Preliminary Draft

TAKING STOCK OF RESEARCH ON INTERNAL MIGRATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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INTRODUCTION

Over generations, people have migrated in response to demographic, economic, political and related factors. The recent boom in international migration, however, calls for new policy approaches that will help maximize the potential benefits of migration, especially for poor people, while minimizing its risks and costs. To this end, there is need for more research and investigative work to inform the policy and academic debates on the matter. To take stock from what has been done and get a sense of where new efforts may be most beneficial an overview is needed of where the knowledge on the topic stands today.

This study reviewed a host of issues involving international migration within Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and aims to present an overview of the state of the art of research and knowledge in this field. The review points out areas where it is essential to focus future research efforts and policy actions for a better understanding and management of migration in Sub-Sahara Africa. The research attempts to cover a broad area of issues pertaining to the migration literature, but does not claim to have captured all publications that have been written on the subject.

This paper is organized into eight sections. Following this introduction, section 2 provides an historical overview of migration phenomena in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 focuses on scale and regional trends of migration. Section 4 explores the intersections between migration and labor market. Section 5 discusses the links between migration and development. Section 6 looks at institutions and policies issues. Section 7 investigates issues related to politics, ethics, and migration. Finally, section 8 offers conclusions and discusses implications for further investigation.

II - HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

2.1. Characterization of migration

Geographic mobility, or migration, has always been an integral part of the social process of the world (Bilger and Kraler 2005). Facilitated in recent years by improved transportation and communications and stimulated by large economic and social inequalities in the world, people are increasingly moving across national borders in an effort to improve their own well-being and that of their family.

Migration of human populations is generally recognized as an integral part of the process of socioeconomic development. It ensures the mobility of labor and its associated human capital between regions and occupations. In a competitive economy, migration serves as an adjustment in factor markets to bring factor markets in different geographical areas into equilibrium (Byerlee 1972). The historical economic development of western Europe and the United States was closely associated with, and indeed defined in terms of, the movement of labor from rural to urban areas (Todaro 1977).

No generally accepted typology of migration flows exists, but commonly, in the literature, authors classify contemporary migration flows in Sub-Saharan African temporal and spatial dimensions. The temporal aspect of migration relates both to the distance traversed and the duration of residence at the destination. In the temporal dimension, Sub-Saharan African migrations include seasonal migration, short-term migration for a period of two to five years, and long-term or permanent migrations.

Spatially, migrations may be rural to rural, rural to urban, urban to rural, or urban to urban (Amselle 1976). Others less common typology concerns chain and group migration, which are common in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chain migration arise from the fact that migrants rely on the network of social relations (friends, relatives, town-folk) that provide accommodation on arrival and assist in securing employment. Unlike voluntary migration, which derives mainly from economic factors, the reasons for mass or group migration within and across national borders in Sub-Saharan Africa are noneconomic, and are related to political and religious factors, and sometimes, natural disasters.

The relative importance of each of these types of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa has varied historically. Seasonal migration between rural areas is important in areas of Sub-Saharan Africa with a pronounced dry season. Historically, seasonal migration to the forest during the dry season has been the most important and widespread in the semi-arid areas (Byerlee 1979). Generally, migrants leave their farms in the savanna zone immediately after harvest in November–December and return for planting in April–May. Short-term migration between rural and urban areas has historically been important throughout Sub-Saharan Africa during the colonial period. Typically, men migrated from their village for a period of two to five years to work in mines, plantations, and factories, sometimes at considerable distance from their home area. Often men would make such a trip several times during their lifetime, giving rise to a "circular" pattern of migration. With increasing unemployment, the competition of a growing body of school leavers, and the closing of international boundaries, the short-term migrant has gradually phased into a permanent migrant, leading to a rapid rates of urbanization accompanied by serious problems of urban unemployment.

2.2. Anthropology of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa

Early analysis concluded that migration began in many Sub-Saharan Africa countries as a result of colonial policies and practices (Eicher and Baker 1984). This simplistic view ignored the possible role of the pre-colonial environment. Today it is increasingly accepted that in order to deeply understand migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to position the phenomenon correctly within the relevant anthropological context in which it originated.

Africa has long been described as an extremely mobile continent. For example, European travelers in the nineteenth century deplored the "elusiveness" and instability of African settlements and villages, which were easily created and easily abandoned (Bilger and Kraler 2005). The instability of African settlements and related practices of extensive land use and shifting cultivation is also cited as indicator of the mobility of the population. Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa has long been characterized by slash-andburn systems wherein farmers use long periods of fallowing to restore soil fertility. Facing declining land productivity, farmers have adjusted by expanding cultivation into marginal land and colonizing new forest areas, giving rise to the shifting cultivation practice (Nkamleu and Manyong 2005).

Past movements took different forms and directions and were triggered by a variety of factors. An important fact that emerges from the African migration literature is that population movements in the pre-colonial era were associated largely with the prevailing sociopolitical and ecological conditions, especially internecine warfare, natural disasters, slavery, and the search for farm land. (Adepoju 1998; Adedokun 2003). It has been suggested that the contemporary phenomenon of massive out-migration from the rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa may represent a continuation in a different guise of earlier migratory movements provoked by slavery and slave trade on the continent (Mabogunje 1990).

Migration within and between different regions in Africa has therefore reflected the general global pattern in which a set of push factors—notably a deteriorating economy, political instability, droughts, and wars—are largely responsible for the exit of people from the sending countries/areas, and other pull factors—such as relative economic prosperity, peace, and stability—are responsible for the attraction of migrants to the receiving countries/areas. As a result, the movements were unstructured and occurred in groups; the migrants were demographically undifferentiated.

This pre-colonial migration in Africa was basically oriented toward trade, labor, and religion (for pilgrimages) and occurred without legal restraints and barriers. The absence of strict legal restrictions made it possible for nomads, farm workers, seamen, traders, and preachers to migrate freely and frequently across international borders, even during the colonial era (Adedokun 2003). Little-organized, these movements were generally circular, seasonal, and of short duration. Pastoral nomads moved across countries in response to seasonal climatic change. Examples are pastoralists moving between Somalia and Ethiopia, between Kenya and Tanzania, and between northern Nigeria and Cameroon (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006). Sedentary farmers also moved seasonally in search of supplementary income during the dry and therefore slack farming period from the drier interior into the plantations (cocoa and coffee) of western Africa and also to the coastal farm estates (cotton and tea) of eastern Africa (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2006).

2.3. Colonial interferences

An analysis of the development of migration in the post-independence period since 1960 should be rooted in an understanding of colonial strategies. Knowledge and understanding of these strategies is essential to an understanding of patterns and configuration of the actual migration in the region.

Various policies and activities in Sub-Saharan Africa during both the colonial and post-colonial eras have induced considerable rural labor movements at early stages in the development process (Mabogunje 1990). Rural migration began in many African countries as a result of colonial policies and practices, which superimposed a monetized economy on peasant production (Eicher and Baker 1984). Starting in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the mechanisms displacing migrants from their rural homes were many and varied. A high degree of coercion was needed to initiate it. Colonial taxation policies, for example, required cash payments and therefore necessitated wage work. The colonialists also introduced cash crops. In eastern and southern Africa, white settlers monopolized this production; in western Africa (where climate and malaria discouraged white settlers), Africans were constrained (through tax and labor policies) to produce cash crops for European markets. In many areas, peasant cash crop production has led indirectly to out-migration because cash crop have disrupted the production of food crops, resulting in a need to engage in wage labor to pay for foodstuffs. In some areas, cash cropping competes with subsistence crops for land, labor, and resources. While often more lucrative than food crops, cash crops also entail more risk; when prices fall, or are kept down by government policies, household income flows may be threatened, resulting in the need to migrate (Amselle 1976).

Both the pattern of rural migration and the evolving character of the agrarian response to it can be viewed as the consequences of the integration of the local economies of Sub-Saharan Africa into the expanding world capitalist system. This process entailed the restructuring of the prevailing pre-capitalist modes of production. In Sub-Saharan Africa, restructuring involved the establishment of one of many modes of agricultural production within what came to be identified as the colonial territories of various European nations (Mabogunje 1990). These colonial modes of production, beyond their more obvious effects on such matters as race relations, the land tenure system, and land availability, generally exerted a traumatic and momentous impact throughout the rural social structure. In Sub-Saharan Africa, labor rather than land has always been the factor of production in short supply. The mechanisms of procuring labor for these various modes of colonial production had far-reaching consequences for traditional institutional arrangements and rural class formation and provoked diverse responses to ensure the continued viability of agrarian economies in most parts of the region (Amselle 1976; Mabogunje 1990).

Colonial strategies varied widely throughout Africa; it is difficult to generalize about the impact of these strategies on the countries. A large majority of African countries are former colonies of France or England. British colonial policy in Kenya, for example, promoted extensive European settlements. Sourenson's (1967) assessment of Kenyan agriculture during the colonial period reveals that much of the best land was reserved for Europeans starting in the late 1890s. Head taxes were introduced to encourage small farmers to produce cash crops and to sell their labor to European plantations and mines. On the other hand, British colonial policy in The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone sharply restricted plantation development and settlement by white farmers. In fact British colonial policy in Nigeria prevented private plantations from gaining long-term control over land (Eicher and Baker 1984).

In contrast to British policy, which restricted settlers and plantations in Nigeria, French policy encouraged Europeans to establish plantations to grow coffee and cocoa in Côte d'Ivoire. Some processes of labor recruitment were adopted by the French colonial administration in western Africa. Indeed, until 1946, every male in French Western Africa between the ages of 18 and 60 was subject by law to an annual *corvée*, which requires him to contribute a certain number of days' labor to whatever enterprise the administration assigned him.

But gradually throughout the continent, forced labor as a means of mobilizing workers for agricultural production came to be regarded as unsatisfactory and was replaced by the levying of taxes on the native population. Officially, this system was justified on the grounds that the colonized people should contribute to the cost of their administration. But in reality, the tax compelled the local populations to find ways of raising money and, hence, to participate in the emerging monetized capitalist-oriented economy (Mabogunje 1990). Gradually, Ivorians started to grow coffee and cocoa on small plots scattered throughout the forest, but since they used European techniques, they were called planters. In a study of rural out migration in Mali, Mazur (1984) reported that the French undermined local craft production with cheap imported goods and imposed head taxes to mobilize the Malians as laborers, who met their cash needs by migrating to work on peanut farms in Senegal, and on cocoa plantations in Ghana and the Côte d'Ivoire. This massive migration is stated to have been exacerbated by the French strategy of contrived stagnation and unbalanced investment in the interior regions of western Africa. Vastly disproportionate investment occurred throughout this period, particularly between 1945 and 1960, in the coastal areas (Mazur, 1984).

In eastern and southern Africa, migrants were not directly coerced. Rather, a series of strong economic policies were used to induce labor of the required quality and quantity to work in the mines and plantations (Adepoju 1998). In South Africa in particular, workers' families have been prevented from living with them at the work-site since 1963 (Adepoju 1998). This prohibition, coupled with low pay and poor working conditions, initially led to high labor turnover. Indeed, the conditions favoring such a situation were designed to maintain low subsistence wages and promote a temporary and targeted pattern of migration.

2.4. ***Theoretical and empirical approaches underlying migration research in Africa***

Research on migration and population mobility has long been an important subject in African studies. Several theoretical approaches have been followed to study the phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the basis of a large review of the literature, Eicher and Baker (1984) argue that there are three broad and interrelated schools of thought or theoretical perspectives on migration: structural-functionalist, neoclassical economics, and political economy.

The structural functionalist has a long history. This approach examines the individual decision to migrate within a broad pattern of social relationship and social-structural conditions, including some economic variables. This approach generally presents a positive view of migration.

Neoclassic economics treats migration as an economic phenomenon in which the migrant weighs the costs and returns from current and future employment opportunities. A turning point in migration research by neoclassical economist came with Todaro's ‘‘expected incomes’’ model of migration (1977). Todaro's seminal contribution has provided a framework for much of the econometric work on migration in the past decade.

