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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit	=	CFAF (CFA Franc)
2001: US\$1.00	=	CFAF 670
2002: US\$1.00	=	CFAF 680

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

Metric System

CONGO FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS and ACRONYMS

CFAF	CFA Francs
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoC	Government of the Republic of Congo
GPCP	<i>Three-year Interim Post-Conflict Program</i>
IDA	International Development Association
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Local Development Communities
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PAC	Projet d'Action Communautaire
PCEP	Post-Conflict Emergency Program
PCF	Post-Conflict Funds
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
RRP	Reintegration and Reinsertion Project for Youth and Women
TSS	Transitional Support Strategy
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations for Education, Science and Culture Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Infancy Funds

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

After the 1997 war, the Congolese economy was in deep crisis—the economy system had entirely collapsed and nothing yet existed to take its place. Congolese social conditions, already poor, had seriously deteriorated and damaged. In response to this crisis, the Reintegration and Reinsertion Project for Youth and Women was designed with focus on the Government's highest post-conflict-wide priorities and challenges i.e. consolidating its home-grown peace process and physically reconstructing the country.

The Project relied on the following objectives: (a) Reinforcement of the ability of local communities and in particular women and youth, to identify needs and manage their own development in a democratic way; (b) Assistance of youth and women, the communities they are part of, in overcoming the psychological trauma of war; (c) Increase of the access to basic social services for war-affected communities; (d) Improvement of livelihoods for war-affected community members, particularly women and youth; and (e) Encouragement of mutual confidence, social reintegration and peace.

Project objectives have been achieved for components 1, 2 and 5 and sometimes results went beyond expectations. Component 3's objectives were for about 80%. Only component 4 objectives were not achieved. Overall, the outcome of the project can be rated as "**satisfactory**". Considering the degree of economic, political and civil instability during the project implementation, and the challenges inherent in scaling up participatory operations and establishing formal institutions (LCDs) for sustained operation, the achievements of the project have been remarkable. Output targets for capacity building, social assistance and community development, social reintegration components were substantially met, even over a somewhat shorter time frame than the two years originally envisaged. The most significant shortcoming was weakness in ensuring sustainability of the micro-credit and mutual insurance operations through community participation.

The implementing agency's performance affected project achievement both *positively* (publicity from NGOs and local marketing agents have improved the public perception of the project) and *negatively* (the project became effective with substantial delay and the fact that PAC has changed the Manager has also affected its implementation in terms of delay)

Strong commitment and action within the implementing agency enabled the project to exceed initial expectations in performance monitoring and project coordination. Partnership with development NGOs was fully institutionalized and the potential to contribute was therefore fully realized. In the context of publicity, there was adequate communication with civil society (including the NGOs and press), state government officials, and the general public.

92.4% of the total amount of the project has been disbursed. Taking into consideration the size, complexity and risk of the project, the final US Dollar costs are very close to the initial projected figure.

On balance, the sustainability of the project can be rated as "**likely**". The implementing agency has established itself as an organization well qualified to execute projects for donors, including the European Union, Sweden, UNDP, etc... With the new financing available, the implementing agency should be able to continue to operate in a cost efficient manner.

Overall: (i) the Bank performance can be rated as "**satisfactory**"; it was very supportive of implementing agency's efforts to work with communities, local associations and NGOs in the execution of sub-projects; (ii) the Government's performance for the project is assessed as **satisfactory**. There was close cooperation at all time between the Government, UNDP and the Bank, and the leadership and vision provided by the World Bank ensured that the program that was developed was appropriate to Congo's needs; (iii) the implementing agency performance can be rated as "**satisfactory**". It has implemented the project very efficiently and is today entirely committed to the project and the upcoming second project.

No doubt, the beneficiary assessment: (a) confirmed the very positive impact of the project on employment. The number of beneficiaries is estimated be far in excess of the initial estimate which had been grossly underestimated. The percentage of women and youth among the direct beneficiaries is now estimated at about 60 percent, as compared with an initial estimate of 50 percent; (b) showed that the direct beneficiaries (i.e., the population) are satisfied with the results and impact of the project. As a matter of fact, they want more of the same; (c) showed that the project responded to requests from the population, but it is not obvious that those requests always represented the priorities of the population, who might have been influenced by communal administrators or NGOs, and may not have necessarily known all the choices available to them.

A focus on outcome and output indicators is critical, especially in more nebulous project activities such as "poverty alleviation". The World Bank's current requirement to include these as a central aspect of any project is very useful and having this at the start of the project have helped to re-focus activities when circumstances changed.

For community-based development type projects, there should be a less prescriptive approach and more focus on sharing and articulating objectives and how they will be monitored. There should also be more recognition of the link between environment and health. Also, a greater role for women in management and implementation should be provided.

Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

<i>Outcome:</i>	S
<i>Sustainability:</i>	L
<i>Institutional Development Impact:</i>	M
<i>Bank Performance:</i>	S
<i>Government Performance:</i>	S
<i>UNDP Performance:</i>	S
<i>Project at Risk at Any Time:</i>	Yes

Overview

The following report was accomplished during my stay in Congo from March 12 to March 24 and a week spent after in Washington for the consultancy:

- More than forty books, reports and booklets produced by the Stakeholders, The World Bank, UNDP, NGOs, Consultants and local Ministries were reviewed and checked; changes in text and illustrations were tabled;
- A situation analysis of the project was carried out, mapping out the project's reach;
- Several meetings were held with staff of the PAC (Projet d'Action Communautaire) responsible for the implementation of the project and other stakeholders and partner institutions, to collect data, discuss the strategy, and detail its activities; beneficiaries were interviewed during field visits as well as local authorities
- Other technical meetings with UNICEF, UNESCO, FAO, ILO, EU highlighted the need to reach a consensus on a common outcome indicators to measure the impact of the project in Congo
- Early versions of the present report were reviewed by the Project Implementation Unit and consensus on the final report reached.

