

**HELPING OR HURTING WORKERS?:  
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF *DE JURE* AND *DE FACTO*  
LABOR REGULATION IN INDIA**

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Summary

This article provides a first attempt to study the combined economic effects of legal amendments on different types of labor regulation (*de jure*) as well as of the increasing use of contract labor (*de facto*) in India. Within *de jure* reforms, we distinguish between amendments in laws concerning the procedures for the resolution of labor disputes, and laws concerning job security. In addition, we also identify the effects of legal amendments related to the most contentious regulation of all: Chapter 5b of the Industrial Disputes Act, which stipulates that firms above a certain size threshold cannot retrench workers without permission from the State. We find that both types of regulations *hurt* registered sector workers and exert substantial costs on society. Labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, are the hardest hit by job security regulations, while capital-intensive industries are most affected by changes in dispute resolution procedures. We also find that the widespread and increasing use of contract labor brought some employment and output gains but it did not make up for the adverse effects of labor laws, particularly on employment.

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## 1. Introduction

More than in most other countries, labor laws are an extremely contentious topic in India. According to some observers labor regulations are among the most important constraints to income and job growth in India, especially in manufacturing and in the registered sector.<sup>1</sup> In this view, restrictive labor regulations along with infrastructure constraints largely explain why the manufacturing sector – accounting only for 15 percent of the GDP-- remains so small in India. Instead, to others, current labor laws are necessary to prevent millions of workers from being exploited and to provide decent jobs.<sup>2</sup> Still others argue that given that 92% percent of the economic activity takes place in the unorganized sector, labor regulations have little bearing on the majority of workers or firms.

In recent years, a few studies have assessed the impact of labor regulations on economic and social outcomes. For the most part, such studies suggest that labor market may have detrimental effects on employment, particularly in the registered sector. Yet, most studies refer to the pre-reforms period, when economic policies –state planned economy and little exposure to foreign trade—were very different from the current context of trade liberalization and an increasingly market driven economy. Predictions based on such models may be hard to extrapolate to today’s situation. In addition, most studies assess the effects of legal amendments (*de jure* reforms) without considering that firms may have found ways to lessen the effects of regulations on their activities. Such *de facto* liberalization may have reduced the “bite” of regulations. A common practice is hiring temporary or contract workers by means of an agency or contractor. While contract labor

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<sup>1</sup> We use the words “formal”, “registered” and “organized” as synonyms. They all denote the fraction of production and employment that occurs in firms of more than 10 workers with power or 20 workers without power and for which the regulations contained in the Industrial dispute act (IDA) apply. It follows that the terms “informal”, “unregistered” or “unorganized” cover the rest of output and employment.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance a BBC NEWS interview with Prof. K. Basu and the comments to the interview (2005/06/27)[http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south\\_asia/4103554.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4103554.stm)

can only be hired for certain occupations or activities, it is exempted from most labor regulations. The use of contract labor has increased enormously during the nineties<sup>3</sup>

A related issue is which regulations matter the most for economic outcomes. While in India, regulations on employment security --such as the prohibition to retrench workers without permission from the state for firms that hire 100 or more employees-- draw the most attention, there are 45 pieces of central regulation covering many aspects of employment (such as payment of wages, industrial relations and disputes, and social security) as well as state regulations and rules, whose effects need to be understood. For instance, compared to other countries, India loses a greater proportion of person-days and output due to strikes and lockouts, situation that is often associated with ineffective dispute resolution laws. In this paper, we provide a first step in the direction of assessing the effects of different regulations by examining the effects of two very different types of legislation: legislation that seeks to enhance workers' job security by setting restrictions on the retrenchment of workers and the closure of firms, and legislation that sets the machinery and procedures for the settlement of labor disputes.

At the theoretical level, different labor regulations are expected to cause differential impacts on economic variables because each involves a different combination of at least three effects: (1) a price effect, (2) an expropriation effect, and (3) a rigidity effect. Price effects occur when regulations increase the cost of labor. Expropriation effects are related to holdup problems that occur when regulations make it easier for workers to appropriate part of the return of an employers' investment once that investment is sunk. Finally rigidity effects occur when regulations make adjustment of labor (or other factors) more costly and difficult. While the price and the expropriation effect go in the direction of reducing the demand of labor, the rigidity effect is associated with less job destruction, and possibly, some employment gains. Since theory is silent regarding which of these effects dominates, assessing the effects of regulations on economic and labor market performance becomes an empirical question.

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<sup>3</sup> The share of contract labor in manufacturing has increased from 12 percent in 1985 to 23 percent in 2002.

This paper provides a first attempt to assess the economic effects of *de jure* and *de facto* labor reforms in India in the present economic situation. To address this issue this study follows the methodology laid out in a recent study by Besley and Burgess (2004) with important modifications. As in that study, the methodology used here makes use of the fact that in India most regulatory authority lies vested in the central authorities with the exception of labor regulation, which is one of the few areas that falls concurrently under the authority of Central and State governments. This implies that while there is substantial variation in the evolution of *de jure* labor reforms across Indian states, many other aspects of Indian economic and social policy are common across states. This unique combination of policy variation allows identifying the economic effect of amendments in labor laws from the effects of other economic and social policies.

We depart from the analysis of Besley and Burgess in a number of ways: First, we distinguish between amendments concerning laws that affect firms' flexibility in hiring and firing labor –the most contentious aspect of labor laws in India-- from amendments on laws concerning the procedures and machinery for resolution of labor disputes. In addition, we also identify amendments related to the most contentious regulation of all: Chapter 5b of the Industrial Disputes Act, which stipulates that firms above a certain size threshold have to obtain permission from the government before retrenching workers. Since this permission is rarely granted, Chapter 5b is akin to a prohibition to retrench for firms above a certain size. Second, we assess whether there are differential effects across individual industries at the 2-digit level and whether the effects differ across labor intensive and capital intensive sectors. Finally, we assess the effect of the increasingly widespread use of contract labor, which implies a *de facto* deregulation. While the use of contract labor is regulated by a central Act (contract labor Act 1970), the responsibility for implementing and enforcing it falls with the states. This feature leads to considerable variation in actual practices across time and states.

The remaining part of this article is organized in 7 sections. Section 2, provides a brief assessment of labor regulations in India.<sup>4</sup> Section 3 provides some evidence on the opinions of employers regarding the extent by which regulations constitute an obstacle for the growth of their business. It also reviews previous studies assessing the effect of labor laws on economic outcomes. Section 4 describes the data used in the rest of the study and the methodology pursued to assess the effects of *de jure* and *de facto* labor reforms on economic outcomes. Section 5 describes our main results concerning the impact of *de jure* labor reforms. Section 6 assesses the combined effects of *de jure* and *de facto* labor reforms. Section 7 assesses whether our findings can be attributed to reverse causality. Finally, Section 8 concludes.

## **2. A Brief Description of Labor Regulations in India**

Labor laws in India are covered by a large number of separate Acts setting minimum wages, conditions of work, payment of wages, benefits, workers' welfare, health and safety provisions, procedures for the resolution of industrial disputes, conditions for hiring and firing workers, and conditions for the closure of establishments. Legislative authority over labor issues falls with both federal and state governments. Over the years, state governments have amended some central acts. In addition, there is also considerable variation in the implementation of the law across states. Therefore labor regulations both *de jure* and *de facto* vary considerable at state level.

The most controversial labor regulations deal with the conditions for hiring and retrenching workers and with the closure of establishments. A 1976 amendment to the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act (IDA, 1947) made layoff, retrenchment and closure illegal except with the previous permission of the appropriated government for all firms with more than 300 workers. This coverage was subsequently extended in 1982 to all firms with more than 100 employees.<sup>5</sup> Permission to retrench or to close is rarely granted and unapproved separations carry a potential punishment of both a substantial fine and a

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<sup>4</sup> See also the reports of the first and second National Commission on Labour, the studies contained in the volume *Reforming the Labour* edited by Bibek Debroy and Pagés and Roy (2006) among others for a more detailed description of labor laws and labor law enforcement in India.

<sup>5</sup>In addition, some states amended chapter 5b above and beyond what is specified in the central Act. For instance in 1980, West Bengal extended chapter 5b to firms hiring 50 or more workers.

prison sentence for the employer. Instead, actual compensation for retrenchment is low by international standards. In this event, any *workman* (as defined by the IDA) with more than 240 days of service is entitled to one month's notice and 15 days of compensation for every year of service at 50 percent of basic wages plus dearness allowance.<sup>6</sup>

The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act also requires firms of more than 100 employees (and in some states 50) to specify to workers the terms and conditions of their employment, while the IDA requires employers to provide Notice of Change (Section 9-A) This requirement states that no employers can effectuate any change in the conditions of service of any workman without giving 21 days of notice. It should be stressed that shifting weekly schedules or days offs without notice could be in non compliance. (Sachdeva's, 2003)

The IDA also sets conciliation, arbitration and adjudication procedures to be followed in the case of an industrial dispute. It empowers national or state governments to constitute Labour Courts, Tribunals, National Tribunals, Courts of Inquiry, and Boards of Conciliation. The government has the monopoly in the submission of industrial disputes to Conciliation Boards, Courts, Tribunals or National Tribunals. Yet, the employer and the employer can, if they agree, refer the dispute to arbitration. After a dispute has been referred to arbitration, the government may also prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out. In industrial disputes originated by the discharge or dismissal of a worker, the court of tribunals can reinstate the work in the conditions thy see fit if they deem such discharge unjustified. If the employer decides to pursue the matter in a higher court, the employer is liable to pay the foregone wages during the period of proceedings.

Contract workers and workers in casual, temporary (paid for 240 days or less in any 365 day period) and *badli* (substitute) are not considered *workmen* under the IDA and are exempted from the application of severance pay, mandatory notice or retrenchment authorization. From this perspective, labor laws create important incentives to hiring non

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<sup>6</sup> In the IDA, workers that are employed in managerial or administrative capacity or that being employed in a supervisory capacity draw wages above 1600 Rp. per month are not considered workman and therefore are exempted from the provisions of such Act.

permanent workers. This process is limited by the vigorous opposition of the unions and by the restrictions on hiring contract and casual labor imposed by the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act. This Act regulates the service conditions of contract labor in firms of 20 or more employees, providing for some basic welfare amenities and provisions against the delay in wage payment. Section 10 of this Act gives authority to the State to prohibit the use of contract labor in any establishment. The relevant factors considered are whether contract labor is employed in work which is of perennial nature and whether it is also done through regular employers in those establishments or in other establishment of similar nature. Notwithstanding such constraints, the share of contract labor in manufacturing has increased substantially during the last decade rising from around 12 percent of manufacturing employment in 1985 to 23 percent in 2002.