In the political economy approach, the historical expansion of capitalism is viewed as the main explanation of migration. It is assumed that while migration may improve the private economic return of the individual migrant, the net short- and long-term social and economic effects of migration may be negative in the source area and positive in the receiving area.

Some authors (Miro and Potter 1980) argue that theory of the international migration has not acquired any meaning in the field. The pattern, determinants, and consequences of international migration seem to vary enormously between regions and often between countries, as well as over time (Miro and Potter 1980).

Until recently, migration research in Africa was almost exclusively the domain of anthropologists, sociologists, and geographers. These past researches have yielded a large body of knowledge of the characteristics of migrants and the migration process, but little information on the economic factors affecting migration. Byerlee (1972) reviewed several hundred migration studies in Africa and reported that the bulk of research on migration over the 1950–70 period was carried out by sociologists, geographers, and demographers relying on census data and cross-sectional surveys of migrants in urban areas. Much of the early research on migration tended to focus on social, cultural, and psychological factors, while recognizing, but not carefully evaluating, the importance of economic variables that influence migration (Todaro 1977). The factors influencing the decision to migrate are varied and complex. People who are considering changes in residence take into account many factors, including the monetary costs and returns from migration, the services and amenities available in the region of origin and destination, and the intangible costs of adapting to a new environment. Since migration is a selective process affecting individuals with certain economic, social, educational, and demographic characteristics, the relative influence of economic and non-economic factors may vary not only between nations and regions but also within defined geographic areas and populations.

Recent studies in Sub-Saharan Africa have concluded that economic motivates are the primary determinant of the quantity and direction of migration flows (Byerlee 1972; Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). These recent economic analyses of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa have centered around rural-urban migration. They use as a point of departure the theoretical work of Todaro, in which the migrant bases his or her decision on the discounted present value of the difference between urban expected income (taking into account the probability of finding a job) and rural expected income, less the cost of moving (Todaro 1977; Stier 1982). Age and level of education influence the expected income differential greatly. Artificially high wages in the urban formal sector (because of minimum wage laws, for example) increase the differential between expected rural income and expected urban income and can induce increased rural-urban migration, even where urban unemployment is already substantial. Under this model, efforts to increase formal sector employment often induce migration and result in higher unemployment rates than were found originally. Invariably every migration study in Africa concludes that the immigrants were mostly males in the young working ages and better educated than the average rural resident (Eicher and Baker 1984; Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980).

Most recent work focuses on both migration and development. Increasing attention is being given to the issue of remittance flows. These remittances are becoming a major source of foreign capital for dozens of countries in the region (Ozden and Schiff 2006).

2.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, tropical Africa rural-rural migrations have become prevalent only since the first decade of the twentieth century, according to the growing literature on aspects of labor migration before independence. This migration from the rural areas of most countries began as a response to demand for wage-earning labor of an emergent capitalist economy. All past studies suggest that the number of migrant into the cities as well as into other rural areas has increased considerably since the end of the Second World War and that the number of rural areas that attract migrant farmers has also increased.

Colonial rule paved the way for peace and political stability. Movements previously associated with internecine warfare ceased or were reduced. However, these movements have resurfaced in a different pattern, in the form of refugees, as independent nations have engaged in war (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone), internal conflict (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan), or political discord (Zimbabwe). Natural disasters persist; the drought in the Sahel region of western Africa and parts of eastern Africa has dislodged many thousand of people, including women and small children. The search for new and fertile land continues, and the number of landless poor has increased considerably, notably in eastern Africa.

The economic theory of migration to date has been similar to the theory of trade. Migration, however, is a much more complex phenomenon than trade. Like trade, migration is likely to enhance economic growth and the welfare of both natives and migrants, and restrictions on migration are likely to have economic costs. However, people move for a variety of reasons, by no means all economic. There are significant externalities—both social and economic—to migration. Further economic conceptualization is needed to integrate all these aspects in order to have a realistic picture of the migration framework.

III - SCALE STRUCTURE AND REGIONAL TRENDS OF MIGRATION IN SUB-SARAN AFRICA

This section concentrates on the trend and actual stocks of migrants in different regions in Africa. Measuring migration is difficult, and the migration rates that are most commonly estimated pose special problems of interpretation. For example, the definition of "foreign-born" residents differs from country to country and from survey to survey. Some classify a person on the basis of the ethnicity of the parent; others use classifications based on the place of birth. To complicate matters, much of the international migration in Africa has occurred and still occurs outside of a regulatory framework. In addition, the usual estimate for net urban growth due to migration (urban growth rate less national growth rate) may often be inflated by the reclassification of rural areas into urban ones.

The most common sources of information on migration are national census reports delineating the numbers of foreign-born or foreign nationals. Unfortunately, census data are not available for many countries. Even when they exist, most authors recognize that there are several sources of potential bias in the available census data of the countries for which some census-based migration data are available. However, census data provide a fairly solid, conservative baseline estimate of the numbers of migrants and general directions of their movement (Page and Plaza 2005; Lucas 2005). This section relies on estimates of migrant stocks compiled by the United Nations (UN) Population Division and few scattered data released by past publications on migration to depict the trend of migration in different region of Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.1. Western Africa

A well-done survey of research carried out by Stier (1982) yields some indication of the migration stock in western Africa in the period before independence. Stier argues that the volume of emigration was light in western Africa until 1923, but increased from 1924 to 1932. Forced recruitment for work increased in the plantations of Côte d'Ivoire, but Ghana remained the principal destination until 1932. The partitioning of Upper Volta (later Burkina Faso) among Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Niger in 1932 facilitated conscription, and the flow of workers to Côte d'Ivoire increased. Forced labor was officially abolished between 1936 and 1939, but administrative pressure increased the amount of semi-voluntary emigration to Côte d'Ivoire from roughly 4,000 to around 9,500 people. Forced labor was reinstituted in 1940, and the number of voltaic workers in Côte d'Ivoire reached roughly 71,000 by 1942. With the abolition of forced labor and the reconstitution of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), emigration to Ghana increased for a few years, but Côte d'Ivoire became the principal destination after 1950. In Togo, there was little investment during the colonial period, and many public sector jobs were held by Dahomeyans. Many Togolese emigrated. There were at least 75,000 Togolese nationals in Ghana by 1925–30. By 1960, the number had risen to 280,000 (Zachariah, Condé , and Nair, 1980).

In Mali (Soudan Francais), the motivation for young men to take up seasonal work in the groundnut regions of Senegal and Gambia was, as in Upper Volta, mostly to escape recruitment for forced labor and to earn money to pay taxes (David 1980). The number of Sudanian workers in the groundnut areas may well have reached 25,000 to 30,000 by 1920–21 (David 1980). The numbers fell sharply in the early 1930s as earnings fell with the drop in the world groundnut price, but rose to 34,000 by 1938 and continued to fluctuate between roughly 7,000 and 25,000 through 1960 (David 1980).

Migration from Guinea (particularly the Fouta Djallon) followed a similar pattern. Before World War I, the major groups in movement were recently freed slaves (David 1980). Emigration increased in volume in the years after World War I as military recruitment and conscription for forced labor intensified, and as households found themselves unable to cultivate sufficient cash crops (rubber and coffee) to pay their taxes. By 1956, roughly 10,000 to 15,000 Guineans had emigrated to the region of Kedegou in eastern Senegal, and approximately another 14,000 had settled in the Casamance (Balde 1977).

David (1980) argues that seasonal migration from Guinea to the groundnut areas of Senegambia began in the early 1920s. By 1932, 10,000 Guinean seasonal workers were registered in Senegal; the number of seasonal emigrants from Guinea had increased to 35,000 by 1936. Most of these migrants came from the Fouta Djallon. From the matrix of source and destination countries presented in Table 1, it is possible to get a feel of the major direction of movements as of 1975. The table drawn from Stier (1982), shows that the principal sending areas for emigrants, by decreasing order of importance, has been Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Togo. Together, these four countries supplied almost 73 percent of the region's total foreign nationals. The most important receiving area, by far, is Côte d'Ivoire, followed by Ghana and Senegal.

Table 2 summarizes the data on migration demographic indicators for western Africa countries from 1975 to 2005. The table contains data on growth rate of the immigrants stock and immigrants as a proportion of the total population in western African countries. The growth rate of the immigrant stock estimates the average exponential growth rate of the international migrant stock over each period indicated, expressed in percentage terms. International migrants as a percentage of the total population estimates the number of international migrants divided by the total population, expressed as a percentage. The proportion of western Africa immigrants in the total population varied widely as of 2005, ranging from a low of 0.3 percent in Mali to a high of 15.3 percent in Gambia. Immigrants constituted almost 3 percent of the total population in western Africa in 2005. The data on the growth rate of migrants reveals that many countries in the region alternate between being net immigrant and net emigrant areas. In Sub-Saharan Africa, as in other regions of the world, migration is extremely unstable over time. Among the countries in the world with the highest coefficient of variation in the net migration rate in the past fifty years the top four, and twenty-two of the top fifty, are in Sub-Saharan Africa, according to Lucas (2005).

Table 1. Distribution of Foreign Nationals by Country of Origin, Broken Down by Country of Destination, Selected Western African Countries, 1975
Percent, except as indicated

	Country of destination									
Country of nationality	Ghana	Côte d'Ivoire	Burkina Faso[a]	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Togo	Liberia	Gambia	Mali	Percent of foreign nationals from each country of origin for region as a whole
Ghana	n.a.	3.0	17.3	2.8	5.8	50.0	11.8	--	--	3.7
Côte d'Ivoire	3.3	n.a.	44.4	0.4	--	--	2.7	---	7.9	2.6
Burkina Faso[a]	28.3	50.9	n.a.	3.9	1.0	16.0	--	--	47.7	34.2
Senegal	0.01	1.3	2.1	n.a.	--	--	0.4	48.4	11.5	2.1
Sierra Leone	0.05	0.07	0.4	0.2	n.a.	--	8.6	0.8	1.0	0.4
Togo	43.5	0.8	2.9	--	--	n.a.	0.2	--	--	9.3
Liberia	0.8	0.2	0.7	0.1	13.8	--	n.a.	0.6	1.0	0.8
Gambia	0.01	0.007	0.1	12.8	4.3	--	-	n.a.	1.0	1.8
Mali	2.4	24.4	21.8	8.1	--	--	2.5	10.5	n.a.	15.0
Guinea	--	7.4	--	50.8	51.6	--	45.6	32.5	24.1	14.2
Nigeria	9.9	3.5	2.0	--	9.2	--	3.1	--	--	4.2
Other	11.2	8.2	8.3	23.3	14.2	44.0	25.1	7.3	5.8	11.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total foreign nationals (number)	562, 100	1, 425, 900	100,000	355 000	79 400	60 000	55 700	52 300	100 000	2 ,790 ,400
Percent of total population of country of destination	6.6	21.3	1.9	7.1	3.0	3.1	3.7	10.6	1.7	7

Source: Stier (1982).
-- = not available
n.a. = not applicable
a. Burkina Faso was known as Upper Volta until ____ .

