Partial Peace
Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements

Abstract
Previous research proposes that for peace to become durable it is essential to include all rebel groups in any settlement reached. If actors are excluded, continuing to pursue the military course, this could have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed an agreement. This article evaluates this claim and argues that all-inclusive peace deals are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. Given that the parties are strategic actors who are forward-looking when making their decisions, the signatories should be anticipating that they could face violent challenges from excluded parties. Hence, any spoiler activities from outside actors are likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal, thus, not affecting their commitment to peace. But inclusion should still be of importance, as the signatories have revealed enough information to strike a bargain, whereas the non-signatories have yet to converge their beliefs about the outcome on the battlefield, making them likely to continue the military struggle. The empirical analysis is conducted employing unique data on the conflict behavior of the government and each of the rebel group(s) in internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War period. Using a Cox proportional hazards model, the article shows that all-inclusive peace agreements – signed by the government and all rebel groups – are no more likely to see peace prevail. Still, inclusion can make a difference for some parties, as it is found that signatories more likely to stick to peace than parties outside of an agreement. Hence, this article concludes that partial peace is possible.
Introduction

A potential obstacle to durable peace, and an empirical reality of many civil wars, is that conflicts often involve numerous rebel groups. Cases in point are, for instance, Bosnia, Burundi, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan. Conventional wisdom holds that for peace to become durable in such multiparty conflicts it is essential to include all parties in any settlement reached. Indeed, policymakers and academics alike claim that all warring parties are to sign the peace agreement if peace is to prevail (e.g. Hampson 1996; Rubin 2002). For instance, Roy Licklider (2002: 701) stresses the importance of inclusiveness and points out that outsiders “… should exert every effort to bring all of the important players into the process as soon as possible.” The argument implies that the presence of excluded parties can jeopardize peace, not only by heightening the risk of violence involving the outside actors, but also by influencing the commitment to peace among the signatories. However, while many seem to expect that all-inclusive peace agreements are more likely to see peace prevail, this claim has so far not been examined in a quantitative study. The present study addresses this lacuna in previous research by providing a first test of this proposition. Hence, the purpose of this article is to explore whether all-inclusive peace agreements are more likely to provide durable peace than settlements leaving out one or more rebel groups.

I argue that all-inclusive peace deals are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. The literature on this topic seems to suggest that an agreement that leaves out one or more rebel, makes excluded actors more likely fight, and also increases the risk that the signatories engage in violence. But there is a need to take into account that parties in civil wars are acting strategically and look ahead when they make decisions for their future. Hence, the fact that some parties are continuing to engage in the violent struggle against the government should not come as a surprise to the signatories. The parties that have signed a settlement are likely to be well aware that they may come under violent challenges from actors that are excluded from the peace agreement. Thus, any spoiler activities from outside actors are likely to already be factored into the decision-making calculus when the signatories decide to reach a deal. This suggests that while the excluded actors may continue to fight, settlements leaving out one or more rebel groups, should not necessarily make the signatories any more likely to engage in violence. But inclusion can still be of importance. Indeed, the signatories should be more likely to stick to peace than the excluded actors. After all, the signatories have revealed enough information in order to open up bargaining space and strike a bargain, whereas the non-
signatories have yet to converge their beliefs vis-à-vis the government about the outcome on the battlefield, which may lead them to continue the military struggle. There are two implications that follow from this argument. First, all-inclusive deals should not be any more likely to provide durable peace than agreements that leave out one or more rebel groups. Second, moving the analysis from the level of the settlement to the dyadic interactions between the government and each of the rebel groups, we should expect the signatories, on average, to be more likely to stick to peace than the non-signatories. This suggests that inclusion still matters for durable peace.

The issue of inclusion highlights that civil wars often involve multiple rebel groups.1 Whereas many case studies within the literature on durable peace emphasize that the opposition side often consists of several parties, quantitative studies on this topic tend to treat the opposition side as a unitary actor. However, in order to explore this claim on all-inclusive peace agreements it is pivotal to move beyond a characterization of civil war as involving only two parties and take into account all rebel groups on the opposition side. To facilitate such an analysis it is necessary to have data on the conflict behavior of each of the warring parties, as well as information on whether each of these parties is signatory to a settlement or not. The dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), covering all peace agreements in both full-scale and low-level internal armed conflicts, 1989–2004, is the only dataset that meets these requirements. Other datasets report the battle-related deaths per conflict, whereas the UCDP specifies the yearly conflict activity for the government and each of the different rebel groups. Furthermore, UCDP includes all peace agreements signed by the government and the rebel groups that have been fighting in the conflict, while many other lists of peace agreements only include settlements signed by all or the main parties. These data are analyzed employing a Cox proportional hazards model.

The results are well in line with the theoretical argument. To begin with, the findings show that all-inclusive peace agreements – signed by the government and all rebel groups – are no more likely to see peace prevail. Hence, this study finds no support for the common claim that all warring parties are to be included in the settlement for peace to prevail. Also in line with my theoretical argument, the results indicate that inclusion can make a difference for some parties, as it is found that signatories are more likely to stick to peace than parties outside of an agreement. Hence, some kind of partial

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1 In half of all internal armed conflicts where a settlement has been signed in the post-Cold War period, the government has been engaged in fighting with more than one rebel group.
peace is possible. By showing that the excluded parties are indeed likely to continue to fight, but without having a detrimental impact on the signatories’ commitment to peace, this finding also sheds light on our understanding of spoilers. Indeed, violence from outside actors may be less dangerous than previous research has suggested.\(^2\)

The article is outlined as follows. First, I give a short presentation of the research conducted on durable peace, and present the claim on inclusive peace agreements. Second, I introduce my theoretical argument and two hypotheses that are to be examined. Third, the research design is outlined, which includes a description of the data, the structure of the datasets and a presentation of the variables. In the fourth section, the results are presented and finally conclusions are drawn.

