

INEQUALITY, ETHNICITY AND SOCIAL DISORDER: THE ECUADORIAN CASE¹

Jeannette Sánchez²
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Abstract

This paper makes a comparative analysis of the Ecuadorian case with Figueroa and Barrón's paper "*Inequality, Ethnicity, and Social Disorder in Peru*" (2005). Thus, this work adopts the same theoretical approach of Figueroa and Barrón. After showing that there is a pronounced horizontal inequality in Ecuador, the major problem to solve is proving whether ethnicity plays a prime role in social disorder and if this will push institutional changes that will decrease horizontal inequality endogenously. High horizontal inequality for Ecuador is shown in the cases of education and income. Those results coincide with those of the Peruvian study. However, in Ecuador indigenous workers are not only excluded but also discriminated in the labor market. This paper argues that the role of horizontal inequality in the instability of Ecuador has become increasingly significant, particularly in the last two decades, not only in an indirect way as in the Peruvian case, but also in a direct way. Thereby ethnic conflict has become an important factor of social disorder in the contemporaneous Ecuador and it is currently more important than the class conflict. This is so despite the current apparent weakness of the indigenous movement in Ecuador, after its participation in the last government (that was ousted, albeit after a falling out with the indigenous movement). Indigenous collective actions have pushed many political and legal changes in Ecuador in favor of their movement and rights, but not enough to change horizontal inequalities. In Ecuador, as in Peru, indigenous populations are considered second-rate citizens. Thus, it seems that there has not been a sufficient endogenous force in Ecuador capable of making an important difference in the huge economic horizontal disparities, although we should consider that legal and political changes are too recent to be conclusively evaluated. Certain explanations about the different features of the indigenous population participation between the Ecuadorian and the Peruvian cases are related to some historical and even geographical characteristics and the role of external agents. To conclude, in the Ecuadorian case, the empirical results show consistency with the Horizontal Inequality theory (Stewart, 2001). Those results also show consistency with the Sigma's Theory (Figueroa, 2003), except in the fact that ethnic conflict is becoming an important direct factor of social disorder.

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² Social development researcher at the Integrated System of Social Indicators of Ecuador, SIISE-STFS. This paper does not necessarily reflect the position of SIISE.

Introduction

This paper makes a comparative analysis of the Ecuadorian case with Figueroa and Barrón's paper "*Inequality, Ethnicity and Social Disorder in Peru*", (hereafter ISDP). In order to do so, this work adopts the same theoretical approaches that Figueroa and Barrón do. The major problem to solve is proving if there is inter-group inequality and whether ethnicity plays a prime role in the generation of social disorder. Finally, a further issue to analyze is whether social disorder derived from individual or collective action will push institutional changes that will decrease horizontal inequality endogenously.

In the Peruvian case, Figueroa and Barrón (2005) find a significant and persistent horizontal inequality. Education levels, for instance, the proxy variable used for individual assets, depends upon ethnicity. However the authors argue there is exclusion and not discrimination in the labor market. Considering the role of indigenous people in reducing inequality, the conclusion is that ethnic conflict is not a prime mover in social disorder. The explanation attempted is, given the domination history, indigenous peoples are considered second rate citizens in the Peruvian society, and thus, this inequality do contributes to social disorder in Peru, but only in an indirect way. Finally, contrasting and analyzing the facts of the Peruvian case, the authors find consistency with Sigma Theory (Figueroa 2003) and with some predictions of Horizontal Inequality Theory (2001), but inconsistency with the Neoclassical Theory.

This paper seeks to compare those results with the Ecuadorian case. The document is structured in eight sections: 1) theoretical guide; 2) brief historical and geographical background; 3) Ecuador's social structure; 4) horizontal inequalities; 5) internal migration; 6) collective actions; 7) government behavior; and, 8) institutional changes. Finally, the paper attempts some conclusions regarding the initial problem and contrasts them with the conclusions of Figueroa and Barrón's paper about the Peruvian case.

1. Theoretical guide

As mentioned, this paper is based upon the theoretical approach developed in ISDP. The following paragraphs summarize briefly the main points.

There are three main theoretical frameworks that the ISDP paper considers to relate horizontal inequality and social disorder and the role of ethnicity: neoclassical theory (Becker and Murphy, 2000), horizontal inequality theory (Stewart, 2001) and sigma's theory (Figueroa, 2003).

Neoclassical theory assumes that different social groups do not affect the process of production and distribution in society. It is as if ethnic groups did not exist (Figueroa and Barrón 2005). Even in the case of recent works that regard social heterogeneity (Becker and Murphy 2000) that leads to inequality and segregation, it is assumed that it does not generate social violence.

Thus, in order to relate inequality, ethnicity and social disorder, Figueroa and Barrón (2005) consider other two different theoretical approaches: horizontal inequality theory and sigma's theory.

Horizontal inequality theory (Stewart, 2001) argues that severe horizontal inequalities in multicultural societies, meaning an inequality between culturally defined groups, are a crucial factor for social violence.

Sigma's theory (Figueroa, 2003) explains the important role of ethnicity and inequality in the economic process and finds a causal relationship between inequality and social disorder. *Sigma society is an abstract capitalist society where individuals participate in the production process endowed with unequal quantities of economic and social assets* (ISDP, p.2) including political and cultural differences among ethnic groups. That inequality is reproduced by exclusion mechanisms that operate in this type of societies. Exclusion affects particularly the ethnic groups dominated under the colonial foundational shock (z-workers). On the other side, the theory of limited tolerance to inequality makes the connection between inequality and social disorder (Figueroa, 2003). According to this theory, society and individuals have thresholds of tolerance towards inequality; over those thresholds, individuals may cause disorder. Therefore an unequal society is more likely to generate social disorder.

In Sigma society, social disorder comes from class struggle and ethnic conflicts through collective actions and intolerant individual attitudes towards excessive inequality. The theoretical prediction is that z-workers, those poor and excluded, cannot generate directly social disorder. Ethnic conflict becomes significant indirectly only if political actors take up the ethnic question. The final hypothesis in the ISDP paper is that income inequality will not change endogenously.

2. Brief historical and geographical background

Ecuador and Peru have many common geographical and historical references; nevertheless there are also specificities and differences. The knowledge of those specificities could help us to understand some of the different political results between the indigenous peoples from both countries, even if the economic and social results are mostly alike. It is important to warn, however that the reflection that follows is not a complete one and it has many hypotheses to be more deeply analyzed by historians. The goal here is to give a brief background of historical and geographical facts that establishes a framework for the further discussion.

Ecuador is the smallest country among the Andean countries. It is settled in an area of 256 thousand Km², only one fifth of the Peruvian area. There are four different physical regions: the Coast, the Andes, the Amazonian region and the insular region. All of them have different climates and ecological niches. The country has one of the highest biodiversity by hectare in the world, which has also conditioned a very high cultural diversity since even the pre-Inca times. According to some authors, this explains in part why indigenous peoples in this territorial space did not become a large empire, but a network of smaller communities (Larrea and Montenegro, 2004). Differentiation was very

important for keeping cultural identity, even among small groups living close to each other, which did not prevent the formation of active intergroup relationships (Sánchez, 1989). Keeping alliances was very important for indigenous communities' survival, which was based on a vertical control of ecological levels and the consequent access to different types of products.

Strong mercantile traditions linked these populations across the mountain ranges, rivers and deep ravines, generating routes and critical spaces for different types of exchange. These links represented important socio-economic bonds, as well as a rich cultural exchange that allowed these multifarious groups to maintain their ethnic identity while collectively controlling large stretches of land. (Larrea and Montenegro, 2004: 1)

This ability to relate with each other while keeping high cultural resilience on one hand, and, on the other hand, their ability to adapt to different political as well as social and economic conditions after their own conflicts for controlling productive lands and after the conquest first by the Incas and then by the Spanish could give us some clues for understanding part of the indigenous contemporary strength and organizational ability, despite their own differences in Ecuador.

It is important to mention also that in Ecuador the Inca period was very short, less than half of a century before the Spanish arrival in the sixteenth century. The Incas did not have enough time to change many pre-Inca cultures in Ecuador such as those of the spatial and productive management practices mentioned before.

The colonial period lasted three centuries, changed in many ways the spatial and production system, and provoked the loss of numerous indigenous populations. Deler, Gómez and Portais (1983) estimated at between one-half and two-thirds the deaths of indigenous population by the end of the sixteenth century. Explaining factors are the war of conquest, the new diseases introduced by the Spanish, the escapes to inhospitable regions, and the hard labor conditions that operated through the *mita* that forced the entire indigenous communities to work. The Spanish oppression operated over the main indigenous symbols, beliefs and power centers. Even though this is true for Ecuador and Peru, in the Peruvian case, the main Spanish center, Lima, operated in the Coast, far from the main Andean and Amazon indigenous communities; whereas in Ecuador, the Spanish power centre operated in Quito, an important Andean indigenous spatial referent. Whether this can make any difference in the behavior of the indigenous population is not that evident. In any case, authors like Lein (1952 quoted in Larrea and Montenegro 2004) point out some differences such as the earlier cultural miscegenation that happened in Ecuador compared with the cases of Bolivia and Peru. In terms of their economic roles, Peru was an important minerals provider, while Ecuador specialized in textile manufacturing (*Obrajes*). The minerals exploitation production implied moving labor force to work in places many times far from their communities, while textile production functioned inside the new production colonial unit, the *Hacienda*, where many indigenous communities although dominated co-existed. This could have made a difference in the latter interethnic relationships.

Later on, during the republican period and at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the insertion of Ecuador in the international market based on exports of agricultural products (cacao, banana), added to the development of the train routes that connected the Andes and the Coast, resulted in an important population migration from the Highlands to the Coast. This demographic movement changed the population distribution in Ecuador, as well as fomented the urbanization process. Although there are not enough statistics to document that process, indigenous populations were involved in a very important way. Given the precarious living conditions of the indigenous communities—they were forced to settle mostly on low quality highlands as well as their limitations for accessing to natural resources—the indigenous population has constantly migrated in Ecuador, although not too far from their regions of origin, to the urban centers, either temporarily or permanently.

Currently, according to the Social Indicator System of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (CODENPE-SIISE 2005) there are thirteen indigenous nationalities in Ecuador. The Kichua nationality settled in the Andean region is the most numerous indigenous group and it includes many peoples with different cultural identities such as Karanki, Natabuela, Otavalo, Kayambi, Kitukara, Panzaleo, Salasaca, Chibuleo, Puruhá, Waranka, Kañari, Saraguro. In the Amazonian region there are nine nationalities: Achuar, A'í Cofán, Huaorani, Kichua, Secoya, Shiwiari, Shuar, Siona and Zápara. Finally in the Coast four groups have been identified: Awá, Chachi, Epera and Tsa'chila. Besides these nationalities and peoples, there are other indigenous peoples that claim own identities or are in the process of recovering their identities even though they have already lost many cultural traits such as the language.³

Despite this cultural diversity and because of a domination system that with formal changes has remained during all this time (Guerrero, 2000), indigenous peoples in Ecuador are the poorest. They have the lowest formal education level (exclusion from public goods); also they gain the lowest economic returns on education (discrimination in the labor market). This will be shown below. However, indigenous peoples in Ecuador in contrast with the Peruvian case have gained political power mainly during the last two decades. Whether this new political power will make any difference in the huge horizontal inequalities, is difficult to foresight. In any case, this situation makes the Ecuadorian case an interesting one to analyze regarding the other Andean countries; here we will focus in contrasting with the Peruvian case.

