

Part III Learning from Experience

One of the areas that is often neglected in programs aimed at improving probity in the electricity sector is that of reviewing progress or results, identifying lessons learned, and feeding this information back into the planning process. For example, a recent review of World Bank practice (carried out as background for this Sourcebook) found that, out of 30 country, sector, or project strategies from 10 countries, only 5 adequately reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of past interventions (lessons learned) and clearly identified how the impacts of proposed governance interventions were to be assessed over time and “fed-back” into future work.


Monitoring and follow up are important as a way of assessing the effectiveness of strategies adopted for improving probity. If a strategy is effective, this should be evident from an increase in observable indicators of integrity, and corresponding decrease in indicators of corruption risk. Ideally, monitoring and review should be designed-in from the start. The sector strategy or project design could establish what the review process for that strategy or project will be.

14 Reviewing Progress

Monitoring and evaluation can be thought of as “closing the loop” for pro-probity interventions. This section suggests ways in which progress in improving governance and probity can be monitored, and how information from monitoring can be evaluated to inform future interventions.

Figure 14.1 lists (on the left-hand side) the typical steps in monitoring and evaluation of governance and anti-corruption initiatives. It also provides (on the right-hand side) an example of how a monitoring and evaluation regime could be developed for a project focused on improving planning, procurement and supervision in capital works.

Figure 14.1: Monitoring and Evaluation




As illustrated in the figure, the basic steps are to define the expected results, choose indicators for those results, establish a baseline value for the indicators, monitor changes in the indicators over time, and evaluate the results to learn lessons for the future. These steps are each discussed below.

14.1 Defining Expected Improvements

To monitor progress against expectations, it is necessary to be clear about what the expected results are. Sector practitioners should recognize variability in country's abilities and circumstances and focus on the area where what **should** be done, what the **country can do**, and what the practitioner **can influence**, coincide with the aim of expending this area of overlap over time (see Figure 14.2)

Figure 14.2: Recognizing Variability in Country's Abilities and Circumstances



It follows that before designing a monitoring and evaluation program, practitioners must be clear about:

- What are the inputs or interventions whose success is to be monitored?
- What are the hoped for result?
- What is the expected chain of causation between the inputs and the hoped for result?

In the example illustrated in Figure 14.1, the actions involve strengthening planning capacity, bringing in e-Procurement, and involving third parties in supervising procurement and construction. The hoped for chain of causation is that these measures would improve planning and reduce corruption in capital works. The desired result is that more appropriate capital works are procured and that the cost of the works is lower, while the quality is higher. Ultimately it is hoped that this would reduce the cost and increase the quality of electricity services.

14.2 Choosing Suitable Indicators

To monitor progress, practitioners will need something that can be observed and measured, that correlates well with the intended results of the program—in other words, a suitable indicator. Box 14.1 indicates how important this choice is.

Box 14.1: Choosing Indicators in Uganda

Uganda has had a number of M&E initiatives and systems. However, diagnoses of Uganda's M&E arrangements in 2001 and 2003 revealed a large number of uncoordinated and un-harmonized monitoring systems at the sector and subsector levels—at least 16 separate systems. In addition, a detailed investigation of three sectors (health, education, and water and sanitation) revealed a considerable data-collection burden at the district and facility levels.

The management information systems for those three sectors collected data on nearly 1,000 performance indicators, involving almost 300,000 data entries per annum for each of the 110 districts in Uganda. These indicators largely focused on spending, activities, and the physical state of facilities such as schools and health clinics.

However, measures of client satisfaction and outcome measures, such as health status and learning outcomes, were largely missing. Unfortunately, the quality of the data was highly uncertain and often considered poor. As a result, the sector ministries and agencies relied heavily on inspection visits rather than on self-reported performance indicators.

The diagnostic findings led to the decision to create a National Integrated M&E System (NIMES) under the aegis of the Office of the Prime Minister. The objective of NIMES is to create an umbrella M&E system within which existing systems will be coordinated and harmonized and government capacities to conduct and use M&E strengthened.

