

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Ministry of Capacity Building
in Collaboration with
PSCAP Donors



"Woreda and City
Administrations Benchmarking
Survey III"

Synthesis Report

Survey of Service Delivery Satisfaction Status

Final

Addis Ababa
July, 2010

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The survey work was lead and coordinated by Berhanu Legesse (AFTPR, World Bank) and Ato Tesfaye Atire from Ministry of Capacity Building. The Synthesis Report was produced by Alexander Wagner with inputs from Mr. Gil Yaron, Catherine Butcher and Mr. Sebastian Jilke. The survey was sponsored through PSCAP’s multi-donor trust fund facility financed by DFID and CIDA and managed by the World Bank. All stages of the survey work was evaluated and guided by a steering committee comprises of representatives from Ministry of Capacity Building, Central Statistical Agency, the World Bank, DFID, and CIDA.

Large thanks are due to the Regional Bureaus of Capacity Building and all PSCAP executing agencies as well as PSCAP Support Project team in the World Bank and in the participating donors for their inputs in the Production of this analysis. Without them, it would have been impossible to produce.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CRC	Citizen Report Card
CSA	Central Statistical Authority (Ethiopia)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Sub-Program
DFID	(United Kingdom) Department for International Development
DLDP	District Level Decentralisation Sub-Program
EC	Ethiopian Calendar
ECA	(United Nations) Economic Commission for Africa
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FTAPS	Financial Transparency and Accountability Perception Survey
GC	Gregorian Calendar
GoE	Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
ICTP	Information and Communication Technology Sub-Program
IGR	Institutional Governance Review
JSRP	Justice System Reform Program
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MT	Metric ton
na	not available
PBS	Protection of Basic Services
PPS	Proportional to size
PANE	Poverty Action Network in Ethiopia
PASDEP	Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty
PSCAP	Public Sector Capacity Building Program
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Regional state
TIN	Tax Identification Number
TSRP	Tax System Reform Program
UMCBP	Urban Management Capacity Building Sub-program
UN	United Nations
WCBS	Woreda and City Government Benchmarking Survey

1 Executive Summary

In 2010, the Woreda and City Government Benchmarking Survey (WCBS), which is in fact a holistic monitoring and evaluation tool of local institutional capacity, service delivery and participation was conducted for its third time. WCBS III comprises 384 jurisdictions, of which 315 are woredas, 69 city governments of which 20 are municipalities, as well as 10,667 households, 70 Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and 175 Key Informant Interviews (KII) with selected CSO representatives. The survey consists out of several different empirical instruments:

- i) Supply-side - a quantitative questionnaire, which addresses local jurisdictions,
- ii) Demand-side - a quantitative questionnaire based citizen report card (CRC); qualitative FGDs with selected citizens; and semi-structured KIIs with selected representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs).

The selection of jurisdictions and households was based on a multi-stage stratified sampling procedure, based on remoteness and food-security as key stratification criteria. Within regions, jurisdictions were selected in proportion to population size, where size is the data of the national census of 2007.

This report aims to **summarize findings of selected areas of study** of the different instruments of WCBS III. By comparing results from the four different survey instruments, **it is meant to compile WCBS III findings** in order to create a first overview in this regard and to **give an idea what the survey's major findings are about**, as well as what furthermore could be done with the data. However, **for an in-depth analysis of specific study areas please refer to the individual reports¹ of WCBS III.**

1.1 Key results of WCBS III for selected thematic areas

Institutional capacity

While the financial situation of local governments improved, there are large variations in terms of type of jurisdiction as well as per region. In this regard, the data furthermore reveals that the so called *four big regions* are performing better than most emerging regions. The results from the supply-side also display a considerably low institutional memory for a number of jurisdictions, especially when it comes to financial information for previous years.

Supply-side findings furthermore show that user charges and administrative fees play today a more important role than revenues from local taxes. Although there are big differences between surveyed jurisdictions, it is obvious that income from local taxes has decreased, while the amount collected through user charges and fees has increased. In this regard, CRC data shows a statistically significant increase of 4% (from 60 to 64%) in the proportion of informed citizens on what taxes and fees are they legally required to pay - these findings are furthermore supported by similar results of the undertaken FGDs.

As for the use of strategic plans, they are commonly used by all types of jurisdictions: woredas (94%), city governments (96%) and municipalities (80%) – with some minor differences between regions. However, when it comes to linking strategic planning with budgeting, the numbers are considerably low, displaying an important area which needs further improvements. When

¹ WCBS III includes, beside the synthesis report, three individual reports based on individual findings of the supply-side, the CRC and the FGDs/ KIIs. These reports comprise an in-depth analysis of findings of the single instruments of WCBS III.

comparing these results with findings from WCBS II (for woredas), there are obviously less linkages between strategic planning and annual budgets now than there were a few years ago.

As for double-entry accounting systems and practice, figures for city governments (86%) and woredas (87%) across all regions are quite high, while a lesser number of municipalities (60%) utilize accrual accounting systems. However, there are still a number of jurisdictions that “correct” their budget at the end of the year while claiming at the same time to use proper double-entry systems (79%).

For tax administrations, there is an increase in the number of Tax Identification Numbers (TINs) distributed; however, the overall numbers still remain quite low, which could possibly be a result of the low interest local governments have in utilizing the TIN system, since it is mainly an instrument for regional and federal taxes without giving local administrations any incentives for distributing TINs.

In terms of human resources, jurisdictions still face difficulties in recruiting adequate staff - this accounts for all types of jurisdictions. However, local administrations - in terms of staff - are considerably growing - for one staff that leaves an administration on average, two new are recruited. In this regard, high staff turnover is still a problem, which has - besides structural problems - its nature in the recruitment procedures as utilized by most jurisdictions. This can be regarded as a problem for most jurisdictions across all regions. However, relatively bigger administrations face even bigger problems in this regard.

Findings for the training of public sector staff show that most of the training was focusing on government policies and strategies, rather than on practical issues. Furthermore, there is no correlation between the number of training days and performance in the case of financial management, for example. Either training did not reach the poor performing jurisdictions, or the training content did not match the training needs and demands, or the training could not unfold an impact yet. The conclusion might be drawn that training needs to be more targeted to the specific need and that evaluations of training are needed to assess their impact.

When comparing salary expenditure for agriculture extension services, for example, across different rounds of WCBS, it becomes clear that there are large differences in terms of overall spending for salaries, as reported by woreda administrations. It also shows that woredas in the emerging regions are much smaller in terms of overall employment, than those in the four big regions.

Service provision and service perceptions

Supply-side data shows, that the agricultural income situation varies across regions. Here again the four big regions - with the exception of Benishangul-Gumuz - have the highest agricultural income per household and year.

When it comes to the perceived quality of agricultural development agents as shown by CRC data, there has been a significant decline (from WCBS II – III) of respondents who are very satisfied with the service. In general, overall satisfaction remains high - although it has fallen. Trying to understand what is driving an apparent decline in satisfaction in this regard, CRC data shows declines in perceived performance in the areas of agricultural income, as well as food security, with a greater fall for food security. In the context of that fact that national production of cereals and pulses is about five per cent lower than the production in 2008, results do seem to imply that the perceived value of agricultural extension services is closely related to rainfall - which is also supported by finding made by FGDs.

In terms of solid waste, city governments do provide a rather fair service - in terms of territorial and population coverage - while municipalities do have much more problems in providing the same service. Moreover, city governments in Tigray, as well as Addis Ababa, are performing on a very high level, while other regions still have room for improvements. These findings can be confirmed by CRC results which show that satisfaction rates in Tigray are relatively high (Addis Ababa rates are lower but still above average), while those regions that perform worse such as Oromia, Harari and SNNP, have the lowest satisfaction rates.

Developments over time (WCBS II – III) reveal significant improvements, both in terms of coverage rates (supply-side), as well as in terms of overall satisfaction rates (CRC). Again, supply-side data displays disparities between the performance of municipalities, which is comparatively low, and city governments.

Since a number of private business are active in the provision of solid waste collection, the data suggests that in areas where private sector participation is relatively high, the population as well as the territorial coverage is likely to increase. Furthermore, satisfaction rates are seemingly more likely to improve in areas that have a higher coverage of solid waste collection. Therefore, the participation of the private sector in the provision of solid waste collection could be - if there is sufficient administrative capacity for their regulation - an effective trigger for increasing the service quantity.

As for available basic equipment at local health posts, supply-side data suggests that overall results in this regard are more or less sufficient. However, in terms of the number of different types of basic equipments there are differences in terms of type of jurisdiction as well as between regions. While city governments and woredas are performing more or less on the same level, availability of health basic equipment in municipal health posts is comparatively low. In this regard, the relative share of jurisdictions that claimed there is no basic equipment available at all is 8% for city governments, 6% for woredas and 60% for municipalities. Best results can be seen in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harari, while Somali and Dire Dawa - and Oromia to a lesser extent - are not sufficiently staffed.

In terms of population coverage, more than 70% of the populations among each of the three types of jurisdictions are covered by health services in the regions of Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, Somali, and Tigray. The lowest coverage rates can be found in Addis Ababa (43%), Afar (woreda: 47%) and Gambella (woreda: 36%).

When it comes to the utilization of governmental health facilities by citizens themselves, CRC data between 2008 and 2010 reveals a very large increase of those in city governments using public health facilities (50% to 73%) as well as for those in woredas (77% to 87%). In terms of perceived quality of public health services, satisfaction rates are likely to be rising. These findings are furthermore supported by results from FGDs, which reveal that within 69% of FGDs participants believe that health services have improved.

In terms of access to health services as for socio-economic characteristics, in most regions the poor are significantly less likely than the non-poor to identify an improvement of public health services. FGDs confirm that the poor are often discriminated against relatively richer in this regard. Unless action is taken to eliminate this type of inequality, the full benefits from increased investments - especially in rural parts of the country – are unlikely reach the poor.

Accountability and participation

Supply-side data reveals that most jurisdictions do tell they provide their citizens access to written information such as budgets, annual reports, audit reports, strategic plans, tax assessments, services provided, agendas of council meetings, and decisions taking by council.

In this regard, data from the CRC shows that citizens' awareness for the jurisdictions budget, for example, is comparatively low. This finding is also supported by outcomes of the FGDs - even though quite a number of FGD participants were not familiar with the idea that local administrations share information such as budgets or strategic plans with them. Furthermore, they found out that there are certain types of people who felt excluded from such information. The poor, the youth and those not affiliated with the ruling party-coalition perceived that information was less likely to reach them.

Regional comparison of CRC data on who know the budgets, strategic plans and/ or council decisions from their jurisdictions, show regional differences with Somali, Afar and SNNP as low performers, and Gambella as well as Tigray with a relative high share of citizens who know and have access to such information. In terms of developments over time (WCBS II – III), the data displays some improvements, with the exception of Amhara and Harari.

It is not consistent to find that less than a quarter of citizens know their budget, even though supply-side data shows that nearly all jurisdictions say they have disseminated that information. This difference could reflect publicity material that is not easily accessible or understood or it could indicate citizen apathy.

In terms of an effective and legally working council, supply-side data reveals a rather low share of female councilors; however, there are larger differences, both in terms of size of councils and in terms of proportions of female councilors. In this regard, there is a gap on the share of female councilors between the four big regions and the emerging regions, with the latter as worse performers.

In holding the actual front-line service providers to account, data from the CRC shows that just over the half of the respondents feel powerless, but believe they can do at least something. Big differences in this regard are evident between regional states and also a small part of this variation is explained by the rural/urban balance in each region. Given the GoE's objective of improving local public service delivery, attention should be given to improving the ability and confidence of citizens particularly in Tigray, Somali, Afar and Amhara Regions, to hold their local leaders to account on such issues. Local best practice in this area is likely to be found in SNNP, Addis Ababa and Harari.

Internationally lessons learned also suggest that improved *routes of accountability* can be very effective in raising standards of local service delivery. One of the lessons from interaction between frontline service providers and citizen customers is that improvements are more easily obtained when there is a social accountability in service delivery and traditional top-down supervision is ineffective.

2 Objective of the Report

The objective of this report is to **summarize findings** of the different instruments of WCBS III, namely the supply-side survey, the Citizen Report Card (CRC), Focus Group Discussions (FGD), and Key Informant Interviews (KII). In doing so, **only selected areas of study of WCBS III**, such as institutional capacity (local government finance, tax administration, IT and technical support, human resources), service provision and perceptions (extension services, solid waste, health), as well as accountability and participation (public information and empowerment, council work and accountability) **have been chosen to be incorporated in this report.**

By comparing results from the four different survey instruments of WCBS III, **this report is meant to compile WCBS III findings** in order to create a first overview in this regard and to **give an idea what the survey's major findings are about** and what furthermore could be done with the data. Moreover, results will be related to other GoE data and surveys, as well as international lessons learned. However, **for an in-depth analysis of specific study areas please refer to the individual reports of WCBS III.**

3 Background

Having seen major changes within its political regime and state structures in the last fifty years, Ethiopia became a federal republic in 1991 (the current constitution was passed in 1995), with Nine federal states (Afar; Amhara; Benishangul-Gumuz; Gambella; Harari; Oromia; Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's Regional State [SNNP]; Somali; Tigray), and two city-Administrations (Addis Ababa; Dire Dawa). While Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP and Tigray are relatively advanced states in Ethiopia, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali are relatively less developed regions. The two city-Administrations represent the economic centers of the country.

Regional states are furthermore divided into woredas - which are rural communities and include various villages and emerging towns - and municipalities. Municipalities are chartered local governments and have elements of local self-governance. Some of the municipalities - about 100 - also perform functions assigned to woredas, namely health, education and agricultural extension services. These municipalities are labelled city governments.

