the report, RRA initiatives reduced the "scarcity premium" and contributed to this outcome, including a better supply of drugs in public health care facilities, improved service delivery by water companies, the "umeme pamoja" electrification program, and the elimination of road licenses.

Examples of specific achievements from pilot ministries include the following:

- Ministry of Water and Irrigation: Results in 10 thematic areas. For example, under thematic area 7, the goal was to increase the number of irrigated farmers from 117 to 203 within 100 days in the Nkando irrigation scheme of Laikipia District. The result achieved was 186 farmers connected to irrigation, of which 171 have crops.
- Ministry of Health: Results in 6 thematic areas. For example, under thematic area 2, the goal was to increase the number of HIV patients on antiretroviral drugs from 2,580 to 3,870 in Western Province in 100 days. The result was over 5,000 patients on antiretroviral drugs.

*"What we noted when we were implementing the RRA in the ministries is that if the permanent secretary agrees to implement the RRA initiative but he or she doesn't actually sit in the first process, we will go around in circles. On the other hand, when the secretary sits in the initial briefing and instructs the heads of departments about the way we are going, we see a very different type of RRA initiative and support."*

*- Sylvester Obong'O, Kenya, High Performance Development, Conference Insight Report, October 9-11, 2007*

- *Ministry of Agriculture:* Results in 10 thematic areas. For example, under thematic area 3, the goal was to increase cotton balls per plant from an average of 50 balls per plant to 70 balls per plant in 50 days, and to reduce authenticated debts owed to cotton farmers by 50 percent in 50 days. The result was that plants achieved over 100 balls per plant at the end of the season (performance on debt reduction target is unknown).
- *Ministry of Local Government:* Results in 6 thematic areas. For example, under thematic area 3, the goal was to increase the number of staff appraisals from 30 percent to 50 percent through a new performance appraisal system within 100 days. The result was that staff appraisals were conducted on 61 percent of the targeted staff members.
- *Ministry of Immigration:* Results in 4 thematic areas. For example, under thematic area 2, the goal was to reduce the period of issuance of birth and death certificates from 14 to 5 working days after payment. The result was achieved.

In 2007 Kenya received the United Nation's prestigious "Public Service Award" for its introduction of results-based public sector performance contracts. The RRA was linked closely to this because it was the monitoring and evaluation mechanism employed to review the organizations and improve service delivery. This is a rare case where RRA pilots have been scaled up, with full local ownership, to help drive government-wide reforms.

With help from RRA, teams from each organization are able to translate the goals of the ERS into results on the ground, or "results for Kenyans." The temporary governance structure instituted through the RRA initiatives created a vehicle for greater accountability, as well as a way to track progress. For example, in the Ministry of Agriculture the results leader (agriculture secretary) met every two weeks with all strategic leaders to gain feedback and review progress on ongoing RRA initiatives across the country.

#### 4. Lessons from Experience

**1. RRA requires leadership at the highest level.** The chief executive's buy-in was crucial for teams to get buy-in down the chain. It may take anywhere from two weeks to six months to persuade a leader to launch; but RRA initiatives are only launched if the minister

is physically present. A key incentive for buy-in from political leaders is that RRA can help deliver political campaign promises. If the top leadership does not throw its weight behind the effort, no amount of process or methodology can work.

**2. RRA produces shared learning.** During the review sessions, teams from diverse sections of the ministry were brought together to share their experiences and to learn from one another. The Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture, and Social Services brought together 13 teams from various functions to exchange knowledge on innovation for improving service delivery.

**3. When it comes to operationalizing change, RRA is as much about "how" as it is about the "what."** By achieving the rapid results goals aligned to and derived from the ERS, the results on the ground are a leading indicator of a deeper aspiration: boosting the capacity in the ministries/departments for making change. And this is as much about "how" these results are being achieved as it is about "what" is being achieved.

**4. The results are the greatest motivating factor.** All leaders and development partners are won over by results. The initial stages of introducing the RRA to the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture may have fallen off track; the idea of 100-day initiatives may have been first seen as just another parallel government reform program, unnecessary in light of the government's introduction of RBM in the Public Service. But these attitudes changed once the RRA initiative was launched.

Each team was tasked with developing a goal and a workplan targeting a specific area of focus. Team members represented a cross-section of the organization, and in most cases included targeted beneficiaries. Intense preparations took place during the launch. Toward the end of the day as team leaders presented their goals and preliminary work plans to the core leadership team, the mood was one of excitement and empowerment. The teams had acquired a passion to pursue the developed goal, and a renewed passion for the broader role that they could play in their organizations.

Constraints encountered included resistance to change, the absence of demonstrable results of past reform initiatives, lack of harmonization of reform initiatives, and the lack of a communications strategy.

The primary driver for the changes was the president. Other important change agents were his Cabinet, the PSRDS, and the permanent secretaries.

#### 4.1 *Role of capacity building in achieving change and results*

Capacity building was a prominent feature both in the work of the PSRDS and of the pilot ministries. In the former, the PSRDS's transformative leadership, ethics, and the capacity-building component worked to do the following: (a) institutionalize a competency-based human resource management system in the public service; (b) champion change in the implementation of the RBM approach for achieving the ERS targets and other national priorities; (c) help transform the public service from a controlling to an enabling environment for results delivery; (d) encourage attitude changes for leaders and staff with managerial and supervisory authority; and (e) institutionalize public service values and ethics.

In the pilot ministries, one of the targeted result areas under the Ministry of Local Government pilot was to create a staff establishment in the Municipal Council of Mavoko. In achieving this, they determined optimum staffing levels and skill gaps, proposed positions for approval, and recommended qualified staff for promotion and re-designation. These staff deployments were examined, and appropriate recommendations were made.

## 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

Further implementation is moving forward in six steps:

- Training a core team of coaches within the PSRDS in the RRA, and more broadly in RBM
- Developing a RRA implementation manual and user guide
- Developing the RRA and RBM curriculum for use by the PSRDS
- Training a core group of public servants in ministries where RRA has been launched, with members of the ministerial management unit to be at the center of this training
- Continuous training
- Independent ministry launches and the exit of external coaches

The PSRDS has earmarked 15 ministries for one rapid results wave each in the financial year 2006/7: 10 local authorities, 6 regional authorities, all state corporations in the agricultural sector, and the parliamentary and judicial service commissions. International experts on RBM from IPAC Canada and UK National School of Government have developed a five-day training course on RBM. This has been tested on 30 public servants so far, with more training planned for early 2008.

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# Madagascar

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Madagascar is one of Africa's poorest countries.<sup>2</sup> Pursuing a socialist model based on economic self-sufficiency and state intervention since the 1970s, the country began structural reforms starting in 1997 to increase foreign investment and bring Madagascar into the world economy. These efforts produced significant economic growth, averaging 4.6 percent through 2001.

But the growth was limited to urban areas and had little impact on rural poverty. The disparity between urban growth and rural poverty undermined the government's efforts and led many to blame former President Didier Ratsiraka for mismanagement and corruption.

This growing dissatisfaction with the Ratsiraka government led to an upset in the December 2001 general election in favor of Mark Ravolamanana, the former mayor of Antananarivo and a successful business man.

The incumbent president contested the election, refusing to stand down. This brought on a period of political and economic crisis that produced two parallel governments for a time, each with its own central bank. Foreign exchange to the country was suspended, and assets abroad were frozen.

By late 2002 the crisis was over, and the new government under President Ravolamana was formally recognized. But it faced an up-hill battle to recover lost ground while having to deal with new hardships, both man-made and natural.<sup>3</sup>

Hoping to revitalize and strengthen the skills and knowledge of his leadership team, the president asked the World Bank in 2003 for support to improve the capabilities of his leadership team. This case illustrates how leadership support, when embedded in a wider reform program, can become a powerful force for accelerating change.

### *1.1 Context: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change*

The new government recognized the urgency of addressing the peoples' high expectations for concrete economic and social improvements in the short term. While it rushed to put the economy back on track and improve the quality of life, its vision and strategy for reform were no match for the realities on the ground. A Malagasy citizen noted that, "there [was] a contradiction between the state we inherited and the objectives we set for ourselves."<sup>4</sup>

In 2002, by the time the Ravolamanana government assumed power, GDP had declined by 13 percent, key public services were discontinued, and the poverty rate soared from 69 percent in 2001 to 80 percent. There was widespread joblessness and high inflation.<sup>5</sup> The same year, Transparency International ranked Madagascar the third most corrupt country out of 102 countries in its Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, behind Nigeria and Bangladesh.

The public's high hopes for improvements in service delivery in the short run were frustrated by the government's inefficient public service, weak coordination, and limited delegation of authority beyond the level of ministers and permanent secretaries. There was little capacity for policy planning or monitoring and evaluation in most sectors. Collaboration was weak, with no existing mechanism to allow for a joint ministerial response to problems that cut across sectors.

In 2003, hoping to reinvigorate and strengthen the skills and the performance of his leadership

<sup>1</sup> From Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Annual per capita income of US\$290 (2005) (World Bank 2007).

<sup>3</sup> These are well chronicled in Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007, p. 3.

team, the new President asked the World Bank for support. The World Bank responded to this request with an innovative Leadership and Management Program (LAMP) which evolved over time and was specifically tailored to the needs of his leadership team and environment. The LAMP was comprised of four components: (i) a series of government/cabinet retreats combined with a series of Rapid Results pilots; (ii) a one-week management training in Canada by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique (ENAP); (iii) a three-day self-management seminar by the Art of Living Foundation; and (iv) a Transformation Project, led by Dean Williams of the Kennedy School of Government, which sought to develop transformative leadership capacities through intensive adaptive leadership training and coaching.

### 1.2 Government/Cabinet Retreats and Rapid Results Initiatives

While a series of leadership development activities have taken place in Madagascar, this study focuses primarily on the government/cabinet retreats and the Rapid Results Approach (RRA).

Starting in June 2003, the Government of Madagascar—with support from the World Bank Institute—organized four multi-day Cabinet/government Retreats. These were attended by Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, and Chefs de region, chaired by the President and the Prime Minister and followed up by events that involved private sector, civil society and academia and the public sector. The Retreats aimed to assist the government in better defining and implementing its vision and overall strategy and developing a focus on results, while at the same time building a stronger government team.

#### Other objectives of the Cabinet Retreats:

- Provide participants with an opportunity to learn innovative skills
- Inform clients about policy alternatives
- Raise awareness
- Motivate individuals to take action

Source: "Building Leadership Capacity in Madagascar: The Contribution of Cabinet Retreats," D. Kabell, May 2007.

At the first retreat in June 2003, twelve internationally known resource persons gave feedback on the government's evolving strategy, exchanging experiences and good practice from their respective countries. This feedback was used to inform and refine the government's program. Participants discussed the constraints to accelerating developing results. This became an important theme for the second retreat.

The second retreat in January 2004, focused on improving service delivery, and showed a marked shift toward a results orientation. The primary goal for the retreat was to identify ways to speed up the results targeted in Madagascar's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), including governance reforms such as decentralization.

The retreat moved from a sector or thematic focus to a focus on the characteristics, behaviors, and skills of leadership, and to achieving concrete results on the ground. Participants again expressed their desire to link the results of the learning program to development outcomes. The goal was to strengthen leadership capacity to achieve results by considering different strategies for economic growth and by gauging the impact of various approaches on rural development.

