Evaluating Anti-Poverty Programs

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**Abstract:** The chapter critically reviews the methods available for the *ex-post* counterfactual analysis of programs that are assigned exclusively to individuals, households or locations. The discussion covers both experimental and nonexperimental methods (including propensity-score matching, discontinuity designs, double and triple differences and instrumental variables). The problems encountered in applying each method to anti-poverty programs in developing countries are reviewed. Two main lessons emerge. Firstly, despite the claims of advocates, no single method dominates; rigorous, policy-relevant evaluations should be open-minded about methodology, adapting to the problem, setting and data constraints. Secondly, future efforts to draw useful lessons from evaluations will call for more policy-relevant data and methods than the classic (“black box”) assessment of impacts on mean outcomes.

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1. Introduction

Governments, aid donors and the development community at large are increasingly asking for hard evidence on the impacts of public programs claiming to reduce poverty. Do we know if such interventions really work? How much impact do they have? Past “evaluations” that only provide qualitative insights into processes and do not assess outcomes against explicit and policy-relevant counterfactuals are now widely seen as unsatisfactory.

This chapter critically reviews the main methods available for the counterfactual analysis of programs that are assigned exclusively to certain observational units. These may be people, households, villages or larger geographic areas. The key characteristic is that some units get the program and others do not. For example, a social fund might ask for proposals from communities, with preference for those from poor areas; some areas do not apply, and some do, but are rejected. Or a workfare program (that requires welfare recipients to work for their benefits) entails extra earnings for participating workers, and gains to the residents of the areas in which the work is done; but others receive nothing. Or cash transfers are targeted exclusively to households deemed eligible by certain criteria.

After an overview of the archetypal formulation of the evaluation problem found in the literature, the bulk of the chapter examines the main methods found in practice. The discussion reviews the assumptions each method makes for identifying a program’s impact, how the methods compare with each other and what is known about their performance. Examples are drawn mainly from evaluations in developing countries. The penultimate section attempts to look forward — to see how future evaluations might be made more useful for knowledge building and policy making. The concluding section suggests two key lessons from this survey.

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2 Social funds provide financial support to a potentially wide range of community-based projects, with strong emphasis given to local participation in proposing and implementing the specific projects.
2. The archetypal evaluation problem

An impact evaluation aims to assess a program’s performance against an explicit counterfactual, such as the situation in the absence of the program. The program is already in place, making the task ex-post impact evaluation. (That includes the evaluation of a pilot project, as an input to the ex-ante assessment of whether the project should be scaled up.) However, doing an ex-post evaluation does not mean that the evaluation should start after the program finishes, or even after it begins. The best ex-post evaluations are designed and implemented ex-ante — often side-by-side with the program itself.

One must first be clear on the observable outcome indicator most relevant to the program’s objectives. Let this indicator be a random variable, \( Y \), with population mean \( E(Y) \). For anti-poverty programs the objective is typically defined in terms of household income or expenditure (on consumption) normalized by a household-specific poverty line (reflecting differences in the prices faced and in household size and composition). If we want to know the program’s impact on poverty then we might set \( Y=1 \) for the “poor” versus \( Y=0 \) for the “non-poor,” such that \( E(Y) \) is the population headcount index of poverty.\(^3\) More than one indicator is often needed. Consider, for example, a scheme that makes transfers targeted to poor families conditional on parents making human resource investments in their children.\(^4\) The relevant outcomes should, of course, include a measure of current poverty, but in assessing such a program we will also need measures of child schooling and health status, interpretable as indicators of future poverty.

\(^3\) Collapsing the information on living standards into a binary variable need not be the most efficient approach to measuring impacts on poverty; we return to this point.

\(^4\) The earliest program of this sort in a developing country appears to have been the Food-for-Education program (now called Cash-for-Education) that was introduced by the Government of Bangladesh in 1993. A famous example of this type of program is the Program for Education, Health and Nutrition (PROGRESA) (now called Oportunidades), which was introduced by the Government of Mexico in 1997.
We presume that our data include an observation of $Y_i$ for each unit $i$ in a sample of size $n$. Some units receive the program, in which case they are said to be “treated,” and we let $T_i = 1$, while $T_i = 0$ when un-treated. The archetypal formulation of the evaluation problem follows Rubin (1974) in postulating two possible outcomes for each $i$; the value of $Y_i$ under treatment is denoted $Y_i^T$ while it is $Y_i^C$ under the counterfactual of not receiving treatment. Unit $i$ gains $G_i = Y_i^T - Y_i^C$. In the literature, $G_i$ is variously termed the “gain”, “impact” or the “causal effect” of the program for unit $i$.

In keeping with the bulk of the literature, this chapter will be mainly concerned with estimating average impacts (although implications for other impact parameters will be noted along the way). The most widely-used measure of average impact is the average treatment effect on the treated: $TT = E(G|T = 1)$. In the context of an anti-poverty program, $TT$ is the mean impact on poverty amongst those who actually receive the program. One might also be interested in the average treatment effect on the un-treated, $TU = E(G|T = 0)$ and the combined average treatment effect ($ATE$):

$$ATE = E(G) = TT \Pr(T = 1) + TU \Pr(T = 0)$$

(Each of these parameters has a corresponding sample estimate.) We often want to know the conditional mean impacts, $TT(X) = E(G|X,T = 1)$, $TU(X) = E(G|X,T = 0)$ and $ATE(X) = E(G|X)$, for a vector of covariates $X$ (including unity as one element). The most

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5 The bio-medical connotations of the word “treatment” are unfortunate in the context of social policy, but the near-universal usage of this term in the evaluation literature makes it hard to avoid.

6 In the literature, $Y_1$ or $Y(1)$ and $Y_0$ or $Y(0)$ are more commonly used for $Y^T$ and $Y^C$. My notation (following Holland, 1986) makes it easier to recall which group is which, particularly when I introduce time subscripts later.
common method of introducing $X$ assumes that outcomes are linear in its parameters and the
error terms ($\mu^T$ and $\mu^C$), giving:

$$Y_i^T = X_i \beta^T + \mu_i^T \quad (i=1,...,n)$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (1.1)
$$Y_i^C = X_i \beta^C + \mu_i^C \quad (i=1,...,n)$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (1.2)

We define the parameters $\beta^T$ and $\beta^C$ such that $X$ is exogenous ($E(\mu^T|X) = E(\mu^C|X) = 0$).\(^7\)

The conditional mean impacts are then:

$$TT(X) = ATE(X) + E(\mu^T - \mu^C|X,T=1)$$
$$TU(X) = ATE(X) + E(\mu^T - \mu^C|X,T=0)$$
$$ATE(X) = X(\beta^T - \beta^C)$$

How can we estimate these impact parameters from the available data? The literature has
long recognized that impact evaluation is essentially a problem of missing data, given that it is
physically impossible to measure outcomes for someone in two states of nature at the same time
(participating in a program and not participating). It is assumed that we can observe $T_i, Y_i^T$ for
$T_i = 1$, $Y_i^C$ for $T_i = 0$, and (hence) $Y_i = T_i Y_i^T + (1-T_i)Y_i^C$. But then $G_i$ is not directly
observable for any $i$ since we are missing the data on $Y_i^T$ for $T_i = 0$ and $Y_i^C$ for $T_i = 1$. Nor are
the mean impacts identified without further assumptions; neither $E(Y^C|T=1)$ (as required for
calculating $TT$ and $ATE$) nor $E(Y^T|T=0)$ (as needed for $TU$ and $ATE$) is directly estimable from
the data. Nor do equations (1.1) and (1.2) constitute an estimable model, given the missing data.

With the data that are likely to be available, an obvious place to start is the single
difference ($D$) in mean outcomes between the participants and non-participants:

$$D(X) \equiv E[Y^T|X,T=1] - E[Y^C|X,T=0]$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (2)

\(^7\) This is possible since we do not need to isolate the direct effects of $X$ from those operating
through omitted variables correlated with $X$. 

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This can be estimated by the difference in the corresponding sample means or (equivalently) by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression coefficient of $Y$ on $T$. For the parametric model with controls, one would estimate (1.1) on the sub-sample of participants and (1.2) on the rest of the sample, giving:

$$Y_i^T = X_i \beta^T + \mu_i^T \text{ if } T_i = 1$$

$$Y_i^C = X_i \beta^C + \mu_i^C \text{ if } T_i = 0$$

(3.1) (3.2)

Equivalently, one can follow the more common practice in applied work of estimating a single ("switching") regression for the observed outcome measure on the pooled sample, giving a "random coefficients" specification:\(^8\)

$$Y_i = X_i \beta^C + X_i(\beta^T - \beta^C)T_i + \epsilon_i \quad (i=1,\ldots,n)$$

(4)

where $\epsilon_i = T_i(\mu_i^T - \mu_i^C) + \mu_i^C$. In practice, a popular special case is the common-impact model, which assumes that $G_i = ATE = TT = TU$ for all $i$, so that (4) collapses to:

$$Y_i = ATE.T_i + X_i \beta^C + \mu_i^C$$

(5)

A less restrictive model only imposes the condition that the latent effects are the same for the two group (i.e., $\mu_i^T = \mu_i^C$), so that interaction effects with $X$ remain; this is sometimes called the common-effects model.\(^9\)

While these are all reasonable starting points for an evaluation, and of obvious descriptive interest, further assumptions are needed to assure unbiased estimates of the impact parameters. To see why, consider the difference in mean outcomes between participants and non-participants (equation 2). This can be written as:

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\(^8\) Equation (4) is derived from (3.1) and (3.2) using the identity: $Y_i = T_i Y_i^T + (1 - T_i) Y_i^C$.

\(^9\) The justification for these specializations of (4) is rarely obvious; heterogeneity in impacts should be presumed without strong evidence to the contrary. I shall return to this point.
\[ D(X) = TT(X) + B^{TT}(X) \]  

(6)

where:\(^{10}\)

\[ B^{TT}(X) \equiv E[Y^C|X, T = 1] - E[Y^C|X, T = 0] \]  

(7)

is the bias in using \(D(X)\) to estimate \(TT(X)\); \(B^{TT}\) is termed selection bias in much of the evaluation literature. Plainly, the difference in means (or OLS regression coefficient on \(T\)) only delivers the average treatment effect on the treated if counterfactual mean outcomes do not vary with treatment, i.e., \(B^{TT} = 0\). In terms of the above parametric model, this is equivalent to assuming that \(E[\mu^C|X, T = 1] = E[\mu^C|X, T = 0] = 0\), which assures that OLS gives consistent estimates of (5). If this also holds for \(\mu^T\) then OLS will give consistent estimates of (4). I shall refer to the assumption that \(E(\mu^C|X, T = t) = E(\mu^T|X, T = t) = 0\) for \(t=0,1\) as “conditional exogeneity of program placement.”\(^{11}\)

The rest of this chapter is organized around the main methods found in practice for estimating program impacts in the archetypal formulation of the evaluation problem above. One obvious way to assure that \(B^{TT} = 0\) is to randomize placement conditional on \(X\). Then we are dealing with an experimental evaluation, to be considered in detail in section 4. By contrast, in a nonexperimental (NX) evaluation (also called an “observational study” or “quasi-experimental evaluation”) the program is taken to be non-randomly placed.\(^{12}\) The bulk of the chapter is devoted to NX methods. These differ in the assumptions made in identifying impacts. The main

\(^{10}\) Similarly \(B^{TU}(X) \equiv E(Y^T|X, T = 1) - E(Y^T|X, T = 0)\) and \(B^{ATE}(X) = B^{TT}(X) \Pr(T = 1) + B^{TU}(X) \Pr(T = 0)\) in obvious notation.

\(^{11}\) In the evaluation literature, this assumption is also variously called “selection on observables” or “unconfounded assignment” or “ignorable assignment” (although the latter two terms usually refer to the stronger assumption that \(Y^T\) and \(Y^C\) are independent of \(T\) given \(X\)).

\(^{12}\) As we will see later, experimental and NX methods are sometimes combined in practice, although the distinction is still useful for expository purposes.
methods fall into two groups, depending on which of two (non-nested) identifying assumptions is made. The first group assumes conditional exogeneity of placement, or the somewhat weaker assumption of exogeneity for changes in placement with respect to changes in outcomes. Sections 5 and 6 look at single-difference methods that compare outcomes between (possibly carefully-selected) samples of participants and non-participants. Section 7 turns to double- or triple-difference methods. These exploit data on changes in outcomes and placement, such as when we observe outcomes for both groups before and after program commencement.

The second set of methods does not assume conditional exogeneity (either in single-difference or higher-order differences). The main alternative assumption found in applied work is that there exists an instrumental variable that does not alter outcomes conditional on participation (and other covariates of outcomes) but is nonetheless a covariate of participation. The instrumental variable thus isolates a part of the variation in program placement that can be treated as exogeneous. This is the method discussed in section 8, along with (as yet less popular but still promising) alternatives.

Some evaluators prefer to make one of these two identifying assumptions over the other. However, there is no sound a priori basis for having a fixed preference in this choice, which should be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on what we know about the program, its setting and (crucially) what data are available.

3. **Generic issues**

The first problem often encountered in practice is getting the key stakeholders to agree to doing an impact evaluation. There may be vested interests that feel threatened, possibly including project staff. And there may be ethical objections. The most commonly heard objection to an impact evaluation says that if one finds a valid comparison group then this must
include equally needy people to the participants, in which case the only ethically acceptable option is to help them, rather than just observe them passively for the purposes of an evaluation. It seems that versions of this argument have stalled many evaluations in practice.

The ethical objections to impact evaluations for anti-poverty programs should be taken seriously. The objections are clearly more persuasive if eligible people have been denied the program for the purpose of the evaluation and the knowledge from that evaluation does not benefit them. However, the main reason why valid comparison groups are possible is typically that fiscal resources are inadequate to cover everyone in need. While one might object to that fact, it is not an objection to the evaluation per se. Furthermore, knowledge about impacts can have great bearing on the resources available for fighting poverty. Poor people benefit from good evaluations, which weed out defective anti-poverty programs and identify good programs.

Having (hopefully) secured agreement to do the evaluation, three classes of problems must then be addressed. The first is non-random selection and the second is the existence of spillover effects, confounding efforts to locate a program’s impacts amongst only its direct participants. After examining these issues, the section reviews a third set of generic problems related to data and measurement.

