FALINTIL REINSERTION ASSISTANT PROGRAM

(FRAP)

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

DILI, EAST TIMOR

JOHN MC CARTHY

June 2002

Funded by USAID

Opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration or USAID
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Chapter I is the executive summary, which provides a brief programmatic background prior to focusing primarily upon a summary of the general conclusions of the evaluation as well as principal recommendations. The conclusions and recommendations are addressed more fully in Chapter IV, which also includes a section on “future policy implications”.

Chapter II focuses on the performance and impact of FRAP, specifically concerning the degree to which the program has contributed to: the social and economic reintegration of FRAP beneficiaries; stability and security; and related objectives. This chapter also identifies the influence of external factors on reintegration; FRAP performance, and program outcomes.

Chapter III provides a brief summary of East Timor’s recent history, as well as a more detailed treatment of program background, specifically regarding the program environment, context, and specific antecedents that have influenced reintegration and FRAP implementation. Chapter II also includes a description of the FRAP program, program beneficiaries, as well as of the objectives of the evaluation, and the methodologies employed while conducting it. Summaries of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodological approaches are also included in this chapter.
Acknowledgements

There are some whose special contributions to the evaluation warrant particular acknowledgement. Representatives from IOM, USAID, and the World Bank deserve credit for their support to the evaluation. Thoughtful and informed feedback on the content of the following report, particularly from Nina Bowen and Edith Bowles of USAID in East Timor, was particularly valued and appreciated. Christopher Gascon and Oscar Sandoval of IOM provided unfettered access to information and considerable support necessary to conduct the evaluation. Walter Sanchez Arlt aided considerably in coordinating meetings, arranging logistics and providing all forms of help throughout the evaluation; he demonstrated enormous patience and characteristically tireless support in helping to bring the report to fruition. Natacha Meden, from the World Bank, generously shared her broad knowledge of East Timor and profound respect for the East Timorese people. IOM and former FRAP staff, from finance and administration to field staff, were without exception gracious in sharing their time, experiences and perspectives. I am grateful to Prabhat Dixit, for his contributions regarding the tracer study and sample survey as well as for his sage advice and wisdom. Veronica Das Dores was indispensable throughout the evaluation and for many reasons. She helped plan fieldwork, interviews, and meetings (often serving as translator and facilitator). Veronica ensured that I understood not only the East Timorese context, but also the sensitivities, values, and perceptions of FALINTIL veterans, their families, and neighbors.

I am grateful for the access and responsiveness provided by East Timorese Officials, including the members of the East Timorese Defense Forces’ High Command, and members of UNTAET especially current and former members of the Office of National Security Advisor and the Department of Political Affairs. I am indebted to Ed Rees, Nicola Dahrendorf, Jim Della-Giacoma, Warren Knight, Ian White, and Ciara Knudsen for sharing their time, energy, sharp insights, and energetic contributions.

Finally, I am sincerely grateful to the FALINTIL veterans who were remarkably forthcoming in sharing perspectives, concerns, and aspirations. These are honorable people, many of whom have suffered and courageously sacrificed to advance a set of values and principles. Their future is an independent East Timor that has been undergoing its own dramatic transition. Their country, whose independence they fought for, will undoubtedly face difficulties along its path. The challenge before the veterans and other East Timorese is how they will contribute as citizens to overcoming those difficulties. A friend walking through the Independence ceremony on May 20th came across a group of FALINTIL veterans sitting on the ground far to the back of the crowd, and slightly removed from everyone else. “I watched them for a while and then went up and shook hands wishing them congratulations and success,” he said, adding “it seemed poignant, as though they were still in the mountains, watching from afar. Did they look left out? I’d say they looked like they were keeping an eye on things.”

Jack McCarthy
June 2002
### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFC ’75</td>
<td>Association of former combatants from 1975</td>
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<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>UN’s International Civilian Police Force</td>
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<td>CPD/RDTL</td>
<td>Committee for the Popular Defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor: political organization that has not competed in recent UN administered elections, but is involved in extensive organizational efforts. Linked with AFC ’75.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRFV</td>
<td>Commission for the Reinsertion of FALINTIL Veterans</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace-Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>DVOs</td>
<td>District Veteran Officers (FRAP staff at the district levels, who were also veterans and beneficiaries)</td>
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<td>ETPS</td>
<td>East Timor Police Service, English acronym for East Timor’s police force (or TLPS)</td>
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<td>ETTA</td>
<td>East Timor Transitional Administration</td>
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<td>ETTP</td>
<td>East Timor Provisional Administration</td>
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<td>FALINTIL</td>
<td>Forcas Armadas de Liberacao Nacional de Timor Leste (East Timorese National Liberation Army)</td>
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<td>Sagrada Familia</td>
<td>Sacred Family</td>
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<td>FBs</td>
<td>FRAP beneficiaries</td>
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<td>FDTL (or ETDF)</td>
<td>Forca Defensa Timor Lorosae (Portuguese acronym for the East Timor Defense Force, or ETDF)</td>
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<td>FRAP</td>
<td>FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program</td>
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<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GET</td>
<td>Government of East Timor</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>UN-sponsored International Force in East Timor</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Isolados”</td>
<td>“Isolated,” Issue or grievance based group. Term references those who claim to have participated in the resistance but often in isolation from other organized efforts (e.g. within FALINTIL.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAM</td>
<td>World Bank-led Joint Assessment Mission (e.g. to East Timor in 1999 following the referendum)</td>
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<td>KOPASSUS</td>
<td>Indonesian Army Special Forces Command</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>ODFD</td>
<td>Office of Defense Force Development</td>
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<td>OMT</td>
<td>Portuguese acronym for Organization of Timorese Women</td>
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<td>ONSA</td>
<td>UN Office of National Security Advisor</td>
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<td>OTI</td>
<td>Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDTL</td>
<td>Republica Democratica de Timor Leste (Democratic Republic of East Timor)</td>
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<td>SID</td>
<td>Strategic Information Department, within CIVPOL</td>
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<td>Tetum</td>
<td>Major local dialect in East Timor; a national language</td>
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<td>TNI</td>
<td>Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)</td>
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<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor (supervised referendum)</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Program</td>
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<td>UNDPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNMOs</td>
<td>UN Military Observers</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPKF (or PKF)</td>
<td>UN Peace Keeping Force</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNTIM</td>
<td>Universitas Timor-Timur (University of East Timor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Vocational Training Center</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>UN World Food Program</td>
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Chapter I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 Introduction: Rather than gaining the independence achieved by many other Portuguese colonies in the mid-1970’s,¹ East Timor’s aspirations were denied as a result of an invasion in 1975 by the Indonesian armed forces. Most countries deemed Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor illegitimate and illegal.² East Timorese opposition and resistance to Indonesian control began immediately, and continued throughout the next 24 years, despite the asymmetry of power distinguishing the adversaries.³ The resistance movement evolved into three identifiable categories or branches, namely the: external diplomatic branch; internal clandestine branch; and the armed or military branch, known in Portuguese as the Forcas Armadas de Liberacao Nacional de Timor Leste – more commonly referred to as FALINTIL.

Widespread and widely publicized violence, sponsored by Indonesian security forces, occurred in the aftermath of a referendum won by a clear majority of East Timorese favoring independence. Indonesia renounced its previous annexation and withdrew its security forces under the supervision of UN forces sent to the territory to restore calm and order following the mayhem of the post-referendum violence. A more expansive UN Mission with peacekeeping forces was authorized to oversee the administration and security of East Timor during its transition leading to independence. Among many priorities that needed to be addressed during the transition period was the demobilization and reintegration of FALINTIL forces. The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (or FRAP) was developed with the objective to assist the social and economic reintegration of the 1,308 members from the guerrilla force not selected to join the newly established East Timorese Defense Forces (ETDF).

FRAP was implemented by IOM and financed by the World Bank and USAID, otherwise referred to in this report as the principal donors.⁴ The implementing agency and primary donors also served on the steering committee overseeing FRAP, known as the Commission for the Reinsertion of FALINTIL Veterans (or CRFV). The CRFV also included other key stakeholders, representing the FALINTIL High Command and various agencies and offices from the UN’s Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) – specifically Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) and the Office of National Security (ONSA). The head of ONSA chaired the CRFV.

An external evaluation of FRAP was initiated in mid-March and was conducted an independent consultant. The evaluation’s objective was to assess the impact and performance of the program, particularly in terms of its contribution to the reintegration of the 1,308 former combatants, who came to be known as FRAP beneficiaries. The implementing agency and principal donors, with input from the other CRFV members, were responsible for developing the scope of work for the evaluation, which was financed by USAID. IOM, USAID, the World Bank, and other organizations represented in the CRFV are considered the primary audience for this report. These organizations, their representatives, and FRAP beneficiaries are also considered to be key stakeholders in terms of FRAP, and are referred to as such in this report.

¹ Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome e Principe gained independence in this era.
² Australia was the most notable exception to the majority of countries that protested the Indonesian invasion and subsequent occupation of East Timor. US opposition to the invasion was muted and reportedly disingenuous.
³ Indonesia has a population of 200 million (and the region’s most powerful army) while East Timor’s is 800,00.
⁴ Japan and Canada also provided some complementary funding to IOM that contributed toward FRAP’s objectives.
1.1 Program background, context, and overview: FALINTIL forces, as per an agreement between their leadership and the UN, remained in cantonment throughout the period leading up to the national referendum. FALINTIL forces exhibited considerable discipline by not responding to provocations of Indonesian sponsored violence leading up to and particularly following the referendum. In addition to the courage exhibited in making this decision, East Timor’s leaders also demonstrated political savvy and sophistication by recognizing their goal of independence would ultimately be achieved by not fighting. With the arrival of INTERFET and the departure of Indonesian troops, FALINTIL leadership agreed its forces would continue to stay in cantonment and consolidated their troops in Aileu. Many members of FALINTIL stayed there for up to 14 months, until February 2001, when 650 were selected from among the roughly 1,900 former guerrillas to join the ETDF. The remaining (1308) members were demobilized and told they could expect help from the IOM-implemented FRAP that would assist their transition from the life of a combatant to that of a civilian.

FRAP was developed in 2000 through a collaborative effort that included IOM; FALINTIL leadership; and the principle donors. The objective of FRAP was to assist the social and economic reintegration of FALINTIL veterans into civilian society. The beneficiaries were those FALINTIL veterans who were either not chosen-- or chose not-- to join the ETDF. IOM conducted a socio-economic survey (SES) of all FALINTIL in December 2000, the results of which were intended to inform the High Command’s selection of members for the ETDF, as well as provide IOM the basis for better responding to the needs of those who would become FRAP beneficiaries. Registration began in January 2001, and the implementation phase began in earnest upon the demobilization of FALINTIL in early February, and concluded in December 2001. During the year-long program period, FRAP was to have registered beneficiaries and provided a number of services and benefits to assist the reintegration of those demobilized. These included: transport to their host communities, a transitional safety net (or TSN) consisting of a $500 subsidy provided over a 5-month period; a reintegration package or income generating activity; training; as well as job and medical referrals.

1.2 Evaluation Objective: The overarching objective of the evaluation was to assess the impact of the program activities implemented under the FRAP in terms of their contribution to social and economic integration of ex-combatants.

1.3 General Conclusions: The evaluation’s primary conclusions include the following:

1.3.1 FRAP has been largely successful in achieving its overall and primary objectives to regarding the social and economic reintegration of demobilized FALINTIL. In fact, despite some program weaknesses and external factors that adversely affected program performance, FRAP has achieved perhaps more than could reasonably have been expected -- particularly within the implementation period of one year.

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5 See for example Lyndal and Sophie Barry’s compelling documentary entitled “Viva Timor Loro Sa’e” with contemporary footage of, and interviews with, the leadership of FALINTIL and other principals concerning this period, the decision, and its underlying rationale.

6 The terms of reference (TOR) are included as Annex II of this report.
a) The large majority of (the 1,308) FRAP beneficiaries have clearly made considerable progress to date with respect to their social and economic reintegration into their communities and society. This success is largely attributable to FRAP, as well as a reasonably favorable enabling environment, and the attributes of the FALINTIL veterans. FRAP was successful in terms of its impact and contributions to development objectives, as well as to both stability and security.

b) Despite the above referenced achievements regarding the vast majority of FRAP beneficiaries; there is a portion whose continuing needs warrant attention. As many as 15% of the beneficiaries, or 200 -- generally older, more senior, or physically impaired -- veterans appear to be experiencing more acute difficulties in the transition process from former combatants to civilian life. These veterans, while having benefited from FRAP, are believed to have had more profound needs since demobilization and continue to have some basic or special needs beyond -- or in addition to -- what FRAP was able to provide. Their conditions have limited the degree and rate of their economic and social reintegration; their relative vulnerability has both wider and potentially significant implications.

1.3.2. FRAP has provided a solid foundation of programmatic achievements on which to build upon -- in order to consolidate and advance the ongoing social and economic reintegration of demobilized veterans, including the estimated 15% of the beneficiaries whose post-FRAP needs may warrant special attention. With regard to the latter, their reintegration is also adversely affected by the plight of those who did not receive benefits, especially those generally considered as meriting them. The “Forgotten” as they are frequently referred to by particularly older and more senior veterans, are those -- for one reason or another -- who were never included on the FALINTIL High Command’s “Master List” as eligible for FRAP benefits and therefore were not assisted by IOM or FRAP. The “Forgotten” are said by veterans to include:

a) Some former FALINTIL combatants who (generally as a result of age, poor health, or wounds) left the guerrilla force prior to the late 1990s;

b) Some other FALINTIL veterans (with estimates ranging as high as 2 – 300) who may have met the eligibility criteria for FRAP participation, but through design or omission, were not designated as eligible to participate in FRAP; and,

c) Widows, orphans of FALINTIL combatants killed during the conflict.

The extent to which the interests of the “Forgotten” are perceived as legitimate but remain unattended will (continue to) adversely effect the further gains and consolidation of achievements concerning the reintegration process among some FRAP beneficiaries.

1.3.3 FRAP generated discernible and ongoing benefits that have contributed to security and stability since its initiation, as well as additional benefits in these respects over the medium, and some extent, longer-terms. FRAP provided responsiveness and viable options at a time when there was a considerable, credible, and growing threat for potential violence that was particularly pronounced during final period of cantonment and immediately following demobilization, when the fear, frustration, and anger of FALINTIL veterans were at a high point. During its implementation, FRAP continued to provide a point of contact, benefits, and options that generated externalities favoring stability and security. FRAP’s successful efforts to assist the reintegration of FALINTIL veterans has diminished significantly the risk of the overwhelming
majority of FRAP beneficiaries of either being, or becoming, involved in threats to East Timor’s security and stability.

a) While there are other serious challenges and perhaps threats emanating from security groups – a large majority of FRAP beneficiaries veterans would generally and reliably be expected to oppose the these groups and their objectives.

b) This firm assessment will need to be modified somewhat -- particularly in specific geographic areas (Baucau, Viqueque) – depending on how the Government of East Timor (GET) and other key stakeholders respond to the challenges and risks associated with security groups; the people comprising their membership; and those considered vulnerable to recruitment.

1.3.4 Issue- or grievance- based security groups with questionable or ambiguous motives pose considerable, rapidly growing, and complex challenges for the Government of East Timor (GET). These challenges, and emerging risks, have potentially serious implications for stability and security. A number of key stakeholders, including the UN, ETDF, FRAP beneficiaries, and other informed observers have expressed growing concern about the security groups considerable recruitment of members, expanding presence and intimidation of local communities, and the military style drills and martial training that the groups have been sponsoring.\(^7\) The new government will need to better and more accurately define the nature and scope of challenges emanating from security groups as a prelude to responding effectively and appropriately. A failure to effectively respond to the serious level and nature of challenges posed by security groups seems likely to result in the prospect of at least localized violence, and perhaps some credible threats to the broader security and stability interests of East Timor, its nascent institutions, and fledgling experiment with self-rule and democratic processes.

a) The overwhelming majority of people affiliated with grievance- or issue- based security groups were never members of FALINTIL or FRAP beneficiaries; although a relatively and comparatively few of them are. Rather, the majority of membership of security groups seems to be comprised of: former members of the clandestine network; former (largely non-combatant) “veterans” from the first few years of resistance who generally feel they are owed recognition and compensation; as well as opportunists and political activists with somewhat ill defined or amorphous objectives.

b) Security groups are continuing attempts to build upon their apparently limited success to date in recruiting FRAP beneficiaries as well as members of the ‘Forgotten’. Some political organizations (especially CPD/RDTL and ASDT), have sought to capitalize on the sense of grievance that affects a good many of the people who consider themselves excluded. These and perhaps other political groups have supported the “Association of Former Combatants of ‘75” (AFC ‘75) one of the primary groups that has generated considerable (and legitimate) concern.

c) Security groups like AFC ’75 claim to have 25,000 members,\(^8\) while UN estimates place the number at closer to 5 or 6,000. Some of their actions -- specifically military-like parades, martial training, demonstrations, and intimidation of others in the communities where they are most active -- have been documented and verified. Informed UN sources indicate that training exercises involving a total of nearly 2,000 participants have taken place in 22 different sites

\(^7\) The UN’s most recent threat assessment reportedly ascribes risks associated with these groups as a 3 or 4 on a scale of 10, with 10 being the most serious.

\(^8\) Although the figure is likely to be inflated, it is based on information provided in interviews by representatives from AFC ’75, FRAP beneficiaries, local stakeholders, as well as a review of the groups’ documents.
d) The “Isolados” and “Familia Sagrada” are two other groups generating concern and appear to be most active, though not restricted to, the Baucau, Liquica, and Viqueque regions. These groups are reliably reported to count within their leadership, a number of former commanders from FALINTIL. The groups also appear to share complementary or coincidental objectives with AFC ’75, and to garner support from the same political groups (ASTD and CPD/RDTL).

e) The degree to which some FRAP beneficiaries and members of the group of the “Forgotten” are found to be living in precarious conditions suggests they may also be more vulnerable to manipulation by AFC ’75 or other such groups. Among other effects, such recruitment efforts, if successful, may well serve to validate the grievances and add to the perceived legitimacy of otherwise questionable demands emanating from security groups.

1.3.5 Confusion about who actually constitutes the membership in groups like AFC ’75, has led to false or erroneous conclusions, among them -- the extent of involvement by FRAP beneficiaries with such groups. The degree to which the nature and membership of security groups are misdiagnosed not only does an enormous disservice to the overwhelming majority of FRAP beneficiaries who seem to be unjustifiably considered as a core constituency, but more importantly diminishes the chances that the real challenges will fail to be effectively addressed, and in an appropriate manner. There is a good deal of confusion about the extent to which actual FALINTIL veterans who participated in FRAP are also involved with suspicious and conspiracy minded security groups.\(^9\) The following are some identified sources of confusion.

a) Even though relatively few of those affiliated with security groups such as ACF ’75 were ever veterans of FALINTIL the group and most members identify themselves as belonging to one of the following categories: FALINTIL/OPS; Ex-FALINTIL; and FBA (Forces Bases de Apoio)\(^10\), which has added to the confusion between actual FALINTIL veterans and posers.

b) Specifically, there appears to be a failure to make important distinctions between:
   - Actual FRAP beneficiaries (numbering 1,308) versus former members of the clandestine network (estimated to be roughly 18,000 individuals); and,
   - Actual FALINTIL veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries versus the dubious or patently false claims of others identifying themselves as FALINTIL/OPS; ex-FALINTIL; or FBA.

c) Such classifications or self-identification, understandably perhaps, appears to have led to confusion in many sectors, apparently including members of CIVPOL and by extension those within UNTAET who may rely upon information and analyses generated by CIVPOL. Consequently, there is a concern that the degree to which there is erroneous information or intelligence of dubious validity – coupled with analysis resulting from faulty premises – may contribute not only to misunderstanding, but also misguided responses and policy.

d) In addition to the potentially serious implications resulting from this tendency -- to confuse actual FALINTIL veterans from those claiming to be -- the status, legacy, and identity of true FALINTIL veterans, is also, to some extent, put at risk.

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\(^9\) The perspective, intelligence and resulting analyses emanating from CIVPOL’s Strategic Information Department (SID) in particular are indicative of this confusion.

\(^10\) FALINTIL/OPS refers to “operations”; this category and ex-FALINTIL were said by an organizer from AFC ’75 to refer to distinct services performed by clandestine members during resistance, while FBA refers more generally to supporters of the resistance, armed and other.
1.4 Success, Limiting, and Negative Factors (influencing FRAP performance and impact):
While not without some weaknesses, the overall performance of the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program and its impact have been largely positive, and on multiple levels. The following highlights a number of factors (including program strengths and weaknesses) that influenced FRAP performance and impact.

1.4.1 Success Factors: FRAP components, and the manner that the program was implemented placed greater emphasis on economic over social reintegration.\(^{11}\) IOM was ever conscious of contributing to the objectives of enhancing stability and security, and probably more so than achieving successful developmental goals.\(^{12}\) In terms of program performance and impact, the effective economic reintegration of course has favored socialization. The responsiveness of FRAP, and the options and opportunities provided by its components,\(^{13}\) contributed to enhanced stability and security, on a number of levels. Developmental objectives were also more successful, in some respects dramatically so, than one might have expected. Some success factors concerning FRAP performance were paramount. First, IOM and FRAP management as well as staff were enormously dedicated; generally quite capable; and worked tirelessly to effectively implement the program to benefit a group -- for whom they had high regard. Individual and ongoing efforts, like those of Veronica Das Dores, stand out in particular. Secondly, the representatives from the principle donors dealing with FRAP provided much more than access to funding -- they provided vital, substantive, and on-going input, support, and guidance to the program and those implementing it. Finally, as referenced in the general conclusions, a reasonably positive environment (favoring social reintegration in particular), and the character of the demobilized FALINTIL veterans, were two primary external factors that positively influenced reintegration, FRAP’s performance and impact.

1.4.2 Limiting Factors: Time and money -- the omnipresent factors limiting any program -- have affected FRAP’s implementation performance and resulting outcomes. IOM’s utilitarian approach, regarding FRAP’s design and implementation, has managed to generate the largest amount of benefits for the greatest number of beneficiaries. Still, program resources and duration were a limiting factor, among others, that affected FRAP’s capacity to more effectively address more complex needs, and those more specific to the circumstances of the 200 or so FRAP beneficiaries who continue to face difficulties in their process of reintegration. Resources and time were also factors precluding as many as 300 former FALINTIL who arguably merited benefits from receiving reintegration benefits when the High Command raised their cases after July 2001. With respect to the sustainability of the gains derived from the income-generating activities, there remain some outstanding questions since all were initiated less than a year ago.\(^{14}\)

\(^{11}\) For example by providing funds for the transition (TSN) and income generating activities rather than counseling, transition- or sensitivity- training, which have been considerable components supporting social reintegration efforts in demobilization programs elsewhere.
\(^{12}\) Veterans, particularly at the outset, tended to view benefits as an entitlement more than an opportunity; FRAP was successful in helping beneficiaries feeling as though their needs and claims were being responded to, while the reintegration package and training also favored increased perceptions of benefits as an opportunity.
\(^{13}\) The TSN, income generating projects and training were among the most important, and valued components.
\(^{14}\) This is more accurately a limitation of the capacity of the evaluation to discern more complete benefits or problems, rather than a limitation of FRAP’s performance or impact.
A number of external factors, such as the plight of the forgotten has also had, and continues to have, an adverse effect -- particularly regarding the social reintegration of older, more senior veterans. The absence of UNDP, the UN agency focusing on longer term or developmentally oriented activities, may or may not have been helpful in enhancing FRAP performance or impact, although its participation would likely enhanced the probability that appropriate follow up to FRAP would be supported, especially concerning longer term objectives to build upon the achievements of FRAP and the reintegration process to date. The participation of Timorese civilian leadership in FRAP seemed marginal at best. The limited capacity, competing priorities, and inconsistent participation of FALINTIL (and ETDF) High Command were clearly limiting factors that influenced reintegration generally and FRAP’s performance more specifically. While the reasons for the limited participation of Timorese officials and institutions may be readily comprehensible -- given numerous other priorities and extremely limited resources -- there were consequences in terms of reintegration, FRAP’s performance, and impact.

1.4.3 Negative Factors: In terms of programmatic antecedents, many veterans spent up to 14 months in cantonment living in conditions considered marginal at best. This extremely negative experience concluded with a selection process for the ETDF that was widely perceived by veterans as biased and unfair. These two factors in many ways have had some lasting negative effects regarding some aspects of reintegration. As a result of these combined and cumulative experiences, some veterans felt marginalized, while others developed feelings -- ranging from antipathy to ambivalence -- toward former commanders and, by association, to some GET institutions like the ETDF. Consequently many veterans saw FRAP as the “only one helping”.

In terms of design, IOM’s initial plans to provide benefits that emphasized cash, training, and tools or materials to facilitate reinsertion and reintegration would likely have been far less effective and successful. This limited approach was jettisoned in favor of a more comprehensive one that also emphasized income generating activities -- ultimately the component valued most highly by participating veterans. Other questionable design features, such as the termination of benefits during the program for those participants managing to obtain full-time employment were also eschewed in favor of more rational and effective approaches. Finally, FRAP’s failure to adequately analyze the data and findings from socio-economic survey (SES) conducted prior to FRAP’s implementation was a shortcoming that limited IOM’s and FRAP’s capacity to effectively monitor and report on progress and obstacles during implementation, as well as other negative effects addressed in the body of the report.

1.5 Recommendations: The following are recommendation for consideration by key stakeholders.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{15}}\text{ Perceptions of being marginalized and excluded also tended to enhance the level of appreciation FRAP beneficiaries had for FRAP and IOM, and perhaps ultimately to have, in some regards, to have been a net positive result, especially concerning the reconciliation of expectations with reality.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{16}}\text{ This willingness and capacity to change a key design feature, positively influenced by donors among others, also speaks well of IOM and FRAP’s flexibility.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\text{ See for example, the “Eligibility Criteria” (section 2.4.7) of the FRAP Operations Manual, p. 3}\]
1.5.1 Support the efforts of the newly established Office of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) to consolidate and build upon the achievements of FRAP and the advances made by veterans, by assisting the ongoing and longer term processes of reintegration.

   a) Provide particular attention to older, longer-serving, and disabled veterans, while also responding to opportunities associated with the clear progress of the vast majority of the other FRAP beneficiaries.

   b) Prioritize the provision of at least information and referrals to legitimate FALINTIL veterans and their families, specifically concerning existing or emerging opportunities, services, and dynamics (e.g. security groups) of particular interest and relevance to FALINTIL veterans.

   c) Complete the analysis of data from the socio-economic survey (SES) to help inform decision-making concerning assistance to veterans, their families, and their communities. Despite some shortcomings, the data was updated by IOM through December 2001, and it remains by far the most comprehensive, objective, and reliable source of information about this critical segment of East Timorese society. The VA could benefit from this information and also use the database and completed analysis for monitoring and tracking ongoing performance of the longer term reintegration processes.\textsuperscript{18}

1.5.2 Discretely assess the scope, scale, and nature of the needs associated with the Forgotten, as a pre-cursor to developing a policy, and possible programmatic response, in response legitimate needs and claims. Readily available talent exists within East Timor for discretely obtaining more reliable figures and defining the numbers, characteristics, and basic needs of the people belonging to this category and without raising expectations. Either the proposed Office of Veterans’ Affairs or another office in the Ministry of Labor and Solidarity can be delegated with responsibility for serving as the GET counterpart for donors supporting this discrete assessment.

1.5.3 Improve and enhance the quality of information about security groups on a priority basis as a necessary precursor to responding, effectively and appropriately, to the challenges they pose on various levels. The prevailing assumption within UNTAET seems to be that organized threats to the security of East Timor from groups, like AFC ’75, do not appear to be imminent in part because the groups lack the capability to mount such as threat. Another key assumption by the UN is reportedly that GET efforts to curb the activities of these groups (military parades and martial training) could prove counterproductive. Both assumptions may be correct. However, given apparent weaknesses in gathering and analyzing at least some pertinent intelligence, it may also be likely that the resulting analysis and assumptions and consequently threat assessments are just plain wrong.

   a) Conduct an independent conflict vulnerability assessment (CVA) in order to more accurately and reliably assess challenges and risks; better inform key decision-makers; and decisions regarding effective and appropriate responses to challenges and threats.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18} It would cost an estimated $10,000 to have the SES data adequately analyzed with in-country human resources available. The SES is maintained as an MS ACCESS database, which is a standard, off-the-shelf, software package, with which many East Timorese technicians and professionals are familiar.

\textsuperscript{19} CVA incorporates risk assessment, but adds to it a studied judgment of the capacity of a country or community to cope with risk factors – to manage tensions, to contain violence, or to rebuild the torn social fabric after violence has been contained.
b) The TOR for this effort should concentrate on a number of issues associated with the current challenges and potential future threats posed by security groups. The analysis should also concentrate on assessing underlying reasons for the growth of security groups, while focusing as well on the characteristics and claims of its membership. Priority emphasis of the study should also be placed on the implications of involvement by former members of the clandestine network; at least two former FALINTIL commanders; and the leaders and members of CPD/RDTL.

c) Resulting analysis should seek to address relevant institutional issues and dynamics, including the:

i. Creation and role a intelligence agency currently under discussion;

ii. Continuing involvement and future role of the FDTL in domestic intelligence gathering generally, and particularly regarding security groups and former FALINTIL members; and,

iii. Role of ETPS in dealing not only with challenges posed by security groups, but also in how the newly established police force can improve its sometimes problematic relationship with veterans.

d) Finally, the independent analysis, or CVA, should provide recommendations on how various GET institutions (including security and development oriented agencies) might respond jointly and severally to effectively addressing challenges or threats in a manner consistent with the new constitution.

1.5.4 Donors should consider supporting the preceding recommendations and working closely with the Government of East Timor to develop the necessary capacities, policies and --where appropriate-- programmatic responses: especially those regarding efforts to further advance and consolidate the ongoing reintegration process; and to better assess and respond to potential and apparently growing security threats.

a) A number of the GET’s new institutions will require UN and other donor assistance to enhance their capacities; The recently established Office of Veteran Affairs should figure prominently among those destined for priority assistance, especially regarding its capacities to conduct analyses, formulate policies, and inform programmatic responses. Ultimately, an investment in reducing actual or potential sources of conflict is an investment in development. A social ministry can often contribute more, and more appropriately, toward this end than security oriented agencies.

b) Donors and the GET may also wish to consider support either a new or ongoing initiative or program that employs practical approaches for monitoring and responding to local sources of tension and conflict at various levels, including areas considered particularly problematic. Illustrative interventions might initially focus on expanding access to independent and reliable sources of information that will contribute to conflict mitigation and reconciliation, while also strengthening existing (and traditional) capacities for doing the same.
CHAPTER II: Evaluation’s objectives, methodologies employed, and Program Background

This chapter defines the objectives of the evaluation, and describes the methodologies employed during it in order to assess FRAP’s performance and impact. In addition, the chapter also provides a historical background, context, and historical antecedents followed by a brief overview of FRAP and FRAP beneficiaries.

2.0 The Objectives of the evaluation are to discern the impact of the program activities implemented under the FRAP Program in terms of their contribution to social and economic integration of ex-combatants, and to identify lessons learned. The evaluation is intended to assess the:

- Quality of the assistance provided;
- Degree of participation by the intended beneficiaries; and,
- Overall level of satisfaction with the program.

The evaluation is intended to assess the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) that was implemented in East Timor between January and December 2001 and well as some antecedent and other external factors which have influenced reintegration as well as the performance and impact of FRAP. FRAP was designed to contribute to the stability of East Timor by providing social and economic reintegration assistance to just over 1300 former guerrilla soldiers who were returning to civilian life. The nature of the assistance provided was intended to help participants: return and rejoin their communities; manage the early transition from ex-combatant to civilian; gain access to training, if interested; and establish viable income-generating activities.

2.0.1 From the perspectives of IOM and the donors, primarily USAID and the World Bank, there is an interest in having an external assessment of the design, management, implementation of the program. For the principals or key stakeholders involved, there is perhaps as much or greater interest in the sustainability of whatever achievements have been achieved through FRAP, as well as in the future policy considerations that may need to be considered, regarding the current and likely future status of FALINTIL veterans.

2.0.2 From the perspective of UNTAET, the interest may also be in a more forward-looking analysis for many of the same reasons, i.e. policy considerations and perhaps to a certain degree to benefit from another perspective regarding potential opportunities and of risks that will challenge the new administration in East Timor and its nascent government institutions.

2.0.3 From the perspective of the East Timorese Government: The Government of East Timor (GET) may be interested in the efficacy of efforts to attend to the needs of such a critical constituency. Without a doubt the incoming administration and new state institutions will be compelled to deal with a range of priority issues, including some that concern FALINTIL veterans; others who were either correctly or incorrectly excluded from FRAP, and a host of other related policy considerations. Hopefully, the evaluation will not only help to accurately portray the status of the ongoing reintegration process and the impact of the FRAP, but also

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20 Interview with Dennis McNamara, Deputy UNSGSR for UNTAET.
identify pertinent risks and opportunities and contribute toward informed decision-making concerning the ongoing reintegration process.

**2.1 Methodologies Employed:** This external evaluation was conducted by an independent consultant contracted by the implementing agency (IOM) with USAID funding and guidance from both principal donors. IOM, USAID, and the World Bank assisted the evaluator in a number of ways. His field work was assisted by an East Timorese consultant, and FALINTIL veteran, who frequently served as an interpreter and facilitator in the numerous meetings throughout the country that were conducted in languages other than Portuguese or English. The assistant was employed by the implementing agency, and more specifically served as FRAP’s national project officer, or coordinator between May 2001 until the conclusion of the program at the end of that year. The evaluator arrived in East Timor on March 15, 2002 and conducted interviews, research, and field work for roughly 5 weeks, before departing for the U.S. via London, where an interview was conducted with a well-informed observer and key participant in many issues concerning demobilization and reintegration in East Timor, and FRAP implementation in particular. Three primary methods were employed in order to provide complementary results and findings that would inform the evaluation of FRAP and the impact of its assistance in terms of the social and economic reintegration of FALINTIL veterans. These methods included:

1. Interviews with key stakeholders;
2. Focus group discussions (involving over 160 FRAP beneficiaries in 5 districts; and,
3. A Tracer Study and sample survey (of 240 FRAP beneficiaries in 7 districts).

The remainder of this section provides an overview and summary descriptions of these primary methods employed by, or in support, of this evaluation. The descriptions of each are followed by an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of approaches.

**2.1.2 Description of Methodologies:** This evaluation report seeks to emphasize the perceptions of the participants and key stakeholders concerning the demobilization and reintegration processes generally, as well as in assessing the performance and impact of FRAP in assisting veterans through this process of fundamental change and transition. The use of in–depth interviews and group discussions in selected communities or sites has also permitted the identification of external factors governing the changes in the target population, FRAP beneficiaries, and helped to determine impacts, including those associated to the program’s interventions and other factors. The evaluation report also draws upon the results of two surveys. The first is the socio-economic survey (SES) of the future beneficiaries of FRAP conducted by IOM in December, 2000. The second, sample survey (SS), was conducted at the end-of-project and is included with the Tracer Study initiated prior to this evaluation.

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21 Nicola Dahrendorf, currently King’s College in London, previously served: on the evaluation team of the King’s College Independent Study; as UNTAET’s national security advisor, and as chair of the CRFV during FRAP implementation.
The methodologies employed for this evaluation were intended to draw upon a number of complementary mechanisms to accurately reflect both qualitative and quantitative sources. In addition to referencing the available results and analyses emanating from the surveys, the findings were derived from other primarily qualitative methods. Specifically, these included: focus group discussions with veterans and in depth interviews with key informants and stakeholders, including: community members, project staff, CRFV members, and other informed and interested parties with a stake in the reintegration process and outcomes.

2.1.2.1 Interviews with key stakeholders were conducted from mid-March through April 2002 in Dili, the Districts and beyond, in order for the evaluation to benefit from the informed perspectives of (over 60) individuals involved in – or affected by -- the demobilization, reintegration, and related processes. Apart from the FRAP beneficiaries, most of the individuals interviewed either work, or had worked, for the: UN; donors, implementing agency and partners; Government of East Timor, including the former High Command of FAINTIL and current leaders from the ETDF; the Constituent Assembly; private sector; international and local NGOs; veterans’ and other associations; religious organizations; as well as Dili-based foreign representatives of diplomatic, military, and intelligence sectors. In depth interviews were also conducted with more senior veterans who were demobilized, including L-7 and other former commanders, as well as with some members of their families, local officials, and representatives of other previously cited institutions at the community and District levels.

a. Strengths: Interviews with a wide range of key stakeholders provided the evaluator with access to diverse sources of information, perspectives, and appraisals from many well-informed individuals. Frequently, the interviewees were either directly or indirectly involved in key aspects of FRAP or the demobilization and reintegration processes more generally. The nature of the involvement ranged from key decision-makers to others who performed vital roles in past and present issues concerning FALINTIL veterans. Most of the individuals, and frequently the institutions they represented, have had a stake in the outcome of IOM’s efforts to assist veterans in reintegrating as civilians into their host communities. Many will continue to be affected by the issues relating to the future status of FALINTIL veterans in the ongoing process of reintegration.

b. Weaknesses: The departure from East Timor of some international people – involved in vital processes, decisions, or possessing valuable perspectives – provided some difficulties, that to a large extent were addressed by email and the continued presence and availability of many international actors and key stakeholders still located in East Timor. It would have been useful to conduct additional interviews with veterans (including a former FALINTIL commander) widely considered to be involved with security groups such as the “Isolados” or other groups causing considerable (and legitimate) concern among well-informed observers and stakeholders.

2.1.2.2 Focus group meetings were intended to bring together between 10 and 15 FRAP beneficiaries together for semi-structured discussions where they could share perspectives both as former members of FALINTIL, demobilized combatants, and as FRAP beneficiaries attempting to reintegrate into civilian society. Six focus group meetings were held in 5 districts outside of Dili, specifically: Los Palos; Bâca; Liquica; Maliana; and Ermera. These areas were selected.

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See list of contacts included as Annex III.
for a number of reasons, including the degrees to which the areas, conditions, and participants were representative and typical (or specifically atypical) of those associated with the FRAP beneficiaries more generally (or possessing unique characteristics considered important to a more complete assessment). A conscious effort was made in the selection process to focus on some districts not included within the sample survey in order to benefit from more diverse sources of information in differing environs. Some districts selected for the focus group meetings were same as those chosen for the SS, permitting the evaluator to gauge for consistency and the validity of the SS findings, and gain additional insights beyond those provided by the survey results. This enabled the evaluator to gain a greater exposure to the underlying rationale of responses to the survey and greater appreciation for the context.

The semi-structured discussions focused on issues and questions central to the evaluation objectives --primarily whether or not these ex-combatants were becoming meaningfully reintegrated both socially and economically and how they were managing the transition into civilian life within their communities. Our intention was to hold a series of focus group meetings with an average of 15 participants who were FALINTIL veterans and FRAP beneficiaries. In 4 of the 5 Districts held (Baucau; Los Palos; Liquica; and, Maliana), we averaged just that. However, in Ermera, where we had anticipated meeting with up to 15 participants in one Focus Group meeting, we instead met (separately) with two groups with over 45 participants in each meeting, held in neighboring communities (Vila and Gleno). The wholly unexpected and quite amazing turnout was even more remarkable considering that the individuals participating had only two days advance notice of the meeting. Regarding the average lengths of the meetings, we had anticipated that they would last over 2 hours; they tended to average closer to 3, and were frequently followed by instructive discussions afterwards in smaller groups.

During the second half of each FG meeting (with the exceptions of Baucau and Liquica), we asked participants to ascribe a value (with a range from 0 to 10) -- with zero signifying “no satisfaction” and ten signifying “total satisfaction” – a number of components or benefits both within FRAP and beyond. The facilitator asked, and it was agreed, that younger and quieter members of the groups be polled first, while older, more senior, or more vocal members were asked for their votes afterwards. The results of voice votes, and associated reasoning behind individual and overall outcomes were discussed after the polling. In all, the focus groups included at least 154 participants, 32 of whom indicated having initially entered the armed struggle in 1975/6. The other participants reported having served an average of over 7 years in FALINTIL.

a. Strengths: The focus group discussions held with FRAP beneficiaries was a particularly useful method employed by the evaluation to garner insights into the thoughts, priorities, concerns and aspirations of the FALINTIL veterans who were demobilized. The

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23 Including high concentrations of: ex-combatants in Ermera; deserters in Los Palos; dissidents in Baucau.
24 Most indicated two different dates for having joined FALINTIL, explaining that they were captured, imprisoned, or otherwise forced by circumstances to come down from the mountains sometime between the late 70’s and the early 80’s--- before rejoining FALINTIL in 1983, 1990, or even later.
25 Annex VI contains additional information about the focus group meetings, including additional information about the methodology employed; facilitator’s guide, illustrative or sample questions; and profile of participants.
approach permitted direct contact between the evaluator and quite a few beneficiaries in their districts – and in some cases, their homes. The semi-structured discussions were interactive, dynamic, dialogues that enabled participating veterans to articulate issues they considered priorities. While the sample survey helped provide answers to questions of “what, how many, or how much” – the focus group discussions allowed participants to share – often in great detail – their perspectives on “how, why, and in what way” these issues were important. The input and feedback from the participants were also particularly useful in following up on the preliminary results of the sample survey, and for garnering additional information with greater context, nuance, and degree of relevance.

**FRAP beneficiaries participating in focus groups**

By location, number, percentage (Total = 154 FG participants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/Sub-District</th>
<th>Total # of FG Participants</th>
<th>Total FRAP (# &amp; %)</th>
<th># of ’75 Veterans</th>
<th>Non75 Vet’s, Ave. Year’s of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Baucau:</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>253 (06 %)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lautem:</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>140 (16 %)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Los Palos (19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Lore (3)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Liquica:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84 (12 %)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bobonara / Maliana</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>91 (18 %)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ermera:</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>275 (34 %)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Ermera I (45)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Ermera II (47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total(s): 5 Districts</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>843 (18 %)</td>
<td>&gt; 31</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. Weaknesses:** There were a number of potential or actual weaknesses in how the focus group discussions were conducted. Among several identities, the enormously capable translator and co-facilitator of the meetings, Veronica Das Dores, had served for six months as FRAP’s National Program Officer. The possibility that her direct association with FRAP may have influenced to some extent the feedback from participants cannot be excluded. However, this did not appear to be the case, in part because results from independently conducted in-depth interviews and the sample survey were highly consistent with the results of the focus group discussions. At the same time, the possibility of that the focus group discussions were influenced to some extent as a result of the participation of a former staff member from FRAP – as well as in several cases the use of an IOM vehicle or district level facilities – cannot be dismissed.

The Baucau focus group was the first instance the approach was employed, and in the first week of this evaluation. The guide for the meeting, sample issues and questions developed by the evaluator in advance were found to be somewhat lacking. Consequently, it was not as well conducted as subsequent meetings. While the results were incredibly useful in terms of the evaluation, they could (and should) have been more so – particularly given the significance of

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26 Veronica Das Dores was a long serving member of the resistance and FALINTIL, generally well known and highly regarded for reasons apart from any association participants may have had between her and IOM or FRAP.
reintegration and other issues that are specific to the district and region. Lessons were learned and incorporated into approach employed in the subsequent focus group discussions.

In the focus group discussion held in Liquica, a somewhat overbearing former commander dominated the initial part of the meeting and discussion, thereby limiting and compromising the nature and level of participation from other veterans. The dynamic was subsequently and effectively altered by the arrival of several older veterans (and other former commanders) – which engendered broader and more substantive participation of everyone in the group. However, some results or findings from particularly the initial period of this meeting were deemed not to be wholly representative.

Finally in Ermera, in place of the focus group discussion with perhaps 15 FRAP beneficiaries and another separate meeting planned with as many non-veteran participants, we held two focus group discussions with over 45 FRAP beneficiaries in each. The sheer number of participants in each of these meetings affected the dynamic of discussions and influenced the nature of the exchanges, though seemingly not the validity of the findings. While the scope of participation in Ermera was unanticipated, the results of the meetings were most informative and relevant in terms of the evaluation’s primary objectives. The more serious shortcoming – not being able to meet with a focus group comprised of non-veterans – was to some extent (albeit imperfectly) addressed through additional in-depth interviews with individuals and other small groups of non-beneficiaries, key local informants, and secondary source information.27

2.1.2.3 Tracer Study (TS) and especially the Sample Survey (SS): The Tracer Study may be considered as a complementary document that would be useful for reference in reviewing this evaluation report. While a more comprehensive and detailed description and assessment of the methodology employed in conducting and analyzing the SS results can be found in the Tracer Study, a brief summary is provided here to contribute to the basis for assessing the validity and reliability of SS findings included or referenced in this document. Additionally, readers may also be interested in reviewing the more expansive and detailed SS results and findings, concerning the FRAP beneficiaries, contained in the Tracer Study. One primary objective of conducting the sample survey was to provide a basis of comparison with the results of the Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted in December 2000, which included data on all beneficiaries obtained by IOM just prior to the actual commencement of the FRAP program.28

The sample survey was an additional complementary approach employed to discern valid indications regarding FRAP’s performance and impact, as well as to garner insights into the past, present, and forward looking perspectives of FRAP beneficiaries. A total of 240 FRAP beneficiaries were surveyed in 7 districts.29 The survey was conducted after 3 days of training for the enumerators and supervisors. The actual survey was conducted from February 16 through the 21, 2002, by 14 enumerators, who were students from UNMET (East Timor’s National

27 Including the results of focus group discussions conducted by NDI, as presented in their report, entitled: “Carrying the People’s Aspirations,” February 2002.
28 Annex VII includes a comparison of the results from both (pre- and post) program surveys, i.e. between the results of the SES and TS.
29 The respondents were from Viqueque; Dili; Bobonaro; Baucau; Ermera; Aileu; and Covalima, and included 36 individuals who participated in group-projects and all 12 female beneficiaries.
University) and supervised by 7 survey supervisors, who were former FRAP District Veteran Officers (DVOs) and FRAP project assistants, and also residents of the areas surveyed.

a. Strengths: The results of the end-of-project survey were useful in providing insights into the beneficiaries’ perspectives concerning the reintegration process and FRAP -- both generally and regarding specific components. The results also identified some vital perspectives concerning progress and problems veterans faced in the past, more recently, as well as emerging needs and opportunities. The latter results are particularly instructive for those seeking to consolidate the gains of reintegration and build upon FRAP achievements.