Out of the discussions and conclusions at the second retreat (January 2004) emerged the idea to undertake a practical capacity development effort targeting specific implementation issues. A series of rapid results pilots were launched in February 2005 in four regions, focusing on the rice sector. These pilot initiatives were examined at the third retreat in May 2005, when the decision was taken—by the Prime Minister—to scale up this effort and launch rapid results initiatives in a number of growth sectors (fisheries, tourism, handicrafts, agro-business, mining, and rural electrification). Later the methodology was extended to all 22 regions addressing a wide range of sectors and issues. The process continues, led by Chefs de regions, the RRA has been instrumental in implementing regional development strategies.

Rapid Results is defined as "...a results-focused approach to implement strategy,"<sup>6</sup> aiming to achieve systematic change through a series of small-scale, results-producing and momentum-building initiatives that challenge teams to achieve concrete results in 100 days. In addition, the application of the methodology unleashes creativity and capacity, bringing together teams that work toward

<sup>6</sup> From Robert Schaffer and Associates Rapid Results Training material

agreed-upon results—within and across organizations. In practice, the approach accelerates the learning cycle, collapsing it from years to 100 days or less. It is a useful tool to “jump-start” and inform wider change/reform efforts as it provides valuable insights into the challenges and risks of implementation.

By combining cabinet retreats with rapid results initiatives, participants were able to go from abstract concepts of leadership to a more concrete understanding of strategy and implementation. The rapid results pilots delivered simultaneously valuable lessons and tangible results, while the cabinet retreats built the commitment and receptivity of the new government.

Private sector consultants were trained and engaged by the government to serve as coaches—providing process support—to the rapid results teams. When the initiative was rolled out to all 22 regions, coaches were trained and made available to each region. Some of the coaches were also involved in the development of the retreats, thereby assuring that cases and pilots were developed and tested in advance of the retreats. The local consultants served as facilitators during the retreats, identifying priority goals, and enabling participants to work on issues that were relevant to their future.

The fourth and last Cabinet Retreat, in June 2006, presented the first draft of the government’s new development strategy, the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP), a panel of high-level development experts for review.

### *1.3 Change agent/entry point*

The president was the key change agent, and the entry point was the election outcome resulting from the political and economic crisis of 2002. The president inherited a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) that mapped out an ambitious program to reduce poverty through rapid and sustained growth. While the goals and objectives of the PRS were consistent with the new government’s vision, the underlying economic and social reform program was weak and inconsistent. More important, there was no sense of ownership. While the leadership team was united in their desire for change, they lacked a common vision for the country’s development, and a consistent plan.

The president’s commitment made it possible to rapidly deploy coaches, experts, and trainers to assist key leaders in sketching out a new plan while tackling the barriers to change. The MAP would emerge from this process to become the unifying road map for the country’s vision and strategy for development (see box 1).

## **Box 1. The Madagascar Action Plan: Madagascar’s development vision and strategy**

The Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) 2012 sets out a roadmap for achieving the government’s vision of development. Its purpose is to produce a quantum leap in the development process by mobilizing the Malagasy people and the country’s international partners to ignite rapid growth, and thereby achieve poverty reduction.

The MAP outlines eight specific areas of focus: (i) good governance, (ii) educational transformation, (iii) health and family planning, (iv) environment, (v) rural development, (vi) the economy and the private sector, (vii) the environment, and (viii) national solidarity. For each focus area, there are quantifiable goals to be achieved by 2012.

The MAP further delineates the long-term vision in national development strategy called “Madagascar Naturally,” which the president put forward in 2004 as a roadmap for the period 2007–11. The vision foresees the transformation of Madagascar from a subsistence economy, with significantly increased exports of pharmaceuticals and textiles; enhanced linkages between the rural and industrial economies through agro-industry; the transformation of mineral products; and the provision of economic services such as tourism and agricultural credit.

*Source: Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007.*

<sup>7</sup> Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007

## 2. Leadership and Change

### 2.1 How leaders emerge as drivers of the process

The purpose of the LAMP was to enable the cabinet to work as an effective change management team, and enable the government bureaucracy to implement the president's ambitious reform agenda. The program sought to develop capacity, bring international knowledge into the planning process, and maintain the momentum for change. Concerning the Cabinet Retreats and the Rapid Results Initiatives, the objective of the support was to develop a results-focused leadership approach—at all levels of the implementation chain (from the Presidency to local communities). This meant that a results-culture was introduced—and adopted—by public and private institutions involved in the initiatives.

The Cabinet Retreats, which were attended by the highest level of political leadership (including regional), led to the launch of a series of Rapid Results Initiatives—which are still on-going. Initially this work was led by a high level and cross-sectoral Steering Committee situated at the Presidency (comprised of a representative from the Presidency, the Prime Minister's office, Secretary-Generals of the involved ministries, and the national rapid results coach). At present, the work is led from the newly established National Leadership Institute (NLIM). The RRA has served as an important tool for Chefs de régions to implement their Regional Development Plans and are also considered an important tool for the implementation of the Madagascar Action Plan. In the use of the methodology at the regional level, the strategic leaders have been the Chefs de region, while for sector initiatives, the Ministers of the responsible ministries have served as strategic leaders in charge of the work.

Based on positive results from the early waves of rapid results initiatives, political leaders at the highest level expressed a clear wish to scale up the use of the methodology (in early 2006). This resulted in the following:

- A decision to launch rapid results pilots in all 22 regions
- A decision to launch rapid result pilots in sectors where the methodology had not already been applied (justice, security, mining and health)
- Development of a Malagasy version of the RRA – called the “RRI-Angaredona”

<sup>7</sup> Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007.

<sup>8</sup> The other regions of Vakinankatra and Bongolava were less successful, primarily because of a lack of resources.

While the RRA provided process coaches to implementation teams, the Leadership Transformation Project provided coaching support to the high-level political leadership team and helped formulate and implement a program of institutional, behavioral, and results-oriented change. Its intent was to support the president in transforming his government into a powerful engine for achieving development outcomes, starting with priority ministries (education, transport, commerce). The Leadership Transformation Project is credited with the following breakthroughs:<sup>7</sup>

- The development of the MAP, through a highly consultative process
- Brokered re-engagement of the World Bank transport team and Ministry of Transport, and reactivation of a US\$300 million transport portfolio
- Restructuring of the Ministry of Transport
- Establishment of a new economic development board, drafting a new investment law, and opening a new dialogue with the Ministry of Commerce and key private sector organizations

A range of other tools and leadership development services were employed throughout the LAMP (see table 1).

## 3. Results Matter

### 3.1 RRA process: Desired outcomes

In February 2005, when the government launched its first rapid results pilot, the goal was to mitigate the effects of a significant shortfall in rice production, importation, and distribution. The crisis was solved by a combination of policy-based and technical interventions. Rice production increased significantly in two of the four targeted regions when the Rapid Results Approach (RRA) was applied. In the region of Boeny, production went from 2.5 tons per hectare in 2004 to 4 tons per hectare in 2005, and in the region of Menabe, it increased from 22,000 tons to 37,000 tons.<sup>8</sup>

This success generated an interest in using the RRA in other sectors and regions, and as a result, the government rolled out Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI) nationally in 2005. Since February 2005, five waves of Rapid Results Initiatives have taken place (February 2005 to December 2007).

The second wave of RRAs (July to December 2005) focused on RRA as a tool for supporting rural

**Table 1. Various approaches to leadership development in Madagascar**

Leadership approach	Purpose
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leadership and Management Program</li> </ul>	Corresponded to the specific needs of the leadership team
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government retreats</li> </ul>	Several day retreats attended by ministers, permanent secretaries, and chefs de région, and co-chaired by the president and the prime minister. The main objective of retreats was to help the government better define the vision and the development strategy of the country.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three-day seminar organized by The Art of Living Foundation</li> </ul>	Personal leadership capacity building, providing tools for personal development and stress management, and increasing energy, dynamism, mind clarity, and self confidence in the face of increased responsibility.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Leadership Transformation Project, which is at the core of Leadership and Management<sup>a</sup></li> </ul>	Provides supervision support to the leadership team when they develop and implement an institutional, behavioral, and results-based change program.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic decision meeting</li> </ul>	This is a tool for high-level strategic decision-making developed for a particular area, with participation of all actors in that area, which must lead decision-makers to validate the DRIPS (decision-recommendation-investigations-postpones-stop) that came out of this meeting. The large mine sector and particularly oil exploitation were among the sensitive areas for which this approach was initiated.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rapid results approach</li> </ul>	Development of a results-based culture through RRA at a more operational level in the implementation of reforms.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community score card</li> </ul>	A tool focused on accountability principles by service providers to involve beneficiaries in the improvement of service quality.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SWAP process (sector-wide approach)</li> </ul>	Efficient management and harmonization of procedures under the leadership of the Ministère de la Santé, du Planning Familial et de la Protection Sociale (MINSANPFPS) and in collaboration with partners (World Bank, The French Development Agency [AFD], and others).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decentralized mini-cabinet meetings</li> </ul>	Involving political and technical officials, the civil society, and technical and financial partners in the analysis of stakes and challenges per region and of districts under jurisdiction.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Minister coaching system</li> </ul>	Provides leadership in each region with support to socioeconomic and cultural change, as well as mobilization of related resources.

**Source:** *A Leadership Approach to Achieving Change in the Public Sector: The Case of Madagascar, World Bank, 2006.*

**Note:** a. Early in 2004 Professor Dean Williams from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University was invited to Madagascar to conduct consultations on the specific challenges for leadership in Madagascar. This work provided the basis for and point of entry for phase one of the Transformation Leadership Program, a training intervention (coaching) and consultancy to promote capacity among the president, the prime minister, ministers, and chefs de région, specifically in leadership and change management. Source: World Bank Group Supported Transformational Leadership Program in Madagascar, Kabell Consulting.

development at the regional level. This resulted in the launch of rapid results pilots in a number of growth areas at the local level (litchi, tourism, textiles, mining...<sup>9</sup>), as well as in areas relating to health and family planning.<sup>10</sup> These initiatives proved the methodology a valuable tool in translating regional development plans into concrete results.

In the third Rapid Results wave, from March to December 2006, the methodology was rolled out in all 22 regions, to implement regional development plans—most importantly in the area of local revenue mobilization. During this period developed the notion of a Malagasy form of Rapid Results Initiatives, named the “RRI-Angaredona” emerged.

During the fourth and fifth RRA waves (March to June 2007 and July to December 2007), the methodology was used largely as a tool to implement the MAP at the regional level.

### 3.2 Final outcome and impact

An independent review of the results of the 2005 pilot phase concluded that 67 percent of the pilots in the rice, tourism, and infrastructure sectors met their objectives,<sup>11</sup> 22 percent achieved them partially, and 11 failed. The RRA also contributed to tangible results in health (family planning, HIV/AIDS, and nutrition) and tourism (infrastructure, electrification, and water completed). It has also been used to increase textile production, litchi production, and exports.