Various working groups have been created under NIMES addressing the following issues: M&E in local governments; policy research; evaluation; national statistical data; sector management information systems and spatial data; civil society organizations and M&E; and financial information.

NIMES is reducing the very large number of performance indicators, especially at the sector level, with a greater focus on outputs, outcomes, and impacts, as well as on the setting of targets.

Source: Mackay, K. (2007). *How to Build Monitoring & Evaluation Systems to Support Better Government*. World Bank


Part II of the sourcebook lists numerous indicators that may be suitable for detecting corruption or assessing governance. In selecting which indicators are suitable for monitoring purposes, practitioners may consider the following principles:

- Indicators chosen should relate to the intended results, while also being proximate to the actions whose success is being monitored. Figure 14.3 illustrates the difficulty in getting this right. The ultimate intended result of actions to increase probity in capital works may be to lower the cost of electricity services. It might seem from this that the cost of electricity service would therefore be an appropriate indicator. The difficulty with this is that the cost of electricity service is affected by far more than corruption in capital works—these are the “confounding factors” shown in the figure. If the cost of electricity increases because the price of fuel rises rapidly, the indicator will tell us little about the success of the anti-corruption initiative. For this reason, a more proximate indicator—such as an expert assessment of the quality of the provider's capital expenditure plan—might be a better guide to the success of the intervention
- Indicators for monitoring purposes should ideally be quantitative, rather than qualitative. They must be clearly defined, with a clear and simple process for

measuring them. The indicators should also be relevant over time (several years may elapse between the baseline, interim and final measurements)

- Because most indicators are not perfect indicators of corruption, the practitioner should select a **set** of relevant indicators to review. While conclusions drawn from a single indicator may be misleading, if several indicators are telling the same story, practitioners can have more confidence in their conclusions.

Figure 14.3: The Art of Choosing Monitoring Indicators



In some cases practitioners may be able to use indicators that are already being reported, for example sector performance, or existing surveys, such as the relevant parts of the Doing Business Survey.⁴⁶ In other cases, it will be worth developing indicators specifically for the project. For example, practitioners could supplement performance reviews with simple surveys that collect data on reported side-payments or bribes.

Practitioners may also collect more detailed cost information for unit inputs and supplier contracts, to determine if changes in procurement are taking place. Price tracking can provide a more objective indicator than perceptions of corruption.

⁴⁶ For more information on the Doing Business Survey, please see <http://www.doingbusiness.org/>

14.3 Establishing a Baseline

Ideally, at the beginning of a pro-probity intervention, practitioners would clearly establish the baseline levels for each of the indicators in the set, alongside expected or desired levels after a period. Such a baseline measuring approach was used in Pakistan at the beginning of a decentralization effort, as described in Box 14.2 below.

Box 14.2: Social Audit to Gather Baseline Indicators on Governance and Services

Pakistan has been through a recent decentralization process in which new responsibilities have been devolved to local government. To form a baseline of public service provision in the initial stages of this devolution process, the National Reconstruction Bureau commissioned a social audit on satisfaction with public services, including electricity supply, water supply, sewage and sanitation and gas supply. The audit, which covered 87 districts in Pakistan, included a household questionnaire, a community profile questionnaire, key informant interview schedules with service providers, key informant interview schedules with union councillors, and focus group guides.

The audit was first completed in 2001/02, and results of the audit were published in 2003. At that time, the government signalled plans to regularly repeat the audit process, using the same methods and indicators, to track changes to public perceptions about delivery of public services delivery and local governance over time. The audit was most recently repeated in 2004/05.

A comparison of the two survey results showed an increase in access to electricity supply between 2001/02 and 2004/05, but a slight decrease in satisfaction with the quality of supply. Overall, the audit found “encouraging signs...after two years or more of devolved local government”, but noted that the results also provided “some pointers for issues requiring attention to increase the chances of achieving the goals of devolution”.