Preface

1. This report refers to the Independent Evaluation Report (IER) as required in the Grant Agreement for the Reintegration and Recovery Project for Youth and Women for which Grant (PCF Grant 008B) in the amount of US\$ 1.0 million equivalent was approved by the International Development Association (IDA) on January 16, 2001.
2. The closing date was March 31, 2002. It was extended to December 31, 02 and March 31, 2003. The first tranche of US\$ 500.000 was released in April 2001. The second tranche of US\$ 300.000 was released in April 2002 following the full compliance with the conditions for the release for the first tranche. The balance of US\$ 200,000 was released in September 2002.
3. The IER was prepared by Mr. Prosper Biabo, Consultant, and discussed with Hilly-Anne Fumey of UNDP as Manager of the Community Action Programme.
4. The preparation of this report was based on materials in the project files, the Grant Agreement, and discussions with the Bank, UNDP and IMF staff. The draft Report has been also discussed with the Government and comments have been received.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

Introduction

The current report constitute the independent evaluation of the grant, whose purposes are: (a) to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and (b), to help develop improved directions, policies, and

procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. It independently assesses the Bank-funded Reintegration and Recovery Project (RRP) for Youth and Women (PCF Grant N0 008B) implemented by the UNDP and other UN agencies in the Republic of Congo. It is intended to contribute to improve the quality and effectiveness of Bank grants and to enhance Government's ability to design and/or implement projects.

It aims to (a) provide experience from project implementation to improve country lending strategies and the design of future operations; (b) help ensure greater development impact and sustainability of projects during the operational phase; (c) reinforce self-evaluation, including development impact assessment, by the Bank and borrowers; (d) meet requirements for accountability and transparency in Bank activities; (e) maintain a record of the implementation experience of Bank-financed operations; and (f) highlight lessons learned.

This IER's preparation was based on an examination of project files and other documents, interview of operational staff, and field visits in Congo for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. It thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided by project stakeholders, as well as examine issues of special interest.

The Rating System

The time-tested evaluation methods used are suited to the broad range of the World Bank's work that offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion:

- **Outcome:** The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently.

Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

- **Sustainability:** The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time.

Possible ratings: Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

- **Institutional Development Impact:** The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project.

Possible ratings: High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

- **World Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the World Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project).

Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

- **Government Performance:** The extent to which the Government assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability.

Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

- **UNDP Performance:** The extent to which UNDP assumed responsibility to ensure quality of implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability.

Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Country Background

Since independence in 1960 more than two decades of centrally planned economy, almost one decade of conflict and continuous political strife, including three Presidential coups and one Presidential assassination, have left the Republic of Congo politically tormented and functioning well below its economic potential.

The economy is a mixture of village agriculture and handicrafts, an industrial sector based largely on oil, and support services. The government itself is beset with poor budgetary management and overstaffing. With a per capita GDP of US\$670, the Republic of Congo ranks 12th amongst all Sub-Saharan African countries. Oil, which accounts for more than half of the national GDP, has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy. Earlier large-scale investment but low-return projects were financed by high oil prices. They could only be sustained subsequently through heavy borrowings. In the late 1980s, lower oil prices, fiscal imbalances and misalignment of the CFAF led to substantial economic decline.

In the mid-1990s, government's efforts to bring economic relief were still-born as new civil war conflicts burst out in 1997 forestalling any stabilization of the economy. Economic activity was further hampered when over 800,000 Congolese, nearly 30% of the population, fled their homes during the 1998-1999 conflict.

Following the cessation of hostilities in November 1999, the Government of the Republic of Congo (GoC) initiated a peace process. The re-installation of most of the population displaced during the war has already been accomplished. GoC is now committed to continuing the dialogue with all political parties. A referendum for a new Constitution has taken place at the end of 2001 and general elections for the Presidency and Parliament scheduled by early 2002 are effective.

The project is an integral part of the action reform program contemplated under the Bank's Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the Republic of Congo/*Report n0 21328-COB of November 13, 2000*. The principal objective of the TSS is to help GoC address the four simultaneous challenges of consolidating its home-grown peace process, laying and solidifying the foundation for the democratization of political life, physically reconstructing the country, and improving economic management, including the provision of increased transparency and good governance in public resource management.

Economic rehabilitation will be difficult. Indeed, mismanagement of the economy and war have left the country with heavy indebtedness, only half of the former stock of agricultural tools, 25% of the former livestock population, insufficient and insecure urban and rural infrastructure and basic services, lack of appropriate health and education facilities, a high unemployment rate, a bankrupt financial system and less-than-satisfactory management of natural resources, particularly oil and forestry.

GoC's economic reform program is presented in its *Three-year Interim Post-Conflict Program* (GPCP) for the period 2000-2002. GPCP is built on a reform agenda that includes: the introduction of sound macroeconomic policies and stabilization measures, particularly in the fields of public finance management, pursuing the privatization program, improving governance, accountability and transparency, and revising almost completely the regulatory framework for the private sector.

Progress has already been achieved on several fronts. As provided under the IMF Post-Conflict Emergency Program (PCEP) for the period 2000-01, the Government has resumed its debt service payments to all multilateral creditors and on post-cut-off-date debt to Paris Club creditors. Public finances are being rationalized through the launching of a computerized expenditure control system, and measures to enhance revenue collection of the customs administration and the Treasury are underway. Salary levels of civil servants have been frozen, and recruitment, except in health and education, has been suspended. Important reforms are being introduced in the financial sector under the general umbrella of the government's privatization program.

Moving to a market economy requires simultaneous transitions on several fronts. New laws or regulations are required in nearly every sector, including forestry, markets, labor relations, mining, telecommunications, energy and water. Recently, a new investment charter, drafted by more than 100 private sector and Government representatives, was signed and adopted.

Assessment of Development Objective

Context

The objectives and the design of the Reintegration and Reinsertion Project for Youth and Women need to be assessed in the context of (i) the exceptional economic, political and institutional conditions prevailing in Congo and (ii) the emergency situation of which Congo was involved. After the 1997 war, the Congolese economy was in deep crisis—the economy system had entirely collapsed and nothing yet existed to take its place. Congolese social conditions, already poor, had seriously deteriorated and damaged. The result was critical rural poverty and almost total dependence on food aid and other assistance. In response to these crisis conditions, the application for a DGF/PCF grant was processed quickly, with activities implemented by UNDP, which sub-contracted to specialized UN agencies such as UNICEF, ILO and FAO. The grant application form documented the project and its background particularly well and accurately assessed potential political developments which could contribute to project risks.

Objective

The Project relied on the following objectives: (a) Reinforcement of the ability of local communities and in particular women and youth, to identify needs and manage their own development in a democratic way; (b) Assistance of youth and women, the communities they are part of, in overcoming the psychological trauma of war; (c) Increase of the access to basic social services for war-affected communities; (d) Improvement of livelihoods for war-affected community members, particularly women and youth; and (e) Encouragement of mutual confidence, social reintegration and peace.