Over the last twenty years, Ethiopia has begun to implement some major reform programs for strengthening its Public Sector in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability, as well as increasing opportunities for citizens' voice. In this regard, a great emphasis has been placed on developing sufficient capacities at the local level of public administration, vis-à-vis the right of self-determination as guaranteed in the Ethiopian constitution. In doing so, Ethiopia's legal framework initiated the devolution of a wide range of functions to the local level, as well as the corresponding fiscal decentralization, which included the authority of woredas, city governments and municipalities to collect own taxes. In the fiscal year 2002-2003 EC, the introduction of a block-grant allocation system has provided local governments with the funds to fulfill core functions and provide services for which the responsibility has been delegated to them.


In order to support the capacity building process and to create conducive environments at regional and national level, the Public Sector Capacity Building Program (PSCAP) was introduced in 2005. PSCAP aims at developing greater capacity within Ethiopia’s devolved administrative system in general, and improving GoE’s capacity for effective and responsive public services in particular. In doing so, PSCAP interventions are organized within six different sub-programs: Tax System Reform Program (TSRP), Civil Service Reform Sub-Program (CSR), Justice System Reform Program (JSRP), District Level Decentralisation Sub-Program (DLDP), Urban Management Capacity Building Sub-program (UMCBP) and Information and Communication Technology Sub-Program (ICTP).

In 2005, the Institutional Governance Review of Ethiopia (IGR), a working group of GoE and international donors headed by the World Bank to discuss and co-ordinate activities under the umbrella of PSCAP, announced a study to be prepared on the effects of PSCAP on the ground: WCBS. As per agreement of GoE and international donors, WCBS was designed as a core monitoring and evaluation tool for PSCAP. In doing so, four rounds of WCBS were planned to be conducted during the project lifetime of PSCAP, which were meant to provide, vis-à-vis activities of PSCAP, a systematic, empirical and representative assessment of

- i) the capacity of local government administrations in terms of management of their financial and human resources;
- ii) involvement of participation of local communities in local government planning, budgeting and review processes; and
- iii) performance for some selected public services.

The first round of WCBS was conducted in 2005. Supported by GTZ and covering 48 woredas and 32 municipalities, it may be regarded as a first pilot. The second round of WCBS was conducted in 2008 and supported by CIDA and DFID under a World Bank trust-fund. WCBS II covered already 239 woredas and 52 municipalities, while the third round of WCBS - under the same World Bank trust-fund - covered already 315 woredas and 69 municipalities and city governments. So, after WCBS III there are roughly remaining 100 jurisdictions in the country that have not been incorporated in any round of WCBS yet.

Figure 1: Development of WCBS’ sample size



The first round of WCBS, which included 80 jurisdictions in total, concentrated on the so called *four big regions*, namely Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP and Tigray. The decision for selecting only those regions was taken by the IGR; furthermore, they are considered as the main actors in the Woreda decentralization process of that time and represent the largest populations. The selection of jurisdictions was based on a stratified random sampling, taking into account two stratification-criteria: remoteness and food-security. Following this procedure, twelve woredas and eight municipalities were selected for each region. Based on extensive consultations with all levels of GoE and international donors, the survey instrument was developed. However, unlike WCBS II and III, round one incorporated only the supply-side questionnaire, as it was planned to provide with WCBS I a first baseline since compiled data on local government administrations was rather limited at that time.

The content of the first round's questionnaire was focusing on 18 indicators on financial autonomy and tax administration, institutional capacity and service delivery, while WCBS II extended its scope of service delivery functions studied. Aside from having more topics on various sectors, such as health, education and water, topics on accountability and transparency were put in the supply-side questionnaire. At the same time, round two of WCBS, moreover, incorporated the so called demand-side instruments - CRC, FGDs and KIIs - a mixture a quantitative and qualitative empirical instruments, designed to capture the views, opinions and perceptions of citizens and CSOs. All instruments and questionnaires have run through a proper pretest before they were utilized for the actual field-work.

Beside the extension of its thematic range, also the sample-size for WCBS II (291 jurisdictions in total) increased. However, a smaller relative share of municipalities than in the previous round was sampled, which aimed at better reflecting Ethiopia's rural situation. The sample procedure was again based on a stratified random sampling, however, the only stratification-criteria was food-security. Furthermore, the sampling was based on relative shares of the regions on the total population (probability proportional to size) and most jurisdictions that had been included in the first round were surveyed again. The sub-sample for the CRC (which was conducted in 28 jurisdictions in Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromiya, SNNP, Tigray, and Addis Ababa and Harari) included 11,560 CRC interviews.

At that time, FGDs and KIIs were conducted for a sub-sample of 20 jurisdictions, which were also selected for the CRC. And while WCBS II conducted 192 FGDs and 240 KIIs, the third round incorporated a total of 70 FGDs and 175 KIIs - the decrease of numbers is due to the difficulties that had been encountered in the reporting of FGD and KII results in round two, which was fairly poor.

WCBS II also introduced so called benchmarks for 18 selected areas (see table 3, annex). However, the development of those marks was somehow arbitrary and resulted in setting normative benchmarks that do not reflect the need for peer-learning among jurisdictions and regions as well as led to biases in some few cases (see also Albert 2009; Wegener 2008). Therefore, the WCBS II Data Quality Report (Wegener 2008) recommended their revision, using a relative benchmark allocation - as it is state of the art for most public sector performance measurement systems in the developing as well as the developed world - as well as to reconsider the benchmarks as such. Due to high demand in terms of calculating those benchmarks again for round three of WCBS, benchmarking-scores have been incorporated in the annex (table 4). Moreover, reviews of WCBS II criticized the distended CRC instrument and hence the CRC questionnaire of the third round of WCBS was shortened significantly.

4 Survey Elements

As already stated above, WCBS III includes four different empirical instruments, which are meant to reflect the supply- as well as the demand-side of local government capacity and service delivery functions, providing evidence-based findings on the state of local administrations and the quality of public services.

Figure 2: Elements of WCBS

	Supply-side	Demand-side		
Name	Supply-side survey	CRC	KII	FGD
Type of data-collection	Quantitative questionnaire	Quantitative questionnaire	Semi-structured interviews	Moderated group discussions
Target group	Local administrations	Households	CSO representatives	Selected citizens
WCBS rounds	I, II, III	II, III	II, III	II, III

4.1 Supply-side

The supply-side is composed out of a single quantitative questionnaire, which incorporates 162 different questions (resulting in more than 1,100 variables) on local government finance, financial management, tax administration, IT and technical support, human resources, public information and empowerment, council work and accountability, general service provision, extension services, solid waste collection, land management, health, education, business licensing, water supply, policing and local courts².

The supply-side questionnaire was given to local administration staffs themselves (chief executive officers and head of desks) who were asked to fill the questionnaire for their respective areas of competence and to authenticate their answers by officially sealing the questionnaire. Furthermore, data collectors were asked to validate provided numbers by checking local administrations' documents and books.

4.2 Demand-side

In order to receive a more comprehensive picture on local governments and their performed duties, the demand-side of WCBS was introduced for round II. It aims at compiling views, opinions and perceptions of citizens towards local administrations and consists out of three different data-collection instruments: CRC, FGDs and KIIs.

² In general, policing and local courts services are not provided by local governments; however, as it was asked to include those areas by the WCBS steering committee, they had been incorporated in the supply-side questionnaire of WCBS III.

4.2.1 Citizen Report Card

The primary quantitative instrument for collecting demand-side information is the CRC. It aims at providing a detailed understanding of key demand-side factors, determining local public service delivery and governance. Areas covered by the CRC are: Essential socio-economic and geographic local questions, water services, health services, taxation, land management, solid waste services, agricultural extension services, and public information, consultation and governance.

4.2.2 Focus Group Discussion

FGDs are moderated group discussions with selected local citizens, focusing on four main thematic areas: 1) measures of service quality (health), 2) measures of service quality more general, 3) exploration of whom, how and when local people are consulted by public officials, and 4) public information distribution and access. The discussions as such were facilitated around topics of influence and empowerment to gain insights as to whether local people felt that they had a say in services that affect them.

Furthermore, in discussing public services more generally, questions were purposively open-ended and avoided top-down imposition of services to discuss. This allowed FGD participants to raise those services and issues that were important to them.

In doing so, the specific aims of the FGDs were 1) to assess, from the perspective of citizens, including those from potentially marginalized groups, indicators of quality in service provision and citizen involvement; and 2) to obtain greater depth, detail and voice on aspects of particular interest, such as service delivery and citizen participation.

4.2.3 Key Informant Interviews

The KIIs are semi-structured interviews, conducted with key CSO representatives. They look at the working relationships between CSOs and local administrations and use a combination of opened and closed questions. Questions fall under following categories: Basic information concerning CSO and its location, resources and working relationship, public information, consultation, service provision, registration process for CSOs, accountability and complaint procedures.

In doing so, the specific aims of the KIIs were 1) to gain perspectives from a stakeholder group (CSOs) not covered in detail by other instruments but seen as having an important role in improving access to services and citizen involvement; 2) to gain information in specific areas where key-informants are likely to have specialized knowledge - the relationship between local administration and CSOs; and 3) to provide further depth to and allow for some cross-checking of responses from the supply-side questions for topics relating to CSOs and governance.


5 Methodological Approach

The utilized methodology of WCBS follows the assumption that the assessment of local governments needs to be conducted in a comprehensive manner. In doing so, different empirical instruments have been incorporated in the study design. And in assuring a high quality of compiled data as such, as well a statistical robustness of results, good scientific practice was one of the leading rationales of the research process.

5.1 Sampling

The sampling method of WCBS III uses a multi-stage stratified random sampling technique. In doing so, the first stages incorporate the stratification of jurisdictions (CSA provided a list of 601 safe³ jurisdictions - 488 woredas and 113 local governments and municipalities) by using remoteness from the regional capital and food security as the main stratification criteria. The next step incorporated the selection of 384 jurisdictions (315 woredas and 69 local governments and municipalities⁴) using probability proportional to size (PPS), where size is the population of the 2007 national census.

Figure 3: Overview of WCBS III sample and sub-sample size




The CRC used a sub-sample of these 384 jurisdictions by selecting 70 jurisdictions (45 woredas and 23 local governments and municipalities) in accordance to PPS. Out of this sample, another sub-sample of 30 jurisdictions for FGDs - 23 woredas and seven local governments and municipalities - was selected. For KIIs, the same sub-sample was taken and five additional local governments and municipalities were included. For the CRC, second-stage sampling units through Enumeration Areas (EAs) within each jurisdiction were selected, again using PPS, where size is the number of households in each EA. Finally, households were selected at random from within the EA by fieldworkers (20 households per EA).

From a technical perspective, the calculation of sample size for population-based survey needs to take into account the variability of the key measured characteristics and the degree of confidence required. Based on a confidence interval of +/- 3% at 95% confidence level, CSA calculated the required number of households for the regional representative sample to be 10,440 households. For the supply-side, woredas selected represent more than 64% of the woredas in the country, and selected local governments and municipalities represent more than 61 per cent of the same type of jurisdictions in the country. However, in practices it was not possible to work in two jurisdictions in Somali region and hence 10,657 households were sampled from 68 jurisdictions.

³ In terms of security status.

⁴ For the sampling process, only municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants had been taken into account.

Figure 4: Composition of types of jurisdictions for WCBS III sub-samples

FGDs participants' household selection has been based upon a random selection within the EA by fieldworkers, where 30 FGDs were conducted with men, 30 with women and 10 with the youth (70 FGDs in total). KII participants' selection was mainly purpose-driven, where within the selected 35 jurisdictions, five CSOs were selected out of which three were kebele-level CSOs and two were woreda-level CSOs (175 KIIs in total) for each study site.

The used sampling technique of WCBS III stands in contradiction with the predefined selection of jurisdictions of those that had been already incorporated in WCBS II - as discussed among various stakeholders of WCBS. However, the WCBS steering committee decided to make not use of such an approach in order to ensure that WCBS III includes a great number of jurisdictions that had not yet been covered in former rounds of WCBS. In doing so, the selected sample represents the most comprehensive and rigorous survey of woredas, local governments and municipalities - in terms of sample-size, but also in terms of topics covered - in Ethiopia that had been undertaken until now⁵.


5.2 Sources of Evidence

WCBS III compiles different sources of evidence. While the supply-side of WCBS III is designed to collect data from various representatives of the local administration itself through a standardised questionnaire, the demand-side focuses on the views, opinions and perceptions of citizens. In doing so, it compiles data from a structured CRC, semi-structured interviews with CSO representatives at woreda and kebele level, as well as qualitative FGDs.

This approach allows capturing local government's institutional capacity, accountability and transparency, service provision and service perceptions from different angles: local administrations, citizens and CSOs. Furthermore, utilizing a mixed-methods approach - meaning the combination of quantitative and qualitative empirical instruments - is meant to increase the quality of results and to provide a more comprehensive understanding of local government key issues, as well as validate and place supply-side findings into context.

⁵ Different studies on local administrations, especial on service delivery (Garcia and Rajkumar 2008; PANE 2010) and accountability (GoE 2009), had been undertaken in Ethiopia until now. However, none of these studies is - in terms of sample-size as well as topics covered - as comprehensive as WCBS III. For a closer assessment of those works and their redundancies with WCBS III, see chapter 7.

Figure 5: Comprehensiveness of WCBS III research-strategy



5.3 Data collection

For the collection of data, two different local firms were hired. While the first firm (Selam Development Consultants) - which was already involved in former rounds of WCBS - was responsible for the quantitative components of the survey (supply-side and CRC), the second local firm (WASS international) was assigned for the collection of FGD and KII data. Moreover, the data collection process was monitored by an international data-quality expert, who had been assigned to assure the data-quality of WCBS III. In doing so, he randomly visited data collection teams in the field and assessed as well as supervised their performance. Moreover, all data-collectors have received proper training and familiarization with the survey instruments, including pilot testing. Besides, they have been provided a survey manual outlining how to conduct their respective empirical data-collection, as well as expected approaches.

