
LOCAL GOVERNANCE AFTER CONFLICT: COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT IN EAST TIMOR

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Abstract

A necessary ingredient for peacebuilding and development after conflict is stable and participatory local governance. Yet peacekeeping and state-building operations conducted by the international community still focus on the establishment of national institutions and do not ensure local participation. The World Bank's Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP) was supposed to create sub-national governance to supplement the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The programme was an innovative attempt to combine development with state building in an emergency phase of a post-conflict setting. The results pose questions about the timing of establishing local governance and the degree of social engineering that can be conducted in a post-conflict environment. They show the relevance of sufficient 'local knowledge' in project design and the need for improved inter-organisational cooperation.¹

Introduction

Portugal planned the release of its colonies into independence in the wake of political change in 1974. The half-island of East Timor was promised independence. Internal conflict erupted among different factions and opened the door for the Indonesian invasion and occupation of the country. For nearly 25 years the Indonesian government conducted a harsh rule in East Timor while facing a resistance movement. The resignation in 1998 of President Soeharto led to an opportunity for the East Timorese population to decide on their future. They were asked to vote for or against a proposal for autonomy. The rejection would eventually lead to independence for the former Portuguese colony. Yet a 'popular consultation' in August 1999 led to a brutal rampage by pro-Indonesian militia and the withdrawal of the occupying power. This resulted in the abolishment of the entire official administration and in the economic devastation of East Timor.

For the first time in history the international community assumed full administrative powers and sovereign authority over a country. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was mandated to rebuild and administer the country.

This unprecedented attempt of state building mainly focused on national institution building. Within 30 months it had established some basic institutions for governance and administration. The Transitional Administrator twice appointed transitional cabinets. Eighty-eight Constituent Assembly members were elected, and they drafted a new constitution in five months. The Assembly became a parliament. On 20 May 2002 the country's administration was transferred from international supervision to Timorese control. International aid and the reconstruction of the governance apparatus also stimulated economic revival (UNDP 2002:58).

Decentralisation and devolution have become the main international models for increasing 'good governance' in developing countries, as they provide space for participation and seem to guarantee greater stability. However, in state-building exercises they are still a novelty. UNTAET paid lip service to decentralisation, but embodied a centralised administration which was transferred to the Timorese leadership. The development of local governance had been low on the agenda. The result is a young nation with the appearance of national democratic institutions but unstable at the grassroots.

One of the few attempts of decentralisation was the 'Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (CEP)'. In an unprecedented exercise of inter-organisational collaboration between the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB), the CEP was to support the establishment of local bodies of authority through democratic elections at the village level. These bodies would channel the population's ideas for development projects. This way local participation in the reconstruction of the country and reconciliation of its population would be guaranteed. The authority would later be formalised and integrated into the local governance structure. The project would therefore tackle the three main problems for the country: rebuilding the administration, reconciliation between former pro-Indonesian militias and the population and strengthening civil society. The CEP was therefore an interesting approach that combined the promotion of local governance with peacebuilding and development during an emergency phase of a post-conflict setting.

The CEP has many lessons for state-builders. It provides an example for designing projects that aim at peacebuilding, development and the support of local governance structures at the same time. It raises the question of how far local governance structures can and should be established in the early phase of post-conflict situations and without the partnership of a national government. A closer look at the local organs of authority shows the importance of working with 'local knowledge' and raises the question of the degree of social engineering that can be conducted after a conflict has taken place. In operational terms the CEP showed the problems of inter-institutional cooperation, as it fell victim to UNTAET's lack of decentralisation².

Building Sub-national Administration

For the establishment of local governance UNTAET created 13 district administrations in the country. Initially these were staffed with international personnel and then handed step by step to Timorese counterparts. From these centres District Field Officers (DFO) were responsible for the administration of the sub-districts. Administration at the village and hamlet levels was entirely in the hands of the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) throughout the process. The CNRT had been established a year before the 'popular consultation' as an umbrella organisation for all resistance parties. Immediately after the destruction of East Timor in September 1999, the CNRT appointed representatives at every level, and so established a shadow administration.

Whereas the international community mandated UNTAET as the sole authority of the country, the local population saw the CNRT as the legitimate power. The UN decided to avoid recognition of the CNRT as an official partner. The District Administrations found this difficult to deal with, as the CNRT was present at the grassroots. While the two often competed at the district level, in the sub-districts and villages UNTAET depended on CNRT support to govern. Here CNRT representatives delivered data on the population to UNTAET and were the main link and messenger between the administration and the people.

