

# Conflict and Recovery in Aceh

## An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process

Patrick Barron | Samuel Clark | Muslahuddin Daud



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23<sup>rd</sup> August 2005

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## Preface and Acknowledgements

On August 15<sup>th</sup>, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at ending almost thirty years of armed conflict in Aceh. In order to establish how it can best support the agreement, and the peaceful recovery of Aceh more broadly, the World Bank commissioned a rapid conflict assessment. The assessment aimed at providing an understanding of conflict dynamics on the ground, identifying scenarios that could occur in the months after the signing of the agreement, and identifying tools and mechanisms that the World Bank, and other donors and development actors, could use to support the peace process. The assessment was conducted from July 26<sup>th</sup> – August 19<sup>th</sup>, 2005. This paper presents initial findings and thoughts on moving forward. As such, it is a work in progress aimed at stimulating dialogue rather than an in-depth study of the conflict situation in Aceh or a comprehensive strategy for engagement. The ideas and views presented here are those of the authors rather than the institution they represent.

The assessment was conducted by a small core team consisting of the authors of this report. A wide range of others, however, provided help and inputs. Adam Burke (conflict advisor to DfID) joined for the second field trip down the west coast, for many of the interviews and discussions in Banda Aceh, and was instrumental in developing many of the ideas in the paper. Joanne Sharpe coordinated the newspaper data collection, conducted interviews with the Acehnese diaspora and Javanese in Medan, and provided comments. Luthfi Ashari interviewed Acehnese in Jakarta. Siti Rahmah went beyond the call of duty as a research assistant. Siti Zubaidah Dailami, Wisudanti Madina and Malahayati also provided assistance. Triana Gustiandari helped organize travel and logistics for the fieldwork. A number of facilitators from the SPADA program were instrumental in facilitating the interviews in the field: Faisal Jamaluddin (Pidie), Karyadi Chandra (Lhokseumawe), Ferizal (North Aceh), Yusmalika Fitri (West Aceh), Marzuki (Nagan Raya), and Sofyansyah (South Aceh). Rusly Mohammad Ali, head of the Regional Management Unit (RMU) of KDP in Aceh, provided invaluable help and support, as well as access to KDP networks. The SPADA facilitator for Banda Aceh, Irham M. Amin, also helped in implementing the KDP facilitator survey and gave other assistance. Sri Kuntari and Scott Guggenheim offered support and advice throughout the assessment.

Thanks also to all the informants. All their names are withheld, and many of their locations and positions disguised, in order to ensure their safety. Many who spoke to us were fearful of retribution if their identities were found out. Thank you to all who shared their experiences, views and analysis with us.

The authors can be contacted at:

[pbarron@worldbank.org](mailto:pbarron@worldbank.org)

[sclark@wboj.or.id](mailto:sclark@wboj.or.id)

[mdaud@wboj.or.id](mailto:mdaud@wboj.or.id)

Cover photo: barracks in Tapaktuan, South Aceh, housing people displaced by conflict

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 15<sup>th</sup>, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace accord in Helsinki aimed at ending a thirty year old armed conflict which has resulted in almost 15,000 deaths. Changes in the political environment – and in the demands of both sides – has allowed for the development of an agreement that many see as being the best hope for peace in Aceh for years. Lessons from the failed Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) of 2002-2003 have been learned. The current agreement appears to represent a more comprehensive strategy for bringing peace to Aceh, with many of the social, political and economic factors that have kept Aceh in a state of perpetual war since the failure of the last agreement, considered, if not fully addressed.

Yet while the agreement is more holistic, and the political will from both sides is seemingly stronger, many challenges remain. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) outlines just the bare bones of a settlement. Many issues remain unresolved. Implementation details are unclear. The agreement has largely involved elite actors on both sides, with civil society actors and the communities they represent, given little space for contribution. There is a massive perceived gap between the discussions in Jakarta, Helsinki and, to a lesser extent, in Banda Aceh, and realities on the ground for those in the regions. The signing of the accord does not in itself bring peace. Whether the conflict ends and peace is sustainable will depend very much on the ways in which a range of different actors (including the combating parties, but also others) work through the myriad issues that will arise post-August 15<sup>th</sup>.

This paper constitutes a preliminary assessment of conflict dynamics on the ground in Aceh today, and, particularly, of how the conflict is experienced by the people who make up the vast majority of the populace of this beautiful but tragic place: rural Acehnese villagers. The paper does not seek to analyze the conflict at the macro-level or the intentions of elite actors, including the TNI and GAM leadership and the Government of Indonesia. Instead, it assumes will from these parties to find a solution to the conflict, and considers the *local* dynamics that may make or break the agreement. The paper combines a consideration of the broad dynamics of the conflict (with a focus on events post-tsunami) with an exploration of the views of different local actors, their incentives, and the agency they have to either spoil, or consolidate, the accord. Consideration of this, as well as of the broad political dynamics in Jakarta and Banda Aceh, is necessary in comprehending the likelihood of the agreement contributing to a sustainable peace in Aceh. It is also necessary to help illuminate the ways in which the World Bank and others can help support the peaceful development of Aceh in years to come.

The assessment was conducted from July 26<sup>th</sup>-August 19<sup>th</sup>, 2005 and utilized a number of methods: key informant surveys of KDP facilitators; data collected by SPADA facilitators; newspaper conflict monitoring; two field trips to eight districts plus discussions in Banda Aceh; a review of lessons learned from COHA and other peace processes; and interviews with Acehnese in Medan and Jakarta.

The paper consists of five parts. After an introduction, Section 2 gives a brief overview of conflict on the ground in Aceh today, using survey and qualitative data. Section 3 sets out potential scenarios post-August 15<sup>th</sup>, with an emphasis on dynamics that could negatively impact upon the likelihood of sustainable

peace. Section 4 gives suggestions for broad tools that development actors, such as the World Bank and others, may use to address these, and, more broadly, to support the peaceful recovery of Aceh, and outlines principles for conflict-sensitive development planning. Section 5 concludes.

### *Conflict Dynamics in Aceh Post-Tsunami*

Despite the fact that conflict levels dropped immediately after the tsunami, they have been steadily increasing over the year and, compared to last year, still remain high. Since the beginning of this year, 178 deaths and 170 injuries have resulted from 108 GAM-GoI conflict incidents. However, both incidents of conflict and their violent impacts are concentrated in four “hot spots” districts: North Aceh, South Aceh, East Aceh and Bireuen. With the exception of South Aceh, these districts are on the east coast of Aceh, which has traditionally been GAM’s stronghold.

However, there is both quantitative and qualitative evidence to suggest that that the conflict is moving west, and particularly to South Aceh district. Indeed, conflict levels have risen sharply in South Aceh in the past two months (June and July) whereas levels have dropped off in central and eastern Aceh. This is due to two factors: one, GAM members from other parts of Aceh are moving west to seek protection; and, two, the command line with the GAM leadership functions less well in the west coast region.

Although conflict incidents are concentrated, conflict’s impacts on human security and perceptions of safety are felt across the province. In almost every district, villagers told us of how their lives are affected. Many are unable to tend their forest gardens, the centre of most village economies, for fear of running into GAM who have retreated to the foothills. Similarly, tension between those who nominally sympathize with GAM and those who sympathize with GoI is high across the province, regardless of recent local conflict incidents. Highly relevant for targeting purposes, these cleavages exist within villages. Sympathies for either GAM or GoI tend to be at the household level and therefore differences of opinion and mistrust exist within villages. Cleavages along ethnic and religious lines are weak.

The main forms of GAM-GoI related conflict continue to be firefights between armed actors and kidnapping which almost always involves civilians. Extortion is rampant across the province, particularly on main highways, and is almost entirely carried out by the TNI and the police. Sweeping is more common in “black areas”, that is villages that, according to the TNI, sympathize with GAM. More positively, militias or anti-separatist groups, as they are more commonly referred to in Aceh, are unlikely to be a problem. They have very little legitimacy in the eyes of communities – many members are reluctant recruits – and in the past six months have been involved in almost no incidents (total of 3 incidents in Each Aceh and Lhokseumawe in 2005).

Local community leaders are the key dispute resolution actors. Even for GAM-GoI related conflicts, the Village Head often plays a key role, for example in negotiating in kidnapping cases and settling disputes relating to extortion. Despite the conflict, community leaders have managed to maintain the trust and faith of their communities. Their participation in socializing and monitoring the peace process, as well as in facilitating the trust required for development projects, will be crucial.

### ***Obstacles to Peace: Possible Scenarios Post-August 15<sup>th</sup>***

There are a number of potential scenarios that could undermine the peace agreement.

#### ***Incentives for Resistance and Security Concerns***

One set of spoilers is local actors – including GAM combatants, the TNI and the police – who will resist the implementation of the peace agreement because of economic incentives and/or ideological reasons. Particularly at the sub-district level, these actors possess considerable scope for autonomous action and many are involved in illegal activities on the side. Maintaining control over these actors will require the use of both sticks and carrots.

#### ***Monitoring Capacity***

Partly because there are spoilers within the ranks of both sides, as well as because the high levels of distrust between GAM and GoI, an independent third party monitor has been charged with overseeing the peace process. The list of tasks that the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is responsible for is vast. There is a risk that this team will be unable to satisfactorily cover and respond to all incidents and all aspects of its mandate. How local people view the team, and understand its role, is key.

#### ***Reintegration of GAM***

Thirty years of conflict has eroded trust and relations: amongst communities, between communities and the state, as well as between communities and GAM. Communities could reject GAM because of past abuses or because of the fear that welcoming back ex-GAM combatants with open arms will put them at risk. Similarly, the provision of significant support and aid to ex-GAM combatants could result in serious tensions and social jealousies amongst other victims of conflict.

#### ***Population Movements and Village-level Conflict***

Over the course of the conflict, large numbers of transmigrants and Acehnese fled the province. Their return post-August 15<sup>th</sup> could cause problems relating to property, including land, left behind. Although the numbers of returnees is unlikely to be high in the short-run, the conflict may have weakened the capacity of village level mechanisms to handle these issues.

The two most problematic obstacles, at least in the short-term, will be managing local resistance and crime, as well as ensuring the smooth integration of ex-GAM combatants. There is a significant chance that even if the peace agreement is successful at the macro-level (e.g. in ending the decades-long conflict between the GoI and GAM), that the conflict will fragment and morph from that of a separatist struggle (and a government's attempt to control it), to one underpinned by *local* economic interests and criminality (*premanism*). If this occurs, in the short-term AMM is likely to struggle to fulfill its mandate to investigate and adjudicate on apparent violations. In the longer-term, existing security and judicial institutions will have problems controlling these activities without developing greater trust and legitimacy from communities.

There is a risk that early mistakes in the reintegration of GAM members could derail the whole peace process. All those who have a stake in reintegration, including receiving communities, GAM leadership and combatants, and the GoI, will watch this process, which is set to begin on the 15<sup>th</sup> September. It will be a

litmus test for both Jakarta and GAM's good intentions (and their ability to control their armed members). Success will depend on getting the incentives and messages right. The schedule is tight.

### *Intervention Mechanisms and Principles for Development Actors*

Significant scope exists for donors like the World Bank to support the peace process. Generally, development actors should think about interventions in the following areas:

- Socialization of the peace process
- Bringing people in to the process
- Reintegration of GAM
- Provision of a peace dividend
- Institution building

### *Socialization of the Peace Process*

The importance of disseminating the content and processes of the peace agreement cannot be understated. This could be done in a number of ways:

- **Support existing networks and mechanisms**, including civil society actors, religious networks, and local media networks.
- **Consider establishing a fund – potentially within the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) or the Decentralization Support Facility (DSF) – that local organizations could apply to for funding for socialization activities.**
- **Utilize the Kecamatan Development Program's comprehensive network.**
- **Hire another 45 Information Facilitators (FKIs) in order to expand their coverage to include all of Aceh.**

### *Bringing People in to the Process*

A major weakness of the Helsinki process has been the lack of involvement of Acehnese civil society. Their inclusion in implementing the peace process is of particular importance. Multiple ways for ensuring their inclusion exist. Some include:

- **Public dialogues at the district and sub-district levels** to: elicit communities' social and economic development needs; build dialogue around mechanisms for peace; and improve information flows.
- **Commission a series of publicly-announced needs assessments.** These should cover:
  - Ex-GAM combatants' reintegration needs;
  - Survey of local government needs, including assessments of schools, health clinics and other public infrastructure; and,
  - Surveys of the justice and security sector.
- **Support cultural events** that tap into the community's widespread desire for an end to conflict and hopes for peace.
- In the longer-term **consider truth and reconciliation mechanisms** that relieve the burden and heal the memories of past violence and abuses.

- **Support local level monitoring programs that augment and complement the AMM.**

### *Reintegration of GAM*

Program development for the reintegration of GAM is already underway. Those designing such programs should consider the following suggestions:

- **We suggest that the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) programs be given a name and acronym that means more to local people. One suggestion is to rename the program P-KBG. This stands for *Pulang Kampung, Pulang Barak, Pulang Gudang* (Going home to the village, Going home to the barracks, Giving back the weapons).**
- **In order to ensure support to receiving communities, consider issuing returnees with a voucher that is redeemable upon reentry into a village.** The voucher would provide a set amount to the returnee (either in cash or kind) but would also provide a set amount to receiving communities.
- **Use *Ulamas* to add legitimacy and to aid in reconciliation.**

### *Provision of a Peace Dividend*

**The cornerstone of a donor strategy to support the peace process should be the provision of widespread development programming in areas previously affected by conflict.** Complimentary peace dividend activities in the immediate, medium, and longer-term could include:

- **Highly visible immediate activities:**
  - rebuilding and/or repainting health posts and schools (the latter were often targeted in the conflict);
  - rebuilding bridges (many destroyed by conflict) through cash-for-work programs; and,
  - clearing trails to forest gardens (many of which became inaccessible due to the conflict).
- **Medium term: We suggest that more money is put through the next round of KDP across Aceh to ensure that all villages receive a project through the program.**
- **2006-onwards: SPADA could be expanded to the remaining districts in Aceh; if the first round of SPADA is successful, more money could be put through the program**
- **Livelihoods programming.**

### *Institution Building*

There is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of governance in Aceh. Further, the MoU maps out significant changes to the structure of governance in Aceh. Donors should support a transition to accountable, transparent and participatory governance in Aceh. Concrete support could include:

- **Provide technical and funding support for those responsible for the implementation of the MoU's governance agenda.**
- **Commission a Public Expenditure Review at the provincial and district levels.**
- **Strengthen and support *Rakorbang* (Development Coordination Meetings).**
- **Support the establishment of a joint team to monitor and control illegal logging.**

- **Commission a comprehensive needs assessment of the justice sector.** Specifically, focus on both the capacity of the Courts and Prosecutor’s Office to “supply” justice as well as the capacity of civil society and communities to “demand” justice. The World Bank’s Justice for the Poor program, through the SPADA project, already has a component in Aceh which focuses on the latter.
- **Commission a comprehensive needs assessment of the security sector.** Lessons could be learnt from a World Bank participatory research program that looked at how police at the district and sub-district level in East Java and Flores learn and respond to problems

### *Conflict-Sensitive Development Principles*

It is important that development interventions are implemented in ways that take into account the history of conflict and how development interventions interact with conflict dynamics. Development actors in Aceh should consider the following conflict-sensitive development principles:

- **Distributional issues and targeting**  
Programs targeted at particular population groups, at the expense of others, are more likely to be problematic than those targeted more widely.
- **Community-driven approaches**  
Community projects that use demand-driven approaches are more likely to reflect actual community needs and receive buy-in.
- **Concentrate on processes as well as outputs**  
The processes development programs utilize are more likely to contribute to sustainable peace than their outputs.
- **Built-in complaints mechanisms**  
Clear and transparent complaints mechanisms can help to prevent conflicts when problems do occur.
- **A focus on ensuring transparency and accountability to limit corruption and suspicion**
- **Use independent civil society**  
Civil society is surprisingly strong, if over-stretched, in many districts of Aceh. It is a vital resource.
- **Don’t forget the Government**  
Long-term and sustainable strategies necessitate the involvement of Government at the provincial and district levels.
- **Provide support to field staff**  
Field staff, such as local facilitators, are often over-looked. In a conflict context they are on the front-lines and thus require extra support. Consider: conflict resolution and negotiation training; strong and responsive reporting structures; and early warning information systems for when things go wrong.

### *Conclusions*

The unprecedented response (national and international) to the tsunami has created opportunities for a response to the conflict in Aceh. Human resources and aid delivery mechanisms are already in place. In many parts of Aceh, those affected by conflict, and especially those in the mountainous interior, are now

worse off than those who were directly impacted by the tsunami. Villages in conflict-afflicted areas, and particularly in the rural mountainous interior, have received almost no development aid from government, NGOs or international donors while the conflict has raged. The improvement in security that the peace process, if successful, will bring, provides new opportunities for reaching some of the poorest people in Aceh.

The Helsinki agreement represents the best chance for peace Aceh has had for years. The World Bank, and others, should devote resources (human and financial) to helping to make sure that it succeeds.