5.4 Data quality

On top of monitoring the data-collection process, data-entering and cleaning had been closely monitored by the assigned data-quality specialist. In doing so, for each instrument a 10% random sample of already entered data was picked and checked against the data in the databases. The outcome of this activity revealed a relatively moderate overall error rate. Furthermore, all initial databases were checked against consistency, plausibility and correctness of data entered. One matter of concern in this regard was for the supply-side survey: a number of jurisdictions did not report data sufficiently, especially financial information. In addition, response rates for sensitive areas, such as land management, were relatively small. Another important aspect is the discrepancy of financial data (only for those jurisdictions that were involved in WCBS II and III, which were in total 49) between the Ethiopian fiscal year 1999, which was also included in WCBS II. These problems, however, can rather be related to the low institutional memory of jurisdictions, since data-collection mistakes had been minimized by an official authenticating of all data provided by the local jurisdictions; besides, the data-entry monitoring process of the supply-side of WCBS III revealed an error-rate of less than 3%.

5.5 Comparisons over rounds

When studying WCBS III data, of particular interest are developments over time, meaning those observed improvements, deteriorations or stagnations for selected areas that had been identified across different rounds of WCBS. However, when comparing WCBS results over time, there are a number of important points to bear in mind.

Supply-side

Since its second round, the WCBS supply-side questionnaire and methodology has not undergone major reviews, such as FGDs or KIIs had for example. Only two additional parts on policing and local courts were added. Therefore, from a methodological point-of-view there are no bigger limitations when it comes to the comparison across rounds. However, the little number of jurisdictions that have been involved in the last two rounds of WCBS has to be kept in mind, since such comparisons are not meant to be statistical robust and should hence be seen as rather providing tendencies in the surveyed areas of interest.

Furthermore, discrepancies among datasets of both rounds - possibly an outcome of the mistreatment of missing values and the insufficient data-cleaning during round II - have to bear in mind.

CRC

For the CRC, the WCBS III matched sample of jurisdictions from WCBS II contains 4,000 observations from 23 jurisdictions (and these are compared with approximately 9,800 observations in WCBS III).

Although the jurisdictions are common to both survey rounds, it was not possible to match the EAs within jurisdictions. Moreover, differences in sample design between both rounds led to a lower proportion of city administrations respondents in the WCBS II sample (67% vs. 72%). In order to get the best match possible between rounds, the WCBS II data is weighted to give the same proportions in woredas and city administrations as the WCBS III comparison sample. However, caution is required when comparing CRC results from both survey rounds, as the CSA sample frame is designed to allow regional level analysis using the full WCBS II CRC dataset. But the matched 23 jurisdictions are only a sub-set of the 2010 CRC data (only 58% of all observations in these regions) and so it is not sensible (in terms of being statistically robust) to disaggregate the matched data by region.

FGDs & KIIs

For the FGDs and the KIIs, the approach and content of these survey instruments have been restructured since their initial use in WCBS II. Therefore, results from WCBS III will not be directly comparable with the instruments used in the second round of WCBS.

5.6 Limitations

First of all, the results of the supply-side survey are limited to the data provided by the jurisdictions themselves. And since there were no incentives given to local jurisdictions to provide correct data, this might have resulted in some statistical inconsistencies, however, they were rather minor. Furthermore, the selection of municipalities is rather small.

Besides, the comparison between rounds - for all four instruments, but especially for the supply-side - suffers from some limitations: 1) the number of jurisdictions involved in both rounds of WCBS is rather small (supply-side and CRC); 2) discrepancies among datasets (supply-side), and 3) insufficient data-cleaning and mistreatment of missing values during round two (supply-side).

Hence, comparisons between the different rounds of WCBS have to be seen as rather providing tendencies in the surveyed areas of interested.

In this regard, it is furthermore worth noting that WCBS III was conducted shortly before national elections in 2010 which could have resulted in a political bias of respondent's answers in some cases.

6 Results of WCBS III for selected areas

The following chapter summarizes findings from all four instruments of WCBS III and puts them in relation. However, this chapter is not meant to provide a full analysis and interpretation of all WCBS III findings (please refer to the individual reports in this regard), it rather focuses on certain specific areas of interests and displays what can be done with the data, leaving further room for future research, either on the level of case-studies of individual jurisdictions or regions, or on the macro-level.

6.1 Institutional capacity

As displayed in figure 5, the institutional capacity of Ethiopian jurisdictions as such was mainly captured by the supply-side of WCBS. Therefore, the following sub-chapter focuses on supply-side findings; however, where data is available and directly relatable, connections to the demand-side of WCBS will be drawn.

6.1.1 Local government finance

This sub-section on local government finance address the fiscal status and development of local government in Ethiopia, as mainly captured through the supply-side of WCBS III.

Regarding the income of surveyed jurisdictions, most of them reveal a rather low institutional memory, as many of them had problems in sufficiently reporting financial information, especially for previous years. Although these jurisdictions have reported their financial information to the respective regional bureaus, many of them fail in providing a history in local government finance.

In general, the data reveals that budget income between 1999 and 2001 EC in city governments and woredas grew significantly, while stagnating in municipalities. Particular city states show high growth rates, while budget growth in the emerging regions ranges from stable to modest. Depending on jurisdiction type, other regions display large disparities and variations with relatively high growth rates in city governments, relatively lower yet still high growth rates in woredas (between 10% and 60%) and lowest growth in municipalities. In absolute terms, the per capita revenue (weighted mean) of all municipalities for 2001 EC, which is 150 Birr, is around 25% lower than the one for woredas, which is 205 Birr. The value for city governments, in contrast, lies at around 590 Birr.

Regarding the composition of different forms of income, the largest proportion particularly of grants (recurrent, capital, external etc.) is concentrated in Oromiya and Amhara with a growing tendency from 1999 to 2001 EC (accounting for up to 49% of total grants) - with the exception of SNNP in terms of specific purpose grants and household credit packages of 80%.

Concerning own sources of revenue - local taxes, administrative fees, user charges and revenues from commercial activities - the composition of these sources seem to undergo a dramatic change.

Various studies have reported the importance of local taxes in local governments' total revenue composition in the past, usually land tax, accounting for about 60% of local government total revenue for city governments some five to six years ago. Today, user charges and fees play a much more important role than revenues from local taxes. Although the data displays huge differences between the surveyed jurisdictions, it is obvious that income from local taxes has decreased, while the amount collected through user charges and fees has increased. In this regard, CRC data reveals a statistically significant increase of 4% (from 60 to 64%) in the proportion of informed citizens on what taxes and fees are they legally required to pay - these findings are supported by similar results of the undertaken FGDs. CRC data furthermore displays a significant increase in the proportion of respondents paying most taxes and fees between 2008 and 2010 GC, particularly in city administrations.

The reported increase of fees and user charges compared to the decrease of revenues from local taxes might be related to the high levels of dissatisfaction with tax offices as reported by CRC data, although they also might reflect a more general dissatisfaction with paying taxes as such.

Regarding the expenditure of surveyed jurisdictions, for the group of city governments, the planned recurrent expenditure has been rising consistently between 1999 and 2001 EC, particular in Addis Ababa, Amhara, Dire Dawa and Oromiya. For Tigray and Somali, in contrast, the planned recurrent expenditure for 2001 EC is lower than for 1999 EC. Among the group of municipalities, the planned recurrent expenditure for the respective period has been consistently rising in Amhara, Oromiya and Somali. In SNNP, the planned expenditures for 2001 EC are lower than for 1999 EC. For the group of woredas, in almost all regions - except for Benishangul-Gumuz - the planned recurrent expenditures of woredas are higher for 2001 than for 1999 EC.

When considering the planned capital expenditure among city governments, a high fluctuation between different regions can be seen. Among the most prominent capital expenditures mentioned, there are local roads and expenditures for agriculture. However, since city governments play a more prominent role in service delivery in other areas such as water supply, sewerage, storm water and other state functions such as education and health, these findings are quite astonishing.

Financial information provided by woredas show furthermore that there are still problems with accurate bookkeeping and financial statements. In this regard, 25% of the surveyed woredas stated that their actual income in 2001 EC was exactly the same amount of their actual expenditures in that year which can be indeed possible, however, very unlikely. More realistic is the interpretation that woredas *correct* their financial information at the end of the year - what is commonly known as *backward-budgeting*. For municipalities, the figures are dramatically higher (40%); however, in this regard the relatively small number of observations (20) has to be taken into account.

Furthermore, investments in water supply (19%) are one of the most popular areas for capital expenditures in woredas. Although demand-side data shows that citizens rate water supply much worse than they did three years ago, these investments are still promising and point in the right direction. However, city governments, in contrast, do not invest much in water supply according to the data reported.


6.1.2 Financial management

This sub-section addresses the institutional capacity of local government in Ethiopia. In doing so, it deals with strategic planning, reporting, accrual accounting and audit reports.

First of all, supply-side data clearly shows that strategic plans are used by all types of jurisdictions. In this regard, 94% of woredas, 96% of city governments and 80% of municipalities do prepare a strategic plan. Woredas in Afar (81%) and Somali (67%) show significantly lower results.

While the existence of a strategic plan is an objective itself, the more important question is whether it has been linked with the budget. In this regard, 35% of all city governments report that all capital investments mentioned in the strategic plan can be found in the budget, 45% say “most” of the capital investments, while only 16% say “only a few” and 4% say that there is “no link” between the strategic plan and the budget. For woredas, results are less promising: Only 27% of the woredas say that all capital investments are mentioned and 43% say that “most” are, for 20% only “a few” are mentioned and for 10% there is no direct connection between the strategic plan and the budget.


Figure 6: Can capital investments mentioned in the strategic plan be found in the budget?



In this regard, woredas in Oromiya are most successful, while woredas in Amhara, SNNP and Somali show problems in linking planning with budgeting.

When comparing these results with findings from WCBS II (only for those regions where sufficient and reliable data was available) for woredas, there are obviously less linkages between strategic planning and annual budgets than there were a few years ago.

Figure 7: Relative changes of linkages between strategic planning and annual budgeting in woredas over time (WCBS II – III)



As for the financial outlook, Ethiopian jurisdictions are required to have a multi-year financial outlook based on expenditure and revenue forecasts. In this regard, 65% of municipalities, 86% of city governments and 74% of woredas report that they prepare such an outlook. Very promising are results from woredas in Tigray (96%), Oromiya (84%) and Amhara (83%), while results from the emerging regions - in Afar 81% of the woredas reported that they do not have a multi-year financial outlook, in Benishangul-Gumuz 67%, in Gambella 57% and in Somali 52% - are a matter of concern.

City governments have, compared to woredas and municipalities, more often multi-year financial outlooks, however, in Gambella and Somali none of the city governments (the sample included one city government in each of the two regions) do.

In terms of annual reporting, the overall results are very positive. And while in 75% of municipalities annual reports are available, the same holds true for more than 90% of local governments as well as woredas. In addition, woredas in Afar (one sixth) and Somali (one third) and also one out of six sub-cities in Addis Ababa failed in preparing an annual report. Furthermore, municipalities have been performing a little worse - 75% are preparing annual reports. Overall, however, the data reveals very positive results.

As for accounting systems and practice, 86% of city governments are reporting that they already use double-entry accounting and even 87% of woredas and 60% of municipalities are doing so, which are quite promising results.

Closely connected with this question from the supply-side questionnaire, is the one that asks for the availability of an asset register that is periodically updated - a prerequisite for accrual accounting. However, there are around 20% of jurisdictions that do not have an asset register, but at the same time use double-entry accounting. These results might be caused by jurisdictions that have introduced double entry-accounting systems, but do not utilize them - instead they have practiced so called backward-budgeting. This can be exemplified, when looking at the relative share of observations that did have similar figures for the planned and actual budget in fiscal year 2001 EC, as well as utilized double entry-accounting systems, which is 79%.

In terms of auditing, the data shows that when compared to WCBS II, there are more recent internal audit reports available yet. This holds true for all types of jurisdictions, as well as external audits. However, even performing on a good level, city governments do have more often up-to-date reports in general, but do not have necessarily an internal or external audit report already finalized for the latest fiscal year.

Concerning the results of audit reports, 51% of city governments, 45% of municipalities and 46% of woredas report that they have received adverse comments bordering on dishonesty on the auditor's management letter to the council. The results are rather even for city governments, only Tigray reporting a higher value of 67%, corresponding to the also higher share for woredas in Tigray with 82%. Extremely low adverse comments were received from auditors in Afar (only 6%) and SNNP (only 36%).

6.1.3 Tax administration

This sub-section deals with the institutional capacity of Ethiopian jurisdictions regarding tax administration. In general, supply-side data reveals that the knowledge of jurisdictions on local tax payers and payments is low, as most jurisdictions are not able to link payments to a distinctive number of payers or to a distinctive tax payer at once. Although payments are entered in the ledgers, the accumulated receipts cannot be traced back, making it difficult for the tax administration to monitor uncollected receivables and to develop targeted strategies to improve tax collection and tax coverage rates.

The relatively low institutional capacity of local governments with regard to tax administration is furthermore reflected in the CRC data, where a great share of respondents expresses their high level of dissatisfaction with tax offices. In doing so, their dissatisfaction does not only include aspects of operations such as times of opening and location of offices where payment is made, but also institutional capacity aspects such as information provided on taxes and fees as well as the honesty of officials.

FGD results reveal that around one third of the respondents in woredas do feel that they have been provided better information on taxes compared to the last years, which corresponds with CRC findings that people are slightly less dissatisfied with the information on tax and fee rates available. These results are slightly more optimistic than supply-side data which shows that most jurisdictions only use a few selected communication means to inform citizens about tax related issues, such as kebele-meetings (which has also been a prominent answer during FGDs) and information brochures (especially in the four big regions).