At the hamlet and village level the CNRT appointees enjoyed unchallenged power during the first half of the international administration. Their position was questioned when the CNRT dissolved in June 2001 in preparation for the Constituent Assembly elections. The main resistance party, Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin), had left the CNRT a year earlier. Its strength had been underestimated in the early period. It had started to win back the grassroots and had representatives in place at all levels. In some of the hamlets and villages these representatives began to challenge the position of the CNRT-aligned hamlet and village chiefs.

An additional problem was the UN's employment of Timorese for the sub-national administration. Many people expected that the positions of Timorese district and sub-district administrators would be filled with regard to the traditional and resistance power structure.

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Accordingly, specific families, appointed by the ritual leaders of the community, are designated to 'hold political authority'. Only their senior members can act as legitimate leaders and fulfil the functions of a political ruler. However, when the new administrative staff under UNTAET was chosen, the appointments were based on

educational background and not traditional criteria. The 'modern' concept of purely technical appointments in the administration was new to the population. The discrepancy between the 'modern' way of selecting staff for the administration and the local ideas about legitimate leaders in these positions led local populations to reject the personnel. The result was that UNTAET-selected staff lacked local legitimacy.

Administration at the local level today is still plagued by confusion caused by an unclear local governance structure that was left behind by the international administration (*Suara Timor Lorosae* 22 June 2001). The idea of neutral, apolitical technical administrative personnel as introduced by UNTAET fails to find any support because locally leaders are selected according to very different criteria. Besides, the former CNRT representatives and many of the UNTAET recruits oppose the ruling party Fretilin and lack its recognition. The government has gradually politicised the administration and tried to put in place the party faithful. This has created a situation in which 'the national government has only a roof but no roots' (Interview with a district administrator, East Timor, November 2002). A conflict plays out between the different factions of the resistance movement, and less so, as initially anticipated, between autonomy and independence supporters.

UNTAET also handed over a structure in which sub-national administrators were not given real powers and with a general lack of local participation. Participation is a main pillar of democracy, and bringing the population on board when building their own state is a crucial component to guarantee accountability downwards.

A strong local concept in East Timor is that of the 'centre' and a strong hierarchical power structure. Transferred to a governmental level, a centralised and authoritarian rule seems culturally legitimate. During the UNTAET period the power that was given to the district administrations was small and the capital Dili evolved as the power centre. The government that came to power after UNTAET did not need to change decentralised structures because they did not exist. Yet while they are enshrined in the constitution (Constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, Part I, Section 5), they are far from being achieved (UNDP 2002:37).

Community Empowerment

In September 1999, shortly after the administrative and economic collapse of East Timor, the Asian Development Bank, bilateral donor countries, UN agencies and regional specialists undertook a joint assessment mission (JAM) under the leadership of the WB (World Bank 1999). The JAM stated that the collapse had severely reduced the capacity of the 'two indigenous key institutions', the CNRT and the church. According to the JAM, traditional powers such as the *liurais* (kings) had been constrained through Indonesian influence and had lost power. In addition, an urgent need had arisen for reconciliation between ex-militias and pro-independence fighters, which, if not fulfilled, would result in long-term social problems (Joint Assessment Mission 1999).

The logic of the JAM was that the exodus of the Indonesian system had resulted in a vacuum. This seemed to provide an opportunity for social engineering, including the creation of grassroots institutions and reformed governance. The JAM called for 'immediate

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action in order to fill the existing vacuum and ensure that communities have an effective vehicle for participating in and guiding the rebuilding of their nation' (Joint Assessment Mission 1999:12). The need for local participation was emphasised, because the approach promised to overcome problematic

issues through 'rapid involvement of the population in positive rehabilitation and reconstruction operations' (JAM 1999:11). To enjoy a system of good governance and build peace after conflict, communities have to be provided with the opportunity to take part.

The result of the mission was taken as the basis for the establishment of the World Bank's CEP. The CEP was a successor of the Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP) in Indonesia, of which East Timor had been part. Therefore, the funding for an altered KDP in East Timor was readily available at the beginning of UNTAET's deployment.

