Abstract

Countercyclical markups constitute the key transmission mechanism for monetary and other “demand” shocks in textbook New Keynesian models. This paper tests the foundation of those models by studying the cyclical properties of the markup of price over marginal cost. The first part of the paper studies markups in the aggregate economy and the manufacturing sector. We use Bils’s (1987) insights for converting average cost to marginal cost, but do so with richer data. We find that all measures of markups are either procyclical or acyclical. Moreover, we show that monetary shocks lead markups to fall with output. The last part of the paper merges input-output information on shipments to the government with detailed industry data to study the effect of demand changes on industry-level markups. Industry-level markups are found to be acyclical in response to demand changes.

JEL codes: E32, L16, J31
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How markups move, in response to what, and why, is however nearly terra incognita for macro. …[W]e are a long way from having either a clear picture or convincing theories, and this is clearly an area where research is urgently needed.


1 Introduction

The markup of price over marginal cost plays a key role in a number of macroeconomic models. For example, in Rotemberg and Woodford’s (1992) model, an increase in government spending leads to increases in both hours and real wages because imperfect competition generates a countercyclical markup. In the textbook New Keynesian model, sticky prices combined with procyclical marginal cost imply that an expansionary monetary shock or government spending shock lowers the average markup (Goodfriend and King, 1997). This result also holds in the leading New Keynesian models with both sticky prices and sticky wages, such as Erceg et al. (2000); Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007); Christiano et al. (2005). In Jaimovich and Floetotto’s (2008) model, procyclical entry of firms leads to countercyclical markups, and hence to procyclical movements in measured productivity.

The dependence of Keynesian models on countercyclical markups is a feature only of the models formulated since the early 1980s. From the 1930s through the 1970s, the Keynesian model was founded on the assumption of sticky wages (e.g. Keynes (1936), Phelps (1968), Taylor (1980). Some researchers believed that the implications of this model were at odds with the cyclical properties of real wages, leading to a debate known as the “Dunlop-Tarshis” controversy.1 In response to the perceived disparity between the data and predictions of the traditional Keynesian model, the literature shifted in the early 1980s to the assumption of sticky prices rather than sticky wages (e.g. Gordon (1981), Rotemberg (1982)). This type of model emerged as the leading textbook New Keynesian model. Virtually all current New Keynesian models incorporate the notion that markups fall in response to positive demand shifts.

Estimating the cyclicality of markups is one of the more challenging measurement

1. In fact, Dunlop (1938) and Tarshis (1939) were repeatedly misquoted by the literature as showing that real wages were procyclical. Neither of them showed this. Both authors showed that money wages and real wages were positively correlated, and Tarshis went on to show that real wages were in fact negatively correlated with aggregate employment.
issues in macroeconomics. Theory directs comparing price and marginal cost; however, available data typically include only average cost. Papers studying the cyclical of marginal cost and markups either accept average cost as is (e.g., Domowitz et al., 1986; Chirinko and Fazzari, 1994) or make assumptions on how marginal cost is related to average cost (e.g., Bils, 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991, 1999; Galí et al., 2007). Using measures of price-average cost margins, Domowitz et al. (1986) find that markups are positively correlated with the growth of industry demand, suggesting that markups are procyclical. Bils (1987) estimates marginal cost in manufacturing under several assumptions about overtime and adjustment costs and concludes that markups there are countercyclical. Chirinko and Fazzari (1994) apply a dynamic factor model to estimate markups, and find that they are procyclical in nine of the eleven 4-digit industries they analyze. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1999) study the economy more broadly and present several mitigating reasons why seemingly procyclical patterns in measures of the average markup should be discounted.

In this paper, we present evidence that most measures of the markup are procyclical or acyclical. Moreover, they increase in response to positive monetary shocks and are unresponsive to government spending shocks. The first part of the paper presents the evidence using aggregate data. Markups based on average wages are procyclical, hitting troughs during recessions and reaching peaks in the middle of expansions. Because of concerns that average wages do not adequately capture marginal costs, we use insights from Bils (1987) to make adjustments to convert average wages into marginal costs. In contrast to Bils, we find that all measures of the markup remain procyclical or acyclical even after adjustment. We trace the main source of the difference to Bils's use of annual data, since replication of his methods on quarterly data yield procyclical or acyclical markups. We also consider generalizations of the standard Cobb-Douglas production function and find little effect. We then consider the response of our various markup measures to monetary policy shocks. We find that a contractionary monetary policy shock leads to a fall in both output and the markup. This result raises questions about the basic propagation mechanism of the current versions of the New Keynesian model: If the markup does not move countercyclically, how can money have short-run real effects?