Is there selection bias? The assignment of an anti-poverty program typically involves purposive placement, reflecting both the choices made by those eligible and the administrative assignment of the opportunities to participate. This is not a problem if the X’s in the data capture the “non-ignorable” determinants of placement, i.e., those correlated with outcomes. However, any latent non-ignorable factors — unobserved to the evaluator but known to those deciding participation and influencing outcomes — will bias an impact estimator based on differences in means between participants and non-participants or any of the feasible parametric regression
methods. The following discussion begins with selection bias stemming from inadequate controls for observable heterogeneity and then turns to bias stemming from unobservables.

A concern in any NX evaluation is whether the selection process for the program being evaluated is captured adequately by the control variables $X$. This concern cannot be strictly separated from the problem of non-random placement conditional on observables. One cannot (of course) judge whether conditional exogeneity of placement is a plausible assumption without first establishing whether one has dealt adequately with the observable heterogeneity, though the conditioning variables.

One source of concern in traditional linear-regression methods is that equations (3) and (4) deal with selection on observables in a rather special way, in that the controls enter in a linear-in-parameters form. This ad hoc assumption is rarely justified by anything more than computational convenience (which is rather lame these days). Section 5 will consider non-parametric methods that attempt to deal with this source of bias in a more general way.

In NX evaluations of anti-poverty programs it can sometimes be difficult to assure that observables are balanced between treatment and comparison observations. When program placement is independent of outcomes given the observables (implying conditional exogeneity, as defined in section 2) then the relevant summary statistic to be balanced between the two groups is the conditional probability of participation, called the “propensity score” (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The region of the probabilities for which a valid comparison group can be found is termed the region of common support, as in Figure 1.

To illustrate the potential common-support problem in evaluating an anti-poverty program, suppose that placement is determined by a “proxy-means test,” as often used for targeting anti-poverty programs in developing countries. This assigns a score to all potential

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13 The propensity score plays a role in a number of NX methods, as we will see in section 5.
participants as a function of observed characteristics. When strictly applied, the program is assigned if and only if a unit’s score is below some critical level, as determined by the budget allocation to the scheme. (The pass-score is non-decreasing in the budget under plausible conditions.) With 100% take-up, there is no value of the score for which we can observe both participants and non-participants in a sample of any size. This is an example of what is sometimes called “failure of common support” in the evaluation literature. The problem is plain enough: how can we infer the counterfactual for participants on the basis of non-participants who do not share the same characteristics, as summarized by their score on the proxy means test? Clearly there must then be a serious concern about the validity of any comparison group design for identifying impacts. While this example has pedagogic value, it is an extreme case. Thankfully, in practice, there is often some degree of fuzziness in the application of the proxy-means test and there is typically incomplete coverage of those who pass the test.

Typically, we will have to truncate the sample of non-participants to assure common support; beyond the inefficiency of collecting unnecessary data, this is not a concern. More worrying is that a non-random sub-sample of participants may have to be dropped for lack of sufficiently similar comparators. This points to a trade-off between two sources of bias. On the one hand, there is the need to assure comparability in terms of initial characteristics. On the other hand, this creates a possible sampling bias in inferences about impact, to the extent that we find that we have to drop treatment units to achieve comparability.

Non-random participation also yields a bias if some of the variables that jointly influence outcomes and program placement are unobserved to the evaluator. Then we cannot attribute to

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14 If we don’t need to know impact for the treatment group as whole then the concern is diminished. For example, consider the policy choice of whether to increase the program’s budget allocation by raising the pass mark in the proxy-means test. In this case, we only need focus on impacts in a neighborhood of the pass-mark. Section 6 further discusses “discontinuity designs” for such cases.
the program the observed $D(X)$. The differences in conditional means that we see in the data could just be due to the fact that the program participants were purposely selected by a process that we do not fully observe. The impact estimator is biased in the amount given by equation (7). When program take-up is a matter of individual choice, there must be a reasonable presumption that selection into the program depends on the gains from participation, which are not fully observed by the evaluator. For example, suppose that the latent selection process discriminates against the poor, i.e., $E[Y^C|X, T = 1] > E[Y^C|X, T = 0]$ where $Y$ is income relative to the poverty line. Then $D(X)$ will overestimate the impact of the program. A latent selection process favoring the poor will have the opposite effect.

In terms of the classic parametric formulation of the evaluation problem in section 2, if participants have latent attributes that yield higher outcomes than non-participants (at given $X$) then the error terms in the equation for participants (3.1) will be centered to the right relative to those for non-participants (3.2). The error term in (4) will not vanish in expectation and OLS will give biased and inconsistent estimates. (Again, concerns about this source of bias cannot be separated from the question as to how well we have controlled for observable heterogeneity.)

There are examples from replication studies suggesting that selection bias can be a serious problem in NX impact estimates in specific cases. Influential studies by Lalonde (1986) and Fraker and Maynard (1987) found large biases when the results of various NX methods were compared to randomized evaluations of a U.S. training program. (Different NX methods also gave quite different results, although that is hardly surprising given that they make different assumptions.) Similarly, Glewwe et al. (2004) find that NX methods give a larger estimated impact of “flip charts” on the test scores of Kenyan school children than implied by an experiment; they argue that biases in their NX methods account for the difference. In an
interesting meta-study, Glazerman et al. (2003) review 12 replication studies of the impacts of training and employment programs on earnings; each study compared NX estimates of impacts with results from a social experiment on the same program. They found large discrepancies in some cases, which they interpreted as being due to biases in the NX estimates.

Using a different approach to testing NX methods, van de Walle (2002) gives an example for rural road evaluation in which a naïve comparison of the incomes of villages that have a rural road with those that do not indicates large income gains when in fact there are none. Van de Walle used simulation methods in which the data were constructed from a model in which the true benefits were known with certainty and the roads were placed in part as a function of the average incomes of villages. Only a seemingly small weight on village income in determining road placement was enough to severely bias the mean impact estimate.

Of course, one cannot reject NX methods in other applications on the basis of such studies; arguably the lesson is that better data and methods are needed, informed by past knowledge of how such programs work. In the presence of severe data problems it cannot be too surprising that observational studies perform poorly in correcting for selection bias. For example, in a persuasive critique of the Lalonde study, Heckman and Smith (1995) point out that (amongst other things) the data used contained too little information relevant to eligibility for the program studied, that the methods used had limited power for addressing selection bias and did not include adequate specification tests.¹⁵ Heckman and Hotz (1989) argue that suitable specification tests can reveal the problematic NX methods in the Lalonde study, and that the methods that survive their tests give results quite close to those of the social experiment.

The 12 studies used by Glazerman et al. (2003) provided them with over 1,100 observations of paired estimates of impacts — one experimental and one NX. The authors then

¹⁵ Also see the discussion in Heckman et al. (1999).
regressed the estimated biases on regressors describing the NX methods. They found that NX methods performed better (meaning that they came closer to the experimental result) when comparison groups were chosen carefully on the basis of observable differences (using regression, matching or a combination of the two). However, they also found that standard econometric methods for addressing selection bias due to unobservables using a control function and/or instrumental variable tended to increase the divergence between the two estimates.

These findings warn against presuming that more ambitious and seemingly sophisticated NX methods will perform better in reducing the total bias. The literature also points to the importance of specification tests and critical scrutiny of the assumptions made by each estimator. This chapter will return to this point in the context of specific estimators.

**Are there hidden impacts for “non-participants”?** The classic formulation of the evaluation problem outlined in section 2 assumes that we can observe the outcomes under treatment \( Y_i^T \) for participants \( T_i = 1 \) and the counterfactual outcome \( Y_i^C \) for non-participants \( T_i = 0 \). Then we can observe a comparison group that is in no way affected by the program. However, this can be a problematic assumption for certain anti-poverty programs. Suppose that we are evaluating a workfare program whereby the government commits to give work to anyone who wants it at a stipulated wage rate; this was the aim of the famous *Employment Guarantee Scheme* (EGS) in the Indian state of Maharashtra and in 2005 the Government of India implemented a national version of this scheme. The attractions of an EGS as a safety net stem from the fact that access to the program is universal (anyone who wants help can get it) but that all participants must work to obtain benefits and at a wage rate that is considered low in the specific context. The universality of access means that the scheme can
provide effective insurance against risk. The work requirement at a low wage rate is taken by proponents to imply that the scheme will be self-targeting to the income poor.

This can be thought of as an assigned program, in that there are well-defined “participants” and “non-participants.” And at first glance it might seem appropriate to collect survey data on both groups and compare outcome indicators between the two, as a means of identifying impact (possibly after cleaning out any observable heterogeneity). However, this classic evaluation design could give a severely biased result. The gains from such a program must spill over into the private labor market. If the employment guarantee is effective then the scheme will establish a firm lower bound to the entire wage distribution — assuming that no able-bodied worker would accept non-EGS work at any wage rate below the EGS wage. So even if one picks the observationally perfect comparison group, one will conclude that the scheme has no impact, since wages will be the same for participants and non-participants. But that would entirely miss the impact, which could be large for both groups.

Such spillover effects can also arise from the behavior of governments. Whether the resources transferred to participants actually financed the identified project is often unclear. To some degree, all external aid is fungible. Yes, it can be verified in supervision that the proposed sub-project was actually completed. But one cannot rule out the possibility that it would have been done anyhow. Participants and local leaders naturally would have put forward the best development option they saw, even if it was something they planned to do anyway with the resources available. Then there is some other (infra-marginal) expenditure that is being financed by the aid. Similarly, there is no way of ruling out the possibility that non-project villages benefited through a re-assignment of public spending by local authorities, thus lowering the measured impact of program participation.
This problem is studied by van de Walle and Cratty (2005) in the context of a rural-roads project in Vietnam. The authors find little impact on roads rehabilitated by the (aid-financed) project (comparing project communes with a comparison group). This is taken to reflect (in part) the fungibility of aid, although it turns out that selection bias is also at work (in that the degree of fungibility is overstated unless one controls for the project’s geographic targeting).

*How are outcomes for the poor to be measured?* The archetypal formulation of the evaluation problem in section 2 focuses on mean impacts. As was noted, this includes the case in which the outcome measure takes the value $Y_i = 1$ if unit $i$ is poor and $Y_i = 0$ otherwise. That assessment will typically be based on a set of poverty lines, which aim to give the minimum income necessary for unit $i$ to achieve a given reference utility, interpretable as the minimum “standard of living” needed to be judged non-poor. The normative reference utility level is typically anchored to the ability to achieve certain functionings, such as being adequately nourished, clothed and housed for normal physical activity and participation in society.\(^{16}\)

With this re-interpretation of the outcome variable, $ATE$ and $TT$ now give the program’s impacts on the headcount index of poverty (% below the poverty line). By repeating the impact calculations for multiple “poverty lines” one can then trace out the impact on the cumulative distribution of income. Higher order poverty measures (that penalize inequality amongst the poor) can also be accommodated as long as they are members of the (broad) class of additive measures, by which the aggregate poverty measure can be written as the population-weighed mean of all individual poverty measures in that population.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{16}\) Note that the poverty lines will (in general) vary by location and according to the size and demographic composition of the household, and possibly other factors. On the theory and methods of setting poverty lines see Ravallion (2006).

\(^{17}\) See Atkinson (1987) on the general form of these measures and examples in the literature.
However, focusing on poverty impacts does not imply that we should use the constructed binary variable as the dependent variable (in regression equations such as (4) or (5), or nonlinear specifications such as a probit model). That entails an unnecessary loss of information relevant to explaining why some people are poor and others are not. Rather than collapsing the continuous welfare indicator (as given by income or expenditure normalized by the poverty line) into a binary variable at the outset it is probably better to exploit all the information available on the continuous variable, drawing out implications for poverty after the main analysis.18

**What data are required?** As is clear from the above discussion, concerns about inadequate or imperfect data lie at the heart of the evaluation problem. When embarking on any impact evaluation, it is important to first know the salient administrative/institutional details of the program; that information typically comes from the program administration. For NX evaluations, such information is key to designing a survey that collects the right data to control for the selection process. Knowledge of the program’s context and design features can also help in dealing with selection on unobservables, since it can sometimes generate plausible identifying restrictions, as discussed further in sections 6 and 8.

NX evaluations can be data demanding as well as methodologically difficult. One might be tempted to rely instead on less formal, unstructured, interviews with participants. However, it is difficult to ask counter-factual questions in interviews or focus groups; try asking someone participating in a program: “what would you be doing now if this program did not exist?” Talking to participants (and non-participants) can be a valuable complement to quantitative surveys data, but it is unlikely to provide a credible impact evaluation on its own.

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18 I have heard it argued a number of times that transforming the outcome measure into the binary variable and then using a logit or probit allows for a different model determining the living standards of the poor versus non-poor. This is not correct, since the underlying model in terms of the latent continuous variable is the same. Logit and probit are only appropriate estimators for that model if the continuous variable is unobserved, which is not the case here. For further discussion see Ravallion (1996).
The data on outcomes and their determinants, including program participation, typically come from surveys. The observation unit could be the individual, household, geographic area or facility (school or health clinic) depending on the type of program. Survey data can often be supplemented with useful other data on the program (such as from the project monitoring database) or setting (such as from geographic data bases).19

A serious concern is the comparability of the data sources on participants and non-participants. Differences in the design of the survey instruments can entail non-negligible differences in the outcome measures. For example, Heckman et al. (1999, Section 5.33) show how differences in data sources and data processing assumptions can make large differences in the results obtained for evaluating US training programs. Diaz and Handa (2004) come to a similar conclusion with respect to Mexico’s PROGRESA program; they find that differences in the survey instrument generate significant biases in a propensity-score matching estimator (discussed further in section 5), although good approximations to the experimental results are achieved using the same survey instrument.

There are concerns about how well surveys measure the outcomes typically used in evaluating anti-poverty programs. Survey-based consumption and income aggregates for nationally representative samples typically do not match the aggregates obtained from national accounts (NA). This is to be expected for GDP, which includes non-household sources of domestic absorption. Possibly more surprising are the discrepancies found with both the levels and growth rates of private consumption in the NA aggregates (Ravallion. 2003b).20 Yet here too it should be noted that (as measured in practice) private consumption in the NA includes

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19 For excellent overviews of the generic issues in the collection and analysis of household survey data in developing countries see Deaton (1995, 1997).
20 The extent of the discrepancy depends crucially on the type of survey (notably whether it collects consumption expenditures or incomes) and the region; see Ravallion (2003b).
sizeable and rapidly growing components that are typically missing from surveys (Deaton, 2005). However, aside from differences in what is being measured, surveys do encounter problems of under-reporting (particularly for incomes; the problem appears to be less serious for consumptions) and selective non-response (whereby the rich are less likely to respond).  