3. Ecuador's Social Structure

Since there is not sufficient reliable data on physical capital and land in Ecuador, human capital will be used as an approach to individual endowments, to verify unequal individual quantities of economic assets that generally reflects social classes. A proxy variable for human capital is years of schooling, even though in the case of heterogeneous societies such as Ecuador or Peru, schooling is not a perfect equivalent of human capital, because it also depends on cultural traits and even race.

³ See CODENPE-SIISE. 2005. SIDENPE website: www.codenpe.org.ec

To define empirically the ethnic category, this paper has chosen a multi criteria approach that considers place of origin, as in the Figueroa and Barrón's paper, but also language and self definition. The same critiques that ISDP makes about ethnic data, considering language and self-definition in the case of Perú can be applied to Ecuador. People can hide the fact of being indigenous because of the domination system that has historically discriminated and excluded the indigenous population. There are even direct economic reasons, since being indigenous was associated to payment of tributes mainly during the colonial period. Many indigenous people, on the other hand, have already lost its native language. Thus this paper considers those variables only as relative and reference estimations. It is assumed that if what matters is not absolute data but relative data for estimating inequalities and geographic distribution of the indigenous population, as it is in this paper, then, those statistics are relatively useful.

In Ecuador there are different sources that consider ethnic criteria such as: the population census, particularly the most recent one, of 2001⁴ and the Third Agricultural Census (2001), that include language and ethnic self definition; relatively recent surveys that have incorporated the same questions, such as the Infancy and Households Indicators Survey (*Encuesta de Medición de Indicadores de la Niñez y los Hogares, EMEDINHO, 2000*). While questions about language were already stated in previous census, the question of self-identification is a new variable in the statistics of Ecuador.

Census data (2001) and surveys data (EMEDINHO 2000)⁵ coincide that around 6,6% of the population aged 15 and older are indigenous, defined as those who speak a native language (not necessarily exclusively) or those who are self defined as indigenous. But if it is added also the population whose parents spoke native languages, the figure reaches more than 14.3% (EMEDINHO 2000). Afro-descendant population, on the other hand, represents only 2,2% of the total population according to the census data (2001), but it is 5,7% according to surveys data (EMEDINHO 2000).

It can be argued that even that 14,3% underestimates the actual indigenous population in Ecuador, because, as we have told, in a hierarchical society, as the Ecuadorian society is, people hide the fact of being indigenous and many indigenous have left of speaking its native language. In fact, there are sources that consider higher indigenous population shares such as 25%⁶ and even 38%⁷ in the total Ecuadorian population. However, the primary sources of those figures are not very clear, and certainly they are not official statistics. On the other hand, historically the share of indigenous population in the total

⁴ INEC. 2002. VI Censo de Población y V de Vivienda, 2001 (includes questions on language and self-identification). INEC. 1992. V Censo de Población y IV de Vivienda, 1990 (includes questions on language). III Censo Agropecuario, 2001 (Includes questions on language and self-identification).

⁵ INEC. 2000. Encuesta de medición de indicadores de la niñez y los hogares, EMEDINHO.

⁶ Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, América Indígena. Vol. LIII, No. 4, octubre-diciembre en Deruyttere, A. 1997. Pueblos Indígenas y Desarrollo Sostenible. Washington, D. C.: BID.

⁷ Mahoney, J. and Vom Hau. 2002. **Indigenous people, colonialism, and social development** in Spanish America. Brown University, Providence, RI. Processed. En De Ferranti, D. et al. (2003). **Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Breaking with History?**, Washington, D. C.: World Bank.

population has decreased. Regarding the 1846 census of population, indigenous population, defined so as population who dresses as indigenous and has the *quichua* as maternal language, was the majority (51%) of the population settled in the territory of *La Real Audiencia de Quito* where the Ecuadorian nation was defined.⁸ After one century (1950), considering only native language as an ethnic marker because of data constraints,⁹ indigenous people aged 6 and older who spoke a native language were 13,5%. Although as we have told there are problems of sub registration, it seems clear that indigenous population share has decreased in the long run. In the last half of the century, however, the trend is less clear. Some indicators suggest a decrease of the indigenous participation in the total population of Ecuador. According to the 2001 census, considering the same ethnic marker that than of 1950 (native language) and the same group of population they are only 4,35% of the total population of Ecuador. This statement, however, should be contrasted with the fact that new indigenous generations are losing cultural features such as native language, as the results of EMEDINHO (2000) have proven. In fact, according to that source, 12.5% of the population aged 15 years or older has parents who speak a native language, whereas only 4,4% of that group of population speaks a native language (not necessarily exclusively). This reality makes clear the constraint of language as a single variable for defining indigenous population.

In any case, it is not the purpose of this paper deal with the actual and absolute indigenous population figure, which is a very tricky issue that has to be deeply analyzed. The issue here is whether there is inter-group inequality and to do so official statistics contrasted with qualitative information are useful.

Considering data restrictions this paper takes into account all the criteria from the Ecuadorian official statistics but contrasted and corrected, at least from a geographic and historical reference, with a more qualitative analysis done by the *Consejo de Desarrollo de Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas de Ecuador*, CODENPE, and the *Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales de Ecuador*, SIISE (2002) that built ranges of ethnicity at the parish level. This further analysis estimates the ranges of presence of indigenous population in the rural areas considering historical evidence and interviews to qualified informants. Thus, place of origin is also an ethnic marker considered in this analysis.

Regarding all of these criteria and the last census data (2001) high consistency has been found between regions with a high incidence of indigenous population and the regions with ranges from significant to major presence of indigenous population according to the SIDENPE methodology. In fact, provinces with a major incidence of indigenous population match with regions historically associated with indigenous peoples and identified so by qualified informants that know closely the different regions. Indigenous population is mainly located in the center and northern parts of the Andean and Amazonian regions of Ecuador¹⁰. In the Coast, besides a high immigration of indigenous population from the

⁸ Guerrero, A. 2000. "El proceso de identificación: sentido común ciudadano, ventriloquia y transescritura" en **Antología: Etnicidades**. Quito: FLACSO-Ecuador-ILDIS.

⁹ National Census 1950.

¹⁰ There are only two provinces, Tungurahua y Cañar, that do not fit exactly considering indigenous population incidence between census data and SIDENPE information. They are treated in a group of medium

Andes in different historical periods, and the fact that some indigenous communities do exist, the incidence of this population in the total population of the Coast provinces is smaller.

At this point, it is necessary to incorporate another ethnic category that has not been considered separately in the Peruvian case, which is the Afro-descendant population. Its inclusion as an explicit and different category in the Ecuadorian case has to see with the fact that Afro-Ecuadorian population besides its initial conditions of domination and exploitation as were those of the indigenous population, have reached slightly different levels of inequality. Even though this paper does not attempt to explain those results, it has an interest of setting the issue for further analysis that could help to understand better the inequality question. Geographically, far from the rest, the province with the major incidence of afro-descendant population in Ecuador is the north-western Coast province of Esmeraldas.

Up to this case, three ethnic categories have been considered for regionalization purposes: indigenous, *mestizo* and Afro-Ecuadorian. The white population has not been considered white, because in the Ecuadorian case it is very difficult to find spatially an important region with a very high incidence of white population, at least at the province level, which is the geographic unit of analysis in this section. Working at smaller spatial levels with these categories is very tricky because of the high indigenous population geographic mobility. The white category is considered, however, in another level of analyses without regarding any region in particular. It is important to take into account here the different Ecuadorian geographic reality regarding the Peruvian case, as we already mentioned before. Ecuador is a small country that concentrates a high cultural and bio diversity in very small areas. Indigenous communities, with exception of the Amazonian ones are not really too far from some urban center (See Figure 1). This fact has helped on one hand to keep active inter-ethnic relationships (mainly commercial); and, on the other hand, to keep political attention, because indigenous collective actions generally do affect important urban centers and therefore they can become national affairs. For the Peruvian case, most of the Andean indigenous are physically located far from the main urban center and their local actions may not disturb too much the administrative and political core, which is centralized in Lima.

Regarding all the criteria mentioned, five regions have been conformed in the Ecuadorian case (See Figure 1):

Region A is a region with high incidence of indigenous population, defined so as the provinces with an incidence of 20% or more. The provinces that match this criterion are the Andean provinces of: Chimborazo, Bolívar, Cotopaxi and Imbabura.

Region B is also a region with high incidence of indigenous population, as defined in region A but located in the Amazonian region. The provinces that fit that criterion are provinces located at the center and northern part of the Amazonian region: Morona

incidence of indigenous population considering that census data, in contrast with the SIDENPE's one, includes also urban regions, as we will see bellow.

Santiago, Napo, Pastaza and Orellana. This separation has been done because the indigenous movement in both regions has in some way different political strategies, and it is interesting to see at least as a first approach whether this feature makes any difference between these regions.

Region C is a region with a high incidence of Afro-Ecuadorian population, which is, those provinces with an incidence of 20% or more in the total provincial population. The only province that fits this criterion is the province of Esmeraldas in the north-western Coast, which historically was the region where this population settled. Even though there are other small Afro-Ecuadorian communities (Chota) their incidence at the province level is not high enough.

Region D is a region with a medium incidence of indigenous population, which is an incidence between 5 and 19%. The provinces with that indigenous presence are: Cañar, Tungurahua, Zamora Chinchipe, and Sucumbíos.

Finally, region E has the smallest incidence of indigenous population, which are the provinces with less than 5% of indigenous population. Those provinces are mostly Coast provinces such as El Oro, Guayas and Manabí, the insular province of Galápagos, and the Andean provinces of Carchi, Loja, and Pichincha.¹¹

In terms of contribution to the total indigenous population, it is important to consider that provinces that have the highest concentration of indigenous population in the country are Chimborazo (17,6%), Pichincha (12,2%), Imbabura (10,0%) and Cotopaxi (9,8%).¹² Together, they concentrate half of the total indigenous population in the country. The criterion to be used here, however, is incidence of the indigenous population at the provincial level, and not its contribution to the total indigenous population.

With these caveats and specifications about the empirical definitions of human capital and ethnicity, Table 1 summarizes the level of formal education by region for people aged 25 or older. The prediction of sigma theory tells us that access to education opportunities varies according to ethnic groups, and this can be shown in the Ecuadorian case. In Ecuador, the levels of education are lower for regions with relatively higher proportions of indigenous and afro-descendant populations. The Central and Northern regions of the Andes and the Center and Northern Amazonian regions with high incidence of indigenous population has almost half of their population with a level of education up to elementary school, and 18% and 13% in both regions respectively have no formal education; whereas relatively more population from regions D and E with lower indigenous population incidence as well as, even, Afro-Ecuadorians, have secondary or higher studies. Asymmetry appears to be worse comparing the mean of years of education among indigenous population and the rest of the population aged 25 and older, regardless of the region. As we can see on Table 2C, the mean of years of education for indigenous population aged 25 and older is almost 4 years and there is a gap of almost 3 years between indigenous and white, almost 2 years between indigenous and *mestizo*, and 1,5 years regarding Afro-Ecuadorians.