The programme intended to provide a model for a democratic, participatory and transparent forum. It was to allow villagers to make their own development choices, with mediation and accountability through village development councils. These councils, rather than government agencies, were to become the channels for development. They would receive support from other community institutions in their key tasks: the preparation and execution of developmental plans, dispute resolution, management of village funds, liaison with sub-district and district levels for greater cooperation and training in participatory and democratic practices (JAM 1999:13-14).

Trained facilitators were deployed around the country to support the creation of the councils. The CEP was composed of senior staff members at the central level in Dili to decide on policies and to provide the necessary follow-up and inputs to the teams at the district level. The district-level team members served and assisted the village councils in establishing their role as development planning and management bodies.

The first component consisted of grants allocated to the sub-districts and to be distributed in four cycles. During the first emergency cycle CEP grants were distributed in equal amounts to each village once the election of council members and the formal establishment of the village development council was achieved. Those grants were to be used on the

rehabilitation and reconstruction of social infrastructure, such as public meeting halls, schools and clinics, roads and water supply, and on economic recovery, through, for example, the purchase of agricultural tools, seeds and livestock. Each village received the same amount of money. The grant was distributed between the hamlets according to the proposals agreed by the village development council.

The programme intended to access and promote ideas from the grassroots to strengthen local populations. Participatory planning enhances ownership, reduces corruption, and the projects conducted are relevant to the recipients. This gives them more credibility and raises enthusiasm and acknowledgement. Yet the programme also intended to change local structures. Opposed to local mechanisms of decision-making, it sought to train for and introduce a democratic sense of equality, giving each community member an equal voice in the village council. Gender equality was to be introduced by reserving half the membership of the councils for women. New parallel powers could challenge 'old ways' and be turned into a local governance structure based on the 'will' of the community rather than being imposed from the top. At the beginning of the project it was not clearly defined how the new structure would be converted into official 'local governance' and assume the place of the local level leadership positions that were left vacant by UNTAET.³

Collaborating Institutions

The village development councils were established under UNTAET Regulation 2000/13. It provided the legal framework for an entity that at the community level could legally receive and disperse funds from CEP or other donors. The actual agreement on the regulation was achieved only after a great delay. UNTAET had rejected the project twice in negotiations and signed up for it only after intervention from the UN and WB leadership, as UNTAET was not in favour of decentralising power (La'o Hamutuk 2000; Beauvais 2001:1126; Chopra 2002:992-994).

The CEP started in March 2000. As UNTAET did not have the capacity to manage the project's implementation, Community Aid Abroad/Oxfam (CAA/OXFAM) was contracted as the implementing agency. With the end of CAA's contract in November 2000, the Project Management Unit (PMU) took over the full management of the programme. Three months earlier the PMU had been integrated with the Ministry for Internal Administration. The CEP therefore came under the auspices of the government. Since November 2000 the project had been 'Timorised'.

The negotiations between UNTAET, the WB and the Timorese leadership about the establishment of the CEP were influenced by Timorese politics at the time. The Internal Political Front (FPI) of the main resistance party, Fretilin, had started to conduct elections for village chiefs. To integrate these elections into the operations of the CEP, it was decided to exclude the elected village chiefs from the CEP village development councils, and hence create a separation of powers at the ground level: the village chief as executive, the council as a quasi-legislative body and the council of elders as a quasi-judicial body. The CNRT leadership agreed on the modified plans for the project and FPI was promised a joint 'socialisation' campaign for the project and its own village chief elections. During this campaign, conducted in the first months of 2000, a partnership was established between the CNRT sub-district chiefs and the CEP sub-district facilitators. Together they undertook the major task of informing the local populations about the CEP and its electoral process for the establishment of village councils.

Certain inter-organisational differences between the WB and UNTAET resulted in a lack of cooperation between the CEP structure and the official administration. Although the CEP was officially a governmental project, during its first cycle it had not been integrated into the UNTAET administrative structure and therefore functioned rather independently. Information dissemination was often poor, although an international official in the district administration, who was the CEP focal point, was in charge of coordination between CEP project staff and UNTAET. Some UN field officers and most of the population did not realise CEP was a UNTAET programme. This often led to duplication of initiatives and a lack of joint planning at the local level (Ospina and Hohe 2002:104ff.)