Problems of measurement errors in surveys can to some extent be dealt with by the same methods used for addressing selection bias. For example, if the measurement problem affects the outcomes for treatment and comparison units identically (and additively) and is uncorrelated with the control variables then it will not be a problem for estimating the average treatment effect. This again points to the importance of the controls. But even if there are obvious omitted variables correlated with the measurement error, there is still hope for obtaining reliable estimates using the class of double-difference estimators discussed further in section 7. This still requires that the measurement problem can be treated as a common (additive) error component, affecting measured outcomes for treatment and comparison units identically. These may, however, be overly strong assumptions in some applications.

4. Social experiments

A social experiment aims to randomize placement, such that all units (within some well-defined set) have the same chance ex-ante of receiving the program. Unconditional randomization is virtually inconceivable for anti-poverty programs, which policy makers are generally keen to target on the basis of observed characteristics, such as households with many dependents living in poor areas. More commonly, program assignment is partially randomized.

\[\text{In measuring poverty some researchers have replaced the survey mean by the mean from the national accounts (GDP or consumption per capita); see, for example, Bhalla (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002). This assumes that the discrepancy is distribution neutral, which is unlikely to be the case; for example, selective non-response to surveys can generate highly non-neutral errors (Korinek et al., 2005).}\]
conditional on certain observed variables, \( X \). The key implication for the evaluation is that all other (observed or unobserved) attributes prior to the intervention are then independent of whether or not a unit actually receives the program. By implication, \( B^{TT} = 0 \), and so the observed ex-post difference in mean outcomes between the treatment and control groups is attributable to the program.\(^{22}\) In terms of the parametric formulation of the evaluation problem in section 2, randomization guarantees that there is no sample selection bias in estimating (3.1) and (3.2) or (equivalently) that the error term in equation (4) is orthogonal to all regressors. The non-participants are then a valid control group for identifying the counterfactual,\(^{23}\) and mean impact is consistently estimated (nonparametrically) by the difference between the sample means of the observed values of \( Y_i^T \) and \( Y_i^C \) (including at given values of \( X_i \)).

**Examples:** A number of evaluations in the US have used randomization, often applied to a pilot scheme; much has been learnt about welfare policy reform from such trials (Moffitt, 2003). In the case of active labor market programs, two examples are the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) (see, for example, Heckman et al., 1997b), and the US National Supported Work Demonstration (studied by Lalonde, 1986, and Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). For targeted wage subsidy programs in the US, randomized evaluations have been studied by Burtless (1985), Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) and Dubin and Rivers (1993).

Another (rather different) example is the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, in which randomly chosen public-housing occupants in poor inner-city areas of five US cities were offered vouchers for buying housing elsewhere (Katz et al., 2001; Moffitt, 2001). This was motivated by the hypothesis that attributes of the area of residence matter to individual prospects

\(^{22}\) However, the simple difference in means is not necessarily the most efficient estimator; see Hirano et al. (2003).

\(^{23}\) The term “control group” is often confined to social experiments, with the term “comparison group” used in NX evaluations.
of escaping poverty. The randomized assignment of MTO vouchers helps address some long- 
standing concerns about past NX tests for neighborhood effects (Manski, 1993).  

There have also been a number of social experiments in developing countries. A well- 
known example is Mexico’s PROGRESA program, which provided cash transfers targeted to 
poor families conditional on their children attending school and obtaining health care and 
nutrition supplementation. The (considerable) influence that this program has had in the 
development community clearly stems in no small measure from the substantial, and public, 
effort that went into its evaluation. One third of the sampled communities deemed eligible for 
the program were chosen randomly to form a control group that did not get the program for an 
initial period during which the other two-thirds received the program. Public access to the 
evaluation data has facilitated a number of valuable studies, indicating significant gains to health 
(Gertler, 2004), schooling (Schultz, 2004; Behrman et al., 2002) and food consumption 
(Hoddinott and Skoufias, 2004). A comprehensive overview of the design, implementation and 
results of the PROGRESA evaluation can be found in Skoufias (2005).  

In another example for a developing country, Newman et al. (2002) were able to 
randomize eligibility to a World Bank supported social fund for a region of Bolivia. The fund- 
supported investments in education were found to have had significant impacts on school 
infrastructure but not on education outcomes within the evaluation period.  

Randomization was also used by Angrist et al. (2002) to evaluate a Colombian program 
that allocated schooling vouchers by a lottery. Three years later, the lottery winners had 
significantly lower incidence of grade repetition and higher test scores.  

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24 Note that the design of the MTO experiment does not identify neighborhood effects at the origin, 
given that attributes of the destination also matter to outcomes (Moffitt, 2001).
Another example is Argentina’s Proempleo experiment (Galasso et al., 2004). This was a randomized evaluation of a pilot wage subsidy and training program for assisting workfare participants in Argentina to find regular, private-sector jobs. Eighteen months later, recipients of the voucher for a wage subsidy had a higher probability of employment than the control group. (We will return later in this chapter to examine some lessons from this evaluation more closely.)

It has been argued that development agencies such as the World Bank should make much greater use of such social experiments. While the World Bank has supported a number of social experiments (including most of the examples for developing countries above), that is not so of the Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (the semi-independent unit for the ex-post evaluation of its own lending operations). In the 78 evaluations by OED surveyed by Kapoor (2002), only one used randomization; indeed, only 21 of the evaluations used any form of counterfactual analysis. Cook (2001) and Duflo and Kremer (2005) have advocated that OED should do many more social experiments. However, before accepting that advice one should be aware of some of the concerns raised by social experiments, to which we now turn.

**Issues with social experiments:** There has been much debate about whether randomized designs are in fact the ideal for evaluating anti-poverty programs. Social experiments have often raised ethical objections and generated political sensitivities, which have stalled attempts to implement them, particularly for governmental programs. There is a perception that social experiments treat people like “guinea pigs,” deliberately denying access to the program for some

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25 From Kapoor’s description it is not clear that even this one evaluation was a genuine social experiment.

26 OED only assesses Bank projects (including the evaluations done by the Bank’s project staff) after they are completed, which makes it hard to do proper impact evaluations. Note that other units in the Bank that do evaluations besides OED, including in the research department invariably use counterfactual analysis and sometimes randomization.

of those who need it (to form the control group) in favor of some who don’t (since a random assignment undoubtedly picks up some people who would not normally participate). In the case of anti-poverty programs, one ends up assessing impacts for types of people for whom the program is not intended and/or denying the program to poor people who need it — in both cases running counter to the aim of fighting poverty.

As noted in section 3, the evaluation itself is rarely the reason for incomplete coverage of the poor in an anti-poverty program; rather it is that too few resources are available. When there are poor people who can’t get the program with the resources available, it has been argued that the ethical concerns actually favor social experiments. Indeed, it has been claimed that the fairest solution in such a situation is to assign the program randomly, so that everyone has an equal opportunity of getting the limited resources available.28

The counter-argument is that it is hard to appreciate the “fairness” of an anti-poverty program that ignores available information on differences in the extent of deprivation. A key issue here is what constitutes the “available information.” Social experiments typically assign participation conditional on certain observables. But the things that are observable to the evaluator are generally a subset of those available to key stakeholders. The ethical concerns with social experiments persist when it is known to at least some observers that the program is being withheld from those who need it, and given to those who do not.

Other concerns have been raised about social experiments. Internal validity can be questionable when there is selective compliance with the theoretical randomized assignment. People are (typically) free agents. They do not have to comply with the evaluator’s assignment. The fact that people can select out of the randomized assignment goes some way toward

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28 From the description of the Newman et al. (2003) study it appears that this is how randomization was defended to the relevant authorities in their case.
alleviating the aforementioned ethical concerns about social experiments. People who know they do not need the program will presumably decline participation. But selective compliance clearly invalidates inferences about impact. The extent of this problem depends of course on the specific program; selective compliance is more likely for a training program (say) than a cash transfer program. Sections 7 and 8 will return to this issue and discuss how NX methods can help address the problem, and how partially randomized designs can help identify impacts using NX methods.

Spillover effects are an important source of internal validity concerns about evaluations in practice, including social experiments. It is well recognized in the literature that the choice of observational units should reflect likely spillover effects. For example, Miguel and Kremer (2004) study the evaluation of treatments for intestinal worms in children and argue that a randomized design in which some children are treated and some are retained as controls would seriously underestimate the gains from treatment by ignoring the externalities between treated and “control” children. The randomized design for the authors’ experiment avoided this problem by using mass treatment at the school level instead of individual treatment (using control schools at sufficient distance from treatment schools).

The behavioral responses of third parties can also generate spillover effects. Recall the example in section 3 of how a higher level of government might adjust its own spending, counteracting the assignment (randomized or not). This may well be an even bigger problem for randomized evaluations. The higher level of government may not feel the need to compensate units that did not get the program when this was based on credible and observable factors that are agreed to be relevant. On the other hand, the authorities may feel obliged to compensate for the
“bad luck” of units being assigned randomly to a control group. Randomization can induce
spillovers that do not happen with selection on observables.

This is an instance of a more general and fundamental problem with randomized designs
for anti-poverty programs, namely that the very process of randomization can alter the way a
program works in practice. There may well be systematic differences between the characteristics
of people normally attracted to a program and those randomly assigned the program from the
same population. (This is sometimes called “randomization bias.”) Heckman and Smith (1995)
discuss an example from the evaluation of the JTPA, whereby substantial changes in the
program’s recruiting procedures were required to form the control group. The evaluated pilot
program is not then the same as the program that gets implemented — casting doubt on the
validity of the inferences drawn from the evaluation.

The JTPA illustrates a further potential problem, namely that institutional or political
factors may delay the randomized assignment. This promotes selective attrition and adds to the
cost, as more is spent on applicants who end up in the control group (Heckman and Smith, 1995).

A further critique of social experiments points out that, even with randomized
assignment, we only know mean outcomes for the counterfactual, so we cannot infer the joint
distribution of outcomes as would be required to say something about (for example) the
proportion of gainers versus losers amongst those receiving a program (Heckman and Smith,
1995). Section 9 returns to this topic.

The strength of experiments is in dealing with the problem of purposive placement based
on unobserved factors; their weakness is in throwing light on the determinants of impacts and
other policy-relevant parameters, though this weakness is shared by many NX methods in
practice.
What can be done when the program was not randomly placed? The rest of this chapter provides a critical overview of the main NX methods found in practice.

5. Propensity-score methods

As section 3 emphasized, selection bias is to be expected in comparing a random sample from the population of participants with a random sample of non-participants. There must be a general presumption that such comparisons misinform policy. How much so is an empirical question. On a priori grounds it is worrying that many NX evaluations in practice provide too little information to assess properly whether the “comparison group” of non-participants is similar to the participants in the absence of the intervention.

Some of the bias in single difference comparisons can be cleaned out by matching the two groups on observables. In trying to find a comparison group for assessing the counterfactual it is natural to search for non-participants with similar pre-intervention characteristics to the participants. However, there are potentially many characteristics that one might use to match. How should they be weighted in choosing the comparison group? This section begins by reviewing the theory and practice of matching using propensity scores. Toward the end of the section, other “non-matching” uses of propensity scores in evaluation are also reviewed.

**Propensity-score matching:** This method aims to select comparators according to their propensity scores, as given by

\[ P(Z) = \Pr(T = 1|Z) \quad (0 < P(Z) < 1) \]

where \( Z \) is a vector of pre-exposure control variables (which can include pre-treatment values of the outcome indicator).\(^{29}\) (The values taken by \( Z_i \) are assumed to be unaffected by whether unit \( i \) actually receives the program.) PSM uses \( P(Z) \) (or a monotone function of \( P(Z) \)) to select comparison units.

\(^{29}\) The present discussion is confined to the standard case of binary treatment. In generalizing to the case of multi-valued or continuous treatments one defines the generalized propensity score given by the conditional probability of a specific level of treatment (Imbens, 2000; also see Hirano and Imbens, 2004).
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if outcomes are independent of participation given $Z_i$, then outcomes are also independent of participation given $P(Z_i)$.\(^{30}\) (This is a stronger version of the exogeneity-of-placement assumption discussed in sections 2 and 3.) The independence condition implies that $B^{TT}(X) = 0$, so that the (unobserved) $E(Y^C|X,T = 1)$ can simply be replaced by the (observed) $E(Y^C|X,T = 0)$. Thus, as in a social experiment, $TT$ is non-parametrically identified by the difference in the sample mean outcomes between treated units and the matched comparison group ($D(X)$). Under the independence assumption, exact matching on $P(Z)$ eliminates selection bias, although it does not necessarily provide the most efficient impact estimator (Hahn, 1998; Angrist and Hahn, 2004).

Intuitively, what PSM is doing is creating the observational analogue of a social experiment in which everyone has the same probability of participation. The difference is that in PSM it is the conditional probability (conditional on $Z$) that is uniform between participants and matched comparators, while randomization assures that the participant and comparison groups are identical in terms of the distribution of all characteristics whether observed or not. PSM essentially assumes away the problem of endogenous placement, leaving only the need to balance the conditional probability, i.e., the propensity score. An implication of this difference is that (unlike a social experiment) the impact estimates obtained by PSM must always depend on the variables used for matching and (hence) the quantity and quality of available data.

The control variables in $Z$ may well differ from the covariates of outcomes (the vector $X$ in section 2); this distinction plays an important role in the impact estimates discussed in section 8. But what should be included in $Z_i$? The theory of PSM does not say much about the answer to that question, yet the choice must matter to the results obtained. The choice of variables

\(^{30}\) The result also requires that the $T_i$'s are independent over all $i$. For a clear exposition and proof of the Rosenbaum-Rubin theorem see Imbens (2004).
should be based on theory and/or facts about the program and setting, as relevant to understanding the economic, social or political factors influencing program assignment. Qualitative field work can help; for example, the specification choices made in Jalan and Ravallion (2003b) reflected qualitative interviews with participants in Argentina’s *Trabajar* program (a combination of workfare and social fund) and local program administrators (asking how people go onto the program). Similarly Godtland et al. (2004) validated their choice of covariates for participation in an agricultural extension program in Peru through interviews with farmers. Clearly if the available data do not include important determinants of participation then the presence of these unobserved characteristics will mean that PSM will not be able to reproduce (to a reasonable approximation) the results of a social experiment.

Common practice is to use the predicted values from a standard logit or probit regression to estimate the propensity score for each observation in the participant and the non-participant samples (though non-parametric binary response models can also be used; see Heckman et al., 1997). The participation regression is of interest in its own right as it can provide useful insights into the targeting performance of an anti-poverty program (see, for example, the discussion in Jalan and Ravallion, 2003b). The comparison group is then formed by picking the “nearest neighbor” for each participant, defined as the non-participant that minimizes $|\hat{P}(Z_i) - \hat{P}(Z_j)|$ as long as this does not exceed some reasonable caliper bound. Given measurement errors, more robust estimates are likely by taking the mean of the nearest (say) five neighbors, although this does not necessarily reduce bias.  