Impressive performance results were seen in Analamanga region. Access to family planning sites/services reached 100 percent within 100 days (September 2007). Similarly, acceleration was noted in contraceptive rates, from 18 percent to 24 percent in 2006.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> In the Betsiboka region, RRA initiatives contributed to significant increases in local government revenues from mining activities. In 2005 a pilot program started in two communes to regularize the informal sector and legalize small-scale mining by issuing mining certificates. The quantity of gold declared and registered by small-scale miners went from 400 grams (before the RRA initiatives) to 12 kilograms. The program was expanded to other regions and led to the registration of over 12,000 small-scale miners (Heidenhof, Tegemann, and Sjetnan 2007, p. 11).

<sup>10</sup> Analamanga: the use of contraceptives by women of childbearing age increased from 10.8 percent in 2005 to 21.5 percent by the end of 2006.

<sup>11</sup> Association Hevitra Maro 2006.

<sup>12</sup> EDS, 2006; EPM, 20xx.

Beyond these tangible outcomes RRA also helped build social capital and rally stakeholders, contributing to the notion of “shared leadership and accountability”. It also improved collaboration within multisectoral initiatives by enabling ministries to work together and ministries with local service agents. It has built new confidence and capacity for action, management, and leadership skills.

The application of RRA in support of the government’s decentralization efforts has advanced capacity development by improving the results orientation and instilling a sense of shared responsibility and unity for achieving results at the local level.

In addition, the program has generated significant but less tangible benefits such as ownership, participation, greater transparency, accountability, and improved access to knowledge and information. The rapid results planned in the retreats and brought about through the use of the RRA include the following:<sup>11</sup>

- Increased rice production (Boeny)
- Improved quality of vanilla production (Sava)
- Increased production of silk (Analamanga)
- Increased production and quality of litchis (Atsinanana)
- AIDS testing and family planning improvement (Analamang and Atsimo-Andrefana)
- Increased municipal revenue collection (Atsimo-Andregana)

One of the best examples of the impact of the broader Leadership Development effort is the MAP. Developed to help achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and in line with its broader poverty reduction strategy, the people of Madagascar defined a national strategy and vision for integrated development called “Madagascar Naturally,” a plan for development based on the potential of its natural resources.

Hoping for a quantum leap toward integrated development, the president and the people committed to meet the various challenges and priorities outlined in the MAP for 2007–12. Within the MAP a monitoring mechanism uses a set of defined indicators to monitor the eight commitments found within the plan.

No one can stay in Madagascar for a day without hearing about the MAP. The highly consultative process to develop it and the visibility given to it after its completion is, according to several informants, unprecedented and is much to the credit of the Transformation Leadership Program, and the foresight,

and commitment of the President who commissioned it. It is the reference point for the vast majority of public and private activity in Madagascar and is also the accountability framework for a new government under the leadership of the newly elected President Marc Ravalomanana.<sup>13</sup>

#### 4. Lessons from Experience

1. **Every change initiative has a champion**, who is an agent for change and committed to development and open to leadership development. In Madagascar this was the president.
2. **Leadership interventions should be flexible in design and implementation** to enable them to adjust to an evolving context, as leaders gain a deeper understanding of how to eliminate the barriers. Leaders and their coaches must keep an open mind as they seek to understand the causes and the linkages between the key challenges to implementation.
3. **There should be a willingness to go with the unexpected** and let go of failures, reinforce successful interventions, and curtail initiatives that show poor results.
4. **Coaches must be willing and able to win trust** over a long period.
5. **Monitoring and evaluation of interventions are essential** for taking stock of progress, gaining a better understanding of what works and what does not, and allowing leaders and their coaching teams to adjust to changing circumstances. Monitoring and evaluation also helps communicate the importance of the process with outside stakeholders, including donors, other government officials, the public, the poor, the media, and the opposition.

#### 4.2 Constraints met and overcome

The LAMP helped ministers and permanent secretaries identify administrative issues that slowed implementation. One key problem was the inconsistency of sector strategies and budget allocations. To address this issue, LAMP provided priority ministries with training and advice on demand.

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<sup>13</sup> Kabell and others 2006.

<sup>14</sup> Kabell 2006.

As a result, the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research was successful in flagging its priority programs and protecting them from budget cuts. In addition, a “quick wins” program targeting services with a large public-private interface gained important improvements in service delivery through quick improvements in procedures and resources. These programs have been carried out in justice, land administration, and customs.

#### 4.3 Sustainability and demand

In 2005 the minister of Health and Family Planning decided to scale up the RRA. The directors of the 22 regions met and agreed on a common vision, and on the challenges to be met. As a result, the directors decided to scale up the RRA across all their regions. Each region competed to improve performance, and their efforts were supported by donors. The approach was also scaled up in other central ministries such as Justice, Public Security, and Mining.

Maintaining the availability of well-trained local coaches is essential to sustainability. Coaches are recruited through a competitive process, and are supported by a World Bank-funded project.

There is, however, concern that this may not be possible in the future; and the sustainability of coaching support is a concern. One promising suggestion is to develop a professional coaching practice in-country and a ready pool of external and internal coaches.

#### 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

In Madagascar we see how leadership work can help leverage and accelerate reforms. Leadership development has been instrumental in pursuing reform across sectors. Reform efforts in transport, private sector development, education, health, gender, and other areas have benefited from leadership development.

Leadership development interventions have also helped to accelerate implementation of Madagascar’s administrative reform program. In public sector reform and governance, where past interventions have not had the expected impact, linking more traditional interventions with leadership development can help bring measurable change. The future of the NLIM is unclear. There is an urgent need to provide professional management

for the institute and to address its monitoring and evaluation program. With this, NLIM is likely to improve its ability to attract resources. In general, demand is high for management and leadership tools and training in Madagascar.

More RRA-trained coaches are needed within government agencies to serve as internal coaches. Quality standards should be addressed in the training of RRA coaches to ensure a consistent quality across all RRA coaching professionals.

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# Morocco

## 1. Introduction

The National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) was launched by His Majesty King Mohammed VI, Morocco, in 2005 to address the high level of rural poverty and social exclusion of vulnerable groups in rural and urban areas.

The INDH decentralized resources and responsibilities for improving service delivery to sub-national and local levels of government, and was intended to be a highly participatory mechanism for program planning and implementation.

Now entering its third year of implementation, the INDH has secured supplemental financing (of US\$100 million) from the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral donors.

The main areas of intervention identified in the INDH are:

- Support to income-generating activities
- Capacity development
- Improved conditions for accessing basic services and infrastructure, including education, health care, roads, water and sanitation, and environmental protection
- Support to vulnerable people

### 1.1 Context: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change

As the INDH decentralized responsibilities for service delivery to ministries, governors, and walis (mayors), it became imperative to strengthen the implementation capacity of these and other stakeholders. Since the launch of the INDH, 11,000 small projects have been initiated at the local level.

Despite the government's efforts, the scale of the INDH made managing implementation difficult. In

Casablanca alone there are 1,000 small projects under the INDH implemented by associations that are often poorly trained and that rarely practice monitoring and evaluation.

WBI introduced the rapid results approach (RRA) to improve the capabilities of partner associations to manage for development results.

### 1.2 Change agent/entry point

In 2006 the World Bank Institute (WBI) responded to a request from the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Social Development, and Agriculture for a Leadership Development Program for high-level government officials in charge of designing and delivering the INDH in the provinces. The Ministry of the Interior invited WBI to organize roundtables, or high-level consultations, for governors and mayors in Marrakech in May 2006, and then again in June, 2007, in Casablanca and in Rabat.

The roundtables exposed participants to international experience in project planning and implementation, first-hand examples and techniques in results-based management, and expertise and techniques in institutional transformation and change management.

The roundtables were also meant to develop a platform and mechanisms for sustaining, scaling up and capitalizing on the most relevant innovations in community-driven development in order to address implementation capacity at all levels and to contribute to the overall capacity development strategy. A series of capacity development interventions targeted leaders.<sup>1</sup>

These initiatives prompted a request from the wilaya (or provincial governor) of Casablanca for support in launching a number of rapid results pilots in select prefectures in the region. The rapid results approach was introduced to help teams at the local level overcome

<sup>1</sup> World Bank, 2006. "Recent Interventions to Build Capacity of Leaders: Deepening Bank Support for Meeting the Challenges of Transition." <http://intresources.worldbank.org/INTLICUS/Resources/LeadershipAug06.pdf>

obstacles to implementation and enable them to achieve the expected outcomes in a timely manner.

The pilots also intended to improve collaboration between the different implementing partners, in particular between the political and operational arms of government. The expected learning outcomes of the RRA pilots included: a greater results orientation, enhanced skills, greater consensus and teamwork, and enhanced project implementation and planning capacity.

Lessons from the rapid results pilots were meant to provide useful information and insights to leaders at the highest levels — who, in turn could enhance their policy choices and design implementation systems that would link results on the ground to decision making at the national level. Launched in December 2006, these pilots have brought change and measurable outcomes, both in concrete results and in learning outcomes.

Stakeholders include members of the INDH National Coordination Unit, the mayor of Casablanca, regional representatives of central government ministries (Education, Health, Finance), the governor secretary general of the Wilaya of Casablanca, governors of four Casablanca prefectures, heads of Social Affairs Divisions at different prefectures (Chefs DAS), elected officials (*elus*), members of local INDH facilitation teams, representatives from local and national NGOs, and project leaders at the grassroots level.

An agent of change, Mr. Jamai, the provincial governor of the Greater Casablanca Region, pioneered the experiment with the RRA, which he took from the May 2006 roundtable in Marrakech. The program was aimed at 70 provincial governors, mayors, and territorial senior managers; there was also an intermediate group of participants made up of trainers and facilitators from local training institutes. Coaches introduced the RRA within the context of Morocco's situation.

Participants learned that the RRA could help (a) expose the constraints in the system that slow down implementation; (b) provide feedback to leadership through a built in learning loop; (c) expose deeper institutional constraints and characteristics that if changed could enhance leadership effectiveness in achieving development outcomes.

Following an initial introduction to the RRA in September and October 2006, the first 24 pilot initiatives funded by the INDH were launched in

four prefectures in the Greater Casablanca region in November and December 2006: Mohamédia (2), Ain Chock (3), Moulay Rachid (6), and Casa Anfa (13).

As part of this process, about 30 local representatives, most of them civil servants, were trained in the RRA methodology and its application. An overall rapid results coordinator at the level of the provincial governor was also named and trained. The initial training was led by an international expert from Madagascar who specialized in introducing and adapting the rapid results methodology to local contexts, as well as in providing support for its application.

During the 100-day rapid results pilots in Casablanca, the teams in four different prefectures benefited from the support of (a) the regional coordinator, (b) coaches assigned to each team, (c) two external facilitators (local consultants) who were taken on board during the implementation period to assist the regional coordinator and the coaches (civil servants), and (d) the international rapid results expert.

The WBI facilitation team also supported the process through regular e-mail and telephone contact, and through two missions. See figure 1 for a schematic outline of the set-up and the support provided as part of these initiatives.

## **2. Leadership and Change**


### *2.1 How leaders emerge as drivers of the process*

High-level leadership was instrumental in achieving results at the local level. During the pilot phase the best results were achieved when there was a clear commitment from leaders at the strategic level and higher. Later, during the process of scaling up or “the generalization” of the use of the RRA, the best results were achieved when governors were convinced of the value of the methodology, and lent their support.