Preliminary results and analyses of the sample survey also helped inform the content of the informational objectives regarding the other two primary methods employed in this evaluation -- specifically the focus group discussions and key stakeholder interviews. The sample survey results also provided a vital means for comparing and cross-referencing data with the results of the other two methods employed directly by the evaluator. This was not only useful with respect to assessing validity and reliability, but also in discerning dynamics or phenomenon more pronounced in specific districts. The SS results were also useful for making some comparisons with the results from the SES, or pre-FRAP survey of all beneficiaries.

b. Weaknesses: The utility of the end-of-project sample survey was to some extent diminished as a consequence of not having the appropriate level of data and analyses from the original socio-economic survey (SES) conducted prior to the program as a reference for more meaningful comparisons. Though not a weakness of the sample survey, the lack of appropriately analyzed data from the SES affected the utility of the SS to some degree. A noble effort was made to address this shortcoming, which was partially successful.

Perhaps as a consequence of time and effort due to addressing this shortcoming, the final results and analyses from the sample survey were not fully available to the evaluator until quite late in the process, although there were useful preliminary findings. There were also implications regarding a few results from this survey that were indicative of some isolated problems, specifically regarding the over-representation of Dili-based respondents leading to some urban biases, as well as some survey results relating to land that indicated either: a problem with the design of the survey question; manner in which it was presented; or, how it was perceived or interpreted by the respondents. The limited experience and training of both the enumerators and supervisors may have been a factor in this regard.

Finally, as is often the case and difficult to avoid, the evaluator and survey consultant had no contact or substantive exchanges regarding the design of the SS, or the content of the survey themes and questions, prior to the conduct of the survey.

2.2 Historical Antecedents: As noted in the introduction, East Timor’s aspirations for the independence that so many other former Portuguese gained in the mid-1970’s were denied as a result of the Indonesian invasion in 1975. In the brief and tumultuous period when the Portuguese were no longer effectively governing East Timor and prior to the Indonesian invasion, the territory’s strongest political parties vied for control. Competing and conflicting interests, as well as decidedly different visions in 1975 about country’s future, caused tensions among the rival parties and political elite. These tensions and political disputes erupted into a brief but bloody civil war. While not considered by observers as either the largest or most
popular party at the time, FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor) did control the most firepower. They were successful in overcoming challenges from domestic rivals before assuming control, and declared independence soon after. It was in some senses a pyrrhic victory as Indonesia invaded East Timor 10 days following the optimistic declaration of independence. Many East Timorese political leaders and elites fled at this time to become part of the diaspora.

The experiences from this era have produced a number of legacies with some lasting significance. One of the consequences is “there remains a considerable association between political parties and the fear of violence” among many East Timorese, even among those too young to have experienced directly the trauma of the civil conflict.\textsuperscript{30} To an extent, the political divisions among the elite that existed during that period continue endure and influence relations, although they have evolved over the intervening period. The experiences of the resistance have also generating outcomes with significance to reintegration and other contemporary issues.

2.2.1 East Timorese resistance to Indonesian occupation began immediately after the invasion, and continued over the next 24 years. The armed resistance was led by FALINTIL; a guerrilla force initially affiliated with FRETILIN. FALINTIL constituted one of the three pillars of resistance, along with the external diplomatic and the internal (non-combatant) clandestine network. The core of FALINTIL in 1975 and ’76 was comprised of East Timorese who had served in the Portuguese armed forces.\textsuperscript{31} In addition to these original members, there were as many as 27,000\textsuperscript{32} East Timorese who fled to the mountains in the aftermath of the Indonesian invasion -- though the overwhelming majority of these were unarmed and could not be credibly defined as combatants.\textsuperscript{33} Most of those who fled to the mountains during this time were either killed, starved, wounded, surrendered, captured, or otherwise compelled to leave the mountains by 1979 or by 1981 at the latest. In the order of (decreasing) magnitude, these people generally either:

- returned permanently to life as civilians;
- became members and even leaders within the growing Clandestine Network; or
- rejoined FALINTIL and the armed struggle once again in 1982/3 or subsequently.\textsuperscript{34}

It was not uncommon for some of the above to have spent time in prison.\textsuperscript{35} After prison, a portion of those who went to the hills in the mid 1970s joined FALINTIL when the conditions

\textsuperscript{25} See for example this and other key findings noted in “Carrying the People’s Aspirations: a report on focus group discussions in East Timor,” by NDI and UNTIL; February 2002.
\textsuperscript{31} Included among the surviving members of the original FALINTIL are well known former commanders such as ‘L-7’ as well as TMR (at age 19), Col. Lere, Falur and other members of the FDTL’s High Command.
\textsuperscript{32} Figure noted in UNTAET’s Office of National Security Advisor, Issue Paper No. 5; Edward Rees.
\textsuperscript{33} More recently, many of the older people – both women and men -- who are referred to as ‘Veterans of ’75’ and affiliates with the suspicious “Association of Former Combatants of ’75” are said to members of the broader group from among the 27,000 who went to the hills in the aftermath of the 1975 invasion.
\textsuperscript{34} The reinvigorated clandestine network and FALINTIL were the results of the strategic decisions of the leadership at the time. The re-organization was directed by Xanana Gusmao, then commander of FALINTIL, renowned resistance leader, and recently the first (democratically elected) president of an independent East Timor.
\textsuperscript{35} Some of the older FRAP beneficiaries and others deemed ineligible for FRAP benefits indicated in interviews that they served anywhere between three months and three years in prison after having been captured by the Indonesians in the late 1970’s or early eighties.
were once again propitious; Others served (as either ‘estufetas’ or ‘caixes’) within the clandestine network. A number of these veterans worked with the Clandestinos for a few years before rejoining FALINTIL.

2.2.2 The clandestine branch or network was comprised of 18,000 or so non-combatants who contributed to the resistance in a number of ways. Among other functions, members were responsible for internal political organization and intelligence; they also facilitated communication among those favoring resistance, including that between the external leadership and FALINTIL. They supported FALINTIL, especially with supplies and intelligence. The nature of East Timorese culture and society also favored the functioning of the clandestine network and enhanced its efficacy and efficiency. As a small country, most people are either directly or indirectly familiar and had contact with others throughout the country. Furthermore, the strong village or regionally-based loyalties -- and linguistic groups that reinforce this affiliation -- favored the creation and-- generally secure-- operation of a clandestine intelligence and support network. According to analysis of UNTAET’s ONSA, quite a few former members of the clandestine network have become local officials since the departure of the Indonesians.

2.2.3 Leadership: Many current East Timorese senior leaders have been drawn from the diaspora, and specifically from the ranks of the external leadership or diplomatic branch of resistance who returned upon the departure the Indonesians. Most are, or were, prominent members of FRETILIN. In terms of political parties, FRETILIN remains dominant. It has exerted the most influence both during the resistance, and -- in part as a consequence of this association -- and currently, as a result of critical elections held under the auspices of the UN administration during the transition. Ideologically, a large part of FRETILIN apparently maintains either a Marxist or leftist orientation. Disagreements among the party’s leadership during the occupation, especially between Xanana Gusmao and other long serving party leaders, has generated a number of results of historical, contemporary, and future significance. First, Gusmao as the commander of FALINTIL in the early eighties established a clear delineation between FALINTIL and FRETILIN. Among other effects, this distanced what had been the armed wing of the resistance from the political and ideological orientation of FRETILIN and its leaders. It also to some extent, created divisions within FALINTIL with distinctions between Gusmao and core supporters versus some other veterans and some commanders like L-7, who retained some degree of allegiance to, and affiliation with, FRETILIN.

Some of these divisions within FALINTIL seem to have played a role in the selection of senior commanders, both during the resistance and more recently with regard to the ETDF – which in both cases generally were seen as favoring Gusmao loyalists. Some FALINTIL veterans and commanders like L-7, who left cantonment before demobilization or who were considered “dissidents” – are believed by analysts from the UN and other stakeholders as having become involved with AFC ’75, the “Isolados” and “Familia Sagrada” among other groups. Many of the same veterans and commanders were those considered to have retained allegiance to FRETILIN, at least in the past. More recently some have been associated with the leadership and activities of
CPD/RDTL,\textsuperscript{36} a somewhat mysterious political group that traces its origins and ideological lineage to FRETILIN, particularly as the party was constituted during the mid-1970’s.

The CPD/RDTL might be considered somewhat of a stepchild of FRETILIN, though is further to the left and certainly seen as more iconoclastic than the more established party with which it has in the recent times had some turbulent relations. Many East Timorese, including those within FRETILIN, often refer to the leaders and members of this political group as the “radicals” in part, because its members refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy (and authority) of the UN or their administration of East Timor during the transition. In stead, CPD/RDTL members are said to hold that the 10-day-long period of independence declared in November 1975 was the definitive date of independence. Some individual members from CPD/RDTL, AFC ‘75, and affiliated groups even believe that Nicolai Lobato, the long deceased former head of FRETILIN continues to live, and regard him and his surviving brother (Rogerio) as among the principal (and temporal) leaders of their movement.\textsuperscript{37} Although CPD/RDTL has not fielded candidates for recent elections, they have expressed an interest in acquiring power and are currently attempting to organize people to contribute toward their capacity to garner it.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{2.2.4 These historical antecedents} are relevant to the reintegration of FALINTIL veterans and issues of security and stability. CPD/RDTL and ASDT appear to be seeking to capitalize on the sense of grievance that affects a good many of the people who consider themselves excluded. These and perhaps other political groups have supported the efforts of the “Association of Former Combatants of ‘95” (AFC ’75) a group that has generated a considerable level of concern among informed observers from key institutions, like the UN, FDTL, and ETPS, as well as among FALINTIL veterans and the members of the communities where AFC ’75 are most active.

CPD/RDTL is one of the primary groups supporting AFC ’75, which in turn seem to be comprised primarily of those referred to as the “excluded” by FRAP beneficiaries and others. The ‘excluded’ believe that they warrant: attention, assistance, recompense and recognition for their contributions to the resistance and liberation movement. A considerable, if not the primary, number of those who feel excluded and probably form the base support for AFC ’75 appear to be drawn from among former members of the clandestine network and (mostly noncombatant) “veterans” from the first few years of resistance. While most of these in the latter group may have gone to the mountains and accompanied FALINTIL in the 1970’s, they were generally never part of FALINTIL and served as neither combatants nor support staff. Some from this group in particular have grievances and generally feel they are owed recognition and compensation. In addition, ACF ’75 also seem to be a magnet attracting opportunists and political activists (with specific, though ill defined objectives); and other disaffected segments of the population.

At least two former senior FALINTIL commanders, reported to have less than amicable relations with the current High Command of the ETDF, are among the very few former guerrilla

\textsuperscript{36} CPD/RDTL is the Portuguese acronym for the Committee for the Popular Defense of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.
\textsuperscript{37} Interviews with representatives and members of these groups in Maliana.
\textsuperscript{38} Interviews with UNTAET representatives and former FALINTIL commanders, including L-7.
commanders not serving in the new armed forces. Each are also reportedly involved with “Familia Sagrada” and the “Isolados” respectively -- two other groups that generate concern among some stakeholders and which appear to share complementary objectives and coincidental interests with AFC ’75 as well as CPD/RDTL and ASTD. AFC ’75 (with support from ASTD and CPD/RDTL) appear to cause the greatest concern and claim to have 25,000 members -- although UN estimates their numbers as closer to 5 or 6,000. There are reports from reliable sources, including former FALINTIL and those within the FDTL that are following this and similar groups carefully, that some veterans not included in FRAP and others that were, are affiliated with AFC ’75 among other security groups. The same sources however indicate that the actual numbers of FRAP beneficiaries participating in groups like AFC ’75 are quite small in relative, comparative, and absolute terms. Some implications of security groups and their relations with veterans are further addressed in Chapter IV.

2.3. Programmatic Background and Context: The Asian economic crisis leading to the fall of Indonesia’s Suharto in 1998 after 32 years, and the resulting transition underway in Indonesia, created opportunities for belatedly addressing the issue of East Timor that were seized upon by dynamic diplomatic efforts in which East Timorese, Portugal and the UN figured prominently. As a result, a UN-monitored referendum in August 1999 on the future status of the half-island territory, which was won convincingly by those advocating independence -- garnering roughly 80% of the vote with over 98% of eligible voters participating. Widespread and widely publicized violence in the aftermath of a referendum led to the withdrawal of Indonesian security forces under the supervision of UN forces sent to the territory to restore calm and order. UNTAET, a more expansive UN Mission with peacekeeping forces was authorized to oversee the administration and security of East Timor during its transition leading to independence.

The toll of the violence was high. Several hundreds and perhaps over a 1,000 people were murdered. Nearly 250,000 people were forcibly removed from their homes and coerced into becoming refugees across the border in Indonesia’s West Timor. Another 300,000 were displaced internally. Virtually all buildings in Dili, as well as structures and homes in most towns and many communities throughout the country were systematically and methodically looted and burned. Smoke, burning embers and charred shells of structures remained in the devastated capital and the swath of affected communities throughout the country. Among the many priorities that needed to be addressed during the transition period was to attend to the immediate and longer term needs of virtually the entire population. Another need was to attend to the demobilization and reintegration of FALINTIL forces.

As per an agreement between their leadership and the UN, FALINTIL had remained in cantonment throughout the period leading up to the national referendum. With the arrival of

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39 Eli Foho Rai Bot, better known as “L-7” and Samba Sembelang.
40 Information provided in interviews with representatives from these groups, review of some the groups’ correspondence and other documents, and informed third parties.
41 Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta, who shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, figured prominently among the East Timorese efforts in this regard. Publicity associated with the award raised the profile of East Timor’s often lonely resistance against Indonesian occupation.
42 UNTAET, or the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor was authorized by the UN Security Council on October 25, 1999.
INTERFET and the departure of Indonesian troops, FALINTIL leadership agreed its guerrilla forces would continue to stay in cantonment and by November 1999 had begun to consolidate their troops in Aileu. Many the members would stay there for up to 14 months, until February 2001, when 650 were selected from among the roughly 1,900 former guerrillas to join the ETDF. The remaining (1308) members were demobilized and told they could expect help from FRAP which would assist their transition from the life of a combatant to that of a civilian.

The issue of demobilization is said to have been raised by (then) Vice Commander Taur Matan Ruak to former SRSG Ian Martin as early as November 1999, when the current Commander of the ETDF stated that “FALINTIL are now in a process of transition”…and many “soldiers will want to return to civilian life.” The UN’s new SRSG Sergio Vieira de Mello endorsed a proposal from IOM for demobilizing FALINTIL members. In March 2000, TMR informed IOM and other members of the international community that a group of FALINTIL members had been identified as candidates for demobilization. However, further discussions regarding demobilization were deferred as the focus of the High Command, other East Timorese leaders and members of the international community were first constrained as result of an impasses over the contemporaneous and future status of FALINTIL and later focused on issues surrounding the creation of the ETDF.

2.3.1 The veterans’ experiences in cantonment and the results of the selection process for the ETDF would have considerable consequences for FRAP and the broader reintegration process generally. It took several months for the UNTAET structure and the accompanying peacekeeping forces to arrive, and establish meaningful and effective presence throughout East Timor. It was not until February or March 2000 that the UN Mission began to establish a presence beyond the capital. Meanwhile, during its deployment and beyond, the UNTAET’s primary focus was on addressing the considerable emergency and humanitarian needs of the population at large. FALINTIL elements cantoned in Aileu were not considered priority since they were perceived as posing little risk to security and as either not meriting or ineligible for receiving humanitarian relief and assistance. As a result FALINTIL elements were for the most part left to fend for themselves.

The UN had reservations about how to deal with FALINTIL. UNTAET’s mandate was arguably one of the broadest authorized for any mission in UN’s history. It provided UNTAET with the overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor, including the responsibility to restore peace, provide security and maintain law and order. Since the mandate was silent on the status of FALINTIL, UNTAET considered both their authority and options regarding the dispensation of FALINTIL as limited. As a result, neither the legal nor practical obstacles for normalizing the status of the guerrilla force were addressed leading to an impasse between UNTAET on the one hand and East Timorese leaders on the other.

43 ONSA Issue Paper 5, p. 8; and IOM Draft Proposal March, 2000
44 Interview with Colin Stewart, Chief of the UN’s Department of Political Affairs, UNTAET.
45 See UN SC Resolution 1272 & the Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in East Timor, October 1999
46 See for example the treatment of this issue among the key findings from the King’s College Study.
Perhaps contributing to FALINTIL’s insecurity over their future were reports of discussions about the “Costa Rican model” at various levels within the UN and the East Timorese leadership in 1999 and early 2000. There were questions over whether independent East Timor would need or could afford an armed force. This prospect was subsequently jettisoned for a number of reasons. In the aftermath of the post-referendum violence and continuing security threats from militias, FALINTIL and civilian leaders both were convinced that East Timor needed an army, and that the former guerrilla group would form its core. Rather than demobilize FALINTIL members, and perhaps form a new army at some later date, East Timorese leadership sought a comprehensive approach that would develop the new ETDF, while others not selected would be demobilized.

As time passed for those assembled in Aileu, the shortage of adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical attention and other basic necessities became more acute. Some in FALINTIL High Command were under the impression that some members of the international community (including the UN and perhaps Australia) had committed to providing some assistance. In retrospect the commander of FALINTIL lamented that: “the elements of FALINTIL were eating ‘milho polvo’ [old, dried, rotten and insect-infested corn] that we would never have eaten… even in the mountains.” At the time, an officer and aide to commander characterized the conditions of cantonment in a meeting with international representatives by saying: “Australian dogs are eating better than our men.” FALINTIL was an armed guerrilla force, the future of which was yet to be determined. As such, UN and other organizations believed they were proscribed from providing assistance (emergency or other) that most of their mandates and charters explicitly prohibit. Additionally, FALINTIL had demonstrated itself to be a disciplined force that responded effectively to the command structure; their condition and status were not considered a priority even after the initial emergency needs of the broader civilian population were addressed.

47 Interview with Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak, FDTL.
By May 2000, conditions in cantonment had deteriorated significantly. The status of the situation was addressed directly in a memo from the UNTAET representative in Aileu, who in indicated at the time, that: “the stability of the cantonment in Aileu will be in jeopardy if steps are not taken to move the process forward as a matter of urgency.” In June, Xanana Gusmao described FALINTIL as “almost in a state of revolt”. Reportedly a number of repeated attempts were made to garner assistance necessary for improving the conditions of the assembled guerrilla forces. However, proscriptions on providing assistance to armed groups and the focus of UNTAET and humanitarian organizations was on tending to the priority needs of the civilian population. Even after the immediate needs of the general population were attended, there was still little or no assistance provided to the assembled troops. IOM, before the FRAP was initiated, is to be credited along with other organizations for their discrete efforts to provide some assistance (some food, cooking oil, and basic provisions) and limited support through its CAPS program.

In response to diminishing discipline that accompanied the ongoing and deteriorating conditions, some members of FALINTIL threatened to leave cantonment without authorization, as some of their comrades had done in preceding months, FALINTIL’s commander sent an emissary to his former comrades with the message that:

“If you leave [cantonment in Aileu] without authorization, and even though I have considered you as my comrades and brothers for so many years, I will no longer consider you as such, but rather as my adversaries.”

One well informed foreign military advisor opined that it was principally due to the respect that FALINTIL had for Gen. Matan Ruak and fear they had of Col. Lere, that permitted the situation in Aileu from becoming unraveled.

It was subsequently agreed that an independent study would be conducted by King’s College of London, to assess the various options concerning security including the creation of a military force. In the summer of 2000, the report of the evaluation team was issued, and cautioned that: maintaining the status quo with FALINTIL in cantonment “without dependable means of support or a clearly-defined role is potentially explosive [among other reasons]… because the loss of discipline within the cantonment and the dispersal of an unknown number of FALINTIL troops outside it have potentially serious security implications.” In July, reportedly in response to security concerns, UNTAET finally authorized some funds to by food and other basic needs for those 1,000 or so combatants who had not left for home and were still in cantonment. The report also called for urgent measures:

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48 See for example a contemporaneous portrayal of conditions and other priority issues re: FALINTIL in Cantonment within the “UNTAET Memo from John Bevan” attached as Annex IV.

49 ONSA Issues Paper No. 5; p. 6.

50 Community Assistance for Population Stabilization or CAPS.

51 Interview with Brig. General Taur Matan Ruak, referring to a message he communicated to discontented FALINTIL via Col. Filomeno Paixao during cantonment.

52 “Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor,” frequently referred to as the “King’s College Study” was drafted by the team from King’s College who undertook an evaluation financed by the U.K.’s Department for International Development DFID during the summer of 2000.
“Time is of the essence as a political impasse has been reached between FALINTIL and UNTAET. Key to developing any of the [referenced] recommendations is therefore to resolve the status of recognizing FALINTIL 
 \textit{de jure,} as well as \textit{de facto.} The political impasse needs to be resolved, concrete solutions implemented…”

Around September 2000, a consensus was developing around option #3 of the report – a phased approach to gradually building a lightly armed force of 1,500 regulars with the subsequent development of an additional 1,500 reserves over a number of years. UNTAET established the Office of Defense Force Development (ODFD) to assist the East Timorese leadership, including the High Command, in formulating the ETDF. The firm resolve of the East Timorese leadership, aided by the findings from the King’s College Study, helped to overcome the opposition from UNTAET about the issues that had caused impasse.

By October 2000, the basic outline and design of the demobilization and reintegration plan had been established, with consensus emerging among key actors. In November, a donor conference was held with countries that expressed interest in contributing toward the creation and development of the FDTL. The Commission for the Reintegration of FALINTIL Veterans (CRFV), chaired by a representative of UNTAET Office of National Security Advisor, was also established at this time to serve as a steering committee for the emerging FRAP program.

The decision to demobilize members of FALINTIL was inexorably intertwined with the status of FALINTIL as a whole. As such, demobilization was held hostage to the resolution of the impasse between UNTAET and the East Timorese leadership (including FALINTIL) over the guerrilla army’s legal status. This impasse, or more specifically the failure to overcome it, was among the primary reasons for both the long duration of cantonment (up to 14 months in Aileu) as well as the poor and deteriorating conditions the members of FALINTIL endured while there.

\textbf{2.3.2} Upon the decision to create an ETDF, operational questions began to emerge including those about the demobilization of other armed groups; assistance for members of the unarmed resistance; and about the selection process to determine which 650 FALINTIL members would chosen for the first battalion and consequently who would be demobilized.

Consideration was given to the demobilization of other armed forces or groups, including militia forces; MILSAS, Clandestine operatives (Clandestinos), and East Timorese members of the TNI. However, the High Command of FALINTIL was loathe to accept that other forces associated with wanton destruction and violence would get equal treatment and access to benefits before the FALINTIL members, who had for so long fought against those very forces. Ultimately, it was decided that the Indonesian government had in effect already compensated the members of militias, MILSAS, and East Timorese veterans from TNI, noting in particular that the latter had received payments totaling roughly $1,500.

The decision over whether or not to provide benefits to clandestinos was more sensitive. Clandestinos were one of the three principle pillars of the independence struggle (along with FALINTIL and the external/diplomatic branch). It was determined that there were just too many
and the difficulties of identifying who deserved what seemed insurmountable; so many East Timorese at one time or another contributed to the clandestine network and supported the independence struggle. The FALINTIL High Command was also apparently adamant that members of their organization should receive highest priority and consideration for benefits. In the end, while the contribution of the Clandestinos to the struggle was, and continues to be, valued – the decision was made by East Timorese leaders that only those who actually carried guns or participated actively in the armed struggle as FALINTIL would be eligible for demobilization and reintegration benefits.

2.3.4 The ETDF selection process. With support from USAID/OTI, a socio-economic survey (SES) of FALINTIL members was undertaken in December 2000 prior to FRAP. One of the primary objectives of the survey was to help inform the design and other decision-making processes involved with the FRAP. Three mobile teams of surveyors and presenters traveled to Aileu and throughout the Eastern and Western regions of the country. In basically a 6-day period, over 1700 combatants were surveyed. The results of the survey were incorporated into a database for the IOM managed FRAP program also and made available to the UNTAET’s ODFD for use in the FDTL selection process. In practice however, the selection process was seen as an East Timorese issue, and several participants and observers of the process indicated it was the commanders who made the selections.

By January 2001, the identities of the 650 FALINTIL members to be selected from about 800 of those who had met the (political and technical) criteria by commanders and approved by the High Command for their planned inclusion into the ranks of the first battalion of the ETDF. The technical requirements were said to have consisted primarily of experience, health, as well as the interest and capacity to serve. The political criteria were more subjective, and concerned the opinions of the various commanders regarding the past service, suitability and potential commitment the candidate possessed to serve in the ETDF. The other FALINTIL members not selected (thought to number around 1,100 at the time) were to be demobilized and assisted by IOM through FRAP. On February 1, 2001, those FALINTIL elements selected and not selected for the FDTL received the news. The following day, the veterans chosen as members for the ETDF were sworn in, while the others were told, “IOM will now take care of you”.

Some veterans did not wait. Upon hearing that they were being excluded from the FDTL, some FALINTIL members from Company IV destroyed every worldly possession they had accumulated over their 14 months in cantonment. Some members from this Company, and others, left immediately for their homes upon receiving the bitter news. At that time at least, these demobilized did not even think about taking advantage of FRAP provided transportation and other initial assistance. The delay and the marginal conditions in which many FALINTIL endured while in cantonment period made veterans feel bad enough. A selection process widely viewed as unfair and unjust only added to the veterans’ sense of frustration at the time. Life

53 Concomitantly, an information campaign was initiated to inform members of what challenges lie ahead as civilians if they were not selected for the FDTL and what support they could count on from FRAP to assist them in this transition.

54 Interview with Lt.Col Pedro Klamar Fuik, (Donaciano Gomes) FDTL.

55 Nearly identical variations of this version of what veterans were told were independently offered by Walter Sanchez Arlt, FRAP Program Manager, numerous demobilized veterans, and current FDTL officers who were in Aileu at the time.
outside of FALINTIL or the ETDF also contributed to already high levels of apprehension and concerns about the veteran’s identity; status; future; and the well being of their families.

One former senior commander, although apparently offered a post in the ETDF, reportedly declined due to an agreement he had with his men that if everyone was not selected -- then he would not join. This former commander is widely reported to be involved with the Isolados. In other reactions in the aftermath of the selection for the ETDF, over 45 of FALINTIL veterans selected, renounced their interest in joining the new armed forces in the weeks following the selection. This group came to be known as the “deserters,” and came primarily from Los Palos, and served in Company I. Quite a few of the deserters explained their reason for leaving as directly linked to disappointment over some of their senior comrades not having been selected: “…Many of the older guys, like veterans from 1975, were either not selected or if they were, they were chosen only as regular soldiers, and not as officers [including non-commissioned ranks].”

2.3.5 Impact of the experiences of cantonment and the selection process for the FDTL: Pre-FRAP experiences of the demobilized -- specifically those concerning the conditions and environment in cantonment and the decision by their commanders to exclude them from the new army – had a number of effects beyond elevating considerably the fears and concerns of those who would come to be known as the FRAP beneficiaries.

The negative experiences of many of the demobilized resulted in reduced expectations on a number of levels. While unfortunate in some respects – this is often a very positive circumstance for those attempting to assist the veterans with reinsertion and reintegration, and more generally their transition from a combatant to a civilian; lower expectations are easier to address than higher or unrealistic expectations. The appreciation and genuine gratitude that beneficiaries have expressed toward FRAP and IOM can be partially attributed to the impression among many of the veterans who have indicated: “they [IOM/FRAP] were the only ones there to help us, thank God…without them I just don’t know what we would have done.”

Another largely positive outcome of these otherwise negative experiences seems to be a stronger preference for civilian life than might otherwise have been expected. Even in areas with the highest concentrations of FRAP beneficiaries (and among veterans who had earlier expressed the greatest frustration at being excluded from FDTL), the preference for civilian -- over military life – seems strongest, even while acknowledging the difficulties of the transition. The one possible or partial exception to this otherwise general tendency was gained from an admittedly small number of veterans in Baucau, where the issue of the selection process and having been excluded from the FDTL stills seems to be a quite sensitive subject. While veterans interviewed there expressed satisfaction with civilian life, there were generally only stoic responses to questions regarding the selection process and their perceptions of its fairness: “Our

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56 Feedback from deserters included as participants in the Los Palos focus group discussion.
57 Strong and consistent indications of this sentiment were gained in individual interviews with veterans, as well as within in FG discussions, particularly in Maliana and Ermera – with the highest concentrations of demobilized veterans generally as well as of former members of Company IV; See also “votes” on this issue and associated commentary by veterans in all areas, but particularly those in the two referenced districts.
commanders gave us their orders. Some of us were selected and others [were] not; we follow orders."

There continues to be a degree of lingering resentment toward former commanders. Most veterans, including those who were once among the most interested in joining the new army, indicated that much of the hurt, anger and bitterness they felt in the aftermath of FDTL selection process has diminished considerably. Even while the level of hurt and resentment about this issue has diminished, there continue to be some lingering sensitivities detected among FRAP beneficiaries about the fairness of the selection process. In some cases criticism, sometimes in the form of jokes, is directed toward specific commanders; in others, toward the commanders in general.

There were some indications that veterans, younger and older alike, share a degree of resentment and growing concerns about being excluded from opportunities more generally that is probably more pronounced because of exclusion from the FDTL. A particular source of pique is sensed when stories are told of new recruits or “novatos,” -- who may have joined FALINTIL after 97 or as late as 1999 -- being recruited at the expense of older, more senior, or “genuine” members of FALINTIL. Another example, provided with some frequency, concerns the FDTL’s selection criteria for the recruitment of 650 candidates to form the second battalion. Some veterans noted that only “filhos de autonomia” (literally, sons of autonomy supporters) would meet the selection criteria, since only those under the age of 22 and with secondary level educations need apply. Although this perception is often provided by people expressing disinterest in joining the FDTL (by deserters for example), the principle that the criteria for selection effectively excludes virtually all FALINTIL veterans from consideration was viewed as irksome and added to the generally low regard some veterans have for their former commanders.

Finally, the veterans’ negative experiences resulting form the cantonment period and the FDTL selection process are probably a major contributing factor why FRAP beneficiaries generally give little if any credit for FRAP to key stakeholders, other than IOM and to a far lesser extent, the donors. The former and current commanders (FALINTIL and FDTL) and East Timorese civilian leadership or institutions are given very little credit, or second-degree attribution, by veterans for the benefits and assistance provided by FRAP.

2.4 Description of the FRAP program and beneficiaries: FRAP was designed collaboratively by IOM and the principal donors (the World Bank and USAID), in coordination with the UN, and FALINTIL High command. The program objective was to support the social and economic reintegration of those ex-FALINTIL combatants who were not selected to enter the East Timor Defense Force (ETDF). Overall guidance and supervision for FRAP was provided the

58 Response from a FALINTIL veteran in the Baucau focus group discussion regarding the FDTL selection process.
59 According to a member of UNTAET/ODFD, a recent advertisement for recruiting 250 candidates resulted in over 7,000 applications. A soldier’s monthly salary is currently $80.
60 “Three month FALINTIL” A pejorative expression was used to describe those who joined FALINTIL very late, particularly if they were perceived as having benefitted more than some of the older veterans. While somewhat similar to “90 day wonder,” but is also often an intentional reference alluding to reviled militia members who generally received training for a 3 month period. Used with this double meaning, it becomes a particularly negative term.
Commission for Reinsertion of Falintil Veterans (CRFV), which comprised senior representatives from the office of the National Security Advisor, the East Timorese Defense Force, USAID, the World Bank, IOM and the UN Peacekeeping Force. The CRFV served as the steering committee overseeing FRAP implementation.

The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program included four distinct phases, associated with the program’s primary components and benefits, including:

1. An initial period of cantonment for FALINTIL members and their registration;
2. Second phase of “discharge and departure” activities including transport home;
3. The reinsertion phase -- to serve as a “transitional safely net”—or the payment of cash installments or subsidies of $500 over a five month period, and finally,
4. The reintegration phase -- focused on additional efforts to promote and facilitate the longer-term transition of ex-combatants into civilian life within their chosen communities, especially through support for “reintegration packages” that included FRAP supported income-generating activities; vocational-technical and other forms of training; and other assistance.

Distribution of FRAP Beneficiaries by sub-office. Each office’s area of responsibility is demarcated by a single color, with the number of beneficiaries indicated in parentheses.
2.4.1 The Institutions: Implementing, Financing, and Coordinating Structures:

1. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
2. The Donors: World Bank and USAID, (Japan & Canada)
3. The Commission for Reinsertion of FALINTIL Veterans (CRFV)
4. Transitional Governing Authorities: UNTAET/ETTA & FDTL
5. Implementing Partners: NGOs, UN agencies, and others

2.4.1.1. International Organization for Migration (IOM): was the principal executing and implementing agency engaged by the World Bank and USAID to implement FRAP. The donors, IOM, and the FALINTIL High Command developed the Program collaboratively. While perhaps more widely recognized for its global efforts to assist refugees and internally displaced (IDPs), IOM has also garnered considerable experience in addressing a wide range of post-conflict challenges, including support for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in: Haiti, Mozambique, Guatemala, Bosnia, and Kosovo. During the same period in which IOM/Dili was implementing the FRAP, they also were also assisting the return of nearly 145,000 East Timorese primarily from refugee camps in West Timor and elsewhere.

2.4.1.2. The Donors: The World Bank (WB) and the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) were the primary donors supporting FRAP. Specifically, human and financial resources from within these well-known organizations were garnered from the WB’s Post Conflict Unit (now known as the Conflict Prevention and Response unit) and USAID’s Office of Transitional Initiatives, or OTI. Both of these units have focused on addressing a host of conflict and post-conflict related challenges, including demobilization and reintegration efforts in a number of countries. The donor representatives involved in FRAP were not only responsible for generating the necessary funding for FRAP, but were also very much involved in developing the concept of the program, and accompanying the other major stakeholders throughout the demobilization and reintegration processes. In addition to WB and USAID funding, referred to in this report as the principle donors, IOM generated additional complementary funding from Japan and Canada that contributed both directly and indirectly to IOM’s capacity and its’ implementation of FRAP, including the creation and operation of the district office in Ermera.

2.4.1.3. The Commission for Reinsertion of FALINTIL Veterans (CRFV) was established in early 2001 and convened its first meeting in February of the same year. The CRFV served as the steering committee for FRAP and as a forum for developing and validating strategies, programs and components supporting the demobilization and reintegation of FALINTIL members. The Commission was comprised of representatives from the Office of the National Security Advisor (UNTAET/ETTA(P), the East Timorese Defense Force (ETDF), USAID, the World Bank, IOM and the UN Peacekeeping Force (PKF).

2.4.1.4. Transitional Governing Authorities (UNTAET/ETTA): UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) and the East Timorese Transitional Administration (ETTA). UNTAET was represented by primarily two entities within the CRFV, the Office of the National Security Advisor and the PKF. Apart from being responsible for the overall administration and governance of East Timor, UNTAET was responsible for organizing elections
for the Constituent Assembly (which drafted the nation’s constitution) and, more recently those for the presidency. In addition to its responsibility for administering East Timor, UNTAET was also charged with establishing key institutions and developing local capacity so that the East Timorese and their popularly elected leadership would have a viable if nascent structure to support their efforts upon assuming direct and sole responsibility for governing.

2.4.1.5. Implementing Partners: including vocational technical training institutions and other partners involved in implementing this or complementary programs. The Don Bosco Vocational Training Center, with support from Salesian Mission and the Portuguese foundation Oriente. In addition, vocational and technical training was also provided by the Brazilian Development Agency (ABD) Vo-tech training centers. CADET and Action Against Hunger in Ermera were also among the primary partners contributing to the objectives of the program.

2.4.2. FRAP beneficiary identification process: In principle, all active FALINTIL members not selected for the FDTL should have been eligible for benefits from FRAP. In practice, this was more difficult than it might otherwise seem. Understandably there were no definitive lists or records detailing membership in the guerrilla force. Each commander was expected to know the identity of his troops and submit these names for inclusion on the list of beneficiaries. The FALINTIL High Command’s “master list” was definitive for those veterans seeking FRAP benefits. While there were no explicit criteria per se, in practical terms a candidate for FRAP benefits – in order to be included in the list – would have to have been registered while in cantonment; and/or, Included in the socio-economic survey (SES); and/or have a commander verify the applicant’s bona fides as FALINTIL. Those who had their names on the “master membership list” maintained by the High Command were considered eligible. Any changes to it had to be endorsed by its Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Taur Matan Ruak. In spite of these practical and generally effective steps for ensuring that those eligible were included on the list of FRAP beneficiaries, it was not fail-safe. There are to be sure a number of FRAP beneficiaries who could be considered either undeserving or less deserving than others but were nonetheless included on the list. There were also a number of individuals who should have been met the criteria, but for one reason or another -- were not designated as veterans eligible for FRAP benefits. These are to be counted among the group referred to FRAP beneficiaries as the “Forgotten”.

Undoubtedly this was a difficult process for decision-makers within the FALINTIL High Command who were relying upon imperfect information and operating under a series of other constraints. As ETDF members involved in the process indicated: “the line had to be drawn somewhere.”

IOM and donor assumptions prior to, and during, the initial period of the Program was that there were an estimated 1,050 beneficiaries. However, it was not until

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61 Eligibility is addressed in the “Memorandum of Agreement on the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program,” between Sergio Vieira de Mello (UNSRSG/UNTAET) and Taur Matan Ruak (Commander-in-Chief, FALINTIL), dated 31 January 2001, Dili.

62 While no member of the FDTL involved in process explicitly admitted to the exclusion of eligible veterans to the evaluator, there were both off the record comments and credible reports from third parties that they had received such explicit acknowledgements from representatives from FALINTIL’s High Command.

63 Interview with Colonel Filomeno “Meno” Paixao. Lt. Col. Pedro also provided similar appraisal.
February 2, that the High Command provided a list of 1,093 veterans it deemed eligible for FRAP benefits. This was the day after the members themselves were informed whether or not they were to be included in the ETDF or demobilized. As previously indicated, some left immediately after learning they would be demobilized, but hundreds of veterans left the cantonment area in Aileu long before. While many of those who left in the months preceding demobilization, others never returned, despite transport assistance provided by IOM back to IOM in anticipation of the formal demobilization, selection for the ETDF, and registration as FRAP beneficiaries.

Between February 3rd and 7th 2001 -- 760 beneficiaries were registered, with FRAP staff providing the recently demobilized with information on program benefits; an identification card; and the first TSN installment of $100. The remaining veterans on the list would be registered in the days and weeks that followed. From February through April 2001, names of beneficiaries were added to the High Command’s “Master List” as FRAP beneficiaries. The first group to be added included the 95 that were included in the socio-economic survey (SES) conducted in December 2000, but were neither among the 650 veterans selected for the FDTL, nor registered, and consequently absent from being included on the High Command’s master list of eligible FRAP beneficiaries. Other modifications were subsequently made that addressed the issues of: the deserters; the dissidents; the third, or “Xanana” list; and finally, the L-7 list, most of whom had left cantonment months prior to the formal demobilization and never returned. By mid-April the ultimately definitive list of FRAP beneficiaries came to 1,308 after all the additions, modifications and special cases were addressed.

2.4.2.1 Profile of FALINTIL veterans and FRAP beneficiaries: The definition of who was a member of FALINTIL which has been open to some degree of subjectivity or interpretation due to the fluid nature of who joined, when, for how long, and until when. On one level, the answer is quite simple since commanders and other long serving members generally knew exactly who their comrades were. On another level, the question of who is, or was, FALINTIL has become increasingly difficult and more problematic for a number of reasons including the misappropriation of the FALINTIL name and affiliation by the members of security groups like AFC '75 or as a result of political considerations, or maneuvering, such as recent legislation designating the new name of the armed forces as FALINTIL/ETDF.

In general terms, those familiar with the beneficiary selection process, including veterans and FRAP personnel, note the following common characteristics of those considered eligible, the

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64 FRAP staff met with four ex-combatants who were eligible but not participating in FRAP; they were refusing benefits to make a political statement. Three of the dissidents are natives of Baucau, and are member of CPD/RDTL. They refused their TSN and reintegration packages, stating they “did not fight to get money”. A fourth from Same refused his project funds for the same reasons, but had received his TSN benefits.

65 Referred to as the Xanana list, because the former commander of FALINTIL was absent from previous lists, as were other veterans – both prominent and humble – including 3 women from Los Palos who spent 24 years with guerrilla force in the mountains.

66 Initially, L-7 had pressed for the inclusion of roughly 300 veterans, that was reduced to 120, before agreeing to 63 that were finally accepted by the High Command as eligible to receive FRAP benefits.

67 The very name of the new armed forces (i.e. FALINTIL/FDTL) as mandated by the Constituent Assembly, is itself a source of controversy and not particularly appreciated by FALINTIL veterans, nor ETDF commanders, though generally for different reasons.
majority of veterans from 1975/6 who later rejoined the designated as eligible and ineligible to receive FRAP benefits. Regarding the profile of those armed struggle with FALINTIL were subsequently considered legitimate beneficiaries and included in FRAP. Many, though not all, of the older veterans who subsequently served in the clandestine network were also considered eligible. Younger members who subsequently participated in the armed struggle with FALINTIL were also generally considered as meriting FRAP benefits. The 150 or so participants in the focus group meetings also tended to fit this profile.

Those generally considered ineligible for FRAP benefits by the High Command included clandestinos who did not participate with FALINTIL in the armed resistance. Those who -- as either combatants or more commonly non-combatants -- were in the mountains at sometime during 1975 through 79, though subsequently joined neither the armed or unarmed resistance were also generally considered ineligible. Finally, and worthy of particularly note, were some veterans who apparently should have been considered eligible for reintegration assistance and benefits, but -- for one reason or another -- were never included on the High Command’s master list authorizing their participation in FRAP. Well into the implementation of the program (after July 2001), a representative of the ETDF’s High Command presented a list of approximately 200 veterans who had not received benefits to members of the CRFV, with a view toward rectifying the situation. By this time however it was too late; there were no more resources available from the donors. While the ETDF commanders were understanding of the other stakeholders’ limits, they were also said to be genuinely concerned about what to do about those excluded.

According to the results of the Socio-economic survey (SES) of those FALINTIL designated as FRAP beneficiaries, there were included at least 137 veterans, or 9% of beneficiaries who indicated that they initially joined the armed struggle in 1975 (and ’76). Another 57 veterans participating in FRAP indicated they had joined FALINTIL by 1983. Just over 16% of FRAP beneficiaries had initially joined the FALINTIL at some time during the first 8 years of armed resistance.68 Another 201 veterans, or 16% of those designated as FRAP beneficiaries, reported joining the ranks of FALINTIL during the period between 1983 and 1992. The remaining 68%, or 864 FRAP beneficiaries, reported having joined FALINTIL in the last 8 years of the armed struggle. Within this group, about three-quarters actually joined in the last four years, that is either in 1996, or sometime afterwards. Nearly a third of all FALINTIL Veterans deemed eligible for FRAP benefits actually joined the guerrilla group in 1998 or 1999 – during the last two years of armed conflict.

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68 SES Survey financed by USAID and conducted by IOM, in December 2000. Note: Those early results included only 1,259 respondents who had been surveyed at the time; the remaining 51 FRAP beneficiaries were added in subsequent lists, and included (Xanana himself, and) others that had for a number of reasons been excluded.
A well-informed former staff member of FRAP, and former veteran, familiar with the process for determining eligibility of beneficiaries maintains that there should be no question as to the eligibility of the large “large majority of those selected for FRAP assistance” in terms of their credentials and contributions as FALINTIL. These beneficiaries were considered legitimate longer serving members of FALINTIL who served as either armed combatants or support personnel. (e.g.: responsible for logistics, planning, information, and health). At the same time, the same observer acknowledged that there were some beneficiaries who were perhaps less deserving and a smaller number whose *bona fides* as FALINTIL could be justifiably questioned.

The large percentage of FRAP beneficiaries who joined FALINTIL relatively recently is suggestive of a considerable number of those the older veterans refer to as new recruits or “novatos”. The majority of more recent recruits, that joined in 1998 or 99 for example, are said to have been comprised mainly of younger members who generally came from the clandestine network and joined FALINTIL in the mountains during the violence that was so prevalent during this period. Many joined FALINTIL in part to escape from the violence, some of which was directed very much at them by Koppasus, (Indonesian military intelligence), security forces, and their militia proxies. The Clandestine network was, and reportedly remains, an unarmed civilian based intelligence component of the resistance movement, and is credited by many – including FALINTIL veterans – for their support not only the overall struggle for independence, but to FALINTIL specifically. The bravery, courage, and contribution of many members of the clandestine network are widely acknowledged by East Timorese leaders and society. While many of the new recruits may have warranted benefits on moral grounds, or on the basis of their contributions to the resistance, they were considered by some not to have merited benefits on the basis of having served in FALINTIL, since they joined late and their contributions, to the armed struggle at least, was considered marginal.