In the last part of the paper we analyze the markup in a panel of industries. We match detailed input-output (IO) data on government demand and its downstream linkages with data on employment, hours, and output. We argue that the government
demand variable we construct is an excellent instrument for determining the effects of shifts in demand on markups. We find that an increase in output associated with higher government spending has essentially no effect on markups at an annual frequency.

2 Theoretical Framework

In this section we review the theory that guides our empirical investigation. We first derive the marginal cost of increasing output by raising average hours per worker. We then derive an expression for converting data on average wages to marginal wages. Finally, we consider a more general production function.

The theoretical markup, $M$, is defined as

$$M = \frac{P}{MC},$$

where $P$ is the price of output and $MC$ is the nominal marginal cost of increasing output. The inverse of the right hand side of equation 1, $MC/P$, is also known as the real marginal cost.

As Basu and Fernald (1997a) point out, a cost-minimizing firm should equalize the marginal cost of increasing output across all possible margins for varying production. Thus, it is valid to consider the marginal cost of varying output by changing a particular input. As in Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), we focus on the labor input margin, and in particular on hours per worker. We assume that there are potential costs of adjusting the number of employees and the capital stock, but no costs of adjusting hours per worker.$^2$

Focusing on the static aspect of this cost-minimization problem, consider the problem of a firm that chooses hours per worker, $h$, to minimize

$$\text{Cost} = W_A h N + \text{other terms not involving } h,$$

subject to $\bar{Y} = F(AhN, \ldots)$, $W_A$ is the average hourly wage, $N$ is the number of workers, $Y$ is output, and $A$ is the level of labor-augmenting technology. Bils (1987) argues that the average wage paid by a firm may be increasing in the average hours per worker

$^2$ Hamermesh and Pfann’s (1996) summary of the literature suggests that adjustment costs on the number of employees are relatively small and that adjustment costs on hours per worker are essentially zero.
because of the additional cost of overtime hours. We capture this assumption by specifying the average wage as:

\[ W_A = W_S \left( 1 + \rho \theta \frac{v}{h} \right) . \]

where \( W_S \) is the straight-time wage, \( \rho \) is the premium for overtime hours, \( \theta \) is the fraction of overtime hours that command a premium, and \( v/h \) is the ratio of average overtime hours to total hours. The term \( \rho \theta v/h \) captures the idea that firms may have to pay a premium for hours worked beyond the standard workweek.\(^3\) Bils did not include the \( \theta \) term in his specification because he used manufacturing data from the Current Employment Statistics (CES), in which overtime hours are defined as those hours commanding a premium, where \( \theta = 1 \). In several of our data sources, we define overtime hours as those hours in excess of 40 hours per week. Because overtime premium regulations do not apply to all workers, we must allow for the possibility that \( \theta \) is less than unity and vary over time.

We assume that the firm takes the straight-time wage, the overtime premium, and the fraction of workers receiving premium pay as given, but recognizes the potential effect of raising \( h \) on overtime hours \( v \). Letting \( \lambda \) be the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, we obtain the first-order condition for \( h \) as:

\[ W_S \left[ 1 + \rho \theta \left( \frac{dv}{dh} \right) \right] = \lambda F_1(AhN, \ldots A), \]

where \( dv/dh \) is the amount by which average overtime hours rise for a given increase in average total hours and \( F_1 \) is the derivative of the production function with respect to effective labor, \( AhN \). The multiplier \( \lambda \) is equal to marginal cost, so the marginal cost of increasing output by raising hours per worker is given by:

\[ MC = \lambda = \frac{W_S \left[ 1 + \rho \theta \left( \frac{dv}{dh} \right) \right]}{AF_1(AhN, \ldots A)}. \]

The denominator of equation 5 is the marginal product of increasing hours per worker; the numerator is the marginal cost of increasing average hours per worker. As discussed above, this marginal cost should also be equal to the marginal cost of raising output by

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\(^3\) It would also be possible to distinguish wages paid for part-time work versus full-time work. However, Hirsch (2005) finds that nearly all of the difference in hourly wages between part-time and full-time workers can be attributed to worker heterogeneity rather than to a premium for full-time work.
increasing employment or the capital stock. If there are adjustment costs involved in changing those factors, the marginal cost would include an adjustment cost component. Focusing on the hours margin obviates the need to estimate adjustment costs.