Table 2. Growth Rate of the International Migrant Stock and International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population, Western Africa
Percent, as indicated

		1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05
Western Africa	Growth rate	3.6	-2.5	5.0	5.8	1.4	1.0
	Migrants as %of population	3.3	2.5	2.8	3.3	3.1	2.9
Benin	Growth rate	2.6	3.3	2.4	13.0	-1.8	5.3
	Migrants as % of population	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.4	1.9	2.1
Burkina Faso	Growth rate	9.4	9.4	4.6	5.9	4.2	6.0
	Migrants as % of population	2.6	3.7	4.0	4.7	5.1	5.8
Cape Verde	Growth rate	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.5
	Migrants as % of population	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.2
Côte d'Ivoire	Growth rate	-0.3	1.8	3.2	3.4	0.2	0.3
	Migrants as % of population	18.2	15.8	15.4	15.7	14.0	13.1
Gambia	Growth rate	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
	Migrants as of population	11.6	12.2	12.6	13.3	14.1	15.3
Ghana	Growth rate	1.8	3.2	7.4	7.4	7.4	2.1
	Migrants as % of population	3.7	3.7	4.6	5.9	7.6	7.5
Guinea	Growth rate	1.5	1.5	11.9	15.5	-3.4	-11.9
	Migrants as % of population	4.3	4.1	6.5	11.6	8.7	4.3
Guinea-Bissau	Growth rate	0.5	-0.4	1.9	16.6	-10.0	-0.1
	Migrants as % of population	1.6	1.4	1.4	2.7	1.4	1.2
Liberia	Growth rate	4.8	0.6	-0.5	18.0	-4.4	-23.1
	Migrants as % of population	4.3	3.8	3.8	9.3	5.2	1.5
Mali	Growth rate	-2.9	-2.9	-0.5	1.0	-5.3	-0.8
	Migrants as % of population	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.3
Mauritania	Growth rate	5.1	5.1	15.3	4.5	-12.6	1.1

		1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05
	Migrants as % of population	2.1	2.4	4.6	5.1	2.4	2.1
Niger	Growth rate	2.0	2.0	2.1	3.8	-2.8	0.5
	Migrants as % of population	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.0	0.9
Nigeria	Growth rate	12.5	-26.6	5.0	5.2	5.1	5.1
	Migrants as % of population	1.9	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7
Senegal	Growth rate	-5.2	7.1	10.9	1.7	-1.5	1.8
	Migrants as % of population	2.0	2.5	3.7	3.5	2.9	2.8
Sierra Leone	Growth rate	2.0	2.0	2.6	-14.4	-3.1	18.8
	Migrants as % of population	2.7	2.7	2.7	1.3	1.0	2.2
Togo	Growth rate	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
	Migrants as % of population	5.5	4.7	4.1	3.8	3.3	3.0

Source: Authors' calculations, based on World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database (http://esa.un.org/migration/).

3.2. Central Africa

The magnitude of the migration flow in middle (central) Africa is presented in table 3, based on data series from 1975 to 2005 gathered from the UN population database. For the 2000–05 period, two countries (Cameroon and Democratic Republic of Congo) had a net loss of migrants, while the others experienced a net gain. Growth rate is particularly noticeable in Chad. This can be attributed to the vast movement of refugees from Sudan and voluntary immigrants seeking job in oil companies. The share of migrants as a percentage of the population is particularly high in Gabon. Almost 18 percent of the populations of Gabon are immigrants.

In middle Africa, movements of refugees have been a major—and, in some cases, the main—component of international migration flows among (mainly neighboring) countries. On average, refugees constituted 38.8 percent of the international migrants of the region (table 4). Together with eastern Africa, middle Africa is the main host of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa. The larger country-sources of refugees are well known: Liberia, Burundi, Eritrea, Somalia, Angola, and Sierra Leone. In addition however, such countries as Mauritania, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and Chad each generated more than six refugees per thousand of the population. The distinctions between refugees and other migrants are not always apparent because of ethnical similarities across borders. Also among the important countries of asylum were several major countries of refugee origin, including Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Central African Republic (Lucas 2005).

Dealing with forced displacement continues to be an important issue in the middle Africa region. There is considerable scope to facilitate regional networks to support recent regional initiatives that focus on developing a regional framework for refugee protection.

Table 3. Growth Rate of the International Migrant Stock and International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population, Central Africa
Percent, as indicated

		1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05
Central Africa	Growth rate	1.6	-4.4	-0.6	11.6	-11.6	3.2
	Migrants as % of population	3.6	2.5	2.1	3.2	1.6	1.6
Angola	Growth rate	21.5	3.8	-23.6	2.2	4.1	4
	Migrants as % of population	1.1	1.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Cameroon	Growth rate	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5	-1.5
	Migrants as % of population	2.3	1.8	1.5	1.2	1	0.8
CAR	Growth rate	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
	Migrants as % of population	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9
Chad	Growth rate	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	5.8	28.6
	Migrants as % of population	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.3	4.5
Congo, Rep. of	Growth rate	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3
	Migrants as % of population	4.2	4.7	5.2	5.8	6.4	7.2
Congo, Dem. Rep. of	Growth rate	0.7	-7.7	-0.3	16.0	-21.0	-5.7
	Migrants as % of population	4.9	2.9	2.4	4.6	1.4	0.9
Equatorial Guinea	Growth rate	-6.5	-6.5	-6.5	5.0	5.0	5.0
	Migrants as % of population	2.4	1.2	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.2
Gabon	Growth rate	8.5	3.0	3.0	5.0	5.0	3.0
	Migrants as % of population	13.6	13.5	13.3	14.7	16.5	17.7
São Tomé and Principe	Growth rate	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
	Migrants as % of population	7.0	6.5	6.0	5.6	5.2	4.8

Source:
Table 4. Refugees as a Percentage of International Migrants

Percent

Year	Eastern Africa	Middle Africa	Southern Africa	Western Africa
1960	0.0	5.2	0.0	0.0
1965	6.9	14.9	0.0	1.9
1970	9.3	27.9	0.4	3.2
1975	12.4	31.1	0.3	5.9
1980	42.9	42.6	2.1	1.3
1985	38.7	30.0	1.4	0.4
1990	54.6	29.3	2.9	9.5
1995	43.7	62.0	7.6	22.0
2000	36.0	35.2	2.8	10.8
2005	32.9	38.8	3.2	5.1

Source:

3.3. Eastern Africa

Eastern Africa has a long history of labor migration between and within countries to plantations (cotton and coffee in Uganda), to mines (the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda), and with the seasons (pastoralist communities in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) (DFID 2004a). Workers from Burundi, Malawi, Mozambique, and Rwanda were recruited to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda for employment in agricultural estates. In the post-colonial era, these movements have been supplemented by substantial forced displacement and increasing rural-urban migration within countries for employment or to earn a livelihood. However, both urbanization rates and levels of international migration generally remain lower than in other parts of Africa.

A particular pattern observed in eastern Africa is a type of circular migration involving the movement of secondary school children. This arose as a result of the colonial education pattern; the few schools that existed were not within daily commuting distance. Hence school children moved regularly within Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and this pattern of movement persisted until the 1980s (Bilger and Kraler, 2005; DFID 2004a).

Trends of migration show that the proportion of eastern African immigrants in the total population fell from 3.5 percent to 1.6 percent from 1975 to 2005, mainly due to return migration after military strife in countries such as Burundi, Ethiopia, and Somalia, or political disorder, such as in Zimbabwe (table 5). Some countries in this region host a relatively large amount of immigrants. More than 18 percent of the population in Réunion in 2005 was immigrant, for example.

Labor circulation forms a particularly important part of migration within eastern Africa. Many countries in the region has also experienced substantial movements of refugees and internally displaced people (DFID 2004a). In particular, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda host substantial refugee populations. It is not unreasonable to expect that the return flow of refugees will increase in the coming years. The region needs to begin development of a regional policy framework to address this future shift.

Table 5. Growth Rate of the International Migrant Stock and International Migrants as a Percentage of the Population, Eastern Africa
Percent, as indicated

		1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05
Eastern Africa	Growth rate	8.0	-2.1	5.6	-3.8	-1.9	-0.1
	Migrants as % of population	3.5	2.7	3.1	2.2	1.8	1.6
Burundi	Growth rate	9.4	8.6	-0.6	-2.4	-26.9	5.3
	Migrants as % of population	5.4	7.0	5.9	4.8	1.2	1.3
Comoros	Growth rate	11.2	11.2	5.0	5.0	3.0	2.0
	Migrants as % of population	4.7	7.0	7.7	8.6	8.7	8.4
Djibouti	Growth rate	54.1	-13.3	20.9	-10.4	-4.2	-6.8
	Migrants as % of population	11.9	5.2	10.6	5.8	4.0	2.6
Eritrea	Growth rate	1.5	1.3	1.4	0.2	1.6	2.4
	Migrants as % of population	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
Ethiopia	Growth rate	0.6	7.3	13.7	-7.5	-3.6	-3.5
	Migrants as % of population	1.1	1.3	2.3	1.3	1.0	0.7
Kenya	Growth rate	-0.1	-1.1	-0.8	18.4	-2.2	1.0
	Migrants as % of population	1.0	0.8	0.6	1.3	1.1	1.0
Madagascar	Growth rate	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
	Migrants as % of population	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3
Malawi	Growth rate	-0.2	-0.2	28.0	25.4	-3.0	-0.1
	Migrants as % of population	4.6	3.9	12.2	3.2	2.4	2.2
Mauritius	Growth rate	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	5.8	5.8	5.8
	Migrants as % of population	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.3	1.7
Mozambique	Growth rate	20.8	-10.9	13.9	14.0	8.0	2.0
	Migrants as % of population	0.9	0.5	0.9	1.6	2.0	2.1
Réunion	Growth rate	6.2	6.0	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.9
	Migrants as %	6.4	7.9	9.7	11.9	14.6	18.1

		1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990–95	1995–2000	2000–05
	of population						
Rwanda	Growth rate	2.3	8.9	-1.9	-3.8	7.8	6.2
	Migrants as % of population	1.0	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.3
Somalia	Growth rate	94.7	-14.6	-4.0	-70.7	3.5	51.1
	Migrants as % of population	24.8	12.0	9.5	0.3	0.3	3.4
Uganda	Growth rate	-2.7	-1.3	-2.8	2.1	-2.9	-0.4
	Migrants as % of population	5.4	4.3	3.1	2.9	2.2	1.8
Tanzania	Growth rate	-1.7	-0.3	1	13.5	-4.7	-2.4
	Migrants as % of population	3.0	2.5	2.2	3.7	2.6	2.1
Zambia	Growth rate	-1.3	0.2	-0.1	-0.7	5.5	-5.3
	Migrants as % of population	4.6	3.9	3.3	2.8	3.3	2.4
Zimbabwe	Growth rate	1.0	2.8	3.9	-4.6	0.6	-5
	Migrants as % of population	7.9	7.4	7.6	5.4	5.2	3.9

Source: Authors calculations based on World Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision Population Database (http://esa.un.org/migration/).

3.4. Southern Africa

In southern Africa region, labor migration historically took the form of oscillating, temporary, circular migration guided by specific legal frameworks and state policies. Workers from Lesotho, Malawi, and Swaziland regularly engaged in short-term circulatory migrations to work in the mining areas and tobacco farms of the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (DFID 2004b). Transborder migrations during the colonial period occurred largely between neighboring countries, which were separated by arbitrarily drawn boundaries that sometimes cut across homelands of ethnic or language groups. The Republic of South Africa has been central in the migration process in the region.

State policies in South Africa directly recruited workers or indirectly forced Africans to seek employment as mine or agricultural workers (as through taxes, for example). The State policies also deliberately created labor reserves. The transformation of rural South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as of Lesotho and Swaziland, into labor reserves for the South African economy had tremendous social and political effects and also lay of the heart of South Africa’s Bantustan’s policy (Adebusoye 2006; Bilger 2005).

As shown in table 6, from 1980 to 1985, countries such as Lesotho and South Africa received a high influx of migrants. These migrants came from various parts of the Sub-Saharan region, including Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zaire (Adepoju 2006). The stock of migrants relative to the population was markedly highest in most of the countries in that region during that period. Since 1985, the migrants stock has fallen steadily in Lesotho and South Africa, while continuing to increase in other countries of the region.

An important feature in the region is that some countries of emigration have become destination countries, while in others, economic and political events have led to large fluctuations in migration trends. Although South Africa is frequently mentioned as a principal destination for migrants in the region, United Nations population data suggest that there is an increasing shift of destination toward neighboring countries such as Botswana and Namibia, where the migrants as percentage of the population is the highest.