In general, the perception of citizens' tax awareness by local government officials is that most of them (roughly 80%) are quite optimistic that taxpayers are in a position that they can easily understand how much they have to pay. CRC data, however, reveals that 77% of the respondents are dissatisfied with the information on taxes and fees available to them. In contrast, nearly 60% of the CRC respondents knew which taxes and fees they are legally required to pay. The differences within the CRC data might be related to the fact that respondents do know which taxes they are legally required to pay, but they might feel insufficiently informed about the different modalities on how and when to pay. Furthermore, when disaggregating findings on the regional level, it is quite obvious that results from the four big regions are much better than those from the emerging regions - which accounts for supply-side, as well as CRC data. In this regard, less than 20% of the CRC respondents in Afar and Gambella know which taxes and fees they must be legally paid, while in Amhara and Oromiya more than 60% of the respondents are informed about those issues.

Besides, Tax Identification Numbers (TIN) have proven to be not distributed sufficiently. In 1999 EC, 203 out of 314 jurisdictions reported the distribution of approximately 54,000 TINs, one year later the number dropped to around 52,000 TINs, although the number of reporting jurisdictions increased to 218. For the fiscal year 2001 EC, 232 jurisdictions reported the distribution of around 64,000 TINs. In principle, city governments distribute more TINs per capita than woredas, and the numbers reported do range from 45 per year (woredas in Afar) up to several thousand (Addis Ababa).


Although there is an increase in the number of TINs distributed, the overall numbers still remain low, which could possibly be a result of the little interest local governments have in utilizing the TIN system, since it is mainly an instrument for regional and federal taxes. However, if jurisdictions had an incentive to distribute TINs, such as a simplification of their own revenue administration (through the use of TINs for their own sources of revenue) or the introduction of shared taxes between different layers of government, they could possibly result in a boost within the distribution of TINs and reduce risks of informal, non-taxed commercial activities.

6.1.4 Human Resources

This sub-section deals with human resources and their respective management techniques. In doing so, supply-side data shows large differences of the average employment not only between regions, but also between types of jurisdictions.

Municipalities on average have few employees compared to other types of jurisdictions (171 compared to 730 in woredas and even 984 in city governments). The vacancy rate is rather similar across jurisdictions, ranging from 18% for city governments as well as for municipalities, and 23 % for woredas.

Figure 8: Percentage of staffing and vacancies per jurisdiction type (WCBS III)



When calculating the data for total staffing per 1,000 inhabitants, woredas have a value of 7.95, city governments 9.64 and municipalities 2.93. This shows clearly that municipalities usually have a considerably smaller administration compared to both, city governments and woredas.

Furthermore, a high turnover of staff is often regarded as one of the major problems for the development of institutional capacity in local governments. Despite these turnovers, administrations are growing considerably, as staff numbers are increasing. Very often, for one

expert leaving the administration, two or more have been recruited. It is promising that the speed of growth is less for supporting staff. Here the replacement rate is rather low.

Comparing the staff numbers of woreda administrations across regions, it is obvious that the average size of staff in the four big regions (Tigray: 1.334; SNNP: 614; Oromiya: 934; and Amhara: 932) is - with the exception of Gambella (875) - considerably larger than figures in the emerging regions (Somali: 280; Benishangul-Gumuz: 595; Afar: 540). In terms of vacancies, numbers across regions range between 203 and 326 vacancies on average. The only exceptions in this regard are Somali with 175 and Afar with 99 unfilled positions on average.


When comparing these results with those of WCBS I (1996 EC), where the average number of staff per woreda within the four big regions was 770 and the number of vacancies was 131 on average, this shows that public sector employment - at least for the four big regions - has increased significantly. However, the problem of unfilled positions persists for woredas, since there are still 23% vacancies on average.

For city governments, the picture is rather different. City governments do have more staff than woredas and only Addis Ababa is reporting high numbers of vacancies (927 on average). When compared to previous rounds of WCBS, city governments - as well as woredas - do still suffer from unfilled vacancies, displaying an unsolved problem.

Closely related with the problem of unfilled positions are recruitment procedures. Recruitment is, not surprisingly, regarded as a problem, especially in regions such as Amhara (69%), Oromiya (65%), SNNP (73%) and particularly Tigray (96%). In this regard, woredas report to face larger problems in recruiting staff (63%), while city governments and municipalities have relatively less, but still large (47% respectively 45%) problems. The overall mixed results indicate high disparities among regions and types of jurisdictions, with larger and more developed regions and jurisdictions facing disproportional higher problems in staff recruitment.

In terms of the usage of modern human resource management instruments, supply-side results are very promising throughout the sample. In this regard, written guidelines for staff recruitment are the most commonly used human resource instruments, while the usage of regular individual performance appraisals still can be improved, even though their utilization is already high. In terms of types of jurisdiction there are no big differences, however, municipalities are performing slightly worse than city governments and woredas do.


Figure 9: Utilization of human resource management instruments



Supply-side data, furthermore, displays whether a jurisdiction has ever terminated a contract with an employee or on official due to corruption or misconduct. In doing so, 13% of the jurisdictions have reported that they did terminate a contract due to corruption in the last fiscal year. Disaggregating for types of jurisdictions, municipalities have the highest value (20%), while city governments (16%) range in between and woredas have the lowest value (12%). Within a regional comparison, a particular high value can be seen in Tigray (21%). The results are furthermore supported by CRC data, revealing that city governments and municipalities are performing worse than woredas in this regard. Data also shows that particularly in Tigray and Amhara officials are perceived as being mostly or all corrupt by around 30% of CRC respondents. Regions which are identified as areas with low perceived corruption such as Harari, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz are, moreover, the regions that have zero reported terminated contracts due to corruption in the last fiscal year.

The supply-side results for the training of public sector staff show that most of the training was focusing on government policies and strategies, rather than on practical issues. Furthermore, there is no correlation between the number of training days and performance in the case of financial management, for example. Besides, this is even irrespective of the length of training in the area.

Figure 10: Number of training days (mean) of specific areas in general



Either training did not reach the poor performing jurisdictions, or the training content did not match the training needs and demands, or the training could not unfold an impact yet. The conclusion might be drawn that training needs to be more targeted to the specific need and that evaluations of training are needed to assess their impact.

6.2 Service provision and service perceptions

This sub-section deals with service provision and perceptions, as captured by all four instruments of WCBS III. In doing so, it predominantly concentrates on three areas of interest: agricultural extension services, solid waste and health.

6.2.1 Extension services


Agricultural extension services are provided only by woredas hence answers concerning this service were only collected in and from woredas. First of all, supply-side data shows that the proportion of

subsistence agriculture⁶ varies across regions. While Somali (66%) and Gambella (48%) - closely followed by Tigray (47%) and Afar (46%) - have the highest shares of subsistence agriculture, SNNP (26%) and Oromiya (25%) have relative low shares.

The agricultural income situation varies across regions. Here again the four big regions - with the exception of Benishangul-Gumuz - have the highest agricultural income per household and year.

When comparing salary expenditures for agriculture extension services across different rounds of WCBS, it becomes clear that there are large differences in terms of overall spending for salaries, as reported by the woreda administrations. It also shows that woredas in the emerging regions are much smaller in terms of overall employment, than those in the four big regions.

Figure 11: Salary expenditure for agricultural extension services of woredas over time (WCBS II – III)



The data furthermore reveals a constant increase of salary expenditures between round two and three of WCBS - except in Somali - for extension services.

As for the number of agricultural development agents, its mean ranges from 21 in Somali, 22 Tigray and Afar to a high 94 in Benishangul-Gumuz. In this regard, the high annual agricultural income in Benishangul-Gumuz is possibly a result of the concentration of woredas in the region on activities around agriculture.

When it comes to the perceived quality of agricultural development agents, as seen within the CRC data, there has been a significant decline (from WCBS II – III) in the proportion of respondents who find that the information provided by the extension agent is “very useful” (from 53% - 32%). This has been accompanied by an increase in the proportion reporting it is “quite useful” (37% - 46%) and a small increase in the proportion saying this information was “not useful” (3% - 6%).

In order to try to understand what is driving an apparent decline in satisfaction with this service we consider two areas in which agricultural extension service are likely to have an impact: agricultural income and food security. As CRC data shows, we observe declines in perceived performance in both areas with a greater fall of food security.

⁶ This refers to question 82.5 in the supply-side questionnaire which asks for the percentage of households living in subsistence agriculture for each jurisdiction.

This has to be seen in the context of below normal seasonal raining during the past two years. According to the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission report of 2010⁷, the 2009 national production of cereals and pulses estimated at 16.8 million MT, which is about five per cent lower than the production in 2008. Our results do seem to imply that the perceived value of agricultural extension services is closely related to rainfall - which is also supported by FGD findings, which identify the combination of increasing expense of inputs such as fertilizers and poor weather conditions that have meant expected returns were not realized.


It should further be noted that apart from these constraints which do not fall under the responsibility of woreda administrations, the overall level of satisfaction of agricultural services provided by the woreda administrations is comparatively high.

Table 1: Taking everything into account are you satisfied with the quality of agricultural extension services? (WCBS III)

Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Fairly dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
30%	54%	14%	2%

One possible effect of these high satisfaction rates might be the increase (WCBS II – III) of the number of agricultural development agents in the emerging regions (with the exception of Somali), as well as SNNP and Tigray which are the regions with the highest share of subsistence agriculture.

Figure 12: Development of number of agricultural development agents over time (WCBS II – III)



However, supply-side data shows that agricultural development agents receive little training themselves. The amount of training days (mean) in the last fiscal year ranges from zero to six days, for members of the general staff in the function agriculture the values range from zero to five, indicating that agricultural development agents receive slightly more training than general staff.

⁷ http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/Ethiopia_FSU_March_2010_final.pdf

When comparing supply-side data on agricultural services provided against food security status of woredas, it becomes evident that woredas suffering from food insecurity offer more services to farmers than those woredas which declared themselves as food secure. In this regard, food secure woredas do spend less for agricultural extension services than food insecure. However, employment in food secure woredas is higher than in food insecure.

A similar picture arises for the number of agricultural development agents, where woredas who are claiming to be food insecure, but which do not receive additional funding, have less institutional capacity in terms of staffing. These results show that food insecure woredas provide more services and spend more for agriculture than food secure woredas.


Supply-side data also displays the most dominant problems on extensions services, as perceived by local administration staffs. In doing so, results are indicating that the biggest problems are in the areas of budget, logistics (lack of transportation) and human resources as well as lack of supply and awareness problems with local farmers.

6.2.2 Solid waste

Solid waste collection is a task assigned to city governments, which is also partially provided by municipalities.

The territorial coverage of the collection of solid waste is rather low, ranging from 5% for city governments in Amhara region (compared to 24% for municipalities in the same region) to 90% in Addis Ababa and 85% in Tigray. For the population coverage, figures are more or less similar.

Figure 13: Solid waste coverage in city governments



The provision of solid waste collection in municipalities with population coverage of 30% in Amhara, 28% in Oromiya and 40% in SNNP, is quite low. In a nutshell, city governments do provide a rather fair service - in terms of territorial and population coverage - while municipalities do have much more problems in providing the same service. Moreover, city governments in Tigray, as well as Addis Ababa, are performing on a very high level, while other regions still have room for improvements. These findings can be confirmed by CRC results which show that satisfaction rates in Tigray are relatively high (Addis Ababa rates are lower but still above average), while those regions that perform worse such as Oromiya, Harari and SNNP have the lowest satisfaction rates.

Developments over time (WCBS II – III) reveal significant improvements, both in terms of coverage rates (supply-side), as well as in terms of overall satisfaction rates (CRC). Again, supply-side data displays disparities between the performance of municipalities, which is comparatively low, and city governments.

Table 2: Satisfaction rates for the collection of solid waste over time

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
WCBS II	70%	30%
WCBS III	74%	26%

However, the collection of solid waste is very often provided through private businesses; with 62% private sector participation in Addis Ababa, 61% in Tigray and 47% in municipalities in Amhara. In Oromiya, there are only 17% in city governments and 13% in municipalities, while in SNNP 39% of the city governments, but only 2% in municipalities that provide solid waste collection through private companies.

These results have two implications: in areas where private sector participation in the collection of solid waste is relatively high, the population as well as the territorial coverage is likely to increase. Furthermore, satisfaction rates seem to be more likely to improve in areas that have a higher coverage of solid waste collection. Therefore, the participation of the private sector in the provision of solid waste collection - this might also count for other services such as water supply - could be an effective trigger for increasing the service quantity, unless there is sufficient administrative capacity for their regulation.


An interesting way for using economics-of-scale in the provision of solid waste collection is the co-operation between jurisdictions for joint service delivery. In this regard, 61% of the city governments are reporting to co-operate, but only 30% of municipalities, which can be explained through the fact that municipalities do not have often other municipalities surrounding them. However, the co-operation with other jurisdictions has not increased the service coverage of the collection of solid waste yet.

6.2.3 Health

As for health services, data provided by local administrations show that in 254 jurisdictions there are 846 health facilities of which 702 are public and 113 are private.

As for available basic equipment at local health posts (basic technical equipment, refrigerator for vaccination, basic bandages/ plaster, basic medicaments), supply-side data suggests that overall results in this regard are more or less sufficient. However, in terms of the number of different types of basic equipment, there are differences in terms of type of jurisdiction as well as between regions. While city governments and woredas are performing more or less on the same level, availability of health basic equipment in local health posts is comparatively low for municipalities. In this regard, the relative share of jurisdictions that said there is no basic equipment available at all is 8% for city governments, 6% for woredas and 60% for municipalities.