These objectives reflected essential priorities for post-conflict in Congo at that time, as identified both by the government and by the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy. They were consistent with government strategy for rebuilding the economy, targeting youth and women, through active poverty alleviation, in order to restore peace, security, and promote solidarity among people in a post-conflict situation. They also reflected the priorities identified in the Bank's Country

Assistance Strategy, which called for a flexible strategy that responds quickly to new information while maintaining an overall framework that promotes stability. Of particular importance in the circumstances, the objectives were realistic in terms of (i) demonstrated capacity of the implementing agencies and (ii) extreme political and institutional constraints and related project risks.

During the project implementation, no objective was revised but an agreement responding to FAO's request, and aiming at improving operations systems in the field was signed. The improvement harmonized the technical approaches which were a major problem for the beneficiaries. Addition of this strategy did not amount to a restructuring.

Project Components

The components were as follows:

Component 1: The Grant contained a capacity building component that provided support to local development communities (LDC).

The program supported by the capacity building component included the reinforcement of the ability of local communities, in particular women and youth, to identify needs and manage their own development in a participatory and democratic way. Particularly, it consisted in (a) an election of Local Development Committees (LDC) in four Brazzaville neighborhoods composed of at least 50% of young adults and women; (b) a training of LDC members to become trainers in trauma counseling; (c) the ability of LDC to identify the most vulnerable population to be the beneficiaries of income generating activities; (d) the ability of LDC to identify their needs in technical training; (e) the ability of LDC to identify their needs in infrastructure rehabilitation; and (f) the ability of LDC to report to the community on on-going and planned activities on a regular basis. UNICEF implemented this operation which was successfully achieved. The results went beyond expectations.

Component 2: The grant also contained a social assistance component which focused on assisting youth and women and the communities they are part of, in overcoming the psychological trauma of war. This component relied on the (i) the training of 50 Leaders identified by the communities in recognizing signs of trauma and taking necessary steps; (ii) the training sessions organized with local and regional leaders on understanding and recognizing the impact of trauma on women and youth, and elaborating programs to address it; (iii) the ability of local and regional leaders to elaborate and implement trauma counseling programs for affected communities; and (iv) the capacity of youth and women to feel that leaders and local authorities are better able to understand their trauma and respond to their needs in the area. UNICEF was the implementer and results went beyond expectations.

Component 3: The grant contained a community development component which involved NGOs participation. It focused on increasing access to basic social services for war-affected communities. Basically this component consisted in ((1) the rehabilitation and equipment of Schools; (2) the rehabilitation and equipment of health centers or dispensaries; (3) the rehabilitation of water systems; and (4) the rehabilitation of other community infrastructures. In general, activities were carried out by local NGOs under the supervision of UNDP. The impact of this component in the field was substantial and it would have been more if the crisis in the Pool region was mastered.

Component 4: The Grant contained a micro-credit and mutual-insurance component that provided support to local communities. In fact, it consisted in the improvement of livelihoods for

war-affected community members through income generating activities, particularly women and youth. Particularly, it contributed to (a) an increase of 5000 youth's income by at least one-third; (b) an increase of 5000 women's income by at least one-third; and (c) the ability of 5000 youth and women to take part in mutual micro-health insurance schemes. The impact of this operation in the field was a mitigated success as far as, during the project implementation: (i) a huge part of the Beneficiaries (especially youth) disappeared after they received the micro credit funds; and (ii) mutual insurance members perceived their monthly payment too high; as a result, the number of eligible participants was low.

Component 5: The grant finally contained a reintegration component which focused on encouraging mutual reintegration of youth and women to build peace. It consisted in the (i) the participation of 10,000 women and youth in community reintegration programs; and (ii) the ability of LDC to restart 10 new or interrupted cultural/sporting events bringing together different elements of the population to promote peace and reconciliation. Activities were implemented by UNESCO and the results obtained were successful.

In conclusion, the design of these five components was clearly linked to the objectives described above. The grant focused on the Government's highest post-conflict-wide priorities and challenges, i.e. consolidating its home-grown peace process, laying and solidifying the foundation for the democratization of political life, physically reconstructing the country, and improving economic management, including the provision of increased transparency and good governance in public resource management.

Outcome/achievement of objective

Overall, the outcome of the project can be rated as "**satisfactory**".

Considering the degree of economic, political and civil instability during the project implementation, and the challenges inherent in scaling up participatory operations and establishing formal institutions (LCDs) for sustained operation, the achievements of the project have been remarkable. Output targets for capacity building, social assistance and community development, social reintegration components were substantially met, even over a somewhat shorter time frame than the two years originally envisaged. The most significant shortcoming was weakness in ensuring sustainability of the micro-credit and mutual insurance operations through community participation.

The degree to which the project objectives have been achieved can be summarized as follows:

* the objective of **reinforcing the ability of local communities** and in particular women and youth , to identify needs and manage their own development in a participatory and democratic way has been **achieved**, with sometimes pre-financing provided by the UNICEF;

* the objective of **assisting youth and women** , and the communities they are part of, in overcoming the psychological trauma of war has been **achieved** in the areas of intervention, with sometimes pre-financing provided by the UNICEF;

* the objective of **increasing access to basic social services** for war-affected communities has been **achieved**, particularly for NGOs, and FAO;

* the objective of **improving livelihoods for war-affected community members** through income generating activities, particularly women and youth has **not been achieved**, particularly in

the areas of micro credit and Mutual Insurance activities. In regards to the micro credit activities, most of the Beneficiaries did not reimburse the project funds they were allocated. Concerning the Mutual Insurance activities, the membership monthly payment expected was too high (CFAF 2.500) compared to the acceptable members standard (CFAF 945).

* the objective of **encouraging mutual confidence and social reintegration**, particularly of women and youth, to build peace has been **achieved** particularly for UNESCO and NGOs.

Output by Components

Capacity Building Component

The capacity building component is rated **highly satisfactory**.

This component was designed to reinforce the ability of local communities and in particular women and youth, to identify needs and manage their own development in a participatory and democratic way. It included five activities which were fully implemented by UNICEF in severe and limited financial conditions. Sometimes the implementing Agency pre-financed activities and received reimbursement. During the implementation period, more than four (4) Local Development Committees were selected in Makelekele, Mfilou, Poto Poto, Talangai and Dolisie and 50% of the Committee members were women and young adults. Originally it was expected 04 selected LDCs. More than 6.000 (originally 5.000) LDC members have been trained to become trainers in trauma counseling. After they have been trained, LDCs; (a) have identified the most vulnerable population to be the beneficiaries of income generating activities; (b) have identified needs in technical trainings; (c) have identified needs in infrastructure rehabilitation; and (d) report to the community on on-going and planned activities on a regular basis.

The objective of reinforcing the ability of local communities and in particular women and youth, to identify needs and manage their own development in a participatory and democratic way has **been achieved**.