There were also a few people to be found among those deemed eligible by the High Command who were reliably reported to have been functionaries during the time of the Indonesians and others who had been forcibly recruited by the militias. The latter sub-group reportedly fled to FALINTIL in the mountains after having been forced to witness – or coerced to participate in --
the violence attributed to militias. Some of the young clandestinos who became new recruits, as well as a few of the former bureaucrats, were selected for the ETDF; something that has not escaped notice of at least some long serving veterans in focus group meetings who regretted not being selected for the new armed forces.

2.4.2.2 In sum, the beneficiary identification process was imperfect; as were the conditions under which members of the High Command were expected to develop an accurate comprehensive list of FALINTIL members that would objectively meet the eligibility criteria for FRAP participation. Undoubtedly competing priorities, including efforts to develop the ETDF, were a distraction from focusing more on issues of demobilization and reintegration. Members of the FALINTIL High Command who became the new leaders of the ETDF were also confronted, like those in every other new institution during the transition phase, with limited resources and capacities. The fact remains however, that some who were deserving of reintegration assistance and benefits of the type provided FRAP never received them, while some others who may have been either less deserving, or even undeserving, did in fact receive those same benefits. Those who merited benefits but failed to receive them are the greater concern. It would be surprising if these veterans did not feel excluded, and is probably equally likely that a number of these veterans who were denied access to either the ETDF or FRAP may constitute a part of a broader group who feel excluded, and who give voice to their grievance through participation in groups like AFC ‘75, Isolados, among others. The broader or lasting implications of this exclusion are addressed in the following chapter.

In terms of other impacts resulting from the beneficiary selection process, some otherwise well informed observers have criticized IOM or FRAP for the process of selecting beneficiaries, or -- as some members of the CRFV have -- criticized IOM for being overly aggressive or impolitic with regard to its attempts to obtain a list from the High Command of those they considered eligible or even possibly eligible for participating in the program IOM was expected to implement. However, even if IOM was aggressive in attempting the lists of veterans who would “left in their hands,” one can sympathize with the challenge of attempting to plan and implement a program (including budgets, logistics, staff, placement of offices, etc) without having some details about how many beneficiaries need support; who they are; and to which districts or communities they would be returning. As one FALINTIL veteran who was a satisfied FRAP beneficiary commented: “responsibility belonged with the High Command to identify correctly who deserved demobilization and reintegration assistance. Some commanders were not there in cantonment, or maybe weren’t able to provide an accurate list of members.”

As it turned out, IOM did not receive the sought after list until February 1, 2001 – the same day that veterans learned that they were either to be demobilized to chosen for the ETDF. Subsequently, IOM exhibited considerable flexibility, programmatically and otherwise, in accommodating the numerous revisions and modifications to the list of beneficiaries through April 2001. Previously, when IOM conducted the USAID financed SES in December 2000, this was seen as a contribution to the selection processes for both the ETDF and FRAP beneficiaries. For whatever weaknesses that may be ascribed to the survey, it was conducted in conjunction with FALINTIL commanders and went along way toward meeting one of its objectives of

69 Interview with President of the Constituent Assembly, and a principal leader of FRETILIN, Francisco Guteres (Alias ‘Lu-Olo’) was a member of FALINTIL since ‘75 and a FRAP beneficiary.
gaining information about candidates for both the new army and demobilization. Despite some weaknesses in how the survey was conducted, etc. IOM performed admirably by reaching over 90% of the future beneficiaries within about a week’s time.

Some of the same critics also seem to hold IOM or FRAP responsible for the fact that some of those from the clandestine network who contributed so much were denied benefits, while the perception was that many of those, particularly younger veterans, who received FRAP benefits were to some degree less deserving. While the critique concerning who or who wasn’t deemed eligible for benefits may be valid, the responsibility – or culpability, if that’s what it is -- for the selection process rests squarely with the East Timorese leadership, particularly with the High Command, within whose purview the ultimate decisions about beneficiaries were made, and not IOM or FRAP. The seeming absence of East Timorese civilian leaders in this selection and decision-making process also meant that their colleagues in the military were also placed in a position of trying to do the best that they could. A member of the Constituent Assembly, and one of the civilian leaders one might have expected to contribute in these difficult decisions and processes lamented in retrospect that members of the clandestine network were overlooked, and offered only criticism for the High Command’s role in the selection process.
Chapter III: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE and IMPACT

This chapter focuses on the performance of the IOM implemented FRAP, and the impact it was able to achieve in terms of the social and economic reintegration of FALINTIL veterans who became FRAP beneficiaries. The first section is intended to assess primarily issues of performance regarding IOM’s implementation and administration of FRAP, and well as design factors influencing performance and impact. The following sections include a synthesis of the perceptions of beneficiaries and other key stakeholders regarding issues of performance and impact of FRAP, as well as the program’s impact on stability and security, including external factors that influenced FRAP impact and reintegration more broadly.

3.0 Implementation and Administrative Performance of the IOM and FRAP

The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) was a one-year effort in which IOM, and implementing partners, endeavored to assist the reinsertion as well as the social and economic reintegration of 1,308 FALINTIL veterans, demobilized in February 2001. The World Bank (WB) and USAID were the principal donors, providing just over $2 million (US) to finance FRAP. The principal donors were also very much involved in designing the program, and well as providing ongoing support and guidance during its implementation. The Governments of Japan and Canada also provided an additional combined total of $680,000 in complementary funding for IOM that contributed toward FRAP’s execution, and objectives. In terms of overall funding, IOM counted on roughly $2.7 million to support FRAP’s objectives during 2001.

As a public international organization (PIO), IOM possesses some distinct advantages considered beneficial by donors like USAID. Among these advantages is IOM’s use of generally accepted and pre-approved norms for contracting, sub-contracting, and accounting. Additionally, it is frequently easier, or at least more expeditious, for a donor to provide a grant to a PIO as compared to many other potential implementing agencies. In addition, IOM in East Timor provided the principal donors a number of other apparent comparative advantages as the organization to implement FRAP, it had: a decentralized institutional presence; existing management structure (including logistical, administrative, and finance capabilities); as well as both institutional experience and interest in contributing to the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. IOM’s installed capacity prior to FRAP was developed as a result of the organization’s considerable involvement in assisting the return and resettlement of the proportionally massive numbers of displaced Timorese in the aftermath of the post-referendum violence. In addition to its primary office in Dili, IOM had district level field offices Aileu, Batugade and Suai supporting activities linked to the returnees and community development programs like CAPS and TEPS.

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70 The $630,000 from Japan was part of a general contribution toward the efforts of IOM; it was IOM’s decision to dedicate this amount of the contribution to support FRAP’s operation. Canada contributed $53,000 to cover the expenses of the Ermera sub-office from July through December 2001.
71 Community Assistance for Populations Stabilization (CAPS) was financed primarily by Japan; Temporary Employment Program was financed by USAID/OTI.
As early as March 2000, IOM submitted an ambitious proposal to stakeholders for assisting FALINTIL during the cantonment period and in subsequent phases through demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration. Eight months after IOM initially offered a proposal for assisting reintegration -- while FALINTIL veterans continued either living in cantonment or had already left for their homes -- the barriers obstructing demobilization were overcome. In October 2000, IOM together with the principal donors refined and modified the original proposal in coordination with counterparts from UNTAET and the FALINTIL High Command. Both IOM and the WB engaged consultants to assist the design efforts and a consensus among the stakeholders was reached concerning the objectives and approach for FRAP. General terms and agreements were reached between the principal donors and IOM. The implementation phases were basically defined, as was an associated timetable. The timing of at least the initial phases was determined by the schedule of the High Command and ODFD for creating ETDF’s first battalion.

3.01 FRAP Structure and Staff: In the early months of 2001, IOM rushed to expand its capacity to implement and manage FRAP. In January, the IOM’s program manager arrived from his previous post in Kosovo to focus on this and other immediate priorities, including early implementation. By March, IOM opened new field offices in the districts of Baucau, Los Palos, and Viqueque. In light the unexpected high number of demobilized returning to Ermera and surrounding districts, another office was established there in July. Including the 4 pre-existing offices, IOM established, and FRAP benefited from having, eight offices to attend to the 1,308 demobilized that returned to 12 of East Timor’s 13 districts (since there were no FRAP beneficiaries in Oecussi). Each of FRAP’s district-level offices was staffed with a Head of sub-office (HSO), between 1 and 3 District Veteran Officers (DVOs); and one or two project assistants (PA’s).

The program manager, in addition to his responsibilities for the management of the overall program, served in effect as the HSO of the Dili office – which attended to FRAP beneficiaries in the capital and Liquica. The HSOs were expatriates and assumed their responsibilities for management and implementation of FRAP at the local levels in the existing and the new district offices as they were established. DVOs were generally more senior FALINTIL veterans (and FRAP beneficiaries), including former commanders of sections or platoons, who were selected by FRAP management from among 30 candidates nominated by FALINTIL’s High Command. Among their most important functions, DVOs served as a primary and ongoing point of contact between FRAP and the beneficiaries, and provided support, counsel, and information to their former comrades on behalf of the program. Project assistants supported the efforts of both the HSOs and DVOs, and were selected for their capacity to work in the field as well as the office.

72 Interview with IOM staff, CRFV members, and review of the March proposal and related correspondence.
73 Although agreements in principle were reached between IOM and the donors, the primary contracts or grants were not finalized until nearly mid-way through the calendar year, with FRAP funding provided by the donors thereafter. USAID did however provide a separate grant for the preparatory phase (planning and SES), and also authorized pre-grant expenditures to IOM that ensured reimbursement of expenses incurred prior to final grant approval.
74 East Timorese leadership in particular was interested in ensuring that the ETDF’s Battalion I be established before the elections for the Constituent Assembly scheduled for August 2001.
75 Walter Sanchez Arlt served as FRAP’s Program manager (PM) through the conclusion of the program.
The following chart provides a summary of the office locations; the corresponding areas for which they were responsible; the number of beneficiaries attended by the office; and, the staff designated to assist them.76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IOM/FRAP Sub-office</th>
<th>Area of Responsibility</th>
<th>Number of Beneficiaries</th>
<th>Number of Dedicated Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ-Dili</td>
<td>Overall Program Coordination</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 PM, 1 NPO, 1 PO, 1 LO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>Dili &amp; Liquica districts</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>2 DVOs, 2 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baucau</td>
<td>Baucau &amp; Manatuto</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1 HSO, 3 DVOs, 2 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Palos</td>
<td>Lautem</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>1 HSO, 1 DVO, 1 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viqueque</td>
<td>Viqueque</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1 HSO, 1 DVO, 1 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aileu</td>
<td>Aileu &amp; Ainaro</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1 HSO, 1 DVO, 1 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera</td>
<td>Ermera</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>1 HSO, 2 DVOs, 1 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suai</td>
<td>Manufahi &amp; Covalima</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1 HSO, 1 DVO, 1 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batugade/Maliana</td>
<td>Bobonaro (The Batugade office relocated to Maliana in Aug 2001)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>1 HSO, 1 DVO, 1 PA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1308</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In May, a National Program Officer (NPO) and assistant program manager joined FRAP staff as program support for reinsertion was concluding and support for reintegration activities set to begin.78 The NPO’s brief was expansive as it was vital to the program. Among her numerous roles, the NPO served as mobile supervisor and all round trouble-shooter, helping staff and beneficiaries at the district levels, and informing program management at that level and in Dili. The NPO was also a longer serving member of the resistance and a FALINTIL veteran; this – and her character helped her to also serve as an effective and credible liaison from the head

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76 Chart developed by FRAP staff and also reflects the program personnel assigned to each office.
77 The Ermera office and the expenses associated with its staff (national and international) were funded by the Canadian Assistance for Demobilization in East Timor (CADET) program, earning them the profound gratitude of IOM’s Chief of Mission C. Gascon.
78 Veronica das Dores and Liz Garrett joined FRAP in May 2001, as NPO and assistant pm respectively.
office to the staff in the sub-offices; between expatriates and East Timorese staff; between the veterans and the program; and finally, between FRAP and key constituencies – including the FALINTIL High Command. In addition to the referenced 33 or so staff members, including the Dili based PM and Assistant PM, and the roving NPO, FRAP staff counted among its staff, program and logistics officers, as well as a financial officer and a computer or information technology officer (ITO).

**Summary assessment:** FRAP personnel were a remarkable asset to the program and contributed mightily to IOM’s capacity to implement FRAP. FRAP staff were among the primary factors responsible for generating the positive results attributable to the program. In addition to what they were able to accomplish given considerable constraints (logistics, time, limitation of available human and financial resources) the manner in which they undertook their efforts to assist veterans is noteworthy and commendable. IOM and FRAP staff, from the Chief of Mission and the program manager to the project assistants, seemed to generally hold the beneficiaries in high regard and to have treated participants with considerable degree of respect, which the overwhelming majority of FALINTIL veterans so richly deserve.

More specifically, FRAP generally benefited from the high caliber of staff especially at the district level, and in the position of NPO. They were considered by beneficiaries and other local stakeholders to be accessible, responsive, and helpful. Some of the NPO’s vital roles and attributes were previously cited, but more than a few key actors have concluded that without her contributions FRAP would most likely have been far less effective. Her efforts on behalf of the beneficiaries, most of whom she knew personally, were tireless and effective. Because of her character and experience, she provided instant credibility to the efforts of IOM and FRAP among diverse constituencies. IOM’s Chief of Mission leading up to and during FRAP’s implementation was also given considerable credit for bringing his experience in transition environments elsewhere and applying the lessons learned to help inform FRAP’s design as well as for helping to bring the program to fruition. FRAP staff at the district levels, particularly HSOs, often had to employ creative solutions to respond to pressing challenges under difficult circumstances, which more often than not served both IOM and the beneficiaries well.

Finally the Program Manager, though overworked, was tireless in his efforts to respond to diverse and fast paced needs of the program. The program manager’s interpersonal skills served the program well with counterparts and other key stakeholders, and he was credited with being especially responsive to crises or emergencies involving the sub-offices or involving the beneficiaries directly. IOM personnel responsible for FRAP’s logistics, finance, providing computer support were top-notch, and illustrative of why IOM is considered to possess comparative advantages in these areas. Among the more valued practices instituted by FRAP management were monthly meetings for FRAP staff that were conducted each month in a different sub-office; this permitted a highly effective means for directly exchanging ideas and

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79 Feedback on NPO’s performance from IOM’s CoM C.Gascon; FRAP staff in Dili and the districts; key stakeholders in the CRFV, especially the FALINTIL High Command; and especially veterans, both young and old.
80 Interviews with wide range of FRAP staff and IOM personnel, Heads of UNDPA and UNDP among others.
81 Interview with Kong Mu, Ernst & Young senior accountant, who conducted the external evaluation in April 2001 on behalf of USAID and the WB. Findings from the internal and external audits of the program’s administration of finances sponsored by IOM/Geneva and the principal donors respectively found only exemplary performance.
information between the FRAP management and staff in the field, as well as crucially between among the HSOs, DVOs, and other participants from the different sub-offices.

Despite the excellent overall quality of staff and generally effective management structures, there were some instances where the management burden at times exceeded capacity. The program manager was charged with two concurrent responsibilities: managing the overall Program as well as heading the Dili sub-office – requiring direct attention to be given to a sizable number of beneficiaries in Dili and Liquica. These dual responsibilities appear to have compromised somewhat the capacity of the incumbent, despite considerable talents, to adequately meet the considerable burdens associated with these dual responsibilities. Of some, though less comparative impact, the program manager also arrived to the East Timor in late January 2001 – during the critical initial phases of implementing the program. Consequently, there was a certain degree of “catching up” to do, and the program’s overall management during this early stage was likely to have been affected to some degree. While an extremely able assistant program manager joined the FRAP staff in May 2001, her tenure was relatively brief. Although speculative, if she -- or someone with a similar skill set -- had been hired earlier in the program, it is likely that her contributions would have further enhanced FRAP’s otherwise generally effective management and administration, especially since her considerable talents were near perfectly complementary to those of the program manager. Additional support at this level would also have reduced the referenced burden on, and workload of, the program manager.

There was also an IOM staff member assisting with FRAP related procurement, who was discovered to have been extorting kick-backs, or illicit payments from merchants and suppliers. His calumny was quickly and effectively detected, and the individual and situation were dealt with expeditiously and quite effectively by IOM and FRAP management. To IOM’s credit, donors were apprized of the situation immediately, as well as the steps taken to address the situation, which resulted in the summary dismissal of the individual and the recuperation of all funds involved. FRAP’s management structure appears to have been effective and responsive to the program’s needs with regard to operations, logistics, and administration. Aberrant activities like the fraud described above, or the later attempts by a few beneficiaries to submit bogus claims for cattle they allegedly purchased were detected quickly and dealt with effectively. FRAP’s management structure also proved to be flexible in responding to changing needs, and initiating the necessary modifications.

Due to a number of factors, there were some delays in starting with the implementation of reintegration components or income-generating projects. The program may have been better able to address at least some of these factors had an assistant manager and NPO been hired before May 2001, to provide the necessary orientation, training, and supervision to the district level staff that later proved so helpful in advancing the development, approval, and execution of the veterans’ projects. Earlier engagement of staff at this level might also have allowed the program to better inform beneficiaries earlier about the nature of phase IV assistance and improve the veterans’ comprehension of the reintegration benefits they were eligible to receive. Between June and August DVOs conducted over 175 consultative, or group, meetings throughout the country with this objective in mind. However, the DVOs themselves would have

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82 The first reintegration packages were approved in late August, early September 2001 with the last of projects, that involved all 1,308 beneficiaries, approved in the last month of the program.
benefited from earlier training of the type that was subsequently provided in June and that would have improved their capacity to better inform beneficiaries about income generating projects. It would also be reasonable to deduce that the beneficiaries’ preferences for livestock or small businesses, rather than prepared “reintegration packages” would have been discerned earlier.

IOM and FRAP subsequently recognized the need for modifying their approach, and this led to a fundamental design change in composition and delivery of the benefits within the reintegration phase, resulting in among other impacts – an increased work load for IOM and FRAP. Similarly, earlier contracting of staff for one of both of these positions may have also permitted FRAP to improve upon efforts to coordinate with other entities, including NGOs and private sector, to discern and develop greater programmatic synergies – to the limited extent that they existed, particularly at the district levels, at the time.

A number of the shortcomings noted reflect a common theme: an absence of effective programmatic analysis to inform some aspects of design, planning, decision-making and implementation. The failures to generate or benefit from this sort of analysis in turn reflect a shortcoming in management and/or management structures. In no case was this shortcoming more apparent than in the failure of the program to adequately analyze the results of the socio-economic survey (SES). This stands out as among the more serious weaknesses of FRAP with regard to its implementation and administrative performance, and an exception to what was otherwise a largely well executed and managed program. All but one of the above referenced shortcomings had relatively little adverse consequences with respect to program’s overall performance, outcomes or impact. The failure to adequately and meaningfully analyze and use data collected in the socio-economic survey does appear to have generated perhaps the most serious consequences, specifically concerning some aspects of: design, diagnosing needs, and assessing some progress and problems in achieving different objectives at numerous levels and at varying periods during (and upon the conclusion of) the program. These are addressed more fully in the subsequent subsections of this chapter.

At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the impact of the shortcomings referenced -- including those associated with the SES -- were largely mitigated, if not overcome entirely, by FRAP management and staff through other means. For example, extensive, more direct interaction and consultations between FRAP staff and beneficiaries attenuated to a large extent the impact of not having data results that may have enhanced FRAP’s staff awareness about beneficiaries and the conditions they faced. Still these were not mutually exclusive events, and one immediate impact of not having, for example, better information about “clients”, was that FRAP staff and management simply had to work even harder; which they invariably did.

### 3.0.2 Design factors

FRAP’s design was relatively simple and straightforward, and this contributed to the successful implementation of FRAP. The key stakeholders, with assistance from consultants, developed an approach to assist the reinsertion as well as the social and economic reintegration of

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83 Nat Colleta and Jeff Labovitz were the consultants engaged by IOM and the WB respectively, who assisted key stakeholders in finalizing the design prior to the program’s initiation.
demobilized FALINTIL veterans, as a means for contributing to both stability and security particularly important during East Timor’s transitional phase.

There were a number of assumptions that guided FRAP’s design. Prior to the program’s initiation, it was assumed that there would be around 1,000 beneficiaries, although the actual number was a variable. Efforts to assist the reintegration of veterans would take place in an operating environment where there was basically no superstructure; no bank; and no state. Finally, the principal donors committed roughly $1 million (US) each. In addition to funding the benefits packages, administrative, personnel and operating expenses, funding from the principal donors also anticipated support for establishing three district level offices, or sub-offices, dedicated to supporting FRAP’s implementation.

Within the program as initially designed, it was clear that FRAP would assist the demobilized veterans with transportation to their communities and provide a subsidy facilitating reinsertion to help during the transition from life as FALINTIL to that of a civilian. Regarding the reintegration packages, the details were less clearly defined: including both the nature of the packages and their value.

3.0.2.1 Reintegration and Procurement: The WB had initially favored creating packages for the beneficiaries based on the SES results, with FRAP procuring the necessary materials locally or internationally, or otherwise by awarding sub-grants to achieve the same end. In essence, this meant that IOM would purchase tools for carpentry, plumbing, and masonry, etc., along with some basic materials that would be distributed by FRAP to the beneficiaries after they underwent training. However, the SES results were never adequately analyzed. Furthermore, even if they had been, there are serious doubts as to whether the SES results would have been sufficiently informative or current to guide FRAP decision-making concerning beneficiaries’ preferences for income generating activities. At the time the SES was conducted, many veterans did not seem to have a solid idea of what wanted to do, what they could do, and what opportunities existed either in their communities or as a result of FRAP assistance. Among at least some of those who did have a better idea of what they wanted to do, one might justifiably question the extent their aspirations were informed by reality. In any event, the beneficiaries themselves began demanding entirely different things by the time they had to submit their ‘project' proposals. In the period since demobilization, some veterans who were able -- used a portion of their TSN cash payments to start businesses. Others became more attuned to needs and opportunities for either gaining a livelihood, or diversifying sources of income, since returning to their communities. Finally, beneficiaries became better informed about the nature and value of FRAP assistance.

The discernable preference among beneficiaries in the months following demobilization was for “kiosks and cattle” as a person from IOM put it. In essence, most of the projects submitted and supported became micro-enterprises or small business ventures (kiosks, coffee trading, clothes trading, farming, etc.). The original design was a bit more focused on vocational training and attempt to follow skills development with the tools with which the beneficiaries could apply those newly gained, or enhanced, skills in the labor market in order to generate a sustainable source of income. The approach taken turned out to be even more demand driven, responsive,

84Since the WB was proscribed from giving what amounted to cash grants, the TSN was funded by USAID Justin Sherman, USAID/OTI representative at the time, “saved the day on this one” IOM’s C. Gascon recalled.
and pragmatic. It was less focused on longer term developmentally oriented objectives (enhancing human capacity, including job skills; increasing community’s access to skilled labor, etc.) and more on responding to the exigencies of FRAP’s limited timeframe and beneficiary preferences. Although not always successful, FRAP staff attempted to counsel beneficiaries not to open kiosks on the same street for instance or to avoid overly complex undertakings with remote prospects for success. FRAP staff also recognized that there was not much that could be done in a ‘demand-driven’ program and in a time period that basically encompassed 5 months (July to November 2001). Rather than FRAP procuring materials and distributing them, the beneficiaries were given the primary responsibility for identifying and costing locally available items or livestock, while FRAP personnel assisted and verified these processes, and procured items not readily available.

3.0.2.2 Establishing a set value for the Reintegration Packages: Another design issue concerning the benefits associated with the reintegration phase was whether or not a set value should be established. Some within the donor organizations believed that assigning a set monetary value for the reintegration benefits might reinforce a mindset among veterans that FRAP benefits were an entitlement rather than an opportunity. Another critique of establishing predetermined levels of reintegration benefits was that it would diminish emphasis placed on developing quality proposals and tend to reward proposals that met the funding criteria instead. In practice, FRAP did establish a set value of $560 for reintegration packages.

3.0.2.3 Establishing an equal value of benefits for all beneficiaries: Another fundamental design issue raised at various points during the design period, implementation (and since) concerns the issue of whether or not the value of benefits should have been differentiated among veterans according to their years of service. In practice, the simpler approach was taken: FRAP provided benefits of equal value to all beneficiaries irrespective of their years of service.

The approach that eschewed the principle of providing benefits correlated with beneficiaries’ years of service generated a number of discernable outcomes with practical, perceptual, and political implications. On the one hand, the equal monetary value of benefits packages for reinsertion and reintegration phases totaling $1065 provided in cash and in-kind contributions, made the program easier to implement and avoided predictable conflicts over defining and determining actual years of service within FALINTIL. From the perspective of the beneficiaries, equal value of FRAP benefits reduced the potential for tension and acrimony among veterans that differentiation would invariably have caused.

The average beneficiary, according to the results of the SES, was said to have been a 31 year old, male, married, with 3 children, and had served in FALINTIL for about 7 years. However, this average was obtained largely as a result of two extremes. As indicated in the previous chapter, and reflected in the chart below, the large majority of FRAP beneficiaries had served less than 8 years within FALINTIL. Most within this category were young, generally not heads of households, and joined FALINTIL in the final years of the armed struggle. At the other extreme, there were a considerable number of older, more senior veterans – among them, roughly 140 veterans indicating they first joined the armed struggle in 1975 or 76 – who suffered considerably during their long years of service.
## FALINTIL YEARS OF SERVICE

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**Note:** Results of initial findings from the SES Survey, financed by USAID and conducted by IOM in December 2000. Those early results included only 1,259 respondents who had been surveyed at the time; the remaining 51 FRAP beneficiaries were subsequently added in subsequent lists, and included (Xanana himself, and) others that had for a number of reasons been excluded.

The failure to make distinctions between -- and vary the value of benefits among -- beneficiaries, resulted in at least three outcomes or implications that were: practical, perceptional, and political.

**a. On the practical side,** older veterans arguably had greater needs and responsibilities. Long years of service as combatants meant that they were less likely to have been engaged in economic activities of any consequence. Older veterans also tended to have much greater familial responsibilities: frequently they were not only responsible as the head of households that
included their own nuclear families, but also other dependents as well from their extended families -- including nieces and nephews (left as orphans by the violence). In addition to the greater responsibilities and needs of older veterans, the long years and conditions of service, coupled with the general toll of time, rendered many of the older and longer serving veterans physically weaker, with more vulnerable health, and consequently reduced ability to rebuild a house, to farm, or engage in the typical rigors of rural existence.

b. In terms of the perceptions, the failure to differentiate benefits according to years of service seems to have left some of the older and more senior veterans feeling somewhat short-changed, or that their contributions had been under-valued. Within the context of East Timorese culture and society -- where elders are generally respected for their experience and wisdom -- the failure to distinguish between younger and more recent recruits on the one hand, with older, longer serving members of FALINTIL on the other seems to have left some of the older veterans with a degree of wounded pride. Their exclusion from the FDTL generated similar feelings or perceptions, especially since the initial selection process for the new armed forces was viewed as favoring much younger recruits and subsequent selections favored those who hadn’t served at all.

c. In political terms, the consequence of not distinguishing between years of service has tended to reinforce the pronounced ambivalence among some of the older veterans towards their former commanders. This ambivalence, coupled with outright – though certainly diminished levels of -- antipathy felt by some of older veterans about being excluded from the FDTL, means that neither the new armed forces nor its commanders are viewed very favorably. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that as the older veterans have advanced in the reintegration process, they are generally happier now being civilians than serving in the military (either FALINTIL or FDTL) and concurrently indicate that they no longer feel anything near the degree of antipathy they once felt toward their former commanders in the aftermath of the selection process. The FALINTIL High Command’s involvement in nominating a dozen or so longer serving or more senior veterans as DVO’s within FRAP certainly helped attenuate the effects of this perceived slight, but only marginally.

Furthermore, regarding the perspectives of some key stakeholders, there were also some effects resulting from not differentiating the value of benefits based on years’ served. General Taur Matan Ruak indicated his regret in a recent interview that FRAP was unable to differentiate between older and longer serving veterans on the one hand from the younger recruits in terms of the type and amount of benefits. IOM and FRAP had considered an attempt to do so, and the issue was discussed and debated within the CRFV. At the same time, one of the General’s primary liaisons to the CRFV and FRAP indicated in a separate interview that he felt it was just not possible for a number of reasons to vary the amount of benefits according to years served, citing the difficulty and reliability of information and other shortcomings in available information as well as logistical considerations. Although not addressing the specific issue of associating value of benefits with years of service, a member of one of the principal donor organizations considered that one of FRAP’s fundamental faults was that it appeared not to “benefit those who had made the greatest sacrifices” but rather “those who joined late, like in 1999”. 85

85 Interview with Edith Bowles, USAID/OTI/DAI.
3.0.2.4 Summary conclusion: At the most fundamental level, the raison d’être of FRAP was to “assist the reinsertion (and reintegration) of FALINTIL veterans” who were demobilized; it was not per se to compensate participants for their service, suffering, and contributions. If the latter were the principal -- or even a primary -- objective of the program, the key finding of this evaluation would be that FRAP came up short and that its performance was inadequate. This is decidedly not the case. It is the finding of this evaluation that FRAP has been quite successful and on a number of levels. FRAP’s original design seemed reasonable, although procurement guidelines were stringent and program financing only permitted a minimalist support (in terms of staff and three sub-offices) that strained FRAP’s capacity to implement. The modifications that were subsequently adopted were responsive to circumstances and events. The basic approach of the program, including the modifications, contributed to a more effective implementation over the short timeframe of a program operating in a relatively difficult programmatic environment.

The simplicity of the program design favored more effective implementation. The composition of the benefits had the attributes of being: of equal value; generally responsive to beneficiary preferences; and, distributed in a transparent and timely manner. Under different circumstances, it may have been better to differentiate the value of packages according to years of service. However, due to the context of East Timor, the nature of service in FALINTIL, and other factors – including availability of reliable data – an attempt to do so may well have resulted in a case of ‘making the ideal the enemy of the good’. Even with the benefit of hindsight, and assuming that better and more reliable information could have been accessed by FRAP, there appear to be compelling reasons not to have differentiated the value of assistance according to years served. The benefits of the program design and approach taken arguably outweigh the costs of varying the value of assistance packages. More time, money, and better quality of data (and data management) would have been required. The net result would likely have been a different set of problems and consequences that would not necessarily have been less bad than the effects of the egalitarian approach employed.

Finally, while there is an understandable perspective among some key stakeholders that those who contributed most should receive better treatment and perhaps a greater value of benefits, there were a number of good reasons not to pursue this approach within the framework of FRAP, though the GET should consider appropriate means for recognizing the contributions of particularly older and more senior veterans as a part of its follow up. These veterans are likely to feel entitled, and many informed observers would tend to agree. With regard to FRAP providing benefits to some who perhaps did not deserve them, and not to others who perhaps did, once again this was beyond the manageable interest of the program and IOM, and was very much the responsibility of East Timorese leadership. While IOM’s performance and FRAP’s impact may warrant justifiable praise or criticism, it is unfair to find either at fault for decisions and selections beyond of their control, such as the beneficiary selection process.

Extent to which modifications during project implementation were responsive to changing environment and constraints encountered: The design change that substituted assisted sub-grants in exchange of the ‘prepared packages’ as originally planned, was responsible for a heavier burden being placed on FRAP’s with respect to implementation, and partially responsible for the delay in starting the income-generating packages. The delay did not result in any particularly deleterious effects and the end result was probably better in many respects that
what was originally envisaged. The beneficiaries’ sense of ownership of their projects is considerable and is probably higher than it might have otherwise been with the original design. If there was a trade-off with respect to the modifications, they were ones that favored objectives of security and stability as opposed to developmental objectives. The latter may have been enhanced with an approach that more methodically worked to develop skills as a precursor to a more intensive development of proposals that emphasized developmental criteria more than that based on the set amount of funding available for reintegration benefits. On the other hand, it is equally likely that there would have been no discernable difference or even less success in terms of developmental objectives had the alternate approaches been implemented. It is also quite likely that more time and effort, as well as resources – both financial and personnel – would have been required. From IOM’s perspective, FRAP in general and the reintegration packages in particular, were not intended to provide the sole source of sustenance for beneficiaries; if it were, they acknowledge that it would have been insufficient. Rather, in what amounted to just over $1,000 per participant in benefits purchased stability first, and in addition contributed to other primary objectives as well, including development.86

Regarding other modifications, FRAP was responsive to the changing numbers of beneficiaries designated by the High Command through the first months of the program and adjusted their budgets and implementation accordingly. Similarly, IOM proved both resourceful and entrepreneurial in acquiring additional funding from Canada that complemented that from the principal donors; these resources permitted FRAP to open an additional sub-office by July 2001 in Ermera, the district with the single largest number of beneficiaries. Similarly, complementary funding from Japan contributed toward the program objectives and IOM’s decision to dedicate these resources, from Japan’s contribution to the Organization’s general activities, reflected IOM’s commitment to FRAP and it’s successful execution.

With respect to whether FRAP benefits were seen as an entitlement of an opportunity, and aspects of the approach that either reinforced or diminished these perceptions, most veterans at least initially viewed the benefits as an entitlement. Differentiating benefits according to years of service would probably have reinforced this tendency. Subsequently, it seems the beneficiaries’ perceptions evolved, particularly during the reintegration phase, more toward viewing the income generating activities as opportunities. Equally valued packages probably helped reinforce the notion that an equal opportunity was being given to all in the program. With respect to the outcomes of not differentiating the value of benefits provided either according to years of service or need, these are issues better addressed by the new East Timorese Government (GET). The GET, and other stakeholders, should be particularly aware of, and seek to address, some of the risks and ample opportunities associated primarily with the older, longer serving veterans. Among the primary recommendations of this evaluation is that older, longer-serving veterans, as well as those continue to have special needs or vulnerabilities should receive additional priority consideration for follow-on assistance, building upon some of the considerable achievements of FRAP. Among other benefits, this would demonstrate the government’s interest and capacity in recognizing the contributions --and responding to the needs of the most important group within this critical constituency.

86 Interviews with Christopher Gascon and Walter Sanchez Arlt, IOM’s chief of mission and FRAP’s program manager respectively.
3.1 Implementation: The following is a review of FRAP’s actual versus expected performance in implementing activities during distinct phases.

3.1.1 The preparatory phase: (from November to December 2000) included program planning and preparation for implementing FRAP, and conducting the 104 question socio-economic survey (SES) developed by IOM and members of the CRFV.

The SES was financed by USAID/OTI (Office of Transition Initiatives) and conducted in mid-December 2000. Among other purposes, the results of the SES were intended to assist the High Command and ODFD in determining who would be selected for the FDTL, and more significantly for FRAP, to inform: program design, implementation, and assessment of performance. The time available for preparing and conducting the SES were shorter and sooner than IOM would have preferred. For example, to meet the challenge IOM began advertising for surveyors December 4; interviewing candidates on the 6th and 7th; with the selection, contracting and orientation of survey staff beginning on the 8th; and, training conducted from Saturday the 9th and ran through 13th -- just prior to initiating the survey and information campaign on the December 15, 2000. In the 5-day period that followed, IOM managed to survey 1774 members of FALINTIL in nine different locales throughout most of East Timor, including Aileu. \(^{87}\)

They also simultaneously conducted an information campaign about FRAP and the type of reintegration assistance and benefits that those who would be demobilized could expect. With respect to coordinating the implementation of the survey, IOM was said to have had the formidable challenges of logistics sorted out reasonably well, particularly on such short notice. The survey was able to cover almost all FALINTIL members identified at the time. In addition, FALINTIL commanders demonstrated that they were able to get out the word out, with some veterans arriving who had already been fairly well informed.

However, there were some difficulties in conducting the survey and information campaign, as indicated by a contemporary appraisal from a representative of one of the principal donors: \(^{88}\)

“UNTAET District Administration seemed not to communicate any information to CIVPOL or PKF about the survey. In Liquica the CIVPOL severely over-reacted by closing down the street in front of the survey area and having police and military all around. In Covalima they had the old schedule and we showed up 2 days early by surprise. The worst was Maliana were the Australian PKF woke up 3 Commanders and 1 IOM staff demanding their IDs and searched through their possessions. Although the military were polite, it was still an armed search and questioning. Showing the Falintil ID did not fully satisfy them. When we complained to the PKF the next day, they claimed that any Falintil outside Aileu must have a pass along with the ID, but they did apologize for the inconvenience. Falintil Commanders argue that a pass is only provided

\(^{87}\) In the following months and until November FRAP managed to survey and registered all FBs included in the lists received. The total number of FBs according to the lists was 1,333 though after removing all the duplicated cases, the final number dropped to 1308.

\(^{88}\) Observations of Nicole Seibel (USAID) and conveyed to Christopher Gascon, (IOM) in an email, dated 21 December 2000: ‘Issues observed regarding the Falintil survey from 15-20 December 2000’.
when they allow an individual a personal leave and not for a mission. The Falintil Commanders and Liaison Officers said they get that sort of treatment all the time at the hands of the Australians.”

With respect to the SES, the personnel conducting the survey, both supervisors and enumerators, tended to be inexperienced and under-trained; and despite the availability of translators, language proved to be constraint in some cases. Originally, it was assumed that the respondents (veterans) would be completing the survey themselves, albeit with assistance. However, due to low levels of literacy, it was decided that the surveyors would have to ask the respondents the questions and fill out the survey sheets. The survey was prepared in Tetum despite the original plan that it would be available in the two other principal languages, including Bahasa Indonesian and Portuguese. The linguistic abilities of the surveyors and some of the translators on the one hand did not always correspond to that of the respondents.  

The initial information campaign about FRAP’s objectives and content was, as noted, conducted at the same time as the survey. While helpful and reassuring to some, it also contributed to confusion among others who would become beneficiaries. First, the twinning of distinct, and not particularly compatible, activities (SES and information campaign) seems to have contributed to the confusion of some veterans. A number of beneficiaries subsequently indicated that they expected FRAP benefits to be very specifically tailored to their needs and conditions -- as they identified them in responses to the comprehensive survey questions; “I indicated that I did not have my own home, and thought that I would at least get building materials.” The content of the initial information campaign was vague, at times poorly translated, and compromised at times by differing versions provided by some commanders. A number of commanders, perhaps unintentionally, also added to some of the early confusion among those who would become FRAP beneficiaries, by providing wrong information about the amount and nature of FRAP assistance. Finally, consumers of information obviously tend to be less attentive and responsive to information if it is not perceived as relevant to their circumstances. At the time the initial information campaign was conducted, in December 2000, most FALINTIL members expected (or at least hoped) to be selected for the new army, and consequently were not particularly receptive to information considered irrelevant to their circumstances. It was six weeks later -- after the survey (and simultaneous information campaign) was conducted -- that these veterans got what for many was the surprising and unwelcome news that they were not selected for the FDTL and would indeed be demobilized.

Summary Assessment: Although there was an operating assumption that there would be roughly 1,000 participants in FRAP, neither IOM nor FRAP staff had the benefit during the preparatory stage of knowing how many beneficiaries that there would ultimately be. This affected how FRAP’s fixed program budget would be distributed to cover the TSN and the

89 Finding a mutually comprehensible language proved to be more problematic in Los Palos, with Fatuluko speakers, and more generally with the young Bahasa-Indonesian speaking surveyors who had limited facility managing the Tetum on the survey.

90 Interview with Nelia da Costa, who served as an IOM program assistant supporting the survey and information campaign during the cantonment period.


92 Roughly 70% of FALINTIL members expressed an interest in joining the FDTL in the SES.
Reintegration Packages and consequently the type of details about the program benefits that could be conveyed. Additionally, it was anticipated that the results of the survey, conducted simultaneously, would inform the content of the benefits packages, that further limited the availability of information that could be shared with veterans. The resulting presentation about the benefits were as a result described largely in illustrative terms.

Some of the weaknesses noted are to be expected, particularly during the initial phase of a comparatively large and complex undertaking. Many of the shortcomings can also be attributed to factors beyond the control of either the implementing agency or program, but which nonetheless affected the performance and outcomes of program components. Time, information and resources (particularly human and financial) were among the greatest challenges FRAP most frequently had to address particularly in the early going; it generally managed to do so effectively.

On the whole, particularly given the context and constraints, IOM and FRAP managed to handle most aspects of the initial information campaign and the implementation of the SES adequately. The efficacy of IOM’s initial attempt to inform FALINTIL veterans about the general objectives and content of FRAP during the cantonment period was compromised or attenuated by a number of factors, including time constraints and other factors; some of which were beyond the manageable control of IOM or FRAP. FRAP management recognized that efforts to effectively inform beneficiaries was an ongoing process. The quality, specificity, and relevance of information provided to veterans about the program content and specific benefits would be improved as the number of beneficiaries, their identifies and chosen communities became more apparent. The veterans would also become more receptive to the information provided after demobilization. Subsequent information campaigns benefited from the direct and indirect support from the NPO and assistant program manager after they joined FRAP in May. The program manager with support from these two individuals were then able to contribute to the type of training and orientation needed by especially DVOs and PA’s, thus better enabling FRAP staff to more effectively counsel veterans and convey key aspects of the program and benefits to them.

3.1.2 Phases 1 and 2 refer to the registration that took place during the cantonment period and beyond (from January through April 2001) and the discharge, or formal demobilization, and subsequent departure of those veterans in February 2001. In January 2001, FRAP teams began preparations for registering those who would become beneficiaries. A total of 760 veterans were registered over a 5-day period in February, following the demobilization ceremony in Aileu. Each was issued a program ID card allowing them to access FRAP benefits. Over the next several months, mobile registration teams working in the district centers registered an additional 454 eligible beneficiaries. IOM and FRAP subsequently provided transportation for over 700 veterans and their belongings, back to their communities. FRAP managed to execute these activities effectively.

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93 Particularly after FRAP conducted the Program Awareness Survey in May and identified weaknesses.
3.1.3 Phase 3: Reinsertion: Transitional Safety Net (TSN), February - June 2001
FRAP reportedly considered the results of the SES as well the national average consumption expenditures to arrive at the $500 total amount FRAP would provide beneficiaries in cash installments over the program’s first 5 months to respond to the needs of the beneficiaries and their families during the difficult transition period following demobilization. FRAP also facilitated the distribution of a food package provided by WFP that was distributed at the time veterans were being transported home. The first $100 installment was disbursed upon registration in Aileu or elsewhere, and subsequent payments for the same amount were made on a monthly basis through June. For those whose eligibility were determined later, were registered after February, or missed a payment, FRAP arranged for TSN to be disbursed through July and August at the district levels.

CIVPOL and ETPS provided security for cash being transported to the districts, and for the disbursements to the beneficiaries from there. Officers from these organizations or local officials witnessed payments to the veterans of any amount over $60. The main role of FRAP, at least at the operational level during this phase was to distribute TSN money on regular basis to beneficiaries according to one HSO. This was also the way that beneficiaries saw the program’s role during this phase: to distribute their entitlement in the agreed way. There was little pretense of linking TSN with developmental objectives or activities during this phase. The TSN payments did however permit the beneficiaries an opportunity to know and begin trusting the program and staff, to benefit from some counseling and obtain a greater degree of familiarity with the program. Rather than having large numbers of veterans congregate at a sub-office in the district, some HSOs together with DVOs, project assistants, with accompanying members from either CIVPOL or ETPS traveled to prearranged sites at the sub-district or community levels to meet with clusters of up to 20 beneficiaries at a time in order to make TSN payments, and take advantage of the better dynamics for engaging program participants more meaningfully. This was more convenient for the FRAP participants and kept IOM’s sub-office in the District capital from being viewed as a magnet for attracting unwanted attention from demobilized seeking benefits. Meanwhile, at the management level of FRAP in Dili, in addition to supporting the sub-offices and to attending more directly to the needs of the beneficiaries in the capital and Liquica, preparations were underway to better define the nature and amount of the subsequent phase involving the reintegration packages.

How was the quality of needs assessment and efficacy in responding to needs?
The results of the SES were anticipated as contributing significantly to the quality of needs assessment and efficacy in responding to needs and opportunities with respect to the reintegration packages. Unfortunately, as previously noted, the results were not adequately analyzed. The purpose of the socio-economic survey, and its findings was to serve as:

a) a design tool, and to better understand the intended beneficiaries, their needs, to develop appropriate programmatic responses;

b) a source of comprehensive information to inform decision-making, including that of the FALINTIL high command for determining who would be selected for the FDTL, and

FRAP estimated that $300 would be dedicated to the families’ consumption needs, and the remaining $200 dedicated to shelter and household effects.
by default -- those who would demobilized (and consequently eligible for FRAP benefits); and,

c) a base-line for permitting an assessment of progress and problems concerning the reintegration efforts over time including the impact or results of reintegration efforts at the conclusion of either distinct phases or of the Program.

This failure to have adequately analyzed the data from the SES is seen as a considerable shortcomings in terms of FRAP’s implementation performance. As a result, only the most basic information was available to further refine and modify the existing design of the program; to inform decision-making; and aid in accurately and periodically assessing performance. While ensuring throughout FRAP’s implementation that correct information was entered into the database up until the very end of the program, FRAP management mistakenly seemed to consider this as an end unto itself rather than a means toward an end. In sum, the information was not “operationalized”; the information or data available from the SES was not handled in a manner that would have permitted an improved basis for: better understanding the beneficiaries; being more responsive to their needs; and providing more objective qualitative and quantitative analysis and information either to benefit FRAP management or key constituencies, including donors and other members of the CRFV, and for assessing performance over time.