In one prefecture, the governor monitored the methodology closely and engaged in weekly meetings with the RRA coordinator, producing good results. When an impediment would arise, the governor would pick up the phone and solve the problem.

The main challenge, however, was in meeting the wide demand for leadership across the INDH. Leadership must be willing to invest in a long-term, iterative process of scaling up results, which requires multiple champions at multiple levels. One of the Morocco delegates at the Marseille forum elaborated on this:

**Figure 1. Organization of rapid results pilot at the operational level**



Source: WBI Report 2007.

*In Casablanca we have 11 prefectures, each headed by a governor and each with a population of 400,000 to 500,000. It takes a lot of time to identify the individuals to accompany, implement, and coach several projects. This of course will determine the durability of this initiative. We have launched the mainstreaming of the RRA method but there is still this issue of human resources. The training needed for implementation is lacking. We have 11 prefectures, so we have to install one methodology coordinator per prefecture, to deal with the reporting and evaluation together with the coaches. For each prefecture, there is a methodology coordinator for 2-5 coaches, and each coach deals with 3-5 projects carried out by the associations or committee groups. However, these individuals are rare. In Casablanca we have 3,000 associations or committee groups; but at the INDH, what we particularly look for are small neighborhood associations; they need our support.*

– Morocco Delegate, Leadership and Change Forum

### 3. Results Matter

*This methodology made it possible to mobilize the population in a short time. Of course, we had to do very precise planning of meetings, reporting, and so on, but I think we are getting good results. INDH is an opportunity for the government, the various ministries, departments, and offices to rethink the way they act.*

– Morocco Delegate, Marseille Leadership and Change Forum

#### 3.1 RRA process: Desired outcomes


The general application of the rapid results approach and the support that accompanied the interventions did, in many ways, lead to a review and reformulation of project development objectives. Some of these objectives became more focused on human development (INDH being a human development program) and more aligned with needs identified by stakeholders.

The application of the RRA also imposed a more rigorous planning process upon project teams, who were provided support to complete the process. Periodic reporting and monitoring tools and systems were developed and put in place (weekly and monthly) on a project-by-project basis as well as for all the projects in a consolidated fashion. The local facilitation teams (EAQs) were also included and made operational in this process.

The RRA contributed significantly to increasing the awareness and knowledge of INDH operational procedures (manuals) and to developing basic project planning, including budgeting and other project implementation capacities.

The Casablanca rapid results pilots also benefited from support from the central and regional administration, who integrated themselves in the wider INDH implementation and capacity development effort (see figure 2).

**Figure 2. Organization of rapid results initiatives — Roles and responsibilities**



Source: WBI Report, 2007.

### 3.3 Final outcome and impact

Some of the results of the application of the rapid results methodology included:

- Faster completion of project activities than anticipated and faster than similar projects where the methodology was not applied;
- Acceleration of business processes and procedures (development of “cahier de prescription” done in one week instead of the usual one month, issuing of a “lettre circulaire” in two days instead of 10 days as would normally be the case);
- Encouraging intermediate results with specific development outcomes;
- Capacity development/skills building at the level of NGOs, EAQs, and civil servants (including DAS), including greatly improved project planning skills;
- Development of monitoring tools and systems; for example, the institutionalization of weekly working sessions to analyze progress and readjust planning and implementation processes;
- Improved communication and systems of communication between implementing agents and actors, and between the different levels of implementation, including more frequent meetings, and stronger relationships;
- Reformulation of project development outcomes, with increased focus on human development and sustainable impact;
- Setting up and operationalizing local facilitation teams (EAQs);
- Improved confidence among stakeholders;
- Increased results orientation;
- Increased motivation; support and training have been motivating factors, and rising to the challenge and meeting the targets further increase motivation;
- Improved relationships between stakeholders involved in implementation;
- Increased ownership and accountability of processes and results.

**Table 1. Progress on INDH implementation in Casablanca**

2006 INDH programs	Total projects	Finished	Achieved 60%:99%	Achieved 30%:59%	Achieved 5%:29%	Not launched	Suffering
<b>Vulnerability</b>	40	6	9	4	9	8	4
<b>Cross-cutting</b>	256	59	37	72	25	55	7
<b>Social exclusion</b>	351	31	42	63	36	177	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	647	96 (15%)	88 (14%)	139 (22%)	70 (11%)	240 (37%)	13 (2%)

Source: WBI Report 2007.

**Table 2. Achievement of objectives, RRA versus non-RRA projects in Casablanca**

Social exclusion	Fully achieved	Achieved 60%:99%	Achieved 30%:59%	Achieved 5%:29%	Not launched	Total
<b>RRA projects</b>	10	7	6	0	0	24
<b>Non-RRA projects</b>	19	16	19	37	59	154

Source: WBI Report 2007.

The rapid results methodology was applied to projects aimed at combating social exclusion. In the four prefectures where the projects were initially launched (Aïn Chock, Casa-Anfa, Moulay Rachid, and Mohamédia), a total of 154 projects were programmed in this social exclusion category in 2006. Only 19 (12 percent) fully achieved their objective. Out of the 19 rapid results projects that were launched, 10 projects (53 percent) fully achieved their objective (see table 2 and figure 3).

The RRA changed the way projects were implemented. Before the RRA, partnering associations selected projects and disbursed funds on an ad hoc basis, and there were no deadlines. Afterward, when project plans fell within the framework of the INDH they were closely monitored. Weekly meetings were held and when a problem arose, efforts were made to solve it. Commitment problems were solved rapidly.

This showed the implementing agencies (the associations) that they were better off with the commitment of a higher level leader than working on their own. Technical know-how was also mobilized from time to time.

With the practical hands-on experience of problem solving and overcoming the constraints to implementation, results teams increased their knowledge and understanding of results management.

**3.5 Scalability and sustainability:  
How to grow local talent**


Because of the positive results achieved in the first phase of the RRA in Casablanca, it was decided in the spring of 2007 to “generalize” the experience. This meant scaling up the use of the RRA so that the methodology would be known and applied in INDH projects in all 11 prefectures. WBI requested additional financial and technical support.

As a first step, a seven-day results training program was organized for about 30 representatives from all 11 prefectures. As part of this training, RRA initiatives were launched in the prefectures of Aïn Chock and Sidi Bernoussi. (The “trainees” participated in and contributed to the launches.) The general RRA coordinator of the wilaya, Souad Karim, carried out the training with support from the international rapid results expert and WBI.

An important element of WBI’s mission was to begin scaling up the use of the RRA in the Greater Casablanca region. This involved awareness raising and winning the commitment of the leaders. It also meant developing a shared vision to mitigate obstacles and obtain agreement from the highest levels of regional and local government to solve problems along the way.

One-on-one meetings were conducted with the mayor of Casablanca, along with a series of meetings with the governor, the secretary general of Casablanca, and his team. There were also bilateral meetings between the WBI team and the governors of Aïn Chock, Sidi

**Figure 3. Achievement of objectives: RRA versus non-RRA projects in Casablanca**



Source: WBI Report, 2007.

Bernoussi, Casa Anfa, and Ben M'Sick. The governors committed to supporting the scaling up of the rapid results process.

During meetings at the wilaya with the mayors, the governor and the secretary general, it was decided that RRA projects would be initiated in all 11 prefectures, totaling between 60 and 80 rapid results projects in the region (a minimum of three rapid results projects per prefecture). The governor and secretary general assured the mission team that they would contact the eight governors in the region to get their commitment to solving any operational issues.

They also agreed during these meetings that personnel at the wilaya involved in the initiative would receive the support necessary to carry out their work, including commitment and support from governors, commitment and support from Chefs DAS at each prefecture, mobilization of a sufficient number of internal coaches (one coach per six rapid results projects), transport, and communications.

#### **4. Lessons from Experience**

**1. The commitment of leadership should be strong and unambiguous** for the RRA to succeed. In this case the governor of the greater Casablanca region played a key role in pioneering the use of the RRA, and governors and mayors were engaged in driving and mobilizing change toward achieving results.

**2. Accountability and information sharing increase in line with the results obtained.**

**3. The RRA can be instrumental in jump-starting large-scale change initiatives**, but this entails scaling-up the time and resources required, especially human resources. Multiple champions are required at multiple levels as responsibility is delegated.

**4. Base the learning program on a clear needs diagnosis.**

**5. Developing a communications strategy and program with the INDH was the key to getting the implementation started.** Developing and disseminating the strategy at the local level can help dispel skepticism and build legitimacy for the program, from the grassroots to the national level.

**6. Technical and financial support is necessary for building implementation capacity at all levels.**

**7. Monitoring and evaluation tools are needed** to help leaders capitalize on lessons learned, make adjustments mid-course, and coordinate with other government initiatives. Plans are in place to isolate indicators and train personnel in conducting evaluation.

**8. Harmonizing with the World Bank team in-country provided a unified approach.** WBI's work has been integrated with that of the Bank country team and the INDH project preparation (now supervision/implementation) team. This means that WBI activities and support feed into the wider goals and objectives of these teams.

9. When it comes to choosing results indicators, your hypothesis will determine whether it is a means or an end, an input, an output, or an outcome.

##### *4.1 Constraints met and overcome*

One recurring constraint to making the RRA operational was the lack of a financial decree to reimburse civil servants for expenses related to INDH. Individuals had to carry the costs themselves.

Once the decree was signed and ratified, four governors promised that measures would be taken in each prefecture to see that the government would cover future costs. In this case their willingness to take responsibility for these actions and the associated costs were critical to the change in business practice.

##### *4.2 Role of capacity building in achieving change and results*

The Leadership Development program worked to expand well-trained RRA coaches to support implementation teams in defining and achieving concrete results. The coaches were also responsible for monitoring progress and reporting back on this to an overall coordinator at the wilaya of Casablanca.

While still being scaled up, the RRA has contributed to strengthening the capacity of INDH project teams for project planning and monitoring, as well as providing practical training in implementing the INDH operational manuals. It is planned that RRA be integrated into a training program developed at the University Hassan II Mohammedia for individuals and organizations involved in the implementation of INDH projects (see the Moving Forward section below).

### 4.3 Sustainability and demand

Scaling up and mainstreaming the use of the RRA requires broad-based changes in attitudes, particularly changes in accountability for results, stakeholder and community support, and teamwork. Making these changes operational calls for improved collaboration between public service suppliers and the communities, as evidenced by the degree of interest and buy-in for the standards, the cooperation between players and stakeholders, and real participation.

Progress to date has included the decentralization of the budget process, participation of regional managers in decision making, and a participatory budget process with the contribution of beneficiaries. In addition, WBI found that accountability and information-sharing has increased in line with the results achieved.

## 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

Continued upgrading and expansion of the development of human resources to achieve success under the INDH will require investment in the following:

1. Capacity building for government partners for INDH program execution, based on a specific assessment of needs and careful programming over several years;
2. A communications strategy, adapted to INDH and directed toward poor communities, to promote social cohesion, mainstreaming or generalization, and adherence to a common project; Also needed is a large-scale communications effort to inform and sensitize society about the scope of the initiative;
3. Mobilizing donors: Continuing to make gains in leadership and results will require additional technical expertise and financial support for scaling up the use of the RRA;
4. Setting up monitoring and evaluation systems: To support the assessment of the impact of INDH on human development indicators, The World Bank and the University Hassan II Mohammedia have agreed to partner over 36 months to equip the university with tools for monitoring and evaluation. The university will provide training for those involved in the implementation of the INDH, in collaboration with the provincial government. It is important to further develop these monitoring and evaluation systems.