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## Glossary

### Indonesian/Acehnese Terms

<i>Adat</i>	Tradition/custom
<i>Brimob</i>	<i>Brigade Mobil</i> (paramilitary police)
Bupati	<i>District Head</i>
<i>Camat</i>	Sub-district Head
Clurit	<i>Sickle-shaped weapon</i>
<i>Cuak</i>	Military informant
<i>Dephut</i>	Department of Forestry
<i>Desa</i>	Village
<i>Dusun</i>	Hamlet
Geuchik	<i>Village Head (Acehnese, also known as Keuchik)</i>
Imam	<i>Local religious leader</i>
<i>Kecamatan</i>	Sub-district
<i>Kabupaten</i>	District
<i>Kampung</i>	Village/community
<i>Kepala Desa</i>	Village Head (Indonesian)
Kodam	Komando Daerah Militer ( <i>Regional Military Command</i> )
Kodim	Komando Distrik ( <i>District Military Command</i> )
<i>Koramil</i>	<i>Komando Rayon Militer</i> (Sub-district Military Command)
<i>Korban</i>	Victim
<i>Magrib</i>	Evening prayers
<i>Merantau</i>	Moving away to prove oneself and to search for fortune
<i>Milisi</i>	Militia
<i>Muhammadiyah</i>	Modernist Islamic organization
<i>Mukim</i>	Traditional leader (between the village and sub-district)
<i>Musyawaharah</i>	Collective group decision-making
<i>Panglima Chik</i>	Central Commander (GAM position)
<i>Panglima Muda</i>	District Commander (GAM position)
<i>Panglima Sagoe</i>	Sub-district Commander (GAM position)
<i>Panglima Wilayah</i>	Regional Commander (GAM position)
<i>Pantun</i>	Traditional Malay poetry form
<i>Perlawanan anti-separatis</i>	Anti-separatist groups
<i>Polres</i>	Police (district level)
<i>Polsek</i>	Police (sub-district level)
<i>Preman</i>	Criminals, thugs
<i>Rakorbang</i>	Development coordination meetings
Rp.	<i>Rupiah</i> (Indonesia currency, approx 1 USD = Rp. 9,800)

<i>Sayam</i>	Traditional Acehnese ceremonies
<i>Sinetron</i>	Indonesian television program
<i>Tokoh Masyarakat</i>	Community leader
Ulama	<i>Religious leader</i>
<i>Wali Nanggroe</i>	Head of State (GAM position)

## Acronyms

AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BAPEDALSA	Environmental Protection Agency
BKO	<i>Bawah Kendali Operasi</i> (Central Operations Command)
BRR	<i>Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi</i> (Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency)
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DOM	<i>Daerah Operasi Militer</i> (Military Operations Zone)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (House of Representatives – national parliament)
DPRD	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (district parliament)
DSF	Decentralization Support Facility
EU	European Union
FK	<i>Fasilitator Kecamatan</i> (sub-district facilitator, KDP)
FKI	<i>Fasilitator Kecamatan Informasi</i> (KDP information facilitator)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (Free Aceh Movement)
GoI	Government of Indonesia
HDC	Henri Dunant Centre
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JSC	Joint Security Committee
KBAK	<i>Komite Bersama Aksi kemanusiaan</i> (Committee on Humanitarian Action)
KBMK	<i>Komite Bersama Modalitas Keamanan</i> (Committee on Security Modalities)
KDP	Kecamatan Development Program
KPU	<i>Komisi Pemilihan Umum</i> (General Elections Commission)

MoU	Memorandum of Understanding (signed in Helsinki on August 15 <sup>th</sup> , 2005)
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NAD	Nanggroe Aceh Durussalam
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NTT	Nusa Tenggara Timur
NU	<i>Nahdatul Ulama</i> (traditionalist Islamic organization)
PAN	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party)
PDI-P	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democracy Party-Struggle)
PjOK	<i>Penanggungjawab Operasional Kegiatan</i> (Development Coordinator)
PKB	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (National Awakening Party)
P-KBG	<i>Pulang Kampung</i> (Going home to the village) <i>Pulang Barak</i> (Going home to the barracks) <i>Pulang Gudang</i> (Giving back the weapons)
PKK	<i>Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga</i> (Family Welfare Program)
PKS	<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Justice Prosperous Party)
RMU	Regional Management Unit (KDP)
SPADA	Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas project
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Armed Forces)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

### **Aceh District Names**

Aceh Barat	West Aceh
Aceh Barat Daya	Southwest Aceh
Aceh Besar	Aceh Besar (sometimes referred to as Greater Aceh)
Aceh Jaya	Aceh Jaya
Aceh Selatan	South Aceh
Aceh Singkil	Aceh Singkil
Aceh Tamiang	Aceh Tamiang
Aceh Tengah	Central Aceh
Aceh Tenggara	Southeast Aceh
Aceh Timur	East Aceh
Aceh Utara	North Aceh
Banda Aceh	Banda Aceh
Bener Meriah	Bener Meriah

Bireuen  
Gayo Lues  
Langsa  
Lhokseumawe  
Nagan Raya  
Pidie  
Sabang  
Simeulue

Bireuen  
Gayo Lues  
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Nagan Raya  
Pidie  
Sabang  
Simeulue.

## I. INTRODUCTION

On August 15<sup>th</sup>, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace accord in Helsinki aimed at ending thirty years of fighting which has resulted in almost 15,000 deaths. The conflict meant that even before the tsunami hit Sumatra's shores, large parts of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) had been devastated. Ensuring that the peace agreement holds is vital both for the reconstruction and recovery of Aceh post-tsunami and for ensuring the human security of the Acehnese people.

This is not the first time that hopes have been raised that an end to the conflict is imminent. A Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) was signed at the end of 2002, only to collapse amidst bitter recriminations in May 2003. Previously, a Humanitarian Pause in 2000 had little effect. Peace in Aceh is certainly not yet a done deal. Yet the August 15<sup>th</sup> agreement appears to provide a more comprehensive strategy for bringing peace to Aceh than past attempts. COHA was not a peace settlement but rather a basic framework for negotiation. The new agreement, developed after months of talks facilitated by the Finnish Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), attempts to use economic levers, such as the provision of land to ex-combatants and rumored payouts to GAM commanders, as well as political ones to provide incentives for peace. Lessons have been learned from the failures of COHA, including firm dates for the demobilization of rebel arms and withdrawal of Government troops.

Perhaps, more importantly, the context has changed with both sides seemingly ready for an end to the conflict. The military onslaught after the collapse of COHA significantly weakened GAM, with numbers dropping to around 2,000-3,000, half previous levels, and fighters forced to retreat into the mountainous interior. The Government, too, appears to be ready to take an exit strategy. The close involvement of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and (especially) Vice-President Jusuf Kalla suggests that, in contrast to the past, they believe that the top brass of the military are now 'controllable'. With the exception of muted protests from the nationalists, in particular Megawati's PDI-P, dissent from prominent politicians and military figures in Jakarta and Banda Aceh has been relatively, if not absolutely, absent. This changed context allowed for the softening of positions from both sides in the Helsinki talks, most notably in GAM's acceptance of special autonomy within Indonesia as an at least intermediate end point, and Jakarta's allowance of local political parties in Aceh.

Yet while the agreement is more holistic, and the political will from both sides is seemingly stronger, many challenges remain. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) outlines just the bare bones of a settlement. Many issues remain unresolved. Implementation details are unclear. The agreement has largely involved elites on both sides, with civil society actors and the communities they represent given little space for contribution. There is a massive perceived gap between the discussions in Jakarta, Helsinki and, to a lesser extent, in Banda Aceh, and realities on the ground for those in the regions. The signing of the accord will not in itself bring an end to the conflict. Creating sustainable peace is a task that will take months, even years. Whether the conflict ends and peace is long-lasting will depend very much on the ways in which a range of different actors – including the combating parties, but also others – work through the myriad issues that will arise post-August 15<sup>th</sup>.

### ***The Importance of Local Factors***

This paper examines the local dynamics of conflict in Aceh, and consider ways in which local factors may influence the success of the peace process. The paper does not seek to analyze in any depth the conflict at the macro level or the intentions of elite actors, including the TNI and GAM leadership and the Government of Indonesia. Clearly, these macro and national factors are important; without will from these parties to find a solution to the conflict, and to work through the problems that will inevitably arise, peace will not come to Aceh.

However, building sustainable peace requires understanding obstacles *at every level*. Local dynamics may make or break the agreement.

“The agreement between GAM, Gol and the TNI will not solve all the problems. There are also many problems between GAM and the community, between TNI and the community, and within the community itself. The agreement will not resolve all these problems.”

*NGO, West Aceh*

Local factors matter in a number of ways. First, they affect the implementation by GAM and the TNI of the agreement. Even if leaders of both parties are serious about following the provisions of the agreement, if those at a more local level dissent (say, by refusing to give up their arms, or continuing to extort money from local people and businesses) this could jeopardize the agreement. Economic incentives for local actors may work against parties refraining from provocative activities.

Second, the agreement does not occur in a historical vacuum. The conflict has led not only to thousands of deaths but also economic deprivation, human rights abuses, and a heightened sense of injustice amongst the Acehnese population. Almost everyone who has lived through the past sixteen years has a direct (and negative) experience of the conflict. The conflict has eroded confidence in institutions of the state as well as the social fabric of Acehnese communities. Will communities accept the return of GAM soldiers, many of whom inflicted fear upon local populations? Will people start to trust the military and police, after the legacy of abuses of previous years? Community resistance could scupper the agreement.

Third, a range of local conflicts over issues such as land, local politics, class, and between indigenous people and outsiders are also present in Aceh. The peace agreement – and the political, social and institutional changes it will bring if it is successful – could influence these local conflicts in positive or negative ways. Such disputes are perceived (and understandably so) to be of much less concern than the broader GAM/GoI conflict. However, local conflicts can lead to serious cleavages between different sections of the population and/or between people and the state. Further, changes related to the peace agreement, such as new population flows (if Acehnese who have left the province return home), and changing security arrangements (if the TNI/police reduce numbers) may lead to an increase in local tensions.

The paper combines a consideration of the broad dynamics of the conflict (with a focus on events post-tsunami) with an exploration of the views of different local actors, their incentives, and the agency they have to either spoil, or consolidate, the accord. The paper constitutes a preliminary assessment of conflict dynamics on the ground in Aceh today, and, particularly, of how the conflict is experienced by the people

who make up the vast majority of the province: rural Acehnese villagers. Consideration of this, as well as of the broad political dynamics in Jakarta and Banda Aceh, is necessary in comprehending the likelihood of the agreement contributing to a sustainable peace in Aceh. It is also necessary to help illuminate the ways in which the World Bank and others can help support the peaceful development of Aceh in years to come.

### ***Aims and Structure of the Paper***

The aims of the paper are as follows:

- To provide a better understanding of the social and conflict dynamics on the ground, in particular post-tsunami (Section 2);
- To consider the likelihood of potential scenarios over the short- and medium-term post-August 15<sup>th</sup>, which could negatively impact on the likelihood of sustainable peace (Section 3);
- To outline broad tools that development actors, such as the World Bank and others, may use to address these, and, more broadly, to support the peaceful recovery of Aceh, and to outline principles for conflict-sensitive development planning, which should inform development responses (Section 4).

Section 5 concludes.

### ***Methodology***

The assessment was conducted between July 26<sup>th</sup> and August 19<sup>th</sup>, 2005 and utilized a range of methods. First, rapid key informant surveys were used to gather data on forms of social tensions and conflict, conflict impacts and institutions for conflict resolution post-tsunami. We utilized the network of the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) which has facilitators stationed at the sub-district (*kecamatan*) level throughout Aceh.<sup>1</sup> Overall, 376 facilitators were surveyed, including some PjOK (project managers from the government side). This provided us with data on 178 sub-districts in 20 Acehnese districts (or 75% of all *kecamatan* and 95% of districts in Aceh).

Second, we used data collected by facilitators from the Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas project (SPADA) in twelve districts of Aceh, including almost all of the most conflict-prone ones.<sup>2</sup> The SPADA facilitators will be in the field over the immediate post-peace agreement period; future iterations of

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<sup>1</sup> KDP is a billion dollar community development program which has operated in over 28,000 villages (40% of the total) in Indonesia since 1998. It provides for small-scale infrastructure and economic activities at the local level and is demand-driven (i.e. communities define their needs and priorities and design and implement the projects). Facilitators are stationed at the district and sub-district level, and local villagers are elected to facilitate at the local level. In Aceh, the program was expanded in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami to all areas of the province.

<sup>2</sup> SPADA is a World Bank/Government of Indonesia project, scheduled to become operational in early 2006. In Aceh, district facilitators were hired to conduct social and institutional mapping to aid in the preparation of the project. SPADA districts are Simeuleu, South Aceh, East Aceh, West Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Biruen, North Aceh, Nagan Raya, Aceh Jaya, Banda Aceh, and Lhokseumawae. Overall, SPADA will operate in 41 districts in nine Indonesian provinces.

this paper will thus be able to include local level data on conflict in over half of Aceh, and dynamics in the weeks after the agreement is signed.

Third, a newspaper conflict mapping methodology was used to record and categorize all incidents of conflict reported in two provincial papers (Serambi and Aceh Kita), since the beginning of 2005. This allowed us to look at trends in different forms of conflict (both that directly related to the GAM versus GoI conflict, and other forms of local conflict) over time and space. Data from local and national NGOs was collected for comparison purposes.

Fourth, two field trips were undertaken, one down each of Aceh's coasts. Interviews were conducted in Pidie, Bireuen, North Aceh, Lhoksumawae, West Aceh, Nagan Raya, Southwest Aceh and South Aceh districts, as well as in Banda Aceh. Informants included government (at village, district and provincial level), NGOs, academics, informal leaders (*tokoh masyarakat*, *Mukim*, youth leaders, etc.), KDP and SPADA facilitators, journalists, ex-military members, religious leaders, businessmen and traders, ordinary villagers, the police, and people displaced by conflict and by the tsunami. Informal discussions were also held with a range of actors including donors, the BRR, the EU/ASEAN monitoring team, and the broader international community. The interviews provided an in-depth look at conflict dynamics on the ground, as well as of people's perceptions of the peace process, and opportunities for intervention.

Fifth, a review of the different mechanisms used to support peace processes elsewhere was conducted with a view to establishing lessons from past successes (and failures), and to working out what might be effective in the Acehnese context. The study also draws upon work funded by DfID on donors' attitudes to conflict in Aceh.<sup>3</sup>

Sixth, interviews were conducted with the Acehnese diaspora in Medan (North Sumatra) and Jakarta. This included interviews with those displaced by conflict, businessmen, activists and other civil society actors. Interviews focused on issues around the likelihood of the Acehnese returning if a peace agreement was successful. Questions included: the numbers who would be likely to return, when and to where; the characteristics of those who would likely return, including their economic status and political viewpoints; and the kinds of problems/issues they foresaw arising when they returned, economic, socio-political and/or security-related.

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<sup>3</sup> See Adam Burke and Arfan (2005). "Aceh: Reconstruction in a Conflict Environment." Mimeo. DfID.


## II. CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN ACEH POST-TSUNAMI

### 2.1 Conflict Levels and Changes

#### *Lower levels of conflict in 2005 than in 2004*

On the whole, levels of conflict this year are lower than they have been in previous years. Data from the Koalisi HAM NGO network, who have been tracking human rights abuses over the past five years, shows that rates of murder, detainment, kidnapping and beatings are, in general, lower than in 2004 (see Figure 1). The key informant survey of KDP facilitators also showed that levels of conflict are lower than in previous years, with 66% stating that the number of disputes had decreased compared to the last six months of 2004.

**Figure 1: Human Rights Violations: 2004-2005 by month**




Source: Koalisi HAM, Banda Aceh.

#### *Steady increase in conflict since the tsunami*

Since January, however, there has been a steady increase in both human rights violations and GAM-GoI conflict incidences. This is shown both by the Koalisi HAM data and by the newspaper conflict dataset prepared for this assessment. Figure 2 shows a rise from only three incidents in January to a peak of 33 in June, before dropping back to 22 incidents in July.

**Figure 2: GAM/GoI Incidents in 2005 by month**



Source: Newspaper dataset

There are three possible explanations for this steady increase. First, the conflict has tended to be cyclical over three-month periods. Such a pattern is clearly visible in Figure 1 and this cyclical pattern was also confirmed by local level informants. One reason for this is that both sides feel they need to demonstrate their existence on the ground and force at regular intervals. Hence every few months they escalate their operations. This explains the rise, and subsequent decline in July, as a continuation of the previous pattern.

“Civil servants, village heads etc. every day their heart is beating, every two to three months there is a period of high tension and then it goes down. At the moment it is high again.”

*Village Head, Southwest Aceh*


A second account would explain the drop in July as being the result of non-engagement messages filtering down from the leadership of both GAM and the TNI/police. A third likely reason is that the tsunami severely impacted both sides, and it took a while for them to regroup, at which point conflict levels started to rise again. Probably the explanation is combination of all three. Regardless of the reason, this decline has changed the conflict dynamic on the ground.

***GAM/GoI conflict in 2005 is geographically concentrated***

The newspaper dataset clearly indicates that conflict incidents related to the GAM-GoI conflict are concentrated in a limited number of ‘hot spots’. In fact, over 60 percent of conflict incidents in the past seven months took place in North Aceh (18%, 19 incidents), South Aceh (17%, 18 incidents), East Aceh and Bireuen (both 14%, 15 incidents each) – see Figure 3. The impacts of conflict are also similarly

concentrated (see Section 2.3 below). No GAM-GoI related incident occurred in Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, Central Aceh, Langsa, Simeuleu, Aceh Singkil, Sabang, or West Aceh.<sup>4</sup>

**Figure 3: GAM/GoI Incidents by District (2005)**



Source: Newspaper dataset

Within the four ‘hot spots’, informants told us that GAM had been pushed back to the foothills of these districts. Thus GAM’s current position is very far from most urban centers, such as Lhokseumawe, Langsa and Meulaboh.

“GAM used to be spread out over many parts of Pidie. They even used to come into the outskirts of Sigli [the district capital of Sigli]. There were big battles near here in the rice fields. Now, however, GAM has been forced to retreat into the hills. Their numbers are also much lower, although no one really knows just how many are there [in the hills].”

*Village Head, Pidie*

### ***Moving West?***


“After the tsunami, it seems that the number of GAM has increased. I’ve heard that GAM from other areas gather here. This is not a secret. When incidents happen, it is people with a new face [i.e. from outside this area] who are involved ... Now GAM is more professional here compared to the past. After the tsunami, it seems newcomers are better trained. The new GAM coming in are able to control the GAM already here.”

*Ex-military, South Aceh*

<sup>4</sup> GAM-GoI related incidents may have occurred in these districts, but they were not picked up by our two newspaper sources, Serambi and Aceh Kita. Both sources are province-wide and hence may be limited in their depth of coverage. In particular, central Aceh is relatively inaccessible, and hence all incidents here may not be report. On the limitations of using provincial sources, see Barron and Sharpe (2005), ‘Counting Conflict: Using Newspaper Reports to Understand Violence in Indonesia’, *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper No. 25*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Informants told us that after the tsunami GAM members began moving from the former GAM heartland in east Aceh to the west coast and, particularly, to South Aceh district. Certainly, the newspaper data indicates different trends over time in the top four hotspot areas (colored red in Figure 3). North Aceh, East Aceh and Bireuen all witnessed a peak of GAM-GoI related incidents in May or June this year, with the number of cases then dropping off in June and July to very low levels. In contrast, South Aceh has seen its level of GAM-GoI related incidents jump from almost none between January and May to much higher levels in June and July.

**Figure 4: GAM/GoI Incidents by Month for High Conflict Districts (2005)**



Source: Newspaper dataset

***Perceptions of insecurity are concentrated, but in different areas***

Across the province, the majority of informants indicated they felt safe. Table 1 shows the percentage of informants who said that people felt safe in their sub-district (*kecamatan*) for each district (*kabupaten*). Some of the high conflict districts feature high up (e.g. South Aceh). However, other districts, such as Gayo Lues and Southeast Aceh, with high reported rates of insecurity did not show high levels of conflict in the newspaper dataset. What accounts for this?