Table 6: Growth Rate of the International Migrant Stock and International migrants as a Percentage of the Population, Southern Africa
Percent, as indicated

		1975–80	1980–85	1985–90	1990–95	1995–2000	2000-05
Southern Africa	Growth rate	1.0	11.7	-6.2	-2.2	-0.6	1.7
	Migrants as % of population	3.3	5.2	3.4	2.7	2.4	2.6
Botswana	Growth rate	2.7	5.6	6.4	7.0	7.2	7.2
	Migrants as % of population	1.4	1.6	1.9	2.4	3.2	4.5
Lesotho	Growth rate	17.3	10.7	-16.8	-6.2	1.4	1.5
	Migrants as % of population	0.7	1.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
Namibia	Growth rate	7.0	7.0	7.0	0.7	2.9	0.1
	Migrants as % of population	6.0	7.5	8.5	7.5	7.5	7.1
South Africa	Growth rate	0.4	12.3	-7.9	-2.2	-1.4	1.6
	Migrants as % of population	3.4	5.5	3.3	2.6	2.2	2.3
Swaziland	Growth rate	3.9	3.9	11.4	-12.9	1.8	1.8
	Migrants as % of population	5.5	5.7	8.4	4.0	4.1	4.4

Source:

3.5 Conclusion

Data on migration flows in Sub-Saharan Africa are virtually nonexistent. Accordingly, to analyze dimensions and patterns of migration in the region, researchers must rely on estimates of migrant stocks, derived from incomplete and potentially biased census results (Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley, 1990). Nonetheless, these sources present a compelling picture of migration in the different regions of the continent. African migration is still primarily intraregional. However, reflecting the increasingly global nature of migration, there has been greater diversity both in the countries from which international migrants originate and in their countries of destination. During the last few decades as economic and political instability deepened in many regions, fewer migrants found stable and remunerative work in traditional regional destinations. Consequently, migration in Sub-Saharan Africa has expanded to a wide variety of alternative destinations, and sometime to places without any historical, political, or economic links to the countries of emigration. This movement also became more varied and spontaneous, with rising levels of both temporary and long-term circulation.

Although useful data exist, there are still a number of key data gaps concerning migration and displacement within the regions. Comprehensive data on the scale, structure, and characteristics of migrants in different regions is still lacking and constitutes a main obstacle to the investigation of the likely patterns of future emigration expansion.

IV - MIGRATION AND LABOR MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

There have been numerous efforts to examine the impact of immigration on labor markets in host countries. However, studies of the impact of emigration on labor markets in countries of origin are extraordinarily scarce (Lucas 2005). For Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, because information on the movement of highly skilled workers is very limited, the literature tends to focus on theoretical analysis of migration

4.1. Migration and the labor market in receiving countries

The analysis of the impact of migration on labor markets traditionally focuses on variables such as unemployment levels and real wages of native workers in host countries (Solimano 2001). The impacts of (voluntary) immigration upon the labor market of the world's wealthier nations have been much studied. Some of the patterns of immigration within Sub-Saharan Africa reflect very similar concerns. The literature highlights the fact that internal migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is primarily driven by the opportunity to work.

The impacts of migrants on host country labor markets are diverse. Migrants are very heterogeneous, differing at least as much from one another as from the general population. Migrant experiences are usually more polarized than those for the population as a whole, with larger concentrations at the extremes of such factors as wealth and poverty, and high and low skills (Glover and others 2001).

Consequently, migrants have mixed success in the labor market. Some migrants are very successful, but others are unemployed or inactive. In part, labor market success is influenced by categories such as education and willingness to do "dirty jobs," fluency in the language of the host country**,** and labor demand. Although most persons from developed countries do not migrate without having good employment prospects, this is not necessarily the case for migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are motivational and decisionmaking differences between immigrants from developed countries and those from developing countries. Expatriates from developed countries typically find employment first and then determine if their incomes are comparable to rest of the local workforce. Many migrants tend to gravitate to areas of both relative prosperity and where housing costs are relatively cheap (and housing is available), and where others from their home country already live. Thus they tend to be concentrated in cities and in some particular sectors, such as mines and plantations.

Migrants bring diverse skills, experience, and know-how. In theory, migration is important in helping to address skill shortages at all skill levels and helping foster and stimulate innovation and the creation of new businesses and jobs. There is considerable support for the view that migrants create new businesses and jobs and fill labor market gaps, improving productivity. However, case study evidence of migrants' labor market performance in receiving countries shows that most immigrants from developing countries, regardless of their destination, suffer an earnings penalty (Page and Plaza 2005). This usually poses the problem of transferability of immigrant characteristics. A number of empirical studies use the Chiswik (1978) and the Borjas (1985*)* Immigrant Human Capital Model under different econometric specifications to quantitatively estimate the economic returns to immigrants attributes (Glover and others**,** 2001; Page and Plaza 2005). Yet no such study has been carried out for Africa.

According to this model, the stock of an immigrant's human capital obtained in the sender country may not be fully transferable to the requirements of the host country's labor market. The model predicts a negative relationship between the transferability of human capital and the initial, upon arrival, immigrant–native earnings gap. The lower the international transferability of human capital, the higher is the earnings disadvantage at the time of migration. In order to narrow this wage gap, migrants invest in country-specific human capital in the receiving country and adapt their stock of human capital acquired in the country of origin. This form of investment is what economists call economic assimilation (Page and Plaza 2005).

Large and sudden refugee inflows occur far more commonly in Africa than elsewhere. More, clandestine migration is pervasive throughout the region and considered routine in western Africa, where seasonal migration also figures more prominently than elsewhere on the continent (Byerlee 1979; Adepoju 1988). This situation continues to put heavy pressure on the domestic labor market of some countries, creating a growing feeling in some countries that native workers are harmed by migration. An increasingly hostile reception involving growing xenophobia, apprehension of foreigners, and anti-immigrant political mobilizations is already perceptible in some countries. Rising illegal migration reflects a number of factors, including rising demand in the labor market (particularly, but not only) at the lower end, and other exogenous pressures (including economic, social, and political instability in the country of origin). However, the economic impacts of these flows on the countries of asylum remain both little studied and poorly understood.

At the global level, recent research (United Nations 2004) reveals that migration does not have a significant impact on labor market in receiving country. The major reason why migrants do not have a significant impact on the labor market, particularly over the medium term, is that they increase not only the labor supply but also the demand for goods and services. In addition, some use their entrepreneurial abilities to set up businesses. These activities, together with their dynamic and multiplier effects, increase the demand for labor, offsetting the initial increase in the labor supply that migrants represent. Testing these findings in the Africa context would certainly add value to the existing research.

The economic recession throughout Sub-Saharan Africa is such that recent arrivals face greater challenges and competition in labor markets. Where the process of integration of immigrants into the host's labor market is difficult, some immigrants will establish small and medium firms as alternatives through self-employment. Self-employment of migrants and immigrant entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa has not been well researched. Scattered works have reported, for example, that in South Africa, the post-apartheid wave of immigrants from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe are mostly street vendors and traders seeking to capitalize on the relatively affluent market of South Africa. These entrepreneurs, who work mostly in the informal sector, import traditional African clothing and handicrafts, employ and train locals, and generally invigorate the informal sector. More research is needed to assess how lack of access to employment opportunities commensurate with immigrants' human capital characteristics may encourage them to look for business alternatives through self-employment.

4.2. Migration and the labor market in sending countries

Migration also has implications for the labor market of the countries of origin. The number of skilled and unskilled migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa countries has increased dramatically over the past four decades. As discussed, precise data on the proportion of populations that work outside their borders are unavailable and data on the share of emigrants who are hosted by other African countries are severely limited.

Theory suggests that migration of predominantly unskilled labor reduces the supply of this class of labor in the sending country. This in turn raises the salaries of unskilled workers and narrows the wage-income distribution, therefore generating an egalitarian trend in the sending countries (Solimano 2001). However, these trends need to be confirmed empirically for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Recent debate of the effect of migration on labor has focused on the emigration of qualified professional (brain drain) and the subsequent loss of skills, which may be occurring faster than the replacement rate. The debate originally took on a North-South dimension, in which it was claimed that rich countries were becoming richer because of the transfer of high skills form developing countries. During the 1970s, the debate changed; even the terminology was replaced by terms such as "reverse technology transfer" or "co-operative exchange of skills between developing countries" (Page and

Plaza 2005). One implication of this literature is that investment in education in a developing country may not lead to economic growth if highly educated people leave their countries. In addition, developing countries that subsidize higher education may create an additional loss in terms of public resources.

Fragmentary recent reports point to the magnitude of the phenomenon of brain drain in Sub-Saharan Africa. The United Nations (2004) reports that on average, migrants who leave from Africa have had schooling that is three times as long as the average national population at the migrants' destination. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), up to 75 percent of persons emigrating from Africa to the United States, Canada, or OECD countries have completed university-level studies or equivalent technical training (ILO 2003). Since the mid-1980s, when the economies of many African countries worsened drastically, many highly skilled workers have left Africa, including medical personnel—doctors and nurses—who mainly received training locally at great public expense.

The migration of health personnel is especially extreme About 600 first generation medical specialists from Nigeria work in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and up to 12,000 are in the United States. In South Africa, white doctors emigrated to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, attracted by higher incomes there, while also disdaining the government policy to serve in rural areas, and fearful of the rise in crime. In Zimbabwe, an estimated 60 percent of doctors recently moved to Botswana and South Africa. Adebusoye (2006) reported the case study of Ghana, which exemplifies how damaging the 'brain drain' can be. From 1995 to 2002, nearly a quarter of various cadres of health workers who were trained in Ghana emigrated. Those migrating include more than two-thirds of medical officers (General Practitioners). The migration of a significant number of trained personnel resulted in increased workload for the remaining personnel, thus contributing to poorer health care in Ghana.

The general issues pertaining to the brain drain are well known. First, the withdrawal of any factor of production, such as highly skilled labor, diminishes returns to other factors remaining at home. However, the distribution of those losses among the owners of capital, and unskilled and skilled workers, depends very much upon the nature of technology and hence the extent of substitutions that may occur. Moreover, the extent of losses is affected by how productively the highly skilled workers are employed before their departure. Such broad concerns might apply to the emigration of any type of labor. However, a second line of concern is more specific to departure of the highly skilled. In particular, emigration of the highly skilled may impose various forms of external costs. Three specific, potential forms of external benefits from the continued presence of the highly skilled have been distinguished (Lucas 2005): the effects of the highly skilled on productivity of others; their influence on economic growth; and the contribution of the highly skilled as key personnel in the delivery of specific services and social goods. Each of these remains controversial.

A rising feature in the brain drain literature is the brain gain hypothesis (Schiff 2005). Because brain drain implies that a share of skilled individuals will migrate and earn a higher wage abroad, the new brain drain literature posits that the brain drain raises the expected return on education. This induces additional investment in education (brain gain). This may result in a beneficial brain drain or net brain gain: that is, a brain gain that is larger than the brain drain. Finally, a net brain gain raises welfare and growth.

This line of reasoning illustrates how the impact of brain drain can be complex and multidimensional. Some studies provide some empirical support for this view. For example, Adepoju (1988) reports some evidence to support a pattern of replacement migration, whereby migrants of rural origin move to towns to occupy positions vacated by nationals who emigrate abroad. This seems to be occurring in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, and Mali. The same seems to hold true for Senegal (where urban workers go to France) and Egypt (whose migrants move to the Persian Gulf). In some instances, immigrants from neighboring countries occupy positions vacated by nationals who have emigrated, yielding a step-by-step migration pattern, first from rural areas to cities, from cities to cities in the same country or regions, and then from cities to foreign destinations.

4.3. The particular case of agricultural labor

The links between migration and agriculture are especially significant in Sub-Saharan Africa, where close to 80 percent of the population live in rural areas and practice some form of subsistence farming. Migration and agriculture are related in two ways. Changes in the agricultural sector lead to changes in migration flows; moreover, migration itself affects food production and agricultural development. Historically, migration has been viewed favorably in the development literature because it was perceived to contribute to reducing intraregional and interregional wage differentials and in transferring new crops and ideas over wide regions (Eicher and Baker 1984). Migrants have been characterized as innovators, risk takers, and entrepreneurs. Hill's (1963) pioneering research revealed that migrants were the risk takers in settling land and mobilizing capital in Ghana's cocoa boom in the late nineteenth century. Using a human capital model of migration, Vijverberg (1989) concludes that rural areas lose their productive workers and that urban areas may gain in productivity from the geographical shifts in population from rural to urban zones. Eicher and Baker (1984) argue that the migration of rural people for work in plantations, mines, and factories has been a major catalyst for social change in Africa.