¹¹ It is also included small zones no defined inside any province.

¹² Censo de Población del 2001.

Empirical data about education in Ecuador therefore confirms, as in the Peruvian case, ethnic exclusions in the access to education.

The following question regarding the given endowments of human capital is whether they determine the labor supply allocation to the labor market. Figueroa's sigma theory assumes that labor market operates with exclusion; z-workers would be excluded from the modern sector because they do not have enough human capital. The exclusion mechanisms depends on human capital endowment of workers and it does not depend on racial or ethnic discrimination. Even though, the labor market excludes only by education, the issue is that access to education discriminates against z-workers, and then, indirectly labor market excludes by ethnicity.

The empirical evidence, in the case of Ecuador, shows first that indigenous people are mostly excluded from the modern sector. The categories to be used are economic categories: such as business owner, self employed, employee, family worker and new worker. As shown on table 2A, the major incidence of self-employments and family workers is concentrated in the regions with major incidence of indigenous population, mainly in the Amazon region (62%), whereas for those born in the region with the lowest incidence of indigenous population, that proportion reaches 35%. Moreover, considering only ethnic groups regardless the region, asymmetry seems to become more significant, the proportion of self employments and family workers, a sector of low productivity, is 65% for the indigenous, whereas for the rest of the ethnic groups those types of employments do not reach 40% (See Table 2B). Hence, it seems that exclusion from the labor market in Ecuador, as in the Peruvian case, is ethnically biased.

Regarding class issues, sigma theory predicts that class structure is also related to ethnicity. In the Ecuadorian case, assuming rough and far from perfect categories of social classes we have the following: upper class as business owners, middle class as employees and low class as self employed and family workers, indigenous population does have the highest incidence of low class population, as sigma theory predicts (See Table 2B). It is clear that human capital endowments, which, as we have seen are ethnically biased also influence class position in Ecuador, as it does in Peru.

Now, whether exclusion at the labor market is given by initial educational exclusion and not by racial discrimination is another question. ISDP infers that there is not racial discrimination at the labor market in Peru and exclusion operates by education levels. Even in the case of premiums on wages of whites compared to wages of indigenous workers such as 12% as shown in a case study for a community in Peru (Ñono), ISDP declares that the figure is negligible considering qualitative differences in cultural factors such as the lack of corporate culture and the poor command of Spanish of the indigenous that can not be included on the estimations.

In Ecuador, it is clear that indigenous workers exclusion at labor markets operates due to lack of endowment of human capital, considering education. In addition, there is empirical evidence that racial discrimination is also another factor in Ecuador that punishes wages. It is important to mention, however, that we need to have some precaution to be completely

conclusive about it, given the weak quality that generally characterizes income data. Taking this into account, Larrea and Montenegro (2004) have found evidence of wage discrimination using Oaxaca models that allow decomposition of labor earnings differences in: labor endowments and labor discrimination. They have filtered wages determinants by several variables such as: years of schooling, labor experience, gender, number of working hours, informal and agricultural sectors, domestic service, condition of laborers, employees and self employed workers, regional dummies for the countryside, Coast and Amazon basin, and dummies for household heads and union members. Those variables were tested to be significant. The results, as shown on Table 3, evidence that 74 % of the labor earning gap is due to endowment differences, mostly in education, and in labor insertion, as indigenous workers concentrate in agriculture, informal sector and in the rural area. However, more than one quarter (26%) of the wage gap can be attributed to labor market discrimination. Even though it could be that other factors such as quality of education, linguistic and cultural features could be also behind this, given the high proportion of the wage gap, discrimination can not be neglected either.

Hence, in the Ecuadorian case, as in the Peruvian one, it can also be concluded that exclusion from the labor market is ethnically biased because of more limited opportunities of indigenous people to access to higher level of education. However, in the case of Ecuador racial discrimination directly seems to also play a role and be an additional factor.

We may consider another asset, such as land, with all the limitations of the Ecuadorian case for the rural sector. The recent Agricultural Census (2001) shows us, first, that 21% of the rural farmers are indigenous; and, second, that indigenous have on average a property inferior to the rest of farmers: 10 hectares (Ha.), whereas *mestizo* have 14 Ha. and “whites” have more than twice the average of indigenous land.¹³ Thus, indigenous people also have more constraints for accessing rural land than the rest of the population. On the other hand, patrons are also mostly white and *mestizo* (Table 2A) In sum, we can conclude that population with higher economic power in Ecuador are mostly white and *mestizo*.

These results can explain, in part, the limits of social mobility of the indigenous population in Ecuador. Although, there are good counter-examples, such as the case of the indigenous people of Otavalo,¹⁴ so far this seems to be an exception to the general rule. In any case, those cases should be considered for a deeper research. In order to do so, different paths that are historically and territorially determined, even starting from the same foundational shock, should also be taken into account.

Whether this social structure has changed over time is difficult to prove in Ecuador, because of the lack of comparable historical data (same definition of ethnic categories). Considering only data about poverty in the last decade, however, as we can see on Table 4C, it is, at least clear that the incidence of poverty is highly important in the indigenous population and this has not changed too much on the last decade. The incidence of extreme poverty is even higher in the indigenous population in 2003 than in 1994. Given the

¹³ Chiriboga, M. 2004. Desigualdad, exclusión étnica y participación política: el caso de la CONAIE y Pachacutec en Ecuador.

¹⁴ Kyle David. 2001. «La diáspora del comercio otavaleño: Capital social y empresa transnacional» en Revista Ecuador Debate No. 54, diciembre 2001. Quito: CAAP

relation between education, ethnicity and poverty (See Table 4B) we can conclude that social and ethnic structure has remained mostly untouched, at least for the excluded ones in the last decade.

4. Horizontal and vertical inequalities

Horizontal inequality is defined as an inequality between culturally defined groups. Statistically this is the difference among the mean values of different groups, regardless of the inequality within each group. Vertical inequality is the inequality of the entire population. For evaluating horizontal inequality in Ecuador we will consider mainly four ethnic categories: indigenous, white, *mestizo* and Afro-Ecuadorian, regardless of where they live. The variables to be considered for measuring are: stock of human capital and income flow.

Data shows us there is an important inequality in the endowment of human capital among the different ethnic groups in Ecuador. Considering illiteracy rates, for instance, they are much higher among indigenous people, as we can see on Table 4A. Indigenous people have an illiteracy rate (20%) more than twice the total Ecuadorian population illiteracy rate (8%) and five times the illiteracy rate of whites (4%). On the other hand, it has already been shown on Table 2B that the gap of the average level of education of indigenous population (4 years) is 3 years regarding the level of *mestizo* population and 4 years regarding the level of white population. Horizontal inequality in Ecuador is also evident regarding the quality of education. Taking into account certain tests (APRENDO) applied to fifth grade children to evaluate reading comprehension and mathematical skills for instance, results revealed that the lowest scores were reached by indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian children (Ponce, 2001).

The lack of education is an important factor of exclusion at the labor market. Moreover, besides the inequality in the educational levels of indigenous and non-indigenous people, racial discrimination seems to be an additional factor for exclusion in the labor market, as we have already seen. In fact, economic returns of higher education are unequal between indigenous and non-indigenous population. The gap of labor earnings is higher as the years of schooling increase; indigenous people have smaller economic returns for their higher education level regarding non-indigenous population. This fact could discourage education among indigenous workers. Figure 2 illustrates this situation, considering Larrea and Montenegro's estimations (2004) based on a Living Conditions Survey of 1998 for Ecuador.¹⁵

Regarding poverty data and considering unsatisfied basic needs in Ecuador, the incidence of poverty in indigenous populations is very high, as we can see on Figure 3. In fact, according to that concept, almost nine out of ten indigenous people were poor (88,4%) in the year 2001, almost twice the poverty incidence of white. Afro-Ecuadorian population has also severe problems of poverty: 73,8% of their population did not satisfy their basic needs in the year 2001.

¹⁵ Larrea, C. and Montenegro, F. 2004. Indigenous peoples and poverty in Ecuador. In imprint.

Following the same source, the probability of being poor is 84% for the indigenous population, around 24 points higher than for non indigenous. Years of schooling decrease the probability of being poor mainly for those with superior education. However, being indigenous still has a bias of a higher probability of being poor, regarding the non-indigenous (See Table 4B)¹⁶. As we already mentioned, the last decade has not made any significant improvement in the poverty conditions for indigenous people (See Table 4C). There are not hard figures to extract conclusions about the evolution of horizontal inequality, but which we can see is that the net effect of the last financial crisis occurred at the end of the nineties and its later economic recovery in Ecuador is not as promising as we could think. A recent study of the World Bank (Hall and Patrinos, 2005) shows that even though the incidence of poverty among indigenous population during the last crisis increased slower than among non indigenous, that indicator also decreased slower than for the non indigenous during the post-crisis economic recovery. Thus, at the end, given the fact that indigenous population has started the crisis with relatively lower income levels and a higher poverty incidence than non indigenous, the net impact of the crisis for indigenous population was actually worse.

Vertical inequality in Ecuador on the other hand is one of the highest in Latin America (CEPAL, 2001) as it is in Peru (Figuroa and Barrón, 2005). In 2003, the Gini coefficient for Ecuador was 0,56 (SIISE, 2005). Although this coefficient was smaller than those of 2001 and 2002, the long run trend has not shown an improvement regarding the 1990s decade (See Figure 3). The contribution of horizontal inequality to total inequality in Ecuador, however, is not that high as in the Peruvian case. An explaining factor is the fact that the incidence of indigenous population in the overall Ecuadorian population is lower than in Peru. As it has been mentioned, this could be a problem of under registration, but in any case, horizontal inequalities are deep and, moreover, the incidence of poverty among the indigenous population is very high, as we have seen. If other factors such as health conditions or quality of education were considered, horizontal inequality would probably still be higher. This situation does generate important social disorder in Ecuador, as we will see in the following section.

The following issue to analyze are about the determinants of horizontal inequality, which are the exogenous variables. Sigma theory and HI theory have some suggestions regarding factors such as individual behavior (internal migration), collective action, governmental behavior and the effect of initial conditions on horizontal inequality.

5. Internal Migration and inter-marriage

Internal migration could facilitate a decrease in horizontal inequalities if indigenous people move to regions where they can access better public services such as educational services for instance. The Peruvian case shows no sign in that direction, despite massive emigration of aboriginal populations (ISDP). In Peru, the great majority of people live in the same region where they were born and migration mostly happens among districts of a same region (ISDP). Data from Ecuador, considering only internal migration among the regions defined according to the criteria of incidence of indigenous population, shows a same

¹⁶ Idem

result. Eight out of ten Ecuadorians stays in their regions (See Table 5A). Demographic mobility mostly happens within the regions. However, it is also important to mention that there is more interregional migration from the regions with high incidence of indigenous population, mainly from the center northern Andes (region A), and with high incidence of Afro-Ecuadorian population (region C) one out of four people from these regions went to the region with the lowest incidence of indigenous population (region E). The main region of attraction (region E) includes the provinces of Pichincha and Guayas which are the main administrative, economic and political centers of Ecuador.