**Previous Research on Durable Peace: Bridging the Divide**

In the aftermath of a civil war, what determines if the warring parties engage in violence or whether peace endures? The issue of how to end conflicts was until fairly recently only given limited attention (e.g. Pillar 1983; Stedman 1991; Licklider 1993). Fortunately, the amount of scholarly work devoted to the issue has increased, and there is now considerably more knowledge about the conditions under which parties end civil war and move towards durable peace. For instance, a large part of the research has focused on the role of third parties in guaranteeing the peace, and considerable attention have also been given to the stipulations in the peace agreement and how these influence the peace duration (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 2002b, 1997; e.g. Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004a).

However, while this field has seen significant advances, the literature on durable peace suffers from an unfortunate disconnect between the qualitative and quantitative research. Many case studies recognize that the rebel side often consists of several actors, and propose that this can have implications for creating a lasting peace. Indeed, these works show that various aspects such as spoiler dynamics, and whether parties are standing on the inside or outside of an agreement, can influence the prospects for peace in the wake of a peace agreement (e.g. Hampson 1996; Stedman 1997). However, while

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\(^2\) Stedman (1997: 5) defines spoilers as: “…leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” The concept of spoilers has, however, received criticism, for instance, it has been argued that spoilers have not been possible to identify ‘ex ante’ (Zahar 2003: 114). It should be noted that the present study treats all warring parties as potential spoilers, and hence, does not focus specifically on spoiler violence.
case studies within the literature on durable peace recognize that a more refined view of the rebel side is needed, quantitative studies have, so far, mainly focused on two parties – the government and the opposition. But by treating the opposition side as a unitary actor, the quantitative studies fail to take into account how the dynamics may change when there are several rebel groups present. Hence, a valuable next step is to bridge this divide between qualitative and quantitative studies.

The question of whether to include all actors into peace agreements, attests to the fact that civil wars often involve multiple parties. In order to examine this and other pertinent issues, it is necessary to not view civil wars as involving only two parties, and instead consider that the government may be faced with several rebel groups. Indeed, by recognizing that civil wars often consist of multiple actors, we can start to incorporate insights from case studies into our analyses of the global patterns.

This article addresses the claim in the case study literature that in order to ensure durable peace, it is essential that all parties are included in the settlement. Indeed, a key hypothesis is that an inclusive agreement, in which all actors with the potential to resume hostilities take part, is more likely to provide a sustainable solution (Ohlson and Söderberg 2002). Hampson (1996: 217), for instance, argues that:

…it is absolutely essential that all the warring parties have a seat at the negotiation table and are directly involved in discussions about the new constitutional and political order that will be created after the fighting stops. A ‘good’ agreement is one that has been crafted by all parties to the conflict. If parties are excluded from these negotiations, or if their interests are not represented at the bargaining table, they will have a much stronger incentive to defect from the peace process and resort to violence to achieve their aims.

Licklider (2002: 701) also argues in favor of inclusive peace agreements and stresses that third parties should try to get all of the important players into the agreement and “…resist the temptation to settle for an easy agreement with moderates, (…) because

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3 To the extent that this dimension has been taken into account, it has either been in the theoretical discussion or by introducing a variable that captures the number of factions involved in the conflict (e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2003; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). For a recent study that does consider the number of factions to a conflict, see Doyle and Sambanis (2006). However, while they incorporate some aspects pertaining to the rebel side, they do not explore the dyadic interactions of the government and each rebel group, which forms a significant part of the present study.
such settlements are very likely to fail…” Moreover, according to Jeffrey Rubin (2002: 100), actors on the outside of an agreement may try to disrupt an agreement reached; hence, a settlement that manages to include all actors should be less likely to threaten the peace. Rubin claims that, “…one should probably attempt to include in negotiations all parties who are in a position to disrupt whatever settlement is arrived at; it may be more difficult to reach agreement with many parties and issues floating around, but if an agreement is reached under these circumstances, it will have a greater chance of surviving”. Consequently, an agreement that includes all parties to the conflict should be more likely to ensure that peace prevails than a deal where one or several parties are excluded.

The mechanisms underlying the argument on inclusiveness are not clearly spelled out, but most of the works on this topic implies that excluded parties can threaten the peace between the signatories. In this context, the literature on spoilers in the wake of a negotiated settlement is relevant (Stedman 1997; Newman and Richmond 2006b; Zahar 2003; Newman and Richmond 2006a; Ayres 2006). Indeed, the argument on inclusiveness seem to suggest that if an actor on the outside continues to pursue the military course, this can have a destabilizing effect on the actors that have signed on to an agreement.4 Thus, according to previous research, an agreement that leaves out one or more parties should increase not only the risk that excluded parties engage in violent conflict, but also make the signatories more likely to fight.

**Signatories Sticking to Peace: Anticipating Spoilers**

The claim that all parties should be included in a peace deal is appealing and seems to make intuitive sense. However, applying insights from bargaining theory, which emphasize the strategic nature of conflict, calls this into question. The bargaining perspective depicts war and its resolution as a bargaining process and at the center stage of analysis is the strategic interaction of the parties. The parties are seen to be acting strategically when “…each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how other actors behave, and therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account” (Lake and Powell 1999: 3). Theories on civil war are increasingly taking into account that the parties in civil wars are strategic actors who are forward-looking and try to anticipate the actions

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4 While not explicitly stated in the literature, it is conceivable that the signatories are influenced not only by direct spoiler attacks intended to wreck the peace, but it may also, for various reasons, be more difficult for the signatories to stick to peace if the non-signatories continue pursue their war.
of other actors when making their decisions (e.g. Cetinyan 2002; Walter 2006). In this bargaining process between the warring parties the revealing of information plays a key role. By engaging in fighting and taking part in negotiations, the parties can reveal information about their reservation points and thus facilitate a settlement, instead of them fighting a costly war (Filson and Werner 2002; Fearon 1995). In a civil war where the government is faced with several rebel groups, some actors may have revealed enough information about their capabilities and resolve, in order to reach a bargain, whereas others have not converged their beliefs and have yet to agree on a mutually preferable deal. I suggest that taking into account these aspects of the bargaining process in our analyses can have important implications for our understanding of civil war processes.