Source: Cockcroft, A. et al (2005) *Social audit of governance and delivery of public services*, CIET

The work done in diagnosing corruption risk during project design (see Part II) may provide an adequate baseline. If it does not, it will usually be money well spent to commission additional work to establish baseline values for the chosen monitoring indicators.

14.4 Monitoring Progress

Having a consistent set of indicators is an important first step for accurately measuring changes in governance over time; but it is important, too, that these indicators are properly and consistently applied. Proper application requires a reliable entity to carry out indicator assessment, and a clear review process.

Entities made responsible for reviewing indicator levels should be capable, reliable, and impartial, and must be formally committed to reviewing the indicators. In some countries the suitable entity could be the Ministry of Finance or the National Audit Office. Alternatively, a more sector-specific agency, such as the regulator or Ministry of Energy could take on the monitoring duties. In a decentralized system, local councils, chambers of commerce or well-organized consumer groups could be given some monitoring functions. However, it is important that the selected entity has incentives to monitor and report accurately, and does not have strong incentives to “hide” corrupt activity or poor governance performance. Box 14.3 describes an example of how multi-lateral lending

agencies plan to work together with the Government of Bangladesh to review governance progress.

Box 14.3: Good Governance Review Process in Bangladesh

The World Bank’s Bangladesh Country Assistance Strategy is noteworthy in terms of “reviewing progress”. It sets clear governance targets at the sector level, specifying governance concerns, the sector reforms or changes that would be expected to overcome these concerns, and the specific, visible outcomes (milestones) of such reforms. It also identifies who will be responsible for monitoring progress against each of the indicators—the World Bank, the Government, or other donors—and briefly describes how the monitoring will be completed.

Figure 2.3 shows a performance target matrix from the Bangladesh CAS, which lists milestones or indicators for governance improvements. Although the indicators are broad, they will help the World Bank to assess in future CASs whether the approach to improving governance has been working, or whether changes are needed. To make these indicators more useful at other levels of World Bank operations, the Bangladesh country team could use them as the basis for more specific indicators in each sector or for service providers.

Source: World Bank (2006) *“Bangladesh Country Assistance Strategy”* Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Once an entity (or entities) has been given responsibility for oversight, the review could be completed by:

- 1. Setting reporting requirements for the provider and other sector agencies, based on a clear template.** The less of an administrative burden imposed by such reporting templates, the more likely they will be consistently and thoroughly completed. The administrative burden can be minimized by ensuring that forms require only the essential information required for monitoring—for routine reporting, in particular, the format should be simple, comprehensible and short. Similarly, some reporting requirements may be streamlined into a single report containing sufficient information for all of the entities that want to review performance data. For example, there may be many demands for monitoring data from planners who want information on service reliability and quality, or from local administrative officials who require information on activities undertaken by staff as a means to ensure that funds allocated have been used appropriately. Regulators may also need information on services and costs to be submitted on a regular basis. A simple and clear reporting format can ease the job for both the entities submitting the data and the entities reviewing the data, and helps to ensure data continuity over time

Box 14.4: Electricity Regulatory Reporting Helps Monitor Improvements

In New Zealand, electricity distribution businesses must submit regular, publicly-available reports to the regulator in a prescribed format. The information reported includes both financial performance and technical performance. An example of a technical performance report sheet is illustrated below:

Faults per 100 circuit kilometers of prescribed voltage electric lines							
		2007	2006	2005	2004		
(a)	The total number of faults	16.19	15.22	12.56	14.31		
							2008
(b)	The total number of targeted faults						14.72
							2008–2012
(c)	The average total number of faults						14.72
(d)	Breakdown of (a) to (c) according to line voltage						
		6.6kV	11kV	22kV	33kV	110kV	Total
(a)	2007	11.73	17.00	10.97	10.71	5.52	16.19
(b)	2008	16.13	15.55	8.23	8.74	4.41	14.72
(c)	2008-2012	-	15.55	8.23	8.74	4.41	14.72
Number of faults per 100 circuit kilometers of underground prescribed voltage electric line							
		6.6kV	11kV	22kV	33kV	110kV	Total
	2007	6.88	8.53	8.64	5.43	4.62	8.16
	2006	7.23	7.18	1.45	5.20	-	6.73
	2005	-	4.04	4.07	1.06	-	3.66
	2004	-	6.46	4.09	5.59	7.72	6.28
Number of faults per 100 circuit kilometers of overhead prescribed voltage electric line							
		6.6kV	11kV	22kV	33kV	100kV	Total
	2007	20.33	24.95	57.41	16.51	7.77	24.14
	2006	15.43	24.10	13.44	19.48	3.89	23.53
	2005	-	21.37	-	20.10	19.43	21.12
	2004	-	23.18	-	23.54	11.66	23.01
<p>The clear and consistent reporting format assists the regulator and the public in monitoring utility performance over time. For the consumer-owners of the utilities (most of which are governed by consumer-elected boards), such performance monitoring is useful for illustrating whether changes in management have led to changes in performance.</p>							
<p>The clear and consistent reporting format assists the regulator and the public in monitoring utility performance over time. For the consumer-owners of the utilities (most of which are governed by consumer-elected boards), such performance monitoring is useful for illustrating whether changes in management have led to changes in performance.</p>							

2. **Establishing external reviews and audits by a reliable, independent firm.** If the results of an audit or report are likely to identify governance concerns, the providers or officials concerned will have incentives to attempt a “cover up” by mis-reporting or bribing others to submit false reports. Accordingly, it is important that the monitoring firm or entity is independent, and unlikely to be influenced by threats or bribes, or has incentives to report correctly. In some countries this is achieved by hiring a consulting firm to undertake monitoring activities. In Indonesia, the World Bank was able to resolve many problems with inaccurate audits by ensuring that the auditors were adequately paid for their transportation and accommodation costs, and had less “need” to seek reimbursement through bribes from the officials under review⁴⁷
3. **Analyzing and reporting on results.** Once data has been collected, it needs to be processed in a way that produces meaningful information. Where reports are lengthy or require a detailed understanding of electricity sector issues they are unlikely to be appropriate for anything but a small technical audience. Where information is needed by non sector-specialists for use in planning, it would be best for data to be analysed first by specialists and then reported in a short, clear format consistent with the use to which the data will be put.

14.5 Evaluating Results and Drawing Conclusions

Once information has been generated from the review, and analyzed in accordance with the intended use for the information (such as identifying cost abnormalities, or identifying the incidence of bribes), the lessons learned need to be fed-back in to the sector planning and governance intervention process.

Possible feedback mechanisms include:

- **Identification of decision-points in the project or sector-plan implementation process, where new information or past experience can be reassessed.** This may be particularly important for ensuring that unsuccessful pro-probity interventions are discontinued or modified at an early stage, and that successful interventions are continued
- **Recording “lessons learned”, and feeding these back into future sector strategies or project design** (both within sector, and more widely to other agency staff). Lessons learned, if accurately recorded and reported, can be invaluable for future planning. Vague “success reports” are generally unhelpful; practitioners and governments need to know why a particular program has been successful or unsuccessful. Similarly, following the introduction of report cards in Bangalore the World Bank commissioned an assessment to understand what effect, if any, the card had on governance and accountability (see Box 14.5)

⁴⁷ World Bank (2004) *Village Justice in Indonesia: Case studies on access to justice, village democracy, and governance*, Washington, DC: The World Bank

Box 14.5: Assessment of Impact of Report Cards in India

The Bangalore Citizen Report Card (CRC) was pioneered by an independent NGO, the Public Affairs Centre, in 1994. The report cards involve surveys of random samples of households in Bangalore to assess their satisfaction levels with various dimensions of the quality of services provided by the municipal government and other public service agencies. The dimensions covered by these service delivery surveys include behavior of staff who serve them, quality of service, information provided by staff, and extent of corruption (speed money). The agencies that households are asked to rank include electricity, water, other municipal services, transport, housing, telephones, banks, and hospitals.