Internal migration however is mostly driven by non-indigenous. According to the last census data (2001) only 6% of indigenous people had internally migrated during the five-year period previous to the census; whereas 9% of non indigenous had migrated.¹⁷

Besides internal migration, Ecuador has experienced an intensive international migration mainly since the second half of the nineties, driven by a severe economic crisis of Ecuador that also affected the indigenous population. However it seems that indigenous people share of international emigration is relatively small (5,7%)¹⁸. This could happen because of an economic barrier for the poorest people, both indigenous as well as non indigenous to travel outside the country. However, further research is needed in this matter. Although international migration became massive and Ecuadorian people left from almost everywhere there is no doubt that certain localities were particularly affected. Thus, weighting indigenous international migration by specific communities, the results could give us another perspective. That is the case, for instance, of Otavalo, where internal and particularly international migration has worked in favor of economic and social mobility of the indigenous people. It could be an exception and we could find many cases with very different outcomes, but this is precisely what needs to be researched in order to better understand the process.

In any case and as a dominant trend, indigenous populations seem to migrate less than *mestizo* populations at least out of the regions or out of the country. This result is consistent with sigma theory predictions, that tell us that z-workers being excluded from the labor market are confined to their own communities.

In sum, so far, from this analysis, it could be concluded that internal migration, in Ecuador, as in Peru, has not helped significantly to decrease horizontal inequalities. Still it is important to research deeply in the migration process within the regions to see if this could have helped at least to some indigenous families to move socially; such is the case of Otavalo in Ecuador, for instance. A further question remains open, however, whether international migration will have a more positive role in this process.

Another potential factor of social mobility is intermarriage. In Peru, interethnic marriage is not significant when ethnicity is measured by individual's mother tongue. In the Ecuadorian case, considering ethnicity by language tongue and self definition we could conclude from the figures shown on Table 5B that interethnic marriage is not significant in

¹⁷ Larrea, op. cit.

¹⁸ INEC. VI Censo de Población y V de Vivienda, 2001.

Ecuador either. However in the long trend it is important to consider as we have seen before that indigenous population share in the total Ecuadorian population has decreased. This fact implies an interethnic marriage process that has occurred over time. The *mestizo* category is after all the most numerous ethnic category of Ecuador, and this category can also involve indigenous population that do not declare their actual ethnic condition because of the reasons already mentioned. A deeper analysis about the *mestizo* group is needed to understand better the issues of inequality. This paper, however, focus on indigenous population.

From this we cannot be too conclusive about whether migration or inter-marriage have constituted mechanisms of horizontal equalization in Ecuador. However, we can say that considering at least the core figures of indigenous population, interethnic marriage and regional or international emigration are relatively low, horizontal inequality still persists and is important. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to suggest that, at least considering individual choices, there are endogenous mechanisms to decrease horizontal inequality; as sigma theory predicts.

6. Collective action

Regarding theory, according to HI theory, severe horizontal inequalities will cause social violence and this may induce institutional changes and endogenously reduce horizontal inequalities. Up to sigma theory, ethnic conflict is not that important in social action of sigma countries. ISDP finds the sigma theory prediction more useful for the Peruvian case. The main reason lies in the fact that ethnic conflict in Peru is relatively weak with the excluded aboriginal population, identified as z-workers, operating basically at the local level. Their demands focus on securing their survival and they claim mainly for accessing to basic resources such as land, water, etc. and not for other rights such as education and political rights. What is the case for Ecuador?

The Ecuadorian case has certain similarities but also important differences with respect to the Peruvian case in this matter. The main difference is a qualitative one, collective actions of the indigenous population in Ecuador operate not only at the local level but also at the national level, and their demands are not only regarding their access to basic resources but also to political rights, education and sovereign rights over territories, and even national claims for changing the economic development model.

This situation, however, has not been always so, Ecuadorian history tells us that during the colonial and early republican periods, indigenous claims and struggles were mainly conflicts for basic resources such as water, land and against extreme exploitation of labor, against taxes, etc. However, even if they were kept as local conflicts most of the time, a more political and cultural background cannot be excluded. A summary of those relevant conflicts during that period (1730-1900) can be seen on Table 6A.

Understanding the development of the indigenous movements in the twentieth century could better explain the differences in the current political situation of the indigenous people between Ecuador and Peru. This paper will attempt an initial approach in that direction, considering certain relevant historical facts.

With the breakdown of the colonial system during the 18th century, the rearrangement of forces favored an exacerbated *gamonal* exploitation, given that the Crown's arbitrage and jealousy against the rise of the *criollo's* power had slackened. However the *República de Indios* was kept as a legal and administrative sub-system inside a matrix of a liberal American- and French-Revolution inspired constitutional scheme (Guerrero, 2000). The 1857 abolition of the *tributo de indios* severely weakened that axis of ethnic administration in favor of a more private, *hacienda*-centered system of social, political, religious, cultural and economic control towards which the State organized its forces in a subsidiary manner. Even then compulsive drafts for public works remained a fundamental mechanism of labor exploitation. Under that private and atomized control in the hands of the *hacienda*, the Catholic Church and the sectional representatives of the central powers (*tenientes políticos*), most of the conflicts were dealt as local ones. Sometimes, the magnitude of the rebellion, as in Daquilema's case, (Ibarra, 1993) made that paradigm inapplicable.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, indigenous people were incorporated to national causes. They participated in the liberal revolution commanded by Eloy Alfaro and some indigenous were high-ranking officers. Later, during the 1920s there were several indigenous collective actions supported, in part, by Communist and Socialist partisans, whose projections gave a national horizon to an expanding wave of local struggles. This happened even before the raise of the Socialist and Communist parties in Ecuador (1926 and 1931 respectively). The indigenous people were articulated to the leftist parties from a class perspective, although there always were ethnic references.

An important fact was the law of communities (*Ley de Comunas*) of 1938 that established the *cabildos*, a colonial organizational structure, as an indigenous option for organization given by the public sector. *Cabildos* became important organizational references for the indigenous people that, at the same time, allowed a better interlocution of the State institutions and system previously unattainable. Soon, these organizations supported the indigenous demands and movements, especially around natural resources issues.

The leftist parties played an important role for mobilizing local indigenous collective action to national claims and for connecting the different communities' issues. In 1944, the indigenous people participated in the urban-led revolution against the Arroyo del Río liberal-conservative government. As part of that process, the socialist and the communist parties promoted the creation of the first Indigenous National Federation (*Federación Nacional de Indios*), FEI, identifying the ethnic issue despite the class vision that saw the indigenous population as semi-proletarian peasantry. Later, during the sixties, the anti-leftist catholic syndicalism promoted the National Federation of Peasant Organizations (*Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas*), FENOC, defined more in terms of class but with a national-reaching perspective, in its attempt to respond FEI's influence.

In any case, the indigenous collective actions and organizations maintained always a dilemma between a class position and ethnic identities. Despite the strong culture of domination and indigenous stigmatization, ethnically heterogeneous identities have prevailed. Ecuador has always had a great cultural diversity since the Pre-Columbian times. The Incas could not overcome that reality, and it was an important factor for the limited

advancement of the Inca's domination within Ecuador. This is which has been called the Andean factionalism that authors like Sánchez-Parga (1989) have interpreted as a factor of resistance rather than dispersion, given by a specific kind of indigenous social organization that has been created. In fact, the indigenous model of organization is not only diverse but also produces major diversity. This reality, instead of weakening the indigenous movement or making it homogeneous, has produced increasing ethnic fronts that have mechanisms of internal cohesion that works in favor of their resistance. (Sánchez-Parga, 1989)

The struggles against the abuse of the landowners continued during the following decades. Internal and external siege undermined the hacienda's multidimensional power and reinforced class and cultural components of the indigenous and non-indigenous peasantry. Under the leftist claim "the land is for those who work on it", indigenous collective actions increased. This movement in addition to the difficulties for landowners themselves to manage their immense properties ended in two agrarian reform laws: the first one in 1964 and the second one in 1973. Even if both were closely controlled by landowners' representatives (see the discussion between Barsky, 1983 and Guerrero, 1984 about the degree of peasant responsibility in those processes), their effect was a legal corroboration of a historical defeat for the *hacienda* although not an actual victory for the peasants. Almost 26% of the land controlled by properties of more than 100 Ha was affected, but yielded a precarious extension of *minifundios* (small landholdings) on low quality land (see, for instance, Chiriboga, 2004).

During the 1980s, despite the several land conflicts, the struggles for agrarian reforms lost momentum and the ethnic issues started to become important. Collective actions were based on cultural issues and claims for bilingual intercultural education. The state answered those claims by developing important bilingual educational and rural development projects. Bilingual education, in addition to training and organization support of government agencies, non government organizations, some sectors of the church, and the left and social democrat parties played a key role forming new generations of indigenous leaders that became highly active in the 1990s (Chiriboga, 2004).

An important achievement of the indigenous movement was the creation of the Confederation of Indigenous Ecuadorian Nationalities (*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas Ecuatorianas*), CONAIE, in 1986. CONAIE was created as an umbrella organization that represented the main indigenous peoples and assembled the Andean indigenous organization, ECUARUNARI and the Amazonian indigenous organization, COFENAIE. The CONAIE did not replaced the FEI as a simple mediation organization that asked for the indigenous claims, but instead, created a new social agent able to mobilize the indigenous at a national level independently of political parties and unions (Guerrero, 1993). CONAIE is an ethnic organization that sought to defend the indigenous pluri-culture and demanded the recognition of a pluri-national country and even for another path of development. Local and survival claims are always present, but also the critiques to the economic policies that result from the frustration of not getting any substantial change.

An important factor for the advances of the indigenous population and its national organization, according to Chiriboga (2004) is the fact that the base of the organizational networks are communities rather than individual citizens, in which households participate

articulated to historical processes, with family links and ethnic identity. This kind of organization, without being ideal systems and despite the changes within the indigenous communities economic relationships and reproduction strategies highly influenced by capitalist relationships (Martínez, 2002), allows the flow of information and participation. They are an alternative way to exclusionary relationships.

There are internal conflicts that derive from the complexity and diversity of the ethnic identities and organizations, as has been pointed out previously; however, the leadership of the CONAIE was undeniable. CONAIE led several important indigenous collective actions reaching the national level, as we can see in Table 6B, that achieved important results at the political and legal level. Those collective actions were new struggle practices and new symbolisms, including cultural claims, State reforms, and even President's dismissals, demands that were supported by broad alliances. The dismissals of President Bucaram in 1997 and of President Mahuad in 2000 were not achieved by the indigenous movement alone, because there were strong coalitions among political parties and there was also an implicit role of the national army, and even active intervention of insurrect colonels in the case of the Mahuad dismissal. Those dismissals, however, are unthinkable without the indigenous movement.

Another important fact was the creation of the political party PACHACUTIK, in 1996, intending to free the indigenous people from the partnership of the traditional political parties and be open to other sectors, independent of the CONAIE, without being constrained by the ethnic issue (Chiriboga, 2004).