But, importantly, there are significant differences in the level and evolution of contract labor across states. While some of these differences are likely to reflect differences in the industrial specialization patterns of each state, they can also reflect differences in the implementation and enforcement of contract labor laws across states. Thus, it is noteworthy that states such as Kerala and West Bengal, have very small fractions of contract labor in manufacturing and that such shares have remained constant over the years. In contrast, the share of contract labor is above 40 percent in a number of states, such as Gujarat, Orissa or Andhra Pradesh and has increased considerably in recent years.

Another loophole actively exploited by employers is that voluntary retirements (VR) require no permission from the State. Fallon and Lucas (1991) reported that offers of one month pay per year of work in exchange of retirement were not unusual. While there are no reported data on the number of VR, or the median payments, casual evidence suggest that such payments are widespread and that offers of one month or six weeks per year of work are the norm. Another way to avoid regulations is to remain small or partition a firm in legally separate units each below the size limit exempted of the application of the law.

The large majority of labor Acts were enacted in the period 1940-1980. During the seventies and particularly during the eighties, a number of central and state amendments

increased the variability of the laws across states (see Appendix 1). In most cases, such amendments increased job security provisions. They also increased the cost to employers of solving an industrial dispute, although some changes in the opposite direction were also observed. In the nineties the legislative activity came to a halt, with no new amendments in the IDA or Contract Labor Acts. Yet while there have not been important changes in labor laws or in union formal presence or power, weakening law enforcement, increasing recourse to temporary workers, increasing use of casual and contract labor and a shifting stand of the judiciary –may have increased flexibility in the labor market (Pagés and Roy, 2006).

### **3. The Effect of Labor Market Regulations**

#### **3.1 Employers' Opinions**

How binding are labor regulations in the eyes of employers? Some information on employers' perceptions is available from a recent CII-World Bank Investment Climate survey of individual firms in 55 emerging and developing countries including India, that were asked about the severity of various constraints to growth including labor regulations.<sup>7</sup> Employers were asked to rank from 0 to 3 how much of an obstacle for their growth are a number of country features, among them labor regulations. A score of 0 implies that a certain aspect is not an obstacle for their growth while 3 implies that such aspect is a very large obstacle. We examine this data to assess (i) how constraining are labor market regulations perceived to be relative to other factors and (ii) how do labor constraints in India compare to those in other countries.

In India, larger firms tend to consider labor regulations as more of an obstacle than smaller firms (Figure 1). This is consistent with the fact that the most contentious labor law, chapter 5b of the Industrial Disputes Act, applies only to manufacturing firms that employ 100 or more regular employees. Interestingly, large firms consider labor

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<sup>7</sup> The Investment Climate survey data (ICS) provide firm level information for 25,582 firms from 55 emerging countries. Surveys are administered in each country to a sample of firms stratified by size, sector and location, following a common framework. The surveys contain a number of questions regarding firm' characteristics, outcomes and perceptions about the business environment. The sample size for each country ranges from less than 100 establishments, for countries with small private sector like Bhutan and Eritrea, to more than 1,500 for China, India, and Brazil.



regulations to be as constraining for their growth as electricity shortages, although not as constraining as taxes (rate and administration) or corruption.

Figure 2 shows the average response of employers regarding how much labor laws are seen as an obstacle across all countries for which the data is available. The period of the survey is the end of the nineties and early two thousands. It is quite interesting that India appears as one of the countries where employers perceive labor regulations to be more of an obstacle, jointly with Kenya, Indonesia, Poland and Brazil.<sup>8</sup>

Firms' perceptions about labor market regulations may be colored by the overall degree of optimism or pessimism about the economic outlook in every country. To account for this and the fact that some employers are more likely to complain than others, we subtract from every employers' response to the labor regulation question the average response to all the obstacles questions. Correcting for such individual factors does not substantially affect the ranking of countries. India still remains among the countries in which labor market regulations are perceived to be more binding.

### **3.2 Previous Literature**

A number of studies have attempted to estimate the effects of labor market regulations on economic outcomes in India. Fallon and Lucas (1991) and (1994) studied the effect of laws that alter workers' job security by analyzing the effects of the 1976 introduction of chapter 5b in the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), which mandates firms employing 300 or more workers to request permission from the government prior to retrench. Since this was a Central amendment, the only variation they can exploit is the difference in labor demand levels and adjustment speed rates before and after the reforms, for a number of different industries. They find a large impact on manufacturing jobs: formal employment for a given level of output declined by 17.5 percent. While their estimates could reflect the effect of some unobserved factors that reduced the demand of labor after 1976, the authors provide additional evidence that relates the described changes to labor reforms.

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<sup>8</sup> Quite surprisingly however, Chinese employers rate China's labor regulations to be at least as binding as in India, while objective measures of labor regulations such as the ones presented in the World Bank *Doing Business* Report, classify India as a country with more stringent regulations than China

They find larger employment losses in industries with a higher share of large firms, lower levels of unionization and lower shares of public employment.

A recent study by Dutta Roy (2004) examines the effects of a 1982 central amendment to the IDA which extended the prohibition to retrench workers to firms that employ hundred or more workers. The study focuses on examining changes in the speed of adjustment of employment to changes in economic shocks. The author find evidence of substantial adjustment costs in employment but no evidence that such costs are driven or altered by the IDA legislative amendment.

Besley and Burgess (2004) isolate the effect of a labor reform in a given state, from changes in policies and macroeconomic variables that are common across states, thus better identifying the effect of labor laws. Their measure of regulations aggregates amendments to job security regulations with amendments to industrial dispute resolution laws and therefore their results are not directly comparable to former studies. They find labor regulations to have important adverse effects on output and employment, particularly in the registered manufacturing sector. Their study however, provides no direction on which specific labor laws are behind such adverse effects.

Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2003) examine whether differences in labor laws explain differences in the way labor markets adjusted to trade reforms. They find that states with more stringent labor regulations (measured as in Besley and Burgess 2004) have lower demand elasticities and these elasticities are less affected by trade reforms.

Finally Lall and Mengistae (2005) examine the influence of labor market regulations –as perceived by employers—on plant productivity differences across Indian cities. They find that differences in the degree of labor regulations, jointly with differences in the severity of power shortages, explain a large share of the productivity gaps between cities. As in Besley and Burgess (2004) by aggregating different labor laws into one unique measure, they cannot identify which labor laws are the ones responsible for adverse economic outcomes. From the policy perspective, understanding which laws and regulation have

more pernicious effects is an important question. Since labor laws have proven very difficult to change, focusing precious political capital in reforming some aspects of the law may be one way to mobilize support behind reforms. In this paper, we provide a first attempt to identify the economic effects of different *de jure* as well as *de facto* reforms in India.

### **3.3 Why Different Labor Laws may have Different Effects on Economic Outcomes?**

Different labor regulations are expected to cause differential impacts on economic variables because each may involve a different combination of at least three effects: (1) a *price effect*, (2) an *expropriation effect*, and (3) a *rigidity effect*. Price effects occur when regulations increase the cost of labor. Expropriation effects are related to holdup problems that occur when regulations make it easier for workers to appropriate part of the return of an employers' investment once that investment is sunk<sup>9</sup>. This is the case, for instance, when regulations increase workers' ability to initiate and sustain industrial disputes. Finally rigidity effects occur when regulations make the adjustment of labor (or other factors) more costly and difficult. Regulations that increase the price of labor or generate expropriation effects are expected to have a negative effect on the demand for labor. Instead, regulations that increase the cost of adjusting employment have ambiguous effects since they may cause a reduction of both job creation *and* job destruction (Bertola, 1990). Thus ultimately, whether regulations have a positive or negative effect on employment depends on whether their dampening effects on job creation are offset by a reduction in job destruction. The effects on capital will also depend on which of the three effects dominate. While the price and rigidity effect may lead firms to substitute labor for capital, the fear of expropriation may create strong disincentives on investment and capital formation.

Regulations that specifically target employment adjustment such as chapter 5b are likely to induce large price and rigidity effects, and possibly some expropriation effects as workers' bargaining power vis-à-vis employers increases the more secure workers feel in their job. On the other hand, regulations that increase the cost of solving industrial

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<sup>9</sup> See Besley and Burgess (2002) for a simple model of the expropriation effect.

disputes are likely to generate expropriation effects associated with the increased uncertainty regarding firms' ability to solve industrial conflict in their favor. They also create price effects as the price of labor involves the additional costs of handling labor disputes. Finally, they may also create some rigidity effects as dismissal-initiated labor disputes become more costly for firms. The former implies that the effects of a given regulation on outcomes are ambiguous and depend on which of the three effects dominate. Therefore, the issue of what are the effects of different pieces of regulation on employment and other economic outcomes becomes an empirical question, one that we address in the rest of this paper.

#### **4. Data and Methodology**

To perform this study we use a multiplicity of data sources at the state and, in some cases, at the state-industry level for the period 1959-1997. Data on GDP at the state level and for the agricultural, non agricultural, construction, and manufacturing sector is obtained from the Besley and Burgess (2004) database. Data on net value added, wages, capital, employment and number of factories reported in the registered manufacturing sector at the industry and state level was obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). Data on the percentage of contract workers in registered manufacturing in each state and year was also obtained from this source. Finally, data on industrial disputes was obtained from the Labour Bureau. We provide a detailed description of variables and sources in the Appendix.

We follow, with important amendments, Besley and Burgess (2004), (hereafter BB) in exploiting the time variation in state amendments to central labor laws to identify the effect of such changes on economic outcomes. We identify amendments to two types of laws: (a) laws that regulate the procedures for the resolution of industrial disputes, which we name  $D$  and (b) laws that affect hiring and firing and in consequence, firms' employment adjustment capacity, which we name  $A$ . Within the latter, we also distinguish amendments to Chapter 5b ( $c5b$ ) from other amendments. Finally, we also use state and time variation in the use of contract labor to capture the effect of *de facto* labor reforms.

Regarding laws that affect the resolution of industrial disputes, or *D*, we code as -1 all state amendments that reduce workers or employers' capacity to initiate and sustain an industrial dispute or that expedite the resolution of industrial disputes. Instead, we code as -1 all amendments that restrict such capacity or extend the period of resolution of an industrial dispute. Finally, we code as 0 all the state-year pairs for which there is no change in industrial dispute related laws. For example, Andhra Pradesh passed the followed amendment to the IDA in 1987

“If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms and conditions of an order, (ii) prohibits strikes and lockouts in connection with any industrial dispute”

Since this amendment restricts parties ability to initiate, sustain or win an industrial dispute it is coded as -1. Other examples of amendments concerning the resolution of industrial disputes are amendments that classify some services or industries as public utilities and therefore are subjected to more restrictive laws regarding strikes and lock-outs. In such cases, the government also has more freedom to refer industrial disputes to the appropriate courts, expediting the resolution of disputes. Other amendments that are judged to expedite the resolution of industrial disputes are instances when a state gives more prominence to conciliation or when it increases the powers of more expeditious courts thus reducing the average length of resolution.