The first report card found several problems: low levels of public satisfaction; public agencies that were not citizen friendly; a lack of customer orientation; corruption; and a high cost for the inefficiency of the public sector. The second CRC survey in 1999 revealed improvements in satisfaction levels but no improvement in the proportion of households paying bribes.

The World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group commissioned an assessment of the impact of the first two report cards (1994 and 1999) based on interviews with a sample of agency heads, senior state officials, citizen action groups, and the media in Bangalore. The interviewees reported that they were generally appreciative of the report card as a tool to obtain feedback on services. Following the CRC findings, many of the agencies initiated reform measures. The report cards helped increase public awareness of the quality of services and stimulated citizen groups to demand better services. They influenced key officials in understanding the perceptions of ordinary citizens and the role of civil society in city governance. Bangalore has witnessed a number of improvements, particularly following the second report card. There is now greater transparency in the operations of government agencies and better responsiveness to citizens' needs. Although a number of other factors have also contributed to this transformation of Bangalore, the report cards acted as a catalyst in the process.

Source: Mackay, K. (2007). *How to Build Monitoring & Evaluation Systems to Support Better Government*. World Bank.

- **Applying penalties and rewards.** Examples of penalties include withholding funding disbursements, or prohibiting providers or officials from being involved in the next stage of program implementation. Conversely, utilities that meet objectives can be “rewarded” by being given access to increased capital investment funds, and increased autonomy over their management. For example, in Bangladesh the rural electrification board channels donor funds to providers (rural cooperatives) on the basis of their performance, as measured by indicators such as collections, financial viability, and coverage. If corruption or mismanagement in any of the providers is reported, the board has the power to investigate and to dismiss staff (if the board discovers wrongdoing).

Such a feedback loop seems easy in principle, but can be complicated in practice—the results of the review may be controversial, and sector stakeholders may act to have the information suppressed. In other cases, the information may be made available, but it may be difficult to change existing governance structures or procedures in line with the findings. Sources of further information on monitoring and evaluation are listed below.

Source List 14.1: Reviewing Progress

Source	Description
<p>Kusek, J. and Rist, R. (2004) <i>“Ten Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System”</i>, Washington, DC: The World Bank</p>	<p>This toolkit explains the importance of monitoring and evaluation, and describes clearly what a good monitoring and evaluation system should achieve. It includes a full glossary of monitoring and evaluation terminology (based on OECD definitions) and an extensive reference list for further reading. The toolkit explains that an appropriate evaluative program can provide the context necessary for correctly interpreting information generated through the monitoring process, such as performance data.</p>
<p>Mackay, K. (2007). <i>How to Build Monitoring & Evaluation Systems to Support Better Government</i>. World Bank.</p>	<p>Explains how governments can institute M&E to enhance transparency and support accountability relationships by revealing the extent to which they have attained desired objectives. Strong accountability, in turn, can provide the incentives necessary to improve performance.</p>
<p>Olken, B. (2007) <i>“Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia”</i>, Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research</p>	<p>Community participation is now regarded in much of the development community as the key not only to reduced corruption but to improved public service delivery more generally. Of course, this approach has potential drawbacks as well; for example, monitoring public projects is a public good, so there may be a serious free-rider problem. Grassroots monitoring may also be prone to capture by local elites. To examine the success of different approaches (external monitoring versus community participation and monitoring) to monitoring levels of corruption, the author designed and conducted a randomized, controlled field experiment in 608 Indonesian villages. Traditionally, much of the empirical work on corruption has been based on perceptions of corruption rather than on direct measures of corruption. This paper, however, builds on a small but growing literature that examines corruption by comparing two measures of the same, physical quantity, one “before” and one “after” corruption has taken place. This allows for accurate measures of quality over time, and enables the author to determine the extent of losses due to corruption.</p>