CEP facilitators highlighted this lack of coordination and the negative effect of Temporary Employment Projects (TEP) and Quick Impact Projects (QIP) projects implemented by UNTAET. These had introduced the notion of 'working for three dollars a day'³. This practice disrupted the traditional system of community work and discouraged volunteers. The dynamic created difficulties for the implementation of CEP projects.

One of the main plans for the village development councils was that they could function as a major agency for development at the village level and therefore become the focal point for other donors or NGOs (Cliffe et al. 2003:4). The latter could by-pass the upper levels of authority and work directly with the villages. This was a strange approach for local NGOs as it excluded

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the usual expression of respect to higher authorities, a fact that can undermine or paralyse a collaborative undertaking. International agencies came with their own concepts and strategies of how to conduct development and were not willing to adopt approaches of other organisations. Only in rare cases was a working relationship between NGOs and village

development councils established (World Bank 2001:10). In some sub-districts international NGOs started to make use of the village development council as advisers on developmental issues in the villages. Council members also reported that they wrote proposals and handed them to other agencies. UNTAET was supposed to raise awareness amongst NGOs to involve the councils in their work, but as UNTAET was not involved in the CEP at the beginning, it struggled to develop its own relationship with it first.

Sub-district, village and hamlet chiefs held important power at the local level and had the respect and credibility of the local population. Therefore they had the capacity to mobilise many community members in the assessment, design and implementation of projects promoted by village development councils. They had an overall knowledge of initiatives in their areas and had privileged information about the development projects to be undertaken by the government and other potential donors. Yet they were considered ineligible for the councils.

This exclusion brought resistance from some local leaders. It was felt that the councils with their new power, which was more 'official' than that of the village chief, were not interested in a working relationship. The CNRT representatives were relying on ideological unity and not horizontal participation. They functioned in a hierarchical structure, saw themselves as sole authority, and if 'everybody starts giving orders the system cannot work'. They claimed that if the councils did not start working with the CNRT, they would lose the population's legitimacy. 'CNRT is the face. The CEP has to work with the local authorities, and then things can work. The local leadership has to be behind it' (Interview with CNRT representative, Bobonaro 2001).

Yet the council members had, all of a sudden, much bigger financial means than the traditional power-holders, who regarded themselves as superior. This was not considered appropriate for their social position and the situation strained relations between village chiefs and councils. The village chiefs were traditionally in charge of public issues and relationships with the 'outside' world. Their responsibility for distributing shelter and food aid from international NGOs, and their involvement with UNTAET provided them with legitimacy from another source. Here, the CEP contributed somewhat to conflict potential on the local level (Cliffe et al. 2003:9).

Challenging Local Authorities

One of the main features of the CEP was the introduction of democratic elections for the council members. Yet democratic elections of village chiefs under the Indonesian system had

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not challenged the selection of the 'appropriate' individual confirmed by the traditional order. In the democratic elections under the Indonesian government, Western democratic means were applied to confirm and express Timorese ideas. The majority of villagers voted for the person from the 'right' family that was thought to be in power anyway (Hohe 2002:569-589). Elections

for the CEP village development council illustrated that the development of democracy requires more than simply introducing democratic means, such as elections.

The elections for village development council members at hamlet level were conducted during the first half of 2000 in more than 400 villages. Clear instructions provided the framework of how elections for the village development council were to be held (UNTAET Regulation 2000/13). A selection committee was requested to assist the community in their selection of the identification of a man and a woman candidate as hamlet representatives in the council. Candidates had to be more than 18 years old, be resident of the hamlet, not be a traditional or local leader and have time to work in the council. Eligible voters were every hamlet resident, male and female, more than 17 years of age or married. At least 50% of the hamlet residents had to participate in the election. Once the representatives of each hamlet had been elected, the CEP sub-district facilitator organised the first meeting of the village development council to elect the council head or coordinator, a deputy, a secretary and a treasurer. Two representatives (a man and a woman) were also elected to sit in the sub-district development council. The composition was repeated in the sub-district councils.

In reality the way to choose candidates mostly involved a local means of decision-making. Traditionally candidates for important positions are never selected by secret vote. Village elders appoint them after careful discussion. For example, in the selection of village or hamlet chiefs, where heritage is one of the most important criteria, the elders sit together, recount the history of families and then consider personal capacities before making a decision. Afterwards, the constituency is invited to vote.