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# Sierra Leone

## 1. Introduction

After ending its civil war in 2002, Sierra Leone re-established security and began the process of restoring public services around the country. In 2004 it successfully completed the first local government elections in over 30 years.

Despite these steps forward, it remains one of the poorest countries in Africa. It ranks 176 out of 177 in the UN Human Development Index ranking. Life expectancy is 37 years and the adult literacy rate is 36 percent; 60 percent of the population is below the age of 35. The long civil war from 1991 to 2002 displaced half the population, left 20,000 dead, and destroyed lives and property.

The country's economic mainstays are the weak and unregulated agriculture and mining sectors. The national infrastructural base, devastated by the war, is also weak with poor roads and road networks, irregular and unreliable electricity supply, and a fragile national economy.

To address these challenges, the government of Sierra Leone, backed by the World Bank and a small group of donors, launched in 2004 the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Project (IRCBP). The IRCBP is a US\$25 million, IDA-financed, decentralization-driven governance reform project. It was augmented with US\$27.9 million from the UK Department for International Development (DfID), the EU, the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF), and the Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Fund (PHRD).

The rationale for this initiative was that decentralization would help prevent future conflict by reducing inequality and rampant corruption, which were believed to stem from the centralization of power and resources. It was hoped that the initiative would also open up political participation, lead to more transparent and equitable resource allocation across districts, improve the effectiveness of public spending, bring the state closer to citizens, and contribute to the government's legitimacy — and do this in a way that

would expand the constituency for decentralization and open more doors, through the use of the rapid results approach (RRA).

### *1.1 Problem: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change*

In 2004 a new government under President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah attempted to resuscitate the local governing structures as a means of providing an inclusive and equitable approach to social and economic development.

However, this regime was voted out of power in September 2007; therefore this case study focuses on the objectives and efforts of the former government elected in 2002, which had been instrumental in bringing an end to the civil war. The government was also instrumental in using improved local governance and decentralization to address issues of underdevelopment, exclusion, and marginalization in Sierra Leone, with the hope of bringing the government closer to the people and by so doing win their trust.

At independence Sierra Leone had established district councils that helped provide basic services in education, roads, and community development. This was disrupted by a change of government in 1972, which led to the dissolution of all district councils.

The dissolution of the district councils brought about the full and effective centralization of political and administrative authority based in the capital, and the progressive deterioration and underdevelopment of rural Sierra Leone. The effects of this were a decline in basic services, a loss of confidence and participation in governance by citizens, and unprecedented levels of social exclusion and marginalization.

Following the country's civil war, the government elected in 2002 worked to resuscitate democratically elected local governments. Since there had not been any meaningful local government system for over 32 years, consultations and consensus building were needed not only among the main actors, but also to inform and gain buy-in from the citizenry.

The Ministry of Local Government and Community Development initiated a cabinet paper that authorized the establishment of a National Taskforce on Local Governance and Decentralization. It had broad membership, including government ministries, departments and agencies, civil society organizations, and development partners. This taskforce supported all preparatory work and collaborated with the National Electoral Commission to hold the first democratic local government elections in May 2004.

The theoretical and technical preparations for re-launching the decentralization program were undertaken with the technical assistance of overseas institutions, prominently the University of Birmingham and Robert H. Schaffer and Associates (RHS&A) of Stanford, Connecticut, United States. The University of Birmingham's International Development Department supported the finalization of the legislation and designed the implementation plan. RHS&A supported the introduction of a methodology known as the rapid results approach (RRA) to launch fast, quick-impact interventions for results.

### *1.2 Context: Background for the intervention/initiative*

The election of the local councils (LCs) was completed by August 2004. Orientation programs were designed and run for each of the 19 elected LCs. This involved exposing the new councilors to concepts, theories, and practical issues of administration, immediately followed by an induction program in policy formulation, administration, and management.

RHS&A, with funding provided from the World Bank, was contracted to train young Sierra Leonean graduates to understand, use, and apply RRA. A total of 19 graduates were trained in the methodology, and were each assigned to a LC. At the core of these local council coaches' (LCCs) job description was facilitation and support in project management.

With the support of LCCs, the local councils were able to use the development planning guidelines prepared by the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning to plan and conduct comprehensive needs assessments and prioritization. Eighteen out of 19 councils completed development plans, exceeding the target of five set for the first year. The LCCs also received training in strategic planning and budget preparation. They supported 18 out of 19 LCs in the preparation of full and standard three-year rolling

budgets linked to the development plans, using the macroeconomic policy framework of the medium-term expenditure framework.

Unlike many other decentralized countries, where expenditure assignments are not linked to functional responsibilities, in Sierra Leone the picture was different. The ministries of Finance and Local Government worked closely (as co-directors and champions) of the process, enabling fiscal decentralization to proceed side-by-side with functional devolution.

These institutional reforms required consultations and consensus building among governmental actors and citizens. To aid this, the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development produced a cabinet paper authorizing the creation of a national task force on local governance and decentralization. The task force was drawn from government ministries, departments and agencies, civil society organizations, and development partners. The task force supported all preparatory work and also collaborated with the National Electoral Commission to conduct the first democratic local government elections in May 2004.

### *1.3 Change agent/entry point*

Former President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah made a personal commitment to champion devolution, and described in a government white paper the government's plans to reintroduce democratically elected local governments after 32 years of dissolution.

The financial secretary and permanent secretary of the *Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Local Government and Community Development* provided policy and implementation support.

The development partners (World Bank, UNDP, EC, and DfiD), provided technical and financial support and assistance.

The newly elected local councilors and LCs demonstrated their willingness and ability to work with the local communities to deliver on their electoral mandates by supporting community development projects and promoting service delivery.

The entry point was devolution, on the basis that the timing was right, and that it could lead to visible and quick improvements in something that people cared about.

## 2. Leadership and Change

### 2.1 How leaders emerge as drivers of the process

The ministries of Finance and of Local Government were co-directors of the decentralization program. The RRA was applied to resuscitate the local government system and to jump start and accelerate functional and fiscal devolution (the assumption of devolved services by newly elected LCs in Sierra Leone). Immediately after local government elections, central government challenged each LC to identify, design, and implement one RRA initiative that was urgent, visible (meaning that people would notice the difference), and transferable into real impact in 100 days

The Ministry of Local Government and Community Development Decentralization Secretariat provided coaches, and the Ministry of Finance disbursed local government development grants four months after the election. Success at the community level led to use of RRA for the roll-out of functions from ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) to LCs. LCs are now using RRA for statutory service provision functions devolved to them from the primary health care and agriculture ministries.

The new leaders sought to decentralize authority and rekindle local governance traditions. They knew that achieving tangible results would increase confidence and trust between leaders and the governed. Confidence and trust in turn motivated

leaders to engage more and work harder, creating a virtuous cycle of learning and results and making the RRA initiative a proving ground for the new LCs (see figure 1).

The local councils did not disappoint, and with the help of RRA they tackled diverse development issues such as water, sanitation, feeder roads, bridges, traffic, rice production, and post-harvest loss. Some examples of results were:


- Travel time between Sewafe and Peya of Nimiya Chiefdom of Kono District was reduced from 1 hour to 15 minutes and transportation cost was reduced from Le 5,000 (US\$1.75) to Le 2,000 (70 U.S. cents).
- The availability of high-yield, quick-harvest Inner Valley Swamp Rice seeds was increased in Pujehun District by 4,000 bushels within 90 days.
- A supply of safe and portable drinking water was ensured in the mains and laterals and 25 public taps in the Moyamba Township within 90 days.
- The total volume of garbage in two lorry parks and two markets in Kenema Township was reduced by 90 percent within 95 days.

The LCs were able to achieve these results cheaper and faster than MDAs.

## 3. Results Matter

### 3.1 Getting leaders to think about implementation

**Figure 1. How LCs generated a virtuous cycle from learning to results with RR**



Source: World Bank/AFTPR 2007.

### 3.2 RRA process: Desired outcomes

The RRA supported devolution in the following ways:

- The decentralization secretariat adopted the RRA methodology, and a devolution planning and roll-out task team was established.<sup>1</sup>
- The task team scheduled planning meetings with devolving MDAs and discussed functions and activities slated for devolution in the coming year. The discussion centered on how to plan the effective roll-out of the functions by the LCs, and also on determining the assets, personnel, and financing to accompany the functions. When all of these were decided, a date was set for a devolution planning workshop, with a day dedicated to each sector (for large sectors) and a half -day for smaller sectors.
- The devolution roll-out workshop took place in the capital, Freetown. The rationale for hosting there was that all sector ministers and senior administrative and technical professionals would attend as a demonstration of commitment, and show that the commitments carried authority.

During the devolution planning workshop, the RRA was applied. The minister or his deputy would make a statement promising to uphold the policy on local governance and decentralization in accordance with the law. This was followed by a presentation by the technical head of the sector or his deputy, detailing functions and activities to be devolved in that year, the personnel assigned to execute the functions, the quantity of assets and locations, and the financial resources needed for implementation.

All the activities listed were placed in the RRA framework; and each activity was assigned a lead person, a time frame within which it would start and finish, indicators of progress toward completion of each sub-activity, and a list of other individuals or groups who would provide assistance. At the end of this plan, a tracking chart was prepared with dates,

responsible persons, activities, and so forth.

A general consensus was reached on a monitoring and evaluation system, for stakeholders to assess commitment and compliance at various stages of reviews. Functions would be monitored at *inception* (the commencement of implementation of roll-out of functions) and *midterm* (after 50 percent of the time frame was exhausted, say 50 days into a 100-day time frame to complete roll-out of functions in a particular sector).

During these reviews, challenges were noted and suggestions were made for how to overcome them. There was always a final review (at the end of the agreed time frame, during which the entire process was dissected to determine compliance and percentage of attainment, after which a white paper recognized the roles and contributions of all actors and noted commitments made for further and future support to achieve full success.

### 3.3 Final outcome and impact

Almost immediately, newly elected councilors and community residents took an interest in the decentralization processes, despite its absence for 32 years. In a country where tradition and culture holds back women and youth from direct and public involvement in decision making and leadership, the mix of councilors and community members in joint project implementation is narrowing the gap. Functional devolution, which met a lot of resistance from the center, was implemented in a smooth and participatory manner, with central government authorities working together to improve service delivery.

The rapid results approach was initially used to undertake quick-impact community projects. With the discovery that projects could be implemented rapidly and at lower cost (relative to other agency projects), it was scaled up and adopted for the roll out of functions from MDAs to LCs. The LCs are now using the methodology to undertake statutory service provision functions devolved to them in primary health care and agricultural extension.

There are plans to introduce members of the government elected in 2007 to the RRA methodology and to encourage them to use it in addressing quick-impact policy initiatives.

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<sup>1</sup> The task team included staff from the decentralization secretariat (Ministry of Local Government and Community Development and Local Government Finance Department, Ministry of Finance) and devolving sector MDA professionals.