Source	Description
<p>Schacter, M. (2000) <i>“Evaluation Capacity Development—Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Experience in Supporting Sound Governance”</i>, Washington, DC: The World Bank</p>	<p>This paper explains that M&E can support sound governance in several ways. However, substantial M&E achievements on the ground are rare in Sub-Saharan Africa. The binding constraint appears to be insufficient demand for M&E. Few leading bureaucrats and politicians in Sub-Saharan Africa accept the value of an evaluation culture that supports fact-based administrative and political accountability. The major lesson from two decades of governance support in Sub-Saharan Africa is the failure of the blueprint approach to reform. This failure is instructive. It demonstrates that future interventions, if they are to have a reasonable chance of success, must pay careful attention to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The quality of local leadership for reform ▪ Local capacity to design and implement reform programs ▪ Features of the local incentive and accountability environment, particularly as they relate to the level of corruption in the public sector and the quality of public service delivery ▪ Capacity-building needs of decentralized as well as centralized forms of governance ▪ Forces external to the public service that support government reform.

Appendix A: Glossary

Access to information	Refers to the right of interested parties (the public, NGOs, the media, etc.) to receive information held by government. This right, protected by international and national laws, provides that official documents should be generally available, and that any exceptions should be limited and specific. Access to information increases government accountability to its citizens and reduces opportunities for corruption.
Accountability	Accountability denotes a relationship between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and the agents or agencies responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right. One basic type of accountability relationship is that between a person or agency entrusted with a particular task or certain powers or resources, on the one hand, and the 'principal' on whose behalf the task is undertaken, on the other.
Auditing	Auditing refers to an official examination of an organisation or institution's accounts, to make sure money has been spent correctly, i.e. according to rules, regulations and norms. Audit institutions like national and regional Auditor Generals, Audit Offices, State Comptrollers, Ombudsmen, Tribunals de Cuentas, Cours de Comptes etc. make a vital contribution to good governance by detecting poor management and inappropriate use of public money. Auditing institutions can be considered the taxpayers' independent and professional watchdogs.
Bid rigging	Occurs where officials or managers rig or interfere with the contract award to favor a particular bidder, or bidders (usually in return for a bribe or kickback payment).
Bribes	Payments to an official or utility staff member, paid in advance in return for a promise to act a certain way (for example, award a supply contract to a particular firm, or install a connection within a particular time frame).
Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT)	A BOOT model involves a single organization or consortium designing, building, funding, owning, and operating a scheme for a define period of time (usually around 25 years) and then transferring the ownership across to an agreed party.
Clientelism	Clientelism is an informal relationship between people of different social and economic status: a 'patron' (boss, big man) and his 'clients' (dependents, followers, protégés). The relationship includes a mutual but unequal exchange of favors, which can be corrupt. Patrimonial and clientelist practices can institutionalize hegemonic elites and political corruption, often reaching the highest ranks of state power.
Competitive bidding	Competitive bidding is a selection process based on the principle of open and transparent advertisement of an item or service, which ensures that the best bidder wins according to qualifications, value and other objective criteria (and consequently not according to family or

friendship ties, bribery or threats). Competitive bidding processes are often required by law on public contracts and purchases above a certain value.