It is a good idea to test for systematic differences in the covariates between the treatment and comparison groups constructed by PSM; Smith and Todd (2005a) describe a useful “balancing test” for this purpose.

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31 Rubin and Thomas (2000) use simulations to compare the bias in using the nearest five neighbors to just the nearest neighbor; no clear pattern emerges.
The typical PSM estimator for mean impact takes the form
\[ \sum_{j=1}^{NT} (Y_j - \sum_{i=1}^{NC} W_{ij} Y_i^C) / NT \]
where \( NT \) is the number receiving the program, \( NC \) is the number of non-participants and the \( W_{ij} \)'s are the weights. There are several weighting schemes that have been used, ranging from nearest-neighbor weights to non-parametric weights based on kernel functions of the differences in scores whereby all the comparison units are used in forming the counterfactual for each participating unit, but with a weight that reaches its maximum for the nearest neighbor but declines as the absolute difference in propensity scores increases; Heckman et al. (1997b) discuss this weighting scheme.\(^{32}\)

The statistical properties of matching estimators (in particular their asymptotic properties) are not as yet well understood. In practice, standard errors are typically derived by a bootstrapping method, although the appropriateness of this method is not evident in all cases. Abadie and Imbens (2006) examine the formal properties in large samples of nearest-k neighbor matching estimators (for which the standard bootstrapping method does not give valid standard errors) and provide a consistent estimator for the asymptotic standard error.

Mean impacts can also be calculated conditional on observed characteristics. For anti-poverty programs one is interested in comparing the conditional mean impact across different pre-intervention incomes. For each sampled participant, one estimates the income gain from the program by comparing that participant’s income with the income for matched non-participants. Subtracting the estimated gain from observed post-intervention income, it is then possible to estimate where each participant would have been in the distribution of income without the program. On averaging this across different strata defined by pre-intervention incomes one can assess the incidence of impacts. In doing so, it is a good idea to test if propensity-scores (and

\(^{32}\) Frölich (2004) compares the finite-sample properties of various estimators and finds that a local linear ridge regression method is more efficient and robust than alternatives.
even the Z’s themselves) are adequately balanced within strata (as well as in the aggregate), since there is a risk that one may be confusing matching errors with real effects.

Similarly one can construct the empirical and counter-factual cumulative distribution functions or their empirical integrals, and test for dominance over a relevant range of poverty lines and measures. This is illustrated in Figure 2, for Argentina’s Trabajar program. The figure gives the cumulative distribution function (CDF) (or “poverty incidence curve”) showing how the headcount index of poverty (% below the poverty line) varies across a wide range of possible poverty lines (when that range covers all incomes we have the standard cumulative distribution function). The vertical line is a widely-used poverty line for Argentina. The figure also gives the estimated counter-factual CDF, after deducting the imputed income gains from the observed (post-intervention) incomes of all the sampled participants. Using a poverty line of $100 per month (for which about 20% of the national population is deemed poor) we see a 15 percentage point drop in the incidence of poverty amongst participants due to the program; this rises to 30 percentage points using poverty lines nearer the bottom of the distribution. We can also see the gain at each percentile of the distribution (looking horizontally) or the impact on the incidence of poverty at any given poverty line (looking vertically).  

In evaluating anti-poverty programs in developing countries, single-difference comparisons using PSM have the advantage that they do not require either randomization or baseline (pre-intervention) data. While this can be a huge advantage in practice, it comes at a cost. To accept the exogeneity assumption one must be confident that one has controlled for the factors that jointly influence program placement and outcomes. In practice, one must always consider the possibility that there is a latent variable that jointly influences placement and outcomes.

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33 Further discussion of how the results of an impact assessment by PSM can be used to assess impacts on poverty measures robustly to the choice of those measures and the poverty line can be found in Ravallion (2003b).
outcomes (thus invalidating the key conditional independence assumption made by PSM). This must be judged for the application at hand. Section 7 will give an example of how far wrong the method can go with inadequate data on the joint covariates of participation and outcomes.

**How does PSM differ from other methods?** In a social experiment (at least in its pure form), the propensity score is a constant, since everyone has the same probability of receiving the treatment. The randomized assignment assures that the distributions of both observables and unobservables are balanced between treatment and comparison units. By contrast, PSM only attempts to balance the distributions of observables. Hence the concerns about selection bias in PSM estimates. Nor can it be assumed that eliminating selection bias based on observables will reduce the aggregate bias; that will only be the case if the two sources of bias — that associated with observables and that due to unobserved factors — go in the same direction, which cannot be assured on *a priori* grounds. If the selection bias based on unobservables counteracts that based on observables then eliminating only the latter bias will increase aggregate bias. While this is possible in theory, replication studies (comparing NX evaluations with experiments for the same programs) do not appear to have found an example in practice; I review lessons from replication studies below.

A natural comparison is between PSM and an OLS regression of the outcome indicators on dummy variables for program placement, allowing for the observable covariates entering as linear controls (as in equations 4 and 5). OLS requires essentially the same conditional independence (exogeneity) assumption as PSM, but also imposes arbitrary functional form assumptions concerning the treatment effects and the control variables. By contrast, PSM (in common with experimental methods) does not require a parametric model linking outcomes to program participation. Thus PSM allows estimation of mean impacts without arbitrary
assumptions about functional forms and error distributions. This can also facilitate testing for the presence of potentially complex interaction effects. For example, Jalan and Ravallion (2003a) use PSM to study how the interaction effects between income and education influence the child-health gains from access to piped water in rural India. The authors find a complex pattern of interaction effects; for example, poverty attenuates the child-health gains from piped water, but less so the higher the level of maternal education.

PSM also differs from standard regression methods with respect to the sample. In PSM one confines attention to the region of common support (Figure 1). Non-participants with a score lower than any participant are excluded. One may also want to restrict potential matches in other ways, depending on the setting. For example, one may want to restrict matches to being within the same geographic area, to help assure that the comparison units come from the same economic environment. By contrast, the regression methods commonly found in the literature use the full sample. The simulations in Rubin and Thomas (2000) indicate that impact estimates based on full (unmatched) samples are generally more biased, and less robust to miss-specification of the regression function, than those based on matched samples.

A further difference relates to the choice of control variables. In the standard regression method one looks for predictors of outcomes, and preference is given to variables that one can argue to be exogenous to outcomes. In PSM one is looking instead for covariates of participation, possibly including variables that are poor predictors of outcomes. Indeed, analytic results and simulations indicate that variables with weak predictive ability for outcomes can still help reduce bias in estimating causal effects using PSM (Rubin and Thomas, 2000).

It is an empirical question as to how much difference it would make to mean-impact estimates by using PSM rather than OLS. Comparative methodological studies have been rare.
In one exception, Godtland et al. (2004) use both an outcome regression and PSM for assessing the impacts of field schools on farmers' knowledge of good practices for pest management in potato cultivation. They report that their results were robust to changing the method used.

**How well does PSM perform?** Returning to the same data set used by the Lalonde (1986) study (described in section 3), Dehejia and Wahba (1999) found that PSM achieved a fairly good approximation — much better than the NX methods studied by Lalonde. It appears that the poor performance of the NX methods used by Lalonde stemmed in large part from the use of observational units outside the region of common support. However, the robustness of the Dehejia-Wahba findings to sample selection and the specification chosen for calculating the propensity scores has been questioned by Smith and Todd (2005a), who argue that PSM does not solve the selection problem in the program studied by Lalonde.\(^{34}\)

Similar attempts to test PSM against randomized evaluations have shown mixed results. Agodini and Dynarski (2004) find no consistent evidence that PSM can replicate experimental results from evaluations of school dropout programs in the US. Using the PROGRESA database, Diaz and Handa (2004) find that PSM performs well as long as the same survey instrument is used for measuring outcomes for the treatment and comparison groups. The importance of using the same survey instrument in PSM is also emphasized by Heckman et al. (1997a, 1998) in the context of their evaluation of a US training program. The latter study also points to the importance of both participants and non-participants coming from the same local labor markets, and of being able to control for employment history. The meta-study by Glazerman et al. (2003) finds that PSM is one of the NX methods that can significantly reduce bias, particularly when used in combination with other methods.

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**Other uses of propensity scores in evaluation:** There are other evaluation methods that make use of the propensity score. These methods can have advantages over PSM although there have as yet been very few applications to anti-poverty programs in developing countries.

While matching on propensity scores eliminates bias (under the conditional exogeneity assumption) this need not be the most efficient estimation method (Hahn, 1998). Rather than matching by estimated propensity scores, an alternative impact estimator has been proposed by Hirano et al. (2003). This method weights observation units by the inverses of a nonparametric estimate of the propensity scores. Hirano et al. show that this practice yields a fully efficient estimator for average treatment effects. Chen et al. (2006) provide an application in the context of evaluating the longer-term impacts on poverty of a poor-area development program in China.

Propensity scores can also be used in the context of more standard regression-based estimators. Suppose one simply added the estimated propensity score \( \hat{P}(Z) \) to an OLS regression of the outcome variable on the treatment dummy variable, \( T \). (One can also include an interaction effect between \( \hat{P}(Z_i) \) and \( T_i \).) Under the assumptions of PSM this will eliminate any omitted variable bias in having excluded \( Z \) from that regression, given that \( Z \) is independent of treatment given \( P(Z) \).\(^{35}\) However, this method does not have the non-parametric flexibility of PSM. Adding a suitable function of \( \hat{P}(Z) \) to the outcome regression is an example of the “control function” (CF) approach, whereby under standard conditions (including exogeneity of \( X \) and \( Z \)) the selection bias term can be written as a function of \( \hat{P}(Z) \).\(^{36}\) Identification rests either on the nonlinearity of the CF in \( Z \) or the existence of one or more covariates of participation (the

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\(^{35}\) This provides a further intuition as to how PSM works; see the discussion in Imbens (2004).

vector $Z$) that only affect outcomes via participation. Subject to essentially the same identification conditions, another option is to use $\hat{P}(Z)$ as the instrumental variable for program placement, as also discussed further in section 8.

6. Exploiting program design

NX estimators can sometimes usefully exploit features of program design for identification. Discontinuities generated by program eligibility criteria can help identify impacts in a neighborhood of the cut-off points for eligibility. Delays in the implementation of a program can also facilitate forming comparison groups, which can also help pick up some sources of latent heterogeneity.

Discontinuity designs: Under certain conditions one can infer impacts from the differences in mean outcomes between units on either side of a critical cut-off point determining program eligibility. To see more clearly what this method involves, let $M_i$ denote the score received by unit $i$ in a proxy-means test (say) and let $m$ denote the cut-off point for eligibility, such that $T_i = 1$ for $M_i \leq m$ and $T_i = 0$ otherwise. Examples include a proxy-means test that sets a maximum score for eligibility (section 3) and programs that confine eligibility within geographic boundaries. The impact estimator is $E(Y^T|M = m - \varepsilon) - E(Y^C|M = m + \varepsilon)$ for some arbitrarily small $\varepsilon > 0$. In practice, there is inevitably a degree of fuzziness in the application of eligibility tests. So instead of assuming strict enforcement and compliance, one can follow Hahn et al. (2001) in postulating a probability of program participation, $P(M) = E(T|M)$, which is an increasing function of $M$ with a discontinuity at $m$. The essential idea remains the same, in that impacts are measured by the difference in mean outcomes in a neighborhood of $m$. 
The key identifying assumption for this estimator is that there is no discontinuity in counterfactual outcomes at \( m \).\(^{37}\) The fact that a program has more-or-less strict eligibility rules does not (of itself) mean that this is a plausible assumption. For example, the geographic boundaries for program eligibility will often coincide with local political jurisdictions, entailing current or past geographic differences in (say) local fiscal policies and institutions that cloud identification. The plausibility of the continuity assumption for counterfactual outcomes must be judged in each application.

In a test of how well discontinuity designs perform in reducing selection bias, Buddelmeyer and Skoufias (2004) use the cut-offs in \textit{PROGRESA}’s eligibility rules to measure impacts and compare the results to those obtained by exploiting the program’s randomized design. The authors find that the discontinuity design gives good approximations for almost all outcome indicators.

The method is not without its drawbacks. It is assumed that the evaluator knows \( M_i \) and (hence) eligibility for the program. That will not always be the case. Consider (again) a means-tested transfer whereby the income of the participants is supposed to be below some pre-determined cut-off point. In a single cross-section survey, we observe post-program incomes for participants and incomes for non-participants, but typically we do not know income at the time the means test was actually applied. And if we were to estimate eligibility by subtracting the transfer payment from the observed income then we would be assuming (implicitly) exactly what we want to test: whether there was a behavioral response to the program. Retrospective questions on income at the time of the means test will help (though recognizing the possible biases), as would a baseline survey at or near the time of the test. A baseline survey can also

\(^{37}\) Hahn et al. (2001) provide a formal analysis of identification and estimation of impacts for discontinuity designs under this assumption.

36
help clean out any pre-intervention differences in outcomes either side of the discontinuity, in which case one is combining the discontinuity design with the double difference method discussed further in section 7.

Note also that a discontinuity design gives mean impact for a selected sample of the participants, while most other methods (such as social experiments and PSM) aim to give mean impact for the treatment group as a whole. However, the aforementioned common-support problem that is sometimes generated by eligibility criteria can mean that other evaluations are also confined to a highly selected sub-sample; the question is then whether that is an interesting sub-sample. The truncation of treatment group samples to assure common support will most likely tend to exclude those with the highest probability of participating (for which non-participating comparators are hardest to find), while discontinuity designs will tend to include only those with the lowest probability. The latter sub-sample can, nonetheless, be relevant for deciding about program expansion; section 9 returns to this point.

Although impacts in a neighborhood of the cut-off point are non-parametrically identified for discontinuity designs, the applied literature has more often used an alternative parametric method in which the discontinuity in the eligibility criterion is used as an instrumental variable for program placement; we will return to give examples in section 8.