Figure 14: Number of different types of basic equipment in local health posts by regions



Best results can be seen in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Harari, while Somali and Dire Dawa - and Oromiya to a lesser extent - are not sufficiently staffed regarding basic equipment of local health posts.

A key performance indicator when it comes to the quality of local health facilities is the rate of births attended by skilled staff (mean). Among city governments, the best results are achieved by Addis Ababa (62%), Amhara (62%), Gambella (61%), and Oromiya (63%). The overall best results can be found in SNNP within the group of municipalities (72%). However, the values for city governments and woredas in SNNP are 49% and 42%, respectively. All in all, city governments seem to perform better than municipalities and woredas. Findings from FGDs, however, reveal that for most participants (two thirds) the availability of medical supplies, such as drugs and medicines, is a major concern towards service quality of local health facilities, showing that the comparatively high figures from the supply-side are not sufficient to meet the needs of the local citizenry yet.

In terms of population coverage, more than 70% of the populations among each of the three types of jurisdictions are covered by health services in the regions of Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, Somali, and Tigray. The lowest coverage rates can be found in Addis Ababa (43%), Afar (woreda: 47%) and Gambella (woreda: 36%).


Data from the supply-side of WCBS III, furthermore, reveals that health desks do have limited information on health services - public and private - available in their jurisdiction. The valid answers on the amount of health posts were extremely low if asked for non-public health posts and clinics. Further, all types of jurisdictions had problems in reporting the actual amount of doctors working, while they had much less problems in reporting the administrative staff employed.

In terms of staff coverage and turnover, supply-side results show that the average number of staff entering health services is significantly high among woredas (mean 40-59), with the exception of Afar (16), Gambella (24) and Tigray (25), where results are considerably low. However, the average number of staff leaving health services is lower than the recruitment of new staff itself, indicating a growth in service delivery capacity. Results from FGDs show that the availability of medical professionals is a matter of concern to them, as mentioned within 43% of male FGDs, 30% of youth and 30% of women.

When it comes to the utilization of governmental health facilities by citizens themselves, CRC data between 2008 and 2010 reveal a very large increase of those in city governments using public health facilities (50% to 73%) as well as for those in woredas (77 to 87%).

In terms of perceived quality of public health services, satisfaction rates are likely to be rising, as can be seen from the figure below. These findings are furthermore supported by results from FGDs, which reveal that within 69% of the FGDs, participants believe that health services have improved.

Figure 15: Perceptions of change in the quality of governmental health services since 2008 (WCBS III)



When it comes to the fairness of treatment by governmental health staff as further perceived by participants of FGDs, approximately half of all participants thought all persons were treated fairly and half thought some people were treated better than others. In this regard, the findings reveal differences in the perceived fairness of treatment by local health staff in terms of types of jurisdictions. In municipalities, 74% of the FGDs revealed that treatment was unfair, while in woredas the figure was only about 43%.

"They [health staff] treat us fairly. There is not lopsided treatment except shortages of medicine." (Female FGD participant)

"[...] those who have better clothes are given priority service [to health services]." (Youth FGD participant)

Where participants perceived they had received inferior treatment, it was in terms of waiting times, with other being seen before themselves. Other aspects of poorer treatment were failure to prescribe drugs, inferior beds and lack of explanation.

When using CRC data and deploying a logit regression model by asking who believes services from government health facilities have improved - taking the response that government health services have improved as a dependent variable - for both, city administrations and woredas, we see that socio-economic characteristics are seemingly play a very little part in explaining whether residents of city governments felt that government health services have improved (see annex, table 5). The most likely explanation for this is that government health facilities within city governments serve a large population in a relatively compact area so that all residents gain from investments. The

principle differences in terms of whether residents perceive whether public health facilities have improved or not is therefore between cities rather than within them.

Results from woredas in this regard are quite different (see annex, table 6). The data is showing that men are significantly more likely than women to say that government health services have improved in Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali. This is quite plausible as evidence from FGDs does suggest that women place relatively more value on certain aspects of health services, such as preventative services and health education. In addition, in SNNP as well as in Amhara younger people are more likely to identify improvements than older people but the opposite is true in Benishangul-Gumuz.

As for socio-economic characteristics, in most regions the poor are significantly less likely than the non-poor to identify an improvement of public health services. FGDs confirm that the poor are often discriminated against relatively richer. Those findings are furthermore supported by a recent assessment undertaken by the UN Economic Commission for Africa, which reveals high inequalities in accessing health services for lower wealth quintiles for a number of African countries - including Ethiopia, which was among the worst performers in this regard (see ECA 2008)⁸. Unless action is taken to eliminate this type of inequality and mainstream equality in access to basic services in national, regional and local development plans and interventions, the full benefits from increased investment in woreda health facilities – as shown by supply-side findings – will not reach the poor.

6.3 Accountability and participation

This section deals with accountability and transparency of local administrations and opportunities of participation of the local citizenry at large.

6.3.1 Public information and empowerment

Supply-side data reveals that most jurisdictions do tell they provide their citizens access to written information such as budgets, annual reports, audit reports, strategic plans, tax assessments, services provided, agendas of council meetings, and decisions taking by council. Only jurisdictions in Afar (mean for all accumulated forms of information: 46%), Somali (51%) and Benishangul-Gumuz (57%) do provide less access to these sorts of written information in total. Jurisdictions in Amhara (90%), Oromiya (89%) and Tigray (94%), in contrast are performing on a very high level, displaying some regional differences. The data further shows that there are some variations in terms of access to information between the four big regions and the emerging regions. In terms of type of jurisdictions, there are some smaller differences: city governments (85%), municipalities (72%) and woredas (81%).

When asking which kind of written information are provided more frequently to the citizenry at large, it becomes clear that especially budgets (89%) and annual reports (89%) are frequently accessible, while access to audit reports (69%) and agendas of council meetings (76%) is lower, however, still sufficient.

In this regard, data from the CRC shows that citizens' awareness for the jurisdictions' budget, for example, is 13% - while a higher proportion of men (15%) have these information than women (11%). These relatively low figures are also supported by outcomes of the FGDs, even though quite a number of FGD participants were not familiar with the idea that local administrations share

⁸ Recent research on access to basic services in African LDCs in general and on access to water and sanitation services in particular - using the latest DHS data - reveals Ethiopia's low performance (in terms of discrimination against wealth status, as well as place of residence [rural vs. urban]) in providing basic services that *work* (see Jilke 2010).

information such as the budget or the strategic plan with them. Furthermore, they found out that besides gender, there are certain types of people who felt excluded from such information. The poor, the youth and those not affiliated with the ruling party-coalition perceived that information was less likely to reach them.

KII results show that just over a fifth of respondents had access to budget information and just over a third had access to the strategic plan. Thus access to budget information for CSO representatives is higher than for ordinary citizens. Although access would therefore appear higher for CSO representatives, this is comparatively low. For a number of KII respondents, the idea that strategic plan and budget information should be shared with CSOs was new.

Regional comparison of CRC data on who know their budget, strategic plans and council decisions, reveals regional differences with Somali, Afar and SNNP as low performers, and Gambella as well as Tigray with a relative high share of citizens who know and have access to such kind of information. In terms of developments over time (WCBS II – III), the data displays some improvements - with the exception of Amhara and Harari.

It is not consistent to find that less than a quarter of citizens know their budget, even though supply-side data shows that nearly all jurisdictions say they have disseminated that information. This difference could reflect publicity material that is not easily accessible or understood or it could indicate citizen apathy. Further research is required to disentangle the explanatory factors.

Regarding different means on how jurisdictions share such information with their citizens, there are in general five different ways: public announcements, radio communication, annual report, CSOs and kebele meetings. Most commonly kebele-meetings are used, followed by the annual report and public announcements. In this regard, the data also reveals differences between different types of jurisdictions. City governments (mean of accumulated means of information: 66%) are more actively utilizing a diverse information strategy, so as to a lesser extent woredas (56%) while municipalities are using information strategies to a much lower degree (46%).

In terms of community consultations and participatory methods, 84% of city governments, 80% of municipalities and 83% of woredas claim to use participatory planning methods. In this regard, results from these consultations are quite good for all regions except in Afar and Somali with 69% and 48% respectively.

In this regard, the CRC sought the view of citizens whether local officials in their kebele have actively sought their views concerning the most important development needs and quality of local services. The data in table 3 shows a 10% decline in the proportion reporting consultation on “the most important development needs” in woredas and a 6% increase in city administrations. For “the quality of any public services” we can see a 6% decline in woredas and a 6% increase in city administrations.

Table 3: Have any local officials actively sought the views of the people in your kebele concerning:

The most important development needs		
	<i>woredas</i>	<i>city administrations</i>
Yes (WCBS II)	68%	45%
Yes (WCBS III)	58%	39%

The quality of any public services		
	woredas	city administrations
Yes (WCBS II)	59%	33%
Yes (WCBS III)	53%	39%

The follow-up question asks whether people have personally been consulted in the previous years. Here only 20% of citizens from woredas answer with yes, while lesser 12% in city administrations do so.


For FGDs, the vast majority of men and youth believed that local people were consulted about the quality of local services. Fewer female FGDs (less than three quarter) believed that local people were consulted. Topics such as education provision have clear examples of good practice where plans and skills from the jurisdiction and the community are combined into a workable plan owned by the community.

When asked whether they themselves had a say or influence in the running of services, about a half of the FGDs believed that they did. As for development needs, just under a third of FGDs believed they had a say or influence in setting development priorities and this dropped to below a quarter for rural women. When examples of influence are provided, this was frequently through direct participation, for example, in planting trees or through presenting priorities primarily through public meetings at the kebele level. The electoral system was rarely given as a means as influencing development among participants.

For KIIs, just less than the half of CSO representatives believed they had been consulted on the quality of public services. A similar proportion had been consulted on development needs. As for the preparation of a strategic plan for the jurisdiction's strategic management, the data clearly shows that consultations with CSOs was not the norm.

However, data collected by the supply-side suggests much higher figures. It shows that the general public is involved in capital investment priority setting and service delivery priorities in 71% of city governments, 70% of municipalities and 72% of woredas. Only results from Afar, where 94% of woredas report no participation, are exceptional. In this regard, the overall data of the supply-side suggests that community influence was especially low in city governments in SNNP, Gambella and Somali, and in woredas in Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, SNNP and Gambella.

Placing these findings into context by asking the jurisdictions whether a service or capital investment project has been changed, postponed or started earlier on the basis of community participation, the supply-side data indicates that the practical influence of the community in decision-making is smaller than the formal participation opportunities offered by jurisdictions. Here, 61% of city governments, only 50% of municipalities and 53% of woredas agreed that a service or a capital investment had been changed due to community participation.

Figure 16: Participation and actual influence on decision-making


These findings run more in the direction of the demand-side results; however, there are still some differences between the outcomes of the demand- and supply-side data. Perhaps, we can relate these discrepancies to some indications of FGDs that revealed that the participation process of local administrations sometimes focuses on specific groups of citizens who are consulted over again, rather than the public at large.

"They [the local administration staffs] are partial selective when calling for a meeting." (FGD female participant)

"The youths have never been asked on development matters. It is the elders and members of EPRDF that are called for meeting." (FGD youth participant)

Moreover, the CRC compiles data where citizens were asked what they would do if a certain public service is not satisfactory to them. Evidence from the water sector, for example, suggests that in the time between 2008 and 2010 citizens (particular in urban areas) have become more likely to direct complaints to their local water committee rather than to the local administration themselves.

Figure 17: If drinking water is not satisfactory what would you do about it? – Developments over time (WCBS II – III)



A move towards less reliance on local council interventions to solve problems with public water supply can also be seen when comparing WCBS II and III data. In this regard, most people see participation in local public meetings as the major way to raise concerns in this area. The proportion of citizens who are quite likely or very likely to do this 2008 was 82% and this was 81% in 2010 - with similar consistency for both woreda and city government sub-samples. In contrast, those saying they are quite likely or very likely to speak with or write to their councilors on these issues have been fallen from 68% in 2008 to 35% in 2010. The greatest fall has been in woredas.

Between 2008 and 2010 there has also been a striking loss of confidence among respondents in woredas that the concerns they raise regarding water quality - the same accounts for users of government health facilities - will be addressed: the proportion of the very confident has been fallen from 32% to 8% for water services and from 22% to 11% for health services. Confidence among residents in city administrations has remained largely unchanged in the area of water supply, while for governmental health facilities there has been a fall of confidence, nevertheless to relatively lesser extent (from 12% to 7%).

6.3.2 Council work and accountability


In terms of an effective and legally working council, data from the supply-side reveals, first of all, a rather low share of female councilors; however, there are larger differences, both in terms of size of councils as well as in terms of shares of female councilors⁹. While Tigray has in average 195 councilors per jurisdictions of whom nearly 50% are female, most other regions, such as Afar (58 councilors on average of which nearly 10% are women), Benishangul-Gumuz (18 councilors of which around 15% are female) and Gambella (14 of which less than 10% are women) are performing considerably worse. In this regard, there is a gap on the proportion of female councilors between the four big regions and the emerging regions.

⁹ This indicator is also deployed on the national level (target 3.3) in order to monitor progress towards MDG 3 – promote gender equality and empower women. In this regard, Ethiopia’s share of seats in the national parliament held by women is - according to the UN statistics division – 21.9% for 2009.

Furthermore, there are also large differences concerning the regularity of council meetings. While 70% of city governments report that they have held at least twelve meetings in the last twelve months, only 60% of woredas and municipalities claim to do so. Findings in this regard are rather low and there are some striking results. City governments in SNNP report that 43% of them did not have regular meetings, and in the case of woredas, Afar reports that none had regular meetings, two thirds in Benishangul-Gumuz and more than half in SNNP (57%) did not do so.