Social Assistance Component

The Social Assistance component is rated **satisfactory**.

The outcome of the social assistance component is rated satisfactory. The objectives of this component were to assist youth and women and the communities they are part of in overcoming the psychological trauma of war. This component was implemented exclusively by UNICEF who, many times, pre-financed its operations and received reimbursement. Four main activities supported the component which outcomes were as follows: (1) 60 leaders (originally targeted for 50) have been identified by the community in recognizing signs of trauma and the necessary steps have been taken; (2) On regular basis, training sessions were organized with local and regional leaders on understanding and recognizing the impact of trauma on women and youth and elaborating programs to address it; (3) After they have been trained, local and regional leaders elaborated and implemented trauma counseling programs for affected communities; and (4) Women and youth had the feeling that leaders and local authorities were better able to understand their trauma and respond to their needs in this area.

The objective of assisting youth and women and the communities they are part of in overcoming the psychological trauma of war has **been achieved..**

Community Development Component

The community development component is rated **satisfactory**.

This component was designed to increase access to basic social services for war-affected communities and was carried-out mainly by NGOs and Consultants. Specific objective was reached through (a) Schools Rehabilitation and equipment; (b) Health centers or dispensaries rehabilitation and equipment; (c) Water systems rehabilitation; and (d) Other communities infrastructure rehabilitation. Outcome is summarized in the table below:

Activities	Original Objective	Realization	Realization rate (%)
Schools Rehabilitation and equipment	5	4 rehabilitated & equipped 1 underway	90
Health centers or dispensaries rehabilitation and equipment	5	4 rehabilitated & equipped 1 underway	90
Water systems rehabilitation	180	90	50
Other communities infrastructure rehabilitation	2	1	50

The objective of increasing access to basic social services for war-affected communities has **not** been **achieved**.

Micro-Credit Component

The micro-credit component is rated **unsatisfactory**.

The component was composed of mutual insurance and micro-credit activities mainly. Only part of this component has been implemented, with the carrying out by ILO as implementing agency and LDCs or NGOs. The programming of activities has been somewhat deficient and there has been no incentive to obtain expected results.

In the mutual insurance case, a study was carried out by consultants and the conclusions concerning the minimum membership monthly payment rate was 945 CFAF, which was below the 2,500 CFAF, minimum acceptable standard. Meetings and discussions were held with stakeholders to seek a solution and so far no action is taken. The General hospital, the governmental counterpart objected to support the gap in the treatment cost of mutualists. For this main reason, the rate of participation of the mutual insurance (10%) became problematical.

The micro credit's activities focused on employment generation and capacity building through various training sessions. The grant financed micro-projects in various sectors and Beneficiaries were members of LDCs or unemployed youths. Feedback revealed that the operation was largely unsuccessful for various reasons in terms of sustained micro-credit projects, rates of repayment, failure rates, and quality, low levels of group cohesion, inadequate selection criteria, weak supervision from overseeing bodies (the Kinshasa based ILO consultant in charge of implementation subcontracted tasks to a local consultant who could not follow-up project operations) and Government counterparts. However, the project outcomes have been somewhat jeopardized by the political environment (general elections, insecurity in the Pool region, etc...) and the dramatic deterioration of the economic and social conditions, resulting in considerable limitations of local capacity. For these reasons, the rate of recovery of the micro-credits (29% according to officials) became problematical. \$18,000 (\$14,000 in loan disbursement and \$4,000

in loan guarantee fund) were disbursed to 49 borrowers. The trend continued on the low side, the objective of implementing a sustainable micro-finance system have not be achieved.

The objective of improving livelihoods for affected community through income generating activities, particularly women and youth has **not been achieved**.

The table below shows the results obtained:

Activities	Original Objective	Realization	Realization rate (%)
Youth increased their income	500	25	5
Women increased their income	500	25	5
Women & Youth take part in micro-health insurance scheme	5,000	500	10

Social Reintegration Component

The social reintegration component is rated **satisfactory**.

The component made a significant progress on cultural promotion and peace reconciliation activities with the assistance of catholic church and NGOs. The population expectations was fulfilled and more than 10,000 women and youth attended seminars, symposiums, workshops organized by UNESCO, the implementing agency, in the area of community reintegration. The implementing agency also organized more than twelve events supporting the reconciliation and peace process. In summary, the outcome of the component is substantial. The objective of encouraging mutual confidence and social reintegration, particularly of women and youth , to build peace has been **achieved** as shown in the table below.

Activities	Original Objective	Realization	Realization rate (%)
Participation in Reintegration programs	10,000	9,000	90
Cultural/Sporting events	10	9	90

Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return

Official documents did not include any economic analysis of the project. Now that the project is completed, a cost-benefit analysis is not feasible because of the difficulty of measuring benefits in a rural economy where data are scarce and where goods, services, and labor are often not traded and therefore are difficult to value in money terms.

Financial Rate of Return

Due to its specific nature, no financial rate of return was calculated for this project.

Institutional Development Impact

The Project's institutional development impact of the project has been **modest**.

PAC has shown that it could continue to operate even when Bank financing was no longer available. NGOs and associations have also benefited. On the other hand, the impact on the Ministry of Humanitarian Actions has been negligible. Under the conditions prevailing in Congo during implementation, the justification for this type of project is not in its institutional

development impact, but lies in its ability to undertake concrete actions and show some tangible results at the community level.

Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

PAC performance affected project achievement both positively and negatively. Publicity from NGOs and local marketing agents have improved the public perception of the project, especially of those directly participating, and have moralized participating villagers and local staff. The provision of financial support from programs such as Sweden, the European Union has enabled PAC to replicate practices beyond the scope envisaged in the World Bank-financed project.

The project became effective with substantial delay. Subsequently, disbursements speeded up and grant closing date was extended to provide for the completion of project activities. During project implementation, Congo experienced a lot of turmoil and a high level of insecurity in particular with the situation in the Pool region which was followed by massacres and the paralysis of the executive and administrative branches of local Government for months. The situation was characterized by a large number of professional staff being absent from the area, a general paralysis of the economy due to the destruction of infrastructure and the diversion of many resources to the relief effort in the South, a continuing increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, and a continuing high level of insecurity in the country. All of those factors made it impossible for the project staff to reach many zones of project implementation. The fact that PAC has changed the Manager has also affected its implementation in terms of delay. However, PAC remained operational by performing services for other donors and, therefore, project staff were paid regularly and remained fairly motivated.

Factors generally subject to government control:

The recent Government reshuffle beyond the scope of the project created an atmosphere which facilitated the project's innovative decentralized initiatives including establishment of LDCs. "Government performance" below presents a detailed more related factors to this section..