The important indigenous collective actions that started in the nineties defined, according to Guerrero (2000), a breaking point in the Ecuadorian history between the colonial past and the Republican building process. Before that the indigenous were not a political actor directly - they acted from outside the political system without legitimacy. The important change of the indigenous movement in the nineties is their direct locution to express their claims and expectations that has also implied their direct participation in the State institutions. (Bretón 2005) The direct dialogue and bargaining strategy between the indigenous communities and the State, together with the conflict with other corporative organizations such as the Business Chambers, forced the indigenous movement and their representatives to keep unity and development a coherent discourse that overcome the indigenous issues and include other sectors demands while strengthening their organization. (Barrera, 2001)

These facts generated important advances in the indigenous movement at the political and legal level. One of the most important results at the legal level was the incorporation of changes in the Constitutional Reform of 1998, such as the recognition of Ecuador as a pluricultural and multiethnic country and explicit rights for the indigenous populations, as we will see later. These conquests were derived from the 1990 National Indigenous Uprising (*Levantamiento Nacional Indígena*). At the political and institutional level, there were also important results: whereas before the nineties indigenous people were almost invisible in the Congress and in public functions, *Pachacutik* joined with *Sociedad Patrónica*, the party of the insurrect colonels that helped to remove President Mahuad, and won the presidential elections of 2002 with Lucio Gutiérrez. *Pachacutik* by itself got 11

National Congress representatives, and several local governments (at the provincial, municipal, and *parochial* level). Two important leaders of the CONAIE (Nina Pacari and Luis Macas) were cabinet ministers in 2003, and there were also two ministers that were non indigenous but related to Pachacutik. Finally, many indigenous leaders from different localities were in charge of some administrative public affairs at the national as well as the local level. In this way, the indigenous movement became an important social and political actor, with influence on laws and on public intervention. This political legacy persists in spite of the internal crisis that the indigenous movement experienced after their separation from the Gutierrez government and his later dismissal.

The role of indigenous people in promoting state decentralization and popular participation deserves particular consideration, more so in the context of increasingly “*indigenización*” of the mostly indigenous regions due to the *mestizo* emigration (Ibarra, 1992). In fact, an important indigenous strategy was to win elections for local governments and promote at this level institutional transformations such as instituting social participation, that has allowed changing spending priorities and incorporating rural needs in some municipalities. Although those changes are still in process, these actions have pushed the non indigenous authorities to make changes. In that way, despite the inexperience and internal conflicts of the local indigenous governments, not all successful, it has been an important step for developing alternative ways of public practice, mainly, at the local level in Ecuador. (Chiriboga, 2004)

This complex process perhaps could help to explain better the different paths and achievements of collective actions of the indigenous people of Ecuador. In Peru, as ISDP has referred us, Velasco promoted the consideration of the peasant movement instead of the indigenous movement, that could have been internalized to deal with the racial conflicts of Peru. This joined to the fact that the leftist parties and the guerrilla have focused on class struggles, could have weakened ethnic identities and organizations. In Ecuador, even though, many people do not speak *quichua* any more and there are still stigmas associated with being indigenous, indigenous identities have survived and even emerged. (CODENPE-SIISE, 2002) In addition, there are cases, although not many (for example, Otavalo indigenous people) that have learned to use diversity and indigenous references as a factor of economic mobility through their commercial activities of their own and even imported indigenous handicrafts.¹⁹

In sum, in the Chiriboga’s words (2004), this transformation is the result of three simultaneous processes: *the emergence of a big identity movement, led by the CONAIE; the building of local micro-processes that generated nucleus of local political participation; and, a dynamic of alliances and apertures to other social groups, through Pachacutik.* (1)

The ultimate question to answer in this section is whether these collective actions have generated changes on horizontal inequalities.

Despite the political and legal advances of the indigenous movement, statistics, as we have seen before, tells us that huge horizontal inequalities are still an important trait of the social

¹⁹ Kyle. Op. Cit.

structure in Ecuador. Indigenous collective actions have not modified the important interethnic relationships that operate at the economic level, such as price discrimination during exchanges at the goods market, and wage discrimination at the labor market. This happens because there is no process addressed to change that level. Daily interethnic relationships that have been historically conditioned are not easy to change in the short term endogenously.

In conclusion, collective action did change legal and political aspects in favor of the indigenous peoples, however, economic issues and horizontal inequity are still present. Whether economic and distributional issues will change, as the legal and political and even intercultural aspects continue to advance, or political achievements become only necessary concessions for avoiding violent conflicts, will depend on the indigenous strategy to follow from here on, and how the other actors, including the public ones, internalize those changes and make deeper reforms.

In any case, as ISDP has referred, a re-foundational shock is necessary to change that reality. This will not be a spontaneous outcome. It will have to be deliberately provoked, both endogenously and exogenously; and political party actions, unionism and violent action such as guerrillas, seems to not have given an answer to the ethnic issue in other Andean countries, such as Peru.

7. Government Behavior

The question to deal with in this section is: How did Ecuadorian governments take horizontal inequalities into account? Regarding sigma theory, we could set two hypotheses based on ISDP: governments will take no significant actions to confront horizontal inequalities, since *z*-workers are considered second-rate citizens; and the effect of horizontal inequalities on social disorder operates mostly indirectly through political struggle. This seems to be the case for Peru.

In Ecuador, governments have not solved horizontal inequalities, but they have taken some actions to address that problem. Even if these actions had limited scope, in different ways, they had impacts, many not planned, mainly at the organization level. In first place, the early law of communities (*Ley de Comunas*) decree in 1938, for instance, was an important factor for the indigenous organization and for the interlocution of the State. These instances added to the external agents' influence, such as the left parties, by that time, worked in favor of collective actions that claimed access to land and water. On the other hand, *de facto* governments decreed agrarian reforms for improving peasants land access: the first agrarian reform in 1964 under the government of Castro, Freile, Cabrera and Gándara and the second agrarian reform in 1973 promoted by Rodríguez Lara. These reforms, if not perfect, allowed some indigenous communities to improve their access to land.

Besides the agrarian reforms, the different governments during the second half of the twentieth century attempted several public programs for supporting rural development. Among those programs, it is important to mention, the Fondo de Desarrollo Rural Marginal, FODERUMA, that gave low cost credits and non reimbursable funds for training and organizational strengthen to peasants and particularly to indigenous communities.

Other programs emerged also under the policy of integral rural development. A special Secretariat directly attached to the Presidency was created to deal with it. These actions combined with several NGOs and progressive grassroots, both Catholic and Protestant, church initiatives that also distributed church land and other services to support some indigenous communities, although with limited effects on development and horizontal inequality, promoted organizational skills and leadership (See Bebbington and Ramon, 1992 and Chiriboga 1999). They were also important references to other external actors for intervening, as well as to the indigenous organization and movement themselves.

As we have seen, during the eighties, despite the claims for natural resources, the focus of indigenous collective actions changed to cultural and ethnic issues struggles. Hurtado's government answered those claims by providing indigenous people bilingual education. Although limited and some times problematic, bilingual education was also an important factor to support indigenous organizations and communication. New generations of leaders were developed under the support of bilingual education and under the support of other external agents (public programs, NGOs, church, etc), as we have mentioned. Those leaders strengthened the indigenous movement during the 90s.

After indigenous collective actions during the nineties, different governments gave some answers to the ethnic issue (Barrera, 2001). Although those governments of the 1990s and the new millennium did not solve horizontal inequalities, they did support changes mainly at the legal level and even at the public intervention level. One of the most important changes has been the change in the Constitution of 1998, as we will mention in the following section that recognize the multicultural condition of Ecuador and allows having affirmative action policies in the areas of health and education, mainly.

As one of the consequences of the 1998 Constitution, new programs and even institutions were created. The National Council of Indigenous Nations and Peoples, CODENPE (*Consejo Nacional de Nacionalidades y Pueblos Indígenas*) was created in 1998. The CODENPE is a public institution attached to the Presidency that promotes the indigenous peoples development. In this institution, the following nationalities are represented: Kichwa, Awá, Chachi, Épera, Tsáchila, Huaorani, Siona, Cofán, Secoya, Shuar, Zápara and Achuar; and, in addition, peoples which belong to the Kichua nationality: Otavalo, Natabuela, Karanqui, Kayambi, Saraguro, Kañari, Salasaca, Chibuleo, Waranka, Panzaleo, Puruhá, Kitu Kara and Kichwa of the Amazon region. There were also programs related to indigenous people such as: the Project of Development of the Indigenous and Afro-descendant Peoples, PRODEPINE (*Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros*); Project of Support for Strengthening Alternative Municipalities (*Proyecto de Apoyo al Fortalecimiento de los Municipios Alternativos*), of those that have indigenous majors; Fund for the Development of Indigenous People (*Fondo de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas*) attached to the Presidency; System of Indicators of Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador, SIDENPE (*Sistema de Indicadores de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador*) that intended to monitor the living conditions of indigenous and afro-descendant people, to provide inputs for the public actions in favor of this population as well as for evaluating the public intervention. Finally there are public programs operating at the regional level.

On the other hand, indigenous local governments have influenced changes in the public administration addressed to decentralization. Many indigenous or *Pachacutik* related mayors have instituted social participation, including rural people, in certain Municipality affairs decisions such as the spending allocations.

Public intervention added to other external agents' intervention, even if they have not been too effective in dealing with horizontal inequalities, directly and indirectly, have played a role in strengthening the indigenous movement. This role was undeniably a result of indigenous collective actions. In Ecuador, the indigenous movement, besides their internal problems in getting organized at the national level, is a very important movement, and it has become during the last almost two decades far more important than trade-unionism. This reality establishes a difference with respect to the Peruvian case. In Ecuador the indigenous movement has an important political space and no political party can ignore them to make politics. Beyond that, during the last decades, and despite the last crisis of the indigenous movement after their participation in the Gutierrez government, governance itself in Ecuador is highly dependent on the indigenous movement. Thus governments have to conciliate.

In sum, most of Presidents have had concerns for the indigenous situation, caused in part by the permanent indigenous struggle supported by external agents such as the progressive sectors of the church, NGOs, and the external cooperation in general. An additional factor for explaining the governments concerns about the ethnic issue in the Ecuadorian case is perhaps the fact that Ecuador is a small country and the indigenous collective actions does affect the national affairs. For the Peruvian government, the Andean indigenous are in some way far removed from the administrative and political core, which is centralized in Lima. In contrast, in Ecuador indigenous communities are close to many important cities and have intense inter-group relationships, including inter-ethnic relationships among different ecological places within the boundaries of a relatively small geographical area. Thus, it is difficult for the government to keep distance from the indigenous movement claims.

Although, currently there is a crisis within the indigenous national organization and the movement itself has lost legitimacy because of their public participation that has occurred with many sensible choices but also several mistakes, the indigenous movement has historically showed also an important ability to overcome crisis and deal with disagreements. Thus and despite most of the changes considered, as in Peru, are mostly formal, and they have not changed economic exclusion, the symbolic impact of having control of the Presidency, even for a few hours; getting important achievements in the political elections for the Congress as well as for local governments; and receiving high responsibilities in the administration of the public sector, at the central and local level, represent important changes in the collective imaginary of both indigenous and non indigenous peoples, which could favor further and deeper changes.