**Pipeline comparisons:** The idea here is to use as the comparison group people who have applied for a program but not yet received it. PROGRESA is an example; one third of eligible participants did not receive the program for 18 months, during which they formed the control group. In the case of PROGRESA, the pipeline comparison was randomized. NX pipeline comparisons have also been used in developing countries. An example can be found in Chase

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37 This is sometimes called “pipeline matching” in the literature, although this term is less than ideal given that no matching is actually done.
(2002) who used communities that had applied for a social fund (in Armenia) as the source of the comparison group in estimating the fund’s impacts on communities that received its support. In another example, Galasso and Ravallion (2004) evaluated a large social protection program in Argentina, namely the Government’s Plan Jefes y Jefas, which was the main social policy response to the severe economic crisis of 2002. To form a comparison group for participants they used those individuals who had successfully applied for the program, but had not yet received it. Notice that this method does to some extent address the problem of latent heterogeneity in other single-difference estimators, such as PSM; the prior selection process will tend to mean that successful applicants will tend to have similar unobserved characteristics, whether or not they have actually received the treatment.

The key assumption here is that the timing of treatment is random given application. In practice, one must anticipate a potential bias arising from selective treatment amongst the applicants or behavioral responses by applicants awaiting treatment. This is a greater concern in some settings than others. For example, Galasso and Ravallion argued that it was not a serious concern in their case given that they assessed the program during a period of rapid scaling up, during the 2002 financial crisis in Argentina when it was physically impossible to immediately help everyone who needed help. The authors also tested for observable differences between the two sub-sets of applicants, and found that observables (including idiosyncratic income shocks during the crisis) were well balanced between the two groups, alleviating concerns about bias. Using longitudinal observations also helped; we return to this example in the next section.

When feasible, pipeline comparisons offer a single-difference impact estimator that is likely to be more robust to latent heterogeneity. The estimates should, however, be tested for selection bias based on observables and (if need be) a method such as PSM can be used to clean
out the observable heterogeneity prior to making the pipeline comparison (Galasso and Ravallion, 2004).

Pipeline comparisons might also be combined with discontinuity designs. Although I have not seen it used in practice, a possible identification strategy for projects that expand along a well defined route is to measure outcomes on either side of the project’s current frontier. Examples might include projects that progressively connect houses to an existing water, sanitation, transport or communications network, as well as projects that expand that network in discrete increments. New facilities (such as electrification or telecommunications) often expand along pre-existing infrastructure networks (such as roads, to lay cables along their right-of-way). Clearly one would also want to allow for observable heterogeneity and time effects. There may also be concerns about spillover effects; the behavior of non-participants may change, in anticipation of being hooked up to the expanding network.

7. Higher-order differences

So far the discussion has focused on various single-difference estimators that only require an appropriate cross-sectional survey. More can be learnt if we track outcomes for both participants and non-participants over a time period that is deemed sufficient to capture any impacts of the intervention. The availability of a pre-intervention “baseline,” in which one knows who eventually participates and who does not, can reveal specification problems in a NX single-difference estimator. For example, if the outcome regression (such as equations 4 or 5) is correctly specified then running that regression on the baseline data should indicate an estimate of mean impact that is not significantly different from zero (Heckman and Hotz, 1989).

However, with baseline data one can also estimate impacts under a weaker assumption than conditional exogeneity ( 0  = 0). This section first reviews the widely-used double-
difference (DD) method, which exploits a pre-intervention baseline and at least one (post-intervention) follow-up survey. The discussion then turns to situations — common in evaluating safety-net programs that are set-up quickly to address a crisis — in which a baseline survey is impossible, but we can follow up ex-participants; this provides an example of a triple-difference estimator.

The double-difference estimator: This is a popular approach for addressing concerns about endogenous placement in single-difference cross-sectional comparisons. The essential idea is to compare samples of participants and non-participants before and after the intervention. After the initial baseline survey of both non-participants and (subsequent) participants, one does a follow-up survey of both groups after the intervention. Finally one calculates the difference between the “after” and “before” values of the mean outcomes for each of the treatment and comparison groups. The difference between these two mean differences (hence the label “double difference” or “difference-in-difference”) is the impact estimate.

To see what is involved in more formal terms, let $Y_{it}$ denote the outcome measure for the $i$’th observation unit observed at two dates, $t=0,1$. By definition $Y_{it} = Y_{it}^C + T_{it} G_{it}$ and (as in the archetypal evaluation problem described in section 2), it is assumed that we can observe $T_{it}$, $Y_{it}^T$ when $T_{it} = 1$, $Y_{it}^C$ for $T_{it} = 0$, but that $G_{it} = Y_{it}^T - Y_{it}^C$ is not directly observable for any $i$ (or in expectation) since we are missing the data on $Y_{it}^T$ for $T_{it} = 0$ and $Y_{it}^C$ for $T_{it} = 1$. To solve the “missing-data” problem, the DD estimator assumes that the selection bias (the unobserved difference in mean counterfactual outcomes between treated and untreated units) is time invariant, in which case the outcome changes for non-participants reveal the counterfactual outcome changes, i.e.:
This is clearly a weaker assumption than conditional exogeneity in single-difference estimates; $B_{iTT} = 0$ for all $t$ implies (8) but is not necessary for (8). Since period 1 is a baseline, with $T_{0i} = 0$ for all $i$ (by definition), $Y_{0i} = Y_{0i}^C$ for all $i$. Then it is plain that the double-difference estimator gives the mean treatment effect on the treated for period 1:

$$DD = E(Y_i^T - Y_0^C | T_1 = 1) - E(Y_i^C - Y_0^C | T_1 = 0) = E(G_i | T_1 = 1)$$

(9)

Notice that panel data are not necessary for calculating $DD$. All one needs is the set of four means that make up $DD$; the means need not be calculated for the same sample over time.

When the counterfactual means are time-invariant ($E[Y_i^C - Y_0^C | T_1 = 1] = 0$), equations (8) and (9) collapse to a reflexive comparison in which one only monitors outcomes for the treatment units. Unchanging mean outcomes for the counterfactual is an implausible assumption in most applications. However, with enough observations over time, methods of testing for structural breaks in the times series of outcomes for participants can offer some hope of identifying impacts; see for example Piehl et al. (2003).

For calculating standard errors and implementing weighted estimators (that can help address the potential biases in $DD$, as discussed below) it is convenient to use a regression estimator for $DD$. The data over both time periods and across treatment status are pooled and one runs the regression:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + DD T_{ii} t + \beta T_{ii} + \delta t + \epsilon_i \ (t = 0,1; \ i = 1,\ldots,n)$$

(10)

Notice that it is the coefficient on $T_{ii} t$ that gives the mean impact estimator. However, $T_{ii}$ must be included as a separate regressor to pick up any differences in the mean of the latent individual.
effects between the treatment and comparison units, such as would arise from initial purposive selection bias into the program.\textsuperscript{39} Note (again) that (10) does not require panel data.

The DD estimator can be readily generalized to multiple time periods and $DD$ can then be estimated by the regression of $Y_{it}$ on the (individual and date-specific) participation dummy variable $T_{it}$, with individual and time fixed effects.\textsuperscript{40}

**Examples of DD evaluations:** Duflo (2001) estimated the impact on schooling and earnings in Indonesia of building schools. A feature of the assignment mechanism was known, namely that more schools were built in locations with low enrolment rates. Also, the age cohorts that participated in the program could be easily identified. The fact that the gains in schooling attainments of the first cohorts exposed to the program were greater in areas that received more schools was taken to indicate that building schools promoted better education. Frankenberg et al. (2005) use a similar method to assess the impacts of providing basic health care services through midwives on children’s nutritional status (height-for-age), also in Indonesia.

In another example, Galiani et al. (2005) used a $DD$ design to estimate the impact of the privatization of water services on child mortality in Argentina. The authors exploited the joint geographic (across municipalities) and inter-temporal variation in both child mortality and ownership of water services to identify impacts. Their results suggest that privatization of water services reduced child mortality.

A DD design can also be used to address possible biases in a social experiment, whereby there is some form of selective compliance or other distortion to the randomized assignment (as

\textsuperscript{39} This is equivalent to a fixed-effects estimator in which the error term includes a latent individual effect that is potentially correlated with treatment status.

\textsuperscript{40} As is well-known, when the differenced error term is serially correlated one must take account of this fact in calculating the standard errors of the DD estimator; Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate the possibility for large biases in the uncorrected (OLS) standard errors for DD estimators.
discussed in section 4). An example can be found in Thomas et al. (2003) who randomized assignment of iron-supplementation pills in Indonesia, with a randomized-out group receiving a placebo. By also collecting pre-intervention baseline data on both groups, the authors were able to address concerns about compliance bias.

While the classic design for a DD estimator tracks the differences over time between participants and non-participants, that is not the only possibility. Jacoby (2002) used a DD design to test whether intra-household resource allocation shifted in response to a school-feeding program, to neutralize the latter’s effect on child nutrition. Some schools had the feeding program and some did not, and some children attended school and some did not. The author’s DD estimate of impact was then the difference between the mean food-energy intake of children who attended a school (on the previous day) that had a feeding program and the mean for those who did not attend such schools, less the corresponding difference between attending and non-attending children found in schools that did not have the program.

Another example can be found in Pitt and Khandker (1998) who assessed the impact of participation in Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank (GB) on various indicators relevant to current and future living standards. GB credit is targeted to landless households in poor villages. Some of their sampled villages were not eligible for the program and within the eligible villages, some households were not eligible, namely those with land (though it is not clear how well this was enforced). The authors implicitly use an unusual DD design to estimate impact.41 Naturally, the returns to having land are higher in villages that do not have access to GB credit (given that access to GB raises the returns to being landless). Comparing the returns to having land between

41 This is my interpretation; Pitt and Khandker (1998) do not mention the DD interpretation of their design. However, it is readily verified that the impact estimator implied by solving equations (4a-d) in their paper is the DD estimator described here. (Note that the resulting DD must be normalized by the proportion of landless households in eligible villages to obtain the impact parameter for GB.)
two otherwise identical sets of villages — one eligible for GB and one not — reveals the impact of GB credit. So the Pitt-Khandker estimate of the impact of GB is actually the impact on the returns to land of taking away village-level access to the GB.\textsuperscript{42} By interpretation, the “pre-intervention baseline” in the Pitt-Khandker study is provided by the villages that have the GB, and the “program” being evaluated is not GB but rather having land and hence becoming ineligible for GB. (I return to this example below.)

The use of different methods and data sets on the same program can be revealing. As compared to the study by Jalan and Ravallion (2002b) on the same program (Argentina’s \textit{Trabajar} program), Ravallion et al. (2005) used a lighter survey instrument, with far fewer questions on relevant characteristics of participants and non-participants. These data did not deliver plausible single-difference estimates using PSM when compared to the Jalan-Ravallion estimates for the same program on richer data. The likely explanation is that using the lighter survey instrument meant that there were many unobservable differences; in other words the conditional independence assumption of PSM was not valid. Given the sequence of the two evaluations, the key omitted variables in the later study were known — they mainly related to local level connections (as evident in memberships of various neighborhood associations and length of time living in the same barrio). However, the lighter survey instrument used by Ravallion et al. (2005) had the advantage that the same households were followed up over time to form a panel data set. It would appear that Ravallion et al. were able to satisfactorily address the problem of bias in the lighter survey instrument by tracking households over time, which allowed them to difference-out the miss-matching errors arising from incomplete data.

\textsuperscript{42} Equivalently, they measure impact by the mean gain amongst households who are landless from living in a village that is eligible for GB, less the corresponding gain amongst those with land.
This illustrates an important point about evaluation design. A trade-off exists between the resources devoted to collecting cross-sectional data for the purpose of single-difference matching, versus collecting longitudinal data with a lighter survey instrument. An important factor in deciding which method to use is how much we know *ex ante* about the determinants of program placement (both on the side of program administrators and participants). If a single survey can be implemented that convincingly captures these determinants then PSM will work well; if not then one is well advised to do at least two rounds of data collection and use DD, possibly combined with PSM, as discussed below.

While panel data are not essential for estimating *DD*, household-level panel data open up further options for the counterfactual analysis of the joint distribution of outcomes over time for the purpose of understanding the impacts on poverty dynamics. This approach is developed in Ravallion et al. (1995) for the purpose of measuring the impacts of changes in social spending on the inter-temporal joint distribution of income. Instead of only measuring the impact on poverty (the marginal distribution of income) the authors distinguish impacts on the number of people who escape poverty over time (the “promotion” role of a safety net) from impacts on the number who fall into poverty (the “protection” role). Ravallion et al. apply this approach to an assessment of the impact on poverty transitions of reforms in Hungary’s social safety net. Other examples can be found in Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) (on the impacts of changes in Russia’s safety net during an economy-wide financial crisis), Gaiha and Imai (2002) (on the Employment Guarantee Scheme in the Indian state of Maharashtra) and van de Walle (2004) (on assessing the performance of Vietnam’s safety net in dealing with income shocks).

Panel data also facilitate the use of dynamic regression estimators for the *DD*. An example of this approach can be found in Jalan and Ravallion (2002), who identified the effects
of lagged infrastructure endowments in a dynamic model of consumption growth using a six-year household panel data set. Their econometric specification is an example of the non-stationary fixed-effects model proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), which allows for latent individual and geographic effects and can be estimated using the Generalized Method of Moments, treating lagged consumption growth and the time-varying regressors as endogenous (using sufficiently long lags as instrumental variables). The authors found significant longer-term consumption gains from improved infrastructure, such as better rural roads.

**Concerns about DD designs:** Two key problems have plagued DD estimators for evaluating anti-poverty programs in developing countries. The first problem is that, in practice, one sometimes does not know at the time the baseline survey is implemented who will participate in the program. One must make an informed guess in designing the sampling for the baseline survey; knowledge of the program design and setting can provide clues. Types of observation units with characteristics making them more likely to participate will often have to be over-sampled, to help assure adequate coverage of the population treatment group and to provide a sufficiently large pool of similar comparators to draw upon. Problems can arise later if one does not predict well-enough *ex ante* who will participate. For example, Ravallion and Chen (2005) had designed their survey so that the comparison group would be drawn from randomly sampled villages in the same poor counties of rural China in which it was known that the treatment villages were to be found (for a poor-area development program). However, the authors subsequently discovered that there was sufficient heterogeneity within poor counties to mean that many of the selected comparison villages had to be dropped to assure common support. With the benefit of hindsight, greater effort should have been made to over-sample relatively poor villages within poor countries.
The second problem is that the \textit{DD} assumption of time-invariant selection bias is implausible for many anti-poverty programs in developing countries. Poor-area development programs typically start from the assumption that poor areas lack infrastructure and other initial endowments, which in turn yields lower growth, thus keeping them relatively poor. \textit{DD} will then be a biased estimator, since the subsequent outcome changes are a function of initial conditions that also influenced the assignment to treatment. Then the selection bias is not constant over time. Figure 3 illustrates the point. Mean outcomes are plotted over time, before and after the intervention. The lightly-shaded circles represent the observed means for the treatment units, while the hatched circle is the counterfactual at date $t=1$. Panel (a) shows the initial selection bias, arising from the fact that the program targeted poorer areas than the comparison units (dark-shaded). This is not a problem as long as the bias is time invariant, as in panel (b). However, when the attributes on which targeting is based also influence subsequent growth prospects we get a downward bias in the \textit{DD} estimator, as in panel (c).