Cronyism	Cronyism refers to the favorable treatment of friends and associates in the distribution of resources and positions, regardless of their objective qualifications.
Embezzlement	Embezzlement is the misappropriation of property or funds legally entrusted to someone in their formal position as agent or guardian.
Extortion	Extortion is the unlawful demand or receipt of property or money through the use of force or threat. A typical example of extortion would be when armed police or military men exact money for passage through a roadblock. Synonyms include blackmail, bloodsucking and extraction.
Favoritism	Favoritism refers to the normal human inclination to prefer acquaintances, friends, and family over strangers. It is not always, then, a form of corruption. However, when public officials demonstrate favoritism to unfairly distribute positions and resources, they are guilty of cronyism or nepotism, depending on their relationship with the person who benefits.
Fraud	Fraud is an economic crime involving deceit, trickery, or false pretenses, by which someone gains unlawfully. An actual fraud is motivated by the desire to cause harm by deceiving someone else, while a constructive fraud is a profit made from a relation of trust.
Incentives	An incentive is an inducement or stimulus (the carrot or the stick), that encourages someone to do something. Incentive theory provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the role and potential of recruitment and promotion mechanisms, detection and penalties, and different wage systems in improving the efficiency of public agencies. It challenges, for instance, the simplistic view that pay increases will always reduce fraud in public administration. Note that an incentive might also be a bribe, persuading officials to return undue favors to the briber.
Interest peddling	Interest peddling occurs when a professional solicits benefits in exchange for using his influence to unfairly advance the interests of a particular person or party. Interest peddling is addressed through transparency and disclosure laws, which aim to expose suspect agreements.
Kickbacks	Similar to bribes, but are paid after the fact (for example, once the supply contract has been awarded to a particular firm)
Nepotism	Nepotism is usually used to indicate a form of favoritism that involves family relationships. It describes situations in which a person exploits his or her power and authority to procure jobs or other favors for relatives. Nepotism can take place at all level of the state, from low-level bureaucratic offices to national ministries. Many unrestricted

presidents have tried to secure their (precarious) positions by nominating family members to key political, economic, and military/security posts in the state apparatus.

Patronage

Patronage refers to support or sponsorship of a patron (wealthy or influential guardian). Patronage is used, for instance, to make appointments to government jobs, promotions, contracts for work, and so on. However, there is “no such thing as a free lunch”; most patrons are motivated by the desire to gain power, wealth, and status through their behavior. Patronage transgresses the boundaries of legitimate political influence, and violates the principles of merit and competition.

Transparency

Transparency is the quality of being clear, honest and open. As a principle, transparency implies that civil servants, managers and trustees have a duty to act visibly, predictably and understandably. Sufficient information must be available so that other agencies and the general public can assess whether the relevant procedures are followed, consonant with the given mandate. Transparency is therefore considered an essential element of accountable governance, leading to improved resource allocation, enhanced efficiency, and better prospects for economic growth in general.

Source: Castalia and the Anti-Corruption Resource Center (2007)