We did not visit either district in the field research. However, it seems most likely that conflict is latent in these areas – that is, tensions exist, but they have not yet erupted into violence. Interestingly, both districts report high levels of ethnic tension – something not present in most of Aceh.

**Table 1: Perceptions of Safety**


Kabupaten	Unsafe
Gayo Lues	54%
Lhokseumawe	50%
Southeast Aceh	50%
South Aceh	38%
Aceh Tamian	29%
Bireuen	28%
Southeast Aceh	23%
East Aceh	18%
North Aceh	11%

Source: Key informant survey

## 2.2 Conflict Types and Forms

In Aceh there are two main types of conflict: that relating to the GAM-GoI vertical conflict, and local level conflict or disputes. Reported incidents of these two broad categories are almost equal in number: 108 GAM-GoI-related incidents and 106 local level conflicts/disputes were reported in the newspapers.<sup>5</sup> For each main category, there are a number of different forms. Figures 5 and 6 show the frequency of the different forms for each category.


**Figure 5: Forms of GAM/GoI Conflict (2005)**



Source: Newspaper dataset

<sup>5</sup> We only collected incidents of conflict that resulted in an impact (defined as a death, injury, or damage to property), or that resulted in a form commonly associated with the GAM-GoI conflict (e.g. kidnapping, extortion, rioting, etc.).

**Figure 6: Forms of Local Conflict (2005)**



Source: Newspaper dataset

### ***Firefights***

Since the TNI mounted a massive offensive against GAM after the collapse of COHA in 2003, firefights between the two have been common. Immediately after the tsunami, the number of firefights dropped to almost zero. In January, only one case in East Aceh was recorded. The number of firefights steadily increased over the next months, before dropping off again in July as commands filtered down from the leadership of both sides that they should not attack each other.

“This week two big incidents occurred. TNI are not allowed to shoot GAM and they cannot go more than 750m from their post. This time a group of GAM came down from the mountain to [allegedly] shoot the *Geuchik* [Village Head]. GAM came into the open where they could be seen by the TNI. The two groups just stood there looking at each other. Neither of them could act. After some time GAM left. However, at the same time nearby a teacher was shot. One person from GAM came to the school and argued with the principal. He was dragged outside and shot just 100m from the school.”

*Community leader, South Aceh*

At the height of the military offensive serious battles meant whole villages were forcibly moved. In South Aceh, TNI relocated five villages – over 7,000 people – to barracks in the district capital, Tapaktuan. Since then, the majority have returned home, but almost 500 still remain in destitute housing (see cover photo). They are afraid of returning and their abandoned homes are largely destroyed.

### ***Kidnapping***

Over the course of the conflict, armed actors, but particularly GAM, have used kidnapping as a means to raise funds for their activities. Commonly government employees, including teachers, are targeted. The primary reason appears to be that they are generally wealthier and can therefore raise larger ransoms. The average villager is not a target.

“The people are not afraid of being kidnapped by GAM. But they are afraid that they will be judged [by the military] as supporting GAM.”

*Village leader, Pidie*

Box 1 details a recent example.

**Box 1: A Recent Kidnapping Case**

*This case was told to us by a local community leader in Tapaktuan, South Aceh.*

In February of this year, eleven government employees from the *Bupati's* office were kidnapped. The incident occurred at dusk just after *magrib* prayers and before the night security post was open. Reportedly, 50 GAM members entered the village wearing TNI uniforms. The community went to the TNI security post, but their slow response meant that the kidnapers managed to escape with the eleven victims into the surrounding hills.

One victim managed to foil kidnapers. When GAM knocked on his door he hid. GAM kicked in the door and in a scuffle he was shot in the shoulder. They left him and he was later treated at hospital. However, a number of others were not so fortunate, with some of the kidnapped killed. The ransoms were as high as Rp. 100 million per person (over USD 10,000) and some families have been unable to pay. The government did not take responsibility for paying the ransom money, even though the kidnapped were government employees.

At first the community assumed it was the TNI who had been the perpetrators as the kidnapers were wearing military uniforms. However, later they realized that it must have been GAM. They inferred this from the way they spoke, the guns they used, and the fact that many of the kidnapers were not wearing TNI uniforms.

This practice has resulted in a cycle of kidnapping, where one side kidnaps someone and the other side responds by 'counter-kidnapping'. An anti-separatist leader<sup>6</sup> in West Aceh claimed his group was involved in 'counter-kidnapping', but across the research areas this was not the norm.

"This is what occurs: GAM kidnaps someone and they request ransom money. Then with support from the TNI the family members pay the money but the community, with police or TNI acquiescence, then detains and forces a family who has a GAM member to pay back the ransom money. The aim of this strategy, in addition to recovering the ransom money, is to force GAM to come down from the hills to surrender or to attempt to free their detained family. When they do this, the TNI will try to ambush them."

*Community Member, South Aceh*

"Yes, Front TUM [an anti-separatist group] will take action if someone is truly kidnapped by GAM. They try to investigate the GAM family, as kidnapping someone from a GAM family is a very effective way of responding [to a GAM kidnapping]. Then they inform the police of their actions. Because they don't have weapons, they coordinate with the police for back-up. They tell the police where they are keeping the person so they can guard them."

*Anti-separatist group member, West Aceh*

More often, however, trusted community leaders negotiate between the two sides. Most informants indicated respected community leaders, particularly the *Geuchik* (Village Head) and the *Mukim* (traditional local leader), are involved most often in resolving kidnapping cases. It is a difficult process, however, as negotiators need to be seen as legitimate by both sides. As a result, community leaders do not want to be seen as being too close to either side.

<sup>6</sup> These groups are explored in greater depth below.

### ***Sweeping***

There is much suspicion between rural villagers and the TNI/police. This is particularly the case in remote areas where villages are suspected as being located close to where GAM has retreated. These villages are labeled as “black” and are subject to regular “sweeping”. This results in a range of tactics, many of which put considerable strain on local communities (Box 2).

#### **Box 2: Problems with IDs in East and North Aceh**

*In North Aceh, fishermen need to report to police before they go to sea. If they don't, they are arrested. This causes a problem because they cannot go to sea at short notice.*

In North and East Aceh, when people's ID expires they are often subject to abuse from the army. As one NGO explains, “When the tsunami came, it took the passports away. This was a big problem. The people were beaten.”

*“In black areas [GAM strongholds] in East Aceh, it is a little different. There the military issue ID cards. People must pay Rp. 10,000 for the ID cards. The cards are only valid for one month, then the people must get a new card and pay again. If the card is not valid, the army hits them. People give up because the situation is always the same.”*

### ***Extortion***

Extortion is widely and openly practiced across all areas of Aceh. Common targets are commercial and public transportation. Private vehicles, as well as trucks transporting tsunami aid, usually pass unhindered.

“Between here [Blang Pidie] and Medan there are more than 100 posts where we need to pay money. To Banda Aceh from here, there are 150. At each we normally pay Rp. 2,000. Sometimes they want more, a packet of cigarettes. The drivers try to bargain, for example when they are asked for Rp. 20,000. But then they threaten the driver and they have to pay Rp. 100,000.”

*Village head, Southwest Aceh*

“The people who are afraid of kidnapping are not ordinary people, but the government. Ordinary people are afraid of TNI not GAM, because they can easily negotiate with them [GAM]. If GAM asks for Rp. 10 million, the people give it and the problem is solved. But if the TNI asks, first the commander will ask, the people will give, and then his followers will come for more the next day.”

*NGO, Lhoksuemawe*

Since the period of martial law, and the subsequent weakening of GAM, the TNI and the police carry out almost all extortion. Indeed, informants suggested that extortion increases when fighting decreases as soldiers have nothing else to occupy themselves with (Box 3).

#### **Box 3: Extortion and the Balance of Power**

*“Since the tsunami, and before, the power of GAM has decreased. Since the conditions have been more safe, the role of the TNI has changed. They do not fully pay attention to security. They use the opportunity to create benefit from transportation. So the price of road tolls has gone up. Now we have to pay Rp. 270,000 – 300,000 to go to Medan – one way ... For the past year, the TNI just requests money. Their job is fighting, but now they are comfortable. When the trucks stop, they take beer from them and sit at the side of the road, drinking ... People consider if both parties [GAM and TNI] have a gun and are*

*fighting, well let them fight. It keeps them busy. Whoever is on top, oppresses the community. When GAM were at the peak of their power, they extorted. Now TNI is strong, they do the same. So we hope that either the two parties keep fighting or disappear. If there is an imbalance, it is dangerous for the people."*

*Businessman, West Aceh*

### ***Aid: high tensions/jealousies over tsunami aid distribution***

Although the number of aid-related incidents reported in newspapers was low, only five in total – three in Lhokseumawe, and one each in Aceh Besar and Langsa districts – informants from both the east and west coasts repeatedly told us of high tensions and jealousies over the unequal distribution of tsunami aid:

"For the tsunami areas, there is enough food. But for others [in non-tsunami-affected remote areas] the people remain poor. There is social tension from those in non-tsunami areas because of this."

*NGO, West Aceh*

"For a long time, both the mountainous and the coastal areas have had the same level of suffering from conflict. But now, there's big jealousy because the mountainous areas were affected by the earthquake but receive nothing. There's also jealousy because people have no outlets for complaints ... In some areas of North Aceh, the wells are dry because of the earthquake. People need to walk 3-5 kilometers to get water. So there are problems in the mountainous areas."

*NGO, Lhokseumawe*

These tensions take two forms: one, amongst tsunami affected populations who are receiving different levels and quality of support from various humanitarian organizations; and, two, between the "tsunami-affected population" and "conflict-affected populations", that is between those who are and who are not currently receiving support.


These tensions put significant strains on local village leaders, particularly the Village Head. Village Heads are held responsible by villagers for ensuring that their village receives quality assistance. In Ulim sub-district in Pidie, for example, the community went to the *Camat* (Sub-district Head) and requested that their Village Head be sacked because of his perceived inability to secure the assistance they saw in nearby villages.

## **2.3 Impacts of Conflict**

### ***Conflict impacts concentrated in four districts***

As for conflict incidents, impacts from conflict in 2005 – in terms of death, injuries and destruction – are concentrated in four districts. The newspaper data notes that 75 percent of deaths occurred in these areas: South Aceh (34%, 60 deaths), North Aceh (16%, 28 deaths), Bireuen (15%, 26 deaths), and East Aceh (11%, 20 deaths). Figure 7 shows the GAM-GoI related conflict impacts for each district, clearly indicating that in the past four months the highest impacted districts are these four. It should be noted that this concentration of impacts is for 2005 only, with other districts (such as Pidie and Central Aceh) seeing high impacts in previous years, and impacts spread across the province during the martial law period after COHA collapsed.

**Figure 7: Impacts of GAM/GoI Conflict by District (2005)**



Source: Newspaper dataset

**Higher impacts for GAM-GoI-related conflict than for local level conflict**

Over the past six months, the newspapers recorded a total of 204 fatalities, 194 injuries, and 19 buildings destroyed or damaged (see Table 2). Unsurprisingly, conflict related to the vertical struggle was far higher than that related to general local level conflict. GAM-GoI conflict related incidents resulted in 1.6 deaths and 1.6 injuries per incident. In contrast, non-GAM-GoI related conflicts resulted in 0.2 deaths and 0.2 injuries per incident.

**Table 2: Impacts of Conflict (2005)**

Conflict category	Incidents	Deaths (#)	Injuries (#)	Buildings Damaged (#)
GAM-GoI related	108	178	170	19
Local level conflict	106	26	24	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>19</b>

Source: Newspaper dataset

While the impacts of local conflict are relatively minimal compared to that related with the vertical conflict, they are not inconsiderate. Reported rates are similar to those in other provinces of Indonesia which have serious problems with local conflict, such as NTT.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, rates and impacts of local conflict are likely to be under-reported: (a) because only provincial news sources were used, and (b) because local conflict tends to be under-reported in areas where higher-level conflict has taken place.<sup>8</sup>


<sup>7</sup> See Barron and Sharpe (2005), *op. cit.* On levels of local conflict across Indonesia, see Patrick Barron, Kai Kaiser, and Menno Pradhan (2004). “Local Conflict in Indonesia: Measuring Incidence and Identifying Patterns.” *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3384*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

<sup>8</sup> On the latter point, see Claire Q. Smith (2005). “The Roots of Violence and Prospects for Reconciliation: A Case Study of Ethnic Conflict in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia.” *Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper No. 23*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

## 2.4 Actors

For both GAM-GoI and local level conflict, a range of actors are involved. Figure 8 shows that for the former, GAM, TNI and civilians are involved most often. Civilians are often involved, or caught-up, in GAM-GoI conflict. Figure 8 indicates they are the third most common actor in this category of conflicts, involved in 23% of incidents. Almost 90 percent of incidents implicating individuals involve kidnapping or murder.

**Figure 8: Actors Involved in GAM/GoI Conflict (2005)**




Source: Newspaper dataset

### ***Cleavages high within villages***

The key informant survey indicated there are tensions across three key cleavages. The highest, unsurprisingly, was *tensions between GAM and government sympathizers* (74% respondents reported it as being present in their *kecamatan*). This was followed by those with *differing political affiliations* (46%) and, then, *between the rich and poor* (32%). More significantly, particularly from a programming perspective, these tensions are high both within and between villages (Figure 9). Thus, for example, households within villages are divided over their sympathy for

**Figure 9: Level of GAM/GoI Tensions**



Source: Key informant survey

### ***Insignificant anti-separatist (militia) involvement***

In almost all districts of Aceh, anti-separatist groups, sometimes referred to as militias, have been established.<sup>9</sup> One report states that there are approximately 21 of these groups operating in 17 *kabupaten*.<sup>10</sup> Most of them were established by the TNI during the period of martial law (2003-early 2005), but they are, however, rarely armed.

Informants repeatedly told us that the basis of legitimacy for anti-separatist groups is weak amongst communities, with very few people supporting them, and many members themselves reluctant recruits. Rather, there are reportedly two methods of recruiting members. One method involves Village Heads being forced to nominate two or three men to represent their village. Those nominated, we were told, reluctantly attend meetings and inform the community of their position.<sup>11</sup> The second method involves the use of former GAM members or sympathizers who have gone through re-education programs. One dangerous function of the anti-separatist groups is the use of individuals within them as informants for the TNI (*cuak*). The presence of these informants has resulted in the targeting and killing of many citizens.

However, despite the claims of some that the groups are key actors in the conflict, including statements anti-separatist group members made themselves, both our fieldwork and the newspaper data suggest that they play a minor direct role. The newspaper dataset reported anti-separatist groups as being involved in only three incidents of kidnapping and rioting: in Each Aceh (two) and Lhokseumawe (one) districts.

<sup>9</sup> The majority of informants referred to these groups as “*perlawanan anti-seperatis*” and not “*milisi*”, the term used in East Timor.

<sup>10</sup> Aceh-Eye (2004). “Fear in the Shadows: Militia in Aceh.” [www.aceh-eye.org](http://www.aceh-eye.org)

<sup>11</sup> For more on this, see Section 3.1.

***Local community leaders key resolution actors***

The key informant surveys, as well as field informants, cited local community leaders as the key resolution actors for local level conflicts. In contrast, the security sector actors (the TNI, Brimob, and the ordinary police force), as well as the Village Head, tend to resolve GAM-GoI related conflict incidents. Table 3 ranks the key actors for our two conflict categories. Table 4 indicates the key role the village head plays in resolving cases that often implicate the community, that is incidents of kidnapping and extortion.

***Table 3: Conflict Resolution Actors (two categories)***

<b>Conflict category</b>	<b>Rank</b>
GAM-GoI related	1. TNI 2. Village Head 3. Brimob 4. Police
Local level conflict	1. Village Head 2. TNI 3. Mukim 4. Camat

***Table 4: Conflict Resolution Actors (GAM-GoI conflicts)***

<b>Conflict category</b>	<b>Rank</b>
Firefights	1. TNI 2. Brimob
Kidnapping	1. Village Head 2. TNI
Ambush	1. TNI 2. Brimob
Sweeping	1. TNI 2. Brimob
Extortion	1. Village Head 2. TNI

### III. OBSTACLES TO PEACE: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS POST-AUGUST 15<sup>TH</sup>

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on August 15<sup>th</sup> is but a first step towards bringing peace to Aceh. Despite the MoU comprehensively addressing many of the contentious issues, and the apparent political will from both GAM and GoI, a number of challenges remain. This section outlines a number of hypotheses concerning potential scenarios that could undermine the peace process, and dynamics the peace process may (unintentionally) unleash, and assesses their likelihood. A caveat is necessary at this stage: the assessment of the likelihood of the different scenarios is based primarily on a relatively short period of research. We do not know whether the districts and communities we visited across Aceh are representative of the province more broadly. Given the sensitivity of many of the research topics – e.g. on forms of rent-taking at the local level – more in-depth fieldwork and analytical work would be necessary to explore them in desirable depth. Nevertheless, the hypotheses do focus attention on issues that may arise and to which attention should be paid. The following section then outlines intervention mechanisms that development actors can use to address these.

#### 3.1 Incentives for Resistance and Security Concerns

One category of potential agreement spoilers relates to the incentives for different actors at the local level to resist the implementation of the agreement. As the last section outlined, members of the military, police, GAM, and others, benefit economically from the conflict through extortion and illegal activities such as logging, weapons trading and the growing of marijuana. There is a danger that such actors may either ignore the peace agreement or actively attempt to undermine it. This creates a risk that the nature of conflict could morph from a vertical one (involving the state against civil society actors) into a horizontal one, where various elements of society are in conflict, with high levels of violent crime underpinning the situation.

**HYPOTHESIS 1: TNI/police at the sub-district level will ignore orders from above for withdrawal because of economic interests**  
*Likely only in isolated cases, but forms of illegal activities may adapt to the changing situation*

In Aceh, as elsewhere in Indonesia, ending conflict is not in everyone's interest. Conflict provides an environment in which different actors can benefit economically. A drive down any Acehnese highway demonstrates the extent to which the police and military are included in this. Forms of income include road tolls and other forms of extortion, trade in marijuana, illegal logging and weapons trading. We conducted our field research in the run-up to August 17<sup>th</sup>, and police and military would stop our vehicle to sell us stickers proclaiming the sixtieth anniversary of Indonesian independence day. Unsurprisingly, few drivers, if any, chose to keep their money for other purchases. A province as rich in natural resources as Aceh provides adequate avenues for illicit rent-taking.