Two examples from actual evaluations illustrate the problem. Jalan and Ravallion (1998) show that poor-area development projects in rural China have been targeted to areas with poor infrastructure and that these same characteristics resulted in lower growth rates; presumably, areas with poor infrastructure were less able to participate in the opportunities created by China’s growing economy. Jalan and Ravallion show that there is a large bias in DD estimators in this case, since the changes over time are a function of initial conditions (through an endogeneous growth model) that also influence program placement. On correcting for this bias by controlling for the area characteristics that initially attracted the development projects, the authors found significant longer-term impacts while none had been evident in the standard \textit{DD} estimator.
The second example draws on the Pitt and Khandker (1998) study of Grameen Bank. Following my interpretation of the Pitt-Khandker method of assessing the impacts of GB credit, it is clear that the authors’ key assumption is that the returns to having land are independent of village-level GB eligibility. A bias will arise if GB tends to select villages that have either unusually high or low returns to land. It seems plausible that the returns to land are lower in villages selected for GB, which may well be why they are poor in the first place, and low returns to land would also suggest to GB that such villages have a comparative advantage in the non-farm activities facilitated by GB credit. Then the Pitt-Khandker method will overestimate the impact of the Grameen Bank.

The upshot of these observations is that controlling for initial heterogeneity is crucial to the credibility of DD estimates. Using PSM for selecting the initial comparison group is an obvious corrective, and this will almost certainly reduce the bias in DD estimates. In an example in the context of poor-area development programs, Ravallion and Chen (2005) first used PSM to clean out the initial heterogeneity between targeted villages and comparison villages, before applying DD using longitudinal observations for both sets of villages. When relevant, pipeline comparison groups can also help to reduce bias in DD studies (Galasso and Ravallion, 2004). The DD method can also be combined with a discontinuity design (Jacob and Lefgren, 2004).

These observations point to important synergies between better data and methods for making single difference comparisons (on the one hand) and double-difference (on the other). Longitudinal observations can help reduce bias in single difference comparisons (eliminating the additive time-invariant component of selection bias). And successful efforts to clean out the heterogeneity in baseline data such as by PSM can reduce the bias in DD estimators.
What if baseline data are unavailable? Anti-poverty programs in developing countries often have to be set up quickly in response to a macroeconomic or agro-climatic crisis; it is not feasible to delay the operation to do a baseline survey. (Needless-to-say, nor is randomization an option.) Even so, under certain conditions, impacts can still be identified by observing participants’ outcomes in the absence of the program after the program rather than before it. To see what is involved, recall that the key identifying assumption in all double-difference studies is that the selection bias into the program is additively separable from outcomes and time invariant. In the standard set-up described earlier in this section, date 0 precedes the intervention and DD gives the mean current gain to participants in date 1. However, suppose now that the program is in operation at date 0. The scope for identification arises from the fact that some participants at date 0 subsequently drop out of the program. The triple-difference (DDD) estimator proposed by Ravallion et al. (2005) is the difference between the double differences for stayers and leavers. Ravallion et al. show that their DDD estimator consistently identifies the mean gain to participants at date 1 (TT) if two conditions hold: (i) there is no selection bias in terms of who leaves the program and (ii) there are no current gains to non-participants. They also show that a third survey round allows a joint test of these two conditions. If these conditions hold and there is no selection bias in period 2, then there should be no difference in the estimate of gains to participants in period 1 according to whether or not they drop out in period 2.

In applying the above approach, Ravallion et al. (2005) examine what happens to participants’ incomes when they leave Argentina’s Trabajar program as compared to the incomes of continuing participants, after netting out economy-wide changes, as revealed by a matched comparison group of non-participants. The authors find partial income replacement, amounting to one-quarter of the Trabajar wage within six months of leaving the program,
though rising to one half in 12 months. Thus they find evidence of a post-program “Ashenfelter’s dip,” namely when earnings drop sharply at retrenchment, but then recover.43

Suppose instead that we do not have a comparison group of nonparticipants; we calculate the $DD$ for stayers versus leavers (that is, the gain over time for stayers less that for leavers). It is evident that this will only deliver an estimate of the current gain to participants if the counter-factual changes over time are the same for leavers as for stayers. More plausibly, one might expect stayers to be people who tend to have lower prospects for gains over time than leavers in the absence of the program. Then the simple $DD$ for stayers versus leavers will underestimate the impact of the program. In their specific setting, Ravallion et al. find that the $DD$ for stayers relative to leavers (ignoring those who never participated) turned out to give a quite good approximation to the $DDD$ estimator. However, this may not hold in other applications.

8. Relaxing conditional exogeneity

We now turn to methods that relax the exogeneity assumption of OLS or PSM, and are also robust to time-varying selection bias, unlike $DD$. These methods make different identifying assumptions to the previous methods — although these are assumptions that can also be questioned.

Instrumental variables: Returning to the discussion in section 2, let us now assume that program placement depends on an instrumental variable (IV), $Z$, as well as $X$:

$$T_i = \gamma Z_i + X_i \delta + \nu_i$$

(11)

(I will return to discuss where this function might come from.) To simplify the exposition, I focus on the common-impact specification (section 2); the reader will recall that this is:

43 “Ashenfelter’s dip” refers to the bias in using $DD$ for inferring long-term impacts of training programs that can arise when there is a pre-program earnings dip (as was found in Ashenfelter, 1978).
\[ Y_i = ATE.T_i + X_i\beta^C + \mu_i^C \]  

(5)

While it is assumed that \( Z_i \) and \( X_i \) are exogeneous, selection bias \( E(\mu^C|X,T) \neq 0 \), entails that \( \nu_i \) and \( \mu_i^C \) are potentially correlated. The reduced form equation for outcomes is:

\[ Y_i = \pi Z_i + X_i(\beta^C + ATE.\delta) + \mu_i \]  

(12)

where \( \pi = ATE\gamma \) and \( \mu_i = ATE\nu_i + \mu_i^C \). When it exists, the Instrumental Variables Estimator (IVE) for mean impact is \( \hat{\mu}_{OLS}/\hat{\gamma}_{OLS} \) (in obvious notation). In addition to exogeneity of \( Z_i \) and \( X_i \), the key assumptions for \( \hat{\mu}_{OLS}/\hat{\gamma}_{OLS} \) to yield a consistent estimate of mean impact are that \( Z_i \) matters to placement \( (\gamma \neq 0) \), assuring existence of the IVE) and \( Z_i \) is not an element of the vector of controls, \( X_i \) (allowing us to identify \( \pi \) in (12) separately from \( \beta^C \)). The latter condition is called the “exclusion restriction” (in that \( Z_i \) is excluded from (5)). If these assumptions hold then IVE identifies the mean impact of the program that is attributable to the instrument robustly to selection bias. A variation on this method is to re-write (11) as a nonlinear binary response model (such as a probit or logit) and use the predicted propensity score as the IV for program placement.\(^{44}\)

**How does IVE compare to other methods?** Like all the preceding NX methods, the IVE requires an un-testable conditional independence assumption, although it is a different assumption to PSM or OLS. In the case of IVE, the un-testable assumption is the exclusion restriction.\(^{45}\) However, note that this assumption is not strictly required when a nonlinear binary response regression is used for the first stage, instead of the linear probability model in (11).

\(^{44}\) This estimator is discussed in Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 18).

\(^{45}\) If \( Z \) is a vector (with more than one variable) then the model is over-identified and one can test whether all but one of the IVs is significant when added to the main equation of interest. However, one must still leave one IV and so the exclusion restriction is un-testable.
Then the model is identified off the nonlinearity of the first stage regression. In practice, it is widely considered preferable to have an identification strategy that is robust to using a linear first stage regression. This is really a matter of judgment; identification off nonlinearity is still identification. Nonetheless, it is worrying whenever identification rests on a somewhat *ad hoc* assumption about the distribution of an error term. Avoiding this requires a justification for excluding $Z_i$ from (5). We shall return to this issue.

There are similarities too. As with OLS, the validity of causal inferences for (parametric) IVE rests on mostly *ad hoc* functional form assumptions for the outcome regression. Note also that the first-stage equation (11) echoes the first stage of the PSM method. However, IVE is arguably less demanding of our ability to model the program’s assignment than is PSM; while the instrumental variable $Z$ needs to be a significant predictor for participation, one is not typically as concerned about a low $R^2$ in the first-stage equation for IVE than for the model used to estimate propensity scores for matching or re-weighting.

Notice also that IVE only identifies the effect for a specific population sub-group, namely those induced to take up the program by the instrument; naturally, it is only for that sub-group that the IV can reveal the exogenous variation in program placement. The outcome gain for the sub-group induced to switch by the IV is sometimes called the “local average treatment effect” (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). This sub-group is typically not identified explicitly, so it remains worryingly unclear in practice for whom exactly one has identified the mean impact.

The control-function approach mentioned in section 5 also provides a method of addressing endogeneity; by adding a suitable control function (or “generalized residual”) to the outcome regression one can eliminate the troublesome selection bias on unobservables. In

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46 Todd (2006) provides a useful overview of these approaches.
general, the CF approach should give very similar results to IVE. Indeed, the two estimates are formally identical for a linear first-stage regression (as in equation 11), since then the control function approach amounts to running OLS on (5) augmented to include $\hat{\gamma} = T_i - \hat{\gamma}Z_i$ as an additional regressor (Hausman, 1978). This CF removes the source of selection bias, arising from the fact that $Cov(v_i, \mu_i) \neq 0$.

**The exclusion restriction:** This is the Achilles heel of IVE in practice. Until quite recently, the assumption was barely commented on in applied papers using IVE (the choice of IVs was sometimes even relegated to a footnote on a table of IVE results, with little or no further discussion). Yet, potentially large biases can be generated if the restriction is invalid. Recall that Glazeman et al. (2003) found that this type of method of correcting for selection bias tended in fact to be bias-increasing, when compared to experimental results on the same programs; they point to invalid exclusion restrictions as the likely culprit.

However, standards have risen and these days the validity of the exclusion restriction is routinely questioned in assessments of IVE evaluations in practice. This questioning typically takes the form of proposing some alternative theoretical model for outcomes. For example, consider the problem of identifying the impact of an individually-assigned training program on wages. Following past literature in labor economics one might use characteristics of the household to which each individual belongs as IVs for program participation. These characteristics influence take-up of the program but are unlikely to be directly observable to employers; on this basis it is argued that they should not affect wages conditional on program participation (and other observable control variables, such as age and education of the individual worker). However, for at least some of these potential IVs, this exclusion restriction is questionable when there are productivity-relevant spillover effects within households. For
example, in developing-country settings it has been argued that the presence of a literate person in the household can exercise a strong effect on an illiterate worker’s productivity; this is argued in theory and with supporting evidence (for rural Bangladesh) in Basu et al. (2002).

Where do we find an IV? There are essentially two sources, namely experimental design features and theoretical arguments about the determinants of program placement and outcomes. The following discussion considers these in turn.

**Partially randomized designs as a source of instrumental variables:** As noted in section 4, it is often the case in social experiments that some of those randomly selected for the program do not want to participate. The randomized assignment is a natural choice for an IV in this case. Here the exclusion restriction is plausible, namely that being randomly assigned to the program only affects outcomes via actual program participation.  

An example of the above approach to correcting for bias in randomized designs can be found in the aforementioned MTO experiment, in which randomly-selected inner-city families in US cities were given vouchers to buy housing in better-off areas. Naturally, not everyone offered such a voucher takes up the opportunity. The difference in outcomes (such as school drop-out rates) only reveals the extent of the external (neighborhood) effect if one corrects for the endogenous take-up using the randomized assignment as the IV (Katz et al., 2001).

An example for a developing country can be found in the Proempleo experiment. Recall that this included a training component that was assigned randomly. Under the assumption of perfect take-up or random non-compliance, neither the employment nor incomes of those receiving the training were significantly different to those of the control group 18 months after

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47 For a complete characterization of the theoretical conditions under which an IVE delivers the mean impact of a program see Angrist et al. (1996). Also see the discussion in Dubin and Rivers (1997).
the experiment began.\textsuperscript{48} However, some of those assigned the training component did not want it, and this selection process was correlated with the outcomes from training. An impact of training was revealed for those with secondary schooling, but only when the authors corrected for compliance bias using assignment as the IV for treatment (Galasso et al., 2004).

The above discussion has focused on the use of randomized assignment as an IV for treatment, given selective compliance. This idea can be generalized to the use of randomization in identifying economic models of outcomes, or of behaviors instrumental to determining outcomes. We return to this topic in section 9.

\textit{Nonexperimental sources of instrumental variables:} In the literature in labor economics that has estimated wage regressions with endogenous choice of occupation (or labor-force participation), a common source of IVs is found in modeling the occupational choice problem, whereby it is postulated that there are variables that influence the costs of occupational choice but not earnings given that choice; there is a large literature on such applications of IVE and related estimators.\textsuperscript{49} Here I will focus on applications to evaluating anti-poverty programs. Popular sources of instrumental variables in this context have included the geographic placement of programs, political variables and discontinuities created by program design.

The \textit{geography of program placement} has been used for identification in a number of studies. I consider two examples. The first is from Ravallion and Wodon (2000) who wanted to test the widely heard claim that child labor displaces schooling and so perpetuates poverty in the longer-term. They used the presence of a targeted school enrollment-subsidy in rural Bangladesh (the \textit{Food-for-Education Program}) as the source of a change in the price of schooling in their

\textsuperscript{48} The wage subsidy included in the \textit{Proempleo} experiment did have a significant impact on employment, but not current incomes, though it is plausible that expected future incomes were higher; see Galasso et al., (2004) for further discussion.

\textsuperscript{49} For an excellent overview see Heckman et al. (1999).
model of schooling and child labor. To address the endogeneity of program placement at the individual level they used prior placement at the village level as the IV. The worry here is the possibility that village placement is correlated with geographic factors relevant to outcomes. Drawing on external information on the administrative assignment rules, Ravallion and Wodon provide exogeneity tests that support their identification strategy, although this ultimately rests on an un-testable exclusion restriction and/or nonlinearity for identification. Their results indicate that the subsidy increased schooling by far more than it reduced child labor. Substitution effects appear to have helped protect current incomes from the higher school attendance induced by the subsidy.