Applying these insights, I propose that all-inclusive peace agreements are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. The argument in previous research suggests that agreements that do not include all parties make peace more likely to fall apart, primarily as a consequence of violence from the excluded parties. But if we consider that the warring parties are strategic actors that try to anticipate the decisions of all other actors, this yields other expectations. I argue that the signatories, when taking the decision to sign a deal, are anticipating the actions of all actors in the conflict, that is, also the rebel groups that may be standing on the outside of the peace agreement. The warring parties which decide to sign an agreement, are well aware if there are excluded parties that are likely to continue to fight. If there are excluded parties to a deal, this should serve as an indication to the signatories that the non-signatories have not yet converged their beliefs and therefore are likely to continue the military struggle. Indeed, that some parties are continuing to engage in the violent struggle against the government should not come as a surprise to the signatories. Hence, any spoiler activities from outside actors are probably already taken into account when the parties decided to reach a deal. Thus, while the excluded parties are likely to continue their struggle, agreements leaving out one or more actor should not increase the likelihood that the signatories resort to violence. This is not to say that the parties in civil war are able to anticipate every move of the others actors, or that the signatories always stick to peace. However, it is still reasonable to expect that the signatories have a fairly good sense of the violent challenges they may be facing and, hence, have taken such a scenario into account when signing the deal.
Although all-inclusive deals from this argument are expected to be no more likely to provide for durable peace, it can still make a difference whether an actor signs a settlement or not. Signatories should be significantly more likely to choose the path to peace in the wake of an agreement, than actors that are outside of a deal. Whereas the signatories have revealed enough information about their capabilities and resolve, so as to open up bargaining space and strike a bargain, the non-signatories have yet to agree on a mutually preferable deal. The fact that the government and the excluded parties are unable to reach a deal suggests that they do not share the same expectation concerning the likely outcome on the battlefield, and hence, will continue to pursue the military course. While it is conceivable that some group may have been marginalized due to its insignificance, or may be weakened as the government possibly can redirect their forces against parties outside of an agreement, there is little to suggest that these actors will refrain from using violence. The signatories, on their part, have taken one important step towards peace by signing a deal and are in a very different situation from actors standing on the outside of the settlement. Hence, taken together, when comparing included to excluded actors, those outside of a deal should, on average, be more likely to fight.

There are two testable implications that follow from my theoretical argument. The first is that peace agreements that include all warring parties should not be any more likely to see peace prevail, whereas my theoretical argument further suggests that the excluded parties, in comparison to the signatories, are likely to continue to fight. Thus, the first hypothesis on all-inclusive deal is not expected to receive support, while the second hypothesis, proposing that parties on the inside of a deal are more likely to stick to peace than excluded actors, should be supported.

Hypothesis 1: All-inclusive peace agreements are more likely to see peace prevail than settlements that exclude one or more rebel groups.

Hypothesis 2: Given that a settlement is reached in the conflict, the signatories are more likely to stick to peace than non-signatories.
Research Design

In order to explore the issue of inclusion it is necessary to take into account all rebel groups on the opposition side. But opening up the black box of the rebel side and exploring the hypotheses put forward, requires that the research design reflects this higher degree of complexity. Indeed, moving the analysis from a context where it is assumed that the bargaining process takes place between only two parties, to a situation where there may be many actors involved, makes matters more intricate. Furthermore, while the first hypothesis on all-inclusive deals can be explored by looking at the settlement level, the evaluation of the second hypothesis requires that the focus is shifted towards the dyadic level – focusing on the government and each rebel group.

Data

The hypotheses are evaluated using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on all internal armed conflicts where at least one peace agreement has been signed during the period 1989–2004. This dataset fits the purposes of this study as it provides data on the conflict behavior of all warring parties in a conflict, as well as information on whether each of these actors have signed a settlement or not.

The UCDP defines an internal armed conflict as a contested incompatibility over government and/or territory, between a government and an opposition organization, and which reaches the level of minor armed conflict, that is, at least 25 battle-related deaths in at least one year. This dataset is unique in that it includes data on all rebel groups involved in an armed conflict with the government that has reached at least this level of battle-deaths. Other datasets that cover longer time-periods, such as the Correlates of War Project (COW) and the UCDP/PRIO dataset from 1946 and onwards, only provides a list of all rebel groups that are known to have been active in the conflict (Small and Singer 1982; COW 2006; Strand et al. 2005; Gleditsch et al. 2002). Unfortunately, this means that in these datasets there is no comparable data available on the conflict behavior of each of these rebel groups, and there is no way of knowing which year the groups have been active, or the extent to which these groups have been

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5 If not otherwise mentioned, the data in this study comes from the UCDP. For definitions of concepts, and the different datasets available, see UCDP (2006) and Harbom et al. (2006). Note that since the conflict behavior of the parties is assessed the year after the signing of a peace agreement, and this data has been available up till 2004, only agreements up till 2003 are included in the study.
involved in the fighting. Hence, since the UCDP dataset covering the post-Cold War period, contains data on the conflict behavior of all of the rebel groups that are engaged in conflict with the government, this dataset will be used.