Equation 5 makes it clear that the marginal cost of increasing hours per worker is not equal to the average wage, as is commonly assumed. Following Bils (1987), we call the term in the numerator the “marginal wage” and denote it by $W_M$:

$$W_M = W_s \left[ 1 + \rho \theta \left( \frac{dv}{dh} \right) \right].$$

To the extent that the marginal wage has different cyclical properties from the average wage, markup measures that use the average wage may embed cyclical biases. Bils (1987) used approximations to the marginal wage itself to substitute for marginal cost in his markup measure. We instead use an adjustment that does not require approximation. In particular, we combine the expressions for the average wage and the marginal wage to obtain their ratio:

$$\frac{W_M}{W_A} = \frac{1 + \rho \theta \left( \frac{dv}{dh} \right)}{1 + \rho \theta \left( \frac{v}{h} \right)}.$$

This ratio can be used to convert the observed average wage to the theoretically-correct marginal wage required to estimate the markup. We show in section 3 that the ratio of overtime hours to average hours, $v/h$, is procyclical, and that $\theta$ is roughly constant. Thus, the denominator in equation 7 is procyclical. How $W_M/W_A$ evolves over the business cycle depends on the relative cyclicality of $dv/dh$. The fact that $v/h$ increases with $h$ does not imply that $dv/dh$ increases with $h$. It can be shown that for a constant $\theta$, $d^2v/dh^2 > 0$ is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the wage ratio to be increasing in $h$. Thus, it is possible for $v/h$ to be procyclical, but $W_M/W_A$ to be countercyclical.

A second complication with estimating the markup is estimating the marginal product of labor. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then the marginal product of labor is proportional to the average product. Consider a more general case in which the production function has constant elasticity of substitution (CES):

$$Y = \left[ \alpha (AhN)^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \alpha)K^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}},$$
where \( \sigma \) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. The derivative with respect to effective labor (the \( F_1 \) needed for equation 5) is

\[
\frac{\partial Y}{\partial (AhN)} = \alpha \left( \frac{Y}{AhN} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}}.
\]

The exponent in equation 9 is the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution. If the elasticity of substitution is unity, this specializes to the Cobb-Douglas case. On the other hand, if the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, then the exponent will be greater than unity.

In the simple case where the marginal wage is equal to the average wage and the marginal product of labor is proportional to the average product (as in the Cobb-Douglas case), then the markup is given by

\[
M_{A^\text{CD}} = \frac{P}{W_A / [\alpha (Y/hN)]} = \frac{\alpha}{s},
\]

where \( \alpha \) is the exponent on labor input in the production function and \( s \) is the labor share. In the case where the wage is increasing in average hours, the markup can be written as

\[
M_{A^\text{MD}} = \frac{P}{W_M / [\alpha (Y/hN)]} = \frac{\alpha}{s \left( W_M / W_A \right)},
\]

where we use equation 7 to convert average wages to marginal wages. Finally, allowing for a CES production function, we obtain the markup

\[
M_{A^\text{CES}} = \frac{P}{W_M / \left[ \alpha \left( Y/AhN \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right]} = \frac{\alpha}{s \left( W_M / W_A \right)} \left( \frac{Y}{AhN} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma} - 1}.
\]

One important issue is that \( Y \) should be gross output. As Basu and Fernald (1997b) argue, “value added is not a natural measure of output and can in general be interpreted as such only with perfect competition.”

output, not value added. Unfortunately, no measures of gross output are available for the broad aggregates studied in section 4 so we must use value added. We use gross output when studying the markup at the industry level in section 7.

3 Estimating the Marginal-Average Wage Adjustment

This section describes the estimation of the four components of the marginal-average wage adjustment factor. For expositional purposes, we repeat equation 7:

\[
\frac{W_M}{W_A} = \frac{1 + \rho \theta \left( \frac{dv}{dh} \right)}{1 + \rho \theta \left( \frac{\xi}{h} \right)}.
\]

To construct the ratio of marginal to average wages, we require (1) estimates of the ratio of overtime hours to average hours, \(v/h\); (2) estimates of the marginal change in overtime hours with respect to a change in average total hours, \(dv/dh\); (3) the fraction of overtime hours that command a premium, \(\theta\); and (4) the premium for overtime hours, \(\rho\).

3.1 Measuring \(v/h\)

Most researchers analyzing the cyclical behavior of overtime hours have focused on production workers in manufacturing, since this group is the only one for whom data on overtime hours are readily available. The manufacturing sector is not representative of the entire U.S. economy, however. Even at its post-World War II peak, manufacturing accounted for only 25 percent of employment; it now accounts for only 9 percent of employment. Thus, it is important to look at broader measures of the economy.