A second example of this approach can be found in Attanasio and Vera-Hernandez (2004) who study the impacts of a large nutrition program in rural Colombia which provided food and child care through local community centers. Some people used these facilities while some did not, and there must be a strong presumption that usage is endogenous to outcomes in this setting. To deal with this problem, Attanasio and Vera-Hernandez used the distance of a household to the community center as the IV for attending the community center. These authors also address the objections that can be raised against the exclusion restriction. Distance could itself be endogenous through the location choices made by either households or the community centers. Amongst the justifications they give for their choice of IV, the authors note that survey respondents who have moved recently never identified the desire to move closer to a community center as one of the reasons for choosing their location (even though this was one of the options). They also note that if their results were in fact driven by endogeneity of their IV then they would

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50 As in the Ravallion-Wodon example, the other main requirement of a valid IV, namely that it is correlated with treatment, is more easily satisfied in this case.
find (spurious) effects on variables that should not be affected, such as child birth weight. However, they do not find such effects, supporting the choice of IV.

Political characteristics of geographic areas have been another source of instruments. Understanding the political economy of program placement can aid in identifying impacts. For example, Besley and Case (2000) use the presence of women in state parliaments (in the US) as the IV for workers’ compensation insurance when estimating the impacts of compensation on wages and employment. The authors assume that female law makers favor workers’ compensation but that this does not have an independent effect on the labor market. The latter condition would fail to hold if a higher incidence of women in parliament in a given state reflected latent social factors that lead to higher female labor force participation generally, with implications for aggregate labor market outcomes of both men and women.

To give another example, in evaluating a Bank-supported social fund in Peru, Paxson and Schady (2002) used the extent to which recent elections had seen a switch against the government as the IV for the geographic allocation of program spending in explaining schooling outcomes. Their idea was that the geographic allocation of social-fund spending would be used in part to “buy back” voters that had switched against the government in the last election. (Their first stage regression was consistent with this hypothesis.) It must also be assumed that the fact that an area turned against the government in the last election is not correlated with latent factors influencing schooling. The variation in spending attributed to this IV was found to significantly increase school attendance rates.

The third set of examples exploit discontinuities in program design, as discussed in section 6. Here the LATE is in the neighborhood of a cut-off for program eligibility. An example of this approach can be found in Angrist and Lavy (1999) who assessed the impact on
school attainments in Israel of class size. For identification they exploited the fact that an extra
teacher (in Israel) was assigned when the class size went above 40. Yet there is no plausible
reason why this cut-off point in class size would have an independent effect on attainments, thus
justifying the exclusion restriction. The authors find sizeable gains from smaller class sizes,
which were not evident using OLS.

Another example is found in Duflo’s (2003) study of the impacts of old-age pensions in
South Africa on child anthropometric indicators. Women only become eligible for a pension at
age 60, while for men it is 65. It is implausible that there would be a discontinuity in outcomes
(conditional on treatment) at these critical ages. Following Case and Deaton (1998), Duflo used
eligibility as the IV for receipt of a pension in her regressions for anthropometric outcome
variables. Duflo found that pensions going to women improve girls’ nutritional status but not
boys’, while pensions going to men have no effect on outcomes for either boys or girls.

Again, this assumes we know eligibility, which is not always the case. Furthermore,
eligibility for anti-poverty programs is often based on poverty criteria, which are also the
relevant outcome variables. Then one must be careful not to make assumptions in estimating
who is eligible (for constructing the IV) that pre-judge the impacts of the program.

Two remarks can be made about how these methods relate to the discontinuity designs
discussed in section 6, whereby one makes a single difference comparison of means either side
of the cut-off point. Firstly, and similarly to the aforementioned problem of selective compliance
in a randomized design, the use of the discontinuity in the eligibility rule as an IV for actual
program placement can address any concerns about selective compliance with those rules; this is
discussed further in Battistin and Rettore (2002). Secondly, these IV methods will not in general
give the same results as the discontinuity designs discussed in section 6. Specific conditions for
equivalence of the two methods are derived in Hahn et al. (2001); the main conditions for equivalence are that the means used in the single-difference comparison are calculated using appropriate kernel weights and that the IVE estimator is applied to a specific sub-sample, in a neighborhood of the eligibility cut-off point.

As these examples illustrate, the justification of an IVE must ultimately rest on sources of information outside the confines of the quantitative analysis. Those sources might include theoretical arguments, common sense, or empirical arguments based on different types of data, including qualitative data, such as based on knowledge of how the program operates in practice.

**Bounds on impact:** In practice, IVE sometimes gives seemingly implausible impact estimates (either too small or too large). One might suspect that a violation of the exclusion restriction is the reason. But how can we form judgments about this issue in a more scientific way? If it is possible to rule out certain values for $Y$ on *a priori* grounds then this can allow us to establish plausible bounds to the impact estimates (following an approach introduced by Manski, 1990). This is easily done if the outcome variable is being “poor” versus “non-poor” (or some other binary outcome). Then $0 \leq TT \leq E(Y^T | T = 1)(\leq 1)$ and:

$$
(E[Y^T | T = 1] - 1) \Pr(T = 1) - E[Y^C | T = 0] \Pr(T = 0)
\leq ATE \leq
(1 - E[Y^C | T = 0]) \Pr(T = 0) + E[Y^T | T = 1] \Pr(T = 1)
$$

The width of these bounds will (of course) depend on the specifics of the setting. The bounds may not be of much use in the (common) case of continuous outcome variables.

Another approach to setting bounds on impact estimates has been suggested by Altonji, Elder and Taber (AET) (2005a,b) in their study of the effect on schooling in the US of attending

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51 The lower bound for $ATE$ is found by setting $E[Y^T | T = 0] = 0$ and $E[Y^C | T = 1] = 1$ while the upper bound is found at $E[Y^T | T = 0] = 1$, $E[Y^C | T = 1] = 0$. 53
a Catholic school. The authors recognize the likely bias in OLS estimates of this relationship (probably overestimating the true impact), but they also question the exclusion restrictions used in past IV estimates. Recall that OLS assumes that the unobservables affecting outcomes are uncorrelated with program placement. AET study the implications of the extreme alternative assumption: that the unobservables in outcomes have the same effect on placement as does the index of the observables (the term $X_i\beta^c$ in (5)); in other words, the selection on unobservables is assumed to be as great as that for the observables.\footnote{Altonji et al. (2005a) gives conditions under which this will hold. However (as they note) these conditions are not expected to hold in practice; their estimator provides a bound to the true estimate, rather than an alternative point estimate.} Implementing this assumption requires constraining the correlation coefficient between the error terms of the equations for outcomes and participation ($\mu^c$ in (5) and $\nu$ in (11)) to a value given by the regression coefficient of the score function for observables in the participation equation ($X_i\delta$ in equation (11) with $\gamma = 0$) on the corresponding score function for outcomes ($X_i\beta^c$).

AET argue that their estimator gives a lower bound to the true impact when the latter is positive; this rests on the (\textit{a priori} reasonable) presumption that the error term in the outcomes equation includes at least some factors that are truly uncorrelated with participation. The OLS estimate provides an upper bound. Thus, the AET estimator gives a useful indication of how sensitive OLS is to any selection bias based on unobservables. For example, Altonji et al. (2005a) find that attending a Catholic school has an impact of eight percentage points on the high school graduation rate when one assumes exogeneity but that this falls to five points using their estimator. This also suggests a specification test for IVE; one would question an IVE that was outside the interval spanning the AET and OLS estimators.\footnote{Altonji et al. (2005b) show how their method can also be used to assess the potential bias in IVE due to an invalid exclusion restriction.}
9. Learning from evaluations

So far we have focused on the “internal validity” question: does the evaluation design allow us to obtain a reliable estimate of the counterfactual outcomes in the specific context? This has been the primary focus of the literature to date. However, there are equally important concerns related to what can be learnt from an impact evaluation beyond its specific setting. This section turns to the “external validity” question as to whether the results from specific evaluations can be applied in other settings (places and/or dates) and what lessons can be drawn for development knowledge and future policy from evaluative research.

*Do publishing biases inhibit learning from evaluations?* Development policy-making draws on accumulated knowledge built up from published evaluations. Thus publication processes and the incentives facing researchers are relevant to our success against poverty and in achieving other development goals.

It would not be too surprising to find that it is harder to publish a paper that reports unexpected or ambiguous impacts, when judged against received theories and/or past evidence. Reviewers and editors may well apply different standards in judging data and methods according to whether they believe the results on *a priori* grounds. To the extent that impacts are generally expected from anti-poverty programs (for that is presumably the main reason why the programs exist) this will mean that our knowledge is biased in favor of positive impacts. In exploring a new type of program, the results of the early studies will set the priors against which later work is judged. An initial bad draw from the true distribution of impacts may then distort the known distribution for some time after. Such biases would no doubt affect the production of evaluative research as well as publications; researchers may well work harder to obtain positive findings to
improve their chances of getting their work published. No doubt, extreme biases (in either direction) will be eventually exposed, but this may take some time.

These are largely conjectures on my part. Rigorous testing requires some way of inferring the counterfactual distribution of impacts, in the absence of publication biases. Clearly this is difficult in general. However, there is at least one strand of evaluative research where publication bias is unlikely, namely replication studies that have compared NX results with experimental findings for the same programs (as in the meta-study for labor programs in developed countries by Glazerman et al. 2003). Comparing the distribution of published impact estimates from (non-replication) NX studies with a counterfactual drawn from replication studies of the same type of programs could throw useful light on the extent of publication bias.

*Can the lessons from an evaluation be scaled up?* The context of an intervention often matters to its outcomes, thus confounding inferences for “scaling up” from an impact evaluation. (These “external validity” concerns relate to both experimental and NX evaluations.) If one allows for contextual factors then it can be hard to make meaningful generalizations for scaling up and replication from trials. The same program works well in one village but fails hopelessly in another. This is illustrated by the results of Galasso and Ravallion (2005) studying Bangladesh’s *Food for Education* Program. The program worked well in reaching the poor in some villages but not in others, even in relatively close proximity.

The key point here is that the institutional context of an intervention may well be hugely important to its impact. External validity concerns about impact evaluations can arise when certain institutions need to be present to even facilitate the experiments. For example, when randomized trials are tied to the activities of specific Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as the facilitators (as in the cases cited by Duflo and Kremer, 2005), there is a concern that the
same intervention at national scale may have a very different impact in places without the NGO. Making sure that the control group areas also have the NGO can help, but even then we cannot rule out interaction effects between the NGO’s activities and the intervention. In other words, the effect of the NGO may not be “additive” but “multiplicative,” such that the difference between measured outcomes for the treatment and control groups does not reveal the impact in the absence of the NGO.

A further external-validity concern is that, while partial equilibrium assumptions may be fine for a pilot, general equilibrium effects (sometimes called “feedback” or “macro” effects in the evaluation literature) can be important when it is scaled up nationally. For example, an estimate of the impact on schooling of a tuition subsidy based on a randomized trial may be deceptive when scaled up, given that the structure of returns to schooling will alter. To give another example, a small pilot wage subsidy program such as implemented in the Proempleo experiment may be unlikely to have much impact on the market wage rate, but that will change when the program is scaled up. Here again the external validity concern stems from the context-specificity of trials; outcomes in the context of the trial may differ appreciably (in either direction) once the intervention is scaled up and prices and wages respond.

Contextual factors are clearly crucial to policy and program performance; at the risk of overstating the point, in certain contexts anything will work, and in others everything will fail. A key factor in program success is often adapting properly to the institutional and socio-economic context in which you have to work. That is what good project staff do all the time. They might

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54 Heckman et al., (1998) demonstrate that the partial equilibrium analysis can greatly overestimate the impact of a tuition subsidy once relative wages adjust, although Lee (2005) finds a much smaller difference between the general and partial equilibrium effects of a tuition subsidy in a slightly different model.
draw on the body of knowledge from past evaluations, but these can almost never be conclusive and may even be highly deceptive if used mechanically.

The realized impacts on scaling up can also differ from the trial results (whether randomized or not) because the socio-economic composition of program participation varies with scale. Ravallion (2004a) discusses how this can happen, and presents results from a series of country case studies, all of which suggest that the incidence of program benefits becomes more pro-poor with scaling up. Trial results may well underestimate how pro-poor a program is likely to be after scaling up because the political economy entails that the initial benefits tend to be captured more by the non-poor (Lanjouw and Ravallion, 1999).

**What determines impact?** These external validity concerns point to the need to supplement the evaluation tools described above by other sources of information that can throw light on the processes that influence the measured outcomes.

One approach is to repeat the evaluation in different contexts, as proposed by Duflo and Kremer (2005). An example can be found in the aforementioned study by Galasso and Ravallion in which the impact of Bangladesh’s *Food-for-Education* program was assessed across each of 100 villages in Bangladesh and the results were correlated with characteristics of those villages. The authors found that the revealed differences in program performance were partly explicable in terms of observable village characteristics, such as the extent of intra-village inequality (with more unequal villages being less effective in reaching their poor through the program).

Repeating evaluations across different settings and at different scales can clearly help address these concerns. The practical feasibility of being able to do a sufficient number of trials (to span the relevant domain of variation found in reality) remains a moot point. The scale of a
randomized trial needed to test a large national program could well be prohibitive. Nonetheless, varying contexts for trials is clearly a good idea, subject to feasibility.

An alternative approach is to probe more deeply into why a program has (or does not have) impact in a specific context, as a basis for inferring whether it would work in a different context. The most common evaluation design identifies a relatively small number of “final outcome” indicators, and aims to assess the program’s impact on those indicators. However, instead of using only final outcome indicators, one may choose to also study impacts on certain intermediate indicators of behavior. For example, the inter-temporal behavioral responses of participants in anti-poverty programs are of obvious relevance to understanding their impacts. An impact evaluation of a program of compensatory cash transfers to Mexican farmers found that the transfers were partly invested, with second-round effects on future incomes (Sadoulet et al., 2001). Similarly, Ravallion and Chen (2005) found that participants in a poor-area development program in China saved a large share of the income gains from the program (as estimated using the matched double-difference method described in section 7). Identifying responses through savings and investment provides a clue to understanding current impacts on living standards and the possible future welfare gains beyond the project’s current life span. Instead of focusing solely on the agreed welfare indicator, one collects and analyzes data on a potentially wide range of intermediate indicators relevant to understanding the processes determining impacts.

This also illustrates a common concern in evaluation studies, given behavioral responses, namely that the study period is rarely much longer than the period of the program’s disbursements. However, a share of the impact on peoples’ living standards may occur beyond the life of the project. This does not necessarily mean that credible evaluations will need to track
welfare impacts over much longer periods than is typically the case — raising concerns about feasibility. But it does suggest that evaluations need to look carefully at impacts on partial intermediate indicators of longer-term impacts even when good measures of the welfare objective are available within the project cycle. The choice of such indicators will need to be informed by an understanding of participants’ behavioral responses to the program.