The internal armed conflicts each consists of one or more dyads, where the government and each rebel group engage in violence reaching the level of 25 battle-related deaths in at least one year. Hence, there may be two or more warring parties fighting, of which one of the warring parties always is the government. In this study a party that prior to the peace agreement met this criterion of ‘warring parties’ is of interest, and the government and these rebel groups may, or may not, have signed a peace agreement in the conflict. The reason for focusing on the warring parties is that these have been involved in the armed struggle and at some point had both the incentives and capabilities to use armed violence.

The UCDP also provides a comprehensive dataset of all peace agreements signed in the post-1989 period. Some other lists of peace agreements only focus on the settlements signed by all, or the major warring parties (e.g. Walter 1999: 127–8, 2002b: 52). In order to assess the hypotheses, it is necessary to include all peace agreements and not merely those signed by certain rebel groups. The dataset from the UCDP does not exclude agreements where only some of the rebel groups are signatories. Hence, this study covers all peace agreements that are signed by the government and one or several rebel groups, and which address the incompatibility by settling all or part of it (UCDP 2006). The data used consists in total of 82 peace agreements in 40 internal armed conflicts, and some of the conflicts stand out in terms of the number of peace agreements signed: for example, in Chad nine peace agreements were reached in the period under study. Other conflicts, such as the one in Congo-Brazzaville, have only seen one peace agreement during the same period.

**Statistical Technique and Structure of the Datasets**

The empirical evaluations are conducted using duration analysis, since this statistical technique is preferable when we are interested in the duration of time until some event

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6 Cunningham et al. (2006) have converted the PRIO/Uppsala dataset into one with a dyad-structure, but the problem of not having the yearly conflict activity for each of the dyads remains.

7 For an inquiry into the issue of including non-warring parties in peace agreements, see (REF OMITTED).

8 In line with previous research I will not include ‘peace process agreements’ since these are merely “outlining a process for regulating or resolving the incompatibility” (Sollenberg 2002: 14).
takes place. In this case the interest lies in the duration of peace after the signing of a peace agreement, up to the point where the warring parties may engage in post-settlement armed conflict (i.e. experience an event), if at all. I employ a Cox proportional hazards model which in comparison to other duration models has the advantage of not assuming a specific parametric form for its distribution (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997: 1432). This model estimates the effects of the independent variables on the risk of experiencing armed conflict after a settlement, given that peace has lasted up to that particular point in time.

The hypotheses put forward can be found at two different levels of analysis. Hence, in order to evaluate these hypotheses, two datasets have been constructed, one at the settlement level, and one at the dyadic level. When analyzing the settlement level, the unit of analysis is the post-agreement-year, and the variables primarily refer to aspects related to the settlement, such as whether it was an all-inclusive agreement or not. The analysis at the dyadic level places the focus on the government and each rebel group, and the unit of analysis is the post-agreement-dyad-year. A conflict consists of one or several dyads, where the government remains the same in each dyad, and the variables used in this dataset make it possible to examine factors relating to that particular dyad, such as whether the government has signed an agreement with the rebel group in question.

In both datasets the peace agreements and dyads, respectively, are at risk of experiencing an event from the year after the signing of an agreement, until the observation period ends on the 31st of December 2004. In the analysis at settlement level as well as at dyadic level, the event of interest is armed conflict involving a government and a rebel group that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Since some of the variables vary over time, models with time-varying covariates are used for both sets of data, which makes it possible to study changes over time. The first dataset consists of 82 peace agreements, and since these are observed over time there are multiple observations

9 An advantage with this type of models is that it is possible to take into account so-called right-censored observations (i.e. the ones that at the end of the observation period still are at peace). Furthermore, a duration model has the desirable feature of taking into account all the available information concerning the peace duration (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997).

10 As a robustness check, the models are also estimated using a Weibull model.

11 The primary focus is on the parties that were active prior to the signing of the agreement, and therefore new parties that later emerge are not taken into account in the main analysis. However, in the analysis at the settlement level a robustness check is conducted where another dependent variable has been created that captures the conflict behavior of new parties too.
for each agreement. In the dyadic dataset there are in total 86 dyads, which may or may not be a signatory to a settlement, and as these are observed over time there is also in this case multiple observations for the different dyads.

It should be noted that in the dyadic dataset, the dyads run the risk of experiencing post-settlement armed conflict after each of the agreements (if there are several signed in the conflict).\textsuperscript{12} Thus, in the dataset at the dyadic level, the dyads may exit the risk set if they experience armed conflict following a settlement, and then reenter on the condition that a new settlement is reached. Note that whenever a settlement is reached by any of the rebel groups in the incompatibility, the settlement becomes analytically relevant for all dyads in the incompatibility, regardless of whether these are signatories or not. The dyads may – after the respective settlements – resort to violence, and in addition, some also engage in post-settlement violence more than once. For example, in the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, several peace agreements have been signed over the years, and the non-signatories Hamas and Hezbollah have engaged in violence with the Israeli government following more than one of these agreements. Thus, in this dataset there are repeated failures as the warring parties may engage in post-settlement armed conflict more than once during the observation period. Hence, I employ a duration model that can handle such repeated events.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Dependent Variables}

The post-settlement period is often more complex than peace simply prevailing or breaking down, hence, it is important that our dependent variables reflect what a durable peace may entail. Given that the signatories as well as the non-signatories may use violence after an agreement has been signed, it is important to take into account both these dimensions of peace duration.\textsuperscript{14} Since the unit of analysis is different for the two

\textsuperscript{12} Some dyads drop out of the data earlier either because the incompatibility is resolved or due to the fact that they cease to exist. For instance, if a rebel group completely dissolves or takes over the government the dyad drops out of the dataset. Based on information in the Uppsala Conflict Database (UCDB), each of the parties in the dataset was evaluated according to these criteria in order to determine whether the dyad should continue to remain under observation or not (UCDP 2006).