Significantly, the council member elections were not accompanied by ritual activities. This differed from the previously held village chief elections, which were conducted with significant ceremonial support. It signified that the village chief was an important authority who had to be ancestrally legitimised. The election of council members was perceived as profane by the population (Ospina and Hohe 2002:84ff.). The composition of the councils tells about communities' perception of their function and relations to other powers.

The most important criterion mentioned by the voters about the election of the council members was their capacity to do the job. Hence, they should be literate, intelligent, good speakers, know the community well and be able to coordinate CEP activities in their hamlets, villages and sub-districts. 'Experience', whatever it meant, was regarded as important. It could be in leadership, in project work or in working as a civil servant. The most important fact was that a person had proven to be a good leader through involvement in hamlet activities and had the capacity to organise social matters. Most striking in the selection of council members was their age. In general council members were rather young, between 25 and 45, the age groups that are more likely to be literate. The closer council members lived to urban areas, the higher their education⁴.

As literacy and therefore age were the striking features of the council members, it seemed that no political power was associated with their position. Voters denied that the heritage from a family was of importance. Indeed, council members did not come from the usual 'political authority families' who would traditionally supply the village chief. They were purely seen as 'implementers' of projects, not as leaders making decisions for the community. The SEP was perceived as an external institution; it had no important meaning for the 'inside' community. Therefore the people elected mainly had experiences with the 'outside' and the 'governmental' world. The fact that most council members were young and not from the leading families also implied that they had no power in decision-making processes or conflict resolution. In many cases the real power-holders of the village played a very influential role in these processes.

Theoretically, local authorities took decisions with council members as facilitators. In reality council members only took notes, but hardly ever took an active part in the discussions, nor did they facilitate the discussion. They adopted ideas agreed by consensus once the more vocal people in the meetings advocated for them. Local authorities, such as village chiefs, teachers (mostly the older and educated people in the village) and church representatives discussed the ideas that came up on behalf of the people. Often the decisions were passed to the traditional elders to legitimise them. People were seen to be free to make suggestions for the programme, but traditional elders had to ensure that the

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programme worked in accordance with the local social structures and belief systems. 'Discussion' seemed to be a very important part of the process, confirming a traditional idea about decision-making based on consensus. Although the mechanisms had been created to provide a forum in which all citizens were invited to express their concerns and ideas on

development issues, the process was still dominated by traditional decision-makers. Members of the council saw themselves as facilitators or as a bridge between community members and decision-makers.

Traditional authorities were even more involved in conflicts about project work. They still handled most of the grassroots conflicts during the transitional administration (Mearns 2001). This is an important prerequisite for a project like the CEP (Cliffe et al. 2003:11) because traditional authorities have the knowledge about the history and relations of the families involved in a conflict and hence they have the competence to decide on punishment and reconciliation. In conflicts about the CEP the council members and the community, in many cases, turned to them for help (Ospina and Hohe 2002:97-100). Local powers, even in the CEP process, were still in place and were not challenged by the councils.

Confusing Powers

The crucial component of the project was the establishment of the village development councils to promote a more horizontal and democratic system of governance, breaking through traditional systems of power and former corrupting top-down decision-making processes. A Western democratic system was supposed to be established at the grassroots, in a setting where the separation of powers does not run between the lines of executive, legislative and judiciary. The distinction here is made between political and ritual authorities (Traube 1986:98-124). There was not only an attempted change of the remains of the Indonesian system, but also a challenge to local structures that contributed to stability in the past.

The assumption by the JAM of a 'vacuum' opened the doors for social engineering at the grassroots level. It appeared to be the right moment to introduce democratic structures to a situation where nothing seemed left. This was a misperception. Local

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power concepts had survived even in the most difficult circumstances. East Timor had seen manifold changes in the external administrative systems in its history. Local stability was based on traditional power structures that acted as the framework to absorb external influences. In fact,

especially in times of crisis, traditional structures are relied on most; they provide a commonly understood basis for action when everything else has been destroyed. It is important to realise that, in every community, its members always have a concept of who should be in power and why.⁵ In East Timor it had taken the CNRT only days after the destruction to re-establish a complete structure from the hamlet to the national level that had local legitimacy. This is no romanticising of traditional structures, but a fact that needs to be taken into account, especially if structures are to be changed. What the JAM had perceived as 'vacuum' was essentially a lack of an official administrative and governmental system. Social engineering on the ground was attempted in an environment where strong ideas about leadership existed.