Website References

- 1 <http://www.korrupsioon.ee/orb.aw/class=file/action=preview/id=13373/AN+HONES>
- 2 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/A1-durban-ghana.pdf>
- 3 <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN019121.pdf>
- 4 <http://www.anticorruptionsl.org/pdf/acstrategy.pdf>
- 5 http://www.ipocafrika.org/pdfuploads/THE%20UNITED%20REPUBLIC%20ANTI-CORRUPTION%20OF%20TANZANIA%20THE%20NATI_003.pdf
- 6 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/capacitybuild/pdf/guide_coalitions.pdf
- 7 <http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx>
- 8 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
- 9 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/73153-1181752621336/IRA!2006table1.pdf>
- 10 <http://www.undp.org/governance/docs/Policy-Pub-Indicator%20Sources.pdf>
- 11 <http://www.doingbusiness.org/>
- 12 <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/CountryProfiles/>
- 13 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp
- 14 <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps>
- 15 http://www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3343,en_2649_33935_37081881_1_1_1_1,00.html
- 16 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952071
- 17 http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs07/undp_users_guide_online_version.pdf
- 18 http://electricitygovernance.wri.org/files/EGI%20Toolkit%202007_0.pdf
- 19 <http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/document/literature/pezzullo-1998-journalist-training-curb-to-corruption.pdf>
- 20 <http://bora.nhh.no/bitstream/2330/1400/1/soreide%20tina%202006.pdf>
- 21 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/corruption_news
- 22 <http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/helpdesk/helpdesk/queries/query147.pdf>
- 23 <http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/524117.html>
- 24 <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/CountryProfiles/>
- 25 <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN019883.pdf>
- 26 http://ww2.unhabitat.org/cdrom/TRANSPARENCY/html/2_2.html
- 27 <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20726148~isCURL:Y~menuPK:1740556~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html>
- 28 <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTADMINISTRATIVEANDCIVILSERVICEREFORM/0,,contentMDK:20226586~menuPK:1829142~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:286367,00.html>
- 29 <http://www.pcij.org/training/Investigating%20Corruption.rtf>
- 30 <http://www.adb.org/documents/periodicals/gb/GovernanceBrief16.pdf>
- 31 <http://www.adb.org/documents/periodicals/gb/GovernanceBrief16.pdf>
- 32 <http://electricitygovernance.wri.org/publications/empowering-people>
- 33 <http://www.raponline.org/Pubs/General/BPPwrStr.pdf>
- 34 http://www.igac.net/pdf/publications_adb_manyfacesofcorruption.pdf
- 35 <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2756=understanding-the-private-side-of-corruption>
- 36 <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2755=measuring-private-sector-corruption>
- 37 <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/240073/Post-conflict%20infrastructure%20-%20trends%20in%20aid%20and%20investment%20flows.pdf>
- 38 <http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/567.pdf>
- 39 <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ik/what.htm>
- 40 <http://www.thelinescompany.co.nz/disclosure/AssetManagementPlan2007.pdf>
- 41 <http://icgcommerce.com/corporate/doc/html/resource/whitepapers.htm>
- 42 www.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook
- 43 http://www.transparency.org/tools/contracting/construction_projects
- 44 <http://www.ifitransparency.org/doc/ecosensereport.pdf>
- 45 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/11acc_cam_pim_gav.pdf

46 <http://go.worldbank.org/UFL0PSUG20>

47 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/guidance_note_project_management_102005.pdf

48 <http://rru.worldbank.org/Features/OBABook.aspx>

49 <http://www.gpoba.org/docs/Working%20Paper%20No%201%20Incumbents.pdf>

50 http://www.gpoba.org/docs/OBApproaches_Philippines_SPUG.pdf

51 http://www.gpoba.org/docs/OBApproaches16_CorruptionOBA.pdf

52 <http://www.globalregulatorynetwork.org/Files/IPPmaterials/Presentations/IPPmanual.pdf>

53 <http://crgp.stanford.edu/events/presentations/gcr2/Guasch3.pdf>

54 <http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/gsbwebb/mir/documents/TanzaniaManagementContract.pdf>

55 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINFNETWORK/Resources/Unsolicited_Proposals_Experience_Review_Report_FINAL_2006.pdf

56 http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Toolkits/hiringadvisors_fulltoolkit.pdf

57 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/ppp_standardised_contracts.cfm

58 http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/272bhatia_gulati.pdf

59 http://www.igac.net/pdf/publications_adb_manyfacesofcorruption.pdf

60 <http://www.esri.com/library/bestpractices/municipal-and-cooperative.pdf>

61 <http://www.unescap.org/5p/new/PDF/Executive7.pdf>

62 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTENERGY/Resources/Energy19.pdf>

63 <http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/>

64 <http://electricitygovernance.wri.org/publications/empowering-people>

65 <http://www-esd.worldbank.org/sac/>

66 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2008/01/28/000158349_20080128115512/Rendered/PDF/wps4494.pdf

67 http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/86456/ses2.1_delhielectdiscoms.pdf

68 <http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/2552.pdf>

69 <http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za>

70 <http://rru.worldbank.org/Toolkits/InfrastructureConcessions/>

71 <http://electricitygovernance.wri.org/publications/empowering-people>

72 http://prayaspune.org/peg/publications/erc_survey_042A01.pdf

73 <http://www.regulationbodyofknowledge.org/>