\textsuperscript{13} More specifically, I use a conditional gap time model, see Box-Steppensmeier and Jones (2004).

\textsuperscript{14} It is also important to point out that it can be the government as well as any of the rebel groups that is the first to return to armed conflict in the aftermath of an agreement. While this is an interesting aspect to
sets of data, the dependent variables used for the settlement and dyadic level are not the
same. However, in both datasets, the post-settlement armed conflict is measured as of
the year following the peace agreement in order to ensure that the violence has taken
place after the agreement was signed. While it would have been preferable to measure the
dependent variable directly after the signing of a settlement, the fact that it is the yearly
accumulation of at least 25 battle-related deaths which is studied, makes such an
approach unfeasible.\textsuperscript{15}

In the analysis at the settlement level, two dependent variables are employed in
order to capture different dimensions of peace duration, that is, the signatories’
commitment to peace, but also the overall peace duration in the conflict. The variable
\textit{Signatory Peace Duration} measures the number of years of peace from the signing of the
agreement until the government and at least one of the other signatories engage in
violence, or, if peace has prevailed, to the last year of observation in the period under
study.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, this variable focuses on the behavior of the signatories to the agreement.
To exemplify, in Colombia, the peace agreement signed between the government and
EPL in 1991, was not followed by armed conflict between the signatories until years later
when, in 2004, the fighting between the government and EPL again reached the level of
minor armed conflict.\textsuperscript{17} Meanwhile, FARC-EP and ELN, who did not sign the peace
agreement, continued to fight. But since this variable is intended to only capture the
conflict behavior of the signatories, this means that in terms of the signatory peace
duration, peace prevailed for 13 years.

In contrast, the variable \textit{Overall Peace Duration}, takes into account the conflict
behavior of the government, the other signatories to the agreement, as well as the non-
signatories, that is, the warring parties that were standing outside of the deal. This
variable is measured as the number of years of peace from the signing of the agreement

\textsuperscript{15} The lowest peace duration is therefore one year, although a dyad immediately after the signing of a
settlement may engage in armed conflict.

\textsuperscript{16} Occasionally, there are several peace agreements reached in the same conflict. Of these, there are a few
in which the signatories to the settlement already are at peace when they decide to reach another peace
agreement. To avoid overestimating the impact that these agreements may have on peace duration, the
subsequent agreement is seen as replacing the previous one.

\textsuperscript{17} Some minor incidents are reported at various occasions during this period, but the violence concerning
EPL does not in any given year reach 25 battle-related deaths until it does so in 2004.
until either a signatory or a non-signatory becomes involved in armed conflict, or if peace has prevailed, to the last year of observation in the period under study. Again, taking the example of Colombia, the fact that FARC-EP and ELN continued to fight following the peace agreement is captured by this variable. Thus, whereas peace prevailed in Colombia for 13 years as far as the peace duration for the signatory EPL is concerned, the overall peace duration broke down immediately, as the non-signatories FARC-EP and ELN decided to not lay down their arms but continued their struggle. These two variables at the settlement level, hence, serve to take into account these different aspects of peace duration.

In the analysis at dyadic level, the dependent variable measures the conflict behavior of the government and a particular rebel group. The variable Dyadic Peace Duration captures whether the dyad, consisting of a government and a rebel group, was engaged in armed conflict from the signing of a settlement in the conflict, till the end of the observation period. Thus, in this case, the conflict behavior is measured for each dyad, and the rebel group may, or may not, be a signatory to a settlement. In Colombia, the dyad consisting of the government and EPL is at peace until 2004, whereas the dyads involving the government and FARC-EP and ELN, respectively, simply continued to fight and therefore experienced post-settlement armed conflict already the first time of observation, that is, the year following the agreement in 1991.

**Independent Variables**

A key aspect is the rebel groups’ inclusion or exclusion in relation to a particular peace agreement. In order to evaluate the first hypothesis about all-inclusive peace agreements the variable All-Inclusive is created. This variable is coded 1 if all rebel groups in a conflict have signed a particular agreement, and is coded 0 if one or more rebel groups are standing on the outside of the deal. In the analysis at the dyadic level, the variable Excluded refers to a particular rebel group’s inclusion or exclusion in relation to a settlement. The variable is coded 1 if the rebel group, in a given year, had not signed a peace agreement, and is coded 0 if the rebel group had signed a peace agreement, or previously signed a peace agreement and then refrained from using violence.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{18}\)This means that a group that has signed an agreement and then resorted to violence is considered to be a potential signatory to any subsequent peace agreement signed in the incompatibility. Thus, if another peace agreement is signed in the incompatibility and they remain on the outside of the deal, such a group is seen
The control variables in this study include such factors which previous research has argued to influence peace duration, and theoretically may affect the independent variables as well as the dependent variables. The control variables are basically the same for both levels of analysis, and in the few instances where there is a difference this is pointed out.\(^\text{19}\)

To begin with, I control for the number of warring parties to the conflict, which encompasses the government and one or more rebel group(s). Clearly, considering the focus on inclusion of the various rebel groups, it is pivotal to control for the number of parties in each conflict as this potentially can affect the results. The variable *Number of Parties* is measured as the number of warring parties in the incompatibility in a given year. Second, in line with findings from previous research I found it appropriate to control for the type of deal reached. To this end, a comprehensive dataset covering the terms of peace agreements reached in the post-Cold War period was used.\(^\text{20}\) It is expected that peace agreements which entail power sharing, in comparison to those that lack such provisions, should be more likely to see peace endure. Hence, the dummy variable *Power Sharing* was coded 1 if the agreement contained at least one pact concerning the sharing of power, that is, either military, territorial or political power, and was otherwise coded 0.\(^\text{21}\) This control variable is used at the settlement level and has been coded with reference to whether a particular peace agreement contained one or more of these pacts, or altogether lacked such power-sharing provisions.