The absence of meaningful analysis from the SES results meant that while somewhat superficial characteristics of all the beneficiaries was available – as was more detailed information about specific individuals -- there was very little or no higher level analysis (resulting for example from having desegregated or cross-tabulated the data). Consequently, it would have been inordinately difficult for Program staff or others to discern for example the relationship between older, or longer serving veterans and land ownership, or housing problems among different segments of the beneficiaries in or specific regions. An illustrative case concerns a number of beneficiaries from Ermera and Maliana. Due to the post-referendum violence, many homes in these districts with sizable numbers of FRAP beneficiaries were destroyed. While in most cases, their neighbors who were affected benefited from donations of materials (provided by CNRT, the UN, and NGOs). Even though the houses of veterans were damaged or destroyed, they were told that since they were getting assistance from IOM they would not be receiving additional help, such as building materials.

In certain areas particularly affected by the physical damage resulting from referendum related violence, quite a few FRAP beneficiaries appear to have spent a great deal more (in relative and comparative terms) of their TSN, or transitional subsidies, on ensuring that they had minimally adequate shelter. Timing was certainly a factor in this case, as the violence that damaged the homes took place in late 1999, while building materials were provided in 2000, while most of the veterans were in cantonment. Most of the FALINTIL veterans did not become FRAP beneficiaries until early 2001. Nevertheless, adequate shelter in these areas was a serious concern at the time of the SES and at least throughout the reinsertion phase. This type of circumstance and the corresponding needs and vulnerabilities of a fair number of beneficiaries in a specific and limited geographic area should have been at least discerned and noted as a factor influencing reinsertion and reintegration. In all likelihood, this information or particular need would have been discerned more readily if there had been an adequate analysis of the SES survey results.
Perhaps a more meaningful analysis of the SES results would have enabled FRAP to better assess that while the $500 TSN provided was an adequate amount for the majority of beneficiaries (particularly the younger, less senior veterans and new recruits), it was regarded as insufficient by many of the older, more senior veterans. The latter group -- arguably the most important and influential among all the veterans -- were heads of households, had larger households, greater responsibilities concerning extended family, and were less likely to have been economically active in the recent past. Additionally, older veterans might also have been expected to be less able (due to physical limitations) and a dearth of resources (e.g.: land, cattle, house) to independently respond to their comparatively greater needs during the transition period and beyond.

If, as was likely, program resources were unavailable to address the above referenced needs directly, than a reasonable attempt could have been made to identify the nature, extent and scope of the problem. This may have helped FRAP management to inform and influence the donors and authorities to be more responsive through the provision of materials or other support. Alternatively, the program could have facilitated the provision of some other form of assistance, such as food aid from WFP, to offset some of the beneficiaries’ additional or special needs including the costs of rehabilitating or reconstructing their homes. The key issue is that even barring the capacity to directly address the problems identified that were confronting FRAP beneficiaries, the needs should have been recognized. The failure to do so reflects how a shortcoming with respect to analysis and information management resulted some weaknesses in program implementation.

**Summary Assessment:** FRAP’s implementation of the TSN component was effective. Beneficiaries, even those several hundred whose eligibility was granted subsequent to demobilization and initial registration were well attended. Payments were generally made on time, in a transport manner, and without major incident or disruption. This benefit enabled FRAP to engage demobilized during their transitions from former combatants to civilians, and in the process to establish a relationship between FRAP, its personnel and the beneficiaries. It also permitted FRAP staff at the district level, sometimes quite creatively, to engage beneficiaries more substantively, initiate some counseling, and provide the demobilized with an institution and individuals who were responsive to their needs. The resources provided were indeed a safety net: they enabled beneficiaries to better respond to their own priority needs as they and their families defined them. Typically, these were food and housing -- in that order. Some beneficiaries who were in a position to do so, used a portion of their TSN to initiate income generating activities, which they would further expand with subsequent assistance from FRAP. Mostly however, the TSN purchased time for the demobilized to adjust and generally adequate resources to address pressing needs until they could become economically active and socially re-acclimated.

The time provided as a result of the TSN payments to FRAP beneficiaries also permitted time for IOM to get FRAP sub-offices up and running; purposely adapt the initial strategy, design, and

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95 In some places, like Ermera, the proportion of TSN allotted to housing was considerably higher, according to the Tracer Study’s sample survey.
administration of the program in light of evolving or unforeseen events. For example, since FRAP only received the initial list of those to be demobilized on February 2, 2001, program management (quite understandably) had no idea that there would be so many veterans from Ermera, since veterans from this district were dramatically under-represented in the selection for the FDTL. The TSN permitted the time for IOM, with support additional to FRAP funding, to access Canadian (CIDA) funding and programmatic support through the CADET program to open a sub-office in Ermera, the district with the single largest number of demobilized veterans.

With respect to the assessment of needs, which was to have been completed during this phase, FRAP’s performance was mixed. The amount of the TSN was at least adequate for the most, but perhaps insufficient for up to 15% of the beneficiaries who had greater needs or vulnerabilities. Still, the advantages associated with FRAP’s provision of an equal value of benefits to all veterans probably outweighed differentiation according to variations of assessed needs. The absence of analysis from the SES adversely affected FRAP’s capacity to better assess needs, though particularly those regarding beneficiaries’ special needs or challenges (e.g. damaged homes and the older veterans). The utility of having conducted the socio-economic survey was limited as a result of not having properly analyzed the results, and leads one to speculate what benefits might have accrued if this task was properly completed. Thankfully, the actual negative effects were less than might have been -- given the extra efforts of FRAP staff and management, an environment that was relatively enabling, responsiveness of program participants; and an otherwise generally well-run program. FRAP performed much better with regard to assessing local economic context and market conditions, and working with beneficiaries to develop income generating activities that were both viable and responsive not only to context and conditions, but to the beneficiaries preferences as well.

3.1.4 Phase 4: Reintegration (July-December 2001)
There were a variety of benefits provided during this phase, each of which were intended to contribute to the bases for longer term economic and social reintegration of beneficiaries, primarily through FRAP supported income-generating activities, training, and job skills development.

During April, in anticipation of the commencement of the reintegration phase, FRAP stepped up its efforts to inform and counsel beneficiaries about the nature and opportunities associated with reintegration packages. In May, a limited survey of the beneficiaries’ awareness of the program and reintegration benefits in particular to be lacking. Over the following three months, FRAP increased the quality and coverage of information with beneficiaries to enhance their comprehension of FRAP and the options available regarding reintegration packages. With the addition of the NPO and a new assistant program manager, FRAP’s combined management team and HSOs lead the training efforts for field staff, including DVOs and project assistants, so that all FRAP staff would be better informed and able to provide the type of assistance needed by beneficiaries in developing ideas and proposals for their reintegration packages.

By the end of August 2001, the intensive efforts and ample consultations with beneficiaries had produced results; proposals for reintegration packages were developed and the first of 1208 projects involving all 1,304 participating beneficiaries were approved. As indicated the
beneficiaries demonstrated preferences for livestock breeding or establishing (or in some cases, expanding) kiosks and other small businesses involving coffee, other produce or commodities and services.  

### FRAP Reintegration Projects by Project Type

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<tr>
<td>Business - Buying and Selling</td>
<td>491</td>
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<td>Business - Production</td>
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<td>Business - Service</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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Income-generating activities: The modified design of this component emphasized activities favored by, and familiar to the beneficiaries, and that were reasonably well tailored to local contexts and opportunities. The proposals were developed by the beneficiaries with support from DVOs and other FRAP staff, and were guided by a formula and format developed by FRAP, that included a work plan, budget, and other factors to help determine viability. HSOs were authorized to approve proposals or suggest modifications, and were aided in this effort by DVOs who conducted outreach and site visits to inform their assessments of the proposals submitted. Approval of projects were finalized with a signed agreement between FRAP and the beneficiary outlining terms as well as respective obligations and responsibilities. The income generating projects mostly involved individual beneficiaries, though 136 veterans participated in 43 group projects.

Training: In addition to income generating activities, FRAP facilitated access to vocational and technical education for those beneficiaries expressing an interest. Less than 50 veterans took advantage of this opportunity, although FRAP had secured over twice as many vacancies with the independent partner organizations providing type of job skills training. The Brazilian Development Agency (ABD); Don Bosco Vocational Training Center; and the Rotary Club International provided training in a range of fields, including: carpentry, masonry, electronics, plumbing, production of construction materials (roofing) and installation. The most intensive of the three programs was the one-year program provided by Don Bosco. The program was

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96 Roughly 45% of beneficiaries chose to use their reintegration benefits to purchase livestock, while most of the others chose some form of small business, including kiosks or buying and selling commodities.
provided at no cost to the beneficiaries. The twenty beneficiaries who participated also received an $80 monthly stipend provided by the Portuguese sponsored Oriente Foundation.\footnote{Twenty-three beneficiaries participated in the 10-week training program sponsored by ABD; and another 6 received training and subsequent employment with the Rotarian sponsored roofing program in Baucau.}

In addition to vocational and technical training, FRAP also arranged for shorter-term training to enhance the skills of the beneficiaries in livestock management at the local levels throughout East Timor, and small business development courses in the capital area. Over 450 veterans took advantage of the livestock management course administered in 19 different locations in November and December 2001.

**Referrals:** During the reintegration phase FRAP also provided 39 beneficiaries with referrals leading to employment, as well as medical referrals and logistical support to 33 veterans from Viqueque and Ermera for treatment in the capital.

**Summary Assessment:** Reintegration efforts, and preparations leading up to them, were the most intensive of all the implementation phases. As noted, the prior phase had enabled FRAP sub-offices to become operational, but also permitted a relationship to develop between the program and the beneficiaries; between FRAP staff and reintegrating veterans in their districts.

With the addition of staff to the FRAP management team, the development of the operation’s manual, the intensive training of FRAP staff at the district levels, FRAP worked intensively with veterans to more effectively explain the nature of the program and benefits, and to develop proposals that were responsive to the beneficiaries’ preferences. Although there was a delay of a month or so in getting projects developed to a point where they could be approved, FRAP responded well to the challenge. After the last TSN benefits were provided and just as income-generating projects began to come on line, a number of anxious beneficiaries congregated at IOM’s office in Dili, where they threatened to burn it unless they received their remaining benefits.\footnote{As represented in interviews with Walter Sanchez Arlt and Christopher Gascon among others.} A meeting sponsored by Xanana and General Taur Matan Ruak, and involving FRAP management and representatives from the disgruntled beneficiaries helped address some of the issues and tensions, which dissipated even further as the rate of project approvals hastened dramatically in September and October 2001.

As indicated, design components eschewed the principle of providing a value of benefits correlated to the years of service, in favor an equal and pre-established value package for all beneficiaries. Earlier plans for emphasizing the development of job skills training, the provision of tools and pre-designed reintegration packages, were changed in favor of veterans preferences for more immediate and familiar activities, primarily livestock breeding and small businesses especially kiosks. During the early phases of FRAP, when it was still unknown exactly how many beneficiaries there would ultimately be, program management had estimated that benefits totaling $450 could be provided for each project proposal. This was subsequently changed to $560 based on the funding available after the April deadline, after which no new beneficiaries were included.
Income generating projects: Implementation and activity performance, including expected vis-à-vis actual developmental outcomes and output completion.

As reintegration was the most vital and demanding of all of FRAP’s implementation phases, the income generating component within this phase was the most vital and demanding of all components within it. Concerning implementation, some offices like in Ermera, employed modifications to enhance the responsiveness of the beneficiaries. FRAP staff there asked each beneficiary to submit a proposal of $450. Upon completion of the purchase of project materials, the beneficiaries were asked to submit the receipts and upon completion of formalities, each was paid $60 as a bonus. The sub-office also decided to pay $5 to each beneficiary who participated in any meeting called by FRAP.

FRAP’s mechanism for procuring materials through assisted sub-grants proved effective, and particularly after modifications and improvements in monitoring after some early abuses (regarding bogus purchases of cattle in Baucau). FRAP’s support and implementation with respect to the income-generating activities was effective and generally efficient. In a few instances, where materials or equipment had to be imported, delays and complications attributable to the suppliers, shipping, customs, or other reasons caused some beneficiaries in Baucau for example, to receive production equipment (e.g. palm oil presses) later than anticipated. However these were the exceptions rather than the rule. These instances were also perhaps illustrative of the type of problems that would have been confronted had greater programmatic emphases been placed on pre-established packages, equipment, and kits that would have had to have been imported.

FRAP was initially more demanding in terms of the nature of the proposals it would approve, attempting for example to avoid a proliferation of kiosks in locales already considered to have an abundance. In response to the pressures of time and the demands of the beneficiaries, this reticence subsided, in what amounted to satisfying preferences as well as the objectives of security and stability over possible longer-term viability of specific projects. All 1,208 income-generating activities, involving each participating beneficiary, were initiated within what amounted to a four-month period. In terms of the sustainability and developmental benefits of projects, in certain respects these are difficult to discern – given that all projects were begun less than one year ago. However, the beneficiaries’ assessment of the projects and the contributions of FRAP toward reintegration help in defining the success of these activities. The projects approved were highly valued by beneficiaries and there has been considerable progress concerning reintegration, as will be addressed in the following subsection of this chapter.

Training: Including the extent design and interventions responsive to the capacity of vocational training and skill development system. In terms of the operating or program environment, East Timor has neither an extensive nor a decentralized structure or capacity for providing vocational and technical education. This deficit was even more pronounced during the planning and implementation of FRAP. The program and especially FRAP management, developed effective partnerships with providers of technical training (ABD and Don Bosco) in the capital area, where these facilities are located. Otherwise, the dearth of installed capacity for providing this type of training at the district or regional levels precluded additional partnerships, and likely greater participation of beneficiaries in more substantive job skills training such as that provided by
vocational technical centers. The Dili based centers favored beneficiaries resident to the area and younger veterans. Older veterans tended to have greater responsibilities precluding them from taking advantage of the opportunity, and in some instances expressed shame at being included with younger students at the centers. An equal or greater disincentive that restricted participation of beneficiaries from outside the capital area was the costs attributed to participating. Rural participants would have to forgo some opportunities to work or produce in their home area, and incur the comparatively higher costs of living in Dili (including food and shelter).

However, even with the offer of a generous stipend by Oriente for participants in year-long Don Bosco program, supply or opportunities for training surpassed demand. While it is possible that FRAP may not have been as effective in promoting and counseling beneficiaries of the benefits of job skills training as it might have been – it is more likely that demobilized veterans sought to reconstitute their lives economically and socially in their home communities as opposed to participating in a capital based training program. Doing so also involved additional trade-offs between earning money more immediately versus the potential to earn perhaps more money in the future, assuming successful completion of the training and perhaps a job. As it happened, the technical and vocational training that perhaps favored capital area residents was positive in the sense that these beneficiaries were less likely to have land for farming, and faced with higher costs of living, and some unique challenges regarding reintegration that in some aspects were more difficult than those facing rural beneficiaries.

FRAP deserves considerable credit for fashioning and supporting the implementation of the livestock management training program throughout the country. This was relevant, timely, and responsive to the priorities of a large number of beneficiaries. Since training was administered in the locales of the beneficiaries, this also ensured that participation was less onerous and disruptive to competing priorities. Similarly expansive provision of small business training would also likely have been similarly effective, and valued.

**Job and medical referrals:** FRAP’s contributions with respect to both were limited in terms of scope, nature, and effects. Other programmatic responsibilities assumed higher priority and the environment was not particularly favorable. There is an abundance of unskilled or semi-skilled workers in the job market that far outweighs the demand or employment opportunities provided by the small, anemic and still recovering economy. This is even more evident in areas outside primary population centers, where most are engaged in subsistence agriculture. Regarding medical referrals, FRAP management acknowledges that time and resources limited this assistance to only two districts.

In sum, FRAP’s administration and implementation of components within the reintegration phase were generally quite effective, especially the income generating activities; vocational technical training, in which relatively few beneficiaries participated; and the shorter term training provided, especially concerning livestock management with over 450 participants of the 600 beneficiaries who opted for livestock projects. The quality, intensity, and relevance of information showed considerable improvement in comparison to earlier efforts. Counseling providing to beneficiaries was enhanced by the addition of capable individuals to the
management team and the subsequent training and orientation for FRAP staff enabled them to better represent FRAP and more effectively respond to the needs of the beneficiaries.

3.2 FRAP’s Impact and Performance; including the perspectives of beneficiaries.
This subsection focuses on the impact of FRAP, and includes a synthesis of findings from various sources and methods employed in the evaluation, including: in-depth interviews, the Tracer Study’s sample survey (of 240 FRAP beneficiaries in 7 districts) and focus group discussions (involving over 160 FRAP beneficiaries in 6 districts).

3.2.1 FRAP’s Responsiveness to the Needs of beneficiaries: Regarding the overall performance and impact of the program, nearly three-quarters of FRAP beneficiaries recently surveyed considered FRAP to have been satisfactory; the remaining quarter considered the overall program to have been unsatisfactory. At the same time, 87% of the respondents in the same survey characterized the attitude of FRAP staff as either “helpful” (85%) or “very helpful” (2%). The results of focus group discussions were quite similar and reinforced the findings from the sample survey (SS): a large majority of FRAP beneficiaries were generally quite satisfied with the overall program and even more so with the responsiveness of FRAP personnel. These results are impressive and reflect positively on FRAP and IOM.

To some extent, the degree of the veterans’ favorable appraisal also reflects the low expectations that plagued many veterans during cantonment and fear toward the end of this period about their future beyond FALINTIL after having been excluded from the FDTL. Regarding these fears, one representative from the principal donors observed at the time: “There is great anxiety about the end of FALINTIL apparent in the men’s faces and their expressed concerns. They see the end of FALINTIL as a severe loss in social status and an open chasm of an undefined future.”

FRAP beneficiaries continue to be enormously grateful to IOM and FRAP. As noted, this level of appreciation seems even greater due to the widely held perception among many demobilized veterans that they were treated poorly in cantonment and by their former commanders, particularly concerning the FDTL selection process. However, the level of the beneficiaries’ gratitude is also a function of the prevailing perception held by veterans that few if any other organizations were either willing or able to help attend to their needs. Even beneficiaries indicating some particular or general dissatisfaction with FRAP, commonly express genuine appreciation for the responsiveness of FRAP program staff and IOM more generally. As an older veteran from Liquica said:

“When the high command [FALINTIL] made their decision about who would be selected for the new army, and who was not [selected], we were concerned. In the mountains, we ate leaves; in cantonment it was no better. If not for IOM and FRAP, I’m not sure what we would have done to survive.”

99 In assessing the overall program, 72% consider FRAP beneficiaries participating in the (March/April 2002) Tracer Study’s sample survey, indicated that they considered FRAP to have been satisfactory; the other 27% considered the program to have been unsatisfactory.
The majority of FRAP beneficiaries, and even those who were not satisfied with the level of benefits, give IOM and FRAP considerable credit; FRAP assistance and the efforts of its staff were appreciated. Conversely, neither the UN, the FDTL High Command nor East Timor’s Transitional Administration (ETTA) are perceived as having been particularly helpful or responsive to the needs of FRAP beneficiaries. With rare exception, there was little if any secondary attribution, or credit, given to these institutions or other key stakeholders. The fact that East Timorese leadership or institutions failed to garner from the beneficiaries even second-degree attribution or associative benefits for FRAP is significant. Some veterans noted with understanding ETTA’s limited capacity and resources, quite a few expressed levels of growing frustration at being marginalized, or suffering from discrimination by ETTA, UN agencies, and NGOs. These generalized frustrations as well as the unmet needs of some veterans will have future implications.

Regarding the minority of beneficiaries who expressed dissatisfaction with FRAP, the source of these appraisals was generally not with the program per se, but more typically attributed to the level, or value, of benefits provided by FRAP. While grateful for the help they received, and the responsiveness of FRAP staff, some -- particularly older, more senior, and economically or physically vulnerable veterans -- did not consider the amount of support sufficient to meet their considerable or special needs. These needs were generally associated with: housing; care for large nuclear and extended families (including their own children and often those of relatives orphaned as a result of the violence) and physical disabilities.

“FRAP provided a total of $1060. This might be fine if you have one or two kids. I have 3 and I also take care of my brother’s children; there are 12 in our house. I own a kiosk, but I barely earn enough to make sure that everyone is fed, and nothing more. Sometimes, we are forced to eat our [merchandise that is for sale] in my kiosk.”

Among some of the beneficiaries dissatisfied with the level of benefits, the source of the sentiment seemed to emanate from a certain grievance or of having been short-changed: they had contributed so much and received what they considered relatively little in return. Furthermore, they received an amount equal to new recruits perceived as having contributed little or anything to the armed struggle.100

On the other hand, there were other veterans among those dissatisfied with the program 101 that expressed sincere and genuine concern about their current economic conditions, as well as their limited capacity or prospects for improving them. A number of those considered genuinely vulnerable identified themselves, or were more commonly identified by their peers, as requiring additional help or support beyond FRAP. As one veteran of 8 years with FALINTIL said: “We, for the most part are doing alright, but some of us, particularly the older among us…they don’t have enough to survive.” In visiting with some said to be living in precarious conditions where they resided, it certainly seems that FRAP benefits were for some a source of sustenance rather than supplemental or temporary assistance to help until the veterans could once again get “back on their feet” economically. One long serving older veteran mentioned with apparent

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100 Sample survey results indicate that only 12% of respondents indicated that their projects were in bad shape.
101 Once again, these tended to be particularly the older, longer-serving ones and those with physical disabilities.
shame that he and his family are forced to live in his brother’s already overcrowded house. More in a tone of resignation than plaintively, he added:

“…It is difficult to move ahead beyond just sufficiency; At times we have no sugar for our coffee; many times we don’t have coffee.”

3.2.2 Impact and performance of specific FRAP components: Eighty-eight percent (88%) of beneficiaries characterize the current status of the income-generating project begun with FRAP assistance as either “average” (50%) or “good” (38%); 54% expressed interest in expanding their project initiated with FRAP assistance. There has been more than a 20% increase in livestock ownership among FRAP beneficiaries since the beginning of the program. With respect to training, 57% of those recently surveyed reported having received some form of FRAP supplied training (including small business training, livestock management, etc.) while 12% indicated they had benefited or continue to benefit from vocational and technical training accessed through FRAP’s facilitation. These are impressive results and reflect positively upon FRAP and IOM.

The program component or benefit valued most highly by FRAP beneficiaries was clearly the income-generating activities begun with program support. Satisfaction with vocational and technical training for the relatively few took advantage of this opportunity was also rated highly. While other training provided by FRAP was also valued, it tended to be viewed by some participants as either an entitlement as opposed to an opportunity. The Transitional Safety Net (TSN) or $500 subsidy provided during the first half of the program was also valued on the whole, although the value or level of benefits associated with both the reintegration packages and the TSN were considered insufficient by a minority comprised primarily of older, more senior veterans; females; and those with physical disabilities.

Perceptions among FRAP beneficiaries varied widely about the value of transportation immediately following demobilization, ranging from relatively high levels of satisfaction to general ambivalence. Those expressing satisfaction with this benefit cited in particular IOM’s willingness to transport possessions many had accumulated during the long cantonment period. Quite a few FRAP beneficiaries participating in the Focus Groups expressed a low to extremely low level of satisfaction with transportation. This was not because of any deficiency with this component per se, but rather as the following synthesis of their comments explains:

Many of us spent 14 months in cantonment. From one day to the next we were told that we would no longer be part of FALINTIL; that we would be transported home; and that we were being excluded from the new army. Many in Company IV, after learning that they were not selected for the FDTL, destroyed everything that they could get their hands on, including all of their worldly possessions: cups, plates, clothes, absolutely everything. Some didn’t even wait around for transportation. Without possessions, they walked home. Those who were being demobilized at the time, particularly from Company IV [or

102 Veteran from Liquica initially joined FALINTIL in 1975 and served as a commander of a section and platoon.
103 Draft SS: about 20% of respondents in the sample survey listed training as the most valued of FRAP benefits.
104 The participants in all focus group meetings who did not avail themselves of the transportation service provided by FRAP were over-represented, i.e. deserters, members of Company IV.
the more recently established Company V] were angry; hurt; and frustrated with the selection process [for the FDTL].

In sum, as many of those who were ambivalent about the transportation benefit explained, they were too angry, frustrated and concerned about other matters to either take advantage of this service, or otherwise appreciate it given the grievances and concerns they felt at the time.

3.2.3 Transition from FALINTIL to civilian: A strong majority of demobilized veterans indicated they were happier with civilian life than that of a soldier – either with FALINTIL or the FDTL.\textsuperscript{105} which reflects considerable progress in the ongoing transition process. Critically, even among those previously interested in joining the FDTL at the time of the demobilization, most are now pleased to be civilians and no longer have an interest in serving in the military.

With few exceptions, the consensus expressed in the focus groups indicated a preference -- in many cases a strong one -- for civilian life, even while particularly longer serving veterans acknowledged its’ challenges. This is not to say that many would not welcome the financial security provided by the ($80 per month) salary of those serving in the FDTL; Rather, having been offered at least some viable options (particularly by FRAP), the once strong desire for stability, security, and status of military life is viewed as neither the only nor necessarily the best option. These are significant findings, and positive indications of progress in the transition of FRAP beneficiaries from life as former combatants to that of civilians.

Some regional variations in this regard generated somewhat counter-intuitive results. Many of those most interested in joining the new armed forces at the time of demobilization, even those who destroyed all their possessions in response to being passed over, now show the strongest preference among the demobilized for civilian life.\textsuperscript{106} Despite considerable prior interest among them for joining the FDTL at the time of demobilization, life within the military now seems far less appealing. In a focus group discussion following a straw vote about various reintegration issues, one older veteran exclaimed: “Now we are all happy that we are civilians; we vote in favor of being civilians!” This sentiment was greeted with good-natured cheers and broad approval from the rest of the group in Ermera.

The specter of an undefined future that generated fear among veterans at the time of demobilization seems to have been adequately addressed for most though certainly not all FRAP beneficiaries. Similarly, earlier concerns over the loss of identity and social status of belong to FALINTIL; particularly pronounced among more senior veterans, seem to have largely dissipated. To some extent, previous concerns about the unknown have been replaced by concerns about issues that have become better defined. For example, there is considerable and ongoing preoccupation with the challenges of achieving economic security. However, these challenges are better understood and considerable proportion of beneficiaries express cautious optimism about their capacity to adequately meet these challenges.

\textsuperscript{105}Sixty-eight percent of sample survey respondents indicated they were pleased or happy to have joined civilian life.

\textsuperscript{106} The strongest preferences for civilian over military life were expressed in the focus groups meetings with veterans in Ermera and Maliana -- two districts with some of the highest concentrations of FRAP beneficiaries and the lowest representation in the FDTL.
Another indicator of reintegration is how many veterans describe the differences between life now as a civilian as compared to the previous era as a member of FALINTIL. The word “freedom” is used frequently by FRAP beneficiaries when referring to the comparative benefits of civilian life. This was generally explained as a qualitative improvement in their lives that has allowed veterans to spend time with their families and friends, in their communities, and without either the persecution that was typical “during time of the Indonesians” or the deprivation and discipline of being in the bush (or cantonment) as FALINTIL. Even those experiencing economic insecurity and difficulties – primarily older, longer serving veterans; females; and the disabled -- noted the great appreciation for such freedom, while at the same time likening -- in remarkably similar terms -- their current daily struggle to survive at subsistence levels with the deprivations in the bush during the conflict.107

There are some FRAP beneficiaries who continue to live in precarious conditions. Based on an extrapolation of data and the analyses of results from the Tracer Study’s sample survey and focus group discussions, it is estimated that 15%, or roughly 200, of the FRAP beneficiaries are experiencing more acute difficulties in the transition process for reasons that are primarily economic. There are also related adverse consequences upon the level and rate of this sub-groups social reintegration as well. This category of FRAP beneficiaries includes generally older, more senior veterans; those with disabilities; and the few females participating directly in the program. While they have definitely benefited from FRAP, they have basic or special needs in addition to, or beyond, the benefits and support provided by the program. FRAP, rather than helping to address some basic temporary needs and provide viable opportunities for building a better future, some beneficiaries had far greater needs and fewer resources to meet them than their former comrades.

While 15% of FRAP beneficiaries appear to be experiencing difficulties in their level and rate of reintegration, the large majority have made considerable progress in successfully reintegrating – both economically and socially – as civilians into their communities and society. The large degree of success, specifically regarding the level and pace of the reintegration of most beneficiaries is primarily attributable to three factors:

- **The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP)** including the attention, (and attentiveness) of FRAP staff; the Transitional Safety Net (TSN) -- or $500 subsidy; and especially the income-generating projects or Reintegration Packages;

- **A reasonably positive enabling environment**, in which FALINTIL veterans fought on the winning side; saw the armed forces of their primary adversary totally withdrawn; and a relatively receptive community and society that generally have held FALINTIL, its goals, and members in high regard;

- **The FALINTIL veterans or FRAP beneficiaries themselves**, who on the whole have generally demonstrated enormous amounts of discipline; patience; integrity; and

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107 These perspectives were articulated most clearly and passionately by a number of FRAP beneficiaries (and belonging to the referenced categories) in each meeting, though especially in Lore; Maliana; and Los Palos.
a desire to live peacefully in an independent East Timor; a goal for which they sacrificed so long and so much to achieve.

In addition to the outstanding needs of some beneficiaries, there are also considerable opportunities associated with the large majority of FRAP beneficiaries who are well along in the transition process. Forty percent of those recently surveyed expressed an interest in obtaining vocational or technical training to improve their project initiated with FRAP support; 35% indicated an interest in obtaining credit to improve or expand their project. The figure regarding vocational training is almost a four-fold increase over previous expressions of interest in such training. These results reflect a greater recognition among veterans about specific needs and opportunities for building upon the achievements they have made to date, including those with support from FRAP, and perhaps reflect a level of greater stability that would permit them to participate in training now, as opposed to an earlier time when they demurred.

The veterans’ increased interest in acquiring vocational and technical training is also partially attributable to a demonstration effect as some FRAP beneficiaries with a new enthusiasm for training became more aware of the benefits accruing to the relatively few who availed themselves to this opportunity provided by FRAP and implementing partners. In addition to acquiring marketable skills in areas such as welding, carpentry, and electrical installation, some participating in Don Bosco’s year-long vocational technical training program have received monthly stipends (of $80) from the Portuguese foundation Oriente.

Only 3% of respondents to the sample survey indicated they obtained credit over past year to support their activities, while 35% expressed an interest in accessing credit in the future to expand and improve their projects. Discussions during the focus group meetings revealed that the increased desire for obtaining credit seemed to reflect a combination of factors, including:

a. A greater confidence among the beneficiaries in their own capacities and in the viability of their income-generating activities;

b. A generally clear recognition that additional “entitlements”, concessionary funding or subsidies, like that provided by FRAP, will no longer be forthcoming; and finally,

c. The result of a demonstration effect in which neighbors (including other FRAP beneficiaries) have successfully accessed and utilized credit through programs sponsored by the World Bank and other organizations to improve and expand their businesses.

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108 Comparison of findings from SES and SS, conducted before and after FRAP.
109 For example, opportunity and perhaps other costs associated with commitments to training.
110 A beneficiary and former DVO from Maliana expanded his thriving restaurant business due to credit from WB.
3.2.4 Social Reintegration is largely dependent on economic reintegration. Effective economic reintegration tends to favor social reintegration. As veterans (or anyone else for that matter) are able to provide the necessities for themselves and their families, they are apt to have the stability and security that favors a more positive familiar dynamic, and to participate in cultural, spiritual, and community affairs. The opposite rarely occurs on any sustainable or meaningful level, i.e. successful social reintegration rarely advances the rate or level of economic reintegration to any great extent. While FRAP did not emphasize activities or undertake interventions specifically geared toward promoting social reintegration, FRAP and the reintegration packages in particular contributed to economic reintegration which in turn favorably influenced achievements in the social reintegration of FRAP beneficiaries. The impact of FRAP, together with other factors cited as contributing to the overall success of reintegration (a reasonably positive enabling environment and the quality of the FRAP beneficiaries themselves), have contributed to considerable achievements the large majority of beneficiaries have made reintegrating socially into their communities.

3.24.1 Marriage: The following chart is a comparison showing the marital status of respondents to the social economic survey (SES) in late 2000, with the comparable results from the sample survey (SS) conducted in March 2002. One striking result evident from the comparison is that the number of bachelors among FRAP beneficiaries decreased dramatically since demobilization. The 50% reduction in bachelors among the demobilized veterans is significant to various aspects of reintegration, and for a number of reasons.

Younger single males are reliably considered as being predisposed to antisocial behavior. As former combatants, members of this sub-group would also possess the experience, or demonstrated capabilities, of employing force or violence to achieve objectives. Finally, a single young adult, who is not the head of a household, is more likely to undertake actions that are unencumbered by considerations of family responsibilities since he is unlikely to be directly responsible for the survival or well being of dependents. Conversely, marriage signifies a commitment beyond self, and the assumption of greater responsibilities for spouse, and eventual likelihood of caring for children and aging relatives. Marriage, and the growing number of dependents could be seen as both an incentive to engage in positive activities (e.g. increased labor) in order to meet increasing responsibilities as well as a corresponding disincentives to undertake risks (e.g.: crime, violent acts, war) that would jeopardize the well being not only of one’s self, but also one’s dependents.

Finally, among other things, marriage is an act of optimism: it reflects confidence in the present as well as an investment in, and commitment to, the future. In sum, the dramatic decrease in bachelors among FRAP beneficiaries is a reliable proxy indicator that reflects considerable progress in social reintegration; a level of confidence in the economic conditions and prospects

111 Draft Tracer Study, from sources: SES Table2 & TS-Table 4.
112 Among the variables most highly correlated with more conflicted societies is the relative youth of its population.
for the future. It is also a positive indication that favors enhanced stability and increased security on the level of the individuals as well as those of the broader community.

3.2.4.2 Heads of Households: The dramatic increase in the number of married FRAP beneficiaries over the past two years, and some of its’ significance has already been noted. However, to a large extent the figures concerning marriage also reflect the youthfulness of FRAP beneficiaries in general. At the time of the initial program survey (SES), over half, or 56%, of FRAP beneficiaries were younger than 30 years-old, and nearly half of these were younger than 25. Most of the younger beneficiaries were not likely to have been heads of households and not the primary provider for dependents within their families. The majority of younger, unmarried beneficiaries clearly did not have the nature or level of responsibilities that older, married, veterans carried, as heads of households, with larger nuclear and extended families. This a primary reason why enthusiasm for FRAP benefits runs particularly high among younger beneficiaries, and why many of the older ones tend to indicate that the amount of benefits were generally not sufficient to meet their considerable familiar needs. Given the comparative status and responsibilities of the beneficiaries, highly correlated with age, it is likely that FRAP benefits to younger program participants tended to contribute supplemental assistance to members of their households (parents and siblings) which they did not head, as well as a means to establish their own families. In this sense, FRAP benefits facilitated marriage among younger participants.

<table>
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<th>Percentage distribution of FRAP Beneficiaries by age group</th>
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Source: SES-Table 1

3.2.4.3 Regarding the issue of status: Many FRAP beneficiaries are proud of having served in the armed struggle that contributed toward the achievement of East Timor’s independence. Others in their communities and beyond generally recognize the contributions particularly of the longer serving veterans who served in an institution venerated by East Timorese society
generally. This dynamic and a new found status as owners of livestock and as small-scale entrepreneurs, are viewed by beneficiaries as sources of particular satisfaction. The latter outcome can largely be attributed to FRAP support, especially training and funding for income-generating activities. At the same time, among the multiple levels of considerable concern veterans expressed about security groups like AFC ’75, the misappropriation of the FALINTIL name and the dubious designation of security group members as “ex-FALINTIL” have caused much consternation, while also posing implications affecting negatively on the identity and status of veterans. There is a risk that confusion between actual FALINTIL and those merely, and falsely, identifying themselves as such could have negative implications in terms of how real veterans are perceived. This and other issues related to security groups have additional current -- and perhaps critical -- future implications dealt with in the following sections and chapter. Key stakeholders, especially East Timor’s civilian leadership, would be remarkably well served by establishing better communication with, and providing reliable information to, FRAP beneficiaries – concerning issues of particular interest to veterans (especially topics as important as security groups).

3.2.4.4 FRAP Beneficiaries’ reception by their families, community, and leaders: A considerable minority of beneficiaries also expressed a variety of emotions and difficulties concerning their reception by some members of their immediate and extended families. Beneficiaries indicated that upon their return home, that immediate and extended family members, neighbors and others expressed joy, sadness, and anger and generally a mixture of each emotions, referred to by one veteran as a “kiss and a slap”:

a. Joy - that they had returned home, and in one piece;
b. Sadness - over for the long years of suffering; and,
c. Anger - directed at the beneficiaries - because of the history of harassment and violence that some families and neighbors suffered at the hands of the Indonesians and militias that they attributed (at least in part) to the returning veterans’ affiliation with FALINTIL and armed resistance to Indonesian rule.

Some veterans expressed regret about the reception received in their communities; indicating that they were not always warmly received by their neighbors and community leaders (including District Administrators and traditional leaders, or “chefe de sucos”). While these veterans described the welcome from neighbors and local officials as reasonably accommodating or tolerant, they lamented -- at times with profound emotion -- that they were never formally received or officially welcomed back into their communities.

A large number of FRAP beneficiaries from Ermera, universally expressed deep concern about 5 of their colleagues who the group felt were being unjustifiably harassed by representatives from the new police force (ETPS) and were consequently forced to flee, once again, to the mountains. More specifically those identified as being responsible for the harassment were said to be “holdovers from the time of the Indonesians” or recycled members from the former police
force\textsuperscript{113}, who reportedly bare grudges against FALINTIL veterans generally, and the five FRAP beneficiaries in particular. This issue provides indications that may be illustrative of a broader set of potentially problematic issues concerning:

- The advancement and consolidation of achievements in the reintegration process;
- Advocacy concerning veterans, and the development of relations between FALINTIL veterans as citizens with local and national government, and emerging institutions;
- Community level mechanisms for addressing conflict and issues of reconciliation;
- Accountability of the new police force to community (and civilian) oversight.

Overall, with the notable exception of Ermera, FRAP beneficiaries indicated few serious problems with local officials or community leaders, and indicated they are generally treated with respect. However as noted previously, a number of FRAP beneficiaries expressed considerable concern and growing levels of frustration at being excluded from benefits and opportunities. To some degree, local officials (both government and traditional leaders) are held responsible for discriminating in some cases against veterans in terms of the distribution of benefits, since local leaders are involved in selecting participants and beneficiaries. Specifically, FRAP beneficiaries complained of being excluded from benefits and opportunities originating from the UN and NGO efforts and of about being excluded from job opportunities -- whether temporary low paying jobs (@ $3 per day) sweeping draining ditches or more permanent positions with the new police force, or ETPS. The reason most frequently given by veterans for their exclusion was the impression among traditional leaders and local officials that IOM and FRAP were attending to the needs of the demobilized. This in one respect may be viewed as testimony to the efficacy of FRAP’s effort to inform local stakeholders of the nature of the program and benefits, but more significantly it reflects an issue with considerable concern that is likely to be exacerbated as GET jobs are increasingly assigned to those with the type of skills necessary for administering, and operating within, bureaucracies; skills most veterans do not possess.

3.2.5 Impact of FRAP and reintegration on household members and host communities:
Typically reintegration programs for demobilized include family members as either direct- or (more frequently as) indirect- beneficiaries, as was generally the case with FRAP. An implicit assumption of FRAP was that family members of beneficiaries would benefit from a range of the program’s primary components, though especially the TSN and the reintegration package. In the same manner, training – vocational, technical or other – was generally assumed to be an investment in the employment skills of the beneficiary leading to additional, and more reliable, income that would contribute to the financial security of the beneficiary and the well-being of his family. There were some exceptions in which FRAP benefits were provided directly to family members. Due to the death of several beneficiaries during the program, their benefits were conferred to the spouse or another relative. In a few other cases, veterans opted to transfer the benefits of their reintegration package to another family member, including adult children, permitted by FRAP with the understanding that income-generated from the activity would contribute to the well-being of the beneficiary and his family. Apart from these atypical

\textsuperscript{113} The percentage of “holdovers” or members of the new police force (ETPS) being recycled from the police force during the time of Indonesian governance was estimated to be at least 20% by an international training consultant working to establish and improve East Timor’s new police force.
exceptions, FRAP did generate some economic, social, and other impacts on both families and host communities.

At the level of the beneficiary, his family and community, FRAP assisted veterans to begin the difficult and worrisome transition from that of a combatant – and member of a guerrilla force – to a civilian, and citizen in a nation whose independence they helped achieve. FRAP’s primary and most immediate impact was economic and at the levels of individual beneficiaries and families, rather than at the broader community level. With respect to the TSN, FRAP helped beneficiaries and their families to cover at least some key expenses associated with this transition period, or “reinsertion,” that was key to reconstituting the basics of life: re-establishing a home; a means for earning a living; and, becoming accustomed once again to life with their families, outside of the “bush” and in their community. The TSN provided at least some resources with which to cover priority expenses over the first 5 or 6 months of the transition period following demobilization, when most could gain their footing.

In a rural country with an agricultural based economy – where 76% of heads of households are primarily engaged as farmers\footnote{Results from the Socio-Economic Survey (SES) of FRAP beneficiaries, December 2000.} -- time is essential for planting and harvesting, and for once again to bring goods to sell in the local market. The time and resources that FRAP provided eligible veterans enabled the 82% of FRAP beneficiaries\footnote{Poverty Assessment Project 2001, Draft Report. ETTA; WB; ADB; and JICA.} who reported having agricultural land, to return to their small plots\footnote{Roughly 60% of FRAP beneficiaries who have agricultural land indicated that they owned 1 hectare or less, according the Tracer Study’s sample survey results. (Draft; April, 2002)} and produce, if they were so inclined. While by no means a panacea, or guarantee for reliably ensuring effective reinsertion or reintegration, the availability of agricultural land – even with generally small holdings – provided an opportunity for FRAP beneficiaries an option and a means with which they could contribute to their family’s well-being. Perhaps most importantly, the TSN purchased the valuable commodity of time, especially during demobilization and reintegration processes. East Timor has a small economy that was devastated by the post referendum violence and upheaval. It too required time to begin to recover at both the national and local levels in order to become a more enabling environment that better facilitated both social and especially economic reintegration.

As previously indicated, older veterans were more likely to be heads of households. FRAP benefits to this group helped provide sustenance and opportunities for the generally larger number of dependents living in the households of these beneficiaries.\footnote{At the time of the SES, 56% of beneficiaries were married, whereas more recent survey results indicate that over 76% are now married.} They tended to characterize the TSN as either barely sufficient or inadequate to address the needs associated with their generally large households. Some in Maliana, whose houses were destroyed by the militia, also expressed regret this special need was not taken into account when determining levels of assistance for the transition period. Food and shelter were the overwhelming uses of the TSN reported by respondents to the sample survey, with variations – such as Maliana indicating a considerably higher percentage of the $500 directed to shelter. Overall, 80% of beneficiaries in the sample survey indicated they lived in a home owned by them or their immediate family. Another 10% reported living in a home of a relative or otherwise owned by
someone else other than a family member. The remaining 10% of FRAP beneficiaries indicated some form of problem with housing, including either living in a house in which title or ownership is not resolved, including houses abandoned by departing Indonesians.

The reintegration packages, or income generating activities provided a appreciated opportunity for diversifying the household’s sources of income. Typically, spouses and older children were involved by the beneficiaries in helping to run a kiosk, or care for the livestock procured through the program, while the beneficiary either worked the land, sold goods, and sought wage labor wherever and whenever possible. The diversification of income sources is particularly beneficial in rural and agriculturally based economies like East Timor, where subsistence farming may not always be reliable or sufficient, and prices associated with cash crops, like coffee, suffer from periodic and cyclical fluctuations.

3.2.6 Obstacles to reintegration: In addition to some of the previously cited advances and obstacles beneficiaries are experiencing in their process of reintegration, a number of the issues that were ascribed considerable importance by a wide range of veterans seem to be adversely affecting this process, and are worth noting.

3.2.6.1 In each of the focus group meetings, many – particularly older and longer serving -- veterans raised the issue of those in or near their communities who were excluded from participating in FRAP. The issues surrounding those commonly referred to by the veterans as either the “Forgotten” or the “Excluded” were raised and frequently with great passion and genuine concern. Issues involving the “Forgotten” and “Excluded” were ascribed great significance by veterans; the issues were the primary issue of discussion in one focus group meeting (in Baucau), and among the primary concerns expressed in virtually every other focus group discussion.

The “Forgotten” are those who, for one reason or another, were not included on the FALINTIL High Command’s “Master List” of those considered eligible for FRAP benefits and therefore were not assisted by IOM or FRAP. The veterans generally described the people within the group referred to as the Forgotten as being comprised of:

a. Some former FALINTIL combatants who (perhaps as a result of age, poor health, or wounds) left the guerrilla force prior to the late 1990s, and were subsequently not included on the FALINTIL High Command’s list of veterans eligible for FRAP benefits.

b. Some other FALINTIL veterans, who arguably met fully the eligibility criteria for FRAP participation, but through design or omission, were not included in Master List of veterans considered eligible to participate in FRAP; and,

c. Widows and orphans of FALINTIL combatants killed during the conflict.