Factors generally subject to implementing agency control.

Strong commitment and action within the implementing agency enabled the project to exceed initial expectations in performance monitoring and project coordination. Partnership with development NGOs was fully institutionalized and the potential to contribute was therefore fully realized. In the context of publicity, there was adequate communication with civil society (including the NGOs and press), state government officials, and the general public.

Costs and financing

92.4% of the total amount of the project has been disbursed. The total project cost as compared to the official initial cost estimate is currently estimated at US\$ 924,000. This is about US\$ 76,000 less than the US\$ 1,000,000 estimated in the grant agreement. Taking into consideration the size, complexity and risk of the project, the final US Dollar costs are very close to the initial projected figure.

Sustainability

On balance, the sustainability of the project can be rated as **"likely"**.

Rationale for sustainability rating

A project's sustainability is defined as the probability of its maintaining the achievements generated or expected to be generated in relation to its objectives over the economic life of the project.

For the most important part, the social activities program has to be analyzed at two levels: at the level of the executing agency, PAC, and at the level of completed sub-projects. The survival capacity of PAC has been tested; it has continued to operate during the long period of war, working for UN agencies, and it has also been able to use financing from the European Union. There is no reason why PAC should not be able to continue to work as a NGO raising money from donors.

At the level of the sub-projects, the evaluation is also favorable. It is worth noting that none of the infrastructure constructed or rehabilitated by PAC has been damaged or destroyed, which is undoubtedly a reflection of the sense of ownership by the population of those assets which they contributed to create and which they have done their best to protect. The story regarding the operation and maintenance of the infrastructure is somewhat mixed, in the sense that there has been problems with the availability of teachers or nurses and that beneficiaries may be able to take care of routine maintenance only (but not periodic maintenance). However, staffing problems have been solved and the infrastructure are operating and providing services. Community participation, although introduced only recently in Congo, is a key factor for sustainability, which will be reinforced under the second project. Another positive factor in favor of sustainability is the involvement of NGOs and local associations which are likely to continue to provide support to communities in one form or another.

Transition Arrangements to Regular Operation

PAC has established itself as an organization well qualified to execute projects for donors, including the European Union, Sweden, UNDP, etc... IDA financing for a Second Reintegration Project is underway to be approved, and PAC will implement major components of the new project. PAC's capacity is now satisfactory; it can rely on improved manuals of technical and financial procedures and it has gained a lot of experience in contracting and training intermediaries to implement certain activities. With the new financing available, PAC should be able to continue to operate in a cost efficient manner.

Overall Bank Performance

Overall, the Bank performance can be rated as **"satisfactory"**

The frequency and scope of supervision by World Bank staff was affected by the security situation. At the beginning, because of insecurity, Bank staff visited the country only twice in a year. Fortunately, the Resident Mission (Bank Country Office) provided a continuous presence in the field and maintained good working relations with Government, PAC, and other partners involved in the project. The project had two different task managers in the Bank, who all did a

reasonably good job. Government and PAC acknowledge that, by and large, the Bank has shown flexibility and a willingness to help Congo in the difficult situation that it was experiencing. Thereafter, the Bank was very supportive of PAC's efforts to work with communities, local associations and NGOs in the execution of sub-projects.

Overall Government Performance

Overall, the Government's performance for the project is assessed as **satisfactory**.

There was close cooperation at the time of preparation between the Government and the Bank, and the leadership and vision provided by the World Bank ensured that the program that was developed was appropriate to Congo's needs. Representatives from all the counterpart agencies were involved in the preparation of the grant.

During the implementation phase, and under normal circumstances, the slow start of the project would indicate a lack of commitment to the project of both Government and PAC. However, as mentioned earlier, the main reason for the unsatisfactory performance at the beginning of the project was the country situation, probably the insecurity in the Pool region; Understandably, the Government had other things, than project implementation to worry about.

The project and PAC had the full support of Government, who did not interfere with its day-to-day operations and provided the agreed counterpart person on time. At the beginning of implementation, neither the Government nor PAC had a clear strategy on how to best carry out the project. It is only at a later stage that all parties involved could decide what type of actions would have the maximum impact in view of the country context. For example, what should be the priority projects and their specifications, how should the priority ones be replicated and implemented quickly, the roles of the different actors, the planning of activities, and what should be the monitoring and evaluation procedures.

Overall Implementing Agency Performance

The overall implementing agency performance can be rated as "**satisfactory**".

The performance of the executing agency, PAC, has varied over time. During the first year of the project, Project staff had very little experience in World Bank activities, procedures and moved along on a trial and error basis. The administration and finance side of PAC was particularly weak; accounts were not properly kept, payments to suppliers and contractors were delayed and financial audits were qualified. The situation began to improve considerably, when PAC contributed to the preparation of an internal action plan including improvements in the operational Manual currently used for UNDP funded projects.

Subsequently, following the appointment of a new PAC manager last year, the leadership has considerably changed from strategically thinking to operationally thinking. The impact of this is PAC embarked upon an important program of infrastructure construction and rehabilitation. PAC has implemented the project very efficiently and is today entirely committed to the project and the upcoming second project.

The main feature of this project is definitely the dedication and courage of PAC staff who continued to operate in basically the whole country under very difficult circumstances. This has also been the case for many NGOs/associations.

Lessons Learned

1. The most important lesson from the project is that, in a country in a state of crisis and where insecurity is rampant, this type of demand driven project at the community level may still

be implemented and build up community solidarity that could, eventually, contribute to national reconciliation and help the country to graduate to a "post-conflict" status. Achieving that through infrastructure may not be the best and only way to do it; but, at least experience shows that it can be done where few activities are carried out, provided that the project is based on a simple design for delivering urgently needed support quickly, taking into account the limited local capacity for project execution. This project is probably a good instrument for intervening in a "post-conflict" country.

2. Another related lesson is that in the recruitment of staff for a project implementation unit dealing with communities at the village level, it is important to select individuals with the right qualifications and experience, who are not politically motivated, who have the right personal characteristics to be effective leaders, and who are dedicated and courageous enough to be willing to work in the field despite the insecurity.

3. Finally, even a well designed and implemented project like the RRP is not a panacea for poverty reduction, if unforeseen circumstances lead to a deterioration of economic and social conditions in the whole country. However, the importance and significance of its localized, beneficial impact should not be underestimated. The grant was an effective instrument in an emergency, post conflict situation, for improving the provision of government services and enhance the prospect for national reconciliation. The economic, political and social returns from such an investment in a post-conflict is considerable. However to be effective, the design of the project needs to be sensitive to the capacities in such situation.