In addition, while the findings are contradictory, previous research has indicated that the conflict duration increases the duration of peace, while the intensity of the conflict has been suggested to decrease peace duration (Fortna 2004a; Hartzell et al. 2001: 202; e.g. Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 787). In the dataset at settlement level, I employ the variable *Conflict Duration*, which captures the number of years since the conflict first reached 25 battle-related deaths. In the dataset at the dyadic level, I control for *Dyad Duration*, measured as the number of years since the dyad first reached the

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\(^{19}\) There is always a judgment to be made as to which control variables to include, for instance, whether our model specifications should be guided by “the rule of three”, or instead, follow the advice that “more really is better” (Ray 2003; Oneal and Russett 2005).

\(^{20}\) (REF OMITTED).

\(^{21}\) This is coded in line with the criteria for power-sharing pacts used in Walter’s (2002a) war termination dataset.
threshold of 25 battle-related deaths.\footnote{The data collection for this variable extends back prior to 1989, as some conflicts started prior to the period under study.} Furthermore, the variable \textit{Conflict Intensity} is used at settlement level and is coded 1 if the conflict (either in the year of observation or previously) reaches the level of war, meaning more than 1000 battle-related deaths in a year, and is otherwise coded 0. In the dataset at dyadic level, I include the variable \textit{Dyad Intensity} that measures whether a particular dyad has reached the level of war or not. This variable is coded in the same fashion as conflict intensity, although the conflict activity pertains to the dyad rather than the entire conflict. It is also important to control for the type of issue. Whether the conflict concerns a certain territory or power over the government can possibly affect the prospects for peace (e.g. Zartman 1995; Wallensteen 2002). Thus, I created a control variable \textit{Issue} which is coded 1 if the incompatibility is fought over government and 0 if it is fought over territory (UCDP 2006).

Peacekeeping forces has been found to play a key role in the post-settlement phase by increasing the duration of peace (Fortna 2003). Moreover, it has been proposed that UN peacekeepers may be more ‘neutral’ than regional peacekeepers Zahar (2003: 117). Hence, I control for \textit{UN Peacekeeping}, which is coded 1 if a peacekeeping operation led by the United Nations was present in a given year, 0 otherwise. I also control for \textit{Non-UN Peacekeeping}, in order to capture whether other peacekeeping forces than the UN were deployed. This variable is coded similarly to the \textit{UN Peacekeeping} variable. For a description of the data used, see Heldt and Wallensteen (2006).

Walter (2004) has found that lower levels of economic development can increase the risk of renewed conflict. Hence, I introduce the variable \textit{Log GDP}, in an effort to control for this aspect. Data is available from the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database, which covers the whole time period under study and which partly is based on estimates (The United Nations 2006). The variable is logged so as to account for decreasing marginal effects. Finally, I control for type of political system since it has been suggested that a democratic system can reduce the risk of recurring civil war (Walter 2004). Hence, based on the Polity IV data set I created the variable \textit{Polity}, which ranges from \(-10\) to \(+10\), where a higher score indicates a more democratic system. In order to control for a possible curvilinear relationship I also introduce the variable \textit{Polity-squared} where I have taken the square of the \textit{Polity} variable (Marshall and Jaggers 2003).\footnote{I use the Polity2 variable where values of transitions have been converted to conventional polity scores.}
Results and Analysis

The results are presented in table 1 and 2. In all models, the hazard ratios are reported rather than the coefficients. A hazard ratio above one increases the risk that peace breaks down, whereas a value below one decreases the risk that peace fails. To exemplify, a hazard ratio of 1.5 means that the risk of peace failing is increased by 50 percent, and a hazard ratio of 0.7 indicates that the risk of peace failing is decreased by 30 percent.

The results of the empirical evaluation are well in line with the theoretical argument outlined. Hypothesis 1, derived from previous research, proposed that all-inclusive peace agreements are more likely to see peace prevail than deals where at least one warring party is left outside. The variable All-Inclusive does not show a statistically significant effect on the duration of peace for the signatories (see model 1, table 1). Hence, the hypothesis fails to receive support when looking at the conflict behavior of the signatories. The result supports the theoretical argument of this article that suggests that the signatories already should have taken into account that the excluded parties might threaten the peace process, and hence, all-inclusive deals should not necessarily increase the prospects for peace. It can be noted that the effect even goes in the opposite direction to the hypothesis, indicating an increased risk that the signatories engage in violence if all parties have signed the deal. Indeed, if anything, the signatories seem to be more likely to fight following an all-inclusive peace agreement than if at least one party is standing outside of the deal.

Furthermore, when considering the effect of all-inclusive deals on the overall peace duration, that is, taking into account the conflict behavior of the signatories, as well as the non-signatories, no significant effect can be found (see model 2, table 1). While the effect of the variable All-Inclusive is in the direction of the hypothesis, indicating a decreased risk of peace failing, this result is not statistically significant. These findings are indeed intriguing, especially considering that previous research has argued that all-inclusive deals are more likely to bring durable peace (e.g. Hampson

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24 In the following I will mention some alternative estimations made, these results are not reported here, but are available upon request.

25 All statistical analyses are carried out using version 8.0 of the statistical package STATA (StataCorp. 2003).

26 One possible interpretation is that some of the parties that sign on to inclusive agreements may have been pressured into doing so and therefore are likely to resort to armed conflict.

27 Examining the effect of all-inclusive deals, while taking into account also new parties that have emerged after a particular settlement was signed, generates virtually the same results.
1996). The results here suggest otherwise. Regardless of whether we only look at the conflict behavior of the signatories, or if we take into account also the non-signatories, no support is found for this hypothesis.