On the other hand, political instability in Ecuador has been as bad as in the Peruvian case. Table 7 shows Ecuador's political regimes since 1820. Ecuador has had around 139 governments in 184 years, which is about 1.3 years of duration per government, considering even unusual longer running political regimes. In addition, less than half (48%)

can be defined as democratic governments in the ISDP terms²⁰. Historically, based on the information gathered in this paper, we cannot conclude that the ethnic issue has been a major mover of the political instability at the national level, even if there were important indigenous collective actions before the agrarian reforms. However, in the two last decades is clear that the ethnic issue has become an important mover of political instability. In first place, it is clear as it has been argued here that indigenous claims have incorporated ethnic and national claims. In second place, as Guerrero (2000) has pointed out, the nineties are an inflexion point in the indigenous actions history; they become directly political actors without any ventriloquism from others.

In sum, in Ecuador, governments have had concerns for indigenous people and they have provoked some changes, not only at the political and legal level, but also in the public administration, to favor the indigenous cause. This is a consequence both indirect and direct, regarding the two last decades, of indigenous struggles. Those changes however have not been enough to reduce or eliminate horizontal inequalities that are also related to economic issues.

8. Institutional changes

A multiethnic society can develop as a socially homogeneous society if rights are universal, and this can imply a re-foundational shock, a new social contract (ISDP). Thus, the question that follows in this paper is whether the foundation of the Republic of Ecuador implied a re-foundational shock of the Spanish colonial system granting the indigenous populations universal rights.

The same answer as in the Peruvian case can be drawn in the Ecuadorian case. Indigenous people have not been granted universal rights in Ecuador, regarding the facts, even if formally those rights may be written. Thus, the foundation of the Republic of Ecuador did not imply a re-foundational shock of the Spanish colonial system regarding the indigenous exclusion. As mentioned, first the *República de Indios* and then several mechanisms of public and private exploitation, founded a sequence of systems of second-class citizens.

The private arena has had an important role in reproducing a domination system that has affected to indigenous populations. Authors like Guerrero (2000) argue:

In Ecuador, the government of populations was not a public thing since the second half of the XIX century and it disappeared from the politics until the indigenous struggles that in 1990 and 1994 paralyzed the country. (Guerrero 2000: 39 y 40)²¹

In the same direction, other analysts have found that many institutions were controlled by discriminatory relationships, reproducing a neo-colonial culture that was particularly evident in institutions such as *haciendas*, markets, and local as well as national public

²⁰ Elected by general elections, by Congress, or legal successor of a ruler elected by elections or the Congress.

²¹ Translated by the autor.

institutions²². Although, some institutions such as those at the local level have started to change, driven by legal changes at the national level after the Constitutional Reform of 1998, changes are slow and still have not made any real difference in horizontal inequality.

The main formal changes have occurred in the last decades. In fact, only in 1979, the constitutional reforms for the return to the democracy allowed the vote of the indigenous people. Even though there was not a specific prohibition, the restriction for illiterates to vote, acted “as if” there was a prohibition for the indigenous people to vote, since most of the illiterates were indigenous.

On the other hand, the constitutional reforms of 1998 incorporated many advances for the indigenous people²³. In first place, the Ecuadorian nation is considered a pluri-cultural y multiethnic nation. In second place, the native languages are official languages for the indigenous people. In third place, the Ecuadorian state recognizes and guarantees several collective rights for the indigenous peoples such as: keeping, developing and strengthening indigenous people’s identity and their traditions; respecting their community land property; guaranteeing indigenous participation in the gains, administration and conservation of the exploitation of the natural resources located within their territory; keeping and developing their traditional ways of living, organization and authority. Beyond that, the judicial ability of indigenous peoples for applying their authority to solve problems within their communities is guaranteed, as long as it does not contradict the Constitution. Finally, it has opened the possibility of having specific systems of sectional administration within the indigenous territories.

Although, as we have insisted before, those legal changes are mostly formal and they have not been enough to change horizontal inequalities, they do frame important starting points for further changes in public intervention and in public institutions. There is at least the recognition of the existence of a heterogeneous society and the need to govern the different populations.

Given the fact that the mostly formal changes are relatively recent in a long run trend consideration, which counts for a persistent domination system, it could be expected that outcomes at the economic and social levels, which are mostly prone to preserve those relationships, would be slower. Deeper changes will also depend on further indigenous actions, their ability to make alliances and to manage the political arena and relationships with governments. According to Chiriboga (2004), changes are also influenced by the systems of relationships that each indigenous community has developed. In Ecuador, for instance, there are important differences in interethnic relationships between indigenous people from different regions such as those of Otavalo versus Chimborazo, Bolivar or Cotopaxi. This issue, however, needs to be better analysed.

²² See for instance: Ibarra, A. 1992. *Los indígenas y el Estado en el Ecuador*. Quito: Abya Yala; Ramón, G. 1993. *El regreso de los Runas*. Quito: COMUNIDEC; Korovkin, T. 2002. *Comunidades indígenas, economía de mercado y democracia en los Andes Ecuatorianos*. Quito: CEDIME, IFEA, Abya Yala. Chiriboga, M. 2004. *Desigualdad, exclusión étnica y participación política*.

²³ Chiriboga. *Op Cit*

In addition, regarding another issue posed by ISDP, whether institutions change endogenously or exogenously, ISDP infers, for the Peruvian case, that institutions have not changed endogenously because of indigenous collective action, and even in the case that institutions have had endogenous outcomes, they have not eliminated horizontal inequality. The main reason have to do with which sigma theory predicts: z-workers which are mostly indigenous population have no political power to enforce rights because of the historically-constituted system of domination. In Peru, according to Figueroa and Barrón (2005), worker unions have achieved major advances and a better political position, in comparison with peasant or indigenous organizations, besides the fact that the last ones are more numerous.

This situation is in some ways different in Ecuador. There is no question that Ecuadorian indigenous peoples have become an important social force in the country, more important than workers unions, during the last fifteen years. However, at the end, the indigenous people still have strong disadvantages regarding the rest of the population. Thus, we could conclude that institutional changes so far have not affected horizontal inequality. However, it is important to consider, as we have mentioned before, that given the long history of domination that operates mostly at the private level in many senses, it is to be expected that real changes do not come as fast as a legal disposition. Thus, further changes could still happen in Ecuador.

Whether those changes will happen will depend on indigenous organizations and strategies themselves. An important factor will be the ability to make alliances with other groups. Part of the success of the current indigenous movement political position was capturing national claims not only for the indigenous populations but for all the citizens under their slogan: “Nothing only for the indigenous”. Thus the ability to call other economically excluded groups, such as Afro-Ecuadorians (already articulated) and a proportion of *mestizos*, which are also highly heterogeneous, will give the indigenous movement important political power. This will increase the political potential of indigenous collective actions

In sum, further and deeper changes in horizontal inequality will not come easily; it will be necessary to have endogenous and exogenous delivered actions. A re-foundational shock is still needed to change the social contract in Ecuador.

9. Conclusions

Ecuador is a country with a high degree of horizontal inequality that affects mainly the indigenous people. The contemporaneous political instability and social disorder of the country has much to do with that. This inequality is structural and it stems from the beginning of the Republic of Ecuador itself, a heritage of the colonial system, which aside from the political advances, has not been totally overcome so far.

Factors such as migration, collective action, government policies, have not changed horizontal inequalities. As in Peru, in Ecuador initial conditions (mainly related to initial endowments and measured in this work as education levels) are still influencing those inequalities and limiting social mobility. According to the empirical data analysis, limited access to education significantly influence exclusion from the labor market for indigenous

population, and therefore from social mobility. Discrimination, however, cannot be discounted in the Ecuadorian case, as in the Peruvian case.

Almost two centuries after the colonial independence, the indigenous population is still the poorest population in Ecuador. Thus, as sigma theory predicts, there is not sign of an endogenous convergence between indigenous and non-indigenous.

Ecuadorian reality shows also consistency with HI theory that predicts social violence as a consequence of deep horizontal inequalities. Social disorder emanating from indigenous people mobilizations, due to the consolidation of the national indigenous organization, has increased in Ecuador, mainly in the last fifteen years. Indigenous collective actions during the last decades have established claims, with certain success, not only for local and survival resources, but also on national and cultural issues. Exogenous agents have played an important role in this process, such as political parties, segments of the church, NGOs, public intervention to organize and train new and proactive indigenous generations fighting for their rights. In that sense, indigenous collective actions in Ecuador differ from those of Peru where ethnic conflict is not a prime mover of social disorder. In Ecuador, not always but recently, indigenous collective actions have directly caused political instability, and it cannot be considered an *underlying factor*. This has implied many political and legal changes in Ecuador, although not sufficient to change horizontal inequalities in the short term. Given the small period in which those changes have been made, however, we could not be very conclusive about real outcomes, which may come later depending on many political factors where indigenous organization and actions will be a key factor.

Ecuador, in sum, seems to resemble the sigma society. As sigma theory implies, more equality in political and cultural rights will diminish horizontal inequality. But not only political and cultural rights; also changes in economic institutions and relationships, are significant factors for reducing horizontal inequalities and promoting a less hierarchical multiethnic society. It seems clear that in the Ecuadorian case, as in the Peruvian case, these transformations will not happen endogenously.

Regarding the social agent to carry out such transformation and provoking a re-foundational shock in the Ecuadorian society, it is not possible to derive an answer based on the present analysis. However, it can be considered that governments, including the central and local levels and other external agents such as NGOs, have an important role. Although as in the Peruvian case, governments have not given effective answers to horizontal inequality, in Ecuador because of the indigenous national organization and political presence governments cannot discharge easily the indigenous peoples concerns. The role of indigenous collective actions and their ability to make alliances with other groups will be key factors for any possible endogenous change in horizontal inequalities.

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Table 1. Ecuador: Education and region of birth, 2001 (1) (First entry is percentage of national population; the second entry, in parentheses, is percentage of region)

Educational level	Ecuador	Region of birth, 2001				
		Región A	Región B	Región C	Región D	Región E
No level	10,55	2,65 (17,7)	0,19 (13,1)	0,33 (10,5)	0,89 (13,1)	6,39 (8,8)
Elementary	45,65	7,20 (48,2)	0,75 (50,7)	1,38 (44,6)	3,50 (51,4)	32,44 (45)
High School	25,42	2,83 (18,9)	0,36 (24,1)	0,90 (29,1)	1,32 (19,4)	19,70 (27)
Superior no University	2,18	0,22 (1,47)	0,04 (2,92)	0,10 (3,27)	0,11 (1,61)	1,66 (2,3)
Superior University	14,72	1,85 (12,4)	0,13 (8,5)	0,34 (10,9)	0,89 (13,1)	11,05 (15)
Post graduate	0,88	0,12 (0,79)	0,01 (0,35)	0,02 (0,64)	0,06 (0,86)	0,61 (0,8)
No data	0,59	0,07 (0,46)	0,01 (0,38)	0,03 (1,01)	0,03 (0,48)	0,42 (0,6)
Ecuador	100,00	14,94 (100)	1,48 (100)	3,10 (100)	6,81 (100)	72,27 (100)

Source: INEC. VI Censo de Población y V Vivienda, 2001

Notes:

(1) For people aged 25 and older at the time of the census

(2) A: region with an incidence of indigenous population of 20% or more: Andean provinces of Chimborazo, Bolívar, Cotopaxi e Imbabura.