The vulnerabilities, or economic precariousness, of the Forgotten were often portrayed in dire terms; veterans broadly view their needs and aspirations as legitimate and the predicament of the
Forgotten with sympathy. Virtually all of the FRAP beneficiaries most concerned about the issue generally expressed feelings of shame, sadness, and disgrace regarding the plight of the Forgotten. Some veterans also reported hostility directed toward them by those who did not receive benefits. The extent to which the legitimate interests of the “Forgotten” are not being attended is having (and will continue to have) an adverse effect on at least the social reintegration of a considerable number FRAP beneficiaries, especially older and longer serving veterans.

Most veterans drew fairly clear distinctions between those they referred to as Forgotten -- versus those referred to as Excluded. Veterans generally described the Excluded as being comprised of a far larger number of people than either FRAP beneficiaries or the Forgotten. Generally, veterans tended to be far less sympathetic to claims and demands emanating from this group, some of whom are said to believe they warrant assistance, recompense and recognition for their contributions to the resistance and liberation movement. The large majority of the Excluded seem to be drawn primarily from the following categories of people:

- a. Former “clandestinos” or members of the clandestine network;
- b. Former “veterans” from the first few years of resistance and others with grievances, and generally feel they are owed recognition and compensation;
- c. Opportunists and political activists with somewhat ill defined or amorphous objectives.

3.2.6.2 Security Groups: Some within the group referred to as the excluded include people who may have either served or accompanied FALINTIL earlier, generally at some time between 1975 or ‘76 and 1979. While not totally unsympathetic to the needs of at least some of the Excluded, beneficiaries expressed general skepticism about the validity of claims put forth by many. The outstanding claims or demands for recognition does not appear to be adversely affecting social reintegration of FRAP beneficiaries in the way that the plight of the Forgotten has. However, since the Excluded are believed to constitute a base of support and membership in security groups, there are broader and potentially more serious consequences -- not only concerning the reintegration of FRAP beneficiaries but also regarding threats to security and stability in East Timor; both of which are addressed in subsequently in this report.

There are a number of FALINTIL veterans, including some FRAP beneficiaries, who are affiliated with AFC ’75, Isolados, and Familia Sagrada among other groups with ill defined or questionable motives. However, of the total number of FRAP beneficiaries (1,308) a very small percentage are actually involved with groups of this nature. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of FALINTIL veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries seem to consider such groups to be illegal; threatening; and guilty of at least misappropriating the name and identity of FALINTIL – an institution generally venerated by East Timorese society and toward which they dedicated so much.

Regarding security groups, particularly the Association of Former Combatants of ’75, expressions of concern were particularly strong and widespread among participants in Maliana and Ermera. Veterans reported increased activity by security groups – including military drills
and parades, training exercises, and aggressive recruitment efforts -- were reported along with rumors that the group members either had arms or were in the process of acquiring them. There was a strong consensus that these are “illegal groups” and that they are planning more trouble beyond charging people between $6 and $20 for identification cards, and claiming that the holders of these bogus cards as “FALINTIL” or “ex-FALINTIL”. One beneficiary asked “what should we do with our [FRAP] identification cards since they expired January 31, 2002?.” This practical question was interpreted as reflecting a greater level of concern about identity -- as legitimate veterans-- more than the card itself. Veterans in three separate discussion groups indicated that they each knew perhaps one or two FRAP beneficiaries who was participating with these groups, and considered their friends’ participation misguided, while seeking guidance as to what advice or counsel they might offer their friends.

Those veterans most familiar with AFC ’75 almost universally tended to characterize the leaders as either “crazy” or opportunists and viewed the organizers as being extremely young, and neither from nor representative of, the local communities. They also characterized some affiliated with the groups’ activities as misguided and others as dangerous.

**Summary assessment: Impact of security groups on reintegration.** Issue- or grievance-based security groups with questionable or ambiguous motives are continuing attempts to build upon their still limited success in recruiting the more vulnerable among former FRAP beneficiaries and members of the ‘Forgotten’. The degree to which members of both of these groups are found to be living in precarious conditions suggests that they may also be considered more vulnerable to manipulation to join security groups. Among other effects, recruitment efforts by grievance based security- groups, if successful, may well serve to help validate the grievances and add to the perceived legitimacy of otherwise questionable demands of these groups and those of their constituent members. Those 150 or 200 veterans who were arguably should have been eligible for reintegration benefits but never received them would also seem to be vulnerable to recruitment by security groups.

**3.2.7 Beneficiaries Current and Future Interests and Concerns:** The large majority of FRAP beneficiaries are at least satisfied with FRAP, and particularly with the support of the staff, and the status of the projects begun with program support. There are considerable indications, including from the beneficiaries themselves that they are successfully reintegrating socially and economically as civilians within their families, community and society more generally. Perhaps 15% of FRAP beneficiaries seem to be experiencing difficulties in their transition, primarily affected by economic factors and ongoing needs in addition to those addressed by the program. Beneficiaries are aware that the program was over, and that there was virtually no expectation expressed in focus group meetings that any additional assistance would be forthcoming; on the contrary. Very few participants in the focus group meetings expressed an awareness of what the Association of the Veterans of Resistance of the Foundation of War Veterans of FALINTIL (FVF) were about; among the very few that did, one mentioned that “I think I might be a member, because they included my name on their list.”

There was general concern expressed about the variables that the future held in store, particularly with respect to their economic conditions. Concern was greatest among the older veterans whose current economic conditions were considered insufficient to meet the ongoing needs of their
families. Some expressed a level of apprehension with the conclusion of FRAP benefits and related assistance from FRAP staff. At the same time there were commonly expressions of guarded optimism; a clear majority expressed interest in continuing and expanding projects begun with FRAP assistance. A considerable proportion of beneficiaries expressed and interest in obtaining training and credit.

Three major concerns were ascribed great importance by a wide variety of beneficiaries in different locations: the vulnerability of some of the older beneficiaries; the plight of the Forgotten; and the activities of security groups. To some extent, the feeling of frustrations about being excluded seems to be generalized, but more an issue of potential rather than actual significance -- as most veterans expressed the need to give the new government time. The three previous issues noted were ascribed a greater priority. In response to a question about who should get priority for any possible, though limited future assistance, among choices that included: a) vulnerable FRAP beneficiaries; b) clandestinos, c) widows and orphans of fallen comrades and d) wounded veterans and others who did not receive FRAP benefits, but who arguably merited them -- the consensus of focus groups consistently put forward “c” and “d” as the most needy and deserving. Quite a few participants also gave high priority to assisting older and more vulnerable veterans (who were FRAP beneficiaries) seen by their colleagues as living in poor conditions, particularly regarding their housing.

3.3. FRAP’s impact and performance from the perspective of key stakeholders: The following includes an analysis of the priorities and institutional objectives of key stakeholders concerning reintegration and a synthesis of their perspectives regarding the impact and performance of FRAP to assist this process. The stakeholders interviewed as part of this evaluation include not only those directly involved with reintegration and FRAP, but also representatives from other informed or affected institutions, including East Timor’s Constituent Assembly; foreign and domestic private sector; and the two primary veterans associations, among others.

While the order of priorities varied somewhat among key stakeholders, there was broad general consensus that FRAP should contribute toward the goals of enhanced stability and increased security, as well as developmental objectives -- that favored social and economic reintegration and ideally other positive externalities. Key stakeholders did not necessarily tend to view these objectives as mutually exclusive on the grander scale. However, there were some fundamental differences between and among donors, counterparts, and the implementing agency over design, implementation, and operational issues. These differences seemed most pronounced when greater programmatic emphasis was perceived as being given to security objectives over developmental ones, or vice versa.

118 Principally representatives from UNTAET/ETTA, FALINTIL; ETDF; UN agencies; principal donors, and the implementing agency and partners.
Priorities and stakeholders’ appraisal of FRAP’s impact and performance:

3.3.1 The United Nations: UNTAET replaced INTERFET, the UN military force charged with restoring calm and order following the post referendum violence. UNTAET’s structures and components -- including the accompanying Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) -- took several months following the October 1999 approval of its’ expansive mandate to become established; longer to become operational; and longer still to become effectively operational beyond Dili. According to UN officials present at the time, the operational priorities of UNTAET were focused on responding to: the considerable humanitarian crises affecting the majority of East Timorese; the fluid security situation; and, the requirements for establishing a functioning system of governance and administration of the territory involving some coordination with East Timor’s leaders. As the current Deputy UNSGSR indicated: rather than a weak or tattered government upon the arrival of the UN Mission -- there was no government at all.

In this context, and given competing priorities, it appears that comparatively little importance was ascribed to the status of FALINTIL (legal or otherwise); conditions of their cantonment; the future of an East Timorese military force; and the corresponding disposition of FALINTIL veterans. The experience of senior UNTAET leadership was also oriented more toward humanitarian and emergency responses as well as political -- as opposed to security -- issues, which informed observers have concluded had a strong influence in determining the orientation of the UN Mission. In any event, FALINTIL issues were reportedly not accorded a high priority until diminishing levels of discipline and related security were explicitly acknowledged in the summer of 2000. Security concerns focused on the increasing level of altercations involving primarily young members, and perhaps a dissident faction, within FALINTIL while in cantonment. Another serious concern was the potential for additional spontaneous or unauthorized demobilization and departure from Aileu and dispersal of forces following the departure of L-7 and other veterans. If a prevailing concern or predominant objective could be attributed to the UN regarding FRAP objectives, it would tend to be biased in favor of those supporting increased security and enhanced stability over more developmentally oriented objectives related to economic and social reintegration. UNTAET provided support from the Office of National Security Advisor and delegates from other key offices and agencies to participate in the FRAP oversight committee, as a contribution to the program and its objectives. This support and participation were primarily channeled through the CRFV.

The predominant or prevailing perspective concerning FRAP’s objectives in UNTAET -- or at least or among officials most involved with FRAP -- tended to be biased in favor of programmatic responses to actual and potential threats to security and stability involving

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119 Particularly threats emanating from across the border with West Timor, and involving Indonesian security forces and proxy forces, some members of which were infiltrating back into East Timor as units. See also related UNTAET memo (May 8, from Aileu); findings from the King’s College Study, and ONSA Issues Paper No. 5.

120 Evidenced by actions of Peter Galbraith, former head of DPA, in July 2000 authorizing $100,000 from the UN to provide food and other basic assistance to FALINTIL in cantonment.
FALINTIL. There were some differing perspectives within UNTAET of course, concerning significance of relative priorities that are worth noting. To a large extent, where key individuals sat in UNTAET determined where they stood on specific issues regarding relative importance of FRAP priorities. These perspectives also seem to be highly correlated to stakeholders’ appraisal of IOM’s performance and assessments of FRAP’s impact.

Representatives from PKF, UNMOs, ODFD, CIVPOL, and Office of National Security Advisor (as its name suggests), generally favored FRAP objectives that responded to threats or risks to security and stability. Some within these organizations favored the most expedient method for dealing with FALINTIL in order to focus greater attention on other exigencies. A well placed representative from one of these agencies lampooned the extreme viewpoint of a colleague as defining reintegration as: “give them a bag a rice, and send them home”. This perspective however was not indicative of the majority within the group with the UN that sought to prioritize security consideration. Rather, generally the viewpoints tended to be more profound and possess nuances reflecting specific institutional missions and priorities. For example, CIVPOL, especially the Office for Strategic Information, was most interested in FRAP and IOM being responsive to UN agency’s need to assess security risks and threats involving FALINTIL veterans, particularly since CIVPOL assumes (apparently based largely on erroneous information) that FRAP beneficiaries constitute a large and important source of membership in issue based- or security- groups like AFC ’75.

Some representatives from ODFD tended to view the reintegration efforts involving FALINTIL as somewhat of a diversion for them, and FALINTIL High Command, from their mission to establish the FDTL. Representatives from the ONSA, including the previous head of (ONSA) who served as chair of the FRAP steering committee (CRFV) lamented that IOM and FRAP were unable provide more adequately provide analyses regarding the demobilization and reintegration processes, once underway, and particularly concerning issues most relevant to security more generally. More specifically, the information provided by FRAP field staff management was said to be long on “nuts and bolts” and almost totally devoid of analyses or extrapolations that should have, according this stakeholder, helped CRFV and others gauge security issues as well as progress and problems with the reintegration efforts. But the NSA had a broader remit regarding security issues than the steering committee. Other representatives from UN Peacekeeping Forces (PKF) and especially UN Military Observers (UMNOs) also tended to be somewhat critical of IOM and FRAP’s responsiveness to what they considered to be priority objectives, as well as the performance of the program while underway – especially when problems arose between their organizations and those considered to be FALINTIL veterans and FRAP beneficiaries. Some members from these UNTAET agencies who were stationed at the district levels and more familiar with the operational aspects of FRAP’s implementation and

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121 Specifically UNTAET and the most pertinent affiliated agencies including CIVPOL, PKF, UN Military Observers (UNMOs), the Office of National Security Advisor, and to some degree the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Deputy UNSGSR
122 Based on interviews with the current heads of CIVPOL, Office of Strategic Information, and other CIVPOL representatives in Dili and several districts.
123 Based on interview with Nicola Dahrendorf.
124 Based on interviews with current and previous members from the organizations, IOM staff, CRFV members, and a review of meeting notes from the proceedings of CRFV.
impact tended to view the program and its responsiveness much more favorably than their Dili based colleagues.

On the whole, representatives from key UNTAET agencies and offices who tended to favor FRAP priorities associated with security and stability perceived IOM and FRAP as being less responsive to their priorities than the implementation agency and the reintegration program could, or should, have been.

Other UN agencies, whose representatives believed IOM and FRAP’s priorities should focus more equally on both security issues as well as developmental aspects of social and economic reintegration, tended to view IOM and FRAP as: more responsive; their performance more effective; and the results generated from the program more favorably. These assessments were representative in particular of senior officials from the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and UNDP, institutions with priorities and missions geared less toward security or law and orders issues per se, and more on longer term, as well as political, economic, and social objectives. Specifically, these representatives were keenly aware of the impasse that had developed between UNTAET and FALINTIL and a series of other burgeoning problems and challenges that IOM and FRAP (without UN funding) were able to address or attenuate. The current head of DPA provided a decidedly more positive appraisal of FRAP and IOM’s performance and results than colleagues from other security-focused agencies within UNTAET. Regarding IOM in particular, Stewart considered fortuitous the timing of Christopher Gascon’s arrival to East Timor at a critical juncture in the planning and decision-making process regarding demobilization and reintegration. The head of DPA credited Gascon’s directly relevant experience with similar programs in other transitional environments, and believed that IOM was particularly well suited to attend to the needs of FALINTIL veterans selected, or opting, for demobilization. He characterized both the implementation and impact of FRAP in generally positive terms, particularly with respect to political criteria as well as FRAP’s contribution to enhanced stability and increased security.125

Representatives from the UNDP, an agency not directly involved with FRAP, though familiar with the program’s objectives and performance, and assessed both favorably. As the UN agency generally dedicated to a longer-term country presence and development issues, the UNDP frequently serves as a key institutional actor in fomenting coordination with host country counterparts and among various donor and development agencies within a host country. In East Timor, as elsewhere, the UNDP representative also serves as the UN Development Coordinator. In his capacity as Development Coordinator, Mr. Reske-Nielsen ensured that IOM’s Chief of Mission was included in the weekly agency coordination meetings. Despite the fact that IOM is not technically considered a member of the UN system, IOM’s representatives were welcomed by UNDP as an integral part of the team. The UNDP representative assessed FRAP and IOM’s performance as quite positive and in some aspects laudatory: citing in particular the valuable contribution of IOM -- not only in keeping UNDP and other agencies well informed about FRAP -- but also for the quality of contributions to the overall efforts of the coordinating body.126

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125 Based on an interview with Colin Stewart, head of UNDPA; stationed in East Timor since UNAMET in 1999.
126 Based on an interview with Mr. Reske-Nielsen, UNDP resident representative.
Summary assessment: From the perspectives of key UN stakeholders, the performance and impact of the IOM implemented FRAP received decidedly mixed reviews. Those individuals with the most critical assessments of FRAP and the implementing agency tended to favor a greater programmatic focus on security issues. This perspective generally represented agencies and offices with security-focused missions or mandates. Conversely, those with the most positive assessment of IOM and FRAP tended to favor programmatic focus and objectives that prioritized political, social, and economic issues -- in addition to security considerations. UNTAET offices favoring security related considerations were those represented on the CRFV, with the head of one of the offices chairing the FRAP steering committee. A central criticism of IOM and FRAP by some representatives from among the security oriented offices of UNTAET (that included ONSA, CIVPOL, UNMOs, PKF, and ODFD) was related to information and analysis concerning veterans, the demobilization and reintegration processes. Representatives from CIVPOL’s Strategic Information Division (SID) lamented that IOM was unwilling to share data they considered useful for their purposes, and assumed FRAP beneficiaries constituted one of the core constituencies of the security groups causing them and others considerable concern. The information originating from IOM and FRAP was considered “devoid of analyses or extrapolations” that should have helped CRFV gauge security issues according to the committee’s chair who also served as UNTAET’s national security advisor.

3.3.2 East Timor’s Leadership: Senior civilian leadership returned to East Timor from overseas following the departure of Indonesian forces and the arrival of the UN, and for many it was the first time back to their country after spending many years abroad (primarily in Lusophone countries; Australia; or, like Xanana Gusmao, in an Indonesian prison). Like those in UNTAET, leaders of East Timor were confronted with a range of competing priorities and challenges, including many of the same issues the UN were concerned with, albeit from a distinct perspective. Specifically, these issues included humanitarian-, security-, and political-considerations as well as fundamental issues of politics and governance -- including the role of East Timorese leadership in the context of the UN’s led transitional administration.

While the FALINTIL High Command and some civilian leaders seemed to accord a comparatively higher priority to the status of FALINTIL and dispensation of its members -- many also had competing priorities including existing and future operational security issues and the related issue of developing a national defense force. Given these competing priorities, and the broadly recognized limitations (including human and institutional capacity), East Timor’s leadership appeared to either ascribe (like the UN) greater relative importance to other pressing issues. To the extent that FALINTIL related issues were a priority, demobilization and reintegration of veterans were subordinated to the creation of the ETDF, albeit with some members of FALINTIL at its core. East Timorese leadership also lacked the capacity and resources to adequately address these issues on its own, and the impasse with UNTAET over the creation of the ETDF further mitigated their already limited capacity. Consequently, fundamental issues concerning FALINTIL and its members were not addressed for a significant period of time. While the impasse with UNTAET was overcome, and a comprehensive plan for both creating the ETDF and demobilization were agreed upon, East Timorese leadership retained a

127 Based on interviews with representatives from CIVPOL and SID.
level of caution (reflecting some mistrust) with respect to the role of at least some international organizations and UN agencies involved these processes, including reintegration.128

One officer very much involved in process indicated that while in Aileu “we began talking about the demobilization and reintegration of at least some elements as well as the creation of a new defense force, but when INTERFET arrived, they saw militias and FALINTIL as the same.” Upon the arrival of UNTAET, the High Command viewed an earlier proposal for demobilization with suspicion of some of the interests, as if disarmament and the dismantling of FALINTIL were being attempted prior to the commitment to establish a new army.

There was a range of priorities concerning FRAP, and other competing issues within the former High Command of FALINTIL, and current leadership of the FDTL, as well a some variations of assessments on program performance and impact. To a large extent, it seems that much of the FALINTIL High Command viewed IOM and the principal donors as responsible for responding to the needs of the demobilized FALINTIL, since they had limited resources and were largely focused on the myriad challenges of creating a new army, security concerns, and responding to the exigencies of institution building, including the competition for resources within an emerging East Timorese administration.

Although expressing general, though somewhat tepid, levels of satisfaction with FRAP’s performance and impact, the former commander of FALINTIL (and current commander in chief of FDTL) expressed regret that those veterans who served longer were not entitled to receive a higher value of assistance through FRAP. Another senior FALINTIL commander from FALINTIL currently serving within the FDTL High Command clearly expressed much greater interest in resolving current challenges associated with adequately training and housing members of the ETDF rather than the status of reintegration among FRAP beneficiaries. Other officers within the High Command, including those most directly responsible for representing the interests of FALINTIL and FDTL leadership on the CRFV, tended to provide a more positive appraisal of both IOM and FRAP, with regard to responsiveness and the impact. They recognized and were sympathetic with the difficulties associated with implementing the program and to an extent acknowledged some shortcomings in their abilities to contribute as much to the process as they might have wanted.

Members of the High Command credited FRAP’s responsiveness to incorporate beneficiaries deemed eligible throughout the initial phases of FRAP’s implementation and expressed regret and concern that the 150 of so veterans they identified subsequently were unable to participate in the program. The capacity of some members of the ETDF to contribute was comprised by other concurrent responsibilities, since in addition to working with the CRFV or FRAP, they were also often directed to address other priorities associated with the development of the ETDF force, serving as liaison to the Association of FALINTIL Veterans, among other responsibilities. Those most directly involved in the reintegration process also questioned whether or not it would have been viable to vary benefits according to years of the service within FALINTIL, recognizing the difficulty in designating who served for how long, and the resulting contentiousness that might result from making decisions with imperfect information.

128 Based on separate interviews with several members of the ETDF.
Regarding the FRAP program, members of the High Command expressed considerable gratitude to the principal donors. Col. Paixao, or Meno, who frequently served as a representative to the CRFV, concluded that IOM made a great effort and that generally, “IOM did well to understand the needs of the FALINTIL command and members, even though it was at times difficult.” While noting the occasional frustrations expressed by the High Command with FRAP or IOM, Meno’s opinion was that “They did well in spite of many difficulties, and we must appreciate the work, efforts and contributions of IOM” and donors to the reintegration process.

Among those within the civilian leadership who were most informed about FRAP, there were expressions of appreciation for donor support as well. Lu-Olo, president of the Constituent Assembly, a principal leader of FRETILIN party (and a FRAP beneficiary) said: “we are grateful for the efforts of our friends at IOM for the help they gave to ensure a level of security for FALINTIL members not selected for the FDTL”. Asked if the amount of money and assistance provided by FRAP was sufficient, Lu-Olo responded:

“Yes, from a personal perspective it was enough money and assistance. In principle, I believe that most [beneficiaries] were very satisfied with assistance they received. Was it a sufficient amount of money or assistance with respect to compensation to veterans for their contribution and sacrifice: No, it was not. From a moral perspective, these members [FALINTIL veterans] deserve so much for their suffering and losses, but perhaps this was beyond [the scope of] the program.”

With respect to the future needs of FRAP beneficiaries and others who were denied benefits, the East Timorese leader indicated that “many of these veterans need a guarantee and security for help in the future” while also indicating that some who merited help and assistance, including some veterans and members of the clandestine network were never included in the FRAP program and also deserve attention.

3.3.3 Principal Donors: The World Bank (WB) and USAID, FRAP’s principal donors, were favorably predisposed to comprehending the significance of FALINTIL issues. They exhibited sensitivity to others within UNTAET and among East Timorese leadership (civilian and military) who sought assistance in responding to the challenges and needs associated with FALINTIL. Key personnel within principal donor organizations were either familiar with special needs of transitional environments or possessed a level of knowledge and familiarity with East Timorese issues that proved helpful. These attributes were accompanied by a responsiveness to help address FALINTIL related issues when it seemed UN agencies were shying away from anything to do with security related issues. In the case of USAID/OTI in particular, the institutional orientation, and that of its’ key personnel possessed comparative advantages with respect to understanding the needs of transitional environments and specifically those associated with demobilization and reintegration efforts. Key personnel from the WB, had pre-existing and long standing relationships with a wide range of East Timorese civilian and military leaders that facilitated access and trust. The institutional priorities of the principal donors were to be responsive to East Timor’s humanitarian and developmental needs, while also being supportive of the transition process and the emerging institutions trying to manage it.
While the principal donors certainly placed high priority of FRAP’s contribution to more immediate objectives such as stability and security, they were at least equally concerned that the program contribute toward developmental objectives – which would generate broader, longer-term, and more sustainable benefits – that would result in enhanced stability and increased security. In contrast to the perspective of some UN stakeholders, USAID was concerned that FRAP and IOM were being too closely associated with security issues and problems that went well beyond the ability of the project or organization to influence. Some within the donor organizations viewed reintegration benefits as providing FALINTIL veterans with privileges and opportunities that many other needy Timorese lacked, and lamented the extent that assistance was viewed by beneficiaries as an entitlement as opposed to an opportunity. There were also some misgivings expressed by staff from the donor organizations that many of the FRAP beneficiaries were young and hadn’t served long in FALINTIL and consequently were less deserving than either older veterans and members of the Clandestine network seen as having contributed significantly to resistance.

In terms of impact, the primary WB representative most involved with FRAP was basically satisfied with the results of the program to assist reintegration, although had some misgivings about aspects of its implementation. USAID representatives have been less pleased with at least some aspects of FRAP’s implementation; expressing in particular shortcomings with the program’s provision of information and analyses (including the results of the socio-economic survey), maintaining effective communication regarding progress and problems with respect to FRAP, as well as some perceived design weaknesses in the design and initial approach of FRAP that provided greater emphasis on cash subsidies, training, and kits, as opposed to the productive or income generating packages and related skills development. At the same time, IOM and FRAP are credited with modifying approaches that were more responsive to the needs of the beneficiaries and in cases to some donor priorities as well. Both principal donors had specific critiques of FRAP’s performance, generally concerning information and analysis regarding aspects of the program’s implementation and performance. The WB’s overall appraisal of FRAP’s performance and impact might be characterized as generally positive. USAID’s appraisal of FRAP’s performance would more accurately be described as mixed.

Like ONSA, some donor representatives considered one of FRAP’s major weaknesses as its shortcomings in providing more adequate information and analyses regarding the demobilization and reintegration processes. Unlike ONSA, their lament was not how this information and analyses could contribute to broader security considerations – but rather how it could contribute more effectively toward the program’s implementation and impact. FRAP’s failure to provide an adequate analysis of the results of the SES is cited as an example of this shortcoming.

**3.3.4 IOM**: IOM as an institution is viewed by many of its own staff as a “can do” organization. IOM’s involvement in East Timor began with its response to the post-referendum upheaval and the needs of a considerable portion of East Timor’s population displaced as a consequence. In addition to its primary institutional orientation of assisting displaced persons and refugees, IOM has been extensively involved in addressing other post-conflict needs in other transitional environments -- including demobilization and reintegration programs in Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Key personnel in IOM’s mission in Dili, including the former Chief of Mission and FRAP’s program manager also possessed directly pertinent experience in
formulating and managing demobilization and reintegration programs or otherwise working in post-conflict environs. Apart from this experience, of the institution and key personnel, IOM also possessed a decentralized institutional presence and (particularly a logistical and management) capacity in various regions of East Timor, established to help uprooted populations. For these and other reasons, IOM was considered to possess a number of fundamental comparative advantages for implementing FRAP.

IOM credited both principal donors with the high degree of program ownership and ongoing and informed support. The WB in particular was credited for support in developing the program design, and assistance in facilitating better understanding between IOM and other key stakeholders, especially East Timor’s leadership. USAID’s flexibility and immediate responsiveness to priorities was also highlighted among the attributes ter contributions of the IOM management also that the donors at times sought to micro-manage; provided tentative operating guidelines and limited finance for some components that reflected their design preferences. Additionally stringent procurement guidelines and the late formalized agreements were factors that IOM had to contend.

Regarding FRAP’s objectives, IOM endeavored to be responsive to the priorities of counterparts (UNTAET and East Timorese leadership, primarily FALINTIL High Command); the principal donors; and finally FALINTIL veterans who became FRAP beneficiaries. In retrospect, based on the considerable levels of satisfaction expressed by the large majority of FRAP beneficiaries, it appears that IOM and FRAP are credited with being most responsive to needs and priorities of the beneficiaries, and perhaps more so than other key stakeholders. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, IOM viewed FRAP first and foremost as an opportunity to purchase stability and security, particularly important during East Timor’s transition period. In this regard, IOM perceives FRAP as having been quite successful, particularly given the amount of time, funding and the programmatic environment in which FRAP was operating. In terms of FRAP’s implementation, IOM’s priorities were to be responsive to the various constituencies involved, and assist the reintegration of beneficiaries in the most effective manner possible. While not claiming to have done everything as well as they would have liked, to wit the SES, OIM considers that FRAP’s implementation was timely, responsive and effective in terms of impact, IOM views positively the programmatic achievements it was able to engender concerning the social and economic reintegration of FALINTIL veterans, and considers that the program successfully contributed to the objectives of security, stability, as well as development.

3.3.5 The CRFV, and its role in overseeing project implementation and ensuring stakeholder participation. The CRFV, or steering committee, was chaired by the National Security Advisor and provided a mechanism for key stakeholders to come together on at least a monthly basis to debate key issues; develop responses to pressing needs; validate key decisions and approaches; and, review progress and problems affecting demobilization and reintegration.

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129 Nicola Dahrendorf served as the National Security Advisor to the UNSGSR (Sergio V. de Vieira) within the UNTAET structure, and strictly speaking not to the ETTP per se.

130 (donors, implementers, representatives from FALINTIL High Command and government counterparts, as well as other interested partners)
While reportedly suffering from some weak leadership during the initial period of its activity, this shortcoming was effectively addressed once Nicola Dahrendorf, UNTAET’s National Security Advisor assumed the responsibilities as chairperson for the Commission. While membership or levels of participation seemed to change at varying points during FRAP implementation, the CRFV seems to have benefited from the contributions of a number of key actors who were dedicated; well-informed; and keenly focused on effectively addressing the needs and challenges involved in demobilizing and reintegrating FALINTIL veterans.

As noted previously in this section, UNTAET agencies and offices represented on the CRFV tended to biased in favor of prioritizing security issues, which reflected the institutional perspectives and missions of their respective agencies. FALINTIL High Command’s participation was said by other members of the commission to have been inconsistent, and compromised not only by limited resources (financial, institutional, etc.) but also by the competing priorities of the delegates who were also involved in attending to other tasks simultaneously. The extent of contributions to the workings of the CRFV also seemed to be comprised by certain degree of caution or mistrust on the part of the High Command, which in some cases limited the sharing of information and other forms of participation. The NSA, and chair of the CRFV, viewed the High Command’s caution as emanating from a lack of trust in IOM. However, IOM dispute this and an FDTL officer described the dynamic more as a residual effect of the High Command’s experiences with UN and the international organizations from the cantonment period and impasse over the creation of the ETDF. In either event, the High Command’s reticence to share information contributed for example to the delays in providing FRAP with lists of FALINTIL members and those to be demobilized prior to February 2001, or in seeking prior assistance in developing the list earlier. Members of the High Command who worked most closely with the commission suggested that CRFV’s role was satisfactory, though in retrospect it objectives might have been well served by also having had a representative of East Timor’s civilian leadership in order to provide an additional and perhaps longer term view of reintegration and interests of veterans.

IOM was represented on the CRFV by either the Chief of Mission or FRAP’s program manager, both of whom credit the commission for the support provided to the program, while also observing that it was sometimes difficult to deal with the sometimes intense and conflicting pressures emanating from the various institutions represented. FRAP benefited from information shared by other stakeholders, including UN Military Observers (UNMOs) about FALINTIL; support from the WB and NSA in relations with the High Command; and political support from both donors. The commission was considered helpful in vetting ideas and authorizing changes to the initial design, particularly those involving modifications to the approaches pursued in the reintegration phase.

From the perspective of the NSA, issues that might have been better addressed directly between the donors and IOM sometimes bogged down the CRFV meetings she chaired. The NSA was critical of FRAP’s limited capacity to generate the type of information and analysis that would have contributed to an improved basis for assess problems and progress in terms of reintegration and security issues more generally. The donors too lamented this shortcoming as well as some
problems with communicating about the FRAP developments during implementation. However, one donor representative also questioned the value that the CRFV seemed to place little value on the analysis of information available to it; demonstrating scant interest for example in obtaining more than the two or three page summary of the SES provided by FRAP. A donor representative also observed that the NSA’s resources and mandate for obtaining and analyzing security information was more expansive then CRFV’s or FRAP’s, suggesting that to at least some extent the expectations of NSA (CIVPOL) regarding security related information or analysis from FRAP may have been unrealistic.

3.3.6. Veterans’ Organizations: Two non-governmental organizations were established in 2001 with the intention of focusing on issues involving veterans of resistance – including members of FALINTIL and the clandestine network. The Association of Veterans of the Resistance (AVR) was established by Xanana Gusmao in July 2001 and is intended to assist primarily members of the clandestine network as well as those who served in the armed resistance with FALINTIL (between 1979-1992). The AVR’s objectives are primarily geared toward former members, or veterans, of the estimated 18,000 members of the clandestine network who were not including in FRAP. Its objectives, in addition to helping these members is also to assist widows, orphans and the disabled who bore sacrifices as a result of the liberation struggle. The Foundation of FALINTIL Veterans (FVF) was established in May 2001 by 12 former commanders, the majority of whom are currently members of the ETDF’s High Command. The FVF’s intended constituency is intended to be FALINTIL veterans who participated in the armed struggle and also shares the goal of assisting widows, orphans, and those disabled as a result of the liberation struggle. In one sense, these veterans’ organizations are intended to the East Timorese NGO mechanisms that are intended to build upon and follow through on the reintegration process to assist veterans (from the armed and unarmed) resistance. In addition to the stated objectives, both organizations were created by East Timor’s current leadership (the President and the ETDF) to help channel support to, and thus constructively engage two critical constituencies: former members of the clandestine movement and FALINTIL. One of the primary objectives of both organization seems also to limit the potential for former members of these organizations to become involved in anti-government activities. As a founding member of one of the NGOs put it: ‘How do we keep the members from protesting against our government?’.

The FVF is more specifically geared toward FALINTIL veterans, it is in a sense a Timorese organization dedicated to building upon achievements FRAP was able to contribute toward beneficiares’ reintegration. Adriano da Camara is the president of FVF not only is a representative of an organization directly interested in, and affected by FRAP’s performance and impact, but is also a FALINTIL veteran and FRAP beneficiary.  

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131 The period corresponds to the years Gusmao served as the Commander of FALINTIL prior to his capture in 1992.
132 Founders members and current board members include Gen. Taur Matan Ruak; Colonels Lere; Sabica; Falor Rate Laek who are currently serve as the Commanders in Chief of the ETDF and members of senior officer corps.
133 Adriano da Camara (“LINTIL”) is also former Second Commander from Company II.
As the head of an organization intended to assist FALINTIL veterans and their families, Mr. Camara’s impressions are that FRAP has contributed significantly toward the social and economic reintegration of veterans. As a veteran, he has directly experienced the hardships of his comrades and the benefits of FRAP’s assistance. In fact his perspectives were nearly identical to those of other longer serving veterans who became FRAP beneficiaries. He too spent long months under difficult conditions in cantonment, but also expressed a sentiment many of his colleagues shared: “we complied with the orders of our commanders, otherwise we would have lost what we had fought for.” FVF’s president described as well the growing discontent of members in Aileu, and the fear about the future, particularly concerning the economic prospects of veterans and concerns of life outside of FALINTIL for many who had for so long considered it their family. While two of his brothers were selected for the ETDF, he was not; he is aware of the sadness and hurt many veterans felt about not being selected. Like most veterans who participated in the focus group meetings, Camara was pleased that refugees and others with needs got building materials, but felt that veterans were to some extent discriminated against, because organizations knew that they were to be assisted by IOM.

With respect to the selection process of beneficiaries, da Camara expressed what many older veterans will agree with, but will talk about only with great reluctance: By 1998 or 1999, he estimated that there were only 500 or so guerrillas in FALINTIL. Others joined quite late, and perhaps did not deserve the benefits they received. Nonetheless, Camara felt that the selection was the responsibility of the commanders, whom he claimed should have known quite well those who merited assistance and those who did not. Since most veterans were still in cantonment while zinc and other building materials were being distributed, almost none of the veterans received this form of assistance distributed by agencies to help the population rebuild after the devastation caused by the Indonesians.

Mr. Camara felt that IOM and FRAP assisted veterans with their transition and reintegration more than any other organization, and had high praise for the staff and their efforts. Like many other older or longer serving veterans, he felt that the amount provided for the TSN was insufficient, though expressed great appreciation for the help – recognizing that the resources came not from the UN or his government but from donors. Camara expressed a greater level of satisfaction with the support for the income generating project and remains optimistic about the prospects for earning income from his rice milling service. He indicated that most veterans had very little experience managing money, and the FRAP was very helpful in helping to guide and support veterans developing their proposals, and getting the activities underway.

As a FRAP beneficiary, Camara’s perspectives are nearly identical to the overwhelming majority of his former comrades about the antecedents to demobilization, the reintegration process generally, and in his assessment of FRAP’s contributions. He is enormously grateful for the help he and the other veterans received from FRAP, and while considering the TSN amounts insufficient, expressed quite a high level of satisfaction with the assistance overall, including IOM and FRAP’s contributions. While unsure the extent to which the new government will be able to assist veterans and others who perhaps merit assistance, he is working so that the Foundation can contribute to continuing the assistance to veterans’ reintegration. While seeking funding from donors, and other resources – including land and buildings abandoned by the Indonesians -- from
the new government, the FVF also has a collaborative arrangement with private sector firms involved in gas distribution and retail; the FVF gets a percentage of the sales which goes toward financing the Foundation’s objectives.\(^{134}\)

### 3.3.7. The Private Sector

While not all of the members from the private sector interviewed were particularly well aware of FRAP per se, they were quite familiar with FALINTIL and reintegration efforts; and in fact were contributed toward it by providing employment for veterans. Additionally, members of the private sector had some unique and particularly informed perspectives about the status of reintegration and related issues including security.

Warren Knight is Australian sent to East Timor to help establish operations for Chubb Protective Services in East Timor.\(^{135}\) He brings with him a solid background including several decades of experience within the operational and preventative security fields, both within the government and private sector as well as his training as a linguist. In addition to his good nature, Mr. Knight is well served by his language abilities in Bahasa-Indonesian, the working language of the company. Except for Mr. Knight, who in a capacity as senior advisor, the company is led, managed and operated by East Timorese.\(^{136}\) As local laws begin to establish the processes for incorporating, Chubb expects to register as East Timorese company and subsidiary of Chubb International.\(^{137}\) Currently, Chubb employs about 750 full time permanent employees and currently provides security services at 78 sites in the country, principally in and around the capital of Dili, making the company one of, if not the, single largest private sector source of employment in the country. The company expects to grow still further over the next year both in the capital – after the UNTAET withdrawal -- and in the districts throughout the country.

“Perhaps 50 to 60% of our 750 employees at the moment are either ex-FALINTIL or former Clandestino, as are 3 of our 5 senior managers. This has been a conscious decision on our part to hire these men, some of whom we recruited directly from Aileu in 2000. Eduardo Belo Suares [alias ‘Gahot Lahakfodak’] has been key to our recruitment, and has brought his leadership and other skills including those garnered with FALINTIL.” Mr. Knight indicated that FALINTIL veterans, who are now part of Chubb and members of the High Command, recognized the importance of finding employment for some of the estimated 2000 members of FALINTIL who would be demobilized.

As a veteran of the Australian armed forces, Chubb’s regional advisor was particularly sensitive – both to the needs of these men – as well as to the advantages of recruiting people with a background of discipline. Mr. Knight considered that it was an added bonus Chubb was able to recruit from the FALINTIL, since they “are excellent people and highly respected in East

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\(^{134}\) By April 2002, the Foundation was reported --by a member of the ETDF who supports its efforts -- to have accumulated over $200,000.

\(^{135}\) Chubb Protective Services a British based multinational corporation, with an American CEO; it has subsidiaries in 51 countries, including Australia and a branch in East Timor.

\(^{136}\) The current head of Chubb in East Timor is also an elected member (PPT) of the Constitutional Assembly.

\(^{137}\) Currently, the company pays corporate taxes (30%, as established by UNTAET/ETTP) as well as income tax for its employees.
Timor”. Chubb has benefited enormously from having recruited FALINTIL veterans, who have performed exceptionally well according to Mr. Knight, particularly in difficult or crisis situations; “they don’t always choose the easiest options or the path of least resistance, but look instead for the most appropriate or best viable option” for dealing with a situation or challenge. Chubb expects to grow particularly as CIVPOL’s role diminishes and Mr. Knight fully expects to be recruiting as many FALINTIL veterans as he possibly can to fill the emerging needs of the company in East Timor.

Mr. Knight has also been familiar with FRAP, has met with program staff, and been impressed with the FRAP’s efforts to assist the reintegration efforts of FALINTIL veterans -- a process that he considers to be going quite well on a number of different levels. On the political level, and in addition to the presidency, occupied by its former commander in chief, FALINTIL veterans accounted for about 15 seats in the current Assembly, East Timor’s legislative body. From Mr. Knight’s informed perspective about security issues, particularly in Dili, he has seen no indication that FALINTIL veterans have been involved in anti-social or criminal acts. In terms of economic reintegration, Chubb’s regional advisor recognizes that East Timor’s economy is still small and recovering from the violence and destruction, making it a difficult environment for many low skilled job seekers to find salaried employment. At the same time, he suggested that the same character and discipline that makes veterans attractive employees for his company, will also serve other veterans, not only as dedicated workers but also as good citizens.

3.4 Impact of FRAP on Stability and Security: FRAP has had an overwhelmingly positive effect on security and stability since its inception, and has continued to generate benefits in these regards over the intermediate term.

Without exception every veteran who spent time in cantonment considered the experience as profoundly negative. Over the 14 months while many resided in Aileu, they lived in poor conditions with inadequate shelter and insufficient supplies of basic necessities. Reorganizations of platoons and companies; competition among some commanders; reported agitation by dissident elements; and generalized apprehension about the future also contributed to elevating tensions among FALINTIL while in Aileu. Virtually all contemporary observers noted (frequently with increasing urgency) the poor conditions and corresponding deterioration of discipline as well the increasing tensions and potential for violence or spontaneous and unauthorized demobilization resulting in a dispersal of armed guerrillas outside the control and supervision of the authority from either East Timorese leadership or UNTAET.

The concerns about the threat to security and stability were credible, considerable, and growing. They were noted by UNTAET representatives stationed in Aileu; by members of the

138 CIVPOL’s activities will continue for at least a year or two beyond the termination of UNTAET’s mandate, but it will be gradually reducing the scope of activities.
139 Reportedly, veterans wishing to be candidates selected different and smaller parties so as to ranked higher on the various voting lists and enhancing the chances of getting elected; a strategy that seems to have borne fruit.
140 If one defines the formula for risk as CIVPOL does (Risk = Opportunity + Means + Intent), then most observers might assess FALINTIL members in cantonment as certainly having at least the means and opportunity to threaten security and stability.
The promise of reintegration assistance was one of several factors that mitigated risks during the latter part of the cantonment period. Among the other factors were: members’ respect and fear of commanders; the agreement to establish the ETDF; a comparatively robust international military presence; and, the sentiments expressed by older and influential veterans like LINTIL, that if veterans left cantonment, they would have risked destroying what they fought for. While tensions abated somewhat in anticipation of the ETDF’s selection process, they resurfaced among some with a fury after they learned that they had been excluded and together with the others to be demobilized, faced a host of unknown challenges beyond FALINTIL as civilians. The existence of FRAP, even if imperfectly understood by many beneficiaries at the time, the registration of beneficiaries, the assurance that they would get assistance, and the provision of the first benefits (a $100 stipend, a WFP food ration; and the offer of a lift home) provided at least some initial assurance to veterans uncertain and apprehensive about their future. In this sense, FRAP also contributed considerably to the objectives of stability and security in this very tense period.

As veterans returned to their homes and communities, with or without program transport, threats and risks diminished to some extent, but also became more diffuse. Demobilized veterans are much more likely to cause trouble in someone else’s community than their own. Reunions with family and a generally responsive community, coupled with the first TSN subsidy, helped provide veterans with some level of security in an environment with powerful social and cultural parameters mitigating against anti-social behavior or acts. Initial reinsertion accomplished, with the help of FRAP. While some veterans migrate to population centers, including Dili, most return to the home communities in rural and frequently remote areas. FRAP’s offices and personnel are relatively mobile and provide extensive coverage, culminating in 7 offices located throughout East Timor to provide FRAP support to beneficiaries closer to where they live. TSN payments continue to provide some level of support that is certainly adequate for the great majority of beneficiaries, and sufficient to meet at least the most basic temporary necessities of those with greater needs and responsibilities. While veterans are becoming increasingly acclimated and oriented to their families, friends, and community, they can also begin to work on their homes, farms, or as some did with TSN support – on opening a kiosk, or buying and selling a variety of commodities. Reinsertion advanced with FRAP assistance. Risks to stability and security continue to diminish, as threat source of the threats are dispersed. The opportunity and means to cause trouble, particularly of an organized nature, is reduced; as is, and to an even greater extent, the desire or intention for veterans to cause trouble.

“Malai prometido” or the foreigner promised: Particularly in East Timor -- a promise is a debt unpaid. A level of trust between the beneficiaries and FRAP and its staff begins to grow as
veterans can rely upon the commitments made by the program are fulfilled. The deliveries of TSN benefits are made until June or July 2001 as promised. Time has served to diminish the experiences of cantonment and for many the disappointment of not having been selected for the ETDF. FRAP staff intensifies consultations and counseling with beneficiaries, and the comprehension is enhanced about what the reintegration packages include. Veterans are assisted in developing their income generating projects. Some disgruntled veterans, fearing that they will not get the benefits they were promised, demonstrate in front of IOM’s office in Dili and threaten violence. Within a week, the first proposal is approved and over the next four months all participating FRAP beneficiaries have received support and funding for their projects and roughly half have participated in some form of FRAP provided or facilitated training ranging from brief course in livestock management, business development, or more substantive longer terms job skills training. Reinsertion progressed along the continuum toward steps toward early social and economic reintegration undertaken by FRAP beneficiaries, but assisted and supported by FRAP.