Migration patterns across and within national boundaries affect the distribution of resources—especially human capital. When millions of people are involved, as in western Africa, the economic and social effects of migration are significant to the development of both the countries of origin and those of destination (Zachariah, Condé, and Nair 1980). Essang and Mabawonku (1974) found that in Nigeria, out-migration is associated with increase in hired labor, increase in farm size, higher rural earning per head, and a net transfer of capital from rural to urban areas.

In western Africa, commercial agriculture is the principal economic sector in terms of labor employment for all countries of the region. Agriculture migration occurs principally from the savannah hinterland to Côte d'Ivoire cocoa plantations and to the groundnut farms of the Senegambia. Main migration streams are from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, and from Mali and Guinea to Côte d'Ivoire and Senegambia (Adepoju 1988).

Agricultural migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is of a seasonal nature, on mainly a north-south axis, and largely spontaneous and uncontrolled (Adepoju 1988). Throughout rural Africa, family labor is the most important resource in household production and hired labor the largest production expense. At the peak season—usually July and August—labor is generally a bottleneck in agricultural production. There is a widespread and competitive labor market to allocate labor within households, villages, regions, and even across international boundaries (Byerlee 1979). Seasonal migration has been of central importance in providing labor for farming throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Dupire's (1960) study of Côte d'Ivoire is a classic on the role of "strange farmers" (seasonal migrants). Swindell (1978) and David (1980) report that many of the farmers in the groundnut basin in Senegal are seasonal farmers; such farmers have been migrating to the basin annually from April to December since the beginning of the nineteenth century, when groundnuts were first exported from the basin. Seasonal migration is also significant in the semi-arid areas of Africa, where migrants move from the savannah zone (such as Burkina Faso) to the forest zones (such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana) during the dry season (November to April) to harvest and maintain tree crops (cocoa, oil palm, and rubber). In Ghana, 200,000 persons from the savannah area of northern Ghana migrate annually to southern Ghana to participate in cocoa harvesting and the maintenance of cocoa trees, Beals and Menezes (1970) estimate.

An increasing number of studies focus on the ways in which characteristics of sending and receiving areas and characteristics of migrants themselves, their households, and their communities shape particular population flows (Ouensavi and Kielland 2001; Kielland and Sanogo 2002). Yet this type of analysis has not been applied to the particular case of agricultural labor. Agricultural migration is dynamic and evolves with the changing nature of today capitalism agriculture. New facts and new research in this field are certainly warranted.

4.4. Conclusion

An examination of the interaction of migration and labor market is hampered by lack of data and empirical research on the subject. However, it is clear that Africa has high migration rates compared to other larger developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, and Indonesia. More than 40 percent of the highly skilled population of some small African countries live and work abroad (including doctors, nurses, lecturers, engineers, scientists, and technologists). But very little is known about how many stay within the African continent. More, information is still lacking on the composition, concentration, and the sectoral impact of the migration of highly skilled workers in Sub-Saharan Africa region. These impacts are important, not only to understand the consequences of the withdrawal of highly skilled workers, but labor market adjustments to the departure of less skilled workers, as well. Some basic questions pertaining to the effects of regionally migration urgently need to be addressed: Are higher wages induced for those who stay behind? Is internal migration induced to replace departing workers? Both international and internal movements, and the direction of the flow, affect the development of the labor market of the individual countries and might contribute to the regional growth. Similarly, little is known about the labor market experiences and assimilation of returning emigrants, returning foreign students, and other highly skilled persons, as well as returning of short- or longer-term workers and repatriated refugees.

Migrants (national and international) comprise a considerable amount of the labor force in developing nations; the magnitude of migration has been and will continue to be the principal determinant of the supply of new job seekers. Therefore, the migration process must be understood before the nature and causes of unemployment can be understood in their turn. An understanding of the relationship between migration and labor markets in each country and region is central to any analysis of employment problems in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In summary, measuring the effects of migration on labor market is a complex area. There is a serious shortage of consistent data on skill and qualification categories of migrants and the impact of their emigration in both host and sending countries. The net effect of migration will vary over time and from source/destination country to source/destination country, depending on the skills of migrants, the sectors they leave, the sector they work in, and whether they subsequently return.

V - MIGRATIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

5.1. Migration and remittances

The most common concern for research centered on the country of origin is the effects of brain drain. The skilled migrant's country of origin loses both its earlier investment in the education and training of the person who emigrates and the future contributions that person would have made to the economic development of the home country, including future tax payments (Lucas 2005; Ozden and Schiff 2006). The significance of the brain drain for development is underscored by the "new growth theory," which argues that a person's knowledge not only provides a direct benefit in terms of available skills but also has positive effects on the productivity of others (United Nations 2004). Emigration of those with skills eliminates this indirect benefit to the economy at large.

Standing in contrast with the loss of human resources embodied in brain drain is the financial transfer to the home country represented by the remittances sent by migrants to their families. One of the most central debate in the literature about the costs and benefits of migration itself has revolved around this subject of remittances. Like migration, reliable data on remittances are hard to come by. The International Monetary fund (IMF) reported that global transfers of remittances have grown steadily in the last ten years and exceed $100 billion worldwide to developing countries (IMF 2005). A recent World Bank study (Ozden and Schiff 2006) argues that remittance flow have doubled in the last decade, reaching $216 billion in 2004, with $150 billion going to developing countries.

Data on remittances are incomplete and almost certainly underestimate the true magnitude of such transfers because they do not accurately reflect funds flowing through nonreporting and informal channels. First, most remittance source countries do not require reporting of “small” transactions. Also, remittances through post offices, exchange bureaus, and other agents of money transfer companies are often not reflected in the official statistics. Second, official data do not capture remittance flows through informal channels, which are believed to be large. Recent studies attempt to estimate the size of unofficial remittance worldwide and yield quite different results. El-Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson, (2003), in a study for the International Monetary Fund, estimated that unofficial transfers of remittances to the developing world currently amount to $10 billion per year. AITE (2005) estimates that global remittances are about 2.5 times the size reported in the IMF balance of payments data. Available data agree on one matter: remittances have grown in parallel with the number of international migrants, and for most countries, remittances exceed the volume of foreign aid and investment (United Nations 2005).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, some $4 billion in remittances were received in 2002, Sander and Maimbo (2004) report. This figure represents some 5 percent of total remittances to developing regions, which corresponds to the fraction of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa in relation to total migration from the developing world. This estimate of remittances is believed to be a severe underestimate. For example, the Bank of Ghana estimates that informal flows are at least as high as recorded flows (Lucas 2005).

One main reason for the large underestimation in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa arises from the fact that most of these remittances are sent from countries within the region. In Sub-Saharan Africa, as in East Asia and South Asia, more than two-thirds of emigrants from poor countries migrate to a country in the same region (Page and Plaza 2005). In South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, most of them migrate to another developing country. Remittances from these migrants go largely through agents such as informal operators and are hand carried by travelers. Many household surveys (of Uganda, as well as of Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Moldova) show widespread use of informal channels of remittances (Page and Plaza 2005). In eastern Africa, a range of innovative informal remittance systems have developed across the region to facilitate intra-country flows through bus and courier companies (DFID 2004a). In addition, unrecorded flows appear to be high in Africa, especially in certain countries, Sander and Maimbo (2003) also argue. In Sudan, for example, informal remittances are estimated to account for 85 percent of total remittance receipts. The use of informal routes for money transfer is also encouraged by the illegal status of migrants in some countries. For example, Azam and Gunter (2005) estimate that the total amount sent back by the 60,000 illegal Malian in France adds up to about 100 million euro, which is greater than the 60 million euros of French official aid flow to Mali.

Despite the scarcity of data on remittances, particularly of remittances from and to Sub-Saharan Africa, the literature agree that this is an important but poorly understood type of international financial flow. Given the size and the potentials of remittances, academics and development practitioners are now focusing the majority of their attention on both the development impact of remittances and on regulatory issues in sender and receiver markets.

5.2. Remittances and development

The increase in migration since the 1990s, and the importance of remittances as an additional and in some case primary source of development financing, is pressuring policymakers to consider how best to make use of these human and financial resources. That overall, remittances create a stable net positive transfer is becoming widely accepted. Through their effects on foreign exchange reserves, balance of payments, improved livelihoods, and investments in human capital, remittances are important, particularly for African households and nations. A noteworthy development has been the formation of hometown associations in countries of destination, through which migrants collect funds to send back to the community of origin for the financing of local development projects.

The case of Burkina Faso, which is located in the drier Sahel region of western Africa, exemplifies the importance of remittances emanating from migrations within Africa (Adebusoye 2006). Burkina Faso is a major source of migrant laborers into coastal areas for the production of primary export crops, notably cocoa and coffee, in Côte d'Ivoire. Until the recent civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, remittances from migrants accounted for a substantial portion, around a quarter of the GDP of Burkina Faso (Black, 2004). These sums sent back to Burkina Faso by emigrants in Côte d'Ivoire keep entire families alive.

Still, the macroeconomic effects of remittance inflows remain poorly modeled and poorly understood, not merely in Africa but more generally. One of the most important findings of recent research into remittances concerns the role they play in linking geographically separated family members (Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley 1990). In particular, Sub-Saharan Africa has provided a substantial part of the supporting, empirical literature on the notion of migration as a risk-spreading, family strategy, with remittances offering relief in times of adversity. Various studies in the region have looked at the impacts on remittances from shocks to rainfall, impacting both cropping and livestock, as well as from shocks arising through ill health or death in the family (Lucas 2005). Studies in eastern Africa have shown that rural families increase their livelihood security by splitting the locations of the family. Research in western Kenya suggest that the decision to migrate, and remittance behavior, are linked to a form of intergenerational "migration contract" between a migrant and his or her parents, in which the (usually male) migrant moves and sends remittances, in expectation of a subsequent inheritance (DFID 2004a). Azam and Gubert (2005) found a similar pattern in Mali.

In contrast to the lack of macro data on remittances, a number of studies have appeared on the micro determinants of remittances and their impact on development in specific contexts within Sub-Saharan Africa. Many studies in the region have tried to assess the impact of migration and remittance on household strategy and welfare, particularly in the farming system context. Three links interact in this matter: migration and investment; migration and production; and poverty and income inequality.

First, converting remittances into investment determines their impact on development. Remittances may be turned into savings and investment, through the purchase of land, tools, or machinery, or by helping to start a business. This view maintains that although remittances are most often used for consumption that satisfies basic subsistence needs, they also encourage investment, particularly in human capital, through health and education expenditures (Ozden and Schiff 2006). In an earlier study, Lucas (1987) showed that both cropping and livestock management improved in several countries in southern Africa in response to accumulated earnings of migrants who worked in South African mines. Azam and Gubert (2005) show that migration has enhanced the adoption of improved agricultural technology in Kayes village in Mali. Collier and Lal (1984) show that in the case of rural Kenya, remittances enable the recipient families to hold more productive capital than the others. Studies like these thus bring out the role of migration and remittances as a means of overcoming capital market imperfections, and of bringing home some capital for funding productive investment. By contrast, Rempel and Lobdell (1978) use household survey data from rural Kenya and conclude that remittances from rural-to-urban migrants have little impact on the development of the region of origin.

Another theoretical assumption is that a permanent flow of remittances creates an implicit insurance contract between the migrant and his family; this can give rise to opportunistic behavior, resulting in technical inefficiency among families in the country of origin. Azam and Gubert (2005) reported such a case in the Kayes area in western Mali; although migration has helped the adoption of improved technology there, migrant households do not exhibit better agricultural performance than non-migrant households.

The main issue here is whether remittances received are diverted into inefficient expenditures such as weddings and housing, and other unproductive assets intended only to keep the prestigious image of the family.

Third, inability to finance expensive moves, such as moves overseas or those requiring some degree of education, may prohibit the poor from relocating. Consequently, many of the micro remittance studies in Sub-Saharan Africa find that the poorest are rarely the major beneficiaries of remittances, at least directly (Lucas 2005). This underscores the fact that remittances are in the self-interest of the migrant (to protect an inheritance, to insure property, or to repay education costs), as opposed to being altruistically motivated. Therefore, remittances tend to be greater to families with more assets or higher incomes.