To alleviate concerns that we wrongly are rejecting the hypothesis, some alternative specifications have been conducted. To begin with, I introduce an alternative variable to allow for the possibility that it may be sufficient that most of the actors have signed the deal. This variable is measured as the proportion between the number of signatories to a settlement and the number of warring parties to a conflict. But no significant effect could be found on either dimension of the peace duration. Hence, also when examining the degree to which parties are included in agreements, the results point in the same direction.28 Furthermore, since the sample is small and there are many variables to control for, this can make it more difficult to obtain statistical significance. Therefore, a bivariate analysis was also conducted where all control variables were dropped when looking at all-inclusive agreements. When estimating the effect of all-inclusive deals on the signatory peace duration, the results are almost identical as before, whereas the effect becomes statistically significant at the 0.01 level when signatories as well as non-signatories are considered. This could indicate some support for the argument on inclusiveness but the result should at best be regarded as tentative since this finding is obtained without any control variables. Importantly, these results do not contradict my theoretical argument as it was expected that the non-signatories are likely continue to fight. What is interesting in this context is that the results consistently show that excluding parties from a deal does not seem to affect the signatories’ commitment to peace.

[Table 1 in about here]

These results may add to our understanding of spoilers in peace processes. While the present study does not focus on spoiler behavior as such, the findings still show that all-inclusive agreements are not more likely to see peace prevail, at the very least, not for the signatories. If the excluded parties indeed are acting as spoilers and attempt to trigger the signatories into using violence, their success is limited, as the results here indicate that the signatories are not less likely to commit to peace even if the agreement was exclusive.

28 This variable is significant at the 0.10 level in some alternative specifications but the result goes in the opposite direction to the hypothesis.
This is well in line with my theoretical argument that the signatories should anticipate that there are excluded actors that may engage in violence and therefore peace should not fail as a direct result of this. Indeed, there are several examples of cases where the signatories stick to their deal even when another warring party is left on the outside of the agreement. The Philippine government in 1996 reached a settlement with the MNLF, and peace has prevailed in spite of continued violence involving the Abu Sayyaf, as well as the MILF.29 Similarly, in Burundi, the signatories to the agreement reached in 2000, namely Frolina, Palipehutu and CNDD, did not return to armed warfare in spite of the fact that CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL continued to fight. The mechanisms by which parties engage in armed conflict after a settlement were not explored here, but the findings still suggest that inclusive deals are no panacea for peace. Instead, the results seem to suggest that no particular formula, in terms of the number of signatories, is required for peace to endure.

Is peace more likely to endure for a particular dyad if the rebel group is standing on the inside rather than the outside of the deal? Hypothesis 2 stated that given the signing of a settlement in a conflict, the signatories are more likely to stick to peace than non-signatories (see model 1, table 2). These results are in line with the theoretical expectations, as the variable *Excluded* is shown to increase the risk that peace breaks down in the dyad. In other words, if a rebel group is a signatory to an agreement, peace with the government is more likely to endure than if the rebel group is standing on the outside of the deal. The effect of this variable indicates that if a rebel group is a non-signatory rather than a signatory, the risk of peace failing is increased by 117 percent. This effect is in the expected direction and is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, which means that hypothesis 2 is supported. Inclusion is apparently a key factor for whether a particular dyad sticks to peace or not in the wake of an agreement.

[Table 2 in about here]

Is this a trivial result? After all, it would seem self-evident that it does make a difference for peace prevailing, whether the warring parties have signed an agreement or not. However, it should be noted that due to incentives to bluff, some of the parties can have

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29 See BBC (2003) and Hoddie and Hartzell (2005). It should be noted that armed conflict also came to involve the MNLF faction that emerged, whereas MNFL can be seen to have remained committed to peace.
signed an agreement without having benign intentions, or conversely, may have every
intention of sticking to their agreement but are faced with difficult commitment
problems in the post-settlement phase. Also, as some of the parties sign agreements,
excluded parties may cease using violence due to changing conditions on the battlefield.
For instance, pressure might increase as the government can redirect some of their
military resources towards those standing outside of the deal. However, the theory
proposes that in general we should still expect that the signatories are more likely to stick
to peace than actors outside of a settlement, since signing a deal indicates that a rebel
group has opened up bargaining space vis-à-vis the government. In contrast, for a
government and a rebel group that have not agreed on a deal, their beliefs have yet to
converge, and they need to overcome this information failure to cease using violence.

Indeed, the results are supportive of the general expectation that non-signatories
are more likely than signatories to engage in conflict in the wake of an agreement. This is
notable, especially given that the results at the settlement level indicate that the prospects
of an enduring peace do not seem to improve if all rebel groups are included in a
settlement. The results here at the dyadic level thus add an important piece of
information to the general pattern on peace duration by showing that it does make a
difference whether the parties sign settlements or not. The fact that the dyadic
interactions display somewhat different patterns than at the settlement level can at first
appear puzzling. A plausible interpretation is that there is no particular formula required
in terms of how many parties that need to sign an agreement for peace to last. While the
peace process might be considerably more difficult if there are violent challenges to a
peace deal, the results suggest that the exclusion of parties as such only makes outside
actors more likely to continue to engage in violence, and without necessarily increasing
the risk that the signatory peace will fail. Hence, in contrast to previous research the
findings indicate that to the extent that spoiler attacks from outside actors take place, it
does not seem to influence the conflict behavior of the signatories (Stedman 1997; e.g.
Downs and Stedman 2002).