In this regard, most jurisdictions have established follow-up mechanisms for decisions reached during council meetings. 94% of the city governments claim to have such a follow-up mechanism, 75% of municipalities and 94% of woredas. Although the share of jurisdictions having regular meetings is much smaller, the vast majority claims to have a follow-up mechanism.

Figure 18: Follow-up mechanisms for decision taken by local councils



In terms of holding local leaders to account when they fail to keep promises, CRC data shows that just over the half of the respondents feel powerless (53%), but believe they can do at least something (47%) - a higher proportion of city than woreda respondents felt they could do at least something. When asked what ordinary people can do to hold local leaders to account if they fail to keep their promises, people who described themselves as “very poor” - approximately 10% of the sample - are much more likely to feel powerless to hold local leaders to their promises than all other wealth categories. The biggest differences in this regard, however, are between regional states and also a small part of this variation is explained by the rural/urban balance in each region. Given the Government’s objective of improving local public service delivery, attention should be given to improving the ability and confidence of citizens particularly in Tigray, Somali, Afar and Amhara to hold their local leaders to account on such issues. Local best practice in this area is likely to be found in SNNP, Addis Ababa and Harari.

Figure 19: Proportion believing they can do nothing or very little if local leaders do not keep their promises




Comparing responses of citizens who were asked if it would be likely that people will be punished by local officials if they complain about poor service quality or the misuse of funds suggests very similar results for both, kebele and woreda officials. And while around 2/3 of citizens believe that complaints in the mentioned areas is not all or not very likely to lead to a punishment by local officials, around 20% think there is a real risk of making this type of complaint.

In the following figure, we consider the characteristics of those who believe a complaint will result in punishment. The most striking result is that the two Regions in which the confidence is highest in holding woreda leaders to promises made (SNNP and Addis Ababa) also have the highest concern that people reporting poor quality public services or misuse of funds will be punished. This apparently contradictory finding is probably best understood by noting that respondents may fear the consequences of personally complaining to official leaders but have confidence in community meetings to hold them to account. Indeed, for those who believe it is possible to do something to hold local leaders to account, CRC findings show that community meetings are held to be by far the most important method of doing this.

Internationally lessons learned (see World Bank 2003) also suggest that improved *routes of accountability* can be very effective in raising standards of local service delivery. One of the lessons from interaction between frontline service providers and citizen customers is that improvements are more easily obtained when there is a *social accountability* in service delivery and traditional top-down supervision is ineffective (see for example Björkman and Svensson 2007). This is something GoE can further help to build on.

Figure 20: Percentage of people who think it is likely or very likely that people will be punished by local officials if they complaint about poor services or misuse of funds



In this regard, results from KIIs indicate that almost 60% of the respondents believe there was nothing or very little they could do where jurisdiction failed to keep their promises. The majority of respondents in Addis Ababa, Amhara and Tigray believed there was something that could be done in such situation, showing a degree of accountability on the part of administration and a degree of empowerment of the CSO as such.


"Good governance is practiced in this city, so any organization can do something by complain clearly and openly, for the administration gives due attention for organizations" (KII respondent)

Others, however, indicate poor responsiveness on the part of the administration. In Oromiya the majority of KIIs believed that promises were broken and that there was little that could be done to rectify the situation thus indicating poor relationships with the jurisdictions, low administrative capacity to handle such kind of complaints and possibly low empowerment of CSOs.

"Any written complaint by the CSOs are rejected or not treated fairly by Woreda/City government." (KII respondent)

When asked the CSO representatives what would be effective in putting pressure on local administrations, 82 respondents answered as follows:

Figure 21: Failure to keep promises: what can the CSO do? – For all regions



The results reveal little variations across regions. In this regard, community meetings and contacting the regional leadership were given the most frequent avenue of follow-up. Unlike responses in the FGDs, over one in ten respondents believed that local elections could be effective, showing greater awareness of the political process than detected in FGDs.

7 Other GoE surveys and international lessons learned

GoE also undertook (with PBS support, integrated under its component three) a CRC as well as a smaller number of FGDs and KIIs in order to collect information on citizens’ perceptions of local government accountability, transparency and responsiveness: FTAPS. The survey was conducted from March to April 2008. Unlike, stated in its final report, FTAPS is not the first survey of its kind in Ethiopia. A recent assessment (Albert 2009) of redundancies of both research activities revealed that although there were some unique questions within the FTAPS questionnaire, a substantial number of topics and questions were similar in both surveys, thus resulting in some kind of duplication. The main difference between WCBS’ CRC and FTAPS lies, however, on the methodological stage. Since WCBS’ CRC was designed in order to assess citizens’ perceptions on the level of local administrations, FTAPS data can not be disaggregated to the local level - it follows CSA’s sampling procedure of rather sticking to the zonal level. Indeed, data of both surveys can be used for regional comparison; however, using the data for individual case studies of certain jurisdictions - a key feature when it comes to peer-learning among jurisdictions and planning of development interventions in accordance to different types of jurisdictions, for example - is only possible through WCBS data.

Furthermore, WCBS III was conducted from March to April 2010, while FTAPS field work was done between March and April 2009. Therefore, possible inconsistencies between the both surveys might be related to the time which was between them. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that while FTAPS focuses solely on financial transparency and accountability as perceived by citizens, WCBS uses a much more comprehensive and holistic approach, both in terms of topics covered as well as in terms of different views (see figure 5) and surveyed areas of interest.

In terms of percentage of citizens who report to have knowledge about the woreda/ city government budget, for example, WCBS III displays a share of 13% (so as WCBS II), while FTAPS data shows that only 9% have such kind of information. Although there are minor differences on

how the questions are actually asked, WCBS II data was confirmed through findings of WCBS III – revealing only little changes in the last two years; supply-side data suggest much higher numbers. However, disaggregating WCBS III data clearly shows that there are considerable differences, both in terms of regions as well as in terms of type of jurisdictions.

Another example would be the percentage of citizens who responded that their views on the quality of local services have been actively sought by local officials. FTAPS data suggest that this holds true for approximately 6% of the respondents, while the comparable questions to FTAPS in WCBS III reveals a share of 17%. However, figures provided by jurisdictions are much higher, as supply-side data in this regard shows that jurisdictions for example use participatory methods in around 80% of the cases – pointing more in the direction of WCBS' CRC results, than those revealed by FTAPS data.

Beside FTAPS, another CRC has been undertaken in Ethiopia, which was conducted for its second time by a consortium of Ethiopian CSOs: PANE. PANE's CRC focuses mainly on service delivery and its perceived quality and accessibility. In doing so, it focuses on four main areas of interest: drinking water, health and sanitation, education and agricultural extensions services. Although PANE's CRC is designed to capture citizens' voice on the regional level, its sampling procedure was not designed to receive representative results on the national level. It rather concentrates on five regional states (Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, Tigray and Afar) and one city administration (Dire Dawa). Moreover, it focuses more on the characteristics of local services and their accessibility and displays hence, to some degree, complementary research.

Beside comparable research on the national level, there are various international lessons learned available within the area of local institutional capacity and service delivery in developing countries. One of these lessons as provided most prominent through the Bank's World Development Report 2004 suggest the need to strengthen *routes of accountability* in order to improve access and quality of basic services, as well as - on the long run - local institutional capacity¹⁰. Various researches (see for example Björkmann and Svensson 2007 for a Ugandan case study in this regard) have provided further support for strengthening local accountability in order to improve local services. Lessons from WCBS III further highlight the need for both, improving local accountability structures in Ethiopia as well as further developing institutional capacities in this regard – both are certainly interdependent.

¹⁰ Besides improving accountability mechanisms, there are various macro-factors that determine the degree of equality in access to basic services in African countries, such as policy-coherence (horizontal as well as vertical), inclusiveness and effectiveness of related policy frameworks (see Jilke 2010).

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9 Annex

Table 4: List and explanation of WCBS Benchmarking-scores and Indicators

No	Indicator used	Description
1	Variation between Budgeted and actual Expenditure	<p>Variation between budget and actual expenditure shows how accurately woredas and municipalities forecast and use their resources. The budget and actual figures are a summary of sectoral expenditures. This is a much more preferable approach than using the total revenue budget and actual.</p> <p>The indicator values are as follows:</p> <p>A: Budget and Actual expenditure are closely matched showing an excellent level of planning (0-25%).</p> <p>B: Budget and Actual expenditure are somehow matched showing inconsistent planning that needs to be improved (26-30%).</p> <p>C: Budget and Actual expenditure are extremely divergent showing a complete lack of planning procedure (>31%).</p> <p>D: Actual expenditure is higher than budget showing unplanned financing of expenditure. This also means a push towards using the undesirable subsidy procedures (actual is greater than planned).</p>
2	Salary expenditure against total Expenditure	<p>If the salary portion of expenditure is higher, mobility and service delivery capacity of staff is limited. This situation also shows how constrained is the operational expenditure portion of the jurisdiction.</p> <p>The indicator values are as follows:</p> <p>A: The salary portion of the expenditures is fair enough to allow for more operational and capital expenditures (0-49%).</p> <p>B: The salary portion of the expenditures is exaggerated but still allowing for acceptable levels of operational and capital expenditures. (50-59%)</p> <p>C: The salary portion of the expenditures is extremely inflated and the likelihood of acceptable levels of operational and capital expenditures is dubious. (60-85%)</p> <p>D: Almost all expenditures of the jurisdiction are related with salary expenses and a very low level of operational and capital expenditures is observed (86-100%)</p>
3	Own revenue as percentage of actual expenditure	<p>The indicator is a measure of financial self-sufficiency level of the jurisdiction. To get the indicator values, the sum of all collected taxes and fess is compared to the total expenditure. The values are not normative. They are based on comparisons of percentages among the surveyed jurisdictions.</p> <p>The indicator values are as follows:</p> <p>A: Relatively, a higher collection of taxes and fees when compared to the expenditure level. (>90%)</p> <p>B: Relatively, a moderate level of collection of taxes and fees when compared to the expenditure level. This shows a need to improve the collection level. (50-89%)</p> <p>C: Compared to other jurisdiction, a limited level of own revenue is achieved by the jurisdiction to cover the required expenditure. (<30%)</p>
4	Increase in own taxes, fees and service charges	<p>This is a measure of actual (1996 E.F.Y.) and plans (1997 E.F.Y) collections of taxes, fees and service charges. This indicator is an additional assessment of the above (# 3) and depicts the trend of the jurisdiction towards</p>

No	Indicator used	Description
		<p>improving own revenues. The indicator values are as follows: A: Relatively, a higher collection of taxes and fees when compared to the expenditure level. (>80%) B: Relatively, a moderate level of collection of taxes and fees when compared to the expenditure level. This shows a need to improve the collection level. (35-79%) C: Compared to other jurisdiction, a limited level of own revenue is achieved by the jurisdiction to cover the required expenditure. (<35%)</p>
5	Budget utilization capacity as measured by actual revenue and actual expenditure	<p>The total revenue composed of Block grant, subsidies, loan/grants and own revenue is compared to the actual expenditure. If a jurisdiction is able to consume the allocated resources then its capacity to utilize budget can be judged as excellent. Otherwise, it shows lack of leadership, planning and staff leading to under consumption of the allocated financial resources. The indicator values are as follows: A: Budget and Actual expenditure are closely matched showing an excellent level of planning. (>96%) B: Budget and Actual expenditure are somehow matched showing inconsistent planning that needs to be improved. (90-96%) C: Budget and Actual expenditure are extremely divergent showing a complete lack of planning procedure. (50-89%) D: Actual expenditure is higher than budget showing unplanned financing of expenditure. This also means a push towards using the undesirable subsidy procedures. (<50%)</p>
6	Capital budget against total budget	<p>The capital investment portion in the total budget shows the work-in-progress towards improving service delivery. If the portion of capital budget is minimal then there are no initiatives to improve the infrastructure of the jurisdiction. Higher portions show readiness to meet future service delivery demands in the given jurisdiction. The indicator values are as follows: A: Relatively, higher capital investments that guarantee the readiness of the jurisdiction to meet future service demands. (>80%) B: Relatively, a moderate level of capital investments that somehow guarantee the readiness of the jurisdiction to meet future service demands. (20-79%) C: No Capital investment or its portion in the total budget is negligible showing deteriorating service delivery in the jurisdiction. (<20%)</p>
7	Existence, transparency and inclusiveness of the worda/municipality's strategic plan	<p>The importance of strategic plans can not be overemphasized. The financial strategic plan is sound if it is based on forecast of resources. Besides, if budget allocation is linked to the developed strategic plan then the jurisdiction is in a better financial management position. How the strategic plan was formulated and the practice of submitting the various progress and monitoring reports based on the strategic plan is also an indication of sound financial management. This indicator is a composite measure of the above issues. The indicator values are as follows: A: A strategic plan is used, budgets are forecasted based on this plan and there is a high degree of transparency in reporting. (>90%) B: A strategic plan is used but either budgets are not forecasted based</p>