The long and excruciatingly difficult experiences of cantonment risked turning wine into vinegar. FALINTIL veterans who had demonstrated such admirable discipline in not responding to the Indonesian provocations seemed dangerously close to threaten security and stability if the time and conditions of cantonment continued without hope. Even the promise of assistance for reintegration served to some extent to mitigate some of the considerable tensions and risks associated with FALINTIL at this time. From its inception, throughout its implementation and beyond, FRAP has contributed in a number of ways to reducing risks and threats to security and stability. While the large majority of FRAP beneficiaries typically underwent the stages described above in a process of reinsertion and reintegration assisted by FRAP, security and stability were enhanced.

There are genuine concerns about apparently growing threats to stability and security in East Timor. However, the source of these threats emanates from issue or grievance-based security that are not supported by the overwhelming majority of FRAP beneficiaries, who have made considerable achievements in the process reintegrating both socially and economically into their communities as respected citizens. Some of the historical antecedents regarding these security groups were raised in Ch. 2.2 of this report. There and in Ch. 3.2.6.2, the very limited participation of FRAP participants are referenced, and those who are more likely to comprise the support base for security groups are described.

The following sub-section is intended to address primarily issues relating to the actual source of threats, emphasizing in the process that FRAP beneficiaries -- despite the erroneous conclusion of some within the UN – do NOT constitute the primary or a considerable constituency of security groups. On the contrary, most FRAP beneficiaries would in fact be expected to counter efforts of security groups to threaten security and stability. The implications concerning security groups, and their potential to threaten stability and security are also addressed in the following chapter.
3.4.1 Considerations of Threats and Risks to Stability and Security

The overwhelming majority of FALINTIL veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries pose little or not threats to security or stability. They consider groups like the “Association of Former Combatants of 1975” (AFC ’75) to be illegal; threatening; and guilty of at least misappropriating the name and identity of FALINTIL – an institution venerated by East Timorese society generally, and toward which they dedicated so much.

Security Groups like AFC ’75, with support from CPD/RDTL appear to pose challenges and perhaps emerging risks to stability and security in East Timor. These organizations, and other groups with coincidental interests have sought to capitalize on the sense of grievance that affects a good many of the people who consider themselves as having been unjustifiably excluded from recognition and benefits for their contribution to resistance. Security groups have generated a considerable level of concern among communities where they are most active; informed East Timorese and international observers; East Timorese leadership, including the ETDF; and various U.N. agencies and offices, including CIVPOL and ONSA. The primary groups of particular concern (including AFC ’75, ASTD and CPD/RDTL) claim to have 25,000 members.141

During the evaluation, concerns about AFC ’75 and their activities were noted in Aileu, Same, Maliana, and Ermera, as well as Dili, among other locations. These concerns were expressed, at times with alarm, by FRAP beneficiaries, local officials, representatives from PKF or CIVPOL, non-veterans in the local communities, as well as an IOM staff member, and FALINTIL veteran who reported a potentially dangerous encounter with a menacing group of nearly 100 AFC ’75 members in Same. In these and other locations, members affiliated with AFC ’75 have been practicing military-style drills what organizers and participants have told the evaluator as preparations for providing security for the people of East Timor during this time of vulnerability.142 The many critics of this group from the communities in which they are operating counter that the people participating in these drills are: generally not from their communities; currently have access to arms (traditional and modern weapons) and are seeking additional arms; and are menacing. With respect to the threats perceived and articulated by observers at the local levels, AFC ’75 members in some places have taken possession of areas, where they have been busy clearing bush and trees (and in some cases the crops of neighbors) and restricting access of local community members. Other members of communities in the Same area report that due to the threats they perceive from members of this group, they have either not attended to some of their fields, or otherwise taken a far longer circuitous route to access them in order to avoid contact.

UNTAET’s April 2002 assessment of the threat seems to build upon earlier assessments the UN refers to as the “secret army” and references military style training by the security groups as having taken place in Ermera, Maliana, and Covalima at least since October 2001. The current assessment seems to reflect concern about the escalation of these activities, which is consistent with what is so widely reported by people during the evaluation in the referenced districts and

141 Information provided in interviews with representatives from these groups, review of some the groups’ correspondence and other documents, and informed third parties.
beyond. In addition to AFC ’75, there are other security groups generating concern, including: COLIMAU 2000, ISOLADOS, BAU MALOS and TIM SAKA among others.

The concerns about security group activities at the regional level were illustrated in a version of past incident recounted by the acting chief of CIVPOL in Baucau, who indicated that members of the ETPS there along with CIVPOL were accused by CPD/RDTL of having shot and killed one of their members. (The acting chief indicated that no one had been shot; rather, one of the police officers shot into the air to stop a suspect from fleeing.) CPD/RDTL, reportedly with support from FALINTIL veterans launched a large demonstration in Baucau, East Timor’s “second city” or town. During and immediately following the demonstration, the participants reportedly threatened CIVPOL and ETPS with revenge. The non-event leading to near immediate mobilization (and manipulation) may be illustrative of both motivations of groups like CPD/RDTL as well an environment that suffers from a shortcoming of reliable information disseminated in a way that can help to better inform those who might otherwise fall prey to manipulation.

The CIVPOL representative in Baucau, and other Dili based CIVPOL representatives, as well as the UNTAET assessment tend to identify “ex-FALINTIL” as one of the primary actors in forming these groups and participating in the mobilizations and military parades. For a number of reasons, this assumption about FALINTIL veterans seems to be incorrect or largely misleading.

While difficult without access to confidential UN documents and assessing the bases for analyses supporting them, it appears that UNTAET risk assessment has to a large extent incorrectly concluded that FALINTIL veterans are the principal category of people that comprise the membership of “Issue Motivated” or security groups. The following are intended to generate at least questions about the assumptions.

a) For one, the numbers just do not add up. Estimates of the membership in AFC ‘75 range from between 5,000 to 25,000; while the most generous estimate of FALINTIL members could be estimated at no more than 2,000 at the time of cantonment and demobilization, and about 650 of these FALINTIL veterans are currently serving in the FDTL. Even accounting for those who previously served in FALINTIL and were neither in cantonment nor officially demobilized, the estimates of people belonging to security groups seems to far outnumbers those who have ever served in FALINTIL. As a former FALINTIL commander suggested with bemusement, if we had that many members we may have beaten the Indonesian security forces militarily.

Since UNTAET seems to have identified and verified 22 locations where training has taken place with roughly 2,000 participants, it seems highly improbable that any considerable proportion of the membership of these groups is comprised of actual FALINTIL veterans and even less likely that they were veterans who participated in FRAP.

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143 UNTAET’s assessment was produced before the April 2002 demonstrations in Dili by the primarily young people affiliated with AFC ’75, and dressed with red bandanas, during the time of presidential elections.
b) Secondly, as a result of interviews conducted with some organizers and members of AFC ‘75, it is apparent that many are incredibly young. As one concerned FRAP beneficiary in Ermera concluded: “They never served; they aren’t even old enough to grow a beard.” Other members identified themselves as either having served in the clandestine network, or having been in the mountains with FALINTIL, generally after 1975 and no later than 1981.

c) Third, while a number of veterans readily admit that they know an individual or in some cases, several individuals, who are veterans or FRAP beneficiaries who are affiliated with security groups, the actual numbers seem quite low. In Same, one informed veteran reported that perhaps 10 of the 100 AFC members met there were FALINTIL veterans, led by a former political veteran who has long links with CPD/RDTL. In Maliana and Ermera, out of discussions with over 100 FRAP beneficiaries (including former commanders), they reported knowing personally a total of perhaps 6 or 7 FRAP beneficiaries who are affiliated with AFC ’75 – separate and apart from the reports they heard of some crazy veteran some had known during the conflict or cantonment who was reportedly among the leaders of AFC ’75. (Collegues of one relatively young member in interview at an AFC ’75 office in Maliana boasted that he murdered his father because he was against independence, though they also indicated the man suffers from some mental problems.)

d) Fourth, an officer with the FDTL -- which for good or ill, has been closely monitoring the activities and apparently the membership of security groups – indicated that he believed that no more than 2 or 3% of actual FALINTIL veterans were either directly involved or affiliated with AFC ’75 and other security groups.

e) Fifth, the analyses within the threat assessment attributes the motivation of ex-FALINTIL reportedly involved with security groups with their perceived plight as well as with disenchantment with the FDTL and the interim government. However, based on the results of the sample survey, focus group discussions, and in-depth conducted as part of this evaluation, a very large percentage of FRAP beneficiaries indicate considerable levels of satisfaction with reintegration they received from FRAP; responsiveness of the program; status of their income-generating activities; as well as their status as civilians. Furthermore, while many FRAP beneficiaries admitted to being hurt, disappointed or even betrayed as a result of not being selected for the FDTL, these same veterans indicated almost universally that these feelings -- or at least the depths in which they are felt – have dissipated considerably. Finally, while there may be some growing frustration about being discriminated against in terms of jobs and benefits emanating from the UN and NGOs, the level or nature of the frustration was generalized, typically not directed at the government per se, which surprising number of veterans had a considerable level of information about leaders having barely assumed responsibilities and have very few resources. The level and nature of frustration was nothing approaching that which would contribute to mobilization and participation due to “disenchantment”.

e) Finally, since members of AFC ’75 identify their members as either “FALINTIL, ex-FALINTIL” or a variation of the same even though the vast majority apparently have never served. This misappropriation of the FALINTIL name and identity is likely to be cause for confusion perhaps leading those analyzing the group to consider them as “FALINTIL” or “exFALINTIL” as well. This scenario is considered even more probable as a result of an
interview with a CIVPOL official involved in preparing threat assessments where there was confusion in distinguishing members of all (registered) FALINTIL veterans of roughly 1,950 people, which included (650) recruits for ETDF and (1,308) FRAP beneficiaries with members of the Clandestine Network (estimated to number around 18,000). The fact that some refer to former members of the armed and armed resistance as “veterans” probably adds to the confusion.

**Summary assessment:** The conclusions from UNTAET’s analyses, suggests that efforts to curb these training exercises or otherwise regulate security groups could be counterproductive. The current constitution allows for “other security” in addition to FDTL. Finally UNTAET’s assessment seems to surmise that an organized threat to the security of East Timor from the security groups does not appear to be imminent, due primarily to their lack of capability to mount such a threat. While the conclusions of UNTAET’s threat assessment could be correct, it is also highly likely that at least some of the fundamental analysis and assumptions on which they are based are wrong.

There are potentially serious implications resulting from this apparent confusion between actual FALINTIL veterans from those who claim to be; and between actual FALINTIL veterans and “veterans” of the clandestine network. Analysis suggesting the FALINTIL veterans (or FRAP beneficiaries) comprise a key constituency of security groups if spurious would not only be prejudicial to the veterans, and the venerated FALINTIL, but would perhaps more significantly risk compromising at least a part of the threat assessments and might also adversely affect policy considerations regarding responses to security groups in an effective and appropriate manner.

UN and others interested in assessing the base support for security groups should consider a group referred to by veterans and others as the “Excluded”. Members within this category believe that they warrant: attention, assistance, recompense and recognition for their contributions to the resistance and liberation movement. The overwhelming majority the Excluded seem to be drawn primarily from the following categories of people:

- Former “clandestinos” or members of the clandestine network;
- Former “veterans” from the first few years of resistance and others with grievances, and generally feel they are owed recognition and compensation;
- Opportunists; and,
- Political activists with specific, though somewhat ill defined or amorphous objectives

Some members of ACF ’75 and other security groups undoubtedly include a portion of the estimated 200 FALINTIL veterans who should have been eligible for reintegration benefits but were, for one reason or another, not authorized by the FALINTIL High Command to participate in FRAP. There are credible reports that some of the 1,308 veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries are also involved with security groups. However, all indications are that the level of participation from the latter group is quite small in absolute, comparative, and relative terms. FRAP beneficiaries do not constitute the primary constituency or core of supporters for security groups.

**Effects on reintegration:** Issue- or grievance- based security groups with questionable or ambiguous motives are continuing attempts to build upon their still limited success in recruiting
the more vulnerable among former FRAP beneficiaries and members of the ‘Forgotten’. The degree to which members of both of these groups are found to be living in precarious conditions suggests that they may also be considered more vulnerable to manipulation to join such groups. Among other effects, recruitment efforts by grievance based- or security- groups, if successful, may well serve to help validate the grievances and add to the perceived legitimacy of otherwise questionable demands of these groups and those of their constituent members.
Chapter IV: CONCLUSIONS; IMPLICATIONS and RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Conclusions: At the most fundamental level, the raison d’être of FRAP was to “assist the reinsertion (and reintegration) of FALINTIL veterans” who were demobilized; it was not per se to compensate participants for their service, suffering, and contributions. If the latter were the principal -- or even a primary -- objective of the program, the key finding of this evaluation would be that FRAP came up short and that its performance was inadequate. This is decidedly not the case. The overall conclusion of this evaluation is that FRAP has been quite successful and on a number of levels.

The IOM implemented FRAP, financed primarily by the WB and USAID, provided help to FALINTIL veterans when few other organizations were perceived as either willing or able to attend to the needs of this constituency. With IOM, donors and other stakeholders were able to obtain an effective and comparatively efficient contracting and implementation mechanism from a public international organization with a decidedly “can-do” approach. While not without some shortcomings in terms of implementation, IOM proved equal to the task of successfully assisting the reinsertion and reintegration of demobilized FALINTIL veterans. FRAP’s design was straightforward, and provided beneficiaries with a number of practical benefits and opportunities, FRAP provided financial support during the first five-month transition period to address initial critical needs; guidance in developing income-generating projects, and resources to finance the activities. FRAP assisted the procurement and, in many cases the transport, of materials enabling beneficiaries to obtain the necessary livestock, equipment, mills, presses, and machines for their enterprises.

To enhance the capacity of the beneficiaries in developing and managing their activities, FRAP provided training opportunities in small business and livestock management. The program also facilitated access to more substantive job skills training or vocational and technical education for the relatively few veterans interested and able to take advantage of the courses in carpentry, masonry, plumbing, electrical work, and welding among other skill areas. FRAP also facilitated some temporary and more permanent employment opportunities for veterans, both through FRAP itself (security guards; District Veteran Officers (DVOs) and the National Program Officer (NPO)) and through referrals. Finally, and crucially FRAP engaged beneficiaries constructively, and assisted them during crucial phases of the veterans transition to civilian life in their communities.

The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program has been largely successful in achieving its overall and primary objectives regarding the social and economic reintegration of demobilized FALINTIL. The IOM implemented FRAP has provided a solid foundation of programmatic achievements on which to build upon -- in order to consolidate and advance the ongoing social and economic reintegration of demobilized veterans. FRAP has also generated discernible and ongoing benefits that have contributed to security and stability. However, there does appear to be some potential risks or threats that were discerned while the evaluation was being conducted. At the very least, issue- or grievance- based security groups with questionable or ambiguous motives pose considerable, rapidly growing, and complex challenges for the Government of East Timor (GET). Confusion about who actually constitutes the membership in groups like AFC ‘75, appears to have led to false or erroneous conclusions, among them -- the extent of involvement by FRAP beneficiaries with such groups.
Key stakeholders – and especially East Timor’s new government – should be particularly aware of the predicament of perhaps 200 FRAP beneficiaries experiencing greater difficulties reintegrating. Attention also needs to be given to perhaps an equal number of veterans who, for one reason or another, were excluded from reintegration benefits even though they arguably met the eligibility criteria. Finally, there are widows and orphans of fallen FALINTIL, disabled veterans, and others (with perhaps less compelling rationales justifying priority attention) who are referred to as either the forgotten or the excluded.

The above referenced conclusions of this evaluation are addressed in greater detail within this chapter, which also includes a section dealing with corresponding implications for specific policy objectives and strategies and recommendations for how identified opportunities and risks might be addressed.

4.0.1 FRAP has been largely successful in achieving its overall and primary objectives regarding the social and economic reintegration of demobilized FALINTIL. Despite some shortcomings in program implementation and external factors that adversely affected performance, IOM execution of FRAP has achieved perhaps more than could reasonably have been expected -- particularly within the implementation period of one year. The large majority of (the 1,308) FRAP beneficiaries have clearly made considerable progress to date with respect to their social and economic reintegration into their communities and society. The reasons for the large degree of success with respect to the level and pace of the reintegration of FALINTIL veterans who were demobilized can be attributed primarily to:

a) The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), particularly the Transitional Safety Net (TSN) -- or the $500 subsidy -- provided over the program’s first five months; the income generating activities or “Reintegration Packages”; vocational training for those few who took advantage of this excellent opportunity; and the attention provided by the program and its staff to the FRAP beneficiaries;

b) A reasonably favorable enabling environment, in which FALINTIL veterans fought on the winning side; saw the armed forces of their primary adversary totally withdrawn; and the fact that veterans are attempting to reintegrate into communities, and a society, that have largely held FALINTIL, its goals, and members in high regard; and,

c) The FRAP beneficiaries themselves, who have generally demonstrated enormous amounts of discipline; patience; integrity; and a desire to live peacefully in an independent East Timor – the goal for which they sacrificed so long to achieve.

Eighty seven percent of FRAP beneficiaries participating in the sample survey following the program’s conclusion characterized FRAP staff as either “helpful” (85%) or “very helpful” (2%). The same percentage assessed the current status of their project begun with FRAP assistance as either “average” (50%) or “good” (38%). Seventy-two percent assessed the overall program as having been “satisfactory”. The remaining (27% of the) beneficiaries who assessed FRAP as unsatisfactory generally considered the value of benefits provided as being the biggest shortcoming. However, a sizable majority of even those who considered the overall program as unsatisfactory still valued the assistance of FRAP staff, and the respect with which they were
treated. Roughly the same percentage of veterans who had earlier expressed an interest in joining the ETDF, one year later – and upon the conclusion of FRAP indicated that they were pleased or happy to have joined civilian life.144

Despite the above referenced achievements regarding the vast majority of FRAP beneficiaries; there is a portion whose continuing needs warrant attention. As many as 15% of the beneficiaries, or 200 -- generally older, more senior, or physically impaired – veterans appear to be experiencing more acute difficulties in the transition process from former combatants to civilian life. These veterans, while having benefited from FRAP, are believed to have had more profound needs since demobilization and continue to have some basic or special needs beyond – or in addition to – what FRAP was able to provide. Their conditions have limited the degree and rate of their economic and social reintegration. The veterans within this category tend to be those who have served longer; have greater family responsibilities and corresponding needs (as opposed to the majority, mostly younger, beneficiaries) which the program’s assistance was not fully able to attend. These veterans also tend to be highly regarded by the younger veterans, and their difficulties re-integrating have a higher profile and potentially greater significance with regard to implications addressed in the following section.

4.0.2. FRAP has provided a solid foundation of programmatic achievements on which to build upon -- in order to consolidate and advance the ongoing social and economic reintegration of demobilized veterans, including the estimated 15% of the beneficiaries whose post-FRAP needs may warrant special attention. With regard to the latter, their reintegration is also adversely affected by the plight of those who did not receive benefits, especially those generally considered as meriting them. The “Forgotten” as they are frequently referred to by particularly older and more senior veterans, are those -- for one reason or another -- who were never included on the FALINTIL High Command’s “Master List” as eligible for FRAP benefits and therefore were not assisted by IOM or FRAP. The “Forgotten” are said by veterans to include:

a) Some former FALINTIL combatants (generally as a result of age, poor health, or wounds) left the guerrilla force prior to the late 1990s;

b) Some other FALINTIL veterans (with estimates ranging as high as 2 – 300) who may have met the eligibility criteria for FRAP participation, but through design or omission, were not designated as eligible to participate in FRAP; and,

c) Widows, orphans of FALINTIL combatants killed during the conflict and disabled veterans.

The extent to which the interests of the “Forgotten” are perceived as legitimate but remain unattended will (continue to) adversely effect the further gains and consolidation of achievements concerning the reintegration process among some FRAP beneficiaries.

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144 Sixty-eight percent indicated in the summary survey that they were pleased, or happy, to have joined civilian life.
4.0.3 FRAP generated discernible and ongoing benefits that have contributed to security and stability since its initiation, as well as additional benefits in these respects over the medium, and some extent, longer-terms. Risks of violence were growing precipitously throughout 2000, and had been exacerbated by the inability of the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) and East Timorese leadership to overcome an impasse and reconcile fundamental questions regarding the status, and the future disposition, of FALINTIL and its members. FRAP provided responsiveness and viable options at a time when there was a considerable, credible, and growing threat for potential violence that was particularly pronounced during final period of cantonment and immediately following demobilization, when the fear, frustration, and anger of FALINTIL veterans were at a high point.

Indirectly, FRAP enabled East Timorese leadership (civilian and military), as well as UNTAET, to focus on other fundamental issues associated with establishing a government and key institutions. FRAP was able to successfully respond to a critical need in a timely manner, thereby allowing the UN and East Timorese leadership to focus on issues vital to establishing stability – a viable state, legitimate political processes and representative government and key institutions, including the ETDF and the ETPS with the primary role for ensuring East Timor’s security. It is also likely that it would have been extremely more difficult, if not impossible, for the ETDF to have been developed in the absence of a corresponding program like FRAP that provided viable options for those increasingly restive members of FALINTIL not selected for the new army.

More directly, during its implementation, FRAP continued to provide a point of contact, benefits, and options that generated externalities favoring stability and security. FRAP’s successful efforts to assist the reintegration of FALINTIL veterans has diminished significantly the risk of the overwhelming majority of FRAP beneficiaries of either being, or becoming, involved in threats to East Timor’s security and stability. While there are other serious challenges and perhaps threats emanating from security groups – a large majority of FRAP beneficiaries veterans would generally and reliably be expected to oppose these groups and their objectives. This firm assessment will need to be modified somewhat -- particularly in specific geographic areas (Baucau, Viqueque) – depending on how the Government of East Timor (GET) and other key stakeholders respond to the challenges and risks associated with security groups; the people comprising their membership; and those considered vulnerable to recruitment.

4.0.4 Issue- or grievance- based security groups with questionable or ambiguous motives pose considerable, rapidly growing, and complex challenges for the Government of East Timor (GET). These challenges and emerging risks, have potentially serious implications for stability and security. A number of key stakeholders, including the UN, ETDF, FRAP beneficiaries, and other informed observers have expressed growing concern about the security groups considerable recruitment of members, expanding presence and intimidation of local communities, and the military style drills and martial training that the groups have been sponsoring.\footnote{The UN’s most recent threat assessment reportedly ascribes risks associated with these groups as a 3 or 4 on a scale of 10, with 10 being the most serious.} The new government will need to better and more accurately define the nature and scope of challenges emanating from security groups as a prelude to responding effectively and
appropriately. A failure to effectively respond to the serious level and nature of challenges posed by security groups seems likely to result in the prospect of at least localized violence, and perhaps some credible threats to broader security and stability interests of East Timor, its nascent institutions, and fledgling experiment with self-rule and democratic processes.

The overwhelming majority of people affiliated with grievance- or issue- based security groups appear to have never been members of FALINTIL or FRAP beneficiaries; although a relatively and comparatively few of them are. Rather, the majority of membership of security groups seems to be comprised of: former members of the clandestine network; former (largely non-combatant) “veterans” from the first few years of resistance who generally feel they are owed recognition and compensation; as well as opportunists and political activists with somewhat ill defined or amorphous objectives. Security groups are continuing attempts to build upon their apparently limited success to date in recruiting FRAP beneficiaries as well as members of the ‘Forgotten’. Some political organizations (especially CPD/RDTL and ASDT) have sought to capitalize on the sense of grievance that affects a good many of the people who consider themselves excluded. These and perhaps other political groups have supported the “Association of Former Combatants of ’75” (AFC ’75) one of the primary groups that has generated considerable (and legitimate) concern.

AFC ’75 claims to have 25,000 members,\textsuperscript{146} while UN estimates place the number at closer to 5 or 6,000. Some of their actions -- specifically military-like parades, martial training, demonstrations, and intimidation of others in the communities where they are most active -- have been documented and verified by UNTAET. Informed UN sources indicate that training exercises that took place prior to May 2002 involved nearly 2,000 participants and have taken place in 22 different sites. The “Isolados” and “Familia Sagrada” are two other groups generating concern and appear to be most active, though not restricted to, the Baucau, Liquica, and Viqueque regions. These groups are reliably reported to count within their leadership, a number of former commanders from FALINTIL. The groups also appear to share complementary or coincidental objectives with AFC ’75, and to share at least some common interests with the same political groups (ASTD and CPD/RDTL) supporting AFC ’75. The degree to which some FRAP beneficiaries and members of the group of the “Forgotten” are found to be living in precarious conditions suggests they may also be more vulnerable to manipulation by AFC ’75 or other such groups. Among other effects, such recruitment efforts, if successful, may well serve to validate the grievances and add to the perceived legitimacy of otherwise questionable demands emanating from security groups.

4.0.5 Confusion about who actually constitutes the membership in groups like AFC ’75, has led to false or erroneous conclusions, among them -- the extent of involvement by FRAP beneficiaries with such groups. The degree to which the nature and membership of security groups are misdiagnosed not only does an enormous disservice to the overwhelming majority of FRAP beneficiaries who seem to be unjustifiably considered as a core constituency, but more importantly diminishes the chances that the real challenges will fail to be effectively addressed, and in an appropriate manner.

\textsuperscript{146} Although the figure is likely to be inflated, it is based on information provided in interviews by representatives from AFC ’75, FRAP beneficiaries, local stakeholders, as well as a review of the groups’ documents.
Some UN agencies have apparently reached erroneous conclusions about the extent to which FRAP beneficiaries have been involved with security groups. The basis of this analysis and corresponding conclusion might very well be attributable to confusion on the part of analysts noted during the evaluation. Specifically, there appears to be a failure to make important distinctions by UN personnel involved in preparing threat assessments between actual FALINTIL veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries (numbering 1,308) versus former members of the clandestine network (estimated to be around 18,000). Also, despite the fact that relatively few of those affiliated with security groups such as ACF ’75 were ever veterans of FALINTIL or FRAP beneficiaries, this group and most of its members identify themselves as belonging to one of the following categories: FALINTIL/OPS; Ex-FALINTIL; and FBA (Forces Bases de Apoio)\textsuperscript{147}; this has contributed to the confusion between actual FALINTIL veterans and posers. Analysis emanating from CIVPOL’s Office of Strategic Information seems to reflect this confusion, which also to some extent has influenced perspectives within UNTAET not only with respect to threat assessments but also regarding the degree that FALINTIL veterans are contributing to the threats toward stability and security. Flawed assessments of the actual threat and of the identity of those who may contribute to it, may not only contribute to misunderstanding -- but also toward misguided responses and policy. In addition to the potentially serious implications resulting from this apparent shortcoming -- to confuse actual FALINTIL veterans from those claiming to be -- the status, legacy, and identity of true FALINTIL veterans is also comprised to some extent.

4.0.6. Success, Limiting, and Negative Factors (influencing FRAP performance and impact):

While not without some weaknesses, the overall performance of the FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program and its impact have been largely positive, and on multiple levels. The following highlights a number of factors (including program strengths and weaknesses) that influenced FRAP performance and impact.

4.0.6.1 Success Factors: FRAP components, and the manner that the program was implemented placed greater emphasis on economic over social reintegration.\textsuperscript{148} IOM was ever conscious of contributing to the objectives of enhancing stability and security, and probably more so than achieving successful or lasting developmental objectives according to IOM officials. In terms of program performance and impact, the effective economic reintegration of course has favored socialization. The responsiveness of FRAP, and the options and opportunities provided by its components,\textsuperscript{149} contributed to enhanced stability and security, on a number of levels. Developmental objectives were also more successful, in some respects dramatically so, than one might have expected as measured by participant assessments and reviews of selected projects. Some success factors concerning FRAP performance were paramount. First, IOM and FRAP management as well as staff were enormously dedicated; generally quite capable; and worked tirelessly to effectively implement the program to benefit a group -- for whom they had high

\textsuperscript{147} FALINTIL/OPS refers to “operations”; this category and ex-FALINTIL were said by an organizer from AFC ’75 to refer to distinct services performed by clandestine members during resistance, while FBA refers more generally to supporters of the resistance, armed and other.

\textsuperscript{148} For example by providing funds for the transition (TSN) and income generating activities rather than counseling, transition- or sensitivity- training, which have been components supporting social reintegration efforts in demobilization programs elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{149} The TSN, income generating projects and training were among the most important, and valued components.
regard. Individual and ongoing efforts, like those of Veronica Das Dores, stand out in particular. IOM management had directly relevant experience working demobilized in other transition environments; this served IOM and reintegration efforts well. Although FRAP program management was probably responsible for some shortcomings in implementation, the effects of these were most often mitigated by the energetic efforts of the Program Manager, who labored tirelessly to ensure beneficiaries were well attended by FRAP.

The representatives from the principle donors dealing with FRAP provided much more than access to funding -- they provided vital, substantive, and on-going input, support, and guidance to the program and those implementing it. The flexibility and responsiveness of USAID/OTI and DAI were noted as having “saved the day” in more than one instance. Among the WB’s greatest contributions was the Project Officer handling FRAP. A wide range of key actors has credited the project officer (including those from FALINTIL, ETDF, PKF, UNMOs, and IOM) for her informed and dedicated contributions from the conception through the conclusion of the reintegration program. The contributions of Japan and Canada (CIDA) also contributed considerably to FRAP’s successful implementation, and there is doubt as to whether or not FRAP’s achievements could have been realized without their timely and generous support. IOM is also to be credited for seeking complementary funding to ensure effective implementation, as well as for deciding to dedicate the contributions from the Japanese Government toward the reintegration efforts. Finally, as referenced in the general conclusions, a reasonably positive environment (favoring social reintegration in particular), and the character of the demobilized FALINTIL veterans, were two primary external factors that positively influenced reintegration overall and FRAP’s performance and impact in particular.

4.0.6.2 Limiting Factors: Time and money -- the omnipresent factors limiting any program – certainly affected FRAP’s implementation performance and resulting outcomes. IOM’s utilitarian approach, regarding FRAP’s design and implementation, managed to generate the largest amount of benefits for the greatest number of beneficiaries. Still, program resources and duration were limiting factors, among others, that affected FRAP’s capacity to more effectively address more complex needs, and those more specific to the circumstances of the 200 or so FRAP beneficiaries who continue to face difficulties in their process of reintegration. Resources and time were also factors precluding between 200 and 300 former FALINTIL who arguably merited benefits from receiving reintegration benefits when the High Command raised their cases after July 2001. With respect to the sustainability of the gains derived from the income-generating activities, there remain some outstanding questions since all were initiated less than a year ago.  

The same is true of assessing the full value of the more substantive vocational and technical training provided by the Salesians, since the one year program was ongoing at the time of the evaluation.

A number of external factors, such as the plight of the forgotten has also had, and continues to have, an adverse effect -- particularly regarding the social reintegration of older, more senior veterans. The absence of UNDP, the UN agency focusing on longer term or developmentally oriented activities, may or may not have been helpful in enhancing FRAP performance or impact. However its participation would likely have enhanced the probability that appropriate

\[150\] This is more accurately a limitation of the capacity of the evaluation to discern more complete benefits or problems, rather than a limitation of FRAP’s performance or impact.
follow up to FRAP would be supported, especially concerning longer term objectives to build upon the achievements of FRAP and the reintegration process to date. The participation of Timorese civilian leadership in FRAP seemed marginal at best. The limited capacity, competing priorities, and inconsistent participation of FALINTIL (and ETDF) High Command were clearly limiting factors that influenced reintegration generally and FRAP’s performance. While the reasons for the limited participation of Timorese officials and institutions may be readily comprehensible -- given numerous other priorities and extremely limited resources -- there were consequences in terms of reintegration, FRAP’s performance, and impact. The dearth of contributions from UNTAET to the process seems less comprehensible.

4.0.6.3 Negative Factors: In terms of programmatic antecedents, many veterans spent up to 14 months in cantonment living in conditions considered marginal at best. This extremely negative experience concluded with a selection process for the ETDF that was widely perceived by veterans as biased and unfair. These two factors in many ways have had some lasting negative effects regarding some aspects of reintegration. As a result of these combined and cumulative experiences, some veterans felt marginalized, while others developed feelings -- ranging from antipathy to ambivalence -- toward former commanders and, by association, to some GET institutions like the ETDF. Consequently many veterans saw FRAP as the “only one helping”.

In terms of design, IOM’s initial plans to provide benefits that emphasized cash, training, and tools or materials to facilitate reinsertion and reintegration would likely have been far less effective and successful. This limited approach was jettisoned in favor of a more comprehensive one that also emphasized income generating activities -- ultimately the component valued most highly by participating veterans. Other questionable design features, such as the termination of benefits during the program for those participants managing to obtain full-time employment were also eschewed in favor of more rational and effective approaches. Finally, FRAP’s failure to adequately analyze the data and findings from socio-economic survey (SES) conducted prior to FRAP’s implementation was a shortcoming that limited IOM’s and FRAP’s capacity to effectively monitor and report on progress and obstacles during implementation, and probably to better discern the special needs of some beneficiaries, including notably the 200 or so veterans having some difficulties in their reintegration processes.

4.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:

At a formal celebration in Dili on May 20, 2002, the newly elected President José Alexandre Gusmão formally declared the country’s independence following three years of UN-administered rule. In a gesture of goodwill Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri attended the event. The leader of the nation which had invaded and occupied East Timor received such a big and very heartfelt round of applause upon entering the ceremony, according to one astute observer

Perceptions of being marginalized and excluded also tended to enhance the level of appreciation FRAP beneficiaries had for FRAP and IOM, and perhaps ultimately to have, in some regards, to have been a net positive result, especially concerning the reconciliation of expectations with reality.

This willingness and capacity to change a key design feature, positively influenced by donors among others, also speaks well of IOM and FRAP’s flexibility.

See for example, the “Eligibility Criteria” (section 2.4.7) of the FRAP Operations Manual, p. 3

Although the four Indonesian warships that accompanied Sukarnoputri and were moored in the waters just outside the capital reportedly rattled some Timorese.
and long time resident of East Timor, that “it must have sent her back to Jakarta with a changed frame of mind.” He added: “This for me was the most remarkable moment of the evening: Quite amazing, totally spontaneous, and a marvelous sign from the East Timorese as a nation. The East Timorese possess attributes that will serve them well in their ongoing efforts to construct a new nation. Undoubtedly the people of East Timor and their leaders will confront many more obstacles in the difficult transition of building their country.

In the weeks prior to the formal transfer of authority from a UN administered territory to East Timor’s leadership, the UNDP released a report suggesting that East Timor's rating -- 0.42 -- on the Human Development Index was the lowest in Asia; with an annual per capita gross domestic product of $478 and a life expectancy averaging a mere 57 years. During the May donor conference, representatives from 30 donor countries pledged $442 million in aid over the next three years to assist East Timor’s efforts. During the same week as the donor conference, it was announced that the Timor Gap Treaty with Australia had been signed, allowing the extraction of gas and oil reserves off southern East Timor that is expected to generate up to $64 million in annual revenues for GET beginning in 2004.

While there are ample reasons for optimism regarding the future of the “newest nation” there are also challenges and a range of priorities that will need to be addressed by the new government, it’s nascent institutions, and the people of East Timor. The following section identifies some implications resulting from the evaluation and conclusions.

Like the nation as a whole, FALINTIL veterans have been undergoing a fundamental transition. FRAP ably assisted this transition, by aiding the beneficiaries reinsertion and early reintegration into civilian life. However, the transition process of FALINTIL veterans who were demobilized did not end upon the conclusion of FRAP. Their reintegration will be an ongoing process, just as the conclusion of the UNTAET mandate did not complete the transition period for the nation, but rather ushered in a new phase of it. The progress that the large majority of those considered FRAP beneficiaries have made, with FRAP assistance, in their reintegration effectively means that they will not have unmet needs or expectations of receiving privileged treatment by a new government -- on which many there are already so many competing priorities. There are some noteworthy exceptions to this scenario.

4.1.1 Opportunities associated with the majority of beneficiaries: However, with respect to the majority of FRAP beneficiaries, there are opportunities for building upon the achievements of FRAP that would seem to provide prospective benefits to the new government and the country’s development. As compared to marginal interest in obtaining vocational and technical training, forty percent indicated in the sample survey that they would be now be interested in pursuing such opportunities. Over fifty percent indicated an interest in expanding their project begun with FRAP support, with thirty-five percent indicating interest in obtaining credit to do so. Rather than expectations or demands associated with a perceived entitlement as veterans, these interests and aspirations expressed by FRAP beneficiaries reflect optimism of civilian entrepreneurs interested in generating opportunities for themselves, their families, and communities. Again, this scenario represents an opportunity rather than a need. Explicit efforts to include these former FRAP beneficiaries among other dynamic civilian participants in future
development activities would likely enhance the results generated by any effort supported by the GET or other stakeholders.

A number of former commanders (of companies or sections) were selected and employed as FRAP program staff (DVOs) to both help IOM implement the program throughout the districts and to serve as liaisons to their former comrades in arms. Among other benefits, this ensured that at least some former leaders and commanders who were not selected for the FDTL were not only FRAP beneficiaries, but also gained at least temporary salaried employment that further facilitated their socialization and economic reintegration. Other, primarily anecdotal evidence suggests that most former commanders not selected for, or choosing not to join, the new armed forces are doing quite well for themselves as civilians. A few have proven themselves to be quite entrepreneurial in taking advantage of opportunities in the restaurant or the private security business and other enterprises.

In terms of other issues with potential future implications that the GET in particular should note, there were some generalized feelings and growing frustrations expressed by at least some veterans about being excluded from opportunities. While a good many FRAP beneficiaries admitted that they had been hurt and angered about not being selected for the ETDF, the great majority indicated that they either no longer felt this way, or otherwise felt much less resentment than in the immediate aftermath of having been demobilized. There may be some residual effects or heightened sensitivities among some who feel they were unjustifiably excluded from the ETDF. In any event, even those uninterested in joining the new armed forces expressed a concern that veterans were being excluded from assistance (UN and NGOs) working in their communities. The efforts of the UNHCR sponsored assistance were cited with comparative frequency, and especially shelter programs for returning refugees. While many were pleased their neighbors were getting assistance they needed, there was some resentment expressed regarding aid to some of the more recent returnees who are seen as either militia, militia supporters, or their families.

Some indications were also noted about frustration about having been excluded from opportunities by the East Timorese Transitional Administration (ETTA) as younger, healthier, or better-educated individuals, including “autonomias” (reference to those opposed to independence) gain opportunities, while veterans were being discriminated against in various selection processes. “Discrimination” against veterans is not only cited as the reason for being excluded from assistance (provided by NGO’s, UN, others) but also -- and more significantly -- from job opportunities, whether for the ETPS; FDTL; or, street sweeper paying $3 a day. While most veterans were extremely understanding that government structures were in the early stages of development, the generalized frustrations expressed by a relatively wide range of veterans perhaps foreshadows an issue that may become increasingly relevant as greater opportunities, including those within the government, become available for those with requisite levels of education, which the majority of FALINTIL veterans generally do not possess.

4.1.2 Needs associated with the minority of older, longer serving beneficiaries and the “Forgotten”: While the future considerations regarding perhaps eighty-five percent of FRAP beneficiaries referenced above seem discretionary or an option reflecting an opportunity, the unmet or ongoing needs and vulnerable condition of the remaining fifteen percent, or 200 FRAP
beneficiaries, appears to warrant more immediate attention for a number of reasons. These individuals are the older, longer serving veterans, many of whom were among the 140 or so FRAP beneficiaries who initially joined the armed struggle in 1975 or 1976.\(^{155}\) For a number of reasons particular attention needs to be paid to their ongoing well-being; especially regarding progress and problems they may be experiencing in reintegrating — economically and socially. Their age, length of service, and ongoing needs associated with greater responsibilities — in comparison with the majority of their younger former comrades — has meant that the supplemental and temporary support provided by FRAP was generally insufficient to ensure that they would no better or no worse off than their neighbors. In many cases, these individuals might merit priority attention if based only on a “needs” criteria, rather than their status as former combatants. Apart from considerations of need or a moral debt that East Timorese may feel toward the older and longer serving FALINTIL veterans, there are other considerations as well favoring priority attention. The other veterans as well as other members of the community generally hold the older veterans in high esteem; many are considered heroes for their years of service.

The degree to which some of the older and longer serving veterans in particular are found to be living in precarious economic conditions is likely to reflect poorly upon the East Timorese leadership, who may be viewed by members of the communities and FALINTIL veterans as unresponsive to the needs of those who sacrificed most to achieve independence. Failure to recognize and assist particularly the contributions of the older veterans also presents risks of reinforcing a seemingly nascent but growing frustration among at least some veterans that they are being discriminated against, and excluded from opportunities, by some NGOs, local and national authorities. Finally, if GET does not focus on being responsive to the older, longer serving veterans, there exists a potential that those with more vulnerable economic conditions and experiencing difficulties in their reintegration process could be more vulnerable to manipulation by issue or grievance based security groups like AFC ’75 or political organizations with objectives and agendas not especially consistent with those of the new government.

Conversely, should the new government focus early attention, recognition and some support to the older, longer serving and more vulnerable veterans, it is likely that the corresponding impact would go far in countervailing efforts by to politicize the veterans plight, demonstrate to all veterans and other East Timorese that the veterans’ years of service and contributions are valued highly by the new government and counter the impressions that veterans are being marginalized in the new order. Since East Timorese leadership and institutions gained very little if any credit from their association with FRAP, it would also provide the GET an opportunity to directly demonstrate the priority placed on this important constituency.

In addition to the potential opportunities and pitfalls associated with the older, longer serving veterans, the GET will need to develop options and policies concerning those 200 or so veterans who were arguably met the eligibility criteria for reintegration benefits, but who were nonetheless excluded from the High Command’s master list of those eligible for FRAP. While the older veterans previously referenced had the benefit of participating in FRAP to facilitate their reinsertion and reintegration, these excluded veterans were not so fortunate. Their continued

\(^{155}\) SES: Socio-economic survey results conducted by IOM in December 2000; results include 1,259 respondents of the 1,310 veterans ultimately designated as eligible for FRAP benefits.
exclusion from assistance and recognition is likely to pose even greater risks --- than those associated with the older more vulnerable FRAP beneficiaries -- of their grievances evolving into potential support for security groups or political organizations seen as advocating their interests and demands. The conditions of excluded veterans and the plight of widows and orphans of fallen comrades, as well as those veterans who were disabled as a result of the conflict, but were not considered eligible for FRAP, constitute a group of people who arguably merit priority attention from the new government as part of efforts to follow up on FRAP.

At every discussion with FRAP beneficiaries during the evaluation in focus group meetings in the five districts and elsewhere, the issue of the “forgotten” was raised. Veterans would tell the story of one or two such people in their community, and others would acknowledge with sadness the plight of the person referenced. After group meetings, invariably participants would mention a case and share the names of the individuals. This happened in Lautem, Ermera, and Liquica Districts. In Baucau, once the issue was raised early on in the focus group meeting, the whole group became particularly animated and the issue dominated as no other throughout the course of the meeting. It was also among the primary issues raised by L-7, along with the concept of community based development projects, including the development of a cooperative, as possible means for addressing the needs of the forgotten. Although difficult to determine, an extremely crude estimate might put the number of the most compelling cases as high as 500 families throughout the country – including both eligible veterans who never received FRAP assistance or benefits and the families left more vulnerable with the loss of a FALINTIL veteran as a result of the conflict. At the same time, it does not appear to be inordinately difficult to assess (discretely) the scope and scale of those considered as “forgotten” through a form of social mapping and information provided by reliable key informants familiar with their plight.

The extent to which those who have compelling reasons justifying recognition and some form of support as result of their contributions, suffering, and service to East Timor either as part of FALINTIL, or as surviving family members, will to some degree continue to adversely affect the ongoing reintegration of other veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries. Particularly among the older veterans, there are deep feelings of shame and regret that some of their former comrades in arms, or their surviving family members, have not been assisted and there is great sympathy for the plight of many who are living in precarious economic conditions. The financial costs associated with assisting and recognizing these people and their contributions would likely be far less than the potential costs in terms of security, stability, and legitimacy. Ultimately, the degree to which the issue of excluded veterans and perhaps widows and orphans of veterans becomes (increasingly) politicized also increases the probability that financial costs will be borne sooner or later. The longer effective action is deferred would likely increase the financial and other costs (legitimacy, stability, security) that will ultimately be borne. An early, proactive, and responsive policy and action by the GET in responding to the legitimate needs and aspirations of the preceding groups of individuals will likely generate considerable returns on various levels and transform a potential challenge or risk into a net benefit – not only for those who have been “forgotten” but probably even more so for the new government and its institutions.

The issues associated with the “forgotten” encompass a range of considerations, including moral, ethical, social, as well as political. Should the issue of the “forgotten” be handled incorrectly, there are some indications that it could also – due to politicization or manipulation – become an
issue used by groups in attempts to challenge the credibility and legitimacy of the new East Timorese government and administration. It is likely that politically motivated organizations like CPD/RDTL and security groups like AFC '75 are attempting to build upon some of the limited success they have to date had in recruiting FRAP beneficiaries and members of the Forgotten into their ranks.