Conflict provides a cover for illegal activities. These operate at both the institutional and individual level. Institutionally, the motives are clear. The Indonesian national budget covers only approximately 30% of TNI's costs. The police are similarly under-funded. Other sources of income for the military include the

running of businesses – some legal, others not. However, according to informants, the TNI in Aceh does not tend to run illegal businesses; rather, money comes through charges for security and protection (e.g. of private companies practicing illegal logging – see Box 4), and through extortion. In the absence of a military and police expenditure review, it is impossible to quantify the size of revenues that are entering the coffers of the two security sector institutions, and hence to truly evaluate the institutional incentives that shape operations in such an environment.

#### **Box 4: Illegal logging in Southeast Aceh**

Aceh is rich in natural resources, especially timber. As in other parts of Indonesia, the control of these resources can often result in disputes and sometimes violence.

In Southeast Aceh, the community mobilized to protest illegal logging in their *kecamatan*. Since the 1970s, a large HPH plantation had abused their license by logging in protected areas, felling at a rate faster than that allowed and using more trucks than stipulated in their license. Further, the company never made contributions for community development. The intensive logging resulted in environmental degradation, including erosion that affected the villagers' ability to grow crops.

In response, and with help from a local NGO, the community protested and blocked the trucks' passage to the forests. The NGOs contacted the Serambi editors, ensuring that the demonstration received wide publicity. The police were called in and clashed with the community and many people were injured and detained at the police station. Meanwhile, for ten days the police escorted the trucks over a 20km stretch. After this incident, the company manager attempted to negotiate with the communities. The results of this, which included evidence of license abuse, were sent to the Department of Forestry and both the district (*kabupaten*) and the national parliament. Prior to this, the community and the local NGO had considered a class action. However, they were unable to access legal aid support. Further, even if they had legal representation, the NGO was concerned that the courts would be unable to deliver an impartial decision.

Later, in 2001, when the company's license was up for renewal, the *Bupati* approved their extension amid accusations of corruption. In response, the local district parliament (DPR) rejected the *Bupati's* (District Head's) decision. Finally, the Ministry of Forestry, which only takes recommendations from the *Bupati*, rejected the renewal of the company's logging license. This is an example of one form of illegal logging, but there are others.

Since the conflict intensified in 1999 there are no longer any HPH logging companies in Southeast Aceh. The community and some smaller companies have turned to smaller-scale logging. Most is legal in Southeast Aceh, but the community carries out a small amount without licenses for their own needs. Informants reported that in West Aceh and Aceh Singkil districts, groups and companies, consisting of teams of up to 100 workers, are more systematically involved in illegal logging activities. Both GAM and TNI are said to protect or target these activities for extortion. The presence of these armed actors precludes communities acting in response to illegal logging.

However, informants told us that, in general, illegal activities tend to be operated by *individuals* within the police and army, rather than by the institutions *per se*, albeit with some degree of institutional tolerance:

“When we consider the TNI, it is in fact many different institutions. Many parties within it benefit from the conflict. Individuals within the TNI have business links: marijuana, weapon sales, illegal logging, and so on. The same is true of the police. This happens at the sub-district, district and provincial level. It is hard to have precise conclusions about this, because there are many branches of the military with different interests ... but it is clear the peace process will be affected by this group [those who benefit economically from the conflict]. To deal with this, there must be a very clear line of command.”

*Academic, Lhoksuemawe*

There appear to be a number of reasons for this tolerance. First, allowing individuals other money-making opportunities helps keep up morale in what can be a hard and dangerous posting for those from outside the province. Second, while money does not enter into the TNI or police’s budget, a percentage of it does flow upwards to commanders at higher levels in intricate systems of patronage. It is thus in the interest of those at each level to keep the system going. Generally, these activities are controlled at the *kecamatan* (*koramil*) level, although there is likely to be some degree of informal inter-*kecamatan* cooperation.

The peace agreement is likely to have a number of impacts on the forms and degree of illegal money-making activities by the TNI and police.

The withdrawal of non-organic (BKO) troops and police may help the situation. The Memorandum of Understanding does not directly mention the illegal activities which the military and police undertake. However, it does involve a large reduction in troops and police, from the present level of 53,000 to 23,800, consisting of 14,700 troops and 9,100 police. These will all be organic – i.e. those stationed long-term in the province. Informants told us that non-organic troops and police (BKO), who are based in the province for only short periods of time, were far more likely to conduct short-term money making activities such as extortion.

It is also likely that the market for some activities will collapse, whereas others will remain. The production of marijuana (which has links to Singapore, Malaysia and Jakarta), and illegal logging will likely remain strong. However, opportunities for importing and exporting arms – a market which appears to involve the army selling weapons and weapons-making equipment to GAM – will hopefully be undermined with GAM demobilization. As such, it is likely that while illegal activities remain, the forms it takes may alter.

“When I went into the jungle, I found that GAM had weapons-producing machines made in Bandung, from the TNI headquarters.”

*Academic, Lhoksuemawe*

Third, it is likely that the peace process will result in a transitional period, where local actors will have to reestablish lines of patronage, and control of local resources and forms of revenue generation. This transition may have already begun.

It is extremely difficult in the short-run to directly influence the economic incentives of actors within the TNI and police at the local level. Longer-term strategies, including an increase in the security sector budget, are necessary. However, it is unlikely that the majority of these actors will actively resist orders from above. Command structure and communications lines are strong within both the TNI and the police. If there is political will from above, it is likely that individuals will continue to be involved in illegal rent-taking activities, but that the institutional basis of these will weaken. This will lead to a fragmentation of such activities, with

individuals within the security sector moving into the ‘criminal sector’. This would reflect the situation and dynamic in many other parts of Indonesia, and especially Sumatra, such as Riau and Lampung. Yet as long as such actors stay within the TNI or police force, there is a potential institutional check on their activities.


**HYPOTHESIS 2: GAM members will ignore orders from above for economic and/or ideological reasons**  
***A significant concern, especially in western Aceh***

It is more likely that economic incentives will provide a greater barrier to individual GAM members disarming and reintegrating into the broader community than ideological reasons. Individuals within GAM will likely refuse to reintegrate into broader society, leading to an increase in criminality, with no institutional check or disciplining mechanisms. However, it is unlikely this will lead to a significant increase in inter-communal conflict.

GAM is not homogenous. Early recruits came from Aceh’s eastern coast (Pidie, North Aceh and East Aceh). Between 1986 and 1989, fighters from these areas received paramilitary training in Libya. The GAM line of command was strong, with significant decision-making autonomy for commanders at the sagoe (sub-district level), and groups organized in a cell-like structure (Box 5).

When the Indonesian army pulled back at the end of the DOM period in 1998, GAM started to actively recruit in central and western Aceh, often recruiting local criminals (preman) who joined because the organization offered money-making opportunities.<sup>12</sup> As a result, there are two groups within GAM: those with ideological motivations (most involved from the beginning, many who participated in the Libya training) and those motivated by economic reasons.

<sup>12</sup> See Kirsten Schultz (2004). *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.



It is more difficult for GAM commanders to control the criminal elements of GAM than the more ideologically-driven fighters. Those who have been fighting for longer periods of time tend to respect those above them, with solidarity relatively strong. Interviews also suggest that many GAM fighters are now pragmatic about their weaknesses and inability to win independence through armed struggle. Rejection of the peace agreement by hard-line ideological GAM, who feel their leaders have sold out, is extremely unlikely.

In contrast, the opportunities armed struggle offers for money-making is likely to lead criminal elements of GAM to resist their arms being demobilized. Informants from both sides (GAM and the Government) outlined the difference between the ideological and criminal GAM:

"The GAM members in the field obey what the command says ... Actually, the real GAM always obey their command. But some irresponsible elements call themselves GAM when they are not really GAM."

*GAM spokesperson, Pidie*

"There's no ideology amongst GAM here. People here name themselves GAM because then it's easier to find money. The second group are those who want revenge against the army because of bad things they did."

*Government official, West Aceh*

A scheduled phone interview with a GAM commander in Pidie was interrupted because of a military offensive, but the local GAM leader communicated by text message that he – and his troops – would obey any orders from Sweden.

"Kamoe konsen dgn sgl keputusan pemimpin di luwa."  
(We pay attention to all decisions made by our leaders outside)

*GAM leader, Pidie*

In fact, distinguishing between the two groups is sometimes less clear than the discussion above would suggest. Interviews suggest that GAM members with different motivations operate together in the same cells. Ideologically-driven GAM are also involved in extortion, kidnapping, etc. in order to bring in revenues for living and operational costs, and to pay 'taxes' back to the high command in Stockholm.

Rather, the difference between the two arms of the organization is not so much the extent to which they engage in criminal money-making activities, as the degree to which they obey the line of command. This is clearly important if instructions come from above for GAM fighters to disarm. Significantly, the GAM line of command is stronger on the east coast (Pidie, Bireuen, North Aceh, Lhokseumawe, and East Aceh) than that on the west coast (West Aceh, Southeast Aceh, Nagan Raya, South Aceh, and Aceh Singkil).<sup>13</sup> In these areas, locals do not know who GAM commanders are, and the organization's activities are often shrouded in mystery.

"Maybe in Pidie, North Aceh and Bireuen, the GAM command line is strong. But here it is different. GAM members do not follow instructions. They all have their own interests."

*Youth leader, South Aceh*

The risk of GAM disobeying instructions to disarm is significantly greater in western and central Aceh, than in the area normally thought to be the organization's heartland: eastern Aceh. This poses a serious risk for the peace process.

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<sup>13</sup> We also heard that the GAM chain of command is weak in central Aceh, although time limitations meant that we were unable to visit this region and verify the claims.

How will GAM leadership respond, if various individuals within the organization disobey instructions from above? One informant suggested the need for an active media strategy aimed at disassociating the organization from criminal elements. Another suggested that the top five GAM leaders embark on a tour of the districts to make it clear what the official GAM position is, and to demonstrate that any continuing incidents are not related to the organization.

“There are two kinds of GAM: revolutionary and moderates. The latter group includes those in Sweden and the ideological GAM. But the problem is the revolutionary group who love violence. Maybe they will not agree with the peace process. My prediction is that the revolutionary group (including the *preman*) will form a new group. GAM should have an official statement saying that the revolutionary movement activities should stop. This would be effective in isolating this group.”

*Academic, Lhokseumawe*

If GAM leadership do decide to pursue such a strategy, it will not in itself prevent problems. The most likely scenario is that *preman* within the organization will detach themselves from the GAM label (or GAM will disassociate itself from such people), but will continue their activities. This is a variation on the scenario outlined above, where military/police will continue to conduct illegal activities but without direct institutional sponsorship. The result – if other elements of the peace agreement hold – will be a transformation of the conflict in Aceh from a vertical one concerning the status of Aceh (within or independent from the Indonesian state) to one concerning a horizontal scramble for control of resources and revenue streams, underpinned by widespread violent crime. Again, this would be a variation on the situation in other Indonesian provinces where weak rule of law means that the gun or *clurit* (sickle) governs many elements of life, and where insecurity is rife.

Will this lead to broader inter-community tensions? In places like Lampung, vigilante justice has sparked cycles of violence that have led to a deterioration of relations between villages.<sup>14</sup> It appears that such a scenario is unlikely in Aceh. While identity cleavages do exist, these do not map firmly onto cleavages between GAM and GoI sympathizers. The province is relatively religiously and ethnically homogenous. Levels of social solidarity are probably strong enough to resist conflict becoming inter-communal in nature.

Rather, the major concern is not that increased criminality will lead to a break-down in the peace agreement, but that the costs (financial and, in cases, human) to local populations and businesses will be a barrier to the development of Aceh, widely conceived. A strategy for enhancing human security and promoting economic development in Aceh must focus on building judicial and security institutions to help combat criminality. Also important is ensuring that the reintegration package reflects the needs of GAM members.

**HYPOTHESIS 3: As TNI troops withdraw, civilian security groups will act as proxies, attacking or intimidating GAM sympathizers**  
***Unlikely***

Civilian security or anti-separatist groups exist across Aceh. Organizations like Barantas in North Aceh and Front Tum in West Aceh have branches down to the sub-district level. These groups are involved in clashes with GAM or perceived GAM supporters (see Section 2). The groups are trained and funded by

<sup>14</sup> Patrick Barron and David Madden (2004). “Violence and Conflict Resolution in Non-Conflict Regions: The Case of Lampung, Indonesia.” *Indonesian Social Development Paper* No. 2. Jakarta: World Bank.

the TNI, with money also contributed by local businessmen, and hold meetings at TNI headquarters at the sub-district level. While separate groups exist in each district, they coordinate closely:

“The idea of the organization does not come from the grassroots. It comes from the police and youth leaders who think they should have an organization to anticipate the [actions of] the separatists ... After the organization was formed, there were not many new members of GAM.”

*Anti-separatist group leader, West Aceh*

The existence of such groups has led some to fear that they will act as proxies for the military, enacting revenge on local populations who, for example, dare to show support for independence by raising the Acehese flag.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, Damien Kingsbury, advisor to GAM at the Helsinki negotiations, has warned of “another East Timor”.<sup>16</sup>

Yet the situation in Aceh appears to differ vastly from that of East Timor. First, the anti-separatist groups are, by and large, unarmed. In 2000-2001, the TNI gave weapons to militia, or groups supporting them, in Central Aceh with the aim of combating the growth of GAM. However, in early 2002, the military and police asked for the weapons back after certain elements were deemed to be becoming uncontrollable.<sup>17</sup>

Second, the groups tend not to work very well, with their role limited to a ceremonial one. The only kind of anti-GAM activities we found them to be regularly engaged in, was in cooperating with the police in counter-kidnapping (see Section 2).

“Front Tum is not working well. They just try to get money or programs from the government. Each Village Head needs to give 7-10 people. They don't do anything. They just attend ceremonies and raise the flag. They claim they fight for the Indonesian territory, but they don't have weapons.”

*NGO, West Aceh*

Third, the civilian security groups appear to have little popular support, not only from members of the community but also from their membership. Informants from districts across Aceh told us that people only joined because they were pressured to, not because they wanted to.

“There are anti-separatist groups here. But people are only members because they are forced. At the village level, people won't admit to being members. TNI forces them to join ... They make the Village Head nominate representatives, 2-3 people from each village.”

*KDP Facilitator, Bireuen*

“People are members of anti-separatist groups only because they are pressured, not because they want to.”

*KPU member, Southeast Aceh*

<sup>15</sup> Article 1.1.5 of the MoU allows for Aceh to “use regional symbols including a flag, crest and a hymn.” This could prove contentious. Authorities in the past – in Aceh, but also in Papua and, in cases, in Maluku – have seen the use of regional flags as a direct attack on Indonesian sovereignty, and flag raising has resulted in a number of arrests and shootings.

<sup>16</sup> Mark Forbes. “Nervous eyes on army as Aceh prays for peace”. Sydney Morning Herald. August 15th, 2005.

<sup>17</sup> ICG (2002). “Aceh: Slim Chance for Peace.” Jakarta/Brussels: ICG.

Members of the groups appear to have very little loyalty to them. One of the reasons is the low rate of remuneration. One informant in North Aceh told us that members of anti-separatist groups get paid, but that it is hardly enough to make it worthwhile. Another, in West Aceh, said that the only form of payment was coffee or food when they had meetings. Another reason is that many members are afraid of actively opposing GAM, because they fear what will happen if the military departs.

"[Acehnese do not join militias voluntarily] because it is impossible for them to avoid meeting with GAM. The military cannot stay for ever. So the people won't fight GAM, because one day the military back-up will not be there."

*NGO, West Aceh*

Indeed, we heard reports (which we unable to verify) of forty village-heads in North Aceh who were close to anti-separatist groups fleeing their villages to sleep in military buildings, because they felt the protection they were previously afforded would collapse post-August 15<sup>th</sup>. Indeed, when strong militia groups have existed in the past, as was the case in Central Aceh in 2000-2002, they have tended to consist of non-Acehnese groups, such as the Javanese. Given that most Javanese groups have left Aceh over the past few years, it is unlikely that overly strong militia groups will prove to be a spoiler for the peace agreement, although clearly the actions of the anti-separatist groups post-August 15<sup>th</sup> should be closely monitored.

### 3.2 Monitoring Capacity

In part because of the presence of 'spoilers' within TNI, the police and GAM, violations of the agreement are likely. Compliance with the agreement will be monitored by an independent third party – the EU/ASEAN Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). This body has been charged with monitoring the implementation of the agreement – for example, that weapons are demobilized, troops withdrawn, etc. – as well as investigating any violations and ruling on disputes. Given that there will only be around 250 monitors covering an area with a population of 4.2 million, this will be a daunting task.

**HYPOTHESIS 4: The EU-ASEAN monitoring team will be insufficiently large to able to report and investigate abuses**

***Likely. It will need to utilize local actors for monitoring below the district level if it is to be effective***

The list of tasks that the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is responsible for, is vast. Their role includes monitoring a vast array of issues, as well as investigating and ruling on complaints and alleged violations (Box 6). Whereas in the past three committees were established under the Henri Dunant Centre (HDC) to oversee different elements of the implementation of COHA – the Joint Security Committee (JSC), Committee on Humanitarian Action (KBAK) and the Committee on Security Modalities (KBMK) – this time the AMM alone is responsible for the different tasks.

In some ways, the AMM is a stronger body than the JSC in the COHA period. The number of monitors is greater this time, around 250-275 compared to 144 in 2003. Its legitimacy is also probably greater. The political authority of a third party tasked with guaranteeing the implementation of an accord is particularly important. During COHA, the third party was a non-governmental organization, which arguably has less

**Box 6: The Tasks of the AMM**

*From MoU, Clause 5.2*

The tasks of the AMM are to:

- a) monitor the demobilisation of GAM and decommissioning of its armaments
- b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops
- c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members
- d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field
- e) monitor the process of legislation change
- f) rule on disputed amnesty cases
- g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU
- h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties

authority than an inter-governmental body like the EU or ASEAN.<sup>18</sup> The MoU (Article 6.1) also provides for a higher-level complaints body made up of the GoI Coordinating Minister for Political Law and Security Affairs, the political leadership of GAM and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), with the EU Political and Security Committee informed of developments. This is to be welcomed, as it means that the AMM will not be tainted when it fails to address, in a matter satisfactory to both sides, the highly contentious issues that will inevitably arise.