Regarding laws that reduce the capacity of firms to adjust employment to changing economic conditions, or *A*, we code as 1 all amendments that increase workers' job security (and reduce firms capacity to adjust employment) either by limiting firms' ability to retrench, by making layoffs more expensive, or by restricting firm closures. We code as -1 all amendments that go in the opposite direction and as 0 al state-years in which there are no changes. The appendix provides a list of all state amendments classified as amendments on *D* or *A* and the assigned value of the code in each case. In years and states where there is more than one amendment to a particular type of law, the individual scores are aggregate as follows: we code as 1 if the sum of the individual scores is

positive, -1 if is negative and 0 if the sum is zero. With this procedure, we identify ten state amendments to *D* which are judged to reduce the possibility to initiate an industrial dispute or to reduce the average resolution time, and five amendments that go in the opposite direction. We also find ten state amendments to *A*, *all* in the direction of increasing workers' job security and reducing firms' ability to adjust their labor force. Within the latter, we also distinguish five state amendments to chapter 5b, which set a lower size threshold for the application of the prohibition to retrench without permission than what is specified in the central act. Noticeably, there have not been state amendments to the IDA after 1989.

We relate labor regulations to economic outcomes, by estimating the following specification:

$$Y_{it} = \tau_i + \tau_t + \beta X_{it} + \phi_a R_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{it}$  is an economic outcome such as manufacturing output, employment or wages in state  $i$  in period  $t$ ,  $X_{it}$  is a vector of state controls, and  $\tau_i$  and  $\tau_t$  denote a state and time dummy, respectively.  $R_{it-1}$  is a vector of regulation measures, such as  $SumA_{it-1}$ ,  $SumD_{it-1}$ ,  $Sumc5b_{it-1}$  which refer to the accumulated sum of amendments in a given type of laws over time in a state up to period  $t$ . In some specifications, outcome variables vary at the industry-state level. We lag regulatory variables one period to account for the average lag between enactment and implementation of the law and to reduce the possible endogeneity of labor laws.

Table 2 reports the correlation between our regulatory measures and the regulatory measure described in Bestley and Burgess (2004). Interestingly, the correlation between  $sumD$  and the BB measure is .90, while the correlation between the latter measure and  $sumA$  is .54. Instead, we observe a much lower correlation between  $sumA$  and  $sumD$  or between  $sumc5b$  and  $sumD$ , indicating that these variables reflect different aspects of labor laws, and that as such, they can be treated as separate variables included together in the specifications.

Table 3 provides summary statistics of the data used to estimate these specifications both at the state and at the state-industry level. On average, states enacted laws to restrict the occurrence and resolution time of industrial disputes and to increase job security relative to the central act. All data is reported in per capita, or per worker terms. Persons employed covers all employees (production and non-production) employed in a given time. In this context, the term workers refers to employees directly associated with production.

It should be noted that since most other economic reforms and policies are applied at the national level, our methodology allows to distinguish between the effect of labor laws, applied at the state level, and the effect of other contemporaneous policies and reforms, applied at the national level. It also allows distinguishing the effect of labor reforms from the effects of nation-wide shocks which is not usually possible by just comparing outcomes before and after the application of the laws. In all specifications, we account for the possible autocorrelation of the error term by estimating robust standard errors clustered at the state or at the state-industry level for state-level or industry-state level data, respectively (see Bertrand, Dufflo and Mullainathan, 2004).

## **5. Estimated Effects of *de jure* Reforms**

In this section we report the results of estimating specification (1) on a number of economic variables, such as per capita state output, state manufacturing output in the registered and in the non registered sector and employment, wages, capital stock and number of factories in the registered manufacturing sector.

### **5.1. Effects on Output**

Table 4 reports the estimates of the impact of different labor market regulations on various output measures. As mentioned above, we include a full set of state and year fixed effects in all specifications. Such controls account for reforms and policies that affect all states as well as for unobservable differences across states that are constant over time. In addition, to avoid problems associated with error autocorrelation at the state level we compute standard errors allowing for clustering of the errors within states. The

results suggest that regulations on dispute resolution procedures have a larger effect on output outcomes than regulations on employment security. Nonetheless, a test of the equality of the coefficients does not reject the null hypothesis. Reassuringly, regulations have a higher impact on registered manufacturing output than in sectors such as agriculture or construction where regulations either do not apply or they are mildly enforced. Yet, the results are still sizeable and statistically significant for per-capita state output indicating that states that restrict employment adjustment or increase the cost of settling labor disputes grow at a slower rate.

We next assess the robustness of these results when we control for state specific policies and outcomes by means of two additional variables: the state budget deficit as a percentage of GDP and the logarithm of development expenditures per capita. The fiscal position captures the degree by which states implement responsible fiscal policy. The log of development expenditures controls for the degree by which state governments invest in the health and education of their citizens. Since both indicators are likely to be correlated with labor policies and state output outcomes, its exclusion could bias the results. Following Besley and Burgess (2004) we also control for the logarithm of state population. As usual we allow for clustering of the errors within states.

The results indicate that both dispute resolution regulations (*sumD*) and regulations that impede employment adjustment (*sumA*) are associated with strong negative effects on registered manufacturing output (Table 5). The results also suggest that both types of regulations contribute to expanding the size of the unregistered sector, although coefficients for the unregistered sector are statistically significant at conventional levels only for *sumD*. The results against suggest a larger effect of *sumD* than of *sumA*, although an F test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients. Such coefficients indicate large effects: On average, legal amendments that slow down the resolution of industrial disputes or reduce firm's labor adjustment possibilities lead to a reduction in registered manufacturing output of between 15 and 20 percent, and expand unregistered manufacturing output between 6 and 7 percent. The former underscores that while laws intended to increase job security, such as chapter 5b, draw most of the



attention, dispute-related laws can also exert a large, if not larger effect on economic outcomes.

We further attempt to identify the importance of job security regulations by estimating the effects of extending the scope of chapter 5b to smaller firms. Our results indicate that such amendments lead to a 24 percent decline in registered manufacturing output, although the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The small number of state amendments to Chapter 5b may contribute to the effects being estimated with little precision.

We next examine possible complementarities between amendments to chapter 5b in IDA and amendments in dispute resolution provisions. These complementarities might emerge from the fact that laws that enhance job security tend to reinforce workers' bargaining power within the firm increasing their ability to initiate industrial disputes; the costlier is for a firm to resolve industrial disputes the higher might be the output cost of measures that enhance job security. If this is the case, state amendments that increase job security will have a larger negative effect on output the higher is *sumD*. The results reported in Table 5 support this hypothesis (Columns 5-6). The negative sign on the interaction variable in column (9) suggests that both types of amendments feed each other compounding the adverse effects of both types of regulations on output. An amendment that increases the cost of dispute resolution leads to an additional effect of an amendment in Chapter 5b on the registered manufacturing sector output of another 21 percent points. Thus, the combined effects of amendments in A and D on registered manufacturing employment are very large. Such effects are reversed in the unregistered sector. In fact, the results indicate that more than chapter 5b alone, is the combination of dispute resolution procedures and job security laws what drives the large contraction (expansion) of the registered (unregistered) manufacturing sector.

One possible criticism to the former results is that they could be driven by shifts in the composition of industries within manufacturing and within states that are unrelated with regulations. In that case, we would be wrongly attributing those effects to regulations.

Conversely, to the extent that some industries are more affected by regulations than others, the composition of manufacturing activity could shift towards industries less affected by regulations. In this latter case, manufacturing wide estimates would underestimate the effects of regulations within industries. To account for such effects, we estimate the effects of regulations on net manufacturing value added per capita using variation at the state-industry level. To account for the presence of autocorrelation in the error term within industries and states, we calculate robust standard errors clustered at the industry-state level. We also include a full set of industry-state dummies, and year effects, plus the state policies controls we discussed above.

The results presented in Table 6 confirm that results with aggregated data are robust to further disaggregation by industries and states. As before, we find that both *sumA* and *sumD* exert large and negative effects on manufacturing value added, and while the point estimates of *sumD* are larger than for *sumA*, the equality of coefficients hypothesis is not rejected by the data. We also find large, negative and statistically significant effects of amendments that extend chapter 5b to smaller firms. According to these results, on average, state amendments on chapter 5b have been associated with an 18 percent reduction in manufacturing value added. We also confirm the evidence for complementarities between *sumD* and amendments on chapter 5b. As found in the aggregate data, chapter 5b exerts influence through *sumD*, that is, its effects are much larger and statistically significant in states where resolving disputes is costlier for employers. We also find evidence of complementarities between *sumD* and *sumA*.

In sum, the former results indicate that regulations that restrict employers' ability to adjust employment or that increase the cost of solving industrial disputes is associated with large efficiency losses in the registered sector and an expansion of the unregistered sector. We next examine how efficiency losses in the registered sector are distributed among registered employers and employees. Thus the question that arises is whether labor reforms that have strong adverse effects on output can nonetheless make registered workers better off by shifting resources from capital to labor.

## 5.2 Effects on Employment, Wages and Other Outcomes

Our next set of results indicates that regulations that increase the cost of settling labor disputes or adjusting labor also have an adverse effect on employment (table 7). Making use of state-industry variation, we distinguish between effects on total employment (persons employed) and the effects on the employment of workers directly involved in production (workers employed). The results are very similar when the aggregate rather than the disaggregate data is used. As it was the case for value added, the point estimates suggest a larger effect for *sumD* than for *sumA*, but a test of equality of coefficients is not rejected. We also identify large adverse employment effects of extending chapter 5b to smaller firms.

The decline in the total number of persons employed associated with regulations is larger than the decline in the number of workers, suggesting higher adjustment costs for production than for administrative and managerial workers. The estimates also suggest strong complementarities between regulations affecting employment adjustment and dispute resolution procedures in regards to their effects on employment. It is worth emphasizing the large magnitude of the effects. According to our estimates, on average states that implement amendments that limit employment adjustment (increase *sumA*) experience a 11 decline in manufacturing employment relative to states that don't reform(column (1)) This implies for instance that in the state of Maharashtra, the 1981 amendment to chapter 5b of IDA that extended the prohibition to retrench without government authorization from firms that employed 300 workers to firms that employed at least 100 workers could have implied a destruction of about 144,000 manufacturing jobs (relative to what went on in other states); another 104,000 manufacturing jobs could have been lost in West Bengal in 1980, when chapter 5b was extended from firms that employed 300 or more employees to firms that employed at least 50 workers. More caution should be applied if extrapolating our results to infer effects of future policies. Since they are based on policy changes that occurred quite long ago in a different economic scenario. In addition, the only policy changes we observe are such that made

regulations on firing workers more costly for employers. If laws have asymmetric effects depending upon the direction of the policy, our estimates cannot capture such effects. With these caveats in mind, we estimate that if the effect of amendments on chapter 5b is symmetrical and similar to what was observed in the past, lifting chapter 5b could add about 880,000 registered manufacturing jobs.