No	Indicator used	Description
		on this plan or transparency in reporting is unsatisfactory. The Financial management status needs to improve. (80-90%) C: The financial management status of the jurisdiction is poor. (<79%)
8	Efficiency and comprehensiveness of accounting and Auditing procedures	The indicator measures the use-of modern accounting practices and the soundness of auditing procedures. The composite index is based on use of double-entry accounting, ICT assisted accounting, regularity of reconciliation of fiscal and bank records, existence of account backlogs, and the state of internal and external auditing of the books. The indicator values are as follows: A: The jurisdiction has a better accounting and auditing system that ensures better financial management. (>=70%) B: The jurisdiction has a functioning but not best of the class accounting and auditing procedures. It needs to improve the existing system. (60-69%) C: The accounting and auditing procedures are below standard and the status of the jurisdiction in this regard is very poor. (<60%)
9	Enhancement of existing taxpayers base and efficiency of tax collection	Jurisdictions should in principle assess continually the existing taxpayer base and consider the introduction of viable new taxes and fees for new type of services. This composite measure shows the effort of individual jurisdictions to increase their own revenue by conducting assessments on existing and new taxes/service fees. The indicator values are as follows: A: An excellent initiative to increase own revenue through assessing the taxpayer base and viable new tax/fees. (>=90%) B: A moderate level initiative to increase own revenue through assessing the taxpayer base and viable new tax/fees. The jurisdiction needs to increase such initiatives. (60-89%) C: No initiative or few accomplishments towards increasing own revenue through assessing the taxpayer base and viable new tax/fees. The initiative level of the jurisdiction poor and need to introduce such initiatives. (<60%)
10	Appropriateness of staffing level	High level of vacancies is a major bottleneck towards effective service delivery. The staffing level is the number posts filled against the approved positions of the jurisdiction. However, assuming that approved positions are adequate for delivering the needed services, the more they are unfilled the more service delivery capacity is affected. Hence, the level of vacancy is a proxy indicator of the adequateness of staffing for the needed level of service delivery. The indicator values are as follows: A: The Jurisdiction is appropriately staffed to meet service delivery demands. Few approved positions are vacant. (<10%) B: The Jurisdiction is more or less appropriately staffed to meet service delivery demands. Quite a number of approved positions are vacant. (11-20%) C: The Jurisdiction is poorly staffed to meet service delivery needs. A relatively higher number of the approved positions are vacant. (>20%)
11	Compliance with modern human resource	Just a glimpse of the jurisdiction's management style is assessed by using this indicator. Whether job descriptions and performance measures are issued to employees and if performance appraisal of employees carried out

No	Indicator used	Description
	Approaches	regularly are summarized through this indicator. The indicator values are as follows: A: An excellent human resource management approach is observed in the jurisdiction. (75-100%) B: The Jurisdiction some how used some modern ways to manage its employees. There is a need to improve the personnel management approach. (50-74%) C: The Jurisdiction is managing poorly its employees. (0-49%)
12	Information access level by the public and stakeholders	This composite indicator measures the public access to basic information such as budgets, audit reports, strategic plans, tax assessment, services provided by the jurisdiction, etc. The indicator values are as follows: A: The jurisdiction can let access all or most of the requested information. Information is found in written mode. (60-100%) B: The Jurisdiction has reasonable number documents that can be accessed by the public. It needs to improve its documentation and be more transparent. (50-59%) C: The public access to critical documents in the jurisdiction is very limited and need major improvements. (0-49%)
13	Community empowerment and participation in local government and service delivery	Community participation in budget formulation, strategic planning and improvement of service delivery is measured by this composite indicator. The indicator can be taken as a measure of inclusiveness of the budget and the strategic plan (if formulated). The indicator values are as follows: A: High degree of consultation with citizens and stakeholders. (80-100%) B: Moderate level of community consultation that need improvement. (65-79%) C: A low level community consultation that needs major efforts to improve the situation. (0-64%)
14	Level of Access to Basic Services and appropriateness of delivery actors.	The index is calculated based on whether the selected fifteen basic services are provided mostly by the jurisdiction. The more the jurisdiction is involved with the delivery of the basic services the more positively the target is judged. For woredas, the service delivered by the municipalities within its jurisdiction is considered and vice-versa. The indicator values are as follows: A: The percentage of the services provided by the jurisdiction and its higher/lower jurisdiction layers is satisfactory. (35-100%) B: The percentage of the services provided by the jurisdiction and its higher/lower jurisdiction layers is somehow acceptable but needs further improvement. (30-34%) C: The coverage of basic services by the jurisdiction is unsatisfactory. (0-29%)
15	(For Woreda Only) Agricultural services availability to majority of farmers	This indicator measures availability of a range of typical agricultural services to the majority of farmers. The indicator shows if the woreda is providing critical support to the farmers with respect to cooperatives, technical assistance, direct marketing, food processing facilities, micro-finance, gender specific training, etc. The indicator values are as follows:

No	Indicator used	Description
		<p>A: The percentage of the services provided by the jurisdiction and its higher/lower jurisdiction layers is satisfactory. (50-100%)</p> <p>B: The percentage of the services provided by the jurisdiction and its higher/lower jurisdiction layers is somehow acceptable but needs further improvement. (10-49%)</p> <p>C: The coverage of basic services by the jurisdiction is unsatisfactory. (0-9%)</p>
16	(For Woreda Only) Cost of salaries for agriculture compared to level of agricultural land use	<p>This indicator shows the staff efficiency of the agriculture function in the given woreda.</p> <p>The indicator values are as follows:</p> <p>A: The salary spent to service one hectare of land is minimal showing efficiency of incurred costs in salaries. (0-10 Birr)</p> <p>B: The salary spent to service one hectare of land is moderate showing a reasonable efficiency of incurred costs in salaries. (11-20 Birr)</p> <p>C: The salary spent to service one hectare of land is high showing inefficiency of incurred costs in salaries. (>20 Birr)</p>
17	(For Municipality Only) Solid waste disposal services availability and population coverage	<p>This indicator measures availability of a solid waste disposal services to the majority of the inhabitants of the jurisdiction. The degree of population coverage with this service.</p> <p>The indicator values are as follows:</p> <p>A: The percentage of the services provided by the jurisdiction and its higher/lower jurisdiction layers is satisfactory. (50-100%)</p> <p>B: The percentage of the services provided by the jurisdiction and its higher/lower jurisdiction layers is somehow acceptable but needs further improvement. (10-49%)</p> <p>C: The coverage of basic services by the jurisdiction is unsatisfactory. (0-9%)</p>
18	(For Municipality Only) Cost of salaries against annual solid waste coverage	<p>This indicator shows the staff efficiency of the solid waste disposal function in the given municipality.</p> <p>The indicator values are as follows:</p> <p>A: The salary spent to dispose one metric cube of solid waste is minimal showing efficiency of incurred costs in salaries. (1-10 Birr)</p> <p>B: The salary spent to dispose one metric cube of solid waste is moderate showing a reasonable efficiency of incurred costs in salaries. (11-20 Birr)</p> <p>C: The salary spent to dispose one metric cube of solid waste is high showing inefficiency of incurred costs in salaries. (>20 Birr)</p>

Table 5: WCBS III Benchmarking-scores

RegionName	Woreda_CityName	Benchmarks for WCBS III																	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
AA	Akaki Kality Sub-city	D	A	C	na	D	B	B	A	A	B	A	A	C	C	C			
AA	Arada Sub-city	D	A	C	na	D	B	A	A	A	A	C	A	B	A		C	A	
AA	Bole Sub-city	D	A	C	na	C	B	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	C			
AA	Kirkos Sub-city	D	A	C	na	A	A	C	A	A	B	A	A	A			C		
AA	Nafas Silk Lafto Sub-city	D	A	C	na	D	C	A	A	A	A	A	B	A			A	C	
AA	Yeka-Sub City	A	A	C	na	C	B	B	A	A	A	A	C	A	B	C			
Afar	Abala	A	A	A	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	A	C	B	A	A			
Afar	Amibara	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	B	A	B	B	C	C	A	B		
Afar	Asayita	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	C	A	B	A	B	B	A	C		
Afar	Awash Fentale	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	B	C		
Afar	Bure Mudaitu	D	D	C	na	D	C	B	C	A	A	B	A	C	C	A	C		
Afar	Chifra	A	A	A	na	C	B	B	A	C	A	C	C	C	C	A	C		
Afar	Dawe	A	A	C	na	C	B	B	C	C	A	A	A	A	B	A	C		
Afar	Ewa	A	A	C	na	D	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	C			
Afar	Gewane	A	A	C	na	B	C	B	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	C		
Afar	Golina	D	A	C	na	A	B	C	C	B	A	A	A	C	A	C			
Afar	Hadele Ele	A	A	B	na	C	B	B	C	C	A	A	A	C	B	A	C		
Afar	Kori	D	D	A	na	D	C	C	C	C	A	C	A	C	C	B	C		
Afar	Megale	A	A	B	na	B	C	C	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	B	C		
Afar	Mile	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C		
Afar	Telalak	A	A	C	na	C	B	B	A	B	A	B	A	A	B	A	C		
Afar	Yalo	D	A	C	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	C	B	A	C		
Amhara	Addis Zemen	A	D	A	na	A	C	C	C	A	C	A	A	C	A			D	
Amhara	Adi Arkay	D	A	C	na	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	B	C		
Amhara	Alefa	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Amhara	Aneded	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Antsokiya	A	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	C	A	A	B		
Amhara	Asegiirti	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Awabel	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Bahir Dar	A	A	C	na	D	B	B	A	A	B	B	A	B	A		A	A	
Amhara	Baso Liben	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Basona Worena	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	A	C	A	B		
Amhara	Bati	D	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	C		
Amhara	Borena (D/Sina)	A	A	C	na	C	B	B	A	B	A	A	A	A	C	A	A		
Amhara	Bure	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Amhara	Chagni	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A				
Amhara	Chilga	D	A	C	na	B	C	A	A	A	C	A	A	C	A	A	B		
Amhara	Dabat	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Dangla	D	A	C	na	A	A	A	A	C	B	A	A	A			B		
Amhara	Dawa Chefa (Chafe gola)	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	C	A	A	C	A	A	B		
Amhara	Debark	D	D	C	na	D	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	C			B	
Amhara	Debre Birhan	A	A	C	na	D	A	A	C	B	C	C	A	C	A	A	A		

Amhara	Debre Elias	A	A	C	na	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Amhara	Debre Markos	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	C	C	C	A	A	A			C	
Amhara	Debre Tabor	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	B	A	A	B	A			C	A
Amhara	Dejen	A	D	C	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Dessie City	D	A	C	na	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A			C	A
Amhara	Dessie Zuria	A	A	C	na	B	C	C	C	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A		
Amhara	Enarj Enawaga	D	A	C	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	B	C		
Amhara	Farta	A	D	A	na	D	C	B	A	B	A	C	A	A	A	A	A		
Amhara	Fegita Lekoma	D	A	A	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Amhara	Fogera	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Amhara	Gidan	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	B	B		
Amhara	Gishe	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	C	A	A	B		
Amhara	Goncha Kolala	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	C	A	C	A	A	A			B	
Amhara	Goncha Siso Enase	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	C	A	C	A	A	B	A	A	C		
Amhara	Gonder City	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	B	A	A	C	A			A	
Amhara	Gonder Zuria	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Amhara	Gozamin	D	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Amhara	Guba Lafto	D	D	A	na	D	C	C	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	C		
Amhara	Habru W. Hararge	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C		
Amhara	Hagere Mariam kesem	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Jabi Tehnan	A	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Amhara	Jille Timuga	D	A	C	na	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C		
Amhara	Kewet	A	A		na	D	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C		
Amhara	Kobo	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Kombolcha City	D	A	C	na	A	A	B	A	B	C	A	A	A	A			B	A
Amhara	Kutaber	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	C		
Amhara	Lasta	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	B	A	A	A		
Amhara	Meket	D	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	B	C	B	A	A	A	A	A		
Amhara	Menz Lalo Midir	D	A	C	na	C	B	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Amhara	Merab Belsa	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Amhara	Metema	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C		
Amhara	Mida Woremo	A	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	C		
Amhara	Misrak Este	C	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	B	A	C	A	A	A		
Amhara	Mojana Waderea	D	A	C	na	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Amhara	Quarit	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	B	A	B	A	C	A	A	B		
Amhara	Saya Debirna Wayu	A	A	C	na	A	B	C	C	C	C	A	A	A	C	A	C		
Amhara	Sayint	A	A	C	na	B	C	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	C		
Amhara	Sekela	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	B	A	C	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Sekota Zuria	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Semen Achefer	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Amhara	Shewa Robit City	D	A	C	na	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Amhara	Simada	A	A	C	na	D	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Amhara	Tach Armacho	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Amhara	Werebabu	D	D	A	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	C		
Amhara	Wonberma	A	A	C	na	C	C	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Amhara	Woreta city	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A				C

Amhara	Yilma Na Densa	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
B-G	Assosa	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	C	A	B	A	C	A	A	B		
B-G	Assosa city administration	A	A		na	D	C	C	C	B	C	A	A	B	A			D	C
B-G	Banbasi	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	C	A	A	C	A	A	B		
B-G	Bulen	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	C	A	A	A	C	B	A		
B-G	Dangur	D	D	C	na	D	C	C	A	A	A	B	A	B	A	A	B		
B-G	Dibate	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	B	A	B	A	B	C	A	A		
B-G	Kemashi	A	A	B	na	A	C	C	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	A	C		
B-G	Kurmuk	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	C	A	C	A	C	C	A	A	C		
B-G	Mao Komo Special	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	B	A	C	A	C	A	A	A		
B-G	Menge	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	C	A	A	B	A	C	A	A	A		
B-G	Pawe Special	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	C	A	B	A		
B-G	Sherkole	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	B	B		
B-G	Yaso	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Dire Dawa	Dire Dawa	B	A	C	na	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A				
Gambela	Etang Special Woreda	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	B	C	A	A	C	A	A	C		
Gambela	Gambella City	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	A			A	
Gambela	Gambella Zuria	A	A	C	na	A	A	A	A	C	C	C	A	C	B	A	C		
Gambela	Godare	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	C	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Gambela	Jor	A	A		na	D	C	C	C	C	C	A	A	B	C	B	C		
Gambela	Lare	C	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	B	C	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Gambela	Mengesh	D	A	A	na	C	C	C	A	C	A	B	A	A	C	B	C		
Gambela	Wantawa	C	A	A	na	A	C	B	A	C	A	A	A	B	A	A	C		
Harrari	Harar City	A	A	C	na	D	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	C	B			D	A
Oromiya	Abichuna Gnaa	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	B	A	A	C	B	A		
Oromiya	Abomsa	D	D	C	na	C	B	B	A	A	C	A	A	A	A			C	
Oromiya	Adaba	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A		
Oromiya	Adama	A	D	C	na	D	C	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	C			A	
Oromiya	Adami tulu	D	A	C	na	A	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Adola	A	A	C	na	B	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	B	C		
Oromiya	Agaro	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	B	A	A	B	A			C	C
Oromiya	Akaki	A	A		na	D	C	B	C	B	A	C	B	C	C	A	B		
Oromiya	Ale	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Ambo City	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	C	A	A	A			D	A
Oromiya	Ambo Zuria	A	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Amigna	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Amuru	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	B	A	C	A	A	B		
Oromiya	Anfilo	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Arero	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	C	C	A	C		
Oromiya	Arsi Negele	D	C	C	na	D	B	A	A	A	C	C	A	A	A			D	
Oromiya	Arsi Negele City	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Assela	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			A	A
Oromiya	Babile	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	B	A	B	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Babo Gambel	A	A	C	na	B	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A		
Oromiya	Bako Tibe	A	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	A	A		