Yet the strength of mandate of the AMM brings with it problems. In particular, it is unclear how such a limited number of monitors will be

able to adequately perform all the tasks which are ascribed to it. There are two weaknesses. First, numbers. The AMM will have twelve offices across Aceh, but this is less than one for each district. GAM operate in relatively isolated areas, and therefore any TNI-GAM clashes are likely to be in remote locations. How will AMM be able to cover such areas? Second, local contextual understanding. While the individual monitors within the AMM have experience in monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements, they do not have experience working in Aceh or Indonesia.

Interviews demonstrated that a wide range of Acehnese society shares such concerns. A number of informants called for an armed peacekeeping forces made up of “thousands of internationals”. Even those who acknowledged that the chance of this were non-existent, argued that a greater number of monitors would be needed. Koalisi HAM, an NGO network based in Banda Aceh, plans to establish a local monitoring system using two volunteers for each kecamatan (sub-district) across all of Aceh: around 450 in all.

Using locals for monitoring is not without its risks. AMM will be unable to guarantee the security of local monitors. The experience of the COHA period showed that the military may not take kindly to local NGOs playing a role of this type. However, a space does exist within civil society for monitoring to take place. Whereas NGOs are often seen as being pro-GAM or pro-independence, religious and adat (traditional) leaders tend to be viewed as neutral and legitimate. Imam, Ulama and Mukim are rarely targeted by either side in the way that local government figures (Geuchik) and civil servants (especially teachers) are, or in a similar manner to how the military sometimes treats local NGOs. Utilizing such

<sup>18</sup> Konrad Huber (2004). *The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation*. Washington D.C.: East-West Center.

community representatives as “field representatives” of the monitoring team would allow deeper coverage, while enhancing the legitimacy of the peace process amongst local people.

“The EU must work with prominent local figures like the *Ulama*. By this, I mean not only figures at the district level, but also in the sub-districts and villages. If the monitoring team stay at the district level, local people can do it at the local level. They should have ‘monitor’ labels so people can tell who they are, and for security reasons.”

*Academic, Lhoksumawae*

While such a strategy is obviously not without risks, community leaders we talked to were keen on the idea.

### 3.3 Reintegration of GAM members

Thirty years of conflict has eroded trust between communities and between communities and the state. As the last section outlined, tensions remain: between communities and the TNI, between communities and GAM, and within and between communities themselves. Lack of trust could lead communities to resist GAM members returning and reintegrating into their villages, either because of tensions between combatants and victims, or because of the perceived risk of welcoming former military targets home with open arms. The targeting of development aid at these groups alone could also cause problems.

**HYPOTHESIS 5: Tensions will arise between combatants and victims within villages**  
***Possible, although more likely that desire for peace will outweigh desire for revenge***

The vast majority of Acehnese appear to have sympathy with GAM’s goals at a broad level – that is, the creation of an economic and political system (whether within or outside the Republic of Indonesia) in which the fruits of Aceh’s natural resource wealth are enjoyed by the Acehnese themselves. Yet interviews in the field show that fewer Acehnese sympathize with GAM itself. Rural villagers are stuck in no-mans land, caught in the middle of two sides fighting a war that most see as a barrier to their freedom, rather than a means by which it might be realized. Many villagers have been killed or suffered abuses from the TNI, but many have also suffered at the hands of GAM. Extortion by GAM has become increasingly common. The tale of a community leader in South Aceh is not unusual (Box 7).

#### **Box 7: Schools and Teachers: Targets for Politically-motivated Violence**

During the height of the conflict, schools were targets for political motivated violence. In Bireuen district, as many as 50 percent of schools were destroyed or damaged. Teachers, too, are targets of kidnapping and many have been killed.

In this environment, community leaders need to walk a narrow tightrope to remain safe. One informal leader from South Aceh expressed how, unknowingly, he had overstepped the fine line that divides perceived neutrality from partisanship. At a farewell party for a local teacher in 2002, he was asked, as a respected village figure, to say a few words. “I said, ‘When the children are in school the responsibility is with the teachers. But when outside is the parents. So I say this, it is our collective responsibility to stop the school from being burned a second or third time.’”

Word of his message spread to the local GAM commander and a week later he received a threat. He became very afraid, although he could not understand what mistake he had made. Later a friend explained that he should not be afraid and that he was not actually a target. This friend, it turned out, was a GAM member.

The methods GAM has used to maintain loyalty has won them few friends and GAM-inflicted atrocities against villagers appear to have resulted in a significant loss of support. The situation is now very different than in late 1999, when GAM controlled much of the province. The strength of GAM's power then was demonstrated by the fact that when they called for a boycott of the 1999 elections – and intimidated those who planned to cast their ballot – only 1.4% of the electorate in North Aceh and 11% in East Aceh turned out to vote.<sup>19</sup> We spoke to a number of people who described with hurt in their eyes of relations who had been killed by GAM or of unfeasibly large sums of money they had had to borrow to meet GAM's demands. After thirty years of conflict, revolutionary solidarity is low. Does this mean that villagers will not accept GAM combatants back into their communities? The short answer: in most cases, no.

"They will return but only after they know what is in the agreement. The *kampungs* (village communities) will receive them."  
*Village leader, Pidie*

There are three reasons why reentry of GAM is not problematic for most villagers. First, GAM members return often to their villages; most have family in their indigenous villages. People are used to them returning. Second, villages – which have suffered insecurity and economic deprivation for years as a result of conflict – are likely to make compromises in order to see peace. An *Ulama* in Nagan Raya explained why people in his village would accept GAM members when they returned:

"People have plantations here. But because of the conflict, the land is not used. It is currently neglected. The land is very fertile. Before, we exported produce from here because it is good quality."

*Ulama, Nagan Raya*

The economic returns of villagers doing their best to maintain peace outweigh the perceived benefits of pursuing justice in the short-run.

Third, interviewees argued that communities can distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' GAM members. Locals know who has committed atrocities. Those not involved will be welcomed back. For those who have been involved in criminal acts, return may be more problematic:

"There are two kinds of GAM: ideological GAM and criminal GAM. If the GAM person committed crimes in the past, it is more difficult for them to be accepted – not just for the community themselves, but also for the criminals themselves. For the GAM who surrender [and who do not have criminal past] it is no problem for them to stay in the village. But if the GAM member has hurt innocent people, it is difficult for them to reintegrate."

*Government official, West Aceh*

Yet, by and large, most informants told us that a spirit of compromise was in the air. After years of conflict, most people desire peace rather than retribution. Clearly there will be issues to work through. The MoU

<sup>19</sup> Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch (2003). *The Aceh Peace Process: Why It Failed*. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center.

says a Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be established. Yet, in the short run at least, a desire for revenge is unlikely to scupper the agreement.

**HYPOTHESIS 6: Communities will reject returning GAM members because they fear it will put them at risk**

***Possible. Village heads likely to be wary***

A more likely reason for communities rejecting returning GAM combatants is a fear that their return will put the village at risk from the TNI/police. The MoU promises amnesty for GAM combatants and political prisoners. It also provides for the entry of GAM into politics, and hence the arrival of the organization as a legitimate entity. By extension, explicit support of GAM (as acceptance of returnees may be viewed by some as constituting) should also be legitimate. However, this will require a change in mentality for many in the armed forces, and amongst local government figures who for many years have lived in fear of the organization.

Villagers, and especially village heads and other prominent community leaders, are used to trying to maintain neutrality. A sense of caution thus prevails, often at the expense of economic activities:

“Outsiders need to be very careful coming in to a village. Like for traders from Bireuen. Why? Because people want safety. They don’t want any impact from incoming people.”

*KDP facilitator, Bireuen*

“People are safe to carry out their activities in the field. But there is an instruction from TNI that if we give even a cigarette to GAM, then there will be a big problem. But of course we bring food to the field, and of course GAM wants some. So we cannot go.”

*Community leader, South Aceh*

“We as Acehnese will do whatever people want in order to keep safe. If you ask me to swim in the river, I’ll swim in the river. Because during the conflict, it is very easy to die. Like chickens.”

*NGO activist, Pidie*

Villagers tend to tie their colors to the actors who are most powerful at a given time, with calculations of safety winning out over ideological affiliation. Community members are very cagey about acknowledging their ‘support’ to even individual GAM members, let alone their support for GAM as a movement.

“Not so many people support the TNI. Because if they do – for example, by showing where GAM members are – and if GAM find out that someone has helped the TNI, then they will kill them. So people don’t want the TNI to try to involve them. If TNI find GAM themselves, without help, it is okay. In *kecamatan* Matang Kuli there have been many cases. When people are killed by GAM, people ask who they are. If they are identified as an informant of the TNI, then people just leave the body. Why? Because if the person had not died, many other people in the village would have because of him [because GAM would take revenge against the village who reported them].”

*NGO, Lhokseumawe*

In the past, the military and police have arrested, ‘trailed’ and jailed community members who they claim, in many cases dubiously, support GAM. Box 7 (above) showed how a community leader had to tread carefully. Box 8 provides another example of the delicate balance in loyalties village heads need to maintain.

**Box 8: A Delicate Balance: Village Heads in Southeast Aceh**

“The village heads in remote areas often have to sleep in the police office or *Camat* (sub-district head’s) office. 300 village heads have been killed across Aceh ... We are more traumatized now than in the past. For civil servants, village heads, etc., our hearts are beating strongly all the time ... We don’t blame GAM or TNI because they are both the same ... All the village heads in our sub-district went to the *Camat* and asked to resign because it is very hard for us to do this job. I have been asked for big money – Rp. 10-15 million – four times. After we go to a government ceremony, we get a letter from GAM asking for money. What can we do? But when we ask to resign, the military command, police and *Camat* all say if we want to resign we are not supporting Indonesia.”

Information is obviously key. Villages – and village heads – need assurance that accepting GAM members will not see them labeled at ‘traitors to the nation’ and will not put them at risk from vigilante actions from the military, police or anti-separatist groups. Here, newspapers are extremely important.

Community opinion is shaped by the reactions of local leaders. Village heads, as well as other local level community leaders such as the *Mukim*, *Imam*, and, to some degree, the *Camat*, tend to work together closely and trust each other. Messages conveying that it is safe to accept GAM back must target these figures. Village heads rely on the newspapers for their analysis of the situation and specific incidents and use this to calculate their own safety strategy and how to respond to the community. In this way, then, the distribution of information is likely to have a significant affect on how villagers respond to returning GAM members.

**HYPOTHESIS 7: Tensions will occur between communities and GAM over distribution of aid to ex-combatants**  
**A significant risk. Could cause problems**

“Economic and social development programs could help [support the peace process]. But it depends on who is the beneficiary. If the target is the community, it could help. But if it targets only GAM, then it will not help.”

*NGO, West Aceh*

Whereas desire for revenge is unlikely to disrupt the reintegration of GAM members, and community concerns about maintaining neutrality are not an insurmountable barrier, tensions between communities and GAM over aid distribution does pose a significant threat for the peace process.

The MoU outlines a number of benefits that ex-combatants and former political prisoners will receive. These include “economic facilitation” (Article 3.2.3) and “an allocation of suitable farming land, employment or, in the case of incapacity to work, adequate social security” (Article 3.2.5). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is set to run the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program that will provide the majority of benefits for ex-combatants and political prisoners; this may include housing and livelihoods training.<sup>20</sup> It is clear that it is necessary to offer incentives to returning GAM combatants, and compensation to those imprisoned during the conflict. However, any package which focuses on

<sup>20</sup> The program is provisionally entitled “Peacebuilding in Aceh through Demobilization and Reintegration Assistance to Demilitarized GAM Combatants, Amnesty Recipients and Start-up Assistance Activities for their Dependents and Conflict-affected Communities” and will likely be funded by the European Union.

compensating those directly involved in the fighting, without also providing visible rewards for those who were victims of it, is problematic.

"If there is a program for reintegrating GAM, it may be dangerous. If the program gives privilege to GAM members, it will create jealousy. The program needs to cover the whole community. If not, people would protest and have a demonstration to the government ... We need to think about how we can integrate the program on ex-combatants with ones aimed at the community. Other issues like youth unemployment also need addressed."

*Government official, West Aceh*

The reasons for this are simple. First, the conflict (as well as other factors, notably poor governance and corruption) have meant that few if any development programs reach rural villages. In many cases, the World Bank/GoI Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) was *the only* development program in informants' village. In such an environment, rewarding those who have inflicted misery on many villagers seems patently unfair to local communities. Second, and related, villagers argue that most people in their communities are poor. Those returning from the hills are not necessarily poorer than those who remained in their village, especially as some GAM members may have materially benefited from extorting the communities to which they are returning.

The MoU appears to take such concerns into account by also offering compensation to "civilians who have suffered a demonstrable loss due to the conflict" (Article 3.2.5), offering them the same benefits as for combatants and prisoners. However, the inclusion of this is problematic. The definition of who is a victim is unclear. An IOM study conducted in September 2004 found that 2,500 families (or approximately 10,000 people) had been affected by the civil war.<sup>21</sup>

Yet conflict has impacted almost everyone in Aceh. During our fieldwork we did not find one informant who did not have a friend or family member who had been killed, or kidnapped, or whose economic activities had not been severely impacted by the conflict. Indeed we found that there was a strong feeling that everyone is poor and a victim (*korban*) in Aceh, not just those directly affected by the conflict or, for that matter, by the tsunami.

There are clear concerns, particularly amongst local-level development workers, including local NGOs, KDP facilitators and university academics, that any post-conflict assistance should include the wider community and not solely focus on ex-combatants and prisoners. It is extremely important that programs aimed at the latter groups are accompanied by other visible development programs which target the community more broadly. An element of this will involve programs that provide benefits to villages (and villagers) who receive returning GAM members. Another component must be programs targeted at a wider level to include villages affected by conflict, but which have no returning GAM members. Given the unfeasibility of providing land, jobs and/or social security to all such "victims", community-based mechanisms will need to be utilized (in some cases, established) for determining who benefits should be targeted at; broader programs aimed at providing development across larger areas will also be necessary.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> IOM (2004). *Humanitarian Protection Needs Analysis (HPNA)*.

<sup>22</sup> See Section 4 for a deeper discussion of this.

### 3.4 Population Movements and Village-Level Conflict

As Section 2 showed, a number of forms of local conflict exist across Aceh, including tensions over land and between ethnic groups. The return of peace may lead to inward population flows, or people moving between areas of Aceh. Will this lead to an increase in local conflict which, in turn, undermines the human security of the Acehnese people?

**HYPOTHESIS 8: Return of Javanese transmigrants, other non-Acehnese groups, and the diaspora, will lead to ethnic tensions and conflict over land and other resources**  
*Unlikely. More likely to be an issue over the longer term*

Over the course of the conflict large numbers of Javanese transmigrants, other non-Acehnese, as well as Acehnese, left the province. Some informants estimate that between 1998 and 2002 approximately 100,000 people left Aceh for North Sumatra. The majority of IDPs/refugees ended up in Medan, Malaysia or other parts of Indonesia, including Jakarta. Many were the rural poor, who left in search of better livelihoods. However, rural and urban elites also departed because of personal insecurity or taxes on their businesses.

Local informants told us that when these groups fled the majority left behind their land and fixed property. This was the case in Nagan Raya district, which previously had large numbers of transmigrant villages.

“Yes, there were many transmigrants before, but not now. Most of them left between 1998 and 2002. Some of them sold their land before leaving but the majority just left. There are still quite large numbers here but they are not living in the transmigrants’ areas. They are integrated, have become local, and live in local villages with everyone else.”

*FGD, Nagan Raya*

Interviews with IDPs and diaspora suggested that some, particularly the poor, were likely to return if a peaceful solution to the conflict in Aceh was found. They were apprehensive and although some were prepared to leave immediately after the signing of the peace agreement, the majority will take a wait-and-see approach.

“Perhaps I will go home to Aceh this month ... I have three children. Last night my daughter left for Aceh. Why? Because there is nothing here, because in Medan it’s hard to find food, and because my family are all in Aceh ... It seems a bit safer now, we no longer hear about any of that [violence]...”

*Villager, Medan*

“I have already decided that I will return to Aceh if the peace runs smoothly. If one can only work as a laborer [in Jakarta], it’s better to work in Aceh.”

*Shop worker, Tangerang*

“Before I finished studying, I lived in Aceh. After that, for a number of years I couldn’t find any work there. The conflict just continued. So I decided to leave Aceh and find work in Java. I feel that even if Aceh is peaceful I won’t return. Objectively, here [in Java] it is easier to find work.”

*Government employee, Jakarta*

Whether or not the return of IDPs and/or diaspora will result in conflict will depend on the ability of institutions, both formal and informal, to manage claims and counter-claims. Most likely this task will fall

into the hands of local community leaders, particularly the *Geuchik*, *Mukim* and *Imam*. The community widely considers that these local actors have the legitimacy and ability to resolve the small intra-village disputes that are likely to occur, such as those over land. More difficult will be claims that cut across villages, or even *kecamatan*, and those that implicate ethnic cleavages. Women who have lost their husbands to the fighting, for example, may also have difficulty claiming their inheritance rights – see Box 9.

**Box 9: Land Claims of Those Who Fled**

Ibu Yati, a first generation transmigrant from West Java, fled her small rubber plantation and home in Alur Patung, East Aceh in 2001 when her husband was murdered and most of the 44 households in the village burned to the ground. Previously, she had fled and returned on three separate occasions between 2000-2001, following promises of protection from security forces stationed locally.

Although Ibu Yati says that she has no faith in the peace process and is too fearful to return permanently to her village, she has visited her property on a number of occasions to request a share of the profits from those tapping her rubber trees without her permission. *“Some people are good people, they give, but there are also bad people. Some say, this is state land, it doesn’t belong to you.”* In fact, Ibu Yati says that she had just finished paying off the land, and although she lost her land certificate when her house burned down, the deeds should also be at her local Bank Pembangunan Daerah Aceh (Aceh Development Bank).

However, she has had recent cause for concern, as the *Geuchik* from the neighboring village to hers in Aceh has visited the village where she and around twenty other families from Alur Patung currently reside. He told them that they must either return to their village in East Aceh or forfeit the rights to their land. While this ultimatum surely has no legal currency, it prompted a number of men go back to the village to check on whether promised barrack accommodation had been built. There were no barracks, and no guarantees of security for the returning Javanese to a community where neighbors *“are friends by day, enemies by night.”*

Overall, however, returning refugees/IDPs and diaspora are unlikely to derail the peace process nor cause massive issues in the short to medium term. Relatively strong local level dispute resolution actors and mechanisms, and the absence of strong ethnic animosity, will mitigate the negative impacts of this issue.