Nonetheless, remittances may alleviate poverty, either directly through flows to the poor if not the poorest, or indirectly through any stimulant effect of remittances on the local economy. For example, Lachaud (1999) estimates that international remittances to Burkina Faso reduce the headcount of those in poverty by 7 percent in rural areas and by 3 percent in the urban sector. Gustafsson and Makkonen (1993) examine remittances from Lesotho's mine workers in South Africa. Many of these mine workers are drawn from families that would otherwise be poor. Gustafsson and Makkonen conclude that incidence of poverty in Lesotho would be 15 percent greater in the absence of remittances from mine workers in South Africa. Djajic (1986) argues that remittance transfers improve welfare in the country of origin, even of those who do not receive remittances, because the latter enlarge the set of possible exchange of tradable and nontradable goods. In contrast, Rivera-Batiz (1982) using a general equilibrium model, argues that without remittances, that those remaining behind incur a welfare loss. The set of possible transactions shrinks, as those remaining behind cannot no longer exchange nontradable goods with the migrants.

In sum, past studies yield ambiguous outcomes in terms of net impact of migration and remittances on household welfare in the country of origin. The relationship between international migration and development in the home country has been variously called an "unsettled" or "unresolved" relationship, as Ellerman (2003) notes. More empirical works are certainly needed to be able to establish a clear diagnostic.

5.3. Migrants in receiving countries: Development partners or development parasites?

Voluntary migration—like any profit-motivated international movement of factors of production—is normally a voluntary market transaction between a willing buyer (whoever is willing to employ the migrant) and a willing seller (the migrant), and is hence likely to be both economically efficient and beneficial to both parties. Indeed, the basic economic theory of migration is very similar to that of trade; and, like trade, migration generally is expected to yield welfare gains. As Ellerman (2003, p. xx) notes, "As long as the marginal productivity of labor differs in various countries, the migration of labor is welfare improving. If all markets are functioning well, there are no externalities, and if we are not concerned about the distributional implications, then migration is welfare-improving, not only for migrants, but (on average) for natives. However, the presence of migrants is sometime a source of discomfort and division in host country. This xenophobia is rooted on the negative aspects of international migration, such as the persistence of unauthorized migration, criminal activities by migrants or problems related to integration. On the other hand, a lack of information may reinforce public perceptions that international migration and its social consequences are beyond the control of the State authorities and may give rise to anti-immigrant political parties, as already observed in some Sub-Saharan African countries.

Internal migration in Sub-Saharan Africa is primarily driven by the opportunity to work, creating a growing feeling in some host countries that native workers are harmed by migration. One focal point of the literature has been to examine the impact of immigration on labor markets in host countries. In general, migration increases the supply of labor (and human capital); this is likely, in theory, to reduce wages for workers competing with migrants, and increase returns to capital and other factors complementary to migrant labor (Glover and others 2001). In general, this redistribution will favor natives who own factors of production that are complementary to migrants, and hurt those who own factors of production that are substitutes. Thus a key question is whether migrants' skills are substitutes for or complement those of native workers.

According to a United Nations report (2006), migrants do not have a significant impact on the labor market. The dynamic and multiplier effects of immigrants' activities will increase the demand for labor, offsetting the initial increase in the labor supply that migrants induce. Because of such effects, migration inflows have been identified as a factor that increases economic growth to the benefit of the destination country and all its citizens. This is particularly the case if inflows of skilled workers relieve shortages in important sectors of the labor market. They may also increase the supply of labor in low-skilled occupations that domestic residents are unwilling to fill, thus complementing rather than substituting for domestic labor.

However, Grover and others (2001) maintain that this will happen only if markets are functioning well. If this is not the case, then it is theoretically possible for migration to generate higher unemployment for natives. For example, if native workers are not prepared to accept a wage below a given floor and migration induces the market wage for some native workers to drop below that floor, then migration could in theory lead to an increase in native unemployment. While overall output will not fall, output attributable to natives may decline.

Migration may also have externalities: that is, positive or negative effects beyond those that affect the migrant and his or her employers directly. These might affect the native population in a number of ways:

- Congestion: Migrants could increase congestion in some areas, imposing costs directly on native workers and businesses.
- Neighborhood benefits or disbenefits: Migrants could help regenerate depressed neighborhoods, or the reverse.
- Intangible social and human capital: Migrants may have attributes, such as entrepreneurship, that generate benefits for natives.
- Diversity: Natives may gain tangible or intangible benefits from interacting with migrants from different backgrounds and cultures.

Migration will also generate costs and benefits for the government, which can be viewed as another form of externality for natives—a collective rather than an individual one:

- Consumption of public services: On the cost size, migrants will consume public services, and may be entitled to some social security benefits.
- Generation of tax revenues. On the benefit side, migrants will pay taxes, both direct (if they are in formal employment) and indirect.

In general, conventional equilibrium analysis would suggest that supply responses would act to mitigate the effects of migration in the long run. However, it is possible to imagine cases (generally reflecting increasing returns to scale) in which the long-run impact of migration is greater than the short-run. For example, migrants might bring with them the knowledge/entrepreneurial ability to start a new industry/industry cluster, which then expands to employ natives and to encourage natives to start their own businesses in the same sector.

Unfortunately, not enough is known about migrants' social outcomes, particularly in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. Migration brings negative aspects, but also enriches destination communities socially and culturally by bringing different ideas, customs, languages, cultural values, religions and academic contributions, and increased consumer choice. A key empirical question is in which context and conditions do negative or positive aspects predominate.

5.4. Conclusion

A number of gaps in knowledge exist concerning the impact of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although useful research is available, deeper understanding is needed of the relationships between migration and development in the region. This is particularly the case with estimates of the scale of remittances and their impact on the livelihood households and nations. As a whole, remittances are estimated to be larger than all aid transfers in many countries of the region. Thus the potential developmental role of remittances should be an important topic for future policy research and experimentation

The effect of migration may be more pronounced for specific sectors of the economy and population in sending and receiving countries. This could depend on the economic and social environment; the speed, scale, and concentration of the migrants; the particular characteristics of the migrants and native populations; the extent to which migrants complement, or are in competition with, natives; and the status of the migrants in their country of origin before their departure. All these aspects will need further investigation in order to capture the real overall outcome of migration in the region.

For individual countries of origin and of destination, it will be urgent first to identify a number of tangible positive and negative economic and social effects of emigration and immigration. The flurry of attention being given to remittances by policymakers provides an opportunity to look at ways to increase the benefits that these flows provide. An immediate goal should be to disaggregate the impact of remittances by sector, route, and all other characteristics pertaining to migrants and their home family. As discuss in the section that follows, policymakers also have an important regulatory role to play.

VI - INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES AND REGIONAL MIGRATIONS

International migration is increasingly seen as a development issue. However, national and international migration policies do not yet fully reflect this development perspective and are sometimes inconsistent with other dimensions of development policy, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore necessary to integrate migration policy into development policy, ensuring complete consistency and coherence between the two. Within both countries of origin and countries of destination, migration is usually not dealt with by the same ministry (United Nations 2004), and sometimes different regulatory frameworks are in play.

6.1. National regulatory frameworks

International migration has become an issue of major policy concern to most governments in Sub-Saharan Africa. But this has not been always the case. Before independence, almost all the countries of the region had small number of inhabitants, occupying vast territories. Demographic growth and population movement was not considered a problem by most of the countries. With the advent of independence, many governments enacted legislation to regulate movements across the borders of their countries and, in some case, to limit the number of resident foreigners (Carmen and Potter 1980).

Policies to regulate inflow have become increasingly more refined in recent decades (Adepoju 1988), in part because governments have developed the legislative and administrative capacity to formulate and implement such measures, and in part as a response to domestic political pressures—generated by chronic unemployment, sluggish economic growth, uneven income distribution, inflation, and political instability—which have combined to focus resentments on non-nationals. Policy measures reflecting this trend include border controls, visa and passport requirements, the introduction of quotas, and indigenization policies. These measures have been predicated on the assumed benefits accruing to the native, but doubts now exist as to whether such policies have produced the beneficial effects for the national population that were once claimed for them (Carmen and Potter 1980). Still, most of the international migration in Africa has occurred and still occurs outside of a regulatory framework. This is partly because few African countries have a well articulated policy on international migration, and even fewer seem to enforce their laws and regulations on immigration and emigration rigidly.

Insights into general attitudes and policies toward immigration are provided by periodic United Nations inquiries on government policies, conducted in conjunction with the UN Monitoring Report. Recent available data for western and central Africa, reported by Russell and others (1990), are summarized in table 7. Six countries in western and central Africa view current levels of immigration as significant and too high, and all report having policies to lower existing levels of immigration. The remainder report that current levels of immigration are insignificant and satisfactory and that their policy is to maintain these flows. One exception is Equatorial Guinea, which reported that immigration was significantly too low and that their policy is to raise it. But recent developments in Equatorial Guinea with the discovery and exploitation of oil have turned this feeling.

Table 7. Comparative Views of Levels of Immigration by Governments in Western and Central Africa.

View current levels of immigration as significant and too high	View current levels of immigration as insignificant and satisfactory
Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone	Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo

Source: Russell, Jacobsen, and Stanley (1990).

On the other hand, the policies of African governments toward emigration of their own nationals are liberal. Freedom to emigrate is recognized and even explicitly provided for in some constitutions (Adepoju 1988). At the same time, as reported by a recent UN report (United Nations 2005), an important trend has been the development of policies in countries of origin to enhance the benefits that they derive from international migration and to reduce the costs they incur. Such policies include measures to facilitate migrants' remittances; support to networks that link migrants to their country of origin; the facilitation of return migration; the strengthening of consular services; and, in a few countries, dual citizenship and the right of emigrants to vote abroad in national elections.

In the recent decades, a main component of the internal migration in Africa has been involuntary movement of the population. Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed significant flows of forced migrants, including internally displaced people and victims of trafficking. Peace processes in a number of African countries suggest that attention needs to be turned toward facilitating sustainable return. Despite increased awareness on the issues, a recent survey by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA 2005) indicates that less than half of the governments in the region—21 out of 43 responding countries—have taken any measures or adopted strategies to encourage repatriation, including changes in legislation to facilitate the reintegration of returning nationals in their communities and development activities.

Around the world, almost all countries have adopted national policies on international migration to address an array of concerns, including the effects of low fertility and population ageing, unemployment, the protection of human rights, social integration, xenophobia, national security, the brain drain and the brain gain, remittances, the granting of asylum, undocumented movements, and trafficking in persons. However, the enforcement of these legislations is still weak.

6.2. Regional integration economic grouping and migration

Largely, voluntary international population movements in Sub-Saharan Africa are spontaneous. Nonetheless, some occur within the framework of bilateral and regional agreements, which have been used in the region since 1960s. For example, accords between Nigeria and the Spanish authorities sought to organize the migration of Nigerians to what is now Equatorial Guinea. In 1960, an agreement was concluded between Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) and Côte d'Ivoire to replace the former system of direct recruitment by Ivorian employers. Similarly, a 1973 agreement between Burkina Faso and Gabon sought to organize the flow of workers to Gabon (Russell and others 1990).

Bilateral approaches, although effective for advancing the interests of two governments, generally have a narrow geographical focus and thus make a limited contribution to the regional or continental management of international population mobility. Managing international migration has also become a high priority of regional and sub-regional groups. A number of regional consultative processes on international migration were initiated in the 1990s (United Nations 2004), as exemplified by the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA). It is believed that the formation of regional economic groupings such as the East African Economic Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has reinforced these interregional migrations.