B: region with an incidence of indigenous population of 20% or more: center and northern Amazonian provinces: Morona Santiago, Napo, Pastaza y Orellana.

C: region with an incidence of Afroecuadorian population of 20% or more: province of Esmeraldas

D: region with an incidence of indigenous population between 5 and 19%: prnovices of Cañar, Tungurahua, Zamora Chinchipe and Sucumbíos.

E: region with an incidence of indigenous population smaller than 5%: provinces of El Oro, Guayas and Manabí, Galápagos, and Carchi, Loja, and Pichincha.

Table 2A. Economic category by region according to incidence of indigenous population

	Birth region										
	Ecuador	Región A		Región B		Región C		Región D		Región E	
Patron	9,1	1,2	(7,8)	0,1	(5,3)	0,3	(8,7)	0,7	(9,1)	6,6	(9,4)
Self Employee	34,6	6,7	(42,2)	0,9	(45,0)	1,1	(33,6)	3,1	(42,5)	22,5	(31,9)
Municipality employee	1,6	0,2	(1,4)	0,0	(2,2)	0,1	(2,0)	0,1	(1,5)	1,2	(1,7)
State employee	6,9	1,3	(8,0)	0,2	(9,5)	0,3	(8,8)	0,5	(7,2)	4,6	(6,5)
Private employee	33,7	4,1	(26,2)	0,3	(17,2)	1,0	(31,9)	2,0	(26,8)	25,8	(36,6)
Familiar worker	5,3	1,2	(7,3)	0,3	(13,8)	0,2	(6,1)	0,5	(6,4)	3,2	(4,5)
Non declared	8,7	1,1	(7,0)	0,1	(7,0)	0,3	(8,9)	0,5	(6,5)	6,6	(9,4)
Ecuador	100,0	15,8	(100,0)	2,0	(100,0)	3,2	(100,0)	7,4	(100,0)	70,4	(100,0)

Table 2B. Economic category by ethnic group

	Ethnic group										
	Ecuador	Indigenous	Afroecuadorian	Mestizos	Mulatto	White					
Patron	9,1	0,4	(5,3)	0,2	(8,3)	7,0	(9,1)	0,2	(9,2)	1,2	(11,9)
Self Employee	34,6	4,1	(52,1)	0,8	(32,5)	25,8	(33,7)	0,9	(32,0)	3,0	(29,3)
Municipality employee	1,6	0,1	(0,8)	0,0	(2,0)	1,3	(1,7)	0,0	(1,7)	0,2	(1,8)
State employee	6,9	0,2	(2,8)	0,1	(6,4)	5,6	(7,3)	0,1	(5,1)	0,8	(7,4)
Private employee	33,7	1,5	(18,3)	0,8	(34,5)	26,6	(34,8)	1,0	(36,8)	3,8	(36,5)
Familiar worker	5,3	1,0	(12,9)	0,1	(5,7)	3,6	(4,8)	0,1	(4,9)	0,4	(3,5)
Non declared	8,7	0,6	(7,7)	0,2	(10,5)	6,6	(8,6)	0,3	(10,3)	1,0	(9,5)
Ecuador	100,0	7,9	(100,0)	2,3	(100,0)	76,4	(100,0)	2,7	(100,0)	10,3	(100,0)

Source: INEC. VI Censo de Población y V de Vivienda, 2001

Elaborated by: SIISE-STFS

Tabla 2C. Ecuador: Mean years of schooling by ethnic group, 2001

Ethnic group	Mean of years of schooling
Ecuador	6,56
Indigenous	3,96
Afro-Ecuadorians	5,46
Mestizos	6,67
White	7,99

Source: INEC. VI Censo de Población y V Vivienda, 2001

Notes:

(1) For people aged 25 and older at the time of the census

Table 3: Decomposition of Earning Differences, Ecuador, 1998 (Oaxaca-Blinder Method)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Decomposition</u>		<u>Contribution as a percentage of total differential</u>	
	<u>Endowments</u>	<u>Pay structure</u>	<u>Endowments</u>	<u>Pay structure</u>
	$bn(Xn-Xi)$	$Xi(bn-bi)$		
Dummy Male	0.043	0.157	4.08	14.80
Years of schooling	0.105	-0.210	9.90	-19.77
Years of schooling squared	0.228	0.110	21.51	10.38
Experience (years)	-0.102	1.217	-9.63	114.54
Experience squared	0.196	-1.616	18.46	-152.10
Experience cube	-0.086	0.787	-8.14	74.09
Ln(hours working/week)	-0.015	-0.064	-1.45	-6.00
Dummy Informal sector	0.117	-0.082	10.98	-7.71
Dummy Agricultural sector	0.073	0.320	6.91	30.12
Dummy Domestic employee	-0.015	0.007	-1.46	0.65
Dummy laborer	0.039	-0.109	3.71	-10.28
Dummy employee	-0.151	-0.016	-14.25	-1.52
Dummy self employed	0.217	-0.061	20.39	-5.70
Dummy rural	0.087	-0.124	8.21	-11.66
Dummy Costa	-0.005	0.024	-0.48	2.29
Dummy Oriente	-0.013	-0.010	-1.18	-0.93
Dummy household head	0.021	-0.151	1.97	-14.23
Dummy Union member	0.049	-0.015	4.62	-1.40
Constant	0.000	0.109	0.00	10.28
Total	0.788	0.274	74.16	25.84
	1.062		100.00	

Non-indigenous earnings advantage and its decomposition

	<u>Over-all differential</u>	<u>Amount attributed to</u>	
		<u>Endowments</u>	<u>Pay structure</u>
Sucres advantage	1,007,130	746,867	260,263
as % of non-indigenous Y	47.0	34.9	12.2
As % of over-all diff		74.2	25.8

Source: INEC-World Bank, 1998 LSMS Survey.

Elaboration: Larrea, C. 2004. Indigenous peoples and poverty in Ecuador. In imprint.

Table 4 A: Illiteracy rates
Population aged 15 or older, 2001

	Ecuador	Women	Men
Indigenous	20	36	28
Afro-Ecuadori	11	12	12
Mestizo	7	9	8
Mulatto	8	10	9
White	4	5	5
Total	8	10	9

Source: INEC. VI Censo de Población y V de Vivienda, 2001

Elaborated by: SIISE-STFS

Table 4B
Estimated individual probabilities of being poor

<i>Characteristics</i>	<i>Indigenous</i>	<i>Non-indigenous</i>	<i>All Population</i>
Male	0.840	0.602	0.616
Female	0.871	0.546	0.572
Years of Schooling 0	0.930	0.869	0.884
Years of Schooling 6	0.850	0.705	0.714
Years of Schooling 12	0.601	0.345	0.352
Years of Schooling 16	0.268	0.148	0.150
Healthy	0.841	0.594	0.611
Not Healthy	0.867	0.568	0.588
TOTAL	0.855	0.580	0.599

Source: ECV 1998, in Larrea, C. 2004. Indigenous peoples and poverty in Ecuador. In imprint.

Table 4C
Poverty by ethnicity: 1994-2003

Year	Poverty			Extreme poverty		
	Indigenous	Non indigenous	Total	Indigenous	Non indigenous	Total
1994	80%	51%	53%	48%	14%	14%
1995	65%	55%	56%	27%	20%	20%
1998	87%	61%	63%	56%	25%	25%
1999	92%	64%	66%	74%	26%	26%
2000	84%	68%	69%	63%	39%	39%
2001	80%	59%	61%	57%	32%	32%
2003	78%	56%	57%	54%	29%	31%

Sources: ECV95, ECV98, EMEDINHO 2000, INEC 2001 and ENEMDUR 2003

NOTE: From 1994 to 1999 poverty is based on consumption, and from 2000 and 2003 poverty is based on income.

Elaboration: Larrea, C.

Table 5A. Ecuador: Inter-regional migration matrix, 2001 (1) (First entry is percentage of national population; the second entry, in parenthesis, is percentage of region)

Region of residence (2)	Ecuador	Region of Birth									
		Región A		Región B		Región C		Región D		Región E	
Región A	10.42	9.40	(70.25)	0.02	(0.87)	0.02	(0.71)	0.12	(1.79)	0.80	(1.09)
Región B	2.82	0.17	(1.27)	2.02	(87.68)	0.03	(0.73)	0.14	(2.03)	0.44	(0.61)
Región C	3.17	0.04	(0.32)	0.00	(0.16)	2.49	(71.36)	0.02	(0.24)	0.58	(0.80)
Región D	7.02	0.36	(2.69)	0.08	(3.58)	0.04	(1.29)	5.48	(79.96)	0.99	(1.36)
Región E	76.57	3.41	(25.47)	0.18	(7.72)	0.90	(25.91)	1.09	(15.98)	70.19	(96.14)
Ecuador	100.00	13.38	(100.00)	2.30	(100.00)	3.48	(100.00)	6.85	(100.00)	73.01	(100.00)

Source: INEC. VI Censo de Población y V Vivienda, 2001

Notes:

(1) For people aged 25 and older at the time of the census

(2) Region where the person was while the census took place

(3) A: region with an incidence of indigenous population of 20% or more: Andean provinces of Chimborazo, Bolívar, Cotopaxi e Imbabura.

B: region with an incidence of indigenous population of 20% or more: center and northern Amazonian provinces: Morona Santiago, Napo, Pastaza y Orellana.

C: region with an incidence of Afroecuadorian population of 20% or more: province of Esmeraldas

D: region with an incidence of indigenous population between 5 and 19%: provinces of Cañar, Tungurahua, Zamora Chinchipe and Sucumbíos.

E: region with an incidence of indigenous population smaller than 5%: provinces of El Oro, Guayas and Manabí, Galápagos, and Carchi, Loja, and Pichincha.