Q: Are there social problems between transmigrants and locals? “No. The Locals get benefits from transmigrants. We don’t mind them being here. We learn from each other.”

*FGD, Nagan Raya*

**HYPOTHESIS 9: The conflict had a negative impact on village governance, resulting in reduced capacity to manage local conflict**  
***Local conflict management capacity has not been reduced***

In addition to the GAM-GoI conflict, everyday local level conflict is common in Aceh. The newspaper dataset noted 106 cases, or 50% of all reported violent conflicts, as not being linked to the vertical struggle. These includes disputes relating to the distribution of humanitarian aid and development assistance, land disputes, and petty crime. These types of conflict are not problematic in themselves; contestation and competition is a vital driver of social and economic development, and a necessary part of any society.

What matters is how they are managed. When mechanisms for managing these disputes do not exist they can result in escalation and, in cases, violence.

Community leaders such as the *Geuchik*, *Mukim*, and *Imam* resolve the majority of these disputes. Indeed, key informants ranked these three as the first, second and third most important actors, respectively, in resolving local level conflicts. The approach of these leaders tends to be hierarchical and adjudicative. *Musyawahar* (communal group decision-making) is utilized, but, as is common across Indonesia, this does not automatically result in participatory decision-making.

The ongoing conflict seems to have had two impacts on village governance. First, the conflict has put an enormous strain on community leaders. It is they who are often required to negotiate with both GAM and TNI on behalf of those kidnapped or to justify the sympathies of villagers to powers above. This can get them into trouble if they are seen as becoming too close to one side. Informants told us that over 300 village heads have been killed in Aceh.

"My role and capacity has decreased because of the conflict. I am very tired, my mind is no longer as sharp. This is because I'm under constant pressure from both sides [GAM and TNI]. All *Geuchik* in this area feel the strain."

*Mukim, Pidie*

Second, there is some indication that the conflict has actually consolidated the powers and status of village leaders relative to their fellow villagers, in much the same way that Presidents tend to grow stronger in times of war. Village heads, in particular, are the key point persons if either the TNI or GAM wants something within the village. Villagers rely on them to protect their interests, and provide some modicum of security. With the exception of some incidences of complaints over the distribution of humanitarian tsunami aid, villagers seem to have stuck by their village leaders.

As such, the end of the conflict (if it occurs) may in fact open up political space for different parties to contest village leadership. This, however, is not likely to result in a reduction of local conflict management capacity. While new local-level power struggles may arise, the democratization of local-level dispute resolution will likely increase capacity over the medium term.

#### **IV. INTERVENTION MECHANISMS AND PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPMENT ACTORS**

In the last section, we set out a number of scenarios for potential obstacles to the peace process. We considered issues relating to incentives for resistance and security concerns, monitoring capacity, the reintegration of GAM members, and population movements and village-level conflict. In some of these areas, risks exist that dynamics that the peace agreement unleashes could, over time, undermine it. In others, implementation details are not fully detailed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and will need to be developed.

Scope exists for development agencies like the World Bank to support the peace process. They can do so in a number of ways. One way is to conduct or support activities that are a core part of the agreement such as reintegration. Another involves financing social and economic development ‘flanking’ activities that can support the political elements of the agreement. In addition, use can be made of existing networks and mechanisms (in some cases, expanded) to feed information up and down the system between those implementing the agreement and those on the ground in Acehese villages, and vice versa.

Specifically, development actors should think about interventions in the following areas:

- Socialization of the peace process
- Bringing people in to the process
- Reintegration of GAM
- Provision of a peace dividend
- Institution building

Any interventions will need to be sensitive to the local context. Aceh is a high conflict area, and this increases the importance of considering the processes by which development is ‘done’ as well as the desired outcomes. Principles which *all* development interventions in Aceh should consider include:

- Perceived equitability of targeting
- Community-driven approaches
- A focus on processes as well as outputs
- Build in complaints mechanisms
- A focus on ensuring transparency and accountability
- Use of independent civil society and international actors
- Including the Government at different levels in planning and implementation
- Providing support to field staff

#### 4.1 Socialization of the Peace Process

The importance of disseminating the content and processes of the peace agreement (or ‘socialization’) cannot be understated. Previous agreements were undermined in part by a lack of clarity over what was allowed and what was not. After past failures, people are skeptical that this time around anything is different. The Helsinki agreement was an elite-driven process, with few opportunities for civil society engagement, and many Acehnese we interviewed knew very little about the content of the agreement, or the processes used to reach it.

“The villagers are more clever than the legislators in terms of analyzing the situation on the ground. If the commander says there is no operation in the field, they ask ‘why are there so many incidents on the ground?’ So people are skeptical of what they say.”

NGO, Lhokseumawe

Experience from the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), which lasted from December 2002 – May 2003, shows that a lack of education about the conditions of any peace agreement can contribute to its failure. While an information strategy was employed by the Henri Dunant Center (HDC) to socialize the COHA agreement, it had many weaknesses. One of the most prominent of these was the media used; information broadcasts rarely reached those most affected by conflict – rural Acehnese villagers.

Ensuring clear information flows is vital in combating a number of the risks that we outlined in the last section. We noted earlier the likelihood of a fragmentation of GAM with criminal elements refusing to reintegrate. Similarly, individuals within the TNI and police may continue to pursue illegal activities – organized business interests (such as illegal logging), smaller-scale extortion, and, more generally, harassment of local populations. There is a risk that such criminality could undermine the agreement, if people feel that it is an indication that neither side is serious about pursuing peace. It will be extremely important that a clear message is given by both sides disassociating themselves from such activities. This will not prevent criminal activity *per se*, but will help in removing its legitimacy. *An effective information strategy can prevent people from conflating criminal activities with the vertical conflict concerning Aceh’s political status, and hence such violations with a broader break-down of the peace agreement.*

Effective socialization is also necessary to help ease tensions relating to the reintegration of GAM members. Village heads need to understand the provisions of the agreement in order for them to know that it is safe to welcome back former combatants and prisoners. The terms of compensation for GAM members also need to be clear to limit jealousy between ex-combatants (who receive immediate assistance) and local populations (who will need to wait longer for development aid).

At present, it is unclear who will socialize the content of the agreement. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) has a press unit, but it is tasked only with disseminating information on the tasks of the AMM, not the peace process more generally; interviews suggested a reluctance for the AMM to expand its mandate in this direction. Informal discussions suggest that the Government has responsibility for disseminating information on the agreement. However, there appears to be a lack of clarity within the Government itself on which branch will actively pursue this. The BRR, Ministry of Justice and the Governor’s Office in Banda Aceh are all candidates, yet none of them, with the possible exception of the BRR, has shown much

enthusiasm for engaging in these types of activities. Donors, too, have not yet developed information strategies relating to the agreement, although some such as IOM are working on it, and we heard that the Japanese Embassy and USAID are also interested in getting involved.

Development agencies such as the World Bank are well placed to support information dissemination:

- In part, this will involve *providing funding for socialization activities that can be undertaken by civil society*. Many of the NGO networks have effective mechanisms for getting information out, but do not have the funding to use these fully. The World Bank, and others, should consider supporting such activities.
- The *World Bank should also make use of the networks it has for socialization* purposes. The Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) has a network extending to the village level that can be utilized for such purposes; facilitators from the Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas project (SPADA) can also be used.

### ***Supporting Existing Networks and Mechanisms***

Using existing networks for information dissemination is far more effective than establishing new ones. In particular, in a society where oral communication is often valued over written communication, relationships are particularly important. Many networks exist that can be utilized to socialize the peace agreement.

"In one area of North Aceh, in Sueneddon sub-district, there is a bridge with a sign saying 'this is a GAM area', and showing which area is not. Without getting help from the Village Head we cannot enter [the GAM area]. The Village Head helps us to get access by accompanying us. The big problem is that the community is suspicious. But if we come with the Village Head, it is okay."

*NGO, Lhokseumawe*

First, *a number of NGOs have networks that extend to the village-level*. Many NGOs conduct community development activities, in large part because these were the only activities allowed during the martial law period. The delicateness of working in a conflict environment meant that NGOs had to develop close relations with local leaders who were the 'key holders' for access to rural villages. Most NGOs involved in such work closely guarded their neutrality in order to enable them to work effectively. In part because of the lack of other development projects reaching villages (e.g. from the Government), many NGOs have built up high levels of trust with communities. These networks can be utilized for spreading information about the peace process.

Second, *structured hierarchical networks exist within the religious system*, with *Imam* (at the local level), connected to *Ulama*, who are connected to higher-level *Ulama*. Muhammadiyah and NU both have active networks. These networks can also be used.

Third, *use should be made of the media for spreading information about the content and terms of the peace agreement*. The Acehnese newspaper Serambi is widely read, right down to the village level. Indeed, information reported in Serambi is extremely important for village heads and other leaders seeking to explain conflict incidents to villagers:

"Information from the newspapers is important for the village heads and *Mukim* because normally they retell the statement to the people. Without it, they do not know what to say; the *Kepala Desa* [Village Head] and *Mukim* [informal leader] cannot say anything. There is nothing to refute..."

*NGO, Lhokseumawe*

"If both sides [GAM and the Government] give clear statements in the newspapers, and keep to them, then people will believe in the police for providing security. Otherwise, they will not. People are concerned that there is an imbalance in information. They know about the Republic of Indonesia side, but not the GAM side ... People read about the cases [of kidnappings and killings] in South Aceh and they are afraid, because they [GAM] made no statements after the event. In the past, they used to make statements."

*NGO, Lhokseumawe*

Thought will need to be given as to the mechanisms by which support to existing civil society networks is best provided, and ways to ensure that the media is used effectively for spreading information about the peace process. Some donors will be able to fund civil society groups (or networks) directly, while others may need to channel money through holding pots. **One possibility is to establish a fund – potentially within the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) or Decentralization Support Facility (DSF) – that local organizations could apply to for funding for socialization-related activities.**

### *Using World Bank Networks*

Perhaps the most comprehensive network in Aceh is that of the GoI/World Bank Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). KDP works in over one-third of villages in Indonesia, providing funds for small-scale infrastructure and economic activities through demand-driven processes, involving community participation at the *dusun* (hamlet), *desa* (village), and *kecamatan* (sub-district) levels. In Aceh, it was one of the few programs from international donors that remained active throughout the conflict. Indeed, as we discuss in Section 4.4 below, the program was seen as being very effective by communities, and both GAM and GoI supported the program as being an efficient way of bringing development goods to rural areas affected by conflict. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, KDP was expanded throughout Aceh. It is now in 5,528 Acehnese villages.

There thus exists a strong network, with facilitators and staff at the district, sub-district and village levels. This network can be utilized in a number of ways:

First, *KDP meetings can be used to spread information about the peace process.* The KDP planning cycle involves a number of meetings to formulate proposals, vote on them, and then to account for funds.

Second, *KDP facilitators can be used to share information.* In particular, 21 FKI (Information FKs – sub-district facilitators) have been hired to help coordinate the activities of KDP with those of other projects, and to help coordinate the collection and sharing of data. These IFKs will each cover around four sub-districts in the areas worst hit by the tsunami. They could play a key role in sharing information related to the peace process. **Hiring another 45 Information FKs (IFKs) to cover all areas of Aceh, would be a reasonably cheap and extremely effective mechanism for socializing the peace process.**

There are a number of different media that could be used to share information through KDP networks. One important (and relatively easy) mechanism is the **use of posters to convey key information.**

Information must be provided to people in the places where they are most likely to see it. Posters could be placed in coffee shops, security posts, government offices, universities, NGO offices, public meeting boards, PKK (women’s association) branches, and IDP barracks and tents, at key points during the process: e.g. announcement of the content of MoU, announcement of the GAM reintegration package and how it fits with the rest of the agreement, etc. Provisional estimates show that around 76,000 posters would be needed to cover Aceh (Table 5).

**Table 5: Posters as a Dissemination Tool**

<i>Level</i>	<i>Amount per unit</i>	<i>Number units</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>
District	100	20	2,000
Sub-district	50	275	13,750
Village	10	6,000	60,000
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>75,750</b>

These could be distributed through the KDP (and possibly the SPADA) network within 2-3 weeks. Each round of posters would cost approximately USD 15,000.

#### **4.2 Bringing People In to the Process**

A major weakness of the Helsinki process has been the lack of involvement of Acehnese civil society. Negotiations have been held between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM without any independent Acehnese representation. A consequence, and one strengthened by the broken promises of the past, has been a disengagement of many Acehnese from the peace process. With the exception of the days around the signing, discussion in coffee shops in Banda Aceh was less likely to be about the Helsinki accord than about the problems people face post-tsunami or, indeed, the latest episode of *Sinetron* on television. While almost everyone we spoke to in Aceh keenly desires an end to the conflict, most feel that the success of the accord will be determined by elites in Jakarta, Banda Aceh and Stockholm. People do not yet understand their own role in the process, in large part because little attention has been paid (by elites or within the agreement) to defining it.

“We have heard about the Helsinki process on radio and TV. We just accept what happens. But we hope it brings peace. Our hope is bigger than that mountain [pointing to the mountain in the distance].”

*Person displaced by conflict, South Aceh*

Truly including society in the peace process is vital for two reasons.

First, *a widespread desire for peace is a vital resource that can be tapped to help consolidate the peace process.* More so than in 2003, when GAM was much stronger than it is now, few Acehnese support the continuation of conflict. Parties advocating violent strategies – on either side – now have little legitimacy in the eyes of the Acehnese people. Taking advantage of this will require the development of concrete strategies and mechanisms for bringing people in to the peace process.

"The people here really hope that the peace process will go smoothly. Because people are *really* tired of the conflict. Security is the main problem. In the mountains, we have big fields but for almost five years we cannot go there. If the situation is conducive [peaceful] our economy will take only three years to improve."

*Village leader, Pidie*

Second, *in order for post-conflict programming to adequately address the needs of local people, it will be necessary for communities to be involved in defining what they want out of the peace process, and its shape more broadly.* Without this, there is a risk that widespread disillusionment could fuel a return to violence.

There is a multitude of ways in which communities can be brought in to the peace process. These include:

- Public dialogues at the district and sub-district levels
- Technical needs assessments
- Cultural events
- Local-level truth and reconciliation commissions and events
- Local-level conflict monitoring

### ***Public dialogues***

"There is discussion at the elite level. But what about the grassroots level? The World Bank can give support at the local level to help peace run smoothly. They can help with socialization, as well, at the local level ... People discuss the peace process already, but there is no space for people to get involved. The World Bank can help with this."

*KPU member, Southeast Aceh*

Establishing forums for dialogue at the district and sub-district levels would serve a number of purposes. First, they will *help solicit inputs on community needs and potential social and economic development programming responses.* It is likely that there will be a peace dividend in terms of new development programming if the peace holds (see Section 4.4). The dialogues will give an opportunity for various elements of society to provide input as to the programs that can best support their needs.

Second, the forums will help, more broadly, *to build dialogue around mechanisms for enhancing peace.* While their purpose should not be to specifically discuss issues such as violations of the agreement, the forums, by tying the peace process to popular economic and social development needs, will help strengthen the process. The establishment (and working) of the forums will also give a clear signal that there is a potential for a real peace dividend, in doing so generating buy-in to the peace agreement.

Third, information can also flow downwards through the system. We discussed above mechanisms for socializing the agreement. *The forums would be one mechanism through which such information dissemination could be done.*

Fourth, the public dialogues will also *garner support amongst the international development actors to support economic and social development in conflict-affected areas.*

**Working groups/forums should be established at the district level.** These could potentially be coordinated by BRR, with funding and technical assistance from donors (potentially through the Decentralization Support Facility). Members of these groups would come from government and civil society; attendance at and participation in working group meetings would be open. Two rounds of district meetings should be held. The first could be general meetings to generate ideas. The second could be related to the forums held at the sub-district level.

At the sub-district level, use should be made of the forums of the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). **KDP should sponsor extra ad-hoc meetings in addition to those held for the normal KDP project cycle.** Unlike normal KDP meetings, these forums would be open discussions of the needs in that *kecamatan*, with special emphasis on needs that cross the boundaries of villages, rather than specific projects. Minutes would be taken at the meeting, with representatives asked to prioritize needs, and these would be forwarded on to the second district-level meeting for discussion. This second district level meeting would consist of nominated representatives from each sub-district. Again, needs would not be attached to specific projects; rather, areas of intervention would be prioritized.

#### ***Publicly-announced technical needs assessments***

In addition to the public dialogues, a **series of technical assessments should be conducted by donor agencies to help in the development of programs.** IOM has already conducted an assessment of the needs of former combatants. Further assessment should include:

- Survey of active GAM members, re: reintegration needs (see Section 4.3)
- Survey of local government needs, including assessments of schools, health clinics, and other public infrastructure destroyed or damaged by the conflict (see Section 4.5)
- Survey of justice sector institutions (Section 4.5)

The results of these assessments should be made publicly available.

#### ***Cultural events***

A way of tapping the community's widespread desire for peace is to organize cultural events. These cannot, in themselves, generate political will and change economic incentives, but they can serve as power symbols for communities to meet and rally around. Some NGOs have already begun some cultural programming, organizing the "drums for peace" march in Banda Aceh, for example, just prior to the signing of the peace agreement. Other suggestions from our fieldwork include:

- Fans of Rafly, a prominent Acehnese musician, suggested a "Rafly Aceh Peace Tour"
- Traditional ceremonies to welcome back former combatants (*Sayam*)
- *Pantun* (traditional poetry) competitions and forums
- Peace radio programming
- Peace murals

### ***Local-level truth and reconciliation***

The MoU establishes a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. For what purpose, and through what mechanism, the MoU is unclear. To be sure, pains and wounds exist in almost every village. Many villagers told us how family members had been killed by both GAM and the TNI. Whether a truth and reconciliation process is the best mechanism to repair the fabric of society will depend on details that remain to be worked out. Donors, in supporting truth and reconciliation mechanisms, should consider the following observations:

- In most cases truth and reconciliation commissions get caught-up in elite politics and agendas. Certainly in Indonesia, the Government has avoided sincere investigations of past human rights abuses. Conversely, it is questionable how relevant legalistic and centralized commissions are to the average villager's recovery needs. In order to ground their support, *donors should focus as much on the healing as the justice aspect of truth and reconciliation processes.*
- Those working on these issues at the local level will need to build trust before communities are willing to open-up and discuss past abuses. In the short-term, communities will want to focus more on their livelihood and immediate needs. *Donors could consider postponing local level truth and reconciliation activities until immediate needs are taken care of.*

*In supporting truth and reconciliation activities, donors should consider linking with traditional peace-making ceremonies and community leaders, including Ulamas (see Section 4.3). Lessons can be learned from East Timor where the UN runs a successful truth and reconciliation program that interfaces with local concepts of justice and truth-telling.*

### ***Local-level Conflict Monitoring***

As we discussed in Section 3.2, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) will have insufficient capacity to conduct its tasks if it does not plug into local networks. Already NGO networks such as Koalisi HAM are planning to have volunteers monitor violations of the agreement. In addition, we argued that local informal leaders (*tokoh masyarakat, Imam, Mukim, Ulama, etc.*) could play a vital support role to the AMM. Unofficially, some within the AMM have shown interest in utilizing such individuals and networks. The details of exactly *how* local civil society can best be utilized needs to be thought through. This should be a priority over the coming weeks.