4.1.3 Potential risks and threats to security: The potential difficulties envisaged by inadequately attending to the arguably legitimate needs of the Forgotten are exacerbated by the more questionable claims by a much larger group of others who feel their contributions and sacrifices on behalf of the resistance – armed or other – have been unrecognized and undervalued. As indicted in the preceding chapter, there are increasing challenges emanating from issue or grievance based security groups like AFC '75 supported by CPD/RDTL. Recruitment efforts by groups like the “Isolados” and AFC ‘75 seem to have been successful in garnering support from segments of East Timorese society who feel that they have been unjustifiably excluded from recognition and compensation for their contributions to the resistance.

Membership in these organizations – ranging in estimates from 5 or 6,000 to 25,000 – seems to be drawn primarily from some of the 18,000 or so former members of the clandestine network as well as some who either served or accompanied FALINTIL in the mountains during the late to mid-1970's; and opportunists. There are also, as noted, some FALINTIL veterans including a small number of FRAP beneficiaries reliably reported to be affiliated with AFC '75 and other security groups. However, most indications including the sheer numbers of supposed members – even assuming the lower estimates -- suggest these groups are comprised overwhelmingly of people other than FALINTIL veterans, including FRAP beneficiaries. On the whole, there is very little evidence, or indication, of widespread support or even sympathy among FRAP beneficiaries for grievance based security groups. Conversely, there appear to be credible indications that the opposite it true: there are very few FRAP beneficiaries involved with security groups such as AFC ‘75 that are causing concern among certain sectors in East Timor.

4.1.3.1 Security Groups: There are a number of seemingly critical considerations and possible implications associated with security groups. Among the more significant ones are questions concerning the motivations, objectives and capacity of these groups and the extent to which they pose either a current or future risk to security and stability in East Timor. UNTAET’s April 2002 threat assessment seems to consider the security groups lack of capacity as inhibiting the seriousness or success of any challenges in the near term, though also seems to suggest that the interest of the leadership of CPD/RDTL is on developing its strength and capacity in order to enhance their power and influence. During the evaluation, Dili based and local observers in a number of districts in East Timor noted the increased activities of AFC ‘75 supported by CPD/RDTL, including martial training, military-like parade exercises, recruitment exercises, and demonstrations. While activities that AFC ‘75 have undertaken have been non-violent, some have been viewed as menacing and coercive.\footnote{See annex VI for a summary of a recent incident between AFC ‘75 and a FALINTIL veteran working for IOM.} It an assumption of this evaluation that security groups do in deed pose some serious challenges and also a potential to pose a growing and credible threat and risk to stability and security in East Timor. Even if the best informed assessment indicates otherwise, the level of concern articulated by many FALINTIL veterans,
community members, and well informed observers would warrant that a new assessment be undertaken. Security groups, and the challenges they pose, need to be taken seriously. The capacity, intent, and goals of security groups should be accurately assessed in order to discern the threats to stability at various levels in East Timor, and to inform an effective and appropriate response.

Instability can most simply be defined as the inability of government (and society in general) to adequately address the grievances of the population or a particular subset of that population. The grievances of some who feel marginalized or excluded in East Timor can potentially contribute to instability. However, discontent alone does not necessarily generate instability. “Individuals and mechanisms must be present to articulate the grievances and mobilize the aggrieved to demand redress from the government.” AFC ’75, with support from CPD/RDTL and perhaps other security groups seem to at least aspire to be the mechanism through with grievance are articulated, and in the process to enhance their power and influence.

East Timorese society’s ability to alleviate the problems and/or address the discontent is determined by four key factors: the legitimacy of the regime and the quality of its leadership, resource availability, the strength of civil institutions, and the government’s monopoly over coercive force. In the context of East Timor, the government is new and in many respects untested, although it possesses considerably high levels of legitimacy. However the government and its new institutions are constrained by the availability or resources and civil institutions that could be characterized as weak. Finally, the new constitution is at least ambiguous with respect to ascribing to the state a monopoly of coercive force. In any event, the capacity of the military and police forces (ETDF and the ETPS) are still quite limited. (See Figure 2: Conceptual Model of Political Instability on the following page).

Security groups might be expected to contribute to increased tensions in East Timor, and although unlikely to lead to any widespread conflict, under certain circumstances it would not be beyond the realm of possibilities for security groups with support from political organizations to seek peaceful political change favoring ideological preferences; the promotion of conspiracies and even localized or district level turmoil. It seems quite unlikely that security groups like AFC ’75 even with support from CPD/RDTL, would be able to manifest the type of instability leading to the above references outcomes. However, given the apparently tense past relations between the FRETILIN dominated legislature and the President -- whose role, power, and authority were severely restricted by the new constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly -- it is not inconceivable to envisage attempts by national level actors or more conventional political organizations to take advantage of security groups and less conventional political organizations (like AFC ’75 and CPD/RDTL) to further their agenda. While the de jure authority of the President is quite weak, he possesses enormous legitimacy and power beyond that which is according to him constitutionally. Furthermore, the leadership of the ETDF is said to have been selected in large part due to its loyalty to the President. On one level may give pause to potential political opponents, and on another level may provide opponents with incentives to pursue

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158 Ibid.
159 This model of political instability was developed by Dr. Bruce Kay on behalf of EBD associates.
efforts to counterbalance this source of effective power, through either attempts to diminish the legitimacy and efficacy of the new armed forces or even supporting alternative sources with potential for exercising coercive force.
Figure 2: Conceptual Model of Political Instability
4.1.3.2 Indirect Effects of Security Groups: Less speculative than the above referenced treatment of potential threats is the current indirect effects of the security groups, which also warrant attention. For example, the ETDF appears to be monitoring the group’s activities closely, involving the new armed forces in level of domestic intelligence gathering activities that may establish a longer term, and undesirable precedent concerning the future role of the institution.\textsuperscript{160} At least in part due to the potential for security groups to draw support from former members of the clandestine network and FALINTIL veterans, the president and the FALINTIL High Command have both been directly involved in supporting the AVR and the FVF, both of which are at least in part intended to provide viable options and alternatives to former members unarmed and armed resistance, respectively.

The active participation of government and military leaders in these non-governmental organizations may present some issues of with future implications, including potential conflict of interests. On one level, the effort by civilian and military leaders contributes to the politicization of veterans’ issues, even if the objective is to preclude a more radical politicization of the target groups. Perhaps more importantly, senior officers from the High Command -- who are among the founders of the FVF, and serve as members on its executive board – have authorized a number of income-generating arrangements with private sector firms in East Timor in order to generate capital to help the Foundation pursue its objectives. At the very least, the perception of military leaders’ direct and lucrative involvement with oil distribution and other locally active companies runs the risk of comprising the integrity of the new armed forces and its leaders. Even if the current arrangements are well intentioned, there is the risk of a potentially corrosive or corruptive influence developing as a result of the military as an institution, and its leadership, maintaining business relationships with private sector firms.

4.1.4 Threat assessments and implications resulting from confusion between actual FALINTIL veterans from those who claim to be: Despite the conclusion of the UN’s role in administering East Timor following the May 20 independence ceremonies transferring authority to East Timorese Leadership, various UN agencies will continue to support the new nation’s ongoing transition. CIVPOL is expected to continue operating for another two years in East Timor, assisting the further development of the ETPS. To date CIVPOL, including its Office of Strategic Information (OSI), has been one of the primary institutional actors involved in developing assessments of threats and risks to stability and security in East Timor, and employ a formula or framework for assessing risk along the lines of: Risk = Opportunity + Means + Intent.

The current head of CIVPOL\textsuperscript{161}, who has been in East Timor since November 2001, previously served in comparable positions with other UN Missions in Haiti and transitional environments. He expressed considerable concern about reports and indications CIVPOL was receiving about the suspected participation of FALINTIL veterans in illegal activities or suspect groups. In highlighting the potential for trouble, the Commissioner drew a comparison with demobilized members of the discredited Haitian Police Force as a precursor to establishing a new and

\textsuperscript{160} Some former FALINTIL commanders who were demobilized remain in contact with the ETDF’s High Command through an existing radio system and network.

\textsuperscript{161} Interview with Police Commissioner Peter Miller, head of UNTAET CIVPOL.
improved police force in that troubled country. The Commissioner expressed concern about the potential for demobilized FALINTIL of either being or becoming involved in efforts that might seek to challenge the legitimacy or stability of nascent institutions and political processes, much as the demobilized members of the Haitian Police had.

Due to information that OSI had received, and their resulting analysis, at least some former members of FALINTIL were seen as a threat both in terms of criminal behavior and other forms of activity linked with security groups. In terms of its threat- or risk- analysis, CIVPOL also seemed to view former members of FALINTIL in security groups including AFC ’75, Isolados, and “99”. As a result of the perception that FALINTIL veterans were heavily involved in nefarious activities, CIVPOL reportedly had been interested in obtaining copy of the IOM managed database on FRAP participants, which incorporated the data from the socio-economic survey of all those defined as FALINTIL in December of 2000. However, as a result of conversations with key personnel from OSI, there seemed to be some confusion about the target group they perceived as constituting as an actual or potential threat. For example, no distinction was made between members (or former members) of the Clandestine network and FALINTIL, so that one ranking official asked the evaluator for a copy of the database, as well as other information, profiles, and findings about the 18,000 or so “veterans of FALINTIL”. There also seemed to be additional confusion about distinguishing between FALINTIL veterans who participated in FRAP, and a reportedly large number of individuals affiliated with security groups – linked with CPD/RDTL – including the Association of Former Combatants of ‘75”, who identify themselves as “FALINTIL” or “ex-FALINTIL”. In the main, this self-identification seems mostly bogus as addressed in the body of this report. However, CIVPOL analysis suggesting the FALINTIL veterans (or FRAP beneficiaries) comprise a key constituency for suspect groups is not only spurious and prejudicial to the majority of veterans not involved with security groups, but also risks compromising policy considerations concerning assessments of, and responses to, challenges emanating from security groups.

An ETDF officer monitoring these groups closely, estimated that the number of FALINTIL veterans affiliated with such groups at perhaps 2% to 3%, or -- given the number of FRAP beneficiaries -- roughly 40 individuals who participated in FRAP. It is widely reported that one higher ranking former FALINTIL commander is affiliated with Familia Sagrada and maintains close relations with the leadership of the CPD/RDTL while another former FALINTIL commander is among the leaders of the Isolados. These two groups among others are causing

162 According to an IOM employee, who served as head of a sub-office managing FRAP at the district level, CIVPOL arrived one day in which FRAP beneficiaries were arriving for a meeting in order to receive a TSN installment and some training and began filming FALINTIL veterans who were participating in FRAP.
163 The figure of 18,000 is widely and most frequently quoted in reference to the estimated number of those who served within the clandestine network, or the unarmed branch of the resistance movement.
164 Independently, the results of focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with FRAP beneficiaries and other stakeholder, suggest a similar estimate of FRAP beneficiaries who are believed to be – to varying degrees – involved with groups like AFC ‘75.
165 In an interview, L-7 openly acknowledged his affiliation with Familia Sagrada but disputed any claims the organization posed a threat or reason for concern, but rather was an East Timorese organization favoring reconciliation, peace, and harmony.
varying levels of concern in CIVPOL, UNTAET more generally, and the ETDF among other sectors. There are a number of FALINTIL veterans, including some FRAP beneficiaries, who are affiliated with these and other groups with questionable motives. However, of the total number of FRAP beneficiaries (1,308), the findings of the evaluation suggest that a very small percentage are actually involved, in varying degrees, with groups of this nature. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of FALINTIL veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries consider such groups to be illegal; threatening; and guilty of at least misappropriating the name and identity of FALINTIL – an institution generally venerated by East Timorese society and toward which they dedicated so much.

The degree to which the nature and membership of security groups are misdiagnosed not only does an enormous disservice to the overwhelming majority of FRAP beneficiaries who seem to be unjustifiably considered as a core constituency, but more importantly diminishes the chances that the real challenges will fail to be effectively addressed, and in an appropriate manner.

4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS: The following are recommendations for consideration key stakeholders, and provide suggested how opportunities, needs, and risks identified in the preceding sections of this chapter might be addressed.

4.2.1 Support the efforts of the newly established Office of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) to consolidate and build upon the achievements of FRAP and the advances made by veterans, by assisting the ongoing and longer term processes of reintegration.

a) Provide particular attention to older, longer-serving, and disabled veterans, while also responding to opportunities associated with the clear progress of the vast majority of the other FRAP beneficiaries.

One option may be for the GET to consider establishing a modest pension scheme for the 140 or so FALINTIL veterans who initially joined the armed resistance in 1975/6. Such a mechanism could also serve future ETDF veterans; contribute to the de-politicization of veterans’ issues; and, contribute toward the well being of the most respected and influential members of the venerated FALINTIL. The SES database contains the basic information necessary for determining who would be eligible.

b) Prioritize the provision of at least information and referrals to legitimate FALINTIL veterans and their families, specifically concerning existing or emerging opportunities, services, and dynamics (e.g. security groups) of particular interest and relevance to FALINTIL veterans.

The Office of Veterans Affairs will have limited institutional capacity in its initial stages of operations, including that to manage resources. Support from the UN and donors will be required to help strengthen this capacity, including mechanisms for ensuring effective use of at least external resources dedicated to assist ongoing or additional reintegration efforts.
c) Complete the analysis of data from the socio-economic survey (SES) to help inform decision-making concerning assistance to veterans, their families, and their communities. Despite some shortcomings, the data was updated by IOM through December 2001, and it remains by far the most comprehensive, objective, and reliable source of information about this critical segment of East Timorese society. The VA could benefit from this information and also use the database and completed analysis for monitoring and tracking ongoing performance of the longer term reintegration processes.\textsuperscript{166}

d) This office should serve as the principal point of contact for veterans, and also serve as an advocate on behalf veterans in resolving disputes with other state institutions, such as the ETPS, until more appropriate alternative, and ideally local, mechanisms exist for addressing disputes – which if unchecked may have serious negative consequences.

4.2.2 Discretely assess the scope, scale, and nature of the needs associated with the Forgotten, as a pre-cursor to developing a policy, and possible programmatic response to legitimate needs and claims. Readily available talent exists within East Timor for discretely obtaining more reliable figures and defining the numbers, characteristics, and basic needs of the people belonging to this category and without raising expectations. Either the Office of Veterans’ Affairs or another office within the Ministry of Labor and Solidarity can be delegated with responsibility from the GET to perhaps work with donors in supporting this discrete assessment.

4.2.3 Improve and enhance the quality of information about security groups on a priority basis as a necessary precursor to responding effectively and appropriately to the challenges they pose on various levels. The prevailing assumption within UNTAET seems to be that organized threats to the security of East Timor from groups, like AFC ’75, do not appear to be imminent in part because the groups lack the capability to mount such as threat. Another key assumption by the UN is reportedly that GET efforts to curb the activities of these groups (military parades and martial training) could prove counterproductive. Both assumptions may be correct. However, given apparent weaknesses in gathering and analyzing at least some pertinent intelligence, it may also be likely that the resulting analysis and assumptions contributing to the threat assessments are either incomplete or wrong.

a) Conduct an independent conflict vulnerability assessment (CVA) in order to more accurately and reliably assess challenges and risks; better inform key decision-makers; and decisions regarding effective and appropriate responses to challenges and threats.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{166} It would cost an estimated $10,000 to have the SES data adequately analyzed with in-country human resources available. The SES is maintained as an MS ACCESS database, which is a standard, off-the-shelf, software package, with which many East Timorese technicians and professionals are familiar.

\textsuperscript{167} CVA incorporates risk assessment, but adds to it a studied judgment of the capacity of a country or community to cope with risk factors – to manage tensions, to contain violence, or to rebuild the torn social fabric after violence has been contained.
b) The TOR for this effort should concentrate on a number of issues associated with the current challenges and potential future threats posed by security groups. The analysis should also concentrate on assessing underlying reasons for the growth of security groups, while focusing as well on the characteristics and claims of its membership. Priority emphasis should also be placed on the implications of involvement by former members of the clandestine network as well as the leaders and membership of CPD/RDTL.

c) Resulting analysis should seek to address relevant institutional issues and dynamics, including the:

- Creation and role a intelligence agency currently under discussion;
- Continuing involvement and future role of the FDTL in domestic intelligence gathering generally, and particularly regarding security groups and former FALINTIL members; and,
- Role of ETPS in dealing not only with challenges posed by security groups, but also in how the newly established police force can improve its sometimes problematic relationship with veterans.

d) Finally, the independent analysis, or CVA, should provide recommendations on how various GET institutions (including security, justice, and development oriented agencies) might develop a strategy for responding jointly and severally to effectively address challenges or threats from security groups in a manner consistent with the new constitution. A primary question to be addressed is whether or not security groups and their activities should be regulated.

As CIVPOL will continue to be actively assisting the ETPS in East Timor for the next two years, both institutions should be involved in a partnership with other relevant institutions, (Labor and Solidarity) and even representatives from the private sector among others who have a stake in the potential threats posed, and influence to address at least some of the challenges. Input from perhaps a working group involving representatives from this proposed partnership should help inform the design and objectives of the CVA, and monitor its implementation.

4.2.4 Donors should consider supporting the preceding recommendations and work closely with the Government of East Timor to develop the necessary capacities, policies and -- where appropriate -- programmatic responses: especially those regarding efforts to further

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168 Chubb Security for example is an East Timorese firm specializing in preventative security; it has extensive contacts and information that would contribute to, and complement, relevant information available to CIVPOL, ETPS, and others. Chubb management has informally exchanged information and viewpoints about security issues with CIVPOL in the past, though the practice was discontinued as a result of changes in CIVPOL leadership.
advance and consolidate the ongoing reintegration process; assess and address the needs of FALINTIL veterans not included as FRAP beneficiaries and others within the category referred to as the Forgotten; and to better assess and respond to potential and apparently growing threats to stability and security.

a) A number of the GET’s new institutions will require UN and other donor assistance to enhance their capacities; The recently established Office of Veteran Affairs should figure prominently among those destined for priority assistance, especially regarding its capacities to conduct analyses, formulate policies, and inform programmatic responses. Ultimately, an investment in reducing actual or potential sources of conflict is an investment in development. A social ministry can often contribute more, and more appropriately, to preventative measures that preclude tensions better than security oriented agencies.

b) Donors and the GET may also with to consider support either a new or ongoing initiative or program that employs practical approaches for monitoring and responding to local sources of tension and conflict at various levels, including areas considered particularly problematic. Illustrative interventions might initially focus on expanding access to independent and reliable sources of information that will contribute to conflict mitigation and reconciliation, while also strengthening existing (and traditional) capacities for doing the same. USAID financed efforts supporting dialogue on key issues and Civil-Military relations seems to be an effective mechanism for fostering improved understanding and dialogue about salient issues. Similar efforts at the district or regional levels might also foster the dissemination of better information and more informed discussion at those levels.
Chapter V: LESSONS LEARNED

5.0 Lessons Learned: In referring to the struggle of the East Timorese during the country’s independence ceremony, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan remarked: "Yours has not been an easy path to independence....You should be very proud of your achievement. That a small nation is able to inspire the world and be the focus of our attention is the highest tribute that I can pay....This transitional period has been truly unique....Never before has the world united with such firm resolve to help one small nation establish itself."

There are certainly lessons worth learning from the experiences of East Timor concerning those associated with the international community’s support during the transition period and the specifically issues of reintegration and demobilization efforts involving FALINTIL veterans. This chapter reviews some of the lessons learned and discerned as a result of the evaluation process and the corresponding findings. Some of the lessons refer specifically to the FRAP, and key stakeholder institutions, while other refer more generically to experiences relevant to post conflict interventions and demobilization and reintegration efforts more generally.

5.1 Key Personnel: While institutions, funding, programmatic environment among other factors are important, the personnel involved are the most important feature that will ultimately determine whether efforts result in success or failure. This was clearly the case with respect to FRAP. In particular three groups of people were most important to the success of FRAP: IOM personnel; the representatives from the principal donors; and the beneficiaries themselves. IOM and FRAP personnel were capable, dedicated, and committed to achieving their mission of assisting demobilized veterans above all else. Staff, including management and heads of sub-offices, had experience working in the Sudan, Kosovo, Haiti, Guatemala, among other transitional environments which relevant experience. The principal donors were proactive: they took the initiative from the outset, and representatives most involved with FRAP had a high degree of program ownership, earned by substantively contributing to the design, modification, and ongoing support to the program implementation through its conclusion. Finally, the demobilized FALINTIL veterans themselves – although at times ornery – generally demonstrated patience, discipline, and responsiveness that enabled the program to advance, sometimes with delays and other imperfections, to the point where both FRAP staff and beneficiaries were satisfied with the programmatic results being generated.

In retrospect, it would have probably have been beneficial for the key stakeholders, or even for IOM, to have had access to the ongoing perspective and input of a FALINTIL veteran, other than those from the High Command, to inform management and implementation decisions earlier. The type of role and perspective that the NPO was able to provide in the second half of FRAP would likely have improved even further the quality of management and execution of the program from the outset. Also apart from the effective contributions of the NSA, and valued input from individual representatives from PKF and ONMOS at various stages, there seems to have been deficit of personnel from key institutions with direct experience in developing and overseeing the implementation of demobilization and reintegration programs.169

169 Such as Major Jonathan Ball for example.
5.2 Effective coordination among key institutions: There was not what could be characterized as highly effective coordination among the various actors and institutions involved with FRAP, although the CRFV proved adequate to the task. The CRFV and the working group on demobilization and reintegration issues that preceded it (and FRAP) was helpful in drawing upon the experiences, knowledge and perspective of people from PKF, ONSA, ONMOs, and other institutions that would focus attention on the importance of demobilization and reintegration, as well as help guide the process. As institutional counterparts UNTAET and East Timorese leadership were distracted by competing priorities, and while contributing some dedicated and capable personnel to assist in the coordination, they were not contributing funding or much other support. Their ownership of FRAP seemed quite limited, and their contributions at times constrained by countervailing pressures emanating from their institutions and the exigencies associated with their other roles. IOM, the WB and USAID and not the United Nations were the critical institutional actors that were ultimately responsible for FRAP’s successful implementation.

There was a discernable level of tension associated with the planning and implementation of FRAP, which is not altogether uncommon in transitional circumstances where pressures of time, considerations of security and stability as well as institutional prerogatives are simultaneously at play. On the one hand there was institutional tension between the donors and the implementing agency and on the other among these and various UN agencies involved, and the primary East Timorese counterparts, namely the FALINTIL High Command. There were tensions as well between the competing perspectives key stakeholders from these institutions had regarding the direction and objectives of the reintegration efforts. Not all of this tension was negative, and in fact some of it resulted in benefiting the program design, implementation, and outcomes. To some extent there often seems to be intrinsic conflicts of reintegration efforts concerning the objectives of stability and security versus developmentally oriented approaches. Both are obviously important, as without some meaningful development gains, the contributions toward stability and security even during a transition period is likely to be transitory or ephemeral. IOM responded to these tensions by balancing its approach through FRAP, and ultimately managed to achieve objectives associated with both. In this sense, IOM and FRAP were responsive to disparate pressures applied by key stakeholders.

Some of the less constructive tensions may have been avoided had program results and indicators been established for FRAP from the outset, ideally with input from the key stakeholders, along with a agreed upon plan for the flow of information, along with incentives (for all involved) for sharing relevant information.

5.3 Donor initiative, support, and flexibility: East Timor’s path, at least during the transition period, and UNTAET’s mission would have been far more difficult had it not been for the efforts of the World Bank and USAID to help resolve the issues of demobilization and reintegration -- which other organizations, including the UN, were either reticent, unable, or unwilling to address. The principal donor organizations, and their personnel spearheading the support for reintegration efforts took the initiative to respond to needs associated with reintegration by contributing ideas, resources, and extensive coordination efforts maximize the efficacy of FRAP and ensure that it did not merely respond to the exigencies of the moment.
5.4 The United Nations: There appears to have been little or no leadership demonstrated by the international community, especially UNTAET, in effectively addressing the issue of FALINTIL’s status or the conditions within Aileu, despite numerous reported efforts to is staff and others to apprize the UNSGSR of the poor and deteriorating conditions. Some assistance was authorized by UNTAET, but only after nearly 9 months had passed. The belated response also seems to have been motivated by the exigencies of security concerns, rather than on moral or humanitarian grounds.\footnote{Following a July 1, 2000 meeting between some of the principals (FALINTIL, donor community) with the Peter Galbraith, then head of UN’s DPA, two payments were apparently made to FALINTIL totaling an estimated $100,000 to improve conditions and more importantly from the UN’s perspective reduce the security risk associated with a hungry, bored and disgruntled armed force concentrated an hour and a half from Dili.}

With a mandate as expansive as that provided UNTAET, UN leadership in East Timor was still unable or unwilling to consider it sufficient to effectively respond to FALINTIL issues, including the legal status of the guerilla force for much of the transition period. This and other shortcomings regarding the UN’s role in dealing with FALINTIL issues, including demobilization and reintegration should be reviewed by the international organization to develop their own lessons, since the effects of the shortcomings were considerable, and in other future – and less favorable transition environments – would be expected to have more dire consequences.

INTERFET would have preferred the cantonment and immediate disarmament of FALINTIL.\footnote{Interview with a foreign military officer who participated in INTERFET; and Colin Stewart (DPA) among others.} FALINTIL commanders on the other hand bristled at being treated as a source of insecurity. Generally, while both forces shared common or similar objectives, at least so far re-establishing security and attending to the needs of country’s population, both forces also initially viewed each another with a degree of mistrust and suspicion. As the situation on the ground stabilized, so too did the relationship; a modus vivendi was established. With the last of Indonesian troops withdrawn, by the end of October of 1999, it was agreed that a new cantonment area would be established in Aileu, where FALINTIL forces would concentrate, and would be permitted to retain their arms.\footnote{As a result of an agreement reached by the UNAMET and FALINTIL in mid-1999, members of the guerrilla force began entering 3 cantonment areas by June of the same year; Company I cantoned in Baucau (Quilicai); Companies II & III in Viqueque; and, Company IV in Bobonaro (Ermera).} Decisions regarding FALINTIL’s status, role, and future dispensation would be deferred until after the arrival of UNTAET and PKF authorized by the October 1999 Security Council resolution.

Many FALINTIL members were basically in cantonment for up to 19 months, including 5 months in one of the three cantonment areas during the UNAMET period until after the referendum, and for an additional 14 months of cantonment in Aileu (from October/Nov 1999 through February 2001). While they relied upon public buildings and some private dwellings for shelter, there is nearly universal acknowledgement that FALINTIL members were not provided adequate provisions for nearly their entire time in cantonment.\footnote{There are credible indications that the Portuguese contingent from PKF and some NGOs provided discrete assistance to FALINTIL members intermittently during their 14 month-long cantonment in Aileu.}
5.4.1 Inadvisable to permit a bored, hungry, and armed group of combatants from an experienced guerrilla force to languish in substandard conditions of cantonment for over a year. While obvious to the point of the ridiculous, the delays in addressing the needs of FALINTIL while in cantonment seem inexcusable, and risked violence and longer term negative effects concerning the security and stability of East Timor. With respect to the impasse between UNTAET and the East Timorese leadership which appears to have been primarily responsible for the delay, one party or the other – though especially the UN – should have reached out earlier to a third party to help the principals overcome the impasse. Subsequently DFID supported efforts by the King’s College Study group seemed particularly helpful in this regard.

In addition to risking violence and the unauthorized dispersion of former combatants and the resulting risks for stability and security, the time unproductive time veterans spent in cantonment was wasted, and could have been put toward achieving constructive ends by beginning efforts to orient FALINTIL members to a new situation. Orientation in citizenship, literacy and even job training skills could have been viable methods – not only for engaging those in cantonment and diminishing tensions -- but also in helping the veterans to become better prepared for their future, whether included life as a soldier in the ETDF or as civilian in their communities. Interventions of this sort would also have likely provided veterans a more informed basis for deciding whether or not they wished to join the ETDF, enhanced veterans’ confidence in options beyond life in FALINTIL and probably diminished interest in joining the new armed forces. At the very least, this would have reduced anxiety about life after FALINTIL, diminished disappointment over not having been selected for the ETDF, and jump-started the reinsertion and reintegration efforts.

UNTAET’s failure in this regard, though not singularly theirs, resulted in the loss of time and more vitally lost opportunities to better prepare veterans to more effectively navigate the transition from the life of combatant to civilian. Of equal or even greater significance, the failure to effectively attend to the legitimate needs and demands of FALINTIL veterans specifically during the cantonment and selection processes left a profoundly negative impression among FALINTIL veterans who were demobilized – and apart form a moral, ethical, and political considerations – generated some lasting negative effects including a level of general mistrust among some veterans of their former commanders and some East Timorese leaders.

5.4.2 Missing Links: There did not appear to be many UN personnel involved with FRAP which had extensive or direct experience in designing or overseeing the implementation of demobilization and reintegration programs. The UNDP has what it previously referred to as an Emergency Response Division (ERD), and which is now known as the Conflict Prevention and Response Division (CPR). Unfortunately these institutional resources were not brought to bare, and those with reintegration experience within this UN agency were not made available to support FRAP. The lack of participation of an organization with a longer term developmentally oriented mandate would likely have also aided in developing longer term or supplementary measures to ensure the effective longer term reintegration of FALINTIL veterans, as well as support to the Office of Veterans Affairs established by the GET to spearhead these efforts.
While in other transition situations, the UNDP has often been involved in various post-conflict interventions including demobilization and reintegration efforts, a conscious decision was made to avoid substantive institutional involvement in these processes in East Timor. As indicated by the Resident Representative, by the time that UNDP was up and running, the donors and IOM already seemed to have had the situation well in hand. In spite of some pressure, or advice, from UNDP in New York to get involved, the Resident Representative was interested in avoiding turf battles and in facilitating maximum cooperation and coordination among the various agencies working in East Timor.

5.5 IOM as the implementing agency of reintegration efforts: It is important to recognize while assessing FRAP’s ultimate performance and impact that it was a one year program to assist reinsertion and reintegration of 1,308 demobilized FALINTIL veterans in a small country, with a limited and heavily damaged economy, during a period in which there were few viable local institutions and relatively no superstructure. IOM’s effectively employed its comparative advantages in executing FRAP. Specifically, these included the ability to attract quality, dedicated personnel; establish a decentralized structure with effective management that was responsive to needs at the local level; and maintain effective procurement, finance, logistical and administrative structures in support of its mission. While these comparative advantages served IOM well with regard to FRAP and the organization’s role in demobilization and reintegration efforts elsewhere, there are also some weaknesses recognized with regard to FRAP’s implementation that reflect similar weaknesses noted in other such programs in which IOM has been involved. Primary among these are the shortcomings with respect to information management and associated analysis.

With respect to FRAP, the failure to effectively analyze SES data not only restricted the amount and quality of information and analysis that could have been shared with stakeholders, many of which lamented this shortcoming, but also could and should have served primarily IOM and FRAP in assessing and anticipating problems and opportunities regarding FRAP beneficiaries during their reinsertion and reintegration processes. The weaknesses in information and data base management were also noted in USAID’s assessment of IOM’s implementation of reintegration program in Guatemala.

IOM’s Chief of Mission during the design and implementation of FRAP initiated a creative and useful effort to develop a compact disc which serves as a macro of sorts to help guide future IOM efforts in demobilization and reintegration processes. This seems to be a very useful contribution. IOM should consider such tools to help develop institutional capacity and add to the institutional memory concerning post-conflict interventions. The addition of sections dealing with the creation of results framework, with corresponding indicators for measuring quantitative and qualitative performance would be helpful -- as would some guidance on data collection and analysis, as well as the creation, maintenance databases.

Limited capacity of counterparts: While FALINTIL High Command and presumably other members of the East Timorese leadership were well aware of the condition of FALINTIL members in cantonment, as well as the effect that this was having on the morale and discipline, they seemed unable to either address the problems themselves, nor adequately articulate the
needs to members of the international community who may have been able to assist. They also failed to grasp the significance of UN and other international organizations prohibition against providing assistance to armed groups, and to have somehow viewed this as a detail or an inconvenient legal nicety that should not pertain to their situation.

With respect to the High Command’s participation in the FRAP process of reinsertion and reintegration, the contributions were inconsistent, and in some specific cases -- such as the provision of timely information – weak. In retrospect, it may have been a useful for the High Command to have, with donor support, the option of contracting a consultant to advise them and represent their interest in the process. The likely result may have proven beneficial for all involved, and enhanced the level of trust and perhaps the quality of consistent representation of this important stakeholder throughout the process.

5.7 Mitigating factors concerning the role of UNTAET and East Timorese Leadership: It needs also to be said that the UN (including the SGSR) and both East Timorese and FALINTIL leadership were confronting enormous challenges, including dealing with the aftermath of Indonesian violence and destruction, which affected all of ET’s 850,000 people. The ET leaders were also thrust immediately into the role of trying to figure how to guide and run the country into independence, a situation that they had struggled with so much pain suffering and sacrifice for over 24 years, and now suddenly and almost surreally had been thrust upon them. With regard to the limited role and inconsistent contributions from the East Timorese leadership, whether civilian or military, it is find to find much fault given there were so many competing priorities, and so few human, financial, and institutional resources to respond to them.

Regarding the strengths of UNTAET’s role in East Timor, UNTAET’s Deputy Special Representative, Mr. McNamara, pointed to the UN’s response to the humanitarian challenges; the generally effective administration of East Timor; as well as the UN’s role in organizing and administering a series of national elections. UNTAET’s deputy special representative also mentioned the efforts and mixed progress to date in establishing and developing some key institutions that will contribute to East Timor’s capacity to assume governing responsibilities: “those who are good at doing, are not always good at teaching.” These were some major accomplishments, Mr. McNamara indicated, considering the fact that rather than a weak or tattered government; there was not government at all -- when the UN Mission arrived in East Timor. While not in East Timor at the time, the UN official also indicated that he felt the Mission might have suffered from difficulties, particularly in the early going, in rapidly recruiting and fielding the type and quality people adequately equipped to meet the challenges in East Timor – especially those for administering a territory, a role in which the UN is not especially well prepared to undertake.
ANNEX I: GLOSSARY

Conflict early warning: Activities taken to identify or monitor structural and proximate predictors of conflict in a particular setting. In practical terms, this generally consists of monitoring of field reports received from locally active organizations, UN agencies, and news reports.

Alternatively...The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of anticipating the escalation of violent conflict.

Conflict Vulnerability Analysis: Incorporates risk assessment, but adds to it a studied judgement of the capacity of the country or community to cope with risk factors -- to manage tensions, to contain violence, and to rebuild the torn social fabric after violence has been contained. (from article in the Winter 2001 edition of African Voices by Colleen McGinn)

Demobilization: Release of soldiers from military duty and return to productive civilian life. This entails formal discharge from service, return to normal place of residence, closing of barracks and other military quarters and organizational structures.

Alternatively...The act of returning the force and materiel to a pre-mobilization posture or to some other approved posture; also involves returning the mobilized portion of the industrial base to peacetime conditions.

Disarmament: In the widest sense, the complete removal of weapons from a military force. While this is seldom (if ever) achieved in the widest sense, the term is typically used to mean any program, movement or action to disarm the military in general, and soldiers individually and systematically, even if only on a limited basis.

Displaced People: forced from their homes and livelihoods by conflict, both within national borders (IDPs) and internationally. This term as used in the widest sense includes both refugees and internally displaced persons.

Early prevention: Early diplomatic and development interventions taken to promote diffusion of potentially serious conflicts, or proliferation of weapons, in order to lessen the potential scale of eventual hostilities.

Emergency relief: Immediate and short-term survival assistance to the victims of violent conflict although in some cases the emergency may be prolonged.

Exclusion: This term generally means social exclusion in which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live, including livelihoods, earnings, property, housing, education and welfare benefits, citizenship, social contracts or respect.
**Human capital:** The sum total of the skills and knowledge a person, a community, or a society possesses.

**Interactive conflict resolution:** A process involving small group problem-solving discussions between unofficial representatives of opposing groups or factions, facilitated by a third party.

**Late prevention:** Typically, diplomatic interventions taken after some period of conflict escalation, taken to prevent all-out war. As currently practiced, it often includes aspects of brinkmanship or pushing demands and threats to the edge of war, while still in a nominally diplomatic mode.

**Peacebuilding:** Long-term support to viable political, socioeconomic and cultural institutions able to address the root causes of conflicts and establish the necessary conditions for peace and stability. In the wide sense it is an overarching activity consisting of: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace sustaining.

“Peace-building is a multidimensional process. Its objective is not merely to dismantle the structures of violence, but also to assist in building the structures of lasting peace, and in laying the foundations for sustainable development. It requires comprehensive strategies involving all relevant actors and embracing multiple sectors of activity, including political, military, diplomatic, development, human rights, humanitarian and many others. In essence, peace-building is simply conflict prevention, but with the additional challenges of an immediate, fragile transitional situation.” (SG Kofi Annan - Press Release SG/SM/7647 AFR/278 SC/6964 29 November 2000)

**Peacekeeping:** This part of peacebuilding includes: implementation of peace accords, promotion of good governance through democratization and institution building, support of reconciliation efforts, public security, and protection of human rights. This is often considered in the narrower meaning of the deployment of UN (or other, such as NATO, or ECOMOG) forces for the purpose of placement of armed buffer forces between and among former military opposition forces.

**Peacemaking:** Activities to bring peace to a conflict situation. These include: negotiations, design of peace accords, strengthening the role of civil society.

**Reconciliation:** The healing process dealing with the psychological damage of conflict, especially between perpetrators and victims of violence.

**Reconstruction:** Reestablishment of the political order, institutions and productive capacity to create a base for sustainable development.

**Refugees:** The definition of who is and who is not a *refugee* is part of international law and is closely related to the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which was created to facilitate international protection for them. The official definition states that refugees are people who are outside of their country of origin and who, *due to a well-founded fear of persecution*, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of that country’s protection.
**Rehabilitation:** Actions taken in the aftermath of a disaster or war to enable basic services to resume functioning, assist victim’s self-help efforts to repair dwellings and community facilities, and revive economic activities, including agriculture.

**Reinsertion:** Activities targeted for ex-combatants, demobilized soldiers and their families after some type of peace agreement or accord has been reached. Reinsertion programs are “stepping stone” activities towards reintegration, specifically for ex-combatants within the community. They provide a safety net to provide support for ex-combatants between demobilization and full reintegration.

**Reintegration:** Return to normal functioning society. This term may apply to returnees both military and non-military who must rebuild family and social life within the community.

**Resettlement:** A long-term solution for those who cannot for other reasons be repatriated and reintegrated into their home communities. Particularly in regard to refugees and IDPs, it carries the additional meaning of being resettled to a third location from their current situation of refuge either within or outside the country.

**Social capital:** The norms and social relations imbedded in the social structures of societies that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals.

**Watching Brief:** Term for the monitoring of a country by the World Bank in conflict or risk of conflict, even if there is not an active Bank portfolio in the country.

**Weapons control:** Any activities used to reduce the total amount of arms among the population, or to transfer their control to peacekeeping forces.
ANNEX II: Summary of the Evaluation’s Terms of Reference (ToR)

I. Summary: The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is seeking to undertake a program evaluation for its demobilization program in East Timor. The Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP), which was implemented in East Timor between January and December 2001, was designed to contribute to the stability of East Timor by providing social and economic reintegration assistance to 1300 former guerrilla soldiers who were returning to civilian life. This included assistance in starting self-sustaining, income-generating activities, referral to employment and vocational training.

The evaluation study will assess the quality of the assistance provided, the degree of participation by the intended beneficiaries, and the overall level of satisfaction with the program. The evaluation will begin on February 25, 2002 and conclude on March 24, 2002. The person selected for the position will work in collaboration with a survey consultant who will have conducted a seven-week Tracer Study from January 7 to February 24, 2002; which will serve as a basis for the evaluation.

II. Background: From 1976-99, East Timorese guerrillas organized under the banner of the FALINTIL (Armed Force for the National Liberation of East Timor) carried out an armed resistance against the Indonesian occupation. Following the UN sponsored Referendum held on 30 August 1999, East Timor opted for independence, and the FALINTIL was disbanded in February 2001. One third of the 1900-man force was retained to constitute the core of the new national defense force, while the remaining ex-combatants returned to civilian life.

The FALINTIL Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) was designed by IOM in coordination with the UN, local military leaders, and donor agencies to support the social and economic reintegration of those ex-FALINTIL combatants who either chose to go back to civilian life or were not selected to enter the East Timor Defense Force. Funding for the program is provided by The World Bank, USAID and the Japanese Government. Program activities are monitored by the Commission for Reinsertion of Falintil Veterans (CRFV), which comprises senior representatives from the office of the National Security Advisor, the East Timorese Defense Force, USAID, the World Bank, IOM and the UN Peacekeeping Force.

The FRAP consisted of four stages: 1) a period of cantonment and registration; 2) discharge and departure activities; 3) reinsertion; and 4) reintegration. The program commenced in December 2000 with a survey that was carried out among the 1900 former combatants to assess their social and economic background, skills, and their needs and plans for the future. Based on data collected from the survey, a monthly family subsistence allowance (the “transitional safety net”) was calculated to cover veteran families’ basic needs during the first 6 months after discharge (the reinsertion phase). Also based on survey data, reintegration packages were designed to provide start-up cash and material support for reintegration phase activities which began in June 2001 and included crop farming, livestock, fishing, and micro-enterprise. FRAP also sought to coordinate access to vocational training, community assistance programs, and educational grants.

The program is subject to external evaluation. IOM wishes to employ the services of a consultant in order to evaluate the impact of the program on FALINTIL households and communities. Working under the supervision of, and in accordance with the overall directives received from the Chief of Mission and the donors, the incumbent will be responsible for the conduct of the final evaluation of the demobilization program.
III Objective: To evaluate the impact of the program activities implemented under the FRAP Program in terms of their contribution to social and economic integration of ex-combatants, and to identify lessons learned.

IV Methodology: The consultant will draw on the quantitative results of the end-of-project survey, and complement this information using a range of qualitative methods.

The evaluation should include participant perceptions and expectations. The use of in–depth interviews and group discussions in selected communities or sites will also allow for the identification of external factors governing the changes in the target population as well as impacts that can be conclusively associated to the program’s interventions.

Topics to be assessed include:

- the background context leading up to the design of the FRAP program, and extent to which the response and design was appropriate given assumptions and constraints
- the beneficiary identification process, and its influence on project outcomes and future policy issues
- quality of needs assessment and efficacy in responding to needs, including the extent to which design and interventions were situated within macro economic context, such as levels and characteristics of unemployment and underemployment, and capacity of vocational training and skill development system
- activity performance, including expected vis-à-vis actual developmental outcomes and output completion
- extent to which modifications during project implementation were responsive to changing environment and constraints encountered
- levels of satisfaction of the ex-combatants; including extent to which project addressed problems of high priority as viewed by stakeholders and any unmet expectations and rationales (what exactly is meant by “unmet rationales”?)
- extent to which FRAP facilitated and targeted community assistance to areas receiving large numbers of ex-combatants (design component)
- impact on household members and host communities (ok with stakeholder analysis and key informant interviews as well as other reliable and instructive sources.)
- administrative performance of the FRAP project, including management structures, field implementation (processing time for sub-project proposal review, analysis and recommendation), and adequacy of logistical support and procurement system
- extent to which stakeholders, including receiving communities and government entities not holding seats on the CRFV, were informed of FRAP objectives and activities
- the role of the CRFV in overseeing project implementation and ensuring stakeholder participation
- positive and negative impacts of FRAP on security and social stability
Specific Tasks:

- Review relevant project documents; i.e. program document, implementation manual, grant agreements, monitoring and survey reports.
- Develop a work plan for an approximate 4-week period.
- Interview project stakeholders including: IOM staff, veterans, East Timor Defence Force, the Office of the National Security Advisor, UN Civilian Police, the East Timor Police Service, UNMO, USAID/OTI, World Bank, etc.
- Visit project sites to discuss program with local stakeholders and beneficiaries
- Assess whether all the necessary activities have been carried out and the performance to date is consistent with the individual grant agreements.
- Assess any external factors influencing implementation and project outcomes
- Analyze the above findings to formulate conclusions and lessons learned.
- Facilitate workshop presenting preliminary conclusions and lessons learned for IOM staff and CRFV members.
- Complete final report which includes the following sections: executive summary, introduction (background, rationale of the evaluation, description of the project), methodology, strengths and weaknesses of methods used and quality of both secondary and primary information, findings and conclusions, and implications for the future (projection of potential problems, recommended solutions and courses of action).
Annex III: Contact and Interview List

I. Representatives from East Timorese Institutions:
Brigadier Gen. Taur Matan Ruak, Commander in Chief of the ETDF.
Col. Lere Anan Timor (Tito da Costa), Dep. Commander, ETDF.
Falur Rate Laek (Domingos Raul)
Ular Rihik (Virgilio dos Anjos)
Lt. Col. Filomeno Paixao,
Lt. Col. Pedro;

Francisco Guterres (Lu-olo): President of the Constituent Assembly
Virgilio Smith, Secretary General, Association of the Veterans of Resistance (AVR)
Adriano Da Camara (‘LENTIL’) President, Foundation for the Veterans of FALINTIL (FVF)
Francisco Olser, ETTA Ministerio de Educacaao, Cultura e Juventude
Ciara Knudsen, Social services advisor; Secretary of State for Labor & Solidarity
Manuel A.C. De Lemos Central Fiscal Authority

Program beneficiaries: In addition to conducting interviews with Cornelio Gamma (Commander L-7), former section and platoon commanders, including DVOs, in Maliana, Lautem, Baucau, Liquica, and Bobonaro, the evaluation also conducted six focus group discussions involving over 154 FALINTIL veterans and FRAP beneficiaries from these areas.