Regulations that decrease value added and employment could benefit workers that hold on to a job in the registered sector if their wages increase substantially as a result of regulatory interventions. In Table 8, we examine the effects of regulations on wages, productivity, labor share and other outcome indicators to obtain a better idea of the effect of regulations on workers' bargaining power and welfare. The results indicate significantly different outcomes depending on the type of regulations. While state legal amendments that increase the cost of adjusting labor are associated with a small increase in wages, amendments that increase the cost of resolving industrial disputes have the opposite effect (column (1)). A test on the equality of effects of both types of regulations rejects the null hypothesis.

Column (2) in table 8 suggests that the asymmetric effects in wages are driven by the differential effects of different labor regulations on labor productivity. While labor policies that make employment adjustment more costly do not cause a significant dent on labor productivity, increasing the cost of settling labor disputes does. In turn, such effect is driven by a higher negative effect of  $sumD$  on the stock of capital, suggesting larger expropriation effects of dispute-related regulations.

Adding the estimates in column (1) of table 8 with those in column (4) of table 7 we obtain the effect of regulations on workers' wage bill. The results indicate that job security and dispute procedures regulations *reduce* workers' wage bill. For legal amendments that increase  $A$ , the decline in employment more than offsets the small rise in wages. As a result, total earnings for organized workers decline. This effect is stronger for regulations that increase  $D$  since they cause a decline in both wages *and* employment. Finally, contrary to what could be expected, the results in Column (3) of table 8 indicate

that neither amendments on A nor D have been able to raise the share of value added in the hands of workers.

Columns (5)–(7) of table 8 explore the channels by which labor regulations lead to employment and capital losses. In particular, it examines whether the reduction in employment and capital is associated with a decline in the number of firms (as a consequence of plant closures and foregone entry) or with a decline in the average size of a plant (both in terms of number of workers and capital stock). We find that *the bulk of the effects on employment come from a decline in the number of factories*, while the number of workers per firm does not change significantly. We also find that about half of the reduction in capital associated with industrial dispute laws is driven by a reduction in the number of firms. The other half is driven by a reduction of the capital stock of the average plant. Results presented in the next section suggest that the latter is driven by the exit of more capital intensive plants. These results underscore the importance of firm exit as means of adjustment when employment adjustment is impaired or when profit opportunities dwindle. They also call attention to the costs of regulation in terms of foregone employment and output due to the reduced creation of new firms.

In sum, while labor regulations are generally seen as means to improve workers' welfare our analysis suggests that labor regulations in India did not achieve their intended goals. Instead, our findings indicate that more strict regulations are associated with firm closures, lower investments and reduced output in the registered sector. This in turn dries up the demand for labor, offsetting any positive effects on workers' bargaining power brought by the laws. The end result is less job opportunities and possibly lower wages in the organized sector, and an expansion of the unorganized sector.<sup>10</sup>

### **5.3 Effect of Labor Disputes**

One question that arises from our results is the issue of what drives the adverse effects of labor dispute regulations. Are such effects brought by changes in firms' decisions in light

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<sup>10</sup> Workers' welfare could still improve as a result of labor laws if increased job security or higher benefits offset the negative effects of laws on the wage bill.

of new regulations or are rather driven by a disruption in production and employment directly caused by labor disputes? Table 9 presents the results of re-estimating the basic specification controlling for the number of person-days lost to industrial disputes. It is quite clear that the adverse results of the legislation do not arise from the direct losses associated with industrial disputes. Instead, the former suggest that the adverse effects of legislation concerning the resolution of labor disputes might arise from changes in firms' investment decisions generated by the enactment of such laws.

#### **5.4 Effects by Industry**

Different industries might be differently affected by labor regulations. Micco and Pagés (2004) show that industries that are inherently more volatile –either because they experience more price variation, or because they are subjected to higher demand variance are more affected by labor regulations that inhibit employment adjustment. The degree of labor and capital intensity can also affect the extent by which some industries are affected by labor regulations relative to others. For example, regulations that increase the price of labor are likely to have a larger effect in labor-intensive sectors, as the price of labor constitutes a more important factor in their overall profitability.

We make use of the state-industry variation to estimate the effect of regulations by industry (table 10). It is quite clear that not all industries are equally affected. Moreover, the industries that are more affected by employment adjustment regulations differ from the industries affected by industrial dispute resolution regulations. Our results indicate that industries such as the repair of capital goods, cotton, silk and jute textiles, furniture making, and food production tend to be more affected by employment adjustment regulations than industries such as the production of basic chemicals, of metal production and parts, of rubber plastic and petroleum, and electricity generation and transmission. The effects are felt both in terms of a reduction in value added and jobs. Instead, the effect on wages is mixed. While in some industries the reduction in value added and jobs associated with employment adjustment regulations is accompanied by an increase in wages, in others, wages decline in a significant manner.

On the contrary, regulations governing the resolution of disputes tend to affect more the production of metal products and parts, basic metals and alloy industries and basic chemicals and machinery and equipment. Instead, the least affected industries are the food, apparel, paper and paper products, textiles, wood and furniture and repair of capital goods.

The former results suggest that the degree of labor or capital intensity of a given industry plays a role in how it is affected by an increase in *sumA* or *sumD*. The results presented in table 11 confirm that this is indeed the case. Regulations on employment adjustment lead to higher employment costs in more labor intensive sectors (as measured by the average labor share of an industry during the 1959-1997 period as well as the relative place in the ranking of industries according to their average labor share).<sup>11</sup> Instead, capital intensive sectors are relatively more affected by regulations on dispute resolution procedures suggesting that capital owners tend to find industrial dispute laws more threatening than job security laws and this is especially true in capital intensive sectors.

While at this point, we can only speculate about the possible causes of such patterns, one explanation that fits the evidence is the following: Employment adjustment regulations are hard felt in labor intensive sectors because they involve substantial price effects which are more important for labor intensive sectors. These price effects come from at least two sources: First, prohibitions to retrench increase the cost of negotiated severance packages in voluntary retirement schemes. Second, job security laws raise earnings for workers who remain in their jobs. Instead, regulations that increase the cost of settling an industrial dispute create substantial uncertainty regarding what the cost of an industrial dispute will be in the new scenario. As the threat of long and costly disputes shifts bargaining power to workers, capital owners react by reducing investments. This in turn reduces the demand for labor and restores bargaining power for capital owners.

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<sup>11</sup> The degree of labor intensity of a given industry may be itself affected by labor regulations. To minimize this effect we estimate our specifications using both the average labor share and the relative degree (ranking) of labor-intensity in the 1959-1997 period by industry. While the average labor share is likely to have shifted, the ranking of industries is less likely to be affected by regulations.

## 6. The Effects of *de facto* Liberalization: The Use of Contract Labor

The increasing use of contract labor is another area of heated controversy. While many consider this practice as one beset with exploitative tendencies, employers have been pressing for extended flexibility in the engagement of contract workers even in core and perennial activities.<sup>12</sup> The increasing use of contract labor across states may have provided employers with the flexibility required in the face of strict employment regulations. They may have also resulted in lower costs for firms and lower income for workers –as firms are probably able to pay less for contract labor than for regular workers. Given its significance in overall employment, it becomes important to understand the effects of the widespread use of this type of work. To do so, we add three additional variables to specification (1). These variables are the share of contract labor in manufacturing by state and period, and two interaction terms between our labor law measures and the share of contract labor. As before, we account for the quality of policies implemented at the state level by controlling for fiscal deficit to GDP and log of developmental expenditures. We also lag all variables one period to minimize possible reverse causality problems. It is worth mentioning that adding these variables reduces considerably the size of the sample because a measure of the use of contract labor is only available since 1985. It also constraints our sample to a time period (1985-1997) where relatively fewer legislative changes took place. Given these restrictions, the coefficients on labor regulations are not comparable to those obtained with the whole sample.

Our results provide some evidence that the increasing use of contract labor may be reducing the “bite” of labor law. Thus, columns (1) and (2) in table 12 present the results of estimating the effect of regulations and its interaction with the share of contract labor using industry data aggregated at the state level. The results in the first column suggest that the detrimental effects on value added of both types of regulation are offset by the widespread use of contract labor. If we consider that in the last year of the sample, contract labor accounted for 17 percent of manufacturing employment, our estimates imply that contract labor more than offsets for effect of amendments in A and almost

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<sup>12</sup> See for instance CII (2004)



offset the effect of amendments in D.<sup>13</sup> Column (2) presents the results of the joint effect of regulations and contract labor using the aggregate measure of regulations developed by Besley and Burgess (2004). The positive coefficient on the interaction term suggests again that the use of contract labor outweighs the adverse effect of regulations. The results also indicate that the use of contract labor may increase value added independently of how stringent are labor market regulations.

However, given the data available, we cannot rule out that the increasing use of contract labor comes as a result of changes in the composition of employment across industries rather than deliberate attempts to counterweight the impact of regulations. While some evidence suggest that the use of contract labor increased more in states whose industries opened more to trade and have more strict labor regulations, Ramaswamy (2005) reports substantial differences in contract labor intensity across industries.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, marked shifts in the composition of industries within states could explain changes in the use of contract labor that would be unrelated to changes in enforcement policies or “de-facto” reforms. To account for this possibility, we re-estimate the results presented in column (1) using the industry-state variation, and thus controlling for the structure of manufacturing employment. We also present results for the same sample 1985-1997 but without including the contract labor variables to disentangle the effect of the inclusion of *de facto* variables from changes in the sample size.

The results for value added using the industry-state variation are shown in column (3). While the sign of the coefficients is unchanged relative to the estimates in column (1) the magnitude of the interaction coefficients is lower and the coefficients are not statistically

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<sup>13</sup> This is based on multiplying the coefficients on the interaction terms between regulations and share of contract labor by 17.2% which corresponds to the average use of contract labor in year 1996.

