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## PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

### Learning and Advisory Process on Difficult Partnerships (LAP)

DRAFT

*At the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, held in London, 13-14 January 2005, it was agreed that a short list of principles for good international engagement in fragile states be drafted and circulated by the Co-Chairs of the LAP. At the HLM on March 3 2005, Ministers and Heads of Agencies agreed that the draft principles should be field tested.*

*These draft Principles are thus put forward to act as the basis for the field testing exercise.*

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## PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES

### PREAMBLE

A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world's most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but the adoption of the following shared principles can help maximize the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm.<sup>1</sup>

The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers to build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions. Realisation of this objective requires taking account of and acting according to the following principles:

**1. Take context as the starting point.** All fragile states require sustained international engagement, but analysis and action must be calibrated to particular country circumstances. It is particularly important to recognize different constraints of *capacity* and *political will* and the different needs of: (i) countries *recovering* from conflict, political crisis or poor governance; (ii) those facing *declining* governance environments, and; (iii) those where the state has partially or wholly *collapsed*. Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country context, above and beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength.

**2. Move from reaction to prevention.** Action today can reduce the risk of future outbreaks of conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. A shift from reaction to prevention should include sharing risk analyses; acting rapidly where risk is high; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening the capacity of regional organizations to prevent and resolve conflicts; and helping fragile states themselves to establish resilient institutions which can withstand political and economic pressures.

**3. Focus on state-building as the central objective.** States are fragile when governments and state structures lack capacity – or in some cases, political will - to deliver public safety and security, good governance and poverty reduction to their citizens. The long-term vision for international engagement in these situations must focus on supporting viable sovereign states. State-building rests on three pillars: the capacity of state structures to perform core functions; their legitimacy and accountability; and ability to provide an enabling environment for strong economic performance to generate incomes, employment and domestic revenues. Demand for good governance from civil society is a vital component of a healthy state. State-building in the most fragile countries is about depth, not breadth – international engagement should maintain a tight focus on improving governance and capacity in the most basic security, justice, economic and service delivery functions.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The piloting of the Principles will draw on the experience of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles endorsed in Stockholm (June 2003).

<sup>2</sup> For governments where political will exists and capacity is the main constraint, supporting state-building means direct support for government plans, budgets, decision-making processes

**4. Align with local priorities and/or systems.** Where governments demonstrate political will to foster their countries' development but lack capacity, international actors should fully align assistance behind government strategies. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance, international actors should nevertheless consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Another approach is to use 'shadow alignment' – which helps to build the base for fuller government ownership and alignment in the future - by ensuring that donor programs comply as far as possible with government procedures and systems. This can be done for example by providing information in appropriate budget years and classifications, or by operating within existing administrative boundaries.

**5. Recognise the political-security-development nexus.** The political, security, economic and social spheres are interdependent: failure in one risks failure in all others. International actors should move to support national reformers in developing unified planning frameworks for political, security, humanitarian, economic and development activities at a country level. The use of simple integrated planning tools in fragile states, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities and improve the coherence of international support across the political, security, economic, development and humanitarian arenas.

**6. Promote coherence between donor government agencies.** Close links on the ground between the political, security, economic and social spheres also require policy coherence within the administration of each international actor. What is necessary is a whole of government approach, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. Recipient governments too need to ensure coherence between different government ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.

**7. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors.** This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. In these fragile contexts, it is important to work together on upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; coordination of political engagement; multi-donor trust funds; and practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offices and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities.

**8. Do no harm.** International actors should especially seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as bypassing national budget processes<sup>3</sup> or setting high salaries for local staff which undermine recruitment and retention in national institutions. Donors should work out cost norms for local staff remuneration in consultation with government and other national stakeholders.

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and implementing structures. In countries where political will is the main constraint, support for long-term state-building does not necessarily imply short-term support for government - but it does mean moving beyond repeated waves of humanitarian responses to a focus on how to support and strengthen viable national institutions which will be resilient in the longer-term. A vibrant civil society is also important for healthy government and may play a critical transitional role in providing services, particularly when government lacks will and/or capacity.

<sup>3</sup> The Addis Ababa principle developed in November 2001 as part of the Strategic Partnership for Africa Initiative states: "All donor assistance should be delivered through government systems unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary; where this is not possible, any alternative mechanisms or safeguards must be time-limited and develop and build, rather than undermine or bypass, governmental systems."

**9. Mix and sequence aid instruments to fit the context.** Fragile states require a mix of aid instruments, including, in particular for countries in promising but high risk transitions, support to recurrent financing. Instruments to provide long-term support to health, education and other basic services are needed in countries facing stalled or deteriorating governance – but careful consideration must be given to how service delivery channels are designed to avoid long-term dependence on parallel, unsustainable structures while at the same time providing sufficient scaling up to meet urgent basic and humanitarian needs. A vibrant civil society is important for healthy government and may also play a critical transitional role in providing services, particularly when the government lacks will and/or capacity.

**10. Act fast...** Assistance to fragile states needs to be capable of flexibility at short notice to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground.

**11. ...but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.** Given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, investments in development, diplomatic and security engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other low-income countries: capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilizing for fragile states, international actors commit to improving aid predictability in these countries, by developing a system of mutual consultation and coordination prior to a significant reduction in programming.

**12. Avoid pockets of exclusion.** International engagement in fragile states needs to address the problems of “aid orphans” - states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement but few donors are now engaged and aid volumes are low. To avoid an unintentional exclusionary effect of moves by many donors to be more selective in the partner countries for their aid programs, coordination on field presence and aid flows, and mechanisms to finance promising developments in these countries are essential.