In learning from an evaluation, one often needs to draw on information that is largely external to the evaluation. Qualitative research (intensive interviews with participants and administrators) can be a useful source of information.\textsuperscript{55} One approach is to use qualitative methods to test the assumptions made by an intervention; this is sometimes called “theory-based evaluation,” though that is hardly an ideal term given that NX identification strategies for mean impacts are often theory-based (as discussed in the last section). Weiss (2001) illustrates this approach in the abstract in the context of evaluating the impacts of community-based anti-poverty programs. An example is found in an evaluation of social funds (SFs) by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department, as summarized in Carvalho and White (2004). While the overall aim of a SF is typically to reduce poverty, the OED study was interested in seeing whether SFs worked the way that was intended by their designers. For example, did local communities participate? Who participated? Was there “capture” of the SF by local elites (as some critics have argued)? Building on Weiss (2001), the OED evaluation identified a series of key hypothesized links connecting the intervention to outcomes and tested whether each one worked. For example, in one of the country studies for the OED evaluation of SFs, Rao and Ibanez (2005) tested the assumption that a SF works by local communities collectively proposing the sub-projects that they want; for a SF in Jamaica, the authors found that the process was often dominated by local elites.

\textsuperscript{55} See the discussion on “mixed methods” in Rao and Woolcock (2003).
In practice, it is very unlikely that all the relevant assumptions are testable (including alternative assumptions made by different theories that might yield similar impacts). Nor is it clear that the process determining the impact of a program can always be decomposed into a neat series of testable links within a unique causal chain; there may be more complex forms of interaction and simultaneity that do not lend themselves to this type of analysis. For these reasons, the so-called “theory-based evaluation” approach cannot be considered a serious substitute for assessing impacts on final outcomes by credible (experimental or NX) methods, although it can still be a useful complement to such evaluations, to better understanding measured impacts.

Project monitoring data bases are an important, under-utilized, source of information. Too often the project monitoring data and the information system have negligible evaluative content. This is not inevitably the case. For example, the idea of combining spending maps with poverty maps for rapid assessments of the targeting performance of a decentralized anti-poverty program is a promising illustration of how, at modest cost, standard monitoring data can be made more useful for providing information on how the program is working and in a way that provides sufficiently rapid feedback to a project to allow corrections along the way (Ravallion, 2001).

The Proempleo experiment provides an example of how information external to the evaluation can carry important lessons for scaling up. Recall that Proempleo randomly assigned vouchers for a wage subsidy across (typically poor) people currently in a workfare program and tracked their subsequent success in getting regular work. A randomized control group located the counterfactual. The results did indicate a significant impact of the wage-subsidy voucher on employment. But when cross-checks were made against central administrative data, supplemented by informal interviews with the hiring firms, it was found that there was very low
take-up of the wage subsidy by firms (Galasso et al., 2004). The scheme was highly cost
effective; the government saved 5% of its workfare wage bill for an outlay on subsidies that
represented only 10% of that saving.

However, the supplementary cross-checks against other data revealed that Proempleo did
not work the way its design had intended. The bulk of the gain in employment for participants
was not through higher demand for their labor induced by the wage subsidy. Rather the impact
arose from supply side effects; the voucher had credential value to workers – it acted like a
“letter of introduction” that few people had (and how it was allocated was a secret locally). This
could not be revealed by the (randomized) evaluation, but required supplementary data. The
extra insight obtained about how Proempleo actually worked in the context of its trial setting
also carried implications for scaling up, which put emphasis on providing better information for
poor workers about how to get a job rather than providing wage subsidies.

Spillover effects also point to the importance of a deeper understanding of how a program
operates. Indirect (or “second-round”) impacts on non-participants are common. A workfare
program may lead to higher earnings for non-participants. Or a road improvement project in one
area might improve accessibility elsewhere. Depending on how important these indirect effects
are thought to be in the specific application, the “program” may need to be redefined to embrace
the spillover effects. Or one might need to combine the type of evaluation discussed here with
other tools, such as a model of the labor market to pick up other benefits.

The extreme form of a spillover effect is an economy-wide program. The evaluation
tools discussed in this chapter are for assigned programs, but have little obvious role for
economy-wide programs in which no explicit assignment process is evident, or if it is, the
spillover effects are likely to be pervasive. When some countries get the economy-wide program
but some do not, cross-country comparative work (such as growth regressions) can reveal impacts. That identification task is often difficult, notably because there are typically latent factors at country level that simultaneously influence outcomes and whether a country adopts the policy in question. And even when the identification strategy is accepted, carrying the generalized lessons from cross-country regressions to inform policy-making in any one country can be highly problematic. There are also a number of promising examples of how simulation tools for economy wide policies such as Computable General Equilibrium models can be combined with household-level survey data to assess impacts on poverty and inequality. These simulation methods make it far easier to attribute impacts to the policy change, although this advantage comes at the cost of the need to make many more assumptions about how the economy works.

*Is the evaluation answering the relevant policy questions?* Arguably the most important things we want to learn from any evaluation relate to its lessons for future policies. Here standard evaluation practices can start to look disappointingly uninformative on closer inspection.

One issue is the choice of counterfactual. The classic formulation of the evaluation problem assesses mean impacts on those who receive the program, relative to counterfactual outcomes in the absence of the program. However, this may fall well short of addressing the concerns of policy makers. While common practice is to use outcomes in the absence of the program as the counterfactual, the alternative of interest to policy makers is often to spend the same resources on some other program (possibly a different version of the same program), rather than to do nothing. The evaluation problem is formally unchanged if we think of some alternative program as the counterfactual. Or, in principle, we might repeat the analysis relative to the “do nothing counterfactual” for each possible alternative and compare them, though this is

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56 See, for example, Bourguignon et al. (2003) and Chen and Ravallion (2004).
rare in practice. A specific program may appear to perform well against the option of doing nothing, but poorly against some feasible alternative.

For example, drawing on their impact evaluation of a workfare program in India, Ravallion and Datt (1995) show that the program substantially reduced poverty amongst the participants relative to the counterfactual of no program. Yet, once the costs of the program were factored in (including the foregone income of workfare participants), the authors found that the alternative counterfactual of a uniform (un-targeted) allocation of the same budget outlay would have had more impact on poverty.\footnote{For another example of the same result see Murgai and Ravallion (2005).}

A further issue, with greater bearing on the methods used for evaluation, is whether we have identified the most relevant impact parameters from the point of view of the policy question at hand. The classic formulation of the evaluation problem focuses on mean outcomes, such as mean income or consumption. This is hardly appropriate for programs that have as their (more-or-less) explicit objective to reduce poverty, rather than to promote economic growth \textit{per se}. However, as noted in section 3, there is nothing to stop us re-interpreting the outcome measure such that equation (2) gives the program’s impact on the headcount index of poverty (\% below the poverty line). By repeating the impact calculation for multiple “poverty lines” one can then trace out the impact on the cumulative distribution of income. This is feasible with the same tools, though evaluation practice has been rather narrow in its focus.

There is often interest in better understanding the \textit{horizontal impacts} of program, meaning the differences in impacts at a given level of counterfactual outcomes, as revealed by the joint distribution of $Y^T$ and $Y^C$. We cannot know this from a social experiment, which only reveals net counterfactual mean outcomes for those treated; $TT$ gives the mean gain net of losses
amongst participants. Instead of focusing solely on the net gains to the poor (say) we may ask how many losers there are amongst the poor, and how many gainers. We already discussed an example in section 7, namely the use of panel data in studying impacts of an anti-poverty program on poverty dynamics. Some interventions may yield losers even though mean impact is positive and policy makers will understandably want to know about those losers, as well as the gainers. (This can be true at any given poverty line.) Thus one can relax the “anonymity” or “veil of ignorance” assumption of traditional welfare analysis, whereby outcomes are judged solely by changes in the marginal distribution (Carneiro et al., 2001).

Heterogeneity in the impacts of anti-poverty programs can be expected. Eligibility criteria impose differential costs on participants. For example, the foregone labor earnings incurred by participants in workfare or conditional cash transfer schemes (via the loss of earnings from child labor) will vary according to skills and local labor-market conditions. Knowing more about this heterogeneity is relevant to the political economy of anti-poverty policies, and may also point to the need for supplementary policies for better protecting the losers.

Heterogeneity of impacts in terms of observables is readily allowed for by adding interaction effects with the treatment dummy variable, as in equation (5.1), though this is still surprisingly far from universal practice. One can also allow for latent heterogeneity, using a random coefficients estimator in which the impact estimate (the coefficient on the treatment dummy variable) contains a stochastic component (i.e., $\mu_{iT} \neq \mu_{iC}$ in the error term of equation 4). Applying this type of estimator to the evaluation data for PROGRESA, Djebbari and Smith (2005) find that they can convincingly reject the common effects assumption in past evaluations. When there is such heterogeneity, one will often want to distinguish marginal impacts from average impacts. Following Björklund and Moffitt (1987), the marginal treatment effect can be
defined as the mean gain to units that are indifferent between participating or not. This requires that we model explicitly the choice problem facing participants (Björklund and Moffitt, 1987; Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). We may also want to estimate the joint distribution of $Y^T$ and $Y^C$, and a method for doing so is outlined in Heckman et al. (1997a).

However, it is questionable how relevant the choice models found in this literature are to the present setting. The models have stemmed mainly from the literature on evaluating training and other programs in developed countries, in which selection is seen as a largely a matter of individual choice, amongst those eligible. This approach does not sit easily with what we know about many anti-poverty programs in developing countries, in which the choices made by politicians and administrators appear to be more important to the selection process than the choices made by those eligible to participate.

This speaks to the need for a richer theoretical characterization of the selection problem in future work. An example of one effort in this direction can be found in the Galasso and Ravallion (2005) model of the assignment of a decentralized anti-poverty program; their model focuses on the public-choice problem facing the central government and the local collective action problem facing communities, with individual participation choices treated as a trivial problem. Such models can also point to instrumental variables for identifying impacts and studying their heterogeneity.

When the policy issue is whether to expand or contract a given program at the margin, the classic estimator of mean-impact on the treated (by experimental or NX methods) is actually of rather little interest. The problem of estimating the marginal impact of a greater duration of exposure to the program on those treated was considered in section 7, using the example of comparing “leavers” and “stayers” in a workfare program (Ravallion et al., 2005). Another
example can be found in the study by Behrman et al. (2004) of the impacts on children’s
cognitive skills and health status of longer exposure to a preschool program in Bolivia. The
authors provide an estimate of the marginal impact of higher program duration by comparing the
cumulative effects of different durations using a matching estimator. In such cases, selection
into the program is not an issue, and we do not even need data on units who never participated.
The discontinuity design method discussed in section 6 (in its non-parametric form) and section
8 (in its parametric IV form) is also delivering an estimate of the marginal gain from a program,
namely the gain when the program is expanded (or contracted) by a small change in the
eligibility cut-off point.

A deeper understanding of the factors determining outcomes in *ex post* evaluations can
also help in simulating the likely impacts of changes in program or policy design *ex ante*.
Naturally, *ex ante* simulations require many more assumptions about how an economy works.  
As far as possible one would like to see those assumptions anchored to past knowledge built up
from rigorous *ex post* evaluations. For example, by combining a randomized evaluation design
with a structural model of education choices and exploiting the randomized design for
identification, one can greatly expand the set of policy-relevant questions about the design of
*PROGRESA* that a conventional evaluation can answer (Todd and Wolpin, 2002; Attanasio et al.,
2004, and de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). This strand of the literature has revealed that a budget-
neutral switch of the enrolment subsidy from primary to secondary school would have delivered
a net gain in school attainments, by increasing the proportion of children who continue onto
secondary school. While *PROGRESA* had an impact on schooling, it could have had a larger
impact. However, it should be recalled that this type of program has two objectives: increasing

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58 For a useful overview of *ex ante* methods see Bourguignon and Ferreira (2003). Todd and Wolpin
(2006) provide a number of examples, including for a schooling subsidy program, using the *PROGRESA*
data.
schooling (reducing future poverty) and reducing current poverty, through the targeted transfers. To the extent that refocusing the subsidies on secondary schooling would reduce the impact on current income poverty (by increasing the forgone income from children’s employment), the case for this change in the program’s design would need further analysis.

10. Conclusions

Two main lessons for future evaluations of anti-poverty programs emerge from this survey. Firstly, no single evaluation tool can claim to be ideal in all circumstances. While randomization can be a powerful tool for assessing impact, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for a good evaluation. While economists have sometimes been too uncritical of their NX identification strategies, credible means of isolating at least a share of the exogenous variation in an endogenously placed program can still be found in practice. Good evaluations draw pragmatically from the full range of tools available, often combining methods: randomizing some aspects and using econometric methods to deal with the non-random elements, using randomized elements of a program as a source of instrumental variables, or by combining matching methods with longitudinal observations to try to eliminate matching errors with imperfect data. Good evaluations typically also require that the evaluator is involved from the programs’ inception and is very well informed about how the program works on the ground; the features of program design and implementation can sometimes provide important clues for assessing impact by NX means.

Secondly, even putting internal validity concerns to one side, it is unlikely that the tools of counter-factual analysis for mean impacts on well-defined outcome variables are ever going to be sufficient for informing future development projects and policies. The context in which a program is placed can exercise a powerful influence on outcomes. This points to the need for a
deeper understanding of why a program does or does not have impact. It also calls for an eclectic approach drawing on various sources, including replications across differing contexts when feasible, and testing the assumptions made in a program’s design, such as by tracking intermediate variables of relevance or by drawing on supplementary theories or evidence external to the evaluation. In drawing useful lessons for anti-poverty policy, we need a richer set of impact parameters than has been traditional in evaluation practice, including distinguishing the impacts on gainers from losers at any given level of living. The choice of parameters to be estimated in an evaluation must ultimately depend on the policy question to be answered; for policy makers this is a mundane point, but for evaluators it seems to be ignored too often.
Figure 1: Region of common support

![Diagram showing density for participants and non-participants with the region of common support marked.]
Figure 2: Poverty impacts of disbursements under Argentina’s Trabajar program

Source: Jalan and Ravallion (2003b).

(1) Participant sample pre-intervention (estimated)
(2) Participant sample post-intervention (observed)
Figure 3: Bias in double-difference estimates for a targeted anti-poverty program

(a)

(b)

(c)

Selection bias
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