## **4.3 Reintegration of GAM**

A third form of intervention relates to the reintegration of GAM combatants and former political prisoners into Acehnese villages. We argued earlier that a desire for revenge and/or wariness on the part of village heads to accept them back would not be insurmountable problems. Many GAM members have families in the villages to which they will return and this will provide them with a buffer to help them reintegrate into village life.

We will not detail in this paper technical design issues related to a reintegration program. Others have taken on (and yet others will take on) this task. IOM has started designing a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program. Others, such as UNDP and the World Bank have shown interest in supporting the process of reintegration of former combatants. Rather, we will set out here just some basic principles that any reintegration program must take into account.

First, *reintegration needs to be presented as part of the broader agreement*. It will be hard for villagers to accept some GAM members back (and especially if they are being given land, housing, etc.) if they do not understand that this is but one part of a broader strategy aimed at ending the war. There are cultural symbols and phrases that can be utilized to help educate people about this.

**We suggest that the DDR program – whoever operates it – is given a name and acronym that means more to local people. One suggestion is to rename the program P-KBG.** This stands for *Pulang Kampung* (Going home to the village), *Pulang Barak* (Going home to the barracks), *Pulang Gudang* (Giving back the weapons). These are all concepts that Acehnese people freely understand. Presenting the reintegration program as just one part of a broader movement of people and weapons would help comprehension and aid acceptance.

Second, and importantly, communities who accept GAM members must also see some benefit themselves. As we noted earlier, there is a real possibility for tensions to erupt between ex-combatants who receive aid and locals who do not. Experience with IDPs elsewhere has shown the problems this can cause. Indeed, we heard of a case in Pidie where a community burned down a warehouse filled with goods for tsunami IDPs, because they themselves were poor yet had received no aid. While we argue that widely-targeted peace dividend programming can help to this end (see the next section), these programs will take a while to deliver. Communities need to see some immediate benefit.

**The best way to deal with this tension is to issue returnees with a voucher that is redeemable upon their reentry into a village.** The voucher would offer a set amount to the returnee (either in cash or kind). Every redeemed voucher would also include money for the community, paid into a common-fund for village-level activities.

Third, **have *Ulamas* (religious leaders) chair reintegration meetings**. This will add legitimacy. It will also mean that both those who sympathize with GAM and those who sympathize with GoI will attend.

#### **4.4 Provision of a Peace Dividend**

**The cornerstone of a donor strategy to support the peace process should be the provision of widespread development programming in areas previously affected by conflict.** There are a number of reasons why donors should fund an ambitious and expansive development strategy in conflict-affected areas:

- Villages in conflict-afflicted areas, and particularly in the rural mountainous interior, have received almost no development aid from government, NGOs or international donors while the conflict has raged. As such, *development indicators in these areas are often far below those in other parts of the province, including tsunami-affected areas*
- *Disparities in the provision of aid to those on the coast and those in the mountains has created high levels of tension and latent conflict* that if not addressed could, over time, undermine both the peace process and Aceh's redevelopment
- *The provision of real and visible development projects in conflict areas can help consolidate support for an end to conflict*, and can be an important means by which to build momentum behind the peace process
- *The Helsinki peace agreement creates a tremendous opportunity to bring development to many rural Achenese villages*. The improvement in security that the peace process, if successful, will bring, provides new opportunities for reaching the poor in parts of Aceh that were previously 'no go' areas

*Delivering a peace dividend in Aceh will be easier than in other post-conflict locations, and in the past in Aceh*, for a number of reasons. The tsunami resulted in an unprecedented humanitarian effort, and was followed-on by commitments not only to reconstruct what was destroyed, but to rebuild a better Aceh. There is not a shortage of money flowing in to Aceh for development purposes. "Transnational Charities" such as the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, World Vision, Oxfam, Save the Children, CARE and Catholic Relief, collectively have resources of over USD 2 billion.<sup>23</sup> This is extremely unusual for post-conflict environments, where fund raising and gaining pledges from donors is usually a slow process. The influx of multi- and bi-lateral development agencies, and NGOs (international and national), also means that many of the human resources and financial mechanisms needed to deliver development aid and programming are already in place. In many cases, a geographic expansion of existing programs is all that is needed.

A number of different *complimentary peace dividend activities* should be planned – some which deliver visible and symbolic signs of progress, others aimed at medium-term development.

### ***Immediate Visible Activities***

It is extremely important that people see immediate benefits from the peace process. Donors should fund immediately visible projects. The emphasis here is not so much on meeting community needs (as defined in a systematic way), but on delivering "quick wins" which show the potential social and economic benefits that peace can bring. In addition to choosing projects which can be delivered quickly, this phase of development programming should also focus on delivering goods which have symbolic meaning related to the conflict. Potential short-term activities include:

<sup>23</sup> World Bank (2005). "Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: A Preliminary Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort Six Months after the Earthquake and Tsunami." Draft Report.

- Re-building a small number of health posts or schools (the latter is particularly important, given that schools were often targeted in the conflict)
- Re-painting of schools
- Re-building bridges (many of which were destroyed by conflict), perhaps through cash for work programs
- Clearing trails to forest gardens (many of which became unused during the conflict)

### ***Medium-term Activities: KDP***

We have already discussed the success of KDP in Aceh. During the conflict, KDP was able to continue to operate – in many cases, it was the *only* program that was able to do so. Informants told us how people on both sides of the conflict came together in KDP meetings (see Box 10).

#### **Box 10: KDP and GAM**

*A KDP facilitator in Bireuen sub-district told us of how GAM members participate in local Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) meetings.*

“In the village meetings, sometimes GAM members attend. However, they do not use their uniforms. When this happens, the *Kepala Desa* (Village Head) informed the *kecamatan*-level program facilitator (FK) that GAM has attended. But there’s also a military post there, so the FK needs to be very careful, to make sure they are neutral ... GAM go to the meetings because they want to know about the project and contribute ideas. Normally they propose water and sanitation projects ...

Even though they go to very dangerous places, FK are able to work there. They use a strategy of approaching prominent figures in the village who are trusted by GAM. By explaining that KDP is for the community, and not political, then there are no problems ... Because of lack of coordination between the TNI at the village and sub-district level, sometimes FK are detained. But when they explain the process, and that they have coordinated at the sub-district level with the police, military and intel, they are let free. But they are subject to sweeping and are asked many questions.”

KDP works well, is accepted by both sides in the conflict, and has a network throughout Aceh. As such, it constitutes a useful mechanism through which to deliver peace dividend programming.

**We suggest that more money is put through the next round of KDP across Aceh to ensure that all villages receive a project through the program.** Normally, KDP provides limited resources at the sub-district level. Villages put forward proposals at a sub-district level meeting, but funds at the sub-district level are not enough to fund all proposals. This is a deliberate strategy. Making villages compete raises the quality of proposals, and also helps give villagers the deliberative decision-making skills necessary for democracy to work effectively at the local level.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> On this, see Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2005). *Op. cit.*

While this competition is a key component of what makes KDP effective, circumstances in Aceh are exceptional. In the short-run, it is *of utmost important that villages in Aceh see some concrete benefit from the peace process*. As such, **the KDP budget allocated for sub-district grants should be doubled for the upcoming cycle. The round would be advertised as a special ‘Peace Cycle’ to ensure that villagers can link the tangible benefits they see with the broader peace process.**

This money would be additional to the extra voucher money related to the return of combatants outlined earlier.

### ***2006-onwards: SPADA***

The Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas project (SPADA) is scheduled to become operational in early 2006. It takes the community-driven KDP planning process, and attempts to extend it up to the district level, in the process helping to link it to the Government’s district level programming. In addition, extra components focusing on human development services (health and education), access to justice, and private sector development are planned. The program was developed before both the tsunami and the Helsinki talks. However, it attempts to build on principles of conflict-sensitive planning (see next section), in order to help rebuild the social fabric of communities affected by conflict while stimulating economic development.

*SPADA provides a mechanism through which to deliver infrastructure and services that cross village and sub-district boundaries as well as district-level goods.* It provides potential entry points for more systematic work on improving local business climates and improving the functioning of the legal sector (see next section). Given the extreme need for improving district-level programming in Aceh, and the need for visible wins, thought should be given as to whether **SPADA should be expanded into the remaining districts in Aceh** (it is currently scheduled to work in 12 out of 21 districts). **If the first round of SPADA is successful, more money should be put through the program.**

### ***Livelihoods Programming***

A final area of peace dividend programming should focus on livelihoods. This is an area that has been given too little attention in the post-tsunami response. A needs assessment of disaster-affected areas and host communities receiving IDPs found that individual livelihood assistance was people’s top priority.<sup>25</sup> Interviewees we spoke to in areas affected by conflict also spoke of the provision of jobs and training as their foremost need.

It should be noted, however, that poorly planned livelihoods programs can create problems by distorting markets and destroying social capital.

“The only way to make money here is through the cash for work programs from the international NGOs. These will end this month. But people don’t realize this. It will cause big problems. Cash for work has destroyed the social dynamic. Now people won’t attend village meetings unless they are paid for it, around Rp. 35,000/person ... It is difficult to collect data. They will not give the data unless they get paid for it.”

*NGO, West Aceh*

<sup>25</sup> IOM (2005). *Settlement and Livelihood Needs and Aspirations Assessment of Disaster-Affected and Host Communities in Nangrow Aceh Darussalam.*

Thought needs to be given to the different livelihoods interventions which can best support people in areas affected by conflict.

#### 4.5 Institution Building

There is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of governance in Aceh. Both rural and urban informants repeatedly told us that the government was riddled with corruption and incapable of providing basic services and assistance to the population. Most often we heard complaints regarding the police, justice sector, as well as the TNI. However, informants were also disappointed with the quality of roads, schools and health services. Indeed, the conflict has meant that most government departments currently do not operate in rural villages. The head of Bappeda in Bireuen told us that almost his entire budget for the past three years had been spend on the district capital and that he had no idea as to what the current needs are in his ten *kecamatan*.

"The quality of local government here is very poor. They are a spoiled government. They really depend on the NGOs [to do their work]. Everything is done by the NGOs. So if there's a problem for businessmen, they say 'don't come here, please go to the NGOs'."

*Businessman, West Aceh*

Strong institutions will be required to respond to and mitigate the negative impacts of the obstacles to peace as outlined in Section 3. In particular, a professional and impartial security sector will be necessary to prevent an outbreak of general lawlessness. Without such institutions, a slide or shift to horizontal conflict characterized by criminal activity and *premanism* is likely. Similarly, preventing the privatization of security, the consequences of which are well documented, will be difficult without trusted and capable public security institutions.<sup>26</sup> Further, after the AMM's mandate expires early next year, presumably the legal system will have to deal with violations and politically motivated violence.

Finally, the MoU maps out significant changes to the structure of governance in Aceh. The legal code for Aceh will be redrafted on the basis of international human rights law; it will manage its own interests rates; significant natural resources will managed by Aceh; a human rights court for Aceh will be established, as will a Truth and Reconciliation Commission; a Reintegration Fund and, presumably, a Rehabilitation Fund will both be administered by "the authorities of Aceh". With the exception of the monitoring of the peace process, at a general level, it is unclear who in fact is responsible for managing and implementing the transition and establishing the new institutions.

***Support those responsible for the implementation of the MoU***

**Donors should provide technical and funding support for the implementation of the MoU's governance agenda.**

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<sup>26</sup> On the negative impacts of privatized security in Lampung, for example, see Yuhki Tajima (2004). "Mobilizing for Violence: The Escalation and Limitation of Identity Conflicts, the Case of Lampung, Indonesia." *Indonesian Social Development Paper* No. 3. Jakarta: World Bank.

- Support the provincial DPR, or the Kanun Aceh, in drafting its implementing legislation.
- Provide funding and Technical Assistance for the establishment of the Reintegration Fund and the Reconstruction Fund,<sup>27</sup> ensuring principles of accountability, transparency and participation are built-in to the mechanisms of these new institutions.
- Strengthen the capacity of the authorities of Aceh to develop and implement agricultural and natural resource policy. Ensure principles and mechanisms for accountability, transparency and participation are incorporated.
- Consider supporting a social and economic policy research department at a local university.

### ***Improving Local Government***

"The community hope that government programs will be good. But they have had bad experiences. People see nothing [resulting from government programs], so it creates a bad perception. People see the budget, but there are no changes at the grassroots level. So it is hopeless to put programs through the government ... People want all documents related to the APBD [budget] published in the newspaper. NGOs should also report publicly."

*NGO, Lhokseumawe*

Overall, donors should support activities that increase the **accountability and transparency of local government as well as encourage participatory budgetary and planning processes**. A more thorough strategy to achieve this is necessary. However, some concrete activities could include:

- Completion of a Public Expenditure Review at the provincial and district levels.
- Strengthening and supporting *Rakorbang* (Development Coordination Meetings). These should include making them more transparent and participatory, as well as improving their position vis-à-vis the local government's budgeting processes.
- Strengthen and support the capacity of civil society groups to monitor government budgeting and expenditure, the justice sector, as well their capacity to participate in government budgetary and planning mechanisms.
- Support the establishment of a joint government team to monitor and control illegal logging. Such a team would need to involve the Department of Forestry (Dephut), Environmental Protection Agency (BAPEDALSA), the Police, and the Prosecutor's Office.

### ***Justice Sector***

"Not only here, but over all of Aceh, law enforcement is stagnant after the tsunami. There will be many cases over land boundaries. All component of law enforcement are weak. Before the tsunami, there were lots of problems. The people don't want to use the judicial system to address their problems, because they have no money [and it is too expensive]. Land is a big problem, also criminality, also corruption."

*Advocate, West Aceh*

<sup>27</sup> The MoU is unclear whether these are one or, in fact, two funds. See Articles 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.

The justice sector in Aceh is particularly weak. A review carried out by UNDP in 2003 concluded, “the justice system in Aceh has virtually collapsed, partially as result of the ongoing conflict, and partially as a result of institutional failure.”<sup>28</sup>

Donors can support the establishment of an efficient and impartial justice sector. A comprehensive response should focus on two aspects of the justice sector:

- *Strengthening the management of the State Courts, Syariah Courts and the Prosecutor’s Office.* This could include improving human resource and case management, including case information systems (CIS), ensuring processes of dissemination of case decisions, offering mediation services, increasing expert legal knowledge of court staff, as well as improving the courts’ civil education responsibilities.
- *Building the capacity of civil society to deliver legal aid services, to advocate and to monitor the courts.* This could involve increasing the capacity of existing legal NGOs to provide legal advice and dispute resolution training to rural communities, raising the standard of legal education and building trust in the justice sector, establishing legal aid posts at the *kecamatan* level, as well as targeting the legal needs of the marginalized such as women, widows, orphans and IDPs. The World Bank’s Justice for the Poor, through the SPADA project, already includes a law and dispute resolution component which plans to operate in four Acehnese districts. This component aims to strengthen local capacities to resolve conflicts in an inclusive, independent and just manner and to build community trust in, and access to, the justice sector. Other donors could piggy-back on this model to provide such services to areas currently not covered.

Donors should best move this forward by commissioning a comprehensive justice sector needs assessment.<sup>29</sup>

### **Security Sector**

“We hope for a peaceful resolution on the 15<sup>th</sup> August. The police will play an important role over the coming months. We are ready but we need to increase our human resource capacity. Community policing, negotiation training ... all of those are very important. But we also need new equipment. This would provide a real boost to our morale.”

*District Police Head, Lhokseumawe*

An efficient and impartial security sector will be crucial for ensuring the peace process runs smoothly and that any violations are responded to professionally and impartially. Indeed, in one incident just days after the peace agreement was signed, police threatened amnestied political prisoners as they were freed.<sup>30</sup>

- *Donors should support community policing training at both the district level (Polres) and kecamatan level (Polsek).* Such a program can draw on an action research training program that the World Bank successfully carried out with local police in East Java and Flores. This experience showed that police practice is based more on personal aptitude and learning by example/doing than on formal police training.

<sup>28</sup> UNDP (2003). “Access to Justice: A Review of the Justice System in Aceh, Indonesia.” Draft. para 1.

<sup>29</sup> UNDP’s 2003 review provides a good framework for such an assessment.

<sup>30</sup> Tiarmo Siboro and Nani Afrida, ‘Helsinki Spirit Put to a Test in Aceh’, The Jakarta Post, 18 August 2005.

- In addition to training, *provide the police with the resources and equipment necessary to do their job professionally.*
- *Improving community-police relations.* Donors should work to improve the police as a public institution. Increasing the transparency and accountability of its decision-making mechanisms at the level at which police respond to problems (the *Polsek* at the *kecamatan* level) is necessary.
- *Design programs that help counter the economic incentives for extortion and other illegal activities.* This will require a combination of stick and carrot programming.

Again, the best way for donors to move forward would be to conduct a comprehensive and participatory needs assessment of the security sector.

#### 4.6 Conflict-Sensitive Development Principles

So far we have considered different areas for intervention by development actors. This section outlines some key principles that should guide these interventions. Development programs which aim to be ‘conflict sensitive’ or to explicitly address the causes of conflict can be effective in reducing levels of social tension whilst providing social and economic benefits. At the same time, poorly designed programs and projects – in introducing new resources and rules into communities – can make things worse.<sup>31</sup> Key design principles include:

- Perceived equitability of targeting
- Community-driven approaches
- A focus on processes as well as outputs
- Building in complaints mechanisms
- A focus on ensuring transparency and accountability
- Use of independent civil society
- Including the Government at different levels in planning and implementation
- Providing support to field staff

#### *Distributional issues and targeting*

Programs targeted at particular population groups at the expense of others are more likely to be problematic than those targeted more widely. Our field-work found significant tensions over the geographic targeting of tsunami aid.