Oromiya	Batu City	D	A	C	na	C	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	C
Oromiya	Becho	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Becho Woreda	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Bedele City Administration	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	B	A	A	A	A			B	
Oromiya	Bedesa	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	A			D	A
Oromiya	Begi	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A		
Oromiya	Berek Special	C	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	B	A	C	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Boji Dermeji	D	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Boneya Boshha Woreda	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Bora	D	A	C	na	A	A	C	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Burayu city	D	A	C	na	D	B	C	A	B	C	A	A	A	A			A	
Oromiya	Bure Woreda	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	B		
Oromiya	Chelya	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Chiro City	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			D	B
Oromiya	Chiro Zuria	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Dabo Hana	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Darimu Woreda	D	A	C	na	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Dawo	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A		
Oromiya	Dedessa	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Dedo	A	A	C	na	A	B	B	A	A	A	C	A	C	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Degem	D	A	C	na	C	C	C	C	A	A	C	A	C	C	B	A		
Oromiya	Dembi Dolo	D	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A			D	
Oromiya	Digluna Tijo	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Diksis (Former ?)	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	C	C	B	A		
Oromiya	Doba	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Oromiya	Dodola	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Dodola City	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			D	
Oromiya	Dodota	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A		
Oromiya	Ejere	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	C	C	C	A		
Oromiya	Enkelo Waba	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Fentale	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	C		
Oromiya	Fiche	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	B	B	C	A	B	C			B	C
Oromiya	Gasera	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Gawo Kebe	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	B	C	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Gechi	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Oromiya	Gida Ayana (Gida Kiremu)	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Gimbi	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A		
Oromiya	Gimbichu	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Ginir	D	D	C	na	D	A	B	A	A	C	A	A	A	A				
Oromiya	Goba City	A	D	C	na	D	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C			A	A
Oromiya	Goba seyo	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			B	
Oromiya	Goba Woreda	D	A	C	na	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Oromiya	Gola Oda	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	C	A	B	A		
Oromiya	Gololcha	D	D	C	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Oromiya	Goro Gutu	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	C	C	C	A	A	A		

Oromiya	Nono Benja	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Oromiya	Nunu Kumba	A	A	C	na	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C		
Oromiya	Oda Bultuma (Kuni)	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Omonada	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	C			
Oromiya	Robe	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Sasiga	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Sebeta Hawas	A	A	C	na	C	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Seru	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Shala	D	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Shambu City	D	A	C	na	C	C	A	C	A	C	A	A	A	A					
Oromiya	Shashamene City	D	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	C	A			B	C	
Oromiya	Shebe Senbo	D	A	A	na	C	C	B	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Sibu Sire	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Sinana	D	D	A	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A			
Oromiya	Siraro	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Sire	D	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	A	A			
Oromiya	Sodo Dacha	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Sude	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Teletele	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A			
Oromiya	Tikur Enchini	A	A	B	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B			
Oromiya	Tiro Afeta	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	A	A			
Oromiya	Tiyo	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	B			
Oromiya	Toke Kutaye	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Tole	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A			
Oromiya	Tulo	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C			
Oromiya	Wadera	A	A	C	na	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	B			
Oromiya	Welenchiti	D	D	A	na	D	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	A	A			A	A	
Oromiya	Wenji Gefersa	D	D	A	na	D	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	B	C			C	A	
Oromiya	Were Jarso	D	A	C	na	B	C	C	C	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Woliso	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	C			
Oromiya	Woliso City	A	A	C	na	A	B	A	A	B	B	A	A	B	A			B	A	
Oromiya	Wolmera	A	A	C	na	D	C	C	C	A	A	C	A	C	A	A	A			
Oromiya	Wonchi	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	C			
Oromiya	Yemalogi Welel	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	C	C	A	A			
Oromiya	Ziway Dugda	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A			
SNNP	Abeshge	D	D	C	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C			
SNNP	Alaba Kulito City	D	A	C	na	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A				A	
SNNP	Alaba Leyu	A	A	C	na	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			
SNNP	Aleta Wondo Town	A	D	A	na	A	C	C	C	A	C	A	A	C	A				A	
SNNP	Alichu Werero	A	A	C	na	B	C	C	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	A	B			
SNNP	Amaro	A	A	C	na	C	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A			
SNNP	Analimo	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	A	C			
SNNP	Arba Minch Town	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	C	A			C	B	
SNNP	Arba Minch Zuriya	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	C	A	A	B			
SNNP	Areka	A	A	C	na	C	C	C	A	A	C	A	A	A	A			A	C	
SNNP	Basketo Special	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	C			

SNNP	Benatsemay	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	C	A	C	C	A	B		
SNNP	Bitá	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
SNNP	Boloso Bombe	A	A	C	na	B	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
SNNP	Bona	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
SNNP	Butajira City	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	B	A	C	C	A			A	A
SNNP	cheko	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C		
SNNP	Chencha	A	A		na	D	C	A	A	A	C	A	A	C	C	A	C		
SNNP	Chere Woreda	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	B	A	A	A	C	A	A	B		
SNNP	Dale	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	C	A	C		
SNNP	Dalocha	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	B		
SNNP	Damot Gale	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	C	A	C		
SNNP	Dara woreda	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	C		
SNNP	Dasenech	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	B	A		
SNNP	Decha	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	B		
SNNP	Dilla city	A	A		na	D	C	C	C	A	B	A	A	A	A				
SNNP	Dilla Zuria	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	C	A	A	C		
SNNP	Doyo Gena	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	C	A	C	B	A	C		
SNNP	Duna woreda	A	A	C	na	B	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	C	C	B	A		
SNNP	Gedeb	A	A		na	D	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
SNNP	Gedebano	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	C	A	A	C	A	C	B	B	B		
SNNP	Geta	A	A	C	na	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	A	C		
SNNP	Gewata	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	B		
SNNP	Gezegofa	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	B		
SNNP	Gibe	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
SNNP	Gomibora	D	A	C	na	B	A	B	C	A	A	C	C	C	A	A	A		
SNNP	Gomibora	D	A	C	na	B	A	B	C	A	A	C	C	C	A	A	A		
SNNP	Guraferda	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
SNNP	Hawassa	A	A	C	na	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A			C	
SNNP	Hawassa Zuria	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	C		
SNNP	Hula	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	C		
SNNP	Humbo	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	C	A	B		
SNNP	Jinka City	D	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	B	A	A	A	C	C	C		
SNNP	Kebera	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	B	C	B	B	B		
SNNP	Kedida Gamela	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A		
SNNP	Kindo Didaye	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
SNNP	Kindo Koyisha	A	A	C	na	B	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C		
SNNP	Kochore	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
SNNP	Konso Liyu	A	A	C	na	C	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	B	C		
SNNP	Kucha	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	B	C	A	A		
SNNP	Lanfuro	A	A	C	na	C	C	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
SNNP	Male	A	A	C	na	A	B	B	A	B	C	A	A	A	B	A	C		
SNNP	Malga	D	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	C	A	A	A		
SNNP	Meinit Goldeya	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	C	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
SNNP	Merab Abaya	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	C	A	B		
SNNP	Muhor Na Aklil	D	D	A	na	D	C	B	C	A	A	C	A	C	A	A	B		
SNNP	Nyangatom	A	A	A	na	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	C		

Tigray	Atsbi Wonberta	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C		
Tigray	Enderta	C	A	C	na	B	C	B	A	A	C	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Tigray	Endeselassie City	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	B	A	C	A			A	A
Tigray	Erob	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	C		
Tigray	Gulo Makeda	A	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C		
Tigray	Hawuzen	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Tigray	Hintalo Wajerat	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	C	A	C	B	A	B	B	A	A		
Tigray	Kafta Humera	D	A	C	na	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A		
Tigray	Kilte Awalaelo	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	C	A	A	B	C	A	B		
Tigray	Kola Temben	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Tigray	Laelay Adiyabo	A	A	C	na	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Tigray	Maichew	D	D	A	na	D	B	B	A	A	C	A	A	A	A			A	A
Tigray	Medebay Zana	D	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B		
Tigray	Mekele City	D	A	B	na	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C	C			C	
Tigray	Mereb Lehe	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	B		
Tigray	Nader Adet	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C		
Tigray	Tahtay Adiyabo	D	D	A	na	D	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A		
Tigray	Tahtay Koraro	D	B	C	na	D	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	C		
Tigray	Tahtay Maychew	A	A	C	na	A	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Tigray	Tanqua Abergele	D	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A		
Tigray	Tsegede	A	A	C	na	C	C	A	C	B	A	A	A	C	A			D	
Tigray	Tselemti	A	A	C	na	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B		
Tigray	Were Lehe	A	A	C	na	A	C	C	A	A	A	B	A	C	A	A	C		
Tigray	Wukro City	A	A	C	na	C	B	B	A	A	B	A	A	B	A			A	A

Table 6: Have government health services improved, stayed the same or got worse in the past two years (city governments sample)?

	ADDIS ABABA	HARARI	OROMIYA	SNNP	SOMALI	TIGRAY	AMHARA
VARIABLES	odds ratio	odds ratio	odds ratio	odds ratio	odds ratio	odds ratio	odds ratio
Male	0.348*** -0.129	1.189 -0.788	1.217 -0.255	0.685 -0.206	1.069 -0.447	0.675 -0.361	0.918 -0.205
Years of age	1.088 -0.0833	1.637*** -0.274	0.931 -0.0518	1.071 -0.0561	1.123 -0.112	1.115 -0.164	0.921 -0.0512
Years of age squared	0.999 -0.000869	0.994*** -0.00209	1.001 -0.000688	0.999* -0.000572	0.999 -0.00131	0.999 -0.00182	1.001 -0.000667
Did not go to school	1.857 -1.034	4.69E+14 -7.30E+21	0.450*** -0.111	1.155 -0.46	0.498 -0.268	1.196 -1.26	0.824 -0.213
Very Poor	7.188 -8.699		0.692 -0.317	3.272 -3.669	3.04E+17 -9.94E+25	1.394 -2.36	1.899 -0.922
Poor	1.162 -0.428	0.486 -0.419	0.877 -0.198	0.968 -0.313	1.507 -0.728	0.856 -0.578	0.799 -0.196
cut1							
Constant	0.0167** -0.0315	304.2* -890.6	0.00195** * -0.00232	0.0247*** -0.0299	0.268 -0.473	0.278 -0.805	0.0629** -0.0694
cut2							
Constant	1.36 -2.216	2,861*** -8,742	0.0884** -0.0951	0.792 -0.881	3.792 -6.497	14.62 -42.01	0.251 -0.274
Observations	164	49	536	253	119	63	294

sEform in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Have government health services improved, stayed the same or got worse in the past two years (woreda sample)?

VARIABLES	AFAR odds ratio	B-G odds ratio	GAMBELLA odds ratio	OROMIYA odds ratio	SNNP odds ratio	SOMALI odds ratio	TIGRAY odds ratio	AMHARA odds ratio
Male	1.147	3.231**	3.078**	1.086	1.093	2.070**	0.858	1.124
	-0.451	-1.484	-1.47	-0.123	-0.156	-0.658	-0.206	-0.162
Years of age	0.938	0.674**	1.041	1.001	1.135***	0.903	0.905	1.079**
	-0.0532	-0.109	-0.19	-0.0257	-0.0337	-0.0569	-0.0585	-0.0419
Years of age squared	1.001	1.004**	0.999	1	0.999***	1.001	1.001	0.999*
	-0.000557	-0.00177	-0.00239	-0.000305	-0.00033	-0.000803	-0.000733	-
								0.00048 2
Did not go to school	0.516	1.826	1.759	0.703***	1.308*	2.660***	1.516	0.296***
	-0.459	-1.124	-0.915	-0.0818	-0.198	-0.9	-0.407	-0.0453
Very Poor	0.330**	0.400*	1.913	0.599**	0.574**	1.583	0.294***	1.922***
	-0.169	-0.202	-1.704	-0.122	-0.144	-1.157	-0.101	-0.39
Poor	0.722	1.357	4.501***	1.072	0.987	0.676	0.765	1.035
	-0.326	-0.755	-2.305	-0.129	-0.139	-0.215	-0.203	-0.162
cut1								
Constant	0.0392**	1.59e- 05***	0.344	0.0665***	1.003	0.00924***	0.0133***	0.863
	-0.064	-5.82E-05	-1.173	-0.0346	-0.611	-0.0112	-0.0183	-0.63
cut2								
Constant	0.283	0.000101 **	10.3	0.677	10.93***	0.110*	0.113	2.847
	-0.455	-0.000365	-35.13	-0.347	-6.665	-0.127	-0.153	-2.079
Observa- tions	129	140	89	1,387	958	208	285	786

sEform in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1