<sup>14</sup> In separate regressions not reported in this paper, we find some evidence that the increasing use of contract labor is associated with the interaction of trade liberalization *and* restrictive labor laws. More precisely, we regressed the logarithm of the share of contract labor in every state against a state specific measure of manufacturing tariffs, labor regulations and the interaction of labor regulations and tariffs, plus country and state dummies, and the policy controls used in most of our specifications. Using the Besley and Burgess (2004) measure of regulations, we find that the coefficients on both tariffs and labor regulations are positive while the interaction of labor regulations and tariffs is negative. All coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. If we use our measures of regulations, i.e. *sumA* and *sumD* and their interactions with tariffs, we get that the signs of the coefficients are preserved but the coefficients are not statistically significant.

significant at conventional levels. Comparing the coefficients on the regulatory variables between columns (3) and a specification where we estimate model (1) with the same sample than in column (3) we find that the reduction in significance of *sumA* is not due to the introduction of contract labor but rather to the smaller number of observations.<sup>15</sup> If anything, the effect of the regulatory variables is stronger once the effect of contract labor is accounted for indicating that contract labor somewhat reduces the effect of regulations on output.

Column (4 to 6) presents similar results for total persons and workers employed. The coefficients on the interaction coefficients are either zero or very close to being zero, indicating little evidence that contract labor reduces the adverse effects of regulations on employment. However, contract labor may have an independent positive effect on total employment and on the number of workers per capita. The former suggests that contract labor may be more effective at ameliorating the effects of regulations on output than on employment. This might be due to the fact that regulations reduce the capital-labor, and the output-labor ratio below what would be desired by firms. The introduction of contract labor ameliorates such effects by lessening the effect of regulations on output and investment. It is also worth emphasizing that the introduction of contract labor can have a direct effect on employment and capital independently on labor regulations. Such direct effect may be attributed to a cost effect. The coefficient on contract labor in column (8) is negative, indicating that contract labor reduces the per-worker price of labor and can therefore increase the demand for labor. Finally, the positive coefficient of contract labor as well as of its interaction with *sumD* on the capital specification (column 10) indicate that the higher the share of contract labor, the lower are the expropriation effects brought by changes in dispute resolution laws. While it is often emphasized that firms hire contract labor as a way to reduce wage and adjustment costs, the fact that these workers are not part of the labor force and hence cannot engage in industrial disputes and appropriate returns of capital may be an additional source of interest for employers.

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<sup>15</sup> Estimating specification (1) for the sample 1959-1985 yields strongly negative and statistically significant coefficients on *sumA* suggesting that the reduced variation after 1985 might be responsible for the reduced size and significance of the coefficient.

## **7. Reverse Causality**

The results described above suggest that there is a strong association between economic outcomes and labor regulations. However, one lingering concern is that such association may be driven by reverse causality. In particular, it is plausible that the expectation of poor outcomes in the near future increases the likelihood of reforms that either increase job security or make the resolution of disputes more costly. Such relation would generate a negative association between economic outcomes and labor reforms, and yet economic outcomes would not be driven by regulations. To address this concern, we re-estimate our former regressions extending the lag between legal amendments and economic outcomes to 5 and 8 years. While the anticipation of future poor economic outcomes may drive current legal amendments, it is unlikely that legislators or their constituencies can forecast future economic outcomes five or eight years in advance. Table 13 presents our findings. Reassuringly, lagging the regulatory variables 5 or 8 periods does not alter our results.

## **8. Conclusions**

Labor regulations are generally introduced to improve the lot of workers. However our results suggest that in India they are not achieving this goal. Not only regulations have created large costs for society, but they haven't raised workers' labor share. Instead, workers have been left with an equal portion of a much smaller cake. In the process a large number of job opportunities in the registered sector have been lost, and while some workers have found refuge in the informal sector, the swelling ranks in this sector have probably eroded their paycheck.

We also find that while regulations such as chapter 5b of IDA tend to get all the attention, there are important costs associated with regulations that increase the cost of settling industrial disputes. If anything, our findings suggest that their costs for society and for registered sector workers may be higher than those associated with job security laws. By reducing investment, employment and wages, they generate pure costs for workers and

for the society as a whole. Improving the conciliation-arbitration-adjudication is a pending reform that could bear important gains for all parties involved<sup>16</sup>

Nonetheless, the attention on chapter 5b is well placed. Our results suggest important employment losses associated with the enactment of amendments to this chapter. Moreover, even when earnings may increase somewhat as a result of such policies, registered sector workers lose as employment opportunities dwindle and their wage bill declines with employment. Labor intensive sectors such as textiles are the hardest hit eroding the comparative advantage of India in labor intensive industries, and in the process removing viable job opportunities for a large number of people.

Perhaps not surprisingly, contract labor has become a common way to deal with these problems. Yet, such solution is no panacea. It further expands the degree of labor market segmentation by generating first and second class workers within the manufacturing registered sector.

Secondly, the widespread use of contract labor does not alleviate the adverse effects of labor regulations, particularly in regards to employment. In consequence, many workers cannot find jobs in the organized sector even if willing to be hired as contract workers. While a further liberalization of the use of contract labor is likely to create some additional jobs and increase output and investment, it is unlikely to bring back the jobs lost due to inappropriate labor regulations.

India must find alternative way to improve labor conditions for the majority of workers. While traditionally portrayed as labor advances against the abuses of capital, current labor regulations favor no one. The answer to this conundrum does not involve a complete deregulation of the labor market. Instead, it requires better regulation (and appropriate enforcement) so workers' fundamental rights can be protected and jobs can be created.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> On this issue see A.U. Khan (2005)

<sup>17</sup> See Pagés and Roy (2005) for a related discussion of proposed labor reforms.

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**Appendix: List of State amendments and coding of D and A regulation measures**

State	Provision	Section	Year	Score	DS	D	AS	A
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	Allows the appropriate government to declare any industry as a public utility if a public emergency or public interest requires so. In the central act only industries in the First Schedule (public utilities) may be declared thus. Public utilities are more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and the government has greater power to refer industrial disputes in public utilities service to the appropriate court.	2	1949	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	States that where a Tribunal has been constituted under this Act for the adjudication of disputes in any specified industry or industries and a dispute exists or is apprehended in any such industry then the employer or majority of workmen may refer the dispute to that Tribunal. This facilitates referral of disputes to Tribunals as the process does not need to be intermediated by government. In the central act both sides have to apply to the government so it can refer the dispute to a court.	10	1949	-1	-1		0	
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	Any services in hospitals or dispensaries are classified as a public utility. Public utilities are more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and the government has greater power to refer industrial disputes in public utilities service to the appropriate court. In the central act these services are not classified as public utilities.	2	1968	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	A Labor Court or Tribunal is granted the power of a Civil Court to execute its award or any settlement as a decree of a Civil Court.	11A-11D	1982	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms and conditions of an order. (ii) prohibits strikes and lockouts in connection with any industrial dispute.	10A-10K	1987	-1	-1	0	0	1
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	Prior payment of compensation to the worker is a condition precedent to the closure of an undertaking. Under the central act payment of compensation does not need to be made prior to closure.	25FFF	1987	1	0		1	
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	Where a closed firm is re-opened, workers who were on the roll of a given unit should be given the opportunity to offer themselves for employment in preference to others. Under the central act retrenched workers are given preference but there is less specify as regards rehiring workers from the same unit.	25H	1987	1	0		1	
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	Where a worker is reinstated by an award of a Labour Court or Tribunal, his wages will be paid	25HH	1987	1	0		1	

	from the date specified in that award whether or not he has been reinstated by the employer.							
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	Failure to comply an order by the state Government which constrains industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with imprisonment for a period which is not less than six months and with a fine.	29A	1987	-1	-1		0	
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker he has the right to apply directly to the Labour Court for adjudication. No such right is specified in the central act.	2A	1987	1	1		0	
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	In place of the Collector, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are given the power to recover from an employer money owing to a worker as the result of settlement of an industrial dispute.	33C	1987	1	1		0	
<b>Andhra Pradesh</b>	If an employer wants to change the conditions of service applicable to any worker he has to give him a notice of 42 days (instead of 21)	9A	1987	1	0		1	
<b>Gujarat</b>	Failure of the employer to nominate his representatives to Councils within firms is punishable by a fine of 50 rupees and in the case of continuing failure to do so the employer will pay an additional fine which may extend to 50 rupees per day for every day that such failure continues.	30-30A	1973	1	1	1	0	0
<b>Karnataka</b>	In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker he may within a six months period have the right to apply directly to the Labor Court for adjudication. No such right is specified in the central act.	10	1988	1	1	-1	0	1
<b>Karnataka</b>	Increases the power of the conciliation officer in terms of enforcing attendance at hearings regarding industrial disputes, compelling the production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. Also makes clear what the penalties are for non-attendance or failure to produce relevant documents.	11	1988	-1	-1		0	
<b>Karnataka</b>	The state government obtains the power to transfer any industrial dispute pending before a tribunal to any other tribunal constituted by the state government for adjudication.	10A-10K	1988	-1	-1		0	
<b>Karnataka</b>	If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms and conditions of the order (ii) prevents any public utility service from closing.	10A-10K	1988	-1	-1		0	
<b>Karnataka</b>	The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 workers. Under the central act these rules	25K	1988	1	0		1	



	only apply to permanent establishments, which employ more than 300 workers.							
<b>Kerala</b>	If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms and conditions of the order (ii) prevents any public utility service from closing.	10A-10K	1979	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Kerala</b>	Failure to comply an order by the state Government, which constrains industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with imprisonment for a period, which is not less than six months and with a fine.	29A	1979	-1	-1		0	
<b>Madhya Pradesh</b>	Increases the power of the labor court to try offences covered both under the Industrial Disputes Act as well as offences covered under a range of other Acts pertaining to labor (which are specified in the Second Schedule of the Industrial Disputes Act).	7	1982	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Madhya Pradesh</b>	Labour court is given the power to deal with every offence punishable under the Labour Disputes Act as well as under a range of other central acts dealing with labour issues.	34	1982	-1	-1		0	
<b>Madhya Pradesh</b>	In the case of criminal cases the Labour Court shall have all the powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class.	11A-11D	1982	-1	-1		0	
<b>Madhya Pradesh</b>	(i) Undertakings dealing with construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other construction work are no longer exempted from procedures for closing down undertakings. (ii) State government as opposed to central government is deemed the appropriate government in dealing with negotiations regarding procedures for closing down undertakings.	25O	1983	1	0	0	1	1
<b>Maharashtra</b>	Discontinuation or reduction of power supply to an industrial establishment can be used a reason for lay-off (for which workers will receive compensation). Under the central act only shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of machinery are listed as valid reasons for lay-offs	2	1981	1	0	0	1	1
<b>Maharashtra</b>	If being laid off is not due to electricity problems then the workers receive 100% of their wages as compared to the normal 50%.	25C	1981	1	0		1	
<b>Maharashtra</b>	The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 workers. Under the central act these rules only apply to permanent establishments which employ more than 300 workers.	25K	1981	1	0		1	
<b>Maharashtra</b>	Any employer or worker affected by the decision to close down an enterprise is permitted for 30days from the date of permission to close being granted appeal to an Industrial Tribunal to overturn the decision.	25O	1983	1	0	0	1	1