#### 4. Lessons from Experience

1. Innovations can be introduced when they are inclusive and focused on clear and measurable objectives.
2. Direct community involvement in development work reinforces the principle of ownership and control, and maintains interest in supporting a project or reform process.
3. Managing for results can increase confidence and trust between leaders and the governed, which invariably motivates leaders to engage more and work harder. This may improve governance; however, it does not ensure reelection.

#### 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

A good communication program and comparative performance data of local governments can stimulate peer learning and performance improvement, and be a catalyst for political competition and civic activism. However, whether this will have any impact on the political fortunes of local councilors remains to be seen.

It is also unclear whether Sierra Leone's success with devolution can sustain itself and lead to wider governance reform, as is whether a culture of inclusion and accountability can be built from the ground up. The proposed agenda includes the following activities:

- Scale up the RRA methodology and introduce it to the central government to energize slow public sector reforms like civil service reform.
- Review and appraise the methodology in a multi-stakeholder workshop to determine relevance or if certain elements need to be adapted to specific country needs.
- Source funding to continue engaging RRA experts for mentoring and coaching in-country to support scalability and sustainability.

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# Sudan

## 1. Introduction

In Sudan the rapid results approach (RRA) supported leadership within a fragile state in transition, as partners worked to bring a more strategic approach to managing reconstruction, reform, and development after more than two decades of civil war. The approach focused on working with local governments to embed change agents within localities to jump-start change and transfer know-how to managers of community-driven development projects.

The Community Development Fund (CDF) was set up in 2006 as part of the peace agreement signed between the North and South 18 months earlier. Sixty percent of the financing came from a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) and 40 percent from the government in Sudan.

In December 2006 officials from the CDF contacted the Rapid Results Institute in search of support for introducing RRA into sub-projects that the CDF team was helping to implement in communities in the war-affected regions of Sudan.

Phase I focused on starting demonstration initiatives, testing how well the methodology would work with the CDF implementation model, and training those who would lead the RRA coaching effort, anticipating the eventual need to scale up the RRA.

Phase II would depend on the success of Phase I and focus on expanding the coaching network, while ensuring quality of the delivery of RRA coaching support.

### 1.1 Problem: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change

The post-conflict situation is a race against time. People in war-affected communities in Sudan will either experience the dividends of peace, or they will take up arms again hoping to reap the dividends of war.

The first objective was to demonstrate what it would take to accelerate implementation and achieve results in at

least four localities (in two states), implementing 6–12 fast track projects or subprojects using 100-day rapid results initiatives. The second objective was to begin building the capacity to support and scale these up.

A community-driven development approach was chosen because of the limited absorptive capacity of government programs to channel quick-disbursing funds to local communities, based on poverty targeting and responding to local needs. The main outcomes of the project supported were:

- Strengthen the role and capacity of localities (districts) and NGOs to deliver basic social services, with local community participation.
- Strengthen local community participation in the identification of basic social and economic needs within a framework that encourages transparency in priority setting and allocation of resources.
- Establish a framework for effective cooperation and partnership among social sector ministries, localities, NGOs, and local communities to provide basic services, targeting especially the poorest areas. This would demonstrate the government's commitment to empowering local agents of change (localities, NGOs). It would also develop social capital at the local level by strengthening the role of local partners in implementing social development activities.

One RRA initiative was completed in each of 13 post-conflict communities in North Kordofan, South Kordofan, and Kassala, as part of the CDF.

### 1.2 Context: Background for the initiative

After more than 21 years of civil war between the people of the North and South of Sudan, the government of Sudan and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005.

In land area Sudan is the largest country in Africa. Poverty is widespread and deep, but assessing the

*Development starts from the bottom up.*

*Politicians do it the other way around. But these are politicians and not us. Development starts with us. You will make the base for change.*

*What you have learned as Strategic Leaders and teams will have an impact on our communities even 25 years from now. It won't matter if you are Christian or Muslim — we are all believers in development. Your aspirations should have no limit; the more you succeed the more your ambitions should grow.*

*Think of this and you will start to know how you will free yourselves.*

*—Samuel Loyuth, Executive Manager of Rashad Locality, commenting on the launch presentations of South Kordofan RRA teams in February 2007*

country situation is difficult because of the vast economic and social disparities among regions. For many, the prospect of meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is daunting. A 2006 Sudan Household Survey shows the inequality of access to education.

Net primary school attendance is 53 percent, with rates ranging from 90 percent in River Nile State to 4 percent in Unity State. In the South attendance is less than 10 percent in half the states. Health indicators provide a similar picture.<sup>1</sup>

### *1.3 Change agent/entry point*

The peace settlement created an entry point for starting large-scale reform. The process involved profound change that would forge a plan for more inclusive growth and development in Sudan. The CPA addressed the causes of the conflict and detailed the parties' vision and commitment to accelerated development.

However, the implementation of the CPA has been slower than expected. This was after initial gains that established the government of National Unity, the government of Southern Sudan, and two MDTFs administered by the World Bank. The Darfur conflict, which has cost an estimated 200,000 lives and displaced 2.5 million people, has overshadowed this progress and has interfered with anticipated multidonor support.

In order to jump-start the community-driven development process, CDF embedded change agents in each of the 10 localities targeted for initial support (in four states). These included two development professionals with experience in community driven development, a manager and a social mobilizer. This locality support unit was expanded to include three staff members from the locality administrative unit a procurement officer, an engineer, and a finance officer. The idea was to accelerate capacity transfer between the locality and the CDF support unit through co-location and staff exchanges.

The CDF vision is one of structured and cascading capacity transfer. The CDF support unit handles procurement, contracting, and monitoring projects in the education, health, and water sectors, in

partnership with locality staff. Gradually, CDF hands over responsibilities in these sectors to locality staff, and focuses on infrastructure, income generation, and micro-finance sectors. It then hands these over to locality staff, and so on. Eventually, the capacity of locality staff to manage service delivery in critical sectors expands, while the sector is "jump-started" through CDF funding and CDF's locality support units.

## **2. Leadership and Change**

A temporary structure of accountability was put in place, with leadership at the operational (RRA team), the strategic (locality technical staff), and the political (locality commissioner) levels.

Strategic leaders at the community level were mainly suggested to the teams by the RRA consultants. In a few instances, as in the locality of Rashid, the choice was discussed openly at the stakeholders' orientation workshop. After hearing about the important attributes of a good RRA strategic leader, the communities nominated and approved their strategic leaders. Those chosen included schoolteachers, a herder, an Imam, and leading business owners.

### *2.1 How leaders emerge as drivers of the process*

The temporary structure of accountability put in place through the RRAs gave team members the opportunity to practice leadership skills and demonstrate leadership behavior.

For example, in Tarouba the project team was confronted with a schedule delay one month into their 100-day project. The team had asked community members to contribute bricks for the school construction, but only 21,000 mud bricks were produced in the first month, far short of what was required. The strategic leader of the RRA team, the local Imam, convened the team to deal with this issue. The result: the team set up brick production as a competitive effort between different clusters of the community. The next month, the community was able to produce 45,000 mud bricks!

In each of the 13 initiatives, there were similar setbacks. And yet nearly all the teams persisted and found creative solutions to the problems they encountered. This impetus to forge ahead in spite

<sup>1</sup> World Bank Country Brief 2007.

of difficulties with and doubts about achieving the goal can be traced back to individuals in each team who stepped forward and played a leadership role at critical moments. In some cases, it was the team leaders; in others, it was the strategic leaders; in still others it was individual team members.

In one community in the Nuba Mountains, an RRA team became the arbiter between two groups, to make sure each group contributed its share to the school project. These groups had been at odds over a land dispute. The RR team turned out to be an effective venue for conflict resolution because it had one representative from every ethnic group, and all shared the same goal. So, a long-standing dispute over land was put aside in view of their shared ambitions of increasing school enrollment.

It is important to note that rapid results coaches supported and advised these emerging leaders as they stepped into these roles. One of the key challenges that CDF faces is to strengthen the skills and capabilities of the coaches so they can continue to play this critical role.

Not all the initial RRA teams succeeded. Only one of the four water teams made significant progress towards their goal; the others reported that their failure was caused by circumstances beyond their control.

However, rather than blame others for their situation, the team kept trying to find ways to achieve their goals. In one case, a team went to donors and secured funds for the rehabilitation of their well. In fact, it was the teams that faced these systemic difficulties (such as water ownership rights) that required the most intensive support and coaching. The net result was to highlight these difficulties and to mobilize others at a higher level to resolve them.

### **3. Results Matter**

At the 100-day mark, the 13 rapid results teams in Rashad, Kassala, and North Kordofan did not disappoint. In many cases, the results they achieved exceeded the goals they set for themselves. In general the RRA process was highly visible. Most commissioners and executive managers took part in the wrap-up workshops. In Gebret El Sheikh, the commissioner only intended to stay for opening remarks, but after listening to one team discuss its experience at the “gallery of accomplishments,” he decided to visit all the other team booths. This raised two questions: What was the locality manager’s role in

the RRA? And how did the RRA relate to the localities long-term development plan?

There were few instances where political leadership engaged with operations, but this will be essential in the future for the momentum to go beyond the pilot or demonstration stage.

The results delivered by the rapid results teams at the community level exceeded everyone’s expectations. Classrooms of stone block were constructed where just 100 days before children gathered under a waddle roof, without walls, to sit on rocks. A health center was built, and a well system was rehabilitated. All of this was done with significant contributions from members of the community, including most of the construction materials (mud, bricks, water, and stone and labor).

#### *3.1 RRA process: Desired outcomes*

Each team committed to a results goal of their choice, linked however indirectly to the physical construction effort. This required that the teams deal with social and behavior change issues. Most teams exceeded their results goals: enrollment in schools doubled in 100 days (with female enrollment a priority in some communities). School drop-out rates were cut in half in the two communities that focused on that goal. And malaria incidence among pregnant women and young children in one community fell from an expected 50 percent to single digits.

Even though the initial focus was on specific projects in each of the 13 communities, there was a “spill-over” effect onto other projects in other communities. Most notable was the effect on rural electrification (through a project using solar energy). The CDF coaches who had been trained in the RRA began to use their training to create “results frameworks” for these projects. For example, before installing solar panels and connecting to key locations in the community (such as schools, health centers, and mosques), the coaches organized a rapid results team. This team committed to achieving a result in 100 days that would now be possible through the electrification effort.

The menu of possible results/goals included increasing adult literacy (through evening classes), increasing immunization levels (through the stocking of refrigerated vaccines in electrified health centers), or increasing the use of health centers (through instituting evening shifts).

The initial results reported are encouraging. In Hazaza village (Damazin locality, Blue Nile state), 115 women and 83 men have started adult education in the school. In Abohashein village (Damazein locality, Blue Nile state), 80 women ages 13–72 have registered to attend a primary education course (the Accelerated Learning Program), especially designed to allow adult learners to finish eight years of primary school within four years.

Moreover, the commitment to these goals sparked an urgency to complete the solar electrification projects on time, and built strong ownership for the donated infrastructure. This undoubtedly will increase the chances of good maintenance and protection of the equipment, demonstrating how the various components of the rapid results intervention work together to drive progress forward.