In western Africa, the acceleration of population movements has been sustained by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional organization that has most influenced migration in the region. This group was established in 1975 by a treaty among Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Toga. ECOWAS has a protocol on free movement of persons, and rights of residence and establishment. Some 97 percent of Côte d'Ivoire immigrants are citizens of ECOWAS signatory nations**.**

The Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) is an international member of ECOWAS. CEAO was formed in 1970, succeeding the former Union Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, and an intergovernmental treaty was put in force in 1974. The original members—Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal—were joined by Benin in 1984, and Togo has observer status. Under CEAO's fund for development assistance, an agreement on free circulation of people was signed on October 28, 1978 (the Bamako Protocol on Free Movement of People). The protocol permits free circulation (entry, travel, residence, and exit) upon presentation of a valid passport.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been in existence since 1980, when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled states in southern Africa. The alliance, known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), has as its main aim coordinating development projects to lessen economic dependence on South Africa, which was then apartheid. The founding member states were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The transformation of the organization from a Coordinating Conference into a Development Community (SADC) took place on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. The member states are Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organization of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. This inter-territorial cooperation, headquartered in Arusha, Tanzania, was first formalized in 1948. It provided a customs union and a common external tariff, currency, and postage; and also dealt with common services in transport and communications, research, and education. Following independence, these integrated activities were reconstituted and the High Commission was replaced by the

East African Common Services Organization, which since November 1999 has been called the East African Community. EAC has recently introduced new East African passports and temporary passes to speed up movement between countries in the region, as well as a range of other initiatives to promote greater regional integration. This process supports and reinforces inter-regional migration.

NEPAD (the New Partnership for African Development) also includes programs to foster labor mobility within Africa and the sustained development of the region. This type of integration is likely to accelerate, paving the way for closer economic cooperation and labor migration in the region.

Since international migration is not likely to decrease in volume or importance in the foreseeable future, governments have an interest in continuing to seek new and effective forms of international cooperation in migration management. While bilateral, regional, and multilateral approaches each have their own strengths and limitations, the achievement of orderly migration calls for efforts at all levels, but preferably in the context of an overarching, universally agreed and applied international framework. Less than one third of the governments in Sub-Saharan Africa (12 out of 43 countries) had ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families at the time of an ECA survey (2005). Even fewer countries had started implementing the Convention: namely, Algeria, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, South Africa, and Sudan (ECA 2005).

6.3. Conclusion

Although national and regional policy may have had an impact on interregional migration, the extent of such impact is unknown. Avenues for further research include scrutinizing the influence of policy change on in- and out-migration, at both the national and the regional level. The direction and likely trend in regional economic integration should be used to predict the future picture of migration in Sub-Saharan Africa. There may also be a two-way relationship between migration and policy change, as migration can also influence the policy. Clarifying this relationship will help yield insight into the migration and policy nexus.

Public attitudes in a number of countries remain hostile to migrants. In several cases, this hostility is exacerbated because policies and programs addressing migrants are unclear. Governments and regional organization should actively seek to reverse this trend by ensuring that all stakeholders—countries of destination, countries of origin, transit countries, the individuals who migrate, and those left behind—recognize that well-managed international migration can be mutually advantageous.

7.2. Migration, Democratization, and Rebellion

African societies and people are noted for their traditional hospitality to strangers, which involves welcoming and sharing their limited resources with newcomers. Until recently, it was relatively easy for migrants to acquire citizenship and it was the migrant's choice to accept it or not. However, many migrants did not find it necessary, as they were well integrated, coexistence was peaceful, and they paid little attention to arbitrary national borders. In fact, at the Berlin conference in 1884, when the European powers partitioned Africa into "spheres of influence," colonialists paid little regard to the socio-cultural realities of countries. Ethnic groups were split by pencil sketches into adjacent countries, and many members of these groups regarded movement across "artificial" boundaries simply as an extension of internal migrations, in line with long-standing ethnic solidarity.

During the last decade, many Sub-Saharan Africa countries have undergone democratic changes that have led to the emergence of multiple political parties. New challenges arise when several political leaders vie for leadership of a country. In the process, the right of migrants to vote became relevant, and the voting loyalties of those migrants have entered the picture. Citizenship, nationality, the right to vote, and the right to be elected to high office have become passionate issues. The political parties well-rooted in migrant communities (mainly opposition parties) have been supportive of the integration of migrants in the political process, while ''nationalist'' parties (mainly the ruling party) have feared that migrants could swing the vote in favor of an opposition party with ethnic or religious alliances. In many countries of the region, this atmosphere has put migrants in turmoil, as political parties have behaved opportunistically, courting them to use their voting power to win election or disenfranchising them if they are considered to back the opposition.

Citizenship and nationality are becoming real problems for many migrants. Some of these migrants were brought to the host country by traffickers, to work as child laborers in slavery-like conditions. After they were freed, they have established themselves in the host country. Another group of these migrants were born in the receiving country and are children or grandchildren of migrants. Most of them have lost family ties to their country of origin and do not have or could not obtain citizenship in their country of origin (that is, the country of origin of their parents). At the same time, they are prohibited from citizenship in the host country.

In some countries, this has led to an increase of the number of undocumented migrants, caught in poverty, unemployment and lack of opportunities. A recent UN Report (2004) noted that lacking legal status in receiving country, many of these immigrants become the victims of traffickers of all kind, who exploit the latent vulnerabilities that these social conditions create.

Another weapon used by politicians is the manipulation of nationality and property rights. Increasingly, political leaders have resorted to the use of migrant status to reclassify longstanding residents as non-nationals (as has been the case in Côte d'Ivoire). The transformation of property rights, especially land rights, is viewed as a process that mostly concerns migrants. Land tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa can be characterized as a communal tenure system of public ownership and private use rights of land (Razzaz 1993). In this system, communities control access to land and individuals appropriate the use of land, the products, and have descent rights to land. The combination of private use rights and communal control over access to land allows families to have continued use of the same land over time. However, there is still a lack of judicial legitimacy and legal security. Policies of legalizing land tenure and providing titles to informal settlements have become central to many governments. Theoretically, this is done with a view toward providing better incentives for intensifying agricultural production. In the 1990s, many Sub-Saharan African countries, including Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, seriously studied options for land tenure reform (Place and Migot-Adholla 1998).

It is highly unlikely that such transformation would affect various parties equally. Some would stand to lose and others to gain. In many countries of the region, migrants appear to be the losers. According to Razzaz (1993), responding to risks of loss and/or opportunities to gain, actors might be tempted to "exit" the prescribed arrangements by creating new facts on the ground and investing in alternative institutional arrangements. These new facts can explain the political disorder and rebellion observed in some countries. This can further lead to conflict and war in countries with point resources (primary commodity dependence) such as diamonds, cocoa, and oil (Addison 2000; Collier 2003). As argued by Collier (2003, p. **xx),** point resources often expose countries to merchant-capital war, involving unregulated international trading networks using desperate migrant soldiers, with sometime dramatic spill-over effects, as illustrated by the arc of instability in western Africa: "War in Liberia began war in Sierra Leone, which in turn begat attacks in Guinea and prolonged the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire. Liberia's descent into civil war in late 1989 spilled into Sierra Leone in 1991. Combatants from Sierra Leone and Liberia inevitably attacked border communities in neighboring Guinea in 1999–2000. Civil war finally engulfed Côte d'Ivoire in late 2002 after a decade of rising political and social tensions there. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda border also offers a similar picture.

Research and literature in this area are remarkably scant. Migrants' involvement in political affairs in the host country is a sensitive issue that can affect the overall outcome of migration. Further investigations will certainly help to broaden the understanding of the ongoing political instability in some receiving countries and predict the likely trend in other countries that have the same characteristics.

7.2. Health, AIDS/HIV, and Migration

Malaria and AIDS are major threats to human health and to the social and economic progress of individuals, communities, and nations in Africa.

Malaria, one of the world's most common and serious tropical diseases, is a protozoal infection transmitted to humans by mosquitoes. Each year, malaria causes at least 1 million deaths and an additional 300 to 500 million clinical cases, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates. Ninety percent of malaria deaths occur in Sub-Saharan Africa. High-risk groups include children, pregnant women, travelers, refugees, displaced persons, and laborers entering endemic areas. Malaria is prevalent in 45 countries in Africa. The total direct and indirect costs of malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa exceeded $2 billion; according to 1997 estimates. In some countries with a heavy burden of malaria, the disease may account for as much as 40 percent of public health expenditure, 30 to 50 percent of in-patient admissions, and up to 50 percent of out-patient visits.

Sub-Saharan Africa is also the world's most infected region of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic, with a profound impact at the individual, family, and community levels. An estimated 3.8 million adults and children in Sub-Saharan Africa became infected with HIV during the year 2000, according to a UNAIDS update of December 2000, bringing the total number of people living there with HIV/AIDS at year's end to 25.3 million (Fluitman 2001). The magnitude of the epidemic in different countries and region is portrayed in the figure 1. Regionally, southern and eastern Africa are the worst regions in terms of HIV prevalence. The devastating effects of the spread of AIDS have captured the attention of policymakers. It has become abundantly clear in recent years that the epidemic has dramatic consequences in virtually all spheres of life, including the world of work. Indeed, African economic development depends critically on the development and the effective deployment of its human resources, and both are seriously compromised.

Figure 1. Estimated Percentage of Adults (15–49) Infected with HIV



Source:

The high rates of HIV/AIDS infection in Africa create a nightmare scenario of acute labor shortages in key sectors of education and health, according to Adepoju (2004). This is especially true in the major labor-sending countries (Lesotho, Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland) and labor-receiving countries (Botswana and South Africa) of southern Africa. However, it is also increasingly the case elsewhere in the region (Adepoju 2004). These acute labor shortages are now translating into more migration from skills-surplus sources, especially Kenya, Ghana, and Nigeria, and outside Africa. The case of migration of health personnel is much more of a concern. For example, in South Africa, white doctors and nurses have emigrated to Canada, Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, attracted by higher incomes there, while also disdaining the government policy to serve in rural areas, and fearful of the rise in crime. This emigration of doctors and nurses from South Africa is occurring at a time when their services are urgently needed to halt the extension of health concerns such as HIV. South Africa is taking a heavy toll on the education sector of the traditional sending countries by luring away their skilled health professionals and creating the same type of problem in the sending countries. An estimated 60 percent of Zimbabweans doctors recently moved to Botswana and South Africa.

In Ghana, nearly a quarter of various health workers emigrated between 1995 and 2002, Adebusoye (2006) reports. This migration of a significant number of trained personnel increases the work load for the few remaining, thus contributing to the poorer health care in Ghana.

Unlike the situation in developed countries, it is believed that the major cause of transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in Africa is through heterosexual intercourse and through the placenta from an infected mother to her unborn baby. Other causes include blood transfusion and drug abuse (Adepoju 1994). Migrants are anecdotally accused of being a major vector in spreading HIV/AIDS. Further investigation of these allegations will certainly help to deepen understand of the potential impact of migrations in spreading HIV/AIDS.

7.3. Women in migration

In most countries, immigration regulations are not gender-specific. Yet until very recently, immigration laws and policies tended to assume that female migrants were secondary migrants joining other migrants rather than initiators of migration themselves. This assumption reflects the widespread traditional views of the status and role of women within the family and in society. A typical African woman is probably underprivileged and illiterate, and has limited access to resources. She not only faces discrimination and segregation, both in the organized labor market and in the informal sector employment, but also has different legal rights as regards such matters as inheritance, land, and credit. Family organization and the status of women are related to the agricultural and economic system, which in turn is related to population density and technological levels (Boserup 1990). These arrangements in turn impact the labor market.

A wide range of structural constraints and inequities prevent African women from participating more fully in the migration process. These include laws and cultural norms concerning their access to education, land, credit, productive inputs, information, and health care. As regards education and training, considerable differences in literacy rates for men and women speak for themselves (Fluitman 2001). This sexual difference in privileges could explain early low involvement of women in early international migration.

However, the picture is now changing. Previously, migration worldwide consisted almost exclusively of men who migrated and performed physically demanding work in the industrial or agricultural sector. Now women are increasing involved in international migration. Lucas (2005) highlights this growing role of women in migration in Africa (see table 8). In 1960, less than 41 percent of the migrant stock in Africa was female: by 2000, more than 47 percent of the migrant stock was women. Adepoju (2005) also cites anecdotal evidence on the growing autonomous, international migration of women within Africa. Nonetheless, despite the general rise in the role of women in migration in Africa, southern Africa still has the lowest portion of female migrants of any major region in the world, together with western Asia.