<b>Orissa</b>	The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments, which employ more than 100 workers. Under the central act these rules only apply to establishments, which employ more than 300 workers.	25 K	1983	1	0	0	1	1
<b>Orissa</b>	Any employer or worker affected by the decision to close down an enterprise is permitted for 30 days from the date of permission to close being granted appeal to an Industrial Tribunal to overturn the decision.	25O	1983	1	0		1	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	Member is defined as someone who is an ordinary member of a Union and who has paid a subscription of not less than four annas per month and who is not in arrears as regards these payments. Such an exact definition does not exist under the central act.	2	1960	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Rajasthan</b>	The definition of employer in the context of an industrial dispute also includes owners who have contracted with persons for the execution of work as part of the industry.	2	1960	1	1		0	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	Registrar is defined as the person appointed to be the Registrar of Unions. This makes it clear who is involved in the bargaining process on behalf of the unions. This definition does not appear in the central act and hence might be subject to interpretation.	2	1960	-1	-1		0	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	Union is defined to be a trade union of employees registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. This makes it clear who is involved in the bargaining process on behalf of the unions. This definition does not appear in the central act and hence might be subject to interpretation	2	1960	-1	-1		0	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	The state government has to appoint a Registrar of Unions and may also appoint Assistant Registrars of Unions to work in local areas. This makes it clear who can represent unions within Work Committees.	3	1960	-1	-1		0	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	The state government has the right to refer an industrial dispute to an Industrial Tribunal if it is satisfied that (i) public peace or safety is threatened, serious or prolonged hardship of part of the community is likely to be caused or the industry concerned is likely to be seriously damaged, (ii) the industrial dispute is unlikely to be settled by other means or (iii) it is in the public interest to do so.	10A-10K	1970	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Rajasthan</b>	If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms and conditions of the order. (ii) prevents any public utility service from closing.	10A-10K	1970	-1	-1		0	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	Failure to comply an order by the state Government, which constrains industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with imprisonment for a period, which may extend to one year or with a fine, which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both.	30-30A	1970	-1	-1		0	

<b>Rajasthan</b>	Widens the scope of awards for which the worker can obtain judicial help with securing money owed by an employer to include awards made as the result of an order issued by the state Government to constrain industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public.	33C	1970	1	1		0	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	This describes the supervisory duties of the Registrar of Unions and the rules for registration of unions (which is obligatory). One duty of the Registrar is to ensure that only one union (that with the largest employment) represents a single unit within an industry.	9C	1970	-1	-1		0	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 workers. Under the central act these rules only apply to permanent establishments, which employ more than 300 workers.	25K	1984	1	0	1	1	1
<b>Rajasthan</b>	Under the central act where workers in a mine have been laid off for reasons of fire, flood or gas explosion the employer doesn't have to receive prior consent. However, the employer has to apply for permission to continue the lay-off beyond 30 days. Here that condition is removed	25M	1984	-1	0		-1	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	Union representatives have to be involved in any negotiations concerning retrenchment of workers. Their involvement is not stipulated under the central act.	25N	1984	1	1		1	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	Undertakings dealing with construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other construction work are no longer exempted from procedures for closing down undertakings.	25O	1984	1	0		1	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	The maximum penalty for lay-off and retrenchment of workers without permission is increased to imprisonment for three months or a fine of two thousand rupees or both (from the one month imprisonment or a fine of one thousand rupees or both) which are the terms stipulated in the central act.	25Q	1984	1	0		1	
<b>Rajasthan</b>	The procedures for lay-off and retrenchment specified in Chapter V-A of the central act are deemed to be applicable to industrial establishments of a seasonal character and which employ more than 100 but less than 300 workers. Under the central act these rules only apply to permanent establishments which employ more than 300 workers.	25S	1984	1	0		1	
<b>Tamil Nadu</b>	Allows the appropriate government to declare any industry as a public utility if a public emergency or public interest requires so. In the central act only industries in the First Schedule (public utilities) may be declared thus. Public utilities are more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and the government has greater power to refer industrial disputes in public utilities service to the appropriate court.	2	1949	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Tamil Nadu</b>	States where a Tribunal has been constituted under this Act for the adjudication of disputes	10	1949	-1	-1		0	

	in any specified industry or industries and a dispute exists or is apprehended in any such industry then the employer or majority of workmen may refer the dispute to that Tribunal. This facilitates referral of disputes to Tribunals as the process does not need to be intermediated by government. In the central act both sides have to apply to the government so it can refer the dispute to a court							
<b>Tamil Nadu</b>	If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or services or supplies essential to the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial establishment it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms and conditions of the order and (ii) prevents any public utility service from closing.	10A-10K	1982	-1	-1	-1	0	0
<b>Tamil Nadu</b>	Failure to comply an order by the state government, which constrains industrial dispute activity in the interests of the public is punishable with imprisonment for a period which is not less than six months and with a fine.	29A	1982	-1	-1		0	
<b>Tamil Nadu</b>	Increases the power of the conciliation officer in terms of enforcing attendance, compelling the production of documents and issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses.	11	1988	-1	-1	0	0	0
<b>Tamil Nadu</b>	In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker he has the right to apply directly to the Labour Court for adjudication. No such right is specified in the central act.	2A	1988	1	1		0	
<b>West Bengal</b>	Any worker who presents himself and is given employment for that day cannot be laid off for that day. However, if he didn't receive a work within 2 hours he is deemed as being laid off. Under the central act only the second condition holds.	2	1974	1	0	0	1	1
<b>West Bengal</b>	Workers involved in sales promotion are included in the definition of workers. This category of employment is not specified in the central act.	2	1980	1	1	1	1	1
<b>West Bengal</b>	Retrenchment, which means termination of employment of a worker, does include workers terminated on grounds of continued ill-health. In the central act termination for these workers is excluded from the definition of retrenchment.	2	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	A report of the outcome of conciliation proceedings must be submitted within 60 days of the commencement of conciliation proceedings. In the central act the same report must be produced within 14 days.	12	1980	1	1		0	
<b>West Bengal</b>	In the case of public utility service, the conciliation proceeding is deemed to start on the day, the notice of a strike or lockout is received by a conciliation officer. In the case of other industries the conciliation proceeding is deemed to start on the date conciliation officer asked the parties to join a conference. Under the central act the conciliation proceeding in all industries have to start on the day that notice of a strike or lockout is received by a conciliation officer.	20	1980	1	1			

<b>West Bengal</b>	A Labour Court or Tribunal is granted the power of a Civil Court to execute its award or any settlement as a decree of a Civil Court.	11A-11D	1980	-1	-1		0	
<b>West Bengal</b>	(i) Provides greater detail on the procedures for making awards from Labour Courts or Tribunals including necessary signatories and the timing of awards. (ii) The state government also retains the right to reject, modify any award made by a Labour Court or Tribunal	17A	1980	1	1		0	
<b>West Bengal</b>	The limit of 45 days for workers receiving 50% of their wages upon being laid off (if they worked more than a year) is removed.	25C	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	Where a lay-off extends for more than seven days then the worker only has to present himself once a week at the plant in order to be entitled to compensation as opposed to daily as stipulated under the central act.	25E	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	Prior payment of compensation to the worker is a condition precedent to the closure of an undertaking. Under the central act payment of compensation does not need to be made prior to closure.	25FFF	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	Where a closed firm is re-opened, workers who were on the roll of a given unit should be given the opportunity to offer themselves for employment in preference to others. Under the central act retrenched workers are given preference but there is less specify as regards rehiring workers from the same unit.	25H	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	Where a worker is reinstated by an award of a Labour Court or Tribunal, his wages will be paid from the date specified in that award whether or not he has been reinstated by the employer.	25HH	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may according to the discretion of the state government be applied to industrial establishments, which employ more than 50 workers. Under the central act these rules only apply to establishments, which employ more than 300 workers.	25K	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	The period after which, if the appropriate government has not responded, the employer can commence layoffs (i.e. treat his application as granted) is extended from 2 to 3 months.	25M	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	In place of the Collector, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are given the power to recover from an employer money owing to a worker as the result of settlement of an industrial dispute.	33C	1980	1	1		0	
<b>West Bengal</b>	If an employer wants to change in the conditions of service applicable to any worker he has to give him a notice of 42 days (instead of 21)	9A	1980	1	0		1	
<b>West Bengal</b>	Provides greater detail on the duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals with respect to procedure, hearings, commencement of award and the amount of interim relief admissible to workers that have been discharged, dismissed or retrenched.	15	1986	1	1	1	0	0
<b>West Bengal</b>	In the case of an industrial dispute involving an individual worker if no settlement is arrived at within 60 days the party raising the dispute can apply directly to a conciliation officer. Within 60	10	1989	1	1	1	0	1

	days from the conciliation officer's certificate they can apply to refer the dispute to labour court. No such right is specified in the central act.						
<b>West Bengal</b>	In their application to close down an undertaking the employers have to demonstrate their ability to discharge their liability for payment of compensation to workers.	250	1989	1	0		1
<b>West Bengal</b>	Refusal of employment is added as grounds for an individual worker to enter into an industrial dispute with his/her employer. Only discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or other termination of employment, are mentioned as grounds in the central act.	2A	1989	1	1		0


Source: Data Appendix for Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess [2004] and updated until 2002 according to Sachdeva's (2003). Each labor reform is coded in the following way: a 1 denotes a change that is pro-labour or anti-employer, a 0 denotes a change that is judged not to affect the bargaining power of either workers or employers and a -1 denotes a change which is regarded to be anti-worker or pro-employer. AS is the code of each individual reform related to labor market adjustment, while A is the consolidated score for labor reforms related to labor adjustment in a given state and year. Likewise, DS is the code of each individual reform related with labor disputes, while D is the consolidated