Partners Comments

As described previously, the project has been a successful post-conflict program because of its innovative approaches and specially designed strategies for increasing the level security and peace, for establishing successful community-government partnerships and for providing the foundation for long-term sustainability. Major targets were achieved in quantitative terms ahead of schedule.

Government

Globally, the Government is very satisfied with the project and the performance of PAC, who worked under extremely difficult conditions. The project has been very well received by the population who values the improvement in its living conditions brought about by the infrastructure construction/rehabilitation (schools, health centers and water supply).

Government is looking forward to the implementation of the second project and hopes that it will perform even better than the first project.

Implementing agency

The executing agency, PAC, is also satisfied with the role it played to improve the access of the population to basic social infrastructure. Its only regret is that it has not been able to process and finance all the requests that it has received, and it hopes to complete the job under the second project. Conditions in the field have been very difficult during project implementation, and at times people were wondering whether staff were in their right mind to carry on with their activities. The collaboration with the Bank has been excellent. PAC is pleased with the way the Bank has been listening-in to their problems and responding expeditiously to their requests, for disbursement for example.

The challenge now is how achievements made under the first project can be sustained and to identify possible sources of funding to support them

Co-financiers

There were no co-financiers in the project, although the project benefited from a number of simultaneous and complimentary activities financed in parallel by other donors. During interviews with some donors representatives (European Union, Sweden, ...), it was unanimous that the collaboration with the World Bank has been excellent and regular dialogues have taken place with the different task managers.

Other partners (NGOs)

The ICR mission interviewed members of seven NGOs and LDCs involved in the project and with offices in Brazzaville and Dolisie. Obviously, such a small sample is not representative of that group; nevertheless, those interviews provide some insight into what NGOs and local associations think of the project and PAC. The participation of a LDC, which regroup the residents of a community, in the development process is an interesting example in the Congo context of the solidarity that exists between those that have found jobs in Brazzaville or Dolisie and other cities, and those that have remained in the community. Apparently, communities for which there is an active LDC have experienced relatively few problems.

By and large, the NGOs and LDC were able to work in the field despite the insecurity, and they also confirmed that the completed infrastructures have been operationally maintained. On balance, their evaluation is very positive. They like the fact that PAC could finance sub-projects scattered throughout the country, close to the rural population. They also like the participatory approach of the project, with the requirement that beneficiaries make a contribution to the investment costs in the form of local materials or labor, although this meant that the implementation schedule of sub-projects had to be adjusted to the capacity of the beneficiaries to deliver their contribution. At first, they had some difficulty with the procedures to be followed, but they got used to them and managed to adjust, all the more so that PAC has been very flexible. Some, but not all, mentioned that certain cost items were not taken into account by PAC and that payments were sometimes delayed compared to the disbursement schedule in their contract with PAC.

Generally, NGOs and LDCs believe that beneficiaries should be able to take care of routine maintenance, but will need additional financing for periodic maintenance. One organization interviewed was involved with micro-credits and it was a failure; most of the beneficiaries disappeared to a another area or city, and the LDC organization must have to repay the micro-credits on their behalf. Also was interviewed one organization with mutual insurance and it was a failure; the General hospital officials refused to take part in the low-cost concept. All the persons interviewed paid tribute to the work and dedication of PAC staff.

Additional Information

The PAC (Projet d'Action Communautaire), as the project has been named in French, reflected the thrust of the project approach which put the beneficiaries at the heart of the development process and emphasized the self-help nature of the project. It was: (i) an operation relying on a demand driven concepts, based on the participation of beneficiaries, eventually represented and assisted by intermediaries agencies, such as NGOs and LDCs; (ii) consistent with the Bank's

Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the Republic of Congo which was discussed by the Board in *November 13, 2000*, and which called for a consolidation of its home-grown peace process, a flexible strategy that responds quickly to new information while maintaining an overall framework that promotes stability and security; (iii) based on the strength of (a) consistency of objectives with the priorities for poverty alleviation and post-conflict policies, (b) successful experience and lessons learned during project implementation; (c) demonstrated capacity of the implementing agency, and (d) project design, which accounted for institutional constraints and risks by incorporating flexibility and by fostering ownership at the community level.

No doubt, the beneficiary assessment confirmed the very positive impact of the project on employment. The number of beneficiaries is estimated to be far in excess of the initial estimate which had been grossly underestimated. The percentage of women and youth among the direct beneficiaries is now estimated at about 60 percent, as compared with an initial estimate of 50 percent. Sub-projects consisted mainly of social infrastructure: schools, health centers and water supply; the other sub-projects were for economic infrastructure such as small bridges and feeder roads. The mission confirmed that the quality of the completed sub-projects is generally good. A criticism made, however, is the lack of sanitary installations and water in some schools and health centers, which PAC is trying to remedy with other sources of financing, whenever technically feasible. Nevertheless, at times, the contribution of local materials by beneficiaries has been a problem and a challenge for PAC and NGOs. In some cases, this may have been due to a lack of ownership by the beneficiaries, as a consequence of insufficient community participation in the selection, financing and management of the infrastructure sub-projects (which is likely to also have a negative impact on the willingness of the communities to maintain the completed sub-projects).

An important way to evaluate the success of a project is to rely on the judgment and opinion of the beneficiaries themselves. The beneficiary assessment shows that the direct beneficiaries (i.e., the population) are satisfied with the results and impact of the project. As a matter of fact, they want more of the same. The completed infrastructures are already overcrowded, and future needs (including the areas that have not been served) are huge. For all infrastructure sub-projects, the main benefit for the population is improved access, such as the reduction in the time and effort required to go to a school or a health center or to fetch drinking-water. Infrastructure-specific benefits include an increase in school enrollment as a result of the construction of additional classrooms and an improvement in the health status of the population due to the health centers and water supply sub-projects.

An additive lesson, drawn to some extent from the project and confirmed from numerous Bank studies, is the importance of true community participation in assuring the timely contribution by beneficiaries to the sub-project costs as well as the maintenance and continued operation of Bank-financed infrastructure. The project responded to requests from the population, but it is not obvious that those requests always represented the priorities of the population, who might have been influenced by communal administrators or NGOs, and may not have necessarily known all the choices available to them. It is therefore crucial the second project seeks to improve community participation in the selection, financing and management of the infrastructure sub-projects and in the delivery of social services.

A focus on outcome and output indicators is critical, especially in more nebulous project activities such as "poverty alleviation". The Bank's current requirement to include these as a central aspect of any project is very useful and having this at the start of the project have helped to re-focus activities when circumstances changed.