The changes were to be introduced by the exclusion of the village chiefs from the village development councils and the empowerment of the council members by financial means, while the village chiefs and traditional leaders lacked financial capacity. The councils were set up to develop into new power centres in the community. Yet as 'new' creations they had no resemblance to the local structures (La'o Hamutuk 2000:7). It proved difficult to enforce a separation of powers that was not part of the local system. The international community challenged local hierarchical structures. For the Timorese the non-eligibility of the traditional powers was understood as undermining the power of the village chief, and not as introducing 'democracy'. The village development councils were not connected to the 'political' sphere of the world, nor to ritual life. Therefore anybody could be elected. As council members turned out to be young people from random families, they remained powerless. They were not expected to be responsible for the 'traditional' political tasks of decision-making and conflict resolution. They were only seen as implementers of projects and therefore their position in the local paradigm did not collide with the local authorities and in turn could not challenge them.

It is only through long-term capacity building that the council members could have turned into acknowledged authorities, challenging the traditional power concept. What was

thought to become a new parallel power, the village councils, could have been turned into development focal points to work alongside the traditional authorities. This could have guaranteed more efficient development and the smooth establishment of local governance with full legitimacy from the local population. To have an impact on the socio-political structure of Timorese societies, the CEP should have been planned for a longer period. In the short term, the CEP would have shown better results if it had utilised local power structures. The village chief and his monopoly of knowledge on village issues could have been integrated into the council, to guarantee a well-informed background for the population's decision on development activities. The quality of the development projects conducted under the CEP therefore suffered from the CEP's attempt to conduct social engineering and introduce grassroots democracy.

Conclusions

The case of East Timor and other state-building experiences teach the relevance of the local level to guarantee genuine stability and support in the building of peace. As experience from Mozambique suggests, '... the emphasis in state-building should be on the local

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level' as this is where the peace settlement happens (Jackson 2002:1-2). In practice to date, the importance of the local level in the creation of a well working state has been dramatically underestimated. The international focus has been on the establishment of national institutions, based on the assumption that a

stable national democratic government will necessarily promote a peaceful nation. Yet it is ill-fated logic that the national level can exist without stable grassroots. The need for stability at the local level and the need for clear official structures are extremely high in post-conflict situations. The neglect of the sub-national level weakens the efforts of the population to re-establish a normal life.

At present, nearly two years after the country has become independent there is no definite local governance structure in East Timor. UNTAET had not addressed the issue and the CEP did not have any positive impact. The Timorese themselves understood very well the importance of the lower levels. Hence a political competition over the grassroots has swept through the country. Only recently has a team of international consultants in cooperation with a Timorese technical working group designed possible models for a local governance system, under the auspices of the Timorese Ministry of Internal Affairs⁶. Yet the present government will undertake the final selection of the new system. This will now happen in a much more politically charged environment than right after the destruction of the country. It provides the opportunity for a single party to determine sub-national administration in its own favour. Early development of local governance structures by a sensitive international community in cooperation with local stakeholders could have set the stage before political antagonisms started to play out. A stable local level can prevent further conflicts, even if national institutions are turning out to be fragile. The establishment of local institutions should be a major focus of state-building exercises. The use of developmental funds and initiatives, or even delivery of humanitarian aid, to support early development of local governance and peace-building in a post-conflict situation is a positive innovation and should be more elaborated in future.

Community-driven projects are also a good tool for peacebuilding after conflict. In the case of East Timor, the anticipated friction between the two conflicting parties turned out

Endnotes

¹ This paper is based on an assessment of the CEP-between October 2000 and May 2001, conducted for the World Bank and UNTAET by a team of two international and four East Timorese researchers. The team conducted 309 interviews with village authorities, villagers, youth, women and CEP council members in three sample districts of East Timor. See also Ospina and Hohe, 2002.

² Only towards the end of 2002 were the CEP structures finally integrated with the local administration. CEP sub-district council heads became part of the newly created District Community Development Committees (DCDC).

³ TEP was funded by USAID and QIP by the Consolidated Fund for East Timor. Both projects were implemented through the UNTAET district field officers.

⁴ For it is in urban areas where schools, in particular junior and senior high schools, are usually located.

⁵ The can be disagreements on the issue, or different concepts, which eventually lead to conflict.

⁶ The initiative was funded by Ireland Aid and implemented by UNDP.

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