There are many reasons for women's growing role. Migrant women have less access to formal sector employment and must depend on work in the informal and unregulated labor sectors, such as domestic work, small trade, entertainment, and prostitution, Tyldum (2005) argue. The growing participation of native-born women in the labor force in many societies has led to an increased dependence on foreign workers to undertake childcare, elder care, housekeeping, and other services traditionally performed by housewives, (Tyldum, 2005). In the last decade, however, some professional women have emigrated from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal to other parts of Africa and the OCDE countries, Page and Plaza (2005) note.

Not much research has been conducted in the area of gender and migration in Africa. Available information is scattered and incomplete. One study (Page and Plaza 2005) notes that for western Africa region, migration within the region is female-dominated, especially for Benin, the Gambia, and Togo. Migration to destinations outside the sub-region is basically male-dominated.

Table 8. Percentage of Females in the Migrant Stock

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Eastern Africa	41.9	43.1	45.2	47.2	48.1
Middle Africa	45.3	46.0	46.3	46.3	46.2
Southern Africa	30.1	30.3	35.6	38.6	42.2
Western Africa	41.5	42.8	43.6	46.7	47.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	40.8	42.1	44.0	46.0	47.2

Source: Lucas (2005), citing UN Population Division data.

7.4. Migration and ethical issues: Trafficking and child labor

Generally defined, trafficking is referred to as the illicit and clandestine movement of persons across national and international borders. In a 2002 background paper for the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, the Advisory Council of Jurists (ACJ 2002) argued that while human rights figure prominently in the discourse on trafficking, it is the connection between trafficking and migration—particularly illegal labor migration—that is the driving political force behind international anti-trafficking efforts. Trafficking, like all other forms of irregular migration, involves movement from poorer countries to relatively wealthier ones. The gap between the number of individuals who wish to migrate and the legal opportunities for them to do so has created a demand that is currently being filled by traffickers and migrant smugglers operating in increasingly organized, sophisticated, and successful ways. Migration occasioned by trafficking of women and child workers is the second most lucrative business after gun running, according to Adebusoye (2006).

Africa's human trafficking and smuggling map is complicated, involving diverse origins within and outside the region. Today, analysts are looking into trafficking in children (mainly for farm labor and domestic work within and across countries); trafficking in women and young persons for sexual exploitation (mainly outside the region); and trafficking in women from outside the region (for the sex industry of South Africa) (Adepoju 2004).

In several African countries, newspapers recount stories about individual children sold practically as slaves. Slave-like arrangements have been reported about children from Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo, yet no reasonable estimates exist of the size of such problem. Nevertheless, recently empirical work of particular interest has been conducted to identify the causes and the characteristics of the phenomenon in some parts of the continent (Ouensovi and Kiellend 2001; IITA 2002; Kielland and Sanogo 2002; Nkamleu and Kielland 2006).

A growing number of young people are involved in daredevil ventures to gain entry into Europe. Movements are more clandestine, involving riskier passages and trafficking through diverse transit points, such as trafficking through Senegal to Spain by way of the Canary Islands. Individual stowaways engage in life-threatening trips hidden aboard ships destined for southern Europe, and recently they have headed as far as East Asia. Unscrupulous agents exploit these desperate youths with promises of passages to France, Italy, and Spain.

Between 500,000 and 700,000 women and children are trafficked worldwide each year, according to Adebusoye (2006). For Africa as a whole, the number of children subject to trafficking and to the worst forms of child labor is estimated at 80 million. The most active source of child labor is western Africa, where children are taken from Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria, or Togo to work on farms or in domestic service either within the same sub-region or in central Africa and beyond (Adebusoye, 2006).

In that region, slaver-like child labor is believed to be especially prevalent in rural areas, where the capacity to enforce minimum age requirements for schooling and work is lacking (Bonnet 1993; Grootaert 1998; Andvig 2001; Ranjan Ray 2002). In western Africa, the main source, transit, and destination countries for trafficked women and children are Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, according to Adepoju (2004). Trafficked children are recruited through networks of agents to work as domestic servants, in informal sectors, or on plantations. Parents are often forced by poverty and ignorance to enlist their children, hoping to benefit from their wages to sustain the family's deteriorating economic situation. Some of these children are indentured into "slave" labor in Sudan and Mauritania. In eastern Africa, young girls and women abducted from conflict zones are forced to become sex-slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men in Sudan and the Gulf States. South Africa is a destination for regional and extra-regional trafficking activities. Women are trafficked through the network of refugees resident in South Africa; children are trafficked from Lesotho's border towns, as are women and girls from Mozambique. Women are also trafficked from Thailand, China, and Eastern Europe to South Africa.

Until very recently, there was almost no information available on trafficking routes through and from Africa. Even today, the depth and quality of available information is relatively poor, although this situation is improving. The most likely explanation for the paucity of data is that trafficking, particularly within Africa, is not given as high priority as elsewhere. Official data on trafficking within Africa is, accordingly, almost nonexistent. As argued by ACJ (2002), African governments appear to be less concerned with irregular, nonpolitical border movements than their counterparts in Europe, Asia or the Americas. Partly as a result of this disinterest and partly because of competing resource priorities, administrative structures to protect, detect, and control migration flows are often weak or under-resourced.

7.5. Conclusion

Migration in Africa is dynamic and is becoming extremely complex and increasingly feminized. International migration involves not only economic considerations but also touches some basic issues of freedom and individual rights. In thinking about policy on migration in Saharan Africa, it is important to seriously investigate human trafficking, which seems to becoming a lucrative activity. The consequences of some political events such as democratization and elections on migration, and the involvement of migrants in internal rebellion in some Africa countries, also deserve attention. Such analysis will help illuminate the endogenous relationship between migration and political changes. Another area needing further scrutiny is the potential impact of migrations in spreading HIV/AIDS, both in the country of origin and in the country of destination.

VIII – GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Over the last decades of the twentieth century, international migration increased markedly worldwide. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where migration has always been an integral part of the social process, migration flows are to large extent temporary spurts associated with economic booms in destination countries or political events in countries of origin. An important feature in the region is that some countries of emigration have become destination countries, while in other countries, economic and political events have led to large fluctuations in migration trends. Movements of refugees have been a major—and in some cases, the main—component of international migration flows among countries. However, economic migration remains the most important component

The occurrence of large internal migration flows and their likely positive trend in the region have become a high priority that clearly deserves more analysis, both at the level of empirically documenting such features as its magnitude, composition, and place of destination, as well as in highlighting economic and social effects, and policy responses to the phenomena. This paper reviews a host of issues involving international migration within Sub-Saharan Africa and intends to give an overview of the state of the art of research and knowledge in this field. The review further helps to point areas where it is essential to focus future research efforts policy actions for a better understanding and management of the migration in Sub-Sahara Africa.

Some features emerge from this review:

Migration as an integral part of labor markets and livelihoods across much of the African continent for at least the last century. Over time, and in different places, it has taken a number of different forms. It has included internal, regional, and international movements and has cut across class and skill boundaries. Although African internal migration is still primarily intraregional, migration in Sub-Saharan Africa has recently expanded to a wide variety of alternative destinations, and sometime to places without any historical, political, or economic links to the countries of emigration. This movement also became more complex, varied, and spontaneous, with feminization of migration and rising levels of both temporary and long-term circulation. Moreover, much of the migration in Africa has occurred and is still occurring outside of a regulatory framework.

Recent estimates indicate that, in 2005, migrants constituted 3 percent of the total population in western Africa, 1.6 percent in eastern and central Africa, and 2.5 percent in southern Africa. Refugees as percentage of migrants are particularly high in central and eastern Africa.

Although useful data exist and give a compelling picture of migration in the different regions of the continent, there are still a number of key data gaps concerning migration and displacement within the regions. A deep understanding of migration flows remains a big challenge. Data on the scale, structure, and characteristics of migrants in different regions are still lacking and this lack constitutes a main obstacle to the investigation of the likely patterns of the future expansion of emigration . Estimates and numbers that the authors themselves claim they do not believe are still being used in the literature. While census data could reveal more about migration scale, dedicated migration surveys will also be needed to understand the migration process.

Migration can be perceived as a response to economic incentives arising largely from disequilibria between and within sectors of the economy and between countries and regions. The growing body of literature on migration tends to reach a consensus that economic considerations are of primary importance in the decision to migrate, and that people migrate ultimately to improve their well being. However, while there is consensus on the benefits of an open trade regime and a relatively liberal capital movement, that consensus rarely extends to free movement of people across countries.

Recent debates of the effect of migration in Sub-Sahara Africa still focus on the emigration of qualified professionals (the brain drain) and the subsequent brain gain in receiving countries. There is still doubt whether "brain drain" is a serious problem for many African countries. The likely impact of such brain drain, or brain gain, or both, depends of a set of social and economic parameters. Central questions in that matter are: How productively are the highly skilled workers employed before their departure? Are higher wages induced for those left behind? Is internal migration induced to replace departing workers? What is the nature of technology and hence the extent of substitution that might occur in both receiving and sending countries? What is the extent of external costs/benefits of emigration and immigration of the highly skilled? Also, very little is known about the number and the internal destinations in the continent. Information is still lacking on their composition by skill level, by gender, and by legal status, and their sectoral concentration. The complex relationships between in-continent migration, training, and labor markets change need more exploration.

Individuals belonging to different families, communities, ethnicities, or countries exhibit remarkably different behavior with respect to the incentives to migrate. Members from some communities respond quickly to economic incentives and seem less worried about losing some "social capital" in contrast, members from other communities are reluctant to leave their environment, even in the presence of strong economic incentives. While economists and others have attributed these differences to institutional, cultural, or individual unobservable characteristics, this also raises the issue not only of the role of information networks in transmitting information about the range of available opportunities, and the ease of migrating in spite of intervening obstacles and barriers, but also the role of the family as the decisionmaking body for individual migration. This suggests a role for more research to inform the policy academic debates on the matter.

In contrast with the loss of human resources embodied in brain drain are financial transfers to the home country, represented by the remittances sent by migrants to their families. This subject has prompted a lively debate in the literature about the costs and benefits of migration. One central issue in the literature on remittances is the expenditure of remittances: As some argue, ‘‘Increased income is not increased development.’’ Much of the remittance expenditure is sterile for developmental purposes: it is channeled into non-local expenditures on conspicuous consumption. Others stress the link between remittances and investment.

Data on the remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa remain poor. The best starting point would be to collect consistent cross-sectional and dynamic data before undertaking any serious analysis. In this regard, investment in monitoring systems would be of some value, because most remittance in the continent flow through informal channels.

The dynamics of social relationships among migrants and their home and host societies are complex and represent an important research challenge. In addition to sending remittances, migration affects the social fabric of both home and host societies. Studies show that migrants tend to be net contributors to fiscal revenue. A central question is whether the sums that migrants, on the whole, pay in taxes is greater than what they cost the State in welfare payments, education, and additional infrastructure. Moreover, migrants create and maintain other, broader forms of contact with their host country and their country of origin. These may generate flows of knowledge, investment, and trade to and from that country. Quantification of these flows will be a step forward in the analysis of migration outcomes.

Policies to lowering remittance fees through some degree of deregulation among remittance intermediaries could enhance the benefits from migration. Yet responses to existing policy incentives have not been investigated seriously. Financial service deregulation will have some costs, implying that the elasticity of remittances with respect to these costs needs to be known before any recommendation.

Countries in the region have started taking international migration seriously in their policies and programs. The complexity of international migration and its growing scale have compelled governments to move from a unilateral approach to regional consultative processes. Some examples are the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Migration Dialogue for Western Africa (MIDWA). At the international level, the United Nations system and other multilateral institutions have undertaken a variety of activities through which to address international migration issues. Beyond existing conventions and protocols, the Sub-Sahara Africa region lacks a comprehensive framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive and continental response to migration issues. To this end, at least two issues need to be tackled urgently. Adoption of standard definitions and sharing of knowledge on international migration is a first necessary step. Then mechanisms to deal with refugees and undocumented migrants need to be continuously evaluated, as the refugee problem is a dynamic phenomenon.

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