**Appendix (Continuation) Definition of variables and data sources**

Name of variable	Description	Source	Period available
Output measures	Net State Domestic Product, for all sectors, agriculture, non-agriculture (all sectors excluding agric.), construction and manufacturing.	EOPP Database	1960-1997
Person-days lost in industrial disputes	Sum of person days lost in industrial disputes in the Central and State sphere.	Labor Bureau and EOPP Database	1965-1997
State fiscal Deficit	State expenditures minus state revenues		1960-1997
Population	Rural and urban population ('000)	EOPP database	1959-1997
Development Expenditures	Government expenditures in health and education		1959-1997
Net Value added	Value added created in factory. Computed as value of output minus the gross value of input and Depreciation.	ASI	1959-1997
Productive capital	It refers to the last date of operation in the year. It includes fixed (FK) and working capita (WK). FK is the sum of land, buildings, plant machinery and tools and other fixed assets. It also includes intangible assets. WK consist of stock of materials, fuel, semi-finished goods, cash in hand and at the Bank and the sum of pending payments to creditors	ASI	1959-1997
No of persons employed	Average number of all employees, engaged in production (workers) plus employees in supervisory, managerial and administrative work in a day of work. It is computed adding all workers in all shifts and dividing by days of work	ASI	1959-1997
Workers	Number of Workers. The term workers exclude persons holding positions of supervision and management or employed in confidential positions. It includes apprentices as well as persons employed thought contractors	ASI	1967-1997
Wages to Workers	All remuneration payable more or less regularly in each pay period to workers. (direct wages+bonuses (it excludes severance pay, payments in kind and employers contributions to social security. They are expressed in gross terms, that is before employees contributions to social security and welfare funds.	ASI	1967-1997
Number of factories Registered	Factories registered under the Indian Factories Act 1948. Refers to any premises where ten or more workers are working (if factory uses power) an twenty if it doesn't.	ASI	1959-1997

The EOPP Indian States Data Base from the STICERD, London School of Economics is available online at <http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/research/indian.asp> . ASI is the Annual Survey of Industries produced by the Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, India. Prior to 1973 only data for the sample factory sector (firms that employ 50 workers or more with power or 100 without power) is available while data from 1974 onwards refers to the overall factory sector (firms that employ at least 10 worker with power or 20 without power). While the data for the two periods is not strictly comparable, the time dummies included in our specifications account for the difference. Estimates in which data from the factory survey was extended backwards for the period 1959-1973 using the growth rate of the sample factory sector in the period 1959-1973 yielded very similar results.


**Figure 1:**  
**Ranking of perceptions of constraints (normalized to 100 for electricity) to firm growth by manufacturing firms, by firm size.**



Source: Authors' computations from 2002 IIC-World Bank Investment Climate Survey data.



Figure 2: Firms' perceptions on labor laws as an obstacle for growth: Average country response.



Source: Investment Climate Surveys, The World Bank

Table 1

**Percentage of Contract Labor in Manufacturing across Indian States**

<b>state</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2002</b>
Kerala	1.6	1.8	1.5	2.33
Assam	8.2	6.4	7.9	3.95
Tamil Nadu	6.9	5.2	4.4	7.21
West Bengal	4.6	5.1	5.3	7.63
Delhi	7.5	7.4	4.8	7.64
Karnataka	11.5	10.4	8.1	9.33
Punjab	19.1	8.8	10.8	14.32
Maharashtra	5.7	6.4	12.8	16.34
Bihar	9.8	8	7.8	22.08
Rajasthan	8.8	13.2	14.1	22.25
Madhya Pradesh	13.6	23.1	21.5	23.94
Uttar Pradesh	14.2	12.6	13.5	25.92
Haryana	19	9.9	14.8	28.07
Gujarat	14.5	19.9	23.5	31.27
Jammu & Kashmir	25.4	8	16.1	31.55
Orissa	30	26	28.7	40.14
Andhra Pradesh	33.8	39.9	49.2	62.08
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>16.8</b>	<b>23.22</b>

Source: Annual Survey of Industries

Table 2

**Pairwise correlations among regulatory variables**

	sumA	sumD	sumc5b	Bbreg
sumA	1			
sumD	0.2239*	1		
sumc5b	0.8322*	0.1949*	1	
Bbreg	0.5490*	0.9095*	0.4328*	1

*SumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; *sumc5b* denotes the cumulative sum of all the amendments relative to Chapter 5b. *BBreg* denotes the regulatory measure constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004). \* denotes significant at 5%; \* significance at 5 %.

Table 3					
Summary Statistics: 1959-1997					
State level data					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>SumA</i>	624	0.237	0.587	0	3
<i>SumD</i>	624	-0.277	0.893	-3	3
<i>Sumc5b</i>	624	0.119	0.324	0	1
<i>BBreg</i>	624	-0.122	1.017	-3	4
GDP per capita*	591	2.84E-02	3.40E-02	2.18E-03	1.99E-01
GDP manufacturing per capita*	591	4.52E-03	6.97E-03	1.59E-04	5.40E-02
Registered manuf. GDP per capita*	591	2.94E-03	4.94E-03	3.63E-05	4.22E-02
State-Industry level data (Registered Manufacturing Sector)					
Net value added*	8504	2.47E-04	6.77E-04	6.92E-09	1.62E-02
Persons employed per capita	8630	5.94E-04	9.53E-04	1.15E-07	9.77E-03
Workers employed per capita	7125	4.71E-04	7.60E-04	1.14E-07	8.41E-03
Number registered factories per capita	8634	6.25E-06	1.05E-05	2.85E-08	1.09E-04
Earnings per worker*	7121	1.48E-01	1.53E-01	2.06E-03	1.52E+00
Labor share (workers)	7008	4.34E-01	1.45E+00	1.44E-03	6.97E+01
Productive capital per capita*	8607	8.59E-04	2.79E-03	1.47E-08	7.23E-02

All values marked with (\*) are in '00000 of Rs. *SumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; *sumc5b* denotes the cumulative sum of all the amendments relative to Chapter 5b. *BBreg* denotes the regulatory measure constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004). See Section 4 and Appendix for details on the construction of regulatory variables and data sources.

Table 4

**De Jure Reforms and Gross Domestic Product at the State Level: 1958-1997**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Log GDP per capita	Log Agricultural GDP per capita	Log Non Agricultural GDP per capita	Log GDP in Construction per capita	Log Manufacturing GDP per capita	Log Registered Manufacturing GDP per capita	Log Non Registered Manufacturing GDP per capita
sumA[t-1]	0.011 (0.27)	0.003 (0.09)	-0.013 (0.31)	-0.018 (0.25)	-0.079 (1.15)	<b>-0.158</b> <b>(1.87)+</b>	0.055 (0.60)
sumD[t-1]	<b>-0.045</b> <b>(1.92)+</b>	0.001 (0.05)	<b>-0.073</b> <b>(2.91)*</b>	-0.078 (1.15)	<b>-0.1</b> <b>(2.19)*</b>	<b>-0.192</b> <b>(3.33)**</b>	0.031 (0.80)
Number of Obs.	591	591	591	591	591	591	591
Adjusted R-squared	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.95	0.98	0.97	0.95
Ftest A=D (P.value)	0.35	0.96	0.3	0.59	0.84	0.75	0.85

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state fixed effects; *sumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 5

## De Jure Reforms and Gross Domestic Product at the State Level: 1958-1997

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log		Log		Log	
	registered	unregistered	registered	unregistered	registered	unregistered
	Manuf. Ouput	Manuf. Ouput	Manuf. Ouput	Manuf. Ouput	Manuf. Ouput	Manuf. Ouput
	per capita	per capita	per capita	Ouput	per capita	per capita
sumc5b[t-1]			-0.241 (1.24)	0.047 (0.32)	-0.164 (1.23)	0.021 (0.16)
sumA[t-1]	-0.149 (1.99)+	0.062 (0.79)				
sumD[t-1]	-0.202 (5.80)**	0.074 (2.32)*			-0.107 (2.10)+	0.032 (0.60)
sumc5b[t-1]*sumD[t-1]					-0.218 (3.59)**	0.11 (1.86)+
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP	-0.002 -0.14	0.039 (2.25)*	-0.014 -0.72	0.044 (2.72)*	-0.004 -0.3	0.04 (2.40)*
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita	0.579 (2.15)*	0.322 (1.34)	0.723 (2.31)*	0.256 (1.01)	0.551 (1.91)+	0.33 (1.30)
Log of Population	1.542 (2.20)*	-1.839 (1.69)	0.522 (0.52)	-1.414 (1.31)	0.8 (1.28)	-1.46 (1.42)
Number of Obs.	590	590	590	590	590	590
Adjusted R-squared	0.97	0.96	0.97	0.95	0.97	0.96
Ftest A=D	0.59	0.9				

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state fixed effects; *sumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; *sumc5b* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 6:

**Effects of Regulations on Value Added. State and Industry Variation**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita	Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita	Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita	Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita
sumA[t-1]	-0.104 (1.66)+			-0.079 (1.30)
sumD[t-1]	-0.257 (4.83)**		-0.145 (1.78)+	-0.157 (1.92)+
sumc5b[t-1]		-0.182 (1.81)+	-0.078 (0.77)	
sumc5b[t-1]*sumD[t-1]			-0.241 (2.93)**	
sumA[t-1]*sumD[t-1]				-0.061 (2.28)*
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP	0.028 (2.05)*	0.014 (1.00)	0.028 (2.06)*	0.028 (2.07)*
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita	0.321 (1.85)+	0.53 (3.07)**	0.265 (1.53)	0.278 (1.62)
Log of Population	0.868 (1.04)	-0.497 (0.59)	-0.023 (0.03)	0.325 (0.37)
test sumA[t-1]=sumD[t-1]	0.13		0.67	0.5
Observations	8214	8214	8214	8214
Adjusted R-squared	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-industry fixed effects; *sumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; *sumc5b* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 7

<b>Effects of <i>de Jure</i> Labor Regulations on Employment. State-Industry Variation</b>						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of workers employed per capita	Log of workers employed per capita	Log of workers employed per capita
sumA[t-1]	-0.11 (2.08)*			-0.098 (2.08)*		
sumD[t-1]	-0.158 (3.69)**		-0.08 (1.30)	-0.122 (3.58)**		-0.028 (0.58)
sumc5b[t-1]		-0.183 (2.18)*	-0.123 (1.41)		-0.141 (1.91)+	-0.132 (1.66)+
sumc5b[t-1]*sumD[t-1]			-0.169 (2.66)**			-0.175 (3.55)**
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP	0.017 (1.93)+	0.008 (0.87)	0.017 (1.87)+	0.02 (2.51)*	0.014 (1.76)+	0.02 (2.45)*
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita	0.33 (2.17)*	0.46 (3.04)**	0.292 (1.91)+	0.158 (1.45)	0.28 (2.47)*	0.119 (1.08)
Log of Population	-0.252 (0.36)	-1.115 (1.62)	-0.883 (1.18)	-0.026 (0.04)	-0.695 (1.11)	-0.761 (1.11)
Observations	8334	8334	8334	7050	7050	7050
Adjusted R-squared	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.92	0.92	0.92
Ftest A=D	0.55			0.74		