The results were obtained while controlling for a number of factors which
previous research has identified as important for durable peace. Some of the control
variables are shown to significantly affect the risk that peace fails following a settlement,
and I will briefly reflect on a few of the most notable findings. Somewhat surprisingly a
few of the models indicate that if the political system is democratic rather than a semi-
democratic, the risk of violence is increased (table 1). It could be interesting to explore in
the mechanisms underlying this finding and also whether result holds if other measures of regime type are used. Another finding of this study concerns the role of third parties, or, more specifically, the presence of peacekeeping forces. The results at the dyadic level indicate that the non-UN peacekeeping forces are not very encouraging in terms of creating conditions for durable peace. Furthermore, the intensity of the conflict is found to significantly affect the risk that peace fails (table 1 and 2). The results show that those conflicts that have reached the level of war, prior to the signing of a settlement, are more likely to experience post-settlement violence. This is in line with some previous findings that show that particularly deadly wars are more likely to see the conflict resume.

In addition to controlling for these factors identified in previous research, a number of alternative specifications and statistical tests were carried out. For example, at both levels of analysis I have also employed other measures concerning several of the control variables. The two dummies Democracy and Autocracy have been replaced with a continuous measure based on the same Polity IV dataset. Similarly, the results also hold when using an alternative measure of the Number of Parties. Indeed, I examined the results employing a dummy to control for whether it is a two-party conflict or a conflict involving multiple parties. In addition, since the hypotheses are assessed using a Cox proportional hazards model, it is appropriate to test the assumption that the hazard is proportional. This is examined by performing tests based on the scaled Schoenfeld residuals, and both covariate-specific and global tests are carried out (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 132). None of the main models used to evaluate the hypotheses violates either the global test or the covariate-specific tests. In sum, the various specifications demonstrate the robustness of the results.

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30 However, the effect of this variable is in the opposite direction in model 2, table 1, although not statistically significant.

31 As an additional robustness check, the results are analyzed with a Weibull model, but the main results remain the same. Furthermore, the results are also robust to alternative specifications such as clustering on conflict or country.
Conclusions

This article set out to evaluate the claim in previous research that all warring parties are to be included in the settlement for peace to prevail. It was argued that all-inclusive peace deals are not the panacea for peace that many seem to believe. The theoretical expectations were well in line with the findings of this study. The results showed no support for the common claim that all warring parties are to be included in the settlement for peace to prevail. Also in line with my theoretical argument, inclusion was still shown to play a role, as it was found that signatories are more likely to stick to peace than parties outside of an agreement.

This study contributes to the scholarly literature in several ways. To begin with, by moving away from a characterization of civil war as involving only two parties and consider all rebel groups on the opposition side, it became possible to incorporate insights from case studies into the quantitative analysis. Thereby, this facilitated an inquiry into the global patterns of the claim on inclusive peace agreements (e.g. Hampson 1996). Furthermore, the analysis also could shed some light on our understanding of spoilers by showing that the exclusion of rebel groups from a settlement does not necessarily disrupt the peace among the signatories (e.g. Stedman 1997). At a more general level, by taking into account all rebel groups, this article contributes to the recent studies that in various ways attempt to take the empirical analysis one step further by disaggregating the study of civil war. Indeed, recent quantitative studies exploring the causes, dynamics and the resolution of civil wars, have shown the value of not oversimplifying events but instead refining our measures (e.g. Cunningham 2006; Cunningham et al. 2006).

But were to go next in the study of inclusion of rebel groups in civil war settlements? One implication of the argument that the warring parties are forward-looking is that some agreements never are materialized if the parties deem the prospects for peace so bleak that they see no point in signing a deal at all. Therefore, it may be of interest to further explore the conditions by which agreements are reached in civil wars with multiple actors. A fruitful avenue for future research is, hence, to look at this prior stage in this bargaining process.

An important conclusion from the present study for policymakers is that it may be worthwhile for third parties to try to facilitate agreements even if it proves difficult to bring all the parties to the negotiation table to sign a deal. The result that all-inclusive agreements are no panacea for peace is perhaps less discouraging than it first may
appear. The findings showed that inclusion still can make a difference for some parties, as signatories are more likely to stick to peace than parties outside of an agreement. Hence, third parties should not necessarily refrain from crafting deals that leave some actors on the outside. Indeed, this study could show that partial peace is possible.
### Table 1. All-Inclusive Deals and the Hazard of Peace Failing: Settlement Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All-Inclusive</td>
<td>2.291</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Parties</td>
<td>1.279</td>
<td>1.176*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Sharing</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>0.555**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(2.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Duration</td>
<td>0.937*</td>
<td>0.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>3.994***</td>
<td>2.478***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.18)</td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>1.428</td>
<td>1.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>1.157</td>
<td>0.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>1.137</td>
<td>1.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>3.612*</td>
<td>3.706**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
<td>(2.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>3.253**</td>
<td>2.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.19)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Failures</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-111,354</td>
<td>-178,810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A Cox proportional hazards model is employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported, with robust z statistics (given in parentheses) clustered on conflict. A ratio above one indicates an increase in the risk that peace fails, while a value below one decreases the risk that peace fails. *Statistically significant at the .10 level. **Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. Two-tailed tests are used.
Table 2. Exclusion and the Hazard of Peace Failing: Dyadic Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>2.170***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Parties</td>
<td>1.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyad Duration</td>
<td>0.984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyad Intensity</td>
<td>1.648*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>2.205**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>0.679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>2.283***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log GDP</td>
<td>1.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>1.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>0.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Failures</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-228.176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A Cox proportional hazards model is employed. Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported, with robust z statistics (given in parentheses) clustered on dyad. A ratio above one indicates an increase in the risk that peace fails, while a value below one decreases the risk that peace fails. *Statistically significant at the .10 level. **Statistically significant at the .05 level. ***Statistically significant at the .01 level. Two-tailed tests are used.
References