For community-based development type projects, there should be a less prescriptive approach and more focus on sharing and articulating objectives and how they will be monitored. There should also be more recognition of the link between environment and health. Also, a greater role for women in management and implementation should be provided.

Annexes

Table 1: Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Output of Components

<u>Achievement of Objectives</u>	<u>High</u> (✓)	<u>Substantial</u> (✓)	<u>Modest</u> (✓)	<u>Negligible</u> (✓)	<u>Not Applicable</u> (✓)
Macro Policies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sector Policies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Financial Objectives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Institutional Development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Physical Objectives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Poverty Reduction	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gender Issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other Social Objectives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Environmental Objectives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Public Sector Management	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Private Sector Development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Table 2: Ratings of Bank and Borrower performance

<u>Bank Performance</u>	<u>High</u> (✓)	<u>Substantial</u> (✓)	<u>Modest</u> (✓)	<u>Negligible</u> (✓)	<u>Not Applicable</u> (✓)
Lending	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Overall	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<u>Borrower Performance</u>					
Preparation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Implementation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Implementation Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Overall	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Table 3: Community Action Program Contribution in Congo (US\$ millions)

DONOR	GRANT
IDA	1.0
PNUD	1.2
CONGO	0.2
SUEDE	0.5
ITALIE	0.3
OTHERS	0.1
TOTAL	3.2

Source: PAC

Table 4. Project Timetable

Steps in Project Cycle	Date Planned	Date Actual/Latest Estimate
PCF Steering Committee	January 17, 2001	
First Disbursement	February 2001	
Launch Mission	March 2001	
Supervision Mission	August 2001	
Second Disbursement	August 2001	
Closing Date	January 31, 2002	March 31, 2003

Table 5. Project Costs by component

	Amount budgeted	Amount disbursed	Achievement rate %
Component 1	63,000	68,238	108.3
Component 2	170,000	140,225	82.5
Component 3	688,200	613,895	89.2
Component 4	45,800	46,016	100.5
Component 5	33,000	37,236	112.8
TOTAL	1,000,000	905,610	90.6

Table 6: List of projects financed by PAC

Volet1 : Assainissement de la ville de Brazzaville:

Le projet a couvert les quartiers populeux de Brazzaville (Poto-Poto, Ouenzé et MOUNGALI) et qui a permis de desengorger une rivière sur 1810 mètres et permettant une libre circulation des eaux. Il occupe actuellement 90 jeunes.

Le projet (RATRIVOM) de 3 centres de Poto-Poto et 6 de Talangaï à Brazzaville a permis non seulement de d'assainir la ville, mais de disposer aux maraichers de Brazzaville de disposer du compost bon marché. Elle s'appuie essentiellement sur les associations de quartiers qui doivent garantir la pérennité de cette activité. Ce deuxième occupe déjà 300 personnes pour une activité décentralisée de salubrité publique, qui commence par être rémunératrice.

Ces deux projets ont créé une opportunité d'emplois stables pour 390 jeunes et ont résolu par la même occasion, un problème de compost nécessaire aux maraichers. Ils ont permis également d'améliorer la salubrité publique et par ricochet la santé des populations riveraines (240.000 habitants) avec la réduction significative des nids de moustiques (vecteurs du paludisme). Ils vont contribuer également à une utilisation rationnelle des jeunes en cette période post-conflit.

Volet 2 : Activités génératrices de revenus à Dolisie

Ce projet a relancé les activités agropastorales et s'appuie sur la formation et l'apprentissage pratique des métiers agropastoraux des jeunes. La première vague formée de 30 jeunes sont prêts à s'installer pour leur propre compte.

Volet 3 : appui à l'entretien des pistes rurales (533 Km de pistes rurales sur l'ensemble du territoire national)

Ce projet a mobilisé plus de deux mille cantonniers à travers le pays et a permis de réaliser l'entretien des principaux axes routiers desservant des zones ou des bassins significatifs de production dans les régions du Niari, de la Bouenza, du Pool des Plateaux et de la Cuvette-Ouest.

Point 2-a : Projet Communautaire d'Appui à la Réhabilitation/Reconstruction et Rééquipement de l'Ecole Primaire de Kinguebé à Dolisie

Le projet consiste en la réhabilitation et la reconstruction des édifices et la communauté a apporté du sable, du gravier mais aussi de la brique stabilisée cuite nécessaire à la reconstruction de l'édifice détruit.

Le Programme « Action communautaire » appuierait cette communauté dans les opérations de réhabilitation/reconstruction particulièrement dans l'achat de matériaux nécessaires et l'appui à l'encadrement des travaux.

Point 2-b Réhabilitation du Centre Agropastoral de MBOUNDA et Relance des Activités Maraîchères

Le Centre Agropastoral de MBounda vise l'insertion des jeunes par la formation pratique aux métiers agropastoraux.

Les jeunes installées pourront très vite assurer leur autonomie de fonctionnement grâce aux activités maraîchères. Le site pourra également mieux recycler ces déchets de maraîchage en les confiant aux porcs qui sont élevés sur place.

Point 2-c : Equipement du Lycée Technique inter-régional de Dolisie :

Le projet a vise a réduire le déficit en table-bancs contribuer tant soit peu à l'amélioration des conditions de suivi des cours et de formation dans ce lycée, et dans les autres établissements de la ville, le Programme « Action communautaire » entend doter ce Lycée Technique d'un atelier de Menuiserie charpenterie et d'une « salle machine ».

Dans cette perspective, ce projet va contribuer non seulement à l'amélioration de la qualité de la formation des élèves mais surtout permettre aux filières industrielles de générer des revenus nécessaires au bon fonctionnement de l'Etablissement, par la fabrication de tables-bancs et autres meubles car, la demande locale existe et elle est même importante.

L'intervention du programme Action Communautaire est circonscrite à la dotation d'une combinée machine (rabotage, tranchage à 7 opérations), des outils de travail et d'un stock de planches de départ pour les filières industrielles et par l'achat de quelques machines mécaniques, électriques et de quatre ordinateurs.

Point 2-d : Appui à l'assainissement et au désenclavement des quartiers périphériques de Dolisie (Dimebeko, Tahiti, Batsangui)

Le projet va se résumer en la location d'une tracto-pelle pour le curage de la rivière (en certains points) et par la construction d'un pont sur celle-ci. Il a permis d' améliorer la qualité de vie et désenclaver les quartiers Dimébéko, Tahiti et Batsangui par le curage de la rivière Pinarret et la construction d'un pont sur cette rivière.