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<sup>31</sup> On the nexus between conflict and development, and more on how to design programs in conflict-sensitive ways, see Patrick Barron, Rachael Diprose and Michael Woolcock (forthcoming). *Local Conflict and Community Development in Indonesia: Assessing the Impact of the Kecamatan Development Program*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

"There is a gap [in living standards] between the tsunami-affected people and conflict victims. There is a need to focus on the latter."

*NGO, West Aceh*

"There is no need to differentiate between tsunami and conflict victims. They are both victims. Within the village, there needs to be a program for *all* poor people."

*NGO, Pidie*

"In Nagan Raya district, there are 222 villages. Only 16 were directly affected by the tsunami. The services in the tsunami areas are now very good, while in non-tsunami areas they are not yet good."

*Security guard, Nagan Raya*

The key informant survey also reported tensions both between areas that received aid and those that did not and between people who received aid and people who did not. A potential problem we highlighted above is if aid is targeted only at ex-combatants and prisoners, and maybe a limited number of narrowly-defined conflict 'victims'. As we discussed in Section 3.1, most villagers are poor and most people are perceived as victims of conflict. Giving aid to only segments of the population may prove self-defeating.

In order to avoid such tensions, a number of principles should be applied:

- Whenever a program is launched targeted at a specific population group (e.g. combatants), it should be advertised as being part of a wider program of aid
- As much as possible, communities should decide who should be targeted (e.g. through demand-driven processes – see below)
- For larger programs, targeting should be as wide as possible, e.g. at the village and, in cases, the *kecamatan* level

### ***Community-driven approaches***

Community-driven approaches have a number of benefits. First, end projects are more likely to reflect real community needs. Second, the process of having communities decide how to use money, and of them implementing the program themselves, helps limit corruption and also makes it more likely that communities will continue to care for the outputs of the project (e.g. a well, or a road) over time. Third, if communities themselves take part in decision-making, they are more likely to understand the processes by which decisions are made and hence accept the outcomes of the program. Levels of project-related conflict are considerably lower when demand-driven processes are used.<sup>32</sup>

Our research also found that in fractured environments like Aceh, where tensions exist between two sides, community-driven development programs are more likely to be perceived as neutral, and hence acceptable, by both sides:

<sup>32</sup> See Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (forthcoming) *op. cit.* In research areas in East Java and NTT, they found only one violent conflict related to the demand-driven KDP between 2001 and 2003, compared to 37 related to other programs.

“There is no problem in implementing demand-driven programs here because GAM support them. In 2000, the district government collapsed. There was an emergency program from central government. I was given the job of monitoring it in dangerous areas. GAM accepted the program and guarded me. For development programs that are demand-driven and aimed at the poor, there are no problems. GAM want to be free from Indonesia, but they also want to be free from poverty.”

*Academic, Lhokseumawe*

This is one of the reasons why KDP has been so successful in Aceh, while many other programs have been unable to operate.

### ***Concentrate on processes as well as outputs***

Related to this, interventions in conflict areas, and in post-conflict environments, need to focus as much on processes as outcomes. The end outputs of development projects (schools, health centers, irrigation schemes, etc.) are unlikely in themselves to contribute to sustainable peace. However, the processes by which they are designed can contribute towards improved relations – both within society, and between society and the state. Development projects are delivered through mechanisms which can also be used for dialogue and conflict mediation. Development agencies seeking to build resistance to conflict in areas of Aceh previously affected by unrest should consider the mechanisms by which they will deliver development goods as much as the development outputs themselves.

### ***Build-in complaints mechanisms***

It is extremely important that development programs operating in conflict environments have clear and institutionalized complaints mechanism. In polarized environments, it is likely that particular groups will try to ‘capture’ programs. We heard stories of both GAM and the TNI attempting to take over development projects, or to requisition the benefits that arise from them. Many conflicts triggered by development programs are the result of program malfunctions and frustrations with processes, with no or weak avenues for recourse. Key principles for complaints mechanisms include the following:

- Complaints mechanisms should be accessible to beneficiaries
- The availability of complaints mechanisms should be clearly advertised
- Programs should have mechanisms for reporting back on investigations of complaints

### ***Focus on ensuring transparency and accountability to limit corruption and suspicion***

Corruption is rife in Aceh. Yet while talk of corruption is common in Banda Aceh, the same discourse has, by and large, yet to reach the district level. One informant in North Aceh estimated that half the district budget had been corrupted. Combating corruption – through improving transparency and accountability mechanisms – is one of the most important needs throughout in Indonesia. In conflict areas, ensuring programs are not corrupted is even more pressing.

International experience suggests that financial gain from conflict can be a major reason why warring parties fail to uphold peace agreements.<sup>33</sup> The experience in Aceh mirrors this, with incentives to try to maintain control of illegal revenue sources (on both sides) probably the biggest obstacle to the effective implementation of the peace agreement (see Section 3.1). The peace agreement, if fully implemented, will

<sup>33</sup> See Burke and Arfan (2005). *Op. cit.*

see increased sums of money flowing in to the provincial and district government coffers. Seventy percent of revenues from all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources will remain in Aceh (Article 1.3.4), making the province one of the richest in Indonesia. If the experience of decentralization elsewhere in Indonesia is anything to go by, this will lead to increased attempts at elite capture.<sup>34</sup>

### *Use independent civil society*

Many assessments of civil society in Aceh characterize it as weak, marginalized and politicized. We found a very different picture. Strong NGOs existed in every district we visited. Many had vast experience in community development programming. With the in-flux of INGOs, many are now used to working with international partners. Having to work in an extremely sensitive and polarized conflict environment has meant that many have had to become expert at balancing sides, building trust with communities, and working under adverse circumstances. Indeed, the picture of NGO capacity is much rosier than in many other areas of Indonesia, including parts of Java.

Local NGOs are a vital resource. As discussed earlier, many have networks to the village level and command trust from local leaders. Given the risks that were attached to working for a NGO during the martial law period after COHA (many TNI and GoI personnel regarded NGOs as automatically supporting GAM), the staff of most local NGOs were extremely committed and dedicated individuals.<sup>35</sup>

Donors should make use of local NGOs. In doing so, they should be aware of a number of tensions and lessons that can be learnt from the tsunami reconstruction effort. First, whereas many local NGOs are comfortable playing a subordinate role to international organizations (in the usual donor-recipient development relationship), many are less happy being managed by Indonesians from outside of Aceh, especially those from Java. Second, talented (and, in particular, English-speaking) Acehnese now have employment opportunities at international NGOs and donors. This means that local NGOs have to pay higher wages to retain key staff. This, in turn, bumps up the cost of sub-contracting to local NGOs. Donors should expect to pay more for the services of local organizations in Aceh than they would do elsewhere. Don't forget the Government

Many organizations who came into Aceh after the tsunami acted as if there was not a functioning government in the province. To some extent, this was true, at least initially. Many government personnel were killed, and much of the governance infrastructure was destroyed in the worst hit areas. Yet, over time, the situation has changed and reasonably functional bureaucracies have emerged at both the provincial and district levels. Despite tremendously high levels of corruption, Indonesia is not a failed state. Government often moves slowly, but donors and development agencies must engage them, in particular in conflict-related work.

First, by-passing government structures is not a long-term strategy, in particular in terms of sustainability. If Government does not 'own' to some extent the programs, it is unlikely that they will continue once donor

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<sup>34</sup> On the experience of this in Kalimantan, see John McCarthy (2004). "Changing to Grey: Decentralization and the Emergence of Volatile Socio-Legal Configurations in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia." *World Development*. 32 (7): 1199-1223.

<sup>35</sup> Whether this is also true for the members of the many NGOs who formed after the tsunami remains to be seen.

funding dries up. Second, and as we discussed in Section 4.5, weak government institutions are both a symptom and a cause of conflict. Strengthening institutions is necessary to make sure conflict does not reemerge, and this involves – in some shape or form – engaging existing institutions.

### *Support field staff*

Our final design principle is one often overlooked, in particular by organizations concerned with getting money out quickly. Development programs, especially those working at the local level, are driven by chains of people. The experience of KDP has shown that the quality of the program is in large part a function of the quality and dedication of the people who implement it. In conflict areas, where staff constantly put themselves at risk, having strong support systems is of even more importance. Supporting field staff is important both for functional reasons (so that programs work well) and for ethical ones.

Three areas for improving the support field staff receive emerged during our fieldwork. These were ideas put forward both by KDP facilitators and by those who work for NGOs with vertical relationships to non-field based staff (e.g. in Banda Aceh or Jakarta).

The first concerns *training*. Working in conflict areas, where populations are polarized and trust in the institutions of the state is minimal, is a constant balancing act. We wrote earlier of the unenviable task of village heads in trying to create a neutral space in which villagers could live a simple and productive life. Working as a local facilitator for an NGO or international organization is often similar. Field staff told us that increased training – in particular in conflict mediation – would both aid them in their job and increase their confidence working in highly dangerous areas.

Second, there is often a need to *improve reporting structures* from the field to headquarters and, related, the back-up that field staff receive from those higher up the chain. Many of the KDP staff we spoke to felt that they did not receive adequate support from above when they ran into problems, including with issues such as arbitrary arrest.

Third, organizations should think about *developing early warning information systems* for their staff, which would allow easy communication of information from above (e.g. targeted warning for certain staff to be careful), or for information to rise from the field to the office, so that decisions could be made for when to pull out staff. Developing systems using text messaging or other media would help field staff in their jobs.

## V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The agreement signed in Helsinki on August 15<sup>th</sup>, 2005 is but one step on the road to peace in Aceh. In many ways there are reasons for optimism. The new agreement is more comprehensive than COHA. A number of factors – including the devastating tsunami of late last year, a change in political leadership in Jakarta, and a weakening of GAM – changed the context in which the talks took place. There appears to be political will from high levels on both sides for the peace process to be successful.

However, much work remains to be done. The Memorandum of Understanding does provide a holistic package but many implementation details are unclear. Civil society has not been extensively involved in the peace process, and there is a massive perceived gap between the words of elites in Jakarta, Helsinki and Banda Aceh, and actions on the ground. Local dynamics will also impact on the likelihood of success. Individuals at the local level within GAM, TNI and the police have incentives to try to spoil the peace process and, in many cases, have the agency to do so. The history of conflict has led to high levels of mistrust: between communities, between communities and the state, and between communities and GAM. Moving forward – including the reintegration of former combatants – will be a delicate and tricky process. High levels of local conflict and criminality exist in Aceh, and are only likely to increase as those involved in extortion and with illegal business interests look for new sources of revenue.

We have argued that while challenges remain, development actors have tremendous scope for helping to shape the peace process in ways that make its success more likely. Development agencies, in general, and the World Bank, in particular, should be active in their engagement with the peace process. Opportunities exist to support core elements of the agreement, such as the reintegration package. Social and economic development programming can also be used to alleviate the suffering of the Acehnese people whilst shaping incentives in ways that make sustainable peace more likely. Use can also be made of existing networks to feed information up and down the system, between those implementing the agreement and those on the ground in Acehnese villages, and vice versa. Planning interventions in conflict-sensitive ways – in particular, using demand-driven processes and thinking carefully about targeting – is of vital importance.

The unprecedented response (national and international) to the tsunami has created opportunities for response to the conflict. Human resources and aid delivery mechanisms are already in place. The tsunami response also creates a moral obligation for donors such as the World Bank to get actively involved in re-building areas affected by the conflict, “Aceh’s second great disaster”. In many parts of Aceh, those affected by conflict, and especially those in the mountainous interior, are now at least as poorly off as those who were directly impacted by the tsunami. Villages in conflict-afflicted areas, and particularly in the rural mountainous interior, have received almost no development aid from government, NGOs or international donors while the conflict has raged. The improvement in security that the peace process (if successful) will bring, provides new opportunities for reaching some of the poorest people in Aceh.

We have argued that the best case scenario – if the peace agreement holds – is a transformation of the conflict in Aceh from a vertical one concerning the status of Aceh (within or independent from the Indonesian state) to one involving a horizontal scramble for resources and revenue streams, underpinned by widespread

violent criminality. Addressing these issues requires a focus on building and strengthening institutions, including the justice and security sector. This necessitates longer-term engagement.

The Helsinki agreement represents the best chance for peace Aceh has had for years. The World Bank, and others, should devote resources (human and financial) to helping to make sure that it succeeds.

### ANNEX: TIMELINE OF THE CONFLICT IN ACEH

GAM's Perspective	Events	Government of Indonesia's Perspective
Daud Beureueh leads Darul Islam/TII against government after government fails to live up to promise to apply <i>syariah</i> law in Aceh. GAM as successor to TII following movement's defeat.	<b>December 1976</b> Declaration of the formation of the Free Aceh Movement by Hasan Tiro in Pidie	September 1962 marks the last day Acehnese fought Jakarta, as Daud Beureuh surrendered to government. The 'new' movement (GAM) considered an insignificant threat in comparison with DI/TII.
GAM prepared for long struggle, including the possibility of destruction and torture, to secure independence from Indonesia.	<b>August 1989</b> Military Operation Zone imposed to destroy GAM	With a powerful military and the legislative controlled by the president, it was a simple decision to go to war to protect the unitary state of Indonesia.
With the Indonesian Government in transition from the New Order regime to the reformation era, resulting political instability viewed as a good opportunity for the movement to pursue GAM's unfinished agenda of independence from Indonesia.	<b>October 1998</b> Indonesian troops withdraw after 10 years operating in the Military Operation Zone (DOM). This operation killed 12,000 civilians, and human rights groups recorded 120 different kinds of torture used. Resulting in long lasting trauma for Acehnese.	After 10 years military operation, government forces bound to have destroyed the 150 GAM members sought from start of campaign. With the security situation under control, persistently the security is under control, local authorities guarantee that rebellion quashed, as chain of command destroyed.
With the number of Indonesian troops on the decrease, the timing was ripe to attack government apparatus in order to gain territorial control and so gain freedom from Indonesia.	<b>Early 1999</b> As GAM power increased, and GAM ideology spread, member numbers throughout Aceh grew, GAM began to display its power, leading to an increase in the number of fire-fights, fighting, killing, abduction, ambush, burnings and the displacement of persons throughout Aceh.	The Indonesian government's responsibility to keep guard its territory from the rebel movement is paramount.
GAM's struggle successfully harnessed the power of university students to support their cause. GAM used this opportunity to encourage people to attend the rally in order to plant independence ideology and gain international attention.	<b>November 1999</b> Mass gathering for referendum rally. 1.5 million people gathered in Banda Aceh to demand Acehnese self-determination in reaction to the government's response about the condition of Aceh.	Acehnese community considered too weak to push government to grant independence. However, the rally marked the peak of the central government's 'disappointment' in the GAM movement.

<p>The Humanitarian Pause provides good opportunity to consolidate troops and strengthen GAM strongholds.</p>	<p><b>September 2000</b> The sadistic violence of conflict in Aceh has gained international attention. The Humanitarian pause, signed by Gol and GAM, allows the international community to distribute relief for the victims of the conflict. This was also a point of departure for the ceasefire and peace process.</p>	<p>Due to national and international criticism of the military, the government decides to change its strategy from offensive to defensive.</p>
<p>Confidence high. Soldiers are strong, following consolidation, and as the result of having the people's financial support to purchase weapons. This was the peak of GAM's power and popularity.</p>	<p><b>March 2001</b> High tension and violence throughout Aceh as GAM attacks military posts.</p>	<p>Government responds by increasing number of troops to balance and reduce GAM's power.</p>
<p>Following on from the success of the political struggle, the next step was to interpret the COHA to allow for local elections as the gateway to independence.</p>	<p><b>Dec 2002</b> Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) signed by Gol and GAM brokered by Hendry Dunant Centre. CoHA was to be the first step in the peaceful resolution of Acehese conflict. Learning from the failure of the Humanitarian Pause, the COHA deploys a Tripartite Monitoring Team to monitor the terms of the agreement.</p>	<p>COHA provides for Special Autonomy for GAM. Government waits for GAM to acknowledge the integrity of the unitary state of Indonesia.</p>
<p>The benefit of the collapse of COHA was increased international attention to GAM's cause.</p>	<p><b>April 2003</b> The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement collapses. Monitoring team recalled to Banda Aceh.</p>	<p>Many points of COHA violated by GAM. International monitoring team was not neutral in monitoring points of agreement. Government feels it is appropriate to withdraw from the agreement.</p>
<p>GAM prepared to face the consequence of struggle.</p>	<p><b>May 2003</b> Martial Law imposed, 50,000 troops deployed.</p>	<p>Destroying all GAM elements was seen as being the only solution once the negotiation process had failed.</p>
<p>GAM fighters have local advantage, using knowledge of terrain to avoid and defeat the military. GAM leaders search for political solutions.</p>	<p><b>May 2004</b> Civil Emergency imposed, government troops remain deployed.</p>	<p>A year long operation not enough to destroy GAM, although the security situation had improved, and operations could be reduced.</p>

<p>With numbers of GAM fighters down and GAM power diminished, the time is right for a political solution.</p>	<p><b>December 2004</b>                  Earthquake and Tsunami hit Aceh, leaving 165,000 killed and 30,000 missing, as well as causing Rp. 4,5 trillion in damages.</p>	<p>Government seeks to show commitment to the peaceful development of Aceh.</p>
<p>GAM demands that local parties be allowed to participate in local direct elections (the democratic solution)</p>	<p><b>June 2005</b>                  Both parties agree to end 30 years conflict</p>	<p>The five negotiations result in GAM goodwill and the acknowledgement of Indonesian territorial unity. Problem solved comprehensively.</p>
<p>The GoI is willing to resolve conflict by providing for self-government within the Indonesian state.</p>	<p><b>August 2005</b>                  GoI and GAM sign a peace agreement to create a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to conflict in Aceh, with dignity for all.</p>	<p>The resolution of conflict in Aceh will be a credit to the government if the peace process runs smoothly. National development could accelerate and security improve.</p>



**THE WORLD BANK**

1818 H Street N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

Phone : (202) 458-1876

Fax : (202) 522-1557/1560

e-mail : [books@worldbank.org](mailto:books@worldbank.org)

website : [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

**THE WORLD BANK OFFICE JAKARTA**

Jakarta Stock Exchange Building

Tower II/12th Fl.

Jl. Jenderal Sudirman Kav. 52-53

Jakarta 12910

Phone : (6221) 5299-3000

Fax : (6221) 5299-3111

website : [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

website : [www.conflictanddevelopment.org](http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org)