II. The Implementing Agency: International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Christopher Gascon; IOM Chief of Mission;
Oscar Sandoval, Projects Coordinator. Oscar Sandoval, Acting Chief of Mission;
Walter Sanchez Arlt, IOM FRAP Program Manager
Veronica da Dores, FRAP National Program Coordinator.
Liz Garrett (formerly Assist FRAP Prog. Manager;
Raynald Blouin: Head of sub-office, Baucau.
Monique Van Hoof, Program Officer (formerly headed Aileu & later Los Palos sub-offices).
Matthew Abud, IOM Producer: Oral History Project.
Reza Hosseini, Operations officer.
Jonathan Kime, head of sub-office: Suai.
Drew Kutschenreuter, head of sub-office in Ermera/CADET.
Oleg Naumov, Adm and Finance Officer.
Rui Oliveira, Tech supervisor: BELE.
Dr. Teodulo Ximenes Operations Officer, Suai and former acting Head of sub-office in Suai.
Mona Pistrui, Project Mgr. BELE.
Son Thanh To, IT Officer
Carlito Nunez, former FRAP project assistant, Lautem sub-Office

III. Donor and Country Representatives of Interested Parties
Nina Bowen, PhD: USAID/OTI Resident Representative in East Timor.
Edith Bowles: USAID/OTI/DAI Program Manager, ‘East Timor Transition Project’
Nicole Seibel, USAID Field Representative, Democracy and Governance
Natacha Meden, World Bank, Project Officer or Task Manager.
Afonso Aleixo, representative of CIDA/PSU (Canada) in East Timor
Mr. Hiroshi Matsuura, Representative of Japanese Foreign Ministry in East Timor
Mr. Katsuo Shoji, Resident Representative of JICA; East Timor
Mr. Takehara Masayoshi, Assist Resident Representative of JICA; East Timor.

IV. Representatives from UN Agencies (including those participating in the CRFV)
Dennis McNamara, UNTAET Deputy Special Rep. of the Secretary General.
Colin Stewart, Chief of UN Department of Political Affairs, East Timor.
Finn Reske-Nielsen, UNDP Resident Representative and Development Coordinator
Peter Miller, Chief of CIVPOL
Bonino (Bong), Head of CIVPOL’s Office of Strategic Information
Antonio Quebrar, CIVPOL, Baucau: Acting Superintendent
Nicola Dahrendorf, King’s College London, former Nat’l Security Advisor, Chair of CRFV.
Scott Gilmore, Office of National Security Advisor
Kerry Palmer, Assist, UNTAET’s Office of National Security Advisor
Nelia Da Costa, private secretary of the DSRSG, (and former IOM employee)

Representatives from foreign military institutions, including those (currently or previously) affiliated with UN’s ONMOs, PKF, and ODFD:
Maj. General Eugene Daniel, (US, retired) for member of ODFD
Brig. Gen Clavel, (US Army, retired)
Major Jonathan Ball (Australian Military) formerly UN Military Advisor
Col. Lima Pinto, Portuguese Military
Col. Mark Webb, Defense Attaché, Australian Embassy
Group Captain Garry Dunbar, Australian Defense Liaison Officer
Capt. Jonathan Symons, ODFD

VI. Representatives from NGO’s (including implementing partners) Civil Society and other individuals:
Jim Della-Giacoma: Resident Representative, National Democratic Institute (NDI)
Edward Rees, Senior Program Manager (NDI) - previously with the ONSA.
Estanilau Qintao, Agencia Brasilera de Cooperacao (Brazilian Vocational Training Center).
Father Andres, Don Bosco Vocational Training Center
Luca Barletti Terre des hommes;
David Hines (Power Station, Comoro)
Jim Harrington (APHEDA, Australian NGO)
Eusebio Guterres Lavor LAIFET
Sisters Marylu Mariano, Nimi Rebollos and Mila Guarante (Manatuto)
Kong Mu, Ernst & Young
Warren Knight, Regional Advisor, Chubb Protective Services in East Timor.  
Manuel Calascalao, restaurateur and investor.

174 Also interviewed other private sector representatives who were less interested in being specifically identified, including the heads or senior level employees from a car rental company, two construction companies, and representatives of two oil related businesses in East Timor.
Organizers and Members of the Association of Former Combatants from 1975 in Maliana, Ermera.
Background and Summary

This paper is a resume of the current state of thinking in the Aileu office on the issue of the Falintil cantonment. It is an attempt to deal with the disparate strands of the issue that have to some extent become artificially divided within the UNTAET structure. I reported in December 1999 and January 2000, in memos to headquarters and in weekly reports, that Falintil patrol in the cantonment with automatic weapons and carry out unauthorized and unsupervised roadblocks, searches and detentions. On 16.1.00 I asked for urgent guidance on these issues pointing out that any agreement would come under the remit of national rather than district level UNT AET authorities. As recommended in my memo of 02. 04.00, we should formalise the security role of Falintil in the cantonment and, more generally, regulate the cantonment. This position was supported in principle by General M Smith in his memo to P. Galbraith and N. Parameswaran of OS. 04.00. This proposed interim MOU should cover the SOPs for roadblocks and searches, which would stipulate UN presence and oversight. Immediate steps should be taken pending a decision on the future of Falintil to stabilise the situation in the cantonment, including education and training programmes.
Summary of Current Situation

The legal/regulatory vacuum in which Falintil exists has progressively eroded troop discipline, as evidenced by the heavy-handed and at times provocative behaviour of some (particularly, the younger) Falintil troops in their relationship with the civilian population. Reliable sources also indicate that provocations could have been orchestrated by dissident elements within Falintil (this has been touched on in recent UNMO reports). Other issues raised by the civilian population include arrogant behaviour towards CNRT leaders and the public in general at checkpoints, disrespectful and potentially dangerous behaviour at social or sporting functions (1) and the moves to occupy yet more public buildings without any prior consultation with UNT AET.

2. **Falintil commanders feel completely alienated from the existing justice system**, and are particularly critical of CIVPOL. This is manifested when Falintil detains civilians and only grudgingly permits CIVPOL involvement, preferring to consult exclusively with the UNMO FLT. This makes it increasingly difficult to engage Falintil in dialogue regarding illegal actions related to detentions, searches, carrying of weapons, etc. and violations of the right to free movement. As the administration, UNTAET’s failure to prevent these actions is arguably tantamount to committing daily human rights violations.

3. **According to a number of local leaders, much of the civilian population in Aileu lives in a state of anxiety about Falintil**, others suffering what a prominent CNRT leader refers to as "trauma". Local Catholic Church and CNRT leaders, have expressed their worry about inappropriate and illegal Falintil behaviour. Local leaders, moreover, do not accept that Falintil should routinely carry weapons in Aileu town.

Risk Scenarios

4. A dissident faction within Falintil is widely held to exist. This division could deepen due to the ongoing legal vacuum and worsen relations with the civilian population (a CNRT leader confirms that there is a real risk of violence if action is not taken to regularize the situation).

5. Social and political unrest in Dili or elsewhere could provoke certain Falintil elements to adopt arbitrary measures aimed either at quelling this unrest or exploiting it in relation to a dissident faction within Falintil.

6. The growing gap between the judicial system, CIVPOL, and Falintil’s self-defined role, could lead to clashes resulting from relatively minor incidents such as vehicle accidents (2) or as complex as recent detentions of former TNI and POLRI members travelling innocently from Same to Dili.

(1) At the end of a well-attended football match yesterday, a small fight broke out between two civilians, upon which over fifty young Falintil with automatic weapons ran across the football pitch and joined the melee. Although nothing serious developed, the incident indicates the potential for inappropriate involvement of the Falintil in essentially harmless, civilian affairs. Moreover, the inappropriate involvement of Falintil in a public order situation and the inherent risk of this intervention was not lost on the civilian spectators.
A CNRT leader expressed concern recently that a civilian was forced to pay for the repair of a motorcycle damaged in an accident caused by its Falintil owner in order to avoid further confrontation, and following abusive behaviour by the Falintil member.

Recent Initiatives Towards a Solution

The Core Group meeting of 5 May 2000 reached a level of consensus on the medium term prospects for Falintil, accepting that the Kings College study is key to the longer term decision on the East Timorese Defence Force, ETDF. It seems unlikely, therefore, that any significant discussion on the future of Falintil will take place until the study report is produced in mid-July. The study process itself (which will engage Falintil, amongst others) should help to focus Falintil attention on the complex decisions that the ETDF involves, but there will almost certainly be an uneasy limbo period of at least two months.

Further Necessary Measures

My evaluation is that the stability of the cantonment in Aileu will be in jeopardy if steps are not taken to move the process forward as a matter of urgency. I consider that this can be done in a way that is not prejudicial to the long-term plan. However, the possibility of a fruitful discussion about the ETDF is itself put at risk if, during the interim period, the situation is allowed to deteriorate (possibly leading to dispersion from the cantonment area, resulting in UNTAET losing visibility of Falintil).

The following suggestions have three objectives with respect to the cantonment zone: (1) to maintain stability; (2) to improve the human rights situation; and (3) to begin to normalise their situation in Aileu town, which is currently delayed by Falintil occupation of most public and abandoned buildings and the routine carrying of arms.

Formalize the role of Falintil and regularize the Cantonment.

Any security measures deemed necessary and appropriate for Falintil participation must be regulated and authorized by CIVPOL in coordination with the UNMOs. This would include SOPs for roadblocks, searches and detentions. This agreement would both recognize the de facto role of Falintil while establishing a formal structure upon which commanders could draw support in disciplining troops. The effective application of CIVPOL's proper jurisdiction would provide reassurance to the civilian population.

Initial steps to normalise the situation of Aileu town

Reduce Falintil cantonment to core troops. It is my impression that the numbers of troops in the cantonment are reducing anyway. Of the existing Falintil, the leadership already feels that the veterans and the recent recruits should be demobilised. The sooner this step can be negotiated the better although this might prove impossible until the agreement on the future is made. This measure would include, in part, the further incentive described below.

Restrict the carrying of weapons to peripheral areas of Aileu town and to Falintil barracks and headquarters. Weapons should not be carried on the main streets, or at social and sporting events.
Institute a pension scheme to deal with 250+ Falintil veterans from 1975. This would have the dual benefit of reducing the numbers in the cantonment and signalling UN respect for the past performance of Falintil. It will be impossible to retrain many of these long standing combatants and they would be unlikely to qualify for any future ETDF, so their future needs to be taken care of by the interim authority and then the new independent government. Such a measure would greatly reduce tension amongst the leadership of Falintil who feel a strong moral obligation to these veterans.

Formally require that occupation of public or abandoned buildings by Falintil be subject to coordination with the District Administrator. While this is already applicable in principle, a formal agreement would strengthen this process.

A programme of retraining and reinsertion for the recent recruits (similar to the IOM proposal). The key issue is how and whether to create a programme of basic life skills for those who have already returned home on extended leave. I suspect that such a programme, although ostensibly unnecessary, would greatly assist the long-term reinsertion of combatants.

A training programme including literacy, English, Portuguese and computing should be instituted for all those present in the cantonment, partly as a preparation for the future, partly as a measure to increase the short-term stability of the cantonment.

11. These measures would make it possible to start to normalise the situation in Aileu by making available the public buildings currently occupied by Falintil for use by the public and ET A. Best regards.
ANNEX V: OFFICE OF VETERAN’S AFFAIRS

A: PROPOSAL

Office of Veterans Affairs

Proposal: The development of a Division of Veterans Affairs to be incorporated in the Department of Labor and Solidarity

Goal: A formal office within government to hear concerns, provide information and opportunities and assist individual veterans and their families to plan towards a peaceful future.

Identified Need:

- Formal recognition of the people who have played an essential role in the struggle for independence through involvement in the Resistance, particularly in the clandestine movement and the armed resistance.
- Acknowledgement of the ongoing responsibility of government to this important section of the population through the establishment of an office to be the face of government to Veterans and serve them through advocacy and facilitation.
- With the completion of the Falintil Re-insertion Assistance Program (FRAP) and other initiatives, former Falintil members and other groups who assisted in the Resistance remain without a formal mechanism to provide information, referrals, facilitate economic and social reintegration and assist families of the fallen.
- Government attention to growing frustration among former Resistance members currently without opportunities for training, employment and social services as well as access to education, health and credit, who find themselves left out of processes of community development.
- Discussion on the national level about the role Veterans will play in the country’s future as well as acknowledgement of their crucial role in Independence from East Timor’s past
- Mechanisms and opportunities to develop strategies for former Resistance members to find productive activities outside provision of “Security”, reducing the number of currently proliferating non-ETDF Security groups.
- Formal focus on economic and social reintegration as well as attention to alleviating or changing unfilled expectations

Principles for development of this office:

- Solidarity within the community and towards the heroes of the Resistance and their families
- Recognition of the contributions and roles of Resistance members
- Reintegration of former combatants into the community is essential for future peace and security in East Timor. These members have essential skills to be acknowledged and contributed to the community; they equally have the right to learn new skills and participate in all community activities.
• Sustainable solutions must be found to address the frustrations of former combatants to allow East Timor to move forward in peace with respect to the memory of the Resistance and the sacrifices involved.
• Continued productive service: Former Resistance members have served East Timor in the past; they have significant continued productive service to provide
• Non-discrimination based on gender, religion, marital status, cultural, political or social orientation
• Special attention to most vulnerable groups

Advantages to placement with the Department of Labor and Solidarity:

This Department is currently in process of expansion, taking on a larger mandate to include labor relations, arbitration, skills development, employment services, links to vocational training, Social services to women, children, disabled and elderly, court and prison services, community education and humanitarian response to disaster and emergency, including attention to returning refugees. Cooperation between the Divisions of Labor, Skills Development and Social services allows enormous flexibility for the Office of Veteran Affairs to refer applicants for assistance with employment, skills and assistance.

Collaboration with the Division of Skills Development and Employment Services is an integral advantage. Veterans will have full access to information on training opportunities, job openings and opportunities for small business formation. Training without assuring jobs has been shown to increase frustration and feelings of powerlessness which breed instability. Thus, strong linkages between the Office of Veteran Affairs, Employment and Labor can carefully track the demonstrated needs of industry and small business, helping to shape training opportunities for Veterans through NGO and other training partners.

In the spirit of the FRAP program, the Office of Veteran Affairs must be oriented towards families, including widows and orphaned children of Resistance members. Linkages with Social Services are essential for identifying mechanisms of assistance. Social Services particularly has the mandate to focus on the needs of disabled persons and disabled Veterans should play an essential role in the formation of services in this area.

Proposed strategies and activities of the Office of Veteran Affairs:

1) Information and referral systems
2) Institute formal linkages between employment, skills development, vocational education, social services and other relevant agencies to access information and provide active and effective referral services to allow full participation and access to employment, training, education and assistance opportunities
3) Building up a system of NGOs and other partners with capacity to address the needs of veterans and their communities with special attention to skills improvement according to demonstrated need and opportunity.
4) Advocacy within government to facilitate opportunities for former members of the Resistance and peaceful social and economic integration in their communities, including equal access to participation and opportunity
5) Development or facilitation of necessary policy and legislation to guide the activities of the office and future programming or guidelines for Veterans in East Timor.
Initial Priorities for 2002-2003:

1) Address immediate policy needs including the facilitation of decision-making by leadership to categorize participation in the struggle for East Timorese Independence.
2) Formulate a system to acknowledge the essential contributions of members of the Resistance to East Timor’s current Independence
3) Provide an open door for discussion of issues around veterans affairs and for mediation of difficulties
4) Access existing data on socio-economic conditions, needs and registration of veterans through the FRAP program and other initiatives, in partnership with the Associations currently working for Veterans
5) Formulate a plan to collect additional “gap” information
6) Strengthen existing district support networks to communities including clandestine and former Falintil members
7) Support NGO and other partner capacity to provide training, programming and other assistance to qualifying veterans
8) Provide basic interviewing, referral and counselling when needed
9) Work closely with Veteran’s associations to responsibly reflect the concerns of Veterans and search for solutions within government and civil society
10) Push for the benefit of communities through full reintegration of former and current armed forces, including impending retirement of senior officers
11) Contribute to the development of legislation for pension systems and other safety nets to assist ETDF and others as part of a national social security system

Identified Policy and Legislation needs:

1) Legislation on Social Security including Veterans
2) Regulation for Formation and mandate of Veteran’s Organizations
3) System of acknowledgement of service to the Nation

Related:
4) Regulation on Security Groups
5) Policy on criteria of vulnerability and State assistance

Possible future programs:

- Information, publicity and referral
- Subsidized on the job training
- Apprenticeship or local small business mentoring
- District-based services (access to Skills, Employment and Social services in Baucau, Maliana, Same, Oecusse and Dili)
- Support to NGOs and other partners providing training, assistance and income-generation
- Policy and Legislation development, including pension system through National social security
- Access to services for disabled, traumatized, health issues
- Future civilian corps options including King’s College “Conservation Corps” or the model of Kosovo’s Protection Corps providing civilian services for firefighting, etc.
Sectoral relevance:

- Reduction of poverty, rural and regional development
- Human resource development
- Political Development, External Relations, Defense and Security, Justice, Public Administration, Civil Society, Gender Equality and Media
- Trade and Private Industry
B: SUBMISSION TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

UNITED NATIONS

ETPA
East Timor Public Administration

Office of the Secretary of State for Labor and Solidarity

OVERVIEW

As Independence approaches, activities to demobilize and assist former members of the Resistance has ended with the completion of the Falintil Re-insertion and Assistance Program (FRAP). ETDF structure has been formalized and essential questions remain unanswered for this important group.

This proposal responds to an identified need to formally recognize the people who have played an essential role in the struggle for independence through involvement in the Resistance. Formal recognition must include the acknowledged responsibility of government to this important section of the population. Labor and Solidarity proposes the establishment of a formal Office as the face of government to Veterans, to serve them through advocacy and facilitation as the lead mechanism in executing this responsibility.

The Secretary of State for Labor and Solidarity proposes to create a formal office within government to hear concerns, provide information, referral and opportunities to assist veterans and their families to plan towards a peaceful future.

This office presents an opportunity and mechanism to provide Government attention to the growing frustration among former Resistance members currently unable to access opportunities for training, employment and social services. Many former members and their families also cannot access education, health and credit, and now find themselves left out of processes of community development. The proposal sets up staffing and mandate to coordinate a discussion on the national level about the role Veterans will play in the country’s future as well as acknowledgement of their crucial role in Independence from East Timor’s past. A key strategy will be partnership with Veteran’s associations, civil society and other relevant agencies including the Ministry of Education, etc.

The funding for 2002-2003 is designed to form the base mechanisms to develop strategies to assist former Resistance members to find productive activities outside provision of “Security”, reducing the number of currently proliferating non-ETDF Security groups. The priority of this Office is to formalize focus on economic and social reintegration as well as to pay attention to alleviating or changing unfilled expectations.

The proposed functions of the Office are as follows:
**Liaison and Facilitation**: to access services existing already in skills and vocational training, informal education, humanitarian assistance and employment services. This includes work with partner and NGOs to develop training services specific to the needs of Resistance members.

**Advocacy**: to ensure veterans are included in training, labor and informal education plans as well as project for poor families and disabled, that they receive assistance from small business projects and are able to actively participation in community and national development activities. Advocacy also means that the Office works within Government to raise the concerns of Veterans and make sure their voice is heard.

**Policy**: to support and advise the Council of Ministers and the Parliament in the formation of policy on Veterans and to drive a process of wide consultation to ensure informed support by the larger community. The Office would also be mandated to prepare policy on criteria for services to Veterans and systems of acknowledgement, to be brought to the Council of Ministers.

**Presence**: to take action on formal recognition of Veterans through commendations, honors, etc. with formality and to provide an “Open Door” to Veterans to acknowledge their concerns and needs.

**Donor relations**: to continue to seek bilateral relationships to support re-integration of Resistance members through technical assistance and programs.

**Coordination of Programming**: to develop future NGO or Agency delivered programming which could include: poverty reduction for families of fallen heroes, income-generation projects, adult non-formal education including literacy, on the job training and apprenticeships, subsidized school fees to orphaned children of parents killed in service to the country, and increased access to necessary health interventions including prosthesis.

**BACKGROUND**

Following the inauguration of the Second Transitional Administration of East Timor, the Chief Minister presented a vision that the government would play an important role in recognizing the thousands of people who fought in the Resistance to bring East Timor to Independence. The completion of the FRAP program, the rise in non-ETDF “security” groups, increasing reports of need and vulnerability among families of former Resistance members, and concerns by leadership now demand that this issue be considered and action be taken at the highest level to address government responsibility to this group.

With the completion of the Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) and other initiatives, former Falintil members and other groups who assisted in the Resistance remain without a formal mechanism to provide information, referrals, and facilitate economic and social reintegration. This Office proposes to provide this mechanism.

**JUSTIFICATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Debt to the members of the Resistance**: As we prepare for the May 20 hand-ver and face the full reality that East Timor is finally becoming independent, it is more clear than ever that
there is an enormous debt to pay to those who went to the mountains, who supported the fighters and to those who fought long years for this event. Many have not lived to see it.

East Timor now faces a central issue that every nation born out of conflict must face: how to integrate these heroes into new processes of state-building and development. It takes new skills, new order in society, and a different mission to achieve lasting peace. Many countries have struggled and failed to find a new place for the people who brought them independence. Our new government and the people of East Timor cannot afford the costs of this failure.

Sustainable solutions must be found to address the frustrations of former combatants to allow East Timor to move forward in peace with full respect to the memory of the Resistance and the sacrifices involved. This involves official recognition of the contributions and roles of Resistance members. This also requires that representatives within government are specifically tasked to take on this role and to drive the process of linking Veterans with skills development, assistance and productive economic activity.

**Placement under the Secretary of State for Labor and Solidarity:**

This Department is currently in process of expansion, taking on a larger mandate to include labor relations, arbitration, skills development, employment services, links to vocational training, Social services to women, children, disabled and elderly, court and prison services, community education and humanitarian response to disaster and emergency, including attention to returning refugees. Cooperation between the Divisions of Labor, Skills Development and Social services allows enormous flexibility for the Office of Veteran Affairs to refer applicants for assistance with employment, skills and assistance.

Collaboration with the Division of Skills Development and Employment Services is an integral advantage. Veterans will have full access to information on training opportunities, job openings and opportunities for small business formation. Training without assuring jobs has been shown to increase frustration and feelings of powerlessness which breed instability. Thus, strong linkages between the Office of Veteran Affairs, Employment and Labor can carefully track the demonstrated needs of industry and small business, helping to shape training opportunities for Veterans through NGO and other training partners.

The Office of Veteran Affairs must be oriented towards families, including widows and orphaned children of Resistance members. Linkages with Social Services are essential for identifying mechanisms of assistance. Social Services particularly has the mandate to focus on the needs of disabled persons and disabled Veterans should play an essential role in the formation of services in this area.

This noted, the Department of Labor and Solidarity is most concerned that this Office be formalized. If, according to the Council, it could be placed differently within the Government structure, the Secretary of State would welcome the decision. In this event, the Department remains committed to collaboration to assist Veterans for training, employment and social services.

**Humanitarian:** A recent series of focus groups discussions with veterans have shown that there are significant numbers who still require humanitarian assistance to fulfill basic needs. There are also groups who did not qualify for FRAP assistance but who clearly demonstrate need for help. Included in this number are several widows who lost children and husbands in the fight for Independence and now find themselves at the mercy of the community. Social Services has received several of these cases in the last 7 months and has yet been unable to
address their basic needs. The current proposal includes some attention to this issue, but further action directed by the Office will be needed in collaboration with donors and partners to find a tangible solution to this humanitarian problem.

**The Role of Veterans in Economic Development:** As has been noted, reintegration of former combatants into the community is central to future peace and security in East Timor. However, it is also critical to acknowledge that these members have essential skills to be contributed to the community; they equally have the right to learn new skills and participate in all community activities.

Former Resistance members have served East Timor in the past; they have significant continued productive service to provide. However, assistance is needed to help them take contributing roles within the community.

**Relationship to the National Plan**

The program for Veteran’s Affairs fits in with integral goals of the Poverty Reduction plan as well as to special references in the plan for Justice, Defense and Foreign Affairs, which support particular attention to Veterans.

Attention to Veterans affects questions of poverty reduction, rural development, human resource development, security, political development and defense.

**BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS**

See attached and Budget Review Committee submission for details on proposed budget.

In summary, the Department proposes that the cost of setting up an Office of Veteran Affairs will be $78,870 for 2002-03. In accessing bilateral funding, a key role of this office will be to work with donors to fund further work with former members of the Resistance including needs-based assistance to Resistance widows and their families, disabled Veterans and other vulnerable representatives, as well as specialized training or small business development opportunities. Discussions have been initiated to consider possible transfer of resources from the FRAP program to an Office of Veteran Affairs as well an ongoing relationships with the donor agencies involved.

**JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE IMPLICATIONS**

The creation of the Office of Veteran’s Affairs will drive the formation of legislation to properly determine the nature and extent of services to be provided to Veterans and to identify the target groups.

Possible legislation includes:

6) Regulation for Formation and mandate of Veteran’s Organizations

7) System of acknowledgement of service to the Nation
8) Criteria for services to Veterans as well as criteria for humanitarian assistance based on need

FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND LABOUR IMPLICATIONS

The economic and labor implications of the formation of an Office of Veterans Affairs are evident in the ability to address concerns of Veterans, avoid unrest and assist in bringing this essential population effectively into the workforce. The foreseen job of this office is to push the effective role that Veterans can play in the social and economic future of East Timor. Through job placement, skills development, assistance to families and creation of viable options, this group can take this role as effective economic participants in their communities.

PUBLIC CONTROVERSY

During District Council of Minister’s meetings, evaluations by NDI and IOM, and other National discussions, Community representatives have continuously requested action by government to recognize and assist Veterans, as well as to clarify the status of former members of the Resistance. Creation of an Office of Veteran Affairs is a starting point to address these concerns and to investigate and facilitate best options for further action. Serious concerns have been raised within Government on the possible result of raised expectations. Several community evaluations on the situation of Veterans have shown that these expectations already exist. Thus far, Veterans have received very little direct information on their status in the new East Timor. One of the Office’s main functions is to pay attention to alleviating or changing unfilled expectations. A central aspect of the mandate is provision of information.

ARSENIO PAIXAO BANO

Secretary of State for Labor and Solidarity
C: STRATEGIC PLAN

OFFICE OF VETERAN AFFAIRS

MISSION: An effective formal office within the Government to hear concerns, provide information and opportunities, and assist individual veterans and their families to plan towards a peaceful future.

GOALS:

I. Formal acknowledgement of the people who have played an essential role in the struggle for independence through involvement in the Resistance, particularly in the clandestine movement and armed resistance.

II. Effective and tangible government attention to growing frustration among former Resistance members currently without opportunities for training, employment and social services as well as access to education, health and credit, who find themselves left out of processes of community development.

III. Discussion on the national level about the role Veterans will play in the country’s future as well as acknowledgement of their crucial role in Independence from East Timor’s past.

IV. Mechanisms and opportunities for training, micro-credit, assistance and employment in order to develop strategies for former Resistance members to find productive activities outside provision of “Security”, reducing the number of currently proliferating non-ETDF Security groups.

V. Formal focus on economic and social reintegration in families and communities as well as attention to alleviating or changing unfilled expectations.

OBJECTIVE I.1: Facilitated access to information, referral and opportunities available in training, work, and assistance as well as collection of updated information on the situation of Veterans to better inform this access.

6) STRATEGY I.1.1 Information and referral systems through Skills Development, Labor and Social Services. Institute formal linkages between employment, skills development, vocational education, social services and other relevant agencies to access information and provide active and effective referral services to allow full participation and access to employment, training, education and assistance opportunities.

7) STRATEGY I. 1.2 Access existing data on socio-economic conditions, needs and registration of veterans through the FRAP program and other initiatives, in partnership with the Associations currently working for Veterans.

8) STRATEGY I. 1.3 Formulate a plan to collect additional “gap” information.

Objective II. 1. Increased capacity of NGO partners and other civil society actors to respond to the needs of Veterans in collaboration with the Office of Veteran Affairs.

9) STRATEGY II.1.1 Building up a system of NGOs and other partners with capacity to address the needs of veterans and their communities with special attention to skills improvement according to demonstrated need and opportunity.

10) STRATEGY II. 1.2 Strengthen existing district support networks to communities including clandestine and former Falintil members.
11) STRATEGY II. 1.3 Support NGO and other partner capacity to provide training, programming and other assistance to qualifying veterans

**Objective III. 1.** *Provide a face within government that is responsive to the needs and concerns of Veterans and able to advocate for this important section of society with donors, with government and with civil society*

12) STRATEGY III. 1.1 Advocacy within government to facilitate opportunities for former members of the Resistance and peaceful social and economic integration in their communities, including equal access to participation and opportunity

13) STRATEGY III. 1.2 Provide basic interviewing, referral and counselling when needed

14) STRATEGY III. 1.3 Work closely with Veteran’s associations to responsibly reflect the concerns of Veterans and search for solutions within government and civil society

15) STRATEGY III. 1.4 Provide an open door for discussion of issues around veterans affairs and for mediation of difficulties

**Objective IV: 1.** *Formalize acknowledgement and systems of recognition and support within policy*

16) STRATEGY IV. 1.1 Contribute to the development of legislation for pension systems and other safety nets to assist ETDF and others as part of a national social security system

17) STRATEGY IV. 1.2 Address immediate policy needs including the facilitation of decision-making by leadership to categorize participation in the struggle for East Timorese Independence.

18) STRATEGY IV. 1.3 Formulate a system to acknowledge the essential contributions of members of the Resistance to East Timor’s current Independence

**PERFORMANCE INDICATORS:**

- **Input:** No. of Veterans processed, served, referred, interviewed, trained or otherwise assisted through the OVA
- **Output:** Policy to direct the work of the OVA developed and approved
  - No. of partners identified, support grantees (training partners) identified, grant program launched, further programming identified
  - Updated data on needs and position of Veterans in East Timor developed and made available
- **Outcome:** Policy issues discussed, consulted and formalized through the CoM NGO/Civil society partners increase capacity to work with Veterans and assist them to find tangible and sustainable strategies for livelihood and increased socio-economic integration in collaboration with OVA
- **Efficiency:** Ability of the office to quickly recruit, train and engage in activities including immediate collection of data and formulation of Division plan of action
ANNEX VI: SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF FOCUS GROUPS MEETINGS

A. Summary of Focus Group Meetings with FRAP

1.0 The primary objective of conducting focus group (FG) meetings was to garner feedback from FALINTIL veterans who became FRAP beneficiaries concerning their perceptions about both general and specific topics related to demobilization and reintegration as levels or degrees of satisfaction or dissatisfaction regarding the processes.

Through the focus group meetings, we attempted to engage participants in semi-structured discussions to share their perspectives and perceptions about the past, present and future. From the participants in the focus groups, we also sought to garner more specific feedback and indications regarding specific periods during the transition process as well as their levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with assistance received from FRAP.

1.1 The topics of the discussions in each group included:

- Life within FALINTIL during the struggle, or during the “time of the Indonesians”;
- Cantonment and registration;
- The survey process, and information received about FRAP and program benefits;
- The selection process for the FDTL; and subsequent “Discharge and Departure”;
- Transportation and other initial support (Food/oil and first TSN payment of $100);
- Transitional Safety Net (TSN): Subsidy of $500 over six-month period;
- Reintegration Packages: income-generating activities; project selection, training, etc.

A number of additional topics and issues were discussed that reflected the particular interests of either individuals within the groups, or the consensus of the group as a whole. If some key issues were not raised after roughly two-thirds of the meeting, than the facilitator would raise them.

These included:

- Comparison of advantages of life as a civilian vs. a member of the FDTL;
- Perceptions and feelings about their reception by their families; neighbors; communities; local officials, etc.;
- Hopes and concerns about the current period and the future;
- Issues of particular concern to individuals, and the group as a whole.

1.2 The Plan: Our intention was to hold a series of Focus Group meetings – or semi-structured discussions – with groups averaging 15 people, and comprised of FALINTIL veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries. In 4 of the 5 Districts where such meetings were held (Baucau; Los Palos; Liquica; and, Bobonaro), we averaged just that. However, in Ermera – where we had anticipated meeting with up to 15 participants in one Focus Group meeting -- we instead met (separately) with two groups with over 40 participants in each meeting, held in neighboring communities (Vila and Gleno). The wholly unexpected and quite amazing turnout was even more remarkable considering that the individuals participating had only two days notice in advance of the meeting. Regarding the average lengths of the meetings, we had anticipated that they would last 2 hours or more; they tended to average closer to 3 hours in
duration, and were frequently followed by instructive discussions afterwards in smaller groups.

Toward the latter third of each FG meeting (with the exceptions of Baucau and Liquica), we asked participants to ascribe a value with a range from 0 to 10 -- with zero signifying “no satisfaction” and ten signifying “total satisfaction” – to a number of FRAP components or other events, such as “life as a civilian” or “conditions in cantonment”. The facilitator requested, and it was agreed, that younger and quieter members of the groups be polled first, while older, more senior, or more vocal members were asked for their votes afterwards. Following the vote individuals, and the group as a whole, discussed the rationale or reasoning behind their votes, as well as the overall outcome of the polling exercise.

1.3 Profile of participants in the focus group discussions:

B. FRAP BENEFICIARIES – FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS

By location, number, percentage (Total = 154 FG participants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/Sub-District</th>
<th>Total FG Participants</th>
<th>Total ( #’s / %) FRAP Beneficiaries (District)</th>
<th># of ’75 Veterans</th>
<th>Ave. Years of Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. Baucau:</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>253 (06 %)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Lautem:</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>140 (16 %)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Los Palos (19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Lore (3)*</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Liquica:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84 (12 %)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Bobonara / Maliana</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>91 (18 %)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ermera:</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>275 (34 %)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. Ermera I (45)</td>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Ermera II (47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total(s): 5 Districts</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>843 (18 %)</td>
<td>&gt; 31</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the field visits to the above referenced Districts – between March 22 and April 7 -- we were able to meet in group settings with over 154 veterans of FALINTIL, who were demobilized and beneficiaries of the FRAP program. The beneficiaries with whom we met represented just over 18% of the total number of FRAP beneficiaries in those Districts and nearly 13% of all FALINTIL veterans (1,308) who participated in FRAP. Of the 154 FRAP beneficiaries we met within the context of group discussions, more than 31 of the veterans identified themselves as having initially joined the armed struggle against Indonesian occupation in 1975. FALINTIL veterans who indicated that they first joined the armed resistance in 1975 accounted for at least 20% of the Focus Group participants. We did not ask this question of the participants in the Ermera II group (of 47 people). Nevertheless, we did include among the total, two individuals from this meeting who identified themselves – and were recognized by others – as veterans from 1975.
(Vila), where 12 of the 45 participants indicated they initially joined the armed struggle at that time.

Despite being included within the above table, our meeting with the three women FRAP beneficiaries, from Lore sub-district in Lautem, was not intended to be a Focus Group Meeting as such. Rather our meeting, and later lunch we shared, with the three women was an attempt to learn and benefit from the perspectives of these three very special people, including their perspectives about life in the past; about FRAP, as well as about their current situation; hopes and fears concerning the future.

Although the three women with whom we met were part of FALINTIL since ’75, two of them were 2 years old at that time and all were considered non-combatants. These three women cooked, cleaned, and cared for their fellow members within FALINTIL, which served as their family in more than just a metaphorical sense. The two younger women literally grew up within the guerilla movement. They lived among, and as part of, FALINTIL in the mountains throughout the conflict -- as FALINTIL avoided annihilation and continued their armed resistance to an overwhelming superior occupying force. Julia’s husband (and Emelia’s father) died in combat, as did Fracelina’s father. They too were members of FALINTIL; their exclusion from the list of “1975 veterans” is not intended to question the time or service to FALINTIL. Rather, they are treated separately in order to be conservative in accounting for former combatants reporting the 1975 as the year they joined the armed struggle. The distinction is made, by omitting them from the list of Veterans from 1975, based on their status as non-combatant members of FALINTIL and relevant from an analytical perspective concerning security issues -- rather than a moral or developmental perspective
Total # of FRAP Beneficiaries and Total # of those Participating in Focus Group Discussions (5 District)

- Baucau: 9%
- Lautem: Lospalos (19) & Lore (3)* 14%
- Liquica: 6%
- Bobonaro/Maliana: 10%
- Ermera: Ermera I Vila (45) & Ermera II Gleno (47) 61%

Legend:
- 1. Baucau
- 2. Lautem: Lospalos (19) & Lore (3)*
- 3. Liquica
- 4. Bobonaro/Maliana
- 5. Ermera: Ermera I Vila (45) & Ermera II Gleno (47)
Total number of FRAP Beneficiaries (1,308)

FRAP BENEFICIARIES – FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS
by district, number, and percentage [Total, 154 participants]

PROFILE OF FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS (Total: 154)
Number and Percentages of Veterans from 1975 and Others
Average years in FALINTIL of non-1975 Veterans was 7.7 years
1.4. The results of the polling exercise were as follows:

Polling results

(Value of “0” signifies “no satisfaction”; “10” signifies “total satisfaction”.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th># of FB’s</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grade (or Value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Palos:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment:</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (plus)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSN Assistance</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration Pkg.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maliana:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment:</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (plus)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0 (anger, destruction, broken cups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSN Assistance</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0 (‘from night to day’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration Pkg.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0 (‘grateful IOM; angry @ sup’s’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian life vs. ETDF</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0 (‘Civilian is much better’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera I:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment:</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (plus)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5 (2 were not transported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSN Assistance</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0 (buy Zinc; borrow food)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration Pkg.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian life vs. ETDF</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ermera II:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment:</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (plus)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0 (Most left prior to transport)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSN Assistance</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.9 (27/10; 5/2; 10/1)Older/kids lo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration Pkg.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.6 (2 older gents voted 1; others 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian life vs. ETDF</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>(see comment below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Now we are all happy that we are civilians; we vote in favor of being civilians!”
This sentiment was greeted with good-natured cheers and broad approval from the rest of the group in Ermera (Gleno).

176 Although represented in a quantitative manner for clarity, the polling and subsequent results are intended to convey qualitative feedback that has been objectively operationalized in conjunction with, and in fact a stimulus to, the narrative feedback from the focus group meetings. As such, the results of the voting (or data) should be interpreted as judgments by the participants in the focus groups and not per se as being representative of the broader population of FRAP beneficiaries. “Not everything that is important can be counted, and much that can be counted in not worth knowing.”
1.5 A summary of the guide for conducting the focus group meetings

The evaluator was assisted during the meeting by a facilitator, who was a FALINTIL veteran and previously served as FRAP’s National Project Officer (NPO) from May 2001 through the completion of the program in December. After introductions, the facilitator explained of the objectives of the meeting and its relation to the evaluation. The objective of the meetings were described in terms of opportunity to hear the veterans’ impressions about the demobilization and reintegration processes and in life as well as in life before, during, and since demobilization; as well as their aspirations for the future.

Explained that while facilitator while previously affiliated with the program, she was also a veteran of FALINTIL and that the evaluator was not working on behalf of IOM but rather on an independent basis on behalf of those who contributed financing for IOM. The purposes of the evaluation, we explained, were to provide the donors and IOM with a basis to assess how the program was implemented and determine whether or not the program’s objectives were achieved; and if so – to what extent. The importance of their honest and frank assessments was emphasized. Finally, we explained that we were looking forward to discussing the previously referenced issues and topics, including both the good and the bad parts of the processes and the program, as well as other issues that they considered to be particularly important, whether or not it was directly related to the program. Whenever anything particularly positive was mentioned about IOM, it was once again re-iterated and re-emphasized that the evaluator was not working on behalf of IOM, but rather as an independent consultant attempting to benefit from the most direct, honest, and frank appraisal about the program.

1.6 The characteristics of the locations where focus group meetings were held:

Baucau District is the area of the second largest population center or city in East Timor; it has a comparatively large rural and “urban” or town based population. This District in the eastern region is also home to the second largest number of demobilized (253) -- many of whom have gained a reputation among FRAP staff as some of the more difficult of the beneficiaries to work with. The District and region is also often referred to as one of the more “troublesome” areas in East Timor. There have been considerable amounts of political activism there, some of which is considered suspect by East Timorese leaders, the High Command of the ETDF, and UNTAET. Perhaps not coincidentally, Baucau is also home to one of the best known former FALINTIL commanders, widely known as “L-7,” and has experienced considerable activity by other groups, including AFC ’75 and CPD/RDTL – which are considered by some to be involved in intrigue of a political nature.

Lautem, or Los Palos, District is home to 140 FRAP beneficiaries in this eastern district. Within this rural, far eastern district, there are 140 FRAP beneficiaries. Included among them are a large number (42 of the total of 46) of those who are commonly referred to as ‘the deserters’. The use of the term “deserter” is not intended to be pejorative. It is a term commonly used, including by those with the designation, to describe the FALINTIL veterans selected to join the new armed forces (the FDTL), but decided – within a matter of weeks – to leave for home instead. The FALINTIL High Command subsequently determined them to be eligible for FRAP benefits (and they were added to IOM’s list, to be attended). However,

177 Although they comprise only 3.5% of the total number of FRAP beneficiaries in the country, in Los Palos they account for a third of all FRAP beneficiaries.
they were each penalized by having the amount of their benefit packages reduced by $200. Also in Lautem District are three female FRAP beneficiaries, who had been members of the guerrilla force since 1975, and with whom the evaluator met for an extensive conversation conducted in their homes, as well as for lunch.

**Liquica** District is located due west of the capital of Dili. There are 84 FRAP beneficiaries from this coastal district who were attended to by IOM’s office in Dili. A number of FALINTIL veterans from Liquica had immediately prior to the commencement of the reintegration phase of FRAP, articulated frustration and concerns that they would not be receiving benefits. A former senior commander from this district is also said to be among the leaders of a group referred to by UNTAET and ETDF as the “Isolados”; he had apparently made, and kept, a pledge with men under his command that if all of them were not selected, then he would not serve.

**Maliana** is located in Bobonaro District, which has 91 FALINTIL veterans who were FRAP beneficiaries. In addition toThe evaluator also met with organizers and members of AFC ’75 at their office in Maliana, on the same day Xanana Gusmao, then candidate for president, was visiting the town on a campaign stop, where he questioned the claims of those identifying themselves as “Isolados” or participants in the armed struggle outside of FALINTIL and beyond the knowledge of the resistance leadership. The evaluator also had a chance to conduct a in-depth interview with a person claiming to have been an “Isolado”.  

**Ermera** District that has the largest number of demobilized FALINTIL members and thus FRAP beneficiaries (275). The district was also among the least represented in the new ETDF, compared with the number of FALINTIL veterans. It is situated in a beautiful and fertile mountainous region where much of East Timor’s coffee is produced. Like Baucau, Ermera is seen as an area, from which increasing reports of grievance-based security groups are involved in military like training exercises with accompanying rumors that these groups already have weapons are seeking additional arms to support their ambiguous agenda. These reports and indications have generated considerable levels of concern among the 100 or so FRAP beneficiaries with whom the evaluator was able to meet either as participants in focus group meetings, smaller groups, or on an individual bases. Funding and support from CIDA permitted IOM/FRAP to establish this office, which was not anticipated in the initial FRAP program plan.

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178 Domingos had paid $12 for a card identifying him as “ex-FALINTIL” and indicated that he was affiliated, or a member, of AFC ’75 – claiming the “young people there are seeking to honor those who contributed to the struggle and resistance.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District/Sub-District</th>
<th>Total # of FG Participants</th>
<th>Total (#'s %)</th>
<th>District FRAP Beneficiaries</th>
<th># of '75 Veterans</th>
<th>Ave. Years</th>
<th>(non 75 Vet's)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District/Sub-District</td>
<td>FG Participants</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lautem: Lospalos (19) &amp; Lore (3)*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Liquica:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bobonaro/Maliana</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ermera:a. Ermera I Vila (45) &amp; b. Ermera II Gleno (47)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>&gt;2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total FRAP Beneficiaries (1308) | 1308 |
| Total FBs in Districts not included in FG Meetings (548) | 548 |
| Total FBs Participants in Focus Groups (154) | 154 |
| Total FBs in Districts Visited (843) | 689 |
| All other FG Participants (7.7 years ave. in FALINTIL) | 123 |
| Veterans from 1975 participants in Focus Groups 31 |
| 1. Baucau: Total 14 | 14 |
| 2. Lautem: Lospalos (19) & Lore (3)* Total 22 | 22 |
| 3. Liquica: Total 10 | 10 |
| 4. Bobonaro/Maliana Total 16 | 16 |
| 5. Ermera I Vila Total 45 | 45 |
| 6. Ermera II Gleno Total 47 | 47 |
Annex VII:

**Brief Summary of the Findings from the Tracer Study and Socio-economic Survey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRACER</th>
<th>S-E-Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Total number of FBs</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mean age of FBs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Marital Status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/separated</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Literacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literate</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 If literate, highest grade completed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No schooling</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and up</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Ownership of house</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to the family</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mean size of household</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Size of agricultural land</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total FBs who own agricultural land</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean size of agricultural holding</td>
<td>Hectares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Economic activity before joining FALINTIL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock/poultry</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small business (Kiosk)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masonry</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Present economic activity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent job</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/livestock/poultry</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (including small business)</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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