C'est une activité à haute intensité de main d'œuvre qui va mobiliser près de cinq cent personnes (500), qui se fera avec l'appui du PAM à partir du Programme food for Work.

Point 2-e Réhabilitation et équipement de deux centres de santé dans la Circonscription Socio-Sanitaire de Dolisie (Londela-Kayes et Kimongo):

Le projet vise a réhabiliter le bâtiment de soins et la maternité de Kimongo et doter la population d'une couverture sanitaire de 15.000 Habitants.

Point 3 : Examen d'un projet communautaire d'appui aux activités agropastorales des groupements de NGandou à Madingou (Fonds tract):

Ce projet tri-dimensionnel vise à améliorer les revenus des deux groupements mais également à améliorer leur autonomie avec une production locale de pain qui passe par la réhabilitation du four existant sur le site. Les appuis du « Programme Action Communautaire » concernent particulièrement les actions ci-dessous répertoriées :

Nature des activités à entreprendre	Type d'intervention	Quantité	Montant exigé
Appui au Groupement des jeunes unis de NGandou	plomberie		281.000 F CFA
	Matériaux de construction		323.000 F CFA
	Matériel agricole		635.000 F CFA
	Elevage		380.000 F CFA
	Autres (transport M.O.)		150.000 FCFA
Appui au Groupement pour le développement rural de NGandou	Plomberie		285.000 F CFA
	Matériaux de construction		323.000 F CFA
	Matériel agricole		593.000 F CFA
	Elevage		380.000 F CFA
	Autres (transport M.O.)		150.000 F CFA
Réhabilitation du four à pain			624.500 F CFA
Total			4.124.500 F CFA

Table 7 Activities and Disbursements Status as of March 31, 2003

I° Agence d'exécution: OIT		Sous-Projet		Agence Exécution		Montant du Contrat	Montant décaissés	Engagements
1	Réinsertion économique des Jeunes de Poto-Poto			Organisation internationale du Travail (OIT)/DEX		29,800.00	30,283.80	-483.80
2	Mise en place des Mutuelles de santé de Madibou			Organisation internationale du Travail (OIT)/DEX		16,000.00	15,731.86	268.14
Total Activités menées par OIT						45,800.00	46,015.66	-215.66
II° Agence d'exécution : PNUD Action Communautaire								
3	Gestionnaire du Projet							
4	Appui à la réhabilitation des infrastructures dans le domaine de l'élevage porcin			Forum des Jeunes Entreprises (FJE)		48,000.00	47,040.63	959.37
5	Réhabilitation du Collège Conférence National			DEX (Entreprise de construction) Entreprise : ISSEMA Bâtiment		10,137.00	10,514.48	-377.48
6	Appui aux activités agropastorales (MADIBOU)			MADECOR		36,397.39	34,365.43	2,031.96
7	Assainissement eau potable (MADIBOU)			DEX / UNICEF		30,962.11	34,182.39	-3,220.28
8	Appui à la relance des activités des groupements d'artisans M'Filou			Association des Spiritains pour le Congo		9,853.00	8,864.71	988.29
9	Appui à la relance des activités maratchères			For. Promotion des Group. Ruraux		21,139.40	25,256.47	-4,117.06
10	Réhabilitation Ecole primaire à ITSALI M'Filou			SMEEC		17,039.15	12,009.53	5,029.62
11	Equipement Lycée Technique Dolisie			Batisseurs sans Frontières		11,923.78	17,602.30	-5,678.52
12	Réhabilitation école primaire Kigubé Dolisie			Batisseurs sans Frontières		42,857.14	34,003.06	8,854.08
13	Appui aux activités agricole Mbounda			Spiritains de Dolisie		14,285.71	7,821.04	6,464.67
14	Assainissement eau potable Dolisie			DEX/UNICEF		22,857.14	16,337.43	6,519.71
15	Réhabilitation 2 centres de santé Dolisie			ACTED		10,134.26	7,569.72	2,564.54
17	Construction pont et curage Pinarai Dolis.			DEX/ONG		34,285.71	18,683.43	15,602.29
18	Ramassage ordures mén. Poto?Talangai			Habitat et Ville		11,428.57	10,340.47	1,088.10
19	Curage de la rivière Madoukou			Habitat et Ville		87,971.58	75,960.22	12,011.35
20	Construction puits d'eau Talangai			DEX/UNICEF		33,928.05	35,362.24	-1,434.18
21	Construction puits d'eau M'Filou			DEX/UNICEF		25,000.00	11,457.88	13,542.12
22	Construction Poste de santé ITSALI			SMEEC		25,000.00	11,457.88	13,542.12
Total Activités PNUD Action Communautaire						508,200.00	436,132.62	72,067.38

III° Agence d'exécution UNICEF					
1	Communautés de base	UNICEF	63,000.00	68,238.00	-5,238.00
2	Traumatisme	UNICEF	50,000.00	48,822.00	1,178.00
3	Mobilisation sociale	UNICEF	80,000.00	80,360.00	-360.00
4	Mobilisation sociale et Nutrition	UNICEF	40,000.00	11,083.00	28,917.00
5	Réhabilitation serv. sociaux de base Eau	UNICEF	80,000.00	73,316.98	6,683.02
6	Réhabilitation services de base	UNICEF	50,000.00	85,275.00	-35,275.00
Total Activités UNICEF			363,000.00	367,094.98	-4,094.98
IV° Agence d'exécution : UNESCO					
1	Séminaire "Développement économique	OFDZA (Zanaga)	9,000.00	9,784.99	-784.99
2	Symposium sur la culture de la paix et étude sur la problématique d'intégration des réfugiés dans le Nord du CONGO	Association Panafricain Thomas Sankara + collectif enseignants sociologie, psychologie....	15,000.00	16,009.03	-1,009.03
3	Retraites des Jeunes pour l'unité nationale (Séminaire + tournoi sportif)	Jeunesse Chrétienne du Congo	9,000.00	11,441.74	-2,441.74
Total Activités UNESCO			33,000.00	37,235.76	-4,235.76
V° Autres Activités Action Communautaire					
1	Evaluations externes et Audits des Projets		25,000.00	13,229.38	11,770.62
2	Véhicule (Antenne de Dolisie)		25,000.00	24,018.62	981.38
Total Autres Activités			50,000.00	37,248.00	12,752.00
Total des Engagements en-cours Fonds Banque mondiale			1,000,000.00	923,727.02	76,272.98
Total des Dépenses Fonds Banque Mondiale au 31/03/2003			923,727.02		
Taux d'exécution (Dépenses/Engagements) au 31/03/2003			92.37%		