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-industry fixed effects; sumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; sumc5b denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Log of earnings per worker	Log of labor productivity	Log of share of income to workers	Log of productive capital per capita	Log of Factories Registered per capita	Log of Workers per Factory	Log of productive capital per Factory
sumA[t-1]	0.033 (1.78)+	0.032 (0.92)	0.001 (0.03)	-0.152 (2.24)*	-0.112 (1.93)+	0.002 (0.04)	-0.037 (0.60)
sumD[t-1]	-0.06 (4.25)**	-0.077 (3.05)**	0.016 (0.70)	-0.215 (3.57)**	-0.105 (1.83)+	-0.053 (1.11)	-0.112 (1.91)+
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP	0.007 (1.98)*	0.016 (1.50)	-0.008 (0.80)	0.036 (2.55)*	0.014 (1.48)	0.004 (0.43)	0.022 (1.61)
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita	-0.016 (0.34)	-0.045 (0.49)	0.025 (0.31)	0.395 (2.10)*	0.435 (2.56)*	-0.105 (0.68)	-0.03 (0.16)
Log of Population	0.659 (2.33)*	0.993 (1.91)+	-0.341 (0.73)	1.317 (1.49)	-0.93 (1.06)	0.679 (0.93)	2.232 (2.65)**
Observations	7047	6940	6937	8311	8336	8334	8311
Adjusted R-squared	0.95	0.82	0.42	0.9	0.89	0.80	0.83
Ftest A=D	0	0.04	0.74	0.56	0.95	0.54	0.48

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-industry fixed effects; sumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; sumc5b denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 9

**Are results driven by the losses occasioned by industrial disputes?**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log Registered Manufacturing GDP per capita	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of workers employed per capita	Log of earnings per worker
log of mandays lost in industrial disputes[t-1]	0.024	0.042	0.046	-0.002
	-1.17	(2.99)**	(3.23)**	-0.21
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP	0.006	0.032	0.03	0.007
	-0.39	-1.63	-1.57	-1.27
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita	0.301	0.075	0.104	-0.116
	(1.98)+	-0.52	-0.71	-0.8
Log of Population	1.813	0.291	0.115	0.655
	(2.71)*	-0.36	-0.14	-1.28
sumA[t-1]	-0.144	-0.097	-0.1	0.012
	(2.26)*	-1.38	-1.45	-0.3
sumD[t-1]	-0.176	-0.123	-0.122	-0.045
	(4.45)**	(4.03)**	(3.73)**	-1.52
Observations	496	466	453	449
Adjusted R-squared	0.98	0.92	0.88	0.98

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state fixed effects; *sumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; *sumc5b* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. *Bbreg* denotes Bestley and Burgess (2004) measure of regulations. *Tariffs* measure the evolution of manufacturing tariffs at the state level. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

**Table 10: Effects of *De Jure* Regulations, by Industry.**

<i>Effect of an amendment to sumA</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of workers employed per capita	Log of earnings per worker
Repair of capital goods	-0.933 **	-0.875 **	-1.015 **	0.701 **
Cotton, Silk, Jute textiles	-0.638 **	-0.491	-0.398 **	-0.079 *
Wood, furniture	-0.609 **	-0.457 **	-0.397 **	-0.094 +
paper, paper products	-0.446 **	-0.361 **	-0.351 **	0.038
Transport equipment and parts	-0.209	-0.271 *	-0.252 **	0.029
Food	-0.186 +	-0.108	-0.125	0.154
Water works & supply	-0.186	0.123	0.138	0.109 **
Basic Metals and Alloy industries	-0.185 +	-0.106	-0.106	-0.036
Gas generation and distribution	-0.144	-0.722 *	-0.713 *	0.214 *
Apparel	-0.139	-0.304	-0.037	0.104 **
Beverages, Tobacco	-0.115	0.134	0.238 *	-0.12 +
Non Metallic products	-0.077	-0.176	-0.158 +	-0.006
Machinery & equipment	-0.059	-0.147 +	-0.23 **	0.001
Other manufacturing equipments	-0.05	-0.137	-0.066	0.038
Basic Chemicals	0.009	0.012	-0.1	0.013
Metal products and parts	0.166	0.171	0.126	0.035
Rubber, plastic, petroleum	0.189	0.181	0.242	0.07
Electricity generation and transmission	0.223 *	0.103 +	-0.044	0.2 **
leather, leather products	0.551 **	0.454 *	0.317 +	0.044
<i>Effect of an amendment to sumD</i>				
Metal products and parts	-0.579 **	-0.519 **	-0.413 **	-0.06 +
leather, leather products	-0.555 **	-0.394 **	-0.48 **	-0.087
Basic Metals and Alloy industries	-0.432 **	-0.228 +	-0.122	-0.194
Basic Chemicals	-0.424 **	-0.357 **	-0.183 **	0.033
Machinery & equipment	-0.372 **	-0.184 *	-0.079 +	-0.044 +
Gas generation and distribution	-0.345	0.394	0.357	-0.161
Electricity generation and transmission	-0.322 **	-0.162 *	0.037	-0.243 **
Rubber, plastic, petroleum	-0.283	-0.329	-0.311 +	-0.021
Transport equipment and parts	-0.263	-0.194	-0.128	-0.064 *
Non Metallic products	-0.255 **	-0.142 +	-0.109	-0.024
Beverages, Tobacco	-0.227	-0.218 *	-0.23 *	-0.05
Other manufacturing equipments	-0.216 **	-0.061	-0.11	-0.081 *
Food	-0.194 *	-0.13	-0.061	-0.129 **
Apparel	-0.157	-0.069	-0.283	-0.038
paper, paper products	-0.134	-0.079	-0.036	-0.058
Cotton, Silk, Jute textiles	-0.011	0.037	0.044	0.034
Wood, furniture	0.015	0.115	0.162 +	-0.079 +
Repair of capital goods	0.103 **	0.102 **	0.135 **	-0.254 **
Water works & supply	0.258	0.111	0.023	0.088 **

Each value denotes the coefficient on *sumA* and *sumD* in regressions which include year, state\*industry fixed effects, Log of state fiscal deficit to GDP, log of state development expenditures and log of state population as controls. *sumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 11

**Do effects vary depending on Labor or Skill-Intensity of Industries?**

	(1)	(2)
	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of persons employed per capita
sumA[t-1]	-0.001 (0.01)	0.059 (0.72)
sumD[t-1]	-0.29 (3.09)**	-0.283 (3.46)**
sumA[t-1]* labor share	-0.257 (1.26)	
sumD[t-1]* labor share	0.313 (1.64)	
sumA[t-1]* ranking labor share		-0.016 (2.50)*
sumD[t-1]* ranking labor share		0.012 (1.85)+
sumA[t-1]* ranking skill		
sumD[t-1]* ranking skill		
Observations	8334	8334
Adjusted R-squared	0.89	0.89
F test-A (P. Value)	0.05	0.51
F test-D (P. Value)	0.84	0.0005

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-industry fixed effects, Log of state fiscal deficit to GDP, log of state development expenditures and log of state population as controls.; *sumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; Ranking labor share refers to the ranking of labor share across industries. Higher rankings imply higher skill content or higher labor share. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 12

**De Facto De-regulation. Effects of Widespread Use of Contract Labor**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Log registered Manuf. Ouput per capita	Log registered Manuf. Ouput per capita	Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of persons employed per capita	Log of workers employed per capita	Log of workers employed per capita	Log of earnings per worker	Log of earnings per worker	Log of Productive Capital	Log of Productive Capital
sumA[t-1]	-0.098 (1.46)		-0.006 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.38)	0.002 (0.04)	-0.026 (0.33)	-0.003 (0.05)	-0.036 (1.15)	-0.034 (1.41)	0.055 (0.43)	0.059 (0.65)
sumD[t-1]	-0.131 (4.78)**		-0.177 (2.76)**	-0.054 (1.05)	-0.066 (1.44)	-0.048 (0.89)	-0.061 (1.23)	-0.057 (2.90)**	-0.063 (3.37)**	-0.011 (0.11)	-0.022 (0.29)
sumA[t-1]*Share of Contract labor[t-1]	0.012 (2.40)*		0.003 (0.66)	0.001 (0.21)		0 (0.08)		-0.001 (0.35)		0.001 (0.26)	
sumD[t-1]*Share of Contract labor[t-1]	0.007 (2.34)*		0.003 (1.07)	0 (0.30)		0 (0.18)		-0.001 (1.07)		0.008 (2.77)**	
Share of Contract Labor[t-1]	0.006 (0.78)	0.01 (2.06)+	0.007 (1.17)	0.006 (1.63)		0.006 (1.73)+		-0.003 (1.45)		0.015 (2.49)*	
Regulation_BB[t-1]		-0.108 (1.67)									
Regulation_BB[t-1]*Share of Contract Labor		0.008 (2.95)*									
Observations	191	191	3310	3310	3583	3310	3583	3310	3583	3290	3563
Adjusted R-squared	0.95	0.95	0.91	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.91	0.91	0.94	0.93
Ftest A=D	0.66										
Ftest A_SCL =B_SCL	0.32										

In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications control for Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP, Log of Development Expenditures per Capita and Log of Population. Specifications (1)-(2) include year and state fixed effects while specifications (3) and above include year and state-industry fixed effects; *sumA* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; *sumD* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; *sumc5b* denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%

Table 13

<b>Reverse Causality? Regulatory variables lagged 5 and 8 periods</b>				
	sumA[t-8]		sumD[t-8]	
	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>t-st</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>t-st</i>
Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita	-0.114	(2.30)*	-0.133	(3.18)**
Log of persons employed per capita	-0.108	(3.38)**	-0.115	(3.78)**
Log of workers employed per capita	-0.112	(3.44)**	-0.12	(3.91)**
Log of productive capital per capita	-0.112	(2.04)*	-0.141	(2.91)**
Log of earnings per worker	-0.019	(1.21)	-0.027	(1.91)+
	sumA[t-5]		sumD[t-5]	
	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>t-st</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>t-st</i>
Log Net Manufacturing Value Added per Capita	-0.119	(2.20)*	-0.168	(3.79)**
Log of persons employed per capita	-0.104	(2.62)**	-0.121	(3.59)**
Log of workers employed per capita	-0.095	(2.51)*	-0.118	(3.79)**
Log of productive capital per capita	-0.133	(2.20)*	-0.142	(2.70)**
Log of earnings per worker	0.01	(0.62)	-0.042	(3.09)**

Each line corresponds to a separate regression. In addition to lagged measures of regulations, each regression includes country\*sector fixed effects, year dummies, state fiscal balance as a fraction of state GDP, log state population and log of state development expenditures. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in parentheses. + significant at 10%; \* significant at 5%; \*\* significant at 1%. State-industry variation

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