In addition to these qualitative gains or impacts (such as increased collaboration), we also see in this example the spillover or ripple effect that produces results from the government's own efforts to adopt the RRA on a wider scale and their improvements in implementation and management practices. This is a new way of doing business that contributes daily.

### 3.2 Final outcome and impact

Some of the results achieved within 100 days from the start of the projects include the following:

- *In Khor el Deleib (South Kordofan state)*: Primary school enrollment rate in the primary school increased from 50 (last year) to 87; and the school was fully rehabilitated.
- *In Um Sura (North Kordofan)*: Sixteen of the 22 students who dropped out last year returned to attend the primary school; and new quarters for the teachers were built.
- *In Silkyay (Kassala)*: Enrollment increased from 60 last year to 128; and a new school was built.
- *In Diman (Kassala)*: Malaria prevalence among children and pregnant women fell from 50 to 16 percent (according to a blood test conducted by the malaria control unit); and a health center and doctor's house were renovated.

There are three elements that contributed to success: fast-track funding, community contracting, and adoption of the RRA as an implementation and management tool.

**Fast track funding** was introduced as a way to simplify the requirements and expedite the process

for procurement and approval of community subprojects. Donor project approval procedures can be cumbersome, particularly for rural localities and communities where literacy rates are low and there is little capacity or experience in managing donor projects. In order to build up the confidence of the communities, the CDF staff, in collaboration with the World Bank project team leader, streamlined the process and introduced a “fast track” process that communities can use for their first set of subprojects.

More than 60 fast-track projects were completed in the 13 targeted localities over a period of six months. These mostly involved infrastructure rehabilitation of schools, health facilities, and community wells.

**Community contracting** was introduced as a way to increase community participation and to give community members a bigger stake in infrastructure development. This led to a marked improvement in the quality of the construction at a lower cost for materials and labor. Community members were volunteering their time to transport water and other materials to the project sites to make bricks.

**When RRA initiatives were introduced** in February 2007, this added four critical dimensions to the community projects:

- Communities began to go beyond infrastructure rehabilitation goals and started to take accountability for an actual impact. So in addition to building four classrooms, the community team set a goal focused on increasing enrollment in the primary schools.
- Communities challenged themselves to complete the infrastructure work and achieve the results goals in 100 days or less. This was new, and it injected a sense of urgency and excitement into community projects.
- A temporary structure of accountability was put in place for each project, as discussed above.
- Project visibility was elevated through events where teams made public commitments to achieve precise goals in the presence of other teams as well as of political leaders. Other key events included a status check at the midpoint and a “sustainability review” after the goals were achieved. These carefully planned and choreographed events added to the excitement and commitment levels, and created a healthy competition between teams in each locality and even between localities.

## 4. Lessons from Experience

- 1.) **Change on the ground is not enough.** In public sector reform, linking leadership with results can provide the engine to operationalize change and drive it forward. This is essential for going beyond the pilot or demonstration stage to a more sustainable model. Momentum and desire for change exist at the community level. It is time for this to be complemented with change that is demanded, driven, and supported from the top.
- 2.) **When gauging the full impact of the RRA it is essential to look beyond the pilot initiative to see the ripple effect created by RRA-inspired initiatives that follow.** Some good examples of this are the rural electrification projects described above.
- 3.) **When capacity development initiatives involve setting ambitious goals and learning from experience how to overcome constraints, this can lead to new capacities and confidence, a sense of empowerment, and changes in performance.** The rapid results team experience contributes to these learning gains that are intangible but nonetheless important, such as determination and persistence against adversity, collaboration, creative problem solving, innovation, transparency, inclusiveness and outreach to the community and other stakeholders, and new standards of discipline and responsibility (see section 1.2).

One challenge to this approach is in operationalizing the support and coaching relationship between locality leadership and staff of the CDF support units. This “support from the side” model flies in the face of the typical hierarchical relationship that locality leaders have experienced when outside resources have been embedded in their organizations and communities (from NGOs, donors, and even government). In the past, the norm was “either you are the expert and control the resources and therefore I have to listen to you and do as you tell me, or you work for me and you will do as I tell you.”

Thus, there is the temptation for support unit managers to treat local leaders as subordinates,

since they have control over the CDF development resources — which are often the only funds available for development projects in the locality. The RRA training has emphasized a more collaborative mentality and has slowly seen progress in transforming attitudes and behaviors.

### *4.1 Role of capacity building in achieving change and results*

Now that the first wave of RRAs has been completed and coaches in each locality have had their first experience of supporting RRA teams, CDF has asked the WBI to work with their teams to transfer the capacity to locality staff. These staff had been appointed in line with a decentralization strategy that was an integral part of the Naivasha Peace Agreement. The Capacity Transfer Plan will be key to phasing CDF consultants out of service delivery as the local capacity to manage each sector improves.

So far, local leadership has shown their ability to unleash local capacities for achieving results, as discussed above. Even teams that failed to meet their targets showed remarkable capacity by persistently and creatively solving problems, and bringing them to the attention of leaders higher up.

### *4.2 Sustainability and demand*

The pressure is on to go to scale quickly. This involves doing more projects in the communities that have experienced initial success, as well as expanding the CDF's reach beyond the initial communities and localities targeted in the first phase of its work.

Beyond building new infrastructure to enable this (for example, creating new locality support units), and multiplying the technical know-how through train-the-trainer programs, the leadership at the levels of the state and localities must be engaged in a new way.

While the approach has been from the bottom up, this must be complemented with change that is demand-driven, and supported from the locality commissioners and the state walis. It is not entirely clear yet how this will come about. As a first step, the commissioners and walis agreed to convene in early November 2007 to talk about the experiences their communities have had, and together to shape their role in sustaining and expanding on these experiences.

## 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

Because of the success of the pilots, other communities are eager to adopt the RRA, and politicians and leaders at higher levels are taking notice. Commissioners and walis agreed to convene in early November 2007 to discuss the experiences of their communities, and to determine their own roles in sustaining the expanding on the successes.

CDF's focus at this stage is on capacity transfer to the communities and localities. This will occur at several levels:

1. Enabling more communities to undertake their projects through community contracting
2. Enabling localities to manage the contracting, procurement, and disbursement process directly rather than through CDF's locality support unit
3. Expanding the number of rapid results coaches from one per locality to one per community (scale up by factor of 10 to 20 depending on the locality)

The first two challenges are being addressed through "internal" or "process" RRAs: each locality support unit has set a goal to (i) increase the number of communities doing community contracting, and (ii) hand over the first project for localities to manage from contracting to supervision. This is a new practice and it is too soon to tell how successful it will be.

The third challenge is being addressed by using a train-the-trainer model in the hope of seeing a cascading capacity transfer, in terms of the rapid results methodology, from the Rapid Results Institute staff to social mobilizers in the CDF locality support units, to community-level facilitators. This has informally started.

It is too early to tell whether the government will be able to stay the course, and whether the CDF and the communities they are working with will outpace the impetus for conflict that lurks below the surface. It is clear though that winning this race cannot be accomplished through occasional sprints. We will need to brace ourselves for a long marathon.

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# Yemen

## 1. Introduction

New leadership within Yemen's Ministry of Health and Population (MOPHP), together with successful application of the rapid results approach (RRA), put an important project back on track and proved that MOPHP could deliver.

At the same time it built capacity for managing change and brought new confidence throughout the MOPHP.

After the tumultuous years 2005 and 2006, which saw several large projects stumble and the ministry's relations with key stakeholders stretched, the turnaround in the World Bank project was an important step in re-establishing ministry leadership internally as well as with development partners and other governmental bodies.

### 1.1 Context: Country readiness/sense of urgency for change

In February 2006 the new minister of Health and Population turned to the RRA to rescue a project in trouble—Yemen's World Bank-funded Health Reform Support Project (HRSP).

The HRSP's development objectives were to (i) increase women and children's access to a package of integrated maternal and child health services in selected district hospitals and health centers; and (ii) improve the effectiveness of national public health programs and the resource allocation within the public health sector in Yemen.

The financing plan foresaw a standard International Development Agency grant of US\$27.53 million and a contribution by the borrowers of US\$2.07 million. The expected effectiveness date was October 2002 and the implementation period was planned to be five years (closing December 2007).

While the project appraisal document (PAD) specified the project development objectives (PDOs), the project indicators, inputs, and implementation

mechanisms were vague, with few key performance indicators. During the early stages of implementation this lack of detail, combined with low capacity in the MOPHP, created major obstacles to implementation.

Early signs of difficulty emerged when the project's Credit Administration Unit (CAU) took nearly a year to become fully operational, despite preparation of detailed implementation plans from the project set-up phase. These plans were never formally adopted, and execution of the project became ad hoc, with departments within the ministry often working at cross-purposes. The early phase of the project was characterized by lengthy processes and cumbersome government procedures.

Mid-term review (MTR) in May/June 2005 concluded:

There has been little progress towards achievement of the PDOs due to the slow pace of implementation. US\$2.4 million (9 percent of the credit) has been disbursed so far compared to a target of US\$15 million by June 2005. Only a few of the smaller project activities have been implemented in a timely manner.

MTR identified the main reasons for the slow progress as serious design flaws, inadequate project preparation, and bureaucratic hurdles and lack of ownership and management. Project activities were then streamlined, but a follow-up mission in October 2005 found no substantial change, and there were discussions in the World Bank about whether the project should be cancelled. As a "measure of last resort," the World Bank decided in late 2005 to propose RRA as a methodology for improving project implementation.

During 2005 the slow implementation of the HRSP and another large Bank project became serious liabilities for the government of Yemen, culminating in an announcement by the World Bank in December 2005 that it would cut funding to the government by 34 percent because of unsatisfactory progress in the national reform agenda, governance issues, and a lack of progress in a few "problem projects."

Other donors also expressed dissatisfaction; and in November 2005, the United States dropped Yemen as a candidate for its highly publicized Millennium Challenge Account.

In late 2005/early 2006, the crisis was felt in all government ministries involved in the project: MOPHP, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). This triggered a few immediate measures to improve operations, and a decree was issued by MOPIC delineating the responsibilities of MOPIC and MOF in the administration of the project's credit.

In response to the situation, the government of Yemen formulated the National Agenda for Reform, a six-month action plan adopted by the cabinet in early January 2006; and on February 11, 2006, the government announced a major reshuffle of the cabinet, replacing 15 of the existing 35 ministers, the minister of Public Health and Population among them. A sense of urgency ran high as the president sought to turn things around.

### *1.2 Change agent/entry point*

In December 2005, six months after the MTR, a World Bank Institute (WBI) team arrived in Yemen to explore the possibility of introducing RRA. Senior officials in all three ministries involved (MOPHP, MOPIC, and MOF) showed great interest in this initiative as a way to rescue the project.

In February 2006 RRA was introduced with a five-day workshop that emphasized the principle of setting short-term goals as a step toward achieving the overall PDOs. All relevant stakeholders participated \_ including ministers, deputy ministers, component managers, and representatives from MOPIC and MOF) \_ and the workshop named nine targets to be achieved within the next 100 days.

There were eventually four RRA workshops that took place between February 2006 and May 2007. The first two focused on accelerating implementation and prioritizing targets, and the third workshop emphasized how targets and activities should clearly support the overall development objectives.