Tabla 5B. Ecuador inter-marriage matrices, 2001

Household Head (Male)	Wife						
	Indigenous	Afroecuadorian	Mestizos	Mulatto	White	Other	Ecuador
Indigenous	6,31	0,02	0,86	0,03	0,12	0,00	7,35
Black	0,02	1,12	0,63	0,17	0,21	0,01	2,17
Mestizos	0,71	0,43	71,89	0,81	3,44	0,06	77,35
Mulatto	0,03	0,13	0,95	1,12	0,38	0,01	2,62
White	0,07	0,15	3,07	0,32	6,52	0,05	10,17
Other	0,00	0,01	0,09	0,01	0,06	0,17	0,35
Ecuador	7,16	1,86	77,49	2,46	10,73	0,30	100,00

Household Head (Female)	Husband						
	Indigenous	Afroecuadorian	Mestizos	Mulatto	White	Other	Ecuador
Indigenous	5,20	0,04	1,02	0,05	0,19	0,01	6,52
Black	0,04	1,66	0,81	0,26	0,25	0,02	3,04
Mestizos	0,98	0,94	67,03	1,37	3,95	0,12	74,40
Mulatto	0,05	0,26	1,26	1,44	0,50	0,02	3,53
White	0,16	0,37	4,64	0,58	6,20	0,08	12,04
Other	0,01	0,01	0,13	0,02	0,08	0,24	0,48
Ecuador	6,45	3,28	74,90	3,72	11,17	0,49	100,00

Source: INEC. VI Censo de Población y V de Vivienda, 2001

Elaborated by: SIISE-STFS

Tabla 6A. Ecuador: Peasant Movements, 1730-1900

Place and date	Type of violence	Causes	Consequences	Mobilising Agent
Pomallacta, 1730	Collective (indigenous community rebellion)	Expansion of non-indigenous colonos	Repression	Gaspar Lema
Alausí, 1760	Collective (indigenous uprising)	Violation of the right of the church asylum	Repression	Pascual Baylema and Pedro Veloso
Riobamba, 1764	Collective (indigenous uprising: 10,000 indigenous)	Opposition to the <i>mita</i> of <i>gañerías</i>	Repression	Antonio Obando, Antonio Taype Guaminga
San Miguel de Molleambato, 1766	Collective (indigenous community rebellion)	Excessive tax payments	Repression: Forgiveness in exchange of Taxes restitution	Pedro y Pascual Ati, Diego Janchi and Joaquín Tasituya
San Idelfonso, 1768	Collective (indigenous uprising)	Beating to workers in <i>obrajes</i>	Death penalty for leaders and beatings for accomplices	Manuel Pombosa, Phelipe, Romualdo Yagua and Bárbara Sinailín
San Phelipe, 1771	Collective (indigenous several community rebellion)	Opposition to numbering indigenous	Beathings and forced labor for leaders	Esteban Chingo and Pablo Caisaluisa
Otavalo, 1777 Agualongo, Atuntaqui, San pabli, Cayambe	Collective (indigenous uprising)	Opposition to taxation census	Beathings, hair cuttings, forced labor and taxation	Antonia Salazar, María Juana Cotacache, Rita Piñán, Teresa and Antonia Thamayo an
Guano, 1778	Collective (indigenous rebellion)	Opposition to taxation census and to the water tariffs	Hunging of leaders, confiscation of property and forced labor for accomplices	Atanasio y Manuel Paucar, Tomas Amaguaylla and others
Pelileo 1780	Collective (indigenous community rebellion)	Opposition to <i>Alcabalas</i>	Hunging of leaders, beathings and exile for accomplices	Rosa Gordona, Teresa Maroto
Quisapincha, 1780	Collective (indigenous community rebellion)	Opposition to <i>Alcabalas</i>	Hunging of leaders, confiscation of property and forced labor for accomplices	Martín Velasteguí, Rosa Señapanta, Juan Tamaycha, and Agustín Ortiz
Píllaro, 1780	Collective (indigenous community rebellion)	Opposition to <i>Alcabalas</i>	Hunging of leaders, confiscation of property and exile for accomplices	Fermín Aguirre, Mariano Villalba (everybody in the town according to the defense lawyer)

(Continues.....)

Tabla 6A (continued). Ecuador: Peasant Movements, 1730-1900

Place and date	Type of violence	Causes	Consequences	Mobilising Agent
Guamate, Columbe 1803	Collective (indigenous community rebellion)	Opposition to the tithe and taxation	Hunging of leaders, beatings and exile for accomplices	Francisco Currillo, Mariano Gualpa, Lorenzo peña, Jacinto Juárez, Lorenza Avemañay, Rafael Paholo and everybody else
?, 1828	Collective (indigenous rebellion)	Restoration of the indigenous taxation abolished by the Constitution of <i>Cúcuta</i>	n.s.	n.s.
Provincias del Norte y Chimborazo, 1843	Collective (indigenous community)	Training Law	Nullification of the training law	n.s.
Cañar, 1862	Collective (indigenous rebellion)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Guano 1862	Collective (indigenous rebellion)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Imbabura, 1868	Collective (indigenous uprising)	Fight against <i>concertaje</i>	n.s.	n.s.
Chimborazo, 1871	Collective (indigenous community rebellion)	forced labor	Execution of leaders	Fernando Daquilema (King)

Source: Moreno, S. 1978: "Sublevaciones Indígenas en la Audiencia de Quito"

Ayala, Enrique, ed. Nueva Historia del Ecuador

Note: n.s.: not specified

Tabla 6B. Ecuador: Peasant Movements, 1990-2000

Place and date	Type of violence	Causes	Consequences	Mobilising Agent
Nacional, 1990 Intiraimi	Collective (indigenous several community rebellion)	Indigenous nationalities are ignored	National debate on constitutional rights of indigenous nationalities	CONAIE
Amazonía, Quito, 1992	Collective (Indigenous massive Demonstration)	multi-culture and collective rights are not recognized	National debate on constitutional rights of indigenous nationalities	CONAIE
Nacional, 1994	Collective (Indigenous massive Demonstration)	Lack of indigenous land property rights	Obstruction of reforms to the Agrarian Law	CONAIE
Nacional, 1997	Collective (indigenous several community rebellion)	Mismanagement of President Bucaram	Dismissal of President Bucaram and approval of constitutional changes about a multicultural Ecuador	CONAIE
Nacional, 1999	Collective (indigenous several community rebellion)	Economic adjustment and raise of gas price	Elimination of gas subsidy proposal was stopped	CONAIE
Nacional, 2000	Collective (indigenous several community rebellion)	Mismanagement of Presidente Mahuad	Dismissal of President Mahuad	CONAIE

Source: Chiriboga, M. 2004. Desigualdad, exclusión étnica y participación política; Conaie y Pachacutik. In print

Table 7: Ecuador: political regimes since Independence, 1820-2004

N°	From	To	Régimen (1)	Presidents
1	09/10/1820	31/07/1822	Non Democratic	Olmedo/Ximena/Roca
2	31/07/1822	22/09/1830	Democratic	Bolívar, Santander, Flores
3	22/09/1830	10/09/1834	Democratic	Flores
4	10/09/1834	08/08/1835	Non Democratic	Fernández, Larrea, Ortega, Valdivieso, Rocafuerte
5	08/08/1835	15/01/1843	Democratic	Rocafuerte, Flores
6	15/01/1843	01/04/1843	Non Democratic	Aguirre
7	01/04/1843	25/06/1845	Democratic	Flores
8	25/06/1845	08/12/1845	Non Democratic	Marcos, Olmedo/Roca/Novoa, Valdivieso, Merino
9	08/12/1845	15/10/1849	Democratic	Roca
10	15/10/1849	20/02/1850	Non Democratic	Merino, Ascázubi, Noboa, Elizalde
11	20/02/1850	13/09/1851	Democratic	Novoa
12	13/09/1851	06/09/1852	Non Democratic	Valdivieso, Urbina
13	06/09/1852	15/10/1856	Democratic	Urbina
14	15/10/1856	26/12/1856	Non Democratic	Chiriboga, Gómez, Espinel
14	26/12/1856	01/05/1859	Democratic	Robles
15	01/05/1859	02/04/1861	Non Democratic	Espinel, Carrión, García Moreno/Carrión, Chiriboga, García Moreno, Franco
16	02/04/1861	19/01/1869	Democratic	García Moreno, Cueva, Carvajal, Carrión, Arteta, Espinoza
17	19/01/1869	10/08/1869	Non Democratic	García Moreno, Ascázubi
18	09/08/1865	08/09/1876	Democratic	García Moreno, León, Eguiguren, Pólit, Borrero
19	08/09/1876	26/01/1878	Non Democratic	Veintimilla
20	26/01/1878	26/03/1882	Democratic	Veintimilla
21	26/03/1882	11/10/1883	Non Democratic	Salvador, Fernández, Veintimilla, Alfaro, Guerrero/Cordero/Pérez/ Herrera/Sagasti, Carbo, Borrero
22	11/10/1883	30/06/1888	Democratic	Caamaño
23	30/06/1888	16/08/1888	Non Democratic	Guerrero, Cevallos
24	16/08/1888	16/04/1895	Democratic	Flores, Cordero
25	16/04/1895	09/10/1896	Non Democratic	Salazar, Alfaro
26	09/10/1896	15/01/1906	Democratic	Alfaro, Plaza, Baquerizo, García

27	15/01/1906	10/10/1906	Non Democratic	Alfaro
28	10/10/1906	09/07/1925	Democratic	Alfaro, Moncayo, Freile(2), Estrada, Andrade Marín (2), Baquerizo(2), Plaza, Tamayo, Córdova
29	09/07/1925	09/10/1928	Non Democratic	Bustamante/Dillon/Gómez,Garaicoa, Moreno/Viteri/Ayora/Albornoz, Ayora
30	09/10/1928	24/08/1931	Democratic	Ayora
31	24/08/1931	05/12//1932	Non Democratic	Larrea, Baquerizo, Freile, Guerrero
32	05/12//1932	20/08/1935	Democratic	Martínez, Montalvo, Velasco Ibarra
33	20/08/1935	20/08/1938	Non Democratic	Pons, Páez, Enríquez
34	20/08/1938	28/05/1944	Democratic	Borrero, Mosquera, Arroyo del Río(2), Córdova, Moreno
35	28/05/1944	10/08/1944	Non Democratic	Albornoz, Arízaga/Plaza/Larrea/Rojas, Velasco Ibarra
36	10/08/1944	24/08/1947	Democratic	Velasco Ibarra
37	24/08/1947	16/09/1947	Non Democratic	Mancheno, Suárez
38	16/09/1947	10/07/1963	Democratic	Arosemena T., Plaza L., Velasco Ibarra, Ponce, Velasco Ibarra, Arosemena M.
39	10/07/1963	30/03/1966	Non Democratic	Castro/Freile/Cabrera/Gándara
40	30/03/1966	16/02/1972	Democratic	Yerovi, Arosemena G., Velasco Ibarra
41	16/02/1972	10/08/1979	Non Democratic	Rodríguez/Poveda/Durán/Leoro
42	10/08/1979	21/01/2000	Democratic	Roldós, Hurtado, Febres, Borja, Durán B., Bucaram, Arteaga, Alarcón, Mahuad
43	21/01/2000	21/01/2000	Non Democratic	Solórzano/Vargas/Morales
44	21/01/2000	09/06/2004	Democratic	Noboa, Gutiérrez


Source: Romalcio Ed. 2000. Gobernantes del Ecuador". Quito, 2000; and particular file

Notes:

[1] Democratic: Elected by general elections by the Congress, or legal successor of a ruler elected by elections or the Congress; Non Democratic: rulers who got power by *Golpe de Estado*, *Junta de Notables*, *Delegación*.


[2] In parenthesis, number of periods of government

Figure 1. Map of incidence of Indigenous population by province, Ecuador, 2001




Source: INEC. V Population and IV Housing Census, 2001
Elaborated by: SIISE-STFS

Figure 2
Predicted Labor Earnings by Educations and Ethnicity: 1998




Source: ECV98, in Larrea, C. 2004. Indigenous peoples and poverty in Ecuador. In imprint.

Figure 3
Percentage of poor population according to unsatisfied basic needs (IBN): 2001



Source: VI Censo de Población y V de Vivienda, 2001
Elaborated by: SIISE-STFS

Figure 4
Income Gini coefficient: Ecuador



Source: INEC. Sistema Integrado de Encuestas de Hogares, varios años
Estimated by: Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador SIISE- Secretaría Técnica del Frente Social STFS