The last workshop used the RRA methodology to improve project supervision and ensure overall progress over the remaining two years of the project. Within the HRSP, the RRA was appropriate as a

methodology, with simple guidelines clarifying roles and fostering transparency.

## **2. Leadership and Change**

### *2.1 How leaders emerge as drivers of the process*

By coincidence, the minister of Public Health and Population was replaced on the first day of the workshop. The new minister immediately recognized the importance of the RRA initiative for the success of the HRSP project and offered full support for the initiative. He attended the entire workshop, which was an unprecedented assertion of leadership and high-level support. This sent a message to the deputy ministerial level and throughout the MOH that the health of the HRSP was a priority, driving the project forward.

RRA improved access to information, enabling the ministry and the World Bank to better see the problems and their causes, instead of simply reacting to and treating the symptoms. The minister opened a dialogue with MOPIC and MOF, which allowed for practical problem solving and the removal of red tape. A few weeks after taking office, the minister also replaced the nonperforming head of the CAU, bringing in someone with a track record as an effective manager and communicator, as well as previous experience with World Bank projects. The minister also offered support to CAU to keep the project moving in the right direction.

During the MTR in 2005 the project was restructured, and subsequent RRA workshops were used to make the changes operational. The scope of the project was reduced to focusing on activities showing implementation effectiveness. Achieving the PDO would require adjusting the last two years of the project to further develop ongoing activities and initiatives to ensure results at the point of service delivery (World Bank, Aide-memoire, January 25, 2007).

While the restructuring faced considerable resistance at the beginning (with managers of underperforming subcomponents refusing to scale back their activities), the introduction of targets and participatory processes within the RRA made the process more transparent and logical; and this won over the opposition.

The RRA increased teamwork and led to new expectations for the leadership, as well as new roles that leaders began to play. This led to changes in the

*“Teamwork is changing the dynamic of the hierarchy. We are now working more together and there are direct links, but it does not mean at all that the hierarchical structure will be abolished or that it will be replaced.”*

*–Dr. Majad Aljunaid,  
Deputy Minister Health  
Care Sector*

way traditional hierarchies engaged in the decision-making process with other stakeholders in project implementation. The growing sense of ownership and accountability for results was described by Dr. Majad Alijunaid, the Deputy Minister of the Health Care Sector at the Leadership and Change Forum in Marseille, and is paraphrased below:

*In implementation, leaders find themselves accountable to implementers at higher and lower levels, and they are accountable at the community level. The leader becomes more results oriented, as the process is taken on by the team, holding the leader accountable in terms that are defined by indicators at the outcome level. Teams, not leaders,*

*decide what the targets will be, so the leaders have to delegate some of the decisions about how the work gets done. RRA team members report to the team, and they are all on a first name basis. The RRA has brought an approach to teamwork that is less hierarchical, with improved working relationships. Team members work well together, but it is not likely that this will change the existing hierarchy, or that it will be replaced any time soon.<sup>1</sup>*

### 3. Results Matter

#### 3.1 RRA process: Desired outcomes

The RRA was introduced in four phases. The main activities of each phase are given below.

#### Phase I: Workshop February 2006

- Participants were divided into groups by project subcomponents to review their action plans and identify priority areas where they could achieve results within a 100-day time frame.
- Review sessions were followed by plenary sessions where each project team presented its goals, which were then reviewed and revised by the participants.
  - If the goals were considered unclear, not measurable, or not achievable in 100 days, the team was asked to revise them.
- Component teams were informed that their implementation performance would be measured against the agreed targets and that their component would be dropped from project support in case of failure to achieve the targets.
  - For the first time in the life of the HRSP, component and subcomponent teams were able to review and provide each other with feedback on their strategies and action plans.
- In this initial round, nine component teams were selected, and each team developed a work program with benchmarks, activities, and budgets linked to their 100-day goal.

#### Phase II: Workshop June 2006

- Participants met to review progress made against the targets established in February.
  - Of the nine component teams, four had exceeded their targets, three had met their targets, and two partially met their targets.
    - Two teams only partially met their targets due to factors beyond their control.
- After the review, the teams identified priority goals for the second 100-day cycle. Twelve goals were established.
- Once the application of the RRA methodology began showing results (such as accelerated disbursement), the World Bank granted a one-year project extension to the end of 2008.

#### Phase III: Workshop December 2006

- Participants met to review progress made against the targets established in June 2006.
  - Of the 12 component teams selected, four exceeded their targets, six met their targets, and two partially met their targets.
- After the review, component teams used the RRA methodology to establish two-year work project plans with goals, quarterly benchmarks, and budgets for the remaining life of the project.
- Thirteen goals have been established with realistic targets and budgets to ensure project funds are disbursed by the end of the project.

#### Phase IV: May 2007

- Participants met to review progress made against the targets established in December 2006, and the benchmarks for the first quarter of 2007.

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<sup>1</sup> Neuron Global 2007, p. 33.

While the first two RRA workshops focused on accelerating implementation, thereby prioritizing achievable targets, the third RRA workshop put strong emphasis on ensuring that targets and activities were clearly supporting the PDOs.

The approach evolved over time. In line with the circumstances and requirements of the project, 100-day targets (applied in 2006 during the “rescue phase”) were replaced with two-year targets (in line with the project’s work plan). These targets were linked to the project’s original outcome indicators, demonstrating the versatility and adaptability of the approach.

### *3.2 Final outcome and impact*

Both the government of Yemen and the World Bank consider the application of RRA in the HRSP successful. After the first two RRA workshops, the project implementation rating improved from unsatisfactory to moderately satisfactory. By December 2006 the project had increased disbursements of the credit by nearly 20 percent, or by 90 percent if one includes commitments.

In addition, after two rounds of applying RRA, the teams established 13 priority goals for the next two years and developed a two-year results framework to cover the remaining life of the project. Based on the project’s achievements from June 2006 onward, the rating of the project implementation progress was upgraded from moderately satisfactory to satisfactory, and the rating of project progress toward achieving the PDO remained moderately satisfactory (World Bank, Aide-memoire, January 25, 2007).

**A new results culture.** In addition to the gains from increased disbursements and improved implementation, there were also learning gains from capacity building. By meeting or exceeding targets, RRA strengthened the confidence and motivation of the MOPHP staff. After some initial success increasing disbursements, the RRA teams shifted their focus towards building a results-based culture in the MOPHP. Realizing the danger of being perceived as picking the low-hanging fruit, they gradually steered their attention to the PDOs. During the December 2006 workshop, when the action plan and monitoring plan for the remainder of the project were developed, the PDOs were put at the center of the planning exercise, and the component targets were aligned with the project indicators. Having gone through this exercise, the RRA teams developed new skills and capacities in the practices of results management.

Increased accountability. Another positive achievement was improved cooperation between the MOPHP and stakeholders outside the MOPHP (especially MOPIC and MOF). Longstanding tensions between MOPHP and MOF were set aside in favor of a better working relationship. MOF now processes the CAU requests in a matter of hours instead of weeks. Mentioning “100 day goals” when submitting a request to MOF is said to open doors and ensures prompt MOF staff attention to the project!

**Improvements in M&E.** At the time RRA was introduced to the HRSP, the project did not have a systematic approach to monitoring and evaluation. In the absence of an active project coordination committee, the three rounds of RRA workshops begun in 2006 provided the opportunity for coordination at the facility level, and exchange of information on the status of each component. It was proposed that RRA workshops continue to be used to review and monitor the implementation plans, in lieu of the coordination committee meetings.

Each component team developed a two-year target with quarterly benchmarks and draft corresponding budgets that would be finalized in February 2007 and used to assess progress and expenditures over the two-year period. The fourth RRA workshop in December 2007 was held to review the one year performance and make necessary programmatic or financial adjustments during the last year of the program.

**Replication and scaling up.** The success of the RRA in Yemen has raised the idea of scaling up and institutionalizing the RRA in other projects and in the planning and execution of other donor programs, many of which suffer from similar implementation problems.

Two entry points for scaling-up exist: (i) MOPIC, with its mandate for donor harmonization and alignment, is the natural entry point for broadening the approach into other sectors; (ii) the ongoing health sector review (HSRev) should also be explored as an entry point for scaling up in the MOPHP and among the MOPHP’s partners.

The HSRev could evaluate the potential of scaling up the RRA, while applying it to some of the HSRev components, in particular those where there are multiple stakeholders. However, there are challenges: at present there is no sector-wide approach (SWAP) for Yemen to pool donor resources, and government funds make up the majority of resources in the public health sector.

## 4. Lessons from Experience

- 1. The RRA is a way of making large-scale change happen incrementally.** The approach was introduced gradually, with steady expansion of the number of targets; only during the third round was it emphasized that all activities must directly support the PDOs. The approach was simple, with clear guidelines, and was introduced by competent facilitators.
- 2. Linking leadership with results clarifies roles, fosters transparency, and builds ownership.** Clear responsibilities were assigned to component managers, which increased accountability, made progress measurable, and increased the sense of ownership. The methodology helped component managers know what was expected, the Bank to know where the issues/bottlenecks were, and the ministry leadership to monitor and follow up or intervene where necessary.
- 3. RRA led to a reorientation away from inputs towards results.** Competition increased pressure on component teams to perform, but also gave recognition to people who were doing well.
- 4. With crisis comes opportunity.** The crisis played an important role in mobilizing support for the RRA within the MOPHP leadership and among the deputy ministers. This resulted in strong ownership of the RRA from the top and from the beginning. Since the cut in World Bank support put the performance of the HRSP high on the agenda for the whole government, all three new ministers (MOPHP, MOF, MOPIC) had strong incentives to turn it around.
- 5. The RRA contributed to the success of restructuring the project.** This was done by releasing it from a narrow focus on an over-ambitious package of integrated services at district level, and seeking tangible and realistic evidence-based interventions supporting the PDOs.
- 6. There is no one-size-fits-all approach.** What matters most is that the results achieved are in line with the country's objectives and mechanisms that make sense in the country context. Leadership, ownership, and partnership, the application of the RRA as an appropriate methodology, and the enabling environment (timing) were all important factors for achieving rapid results.

## 5. Moving the Leadership and Results Agenda Forward

Beyond bringing a single project back on track, the success of the RRA has strengthened leadership and confidence in the MOPHP on different levels, including (i) the office of the minister of Health and Population in the cabinet; (ii) the implementation capacity and confidence of component managers; and (iii) the confidence of deputy ministers to manage change more successfully.

The minister of health would like to expand this approach to other projects and programs throughout the ministry, and has also said that it should eventually encompass the entire institution. MOPIC is another promising entry point for moving forward.

Training and raising awareness are still needed. And aligned with support and planning will be the institutionalization of RRA.

The availability of coaches is critical for scaling up. A team of senior ministry staff was selected for RRA training. But to maintain momentum, training would need to be delivered soon without delays in the process.

Training should be intensive and should be followed by an immediate application of the methodology — for example, within the HSRev. Building the capacity of a team of MOPHP staff (potentially to be complemented by local consultants) would reduce dependence on World Bank staff, which will increase sustainability and lower the threshold for other partners to buy in and make use of the process. This might not occur if the process is perceived mainly as a World Bank process.

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