To this end, we use three main data sources. First, we exploit an overlooked data source in order to construct a time series on the distribution of hours worked in the entire civilian economy. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)’s Employment and Earnings publication provides information on persons at work by hours of work, total persons at work, and average hours worked by persons at work, derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS). These data are available monthly beginning in May 1960. The number of persons at work are available only within particular ranges of hours worked, such as 35–39 hours per week, 40 hours per week, 41–48 hours per week, etc. To approximate the distribution of hours worked, we use data from the CPS to calculate a
time-varying average of actual hours worked for each published range. We seasonally adjust the monthly data. The appendix contains a complete list of data sources and additional details of our methodology. Second, we use CES data for manufacturing. The CES provides monthly data on average weekly hours and average weekly overtime hours of production and nonsupervisory workers in manufacturing going back to 1956. This is an establishment-based survey. Third, we use monthly CPS data, which are available from 1976 to 2007. This data source allows us to measure hours for all workers in manufacturing, not just production workers.

A key difference between the CES data and the two CPS data sources is the definition of overtime hours. The CES defines overtime hours as any hours that are paid a premium. The CPS makes no distinction between overtime premium hours and other hours. Thus, we define overtime hours in the CPS data as any hours worked above 40 hours per week, including those possibly worked on a second job. The fact that not all of these hours are paid a premium will be discussed below when we estimate $\theta$.

Figure 1 shows hours series for all workers in the aggregate economy, based on CPS data. The top panel plots average weekly hours per worker, the middle panel plots average weekly hours in excess of 40 ("overtime hours"), and the bottom panel plots the percent of total hours worked that are overtime hours. The bottom panel shows the estimates from Employment and Earnings (labeled "aggregate") as well as our estimates based on individual data from the monthly CPS (available from 1976 to 2007). All three series show pronounced low-frequency movements, decreasing throughout the 1960s and 1970s and rising over the 1980s and 1990s. They also appear to be mildly procyclical, although the low-frequency movements dominate.

Figure 2 shows the CES-based hours series for production and nonsupervisory workers in manufacturing (labeled "aggregate"), as well as the CPS-based ratio of overtime hours to average hours for all manufacturing workers in the bottom graph. All series display noticeable procyclicality, as well as important low frequency movements. The procyclical fraction of overtime hours in the bottom panel implies that average overtime hours varies more than average hours. The bottom panel also shows that despite the difference in the worker universe (establishment-level production workers versus household survey total workers) and the different definitions of overtime hours, the two ratios move together fairly closely, particularly during the first ten years of the overlap. The correlation for the entire overlap period is 0.95. The results are almost indistinguishable when we substitute one for the other in our wage factor. Thus, when
we examine wage factors for the entire period, we will use the CES ratio of overtime hours to average hours.  

The series shown in the bottom panels of figures 1 and 2 are the first element needed to estimate the marginal-average wage adjustment factor. How overtime hours vary with changes in average hours is an important determinant of the cyclicality of marginal cost.

3.2 Estimating $d\nu/dh$

The second key element in the wage factor is the marginal change in overtime hours. Bils (1987) speculated that a given increase in average hours would require more overtime hours if the starting level of average hours was higher. He used CES data from manufacturing to calculate the change in average overtime hours, $\Delta\nu_t$, and the change in average hours, $\Delta h_t$, and related them with the following difference approximation:

$$\Delta\nu_t = \alpha + \eta_t \Delta h_t + \xi_t.$$  

To capture the possible dependence of $d\nu/dh$ on the level of hours, he specified $\eta_t$ as a cubic function of lagged average hours and time trends.  

Averages hours based on aggregate data are not ideal for measuring this component for several reasons. First, as Bils pointed out, higher moments of the average hours distribution could also matter because all workers do not work the same amount of hours. Second, in the aggregate data it is not unusual for $d\nu = 0$ but $d\nu \neq 0$, which is problematic for both the interpretation and the econometric estimation. Ideally, we want to construct the ratio of the change in overtime hours to the change in average hours by individual workers and then take the economy-wide average. That is, we want to construct the “average marginal” change in overtime hours with respect to a change in average hours. The ideal way to do this is to use panel data on individual workers.

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5. One would expect the production worker series to be even closer to the total series in the early part of the sample. In 1956, production workers accounted for over 80 percent of workers in manufacturing; in 1976, they were 75 percent; and by 2009 they were 70 percent.

6. Mazumder (2010) instead regresses the level of $\nu_t$ on a polynomial in $h_t$ and then takes the derivative. The problem with this procedure is that low frequency movements (evident in figure 2) rather than business cycle fluctuations determine the coefficient estimates. Our comparison of the two methods suggests that Mazumder’s (2010) method produces estimates of the effects of average hours on $d\nu/dh$ that are three times larger than those produced by Bils’s first-difference method.
workers.\textsuperscript{7}

To construct this series, we use Nekarda’s (2009) Londitudinal Population Database, a monthly panel data set constructed from the CPS microdata that matches individuals across all months in the survey. The data are available from 1976 to 2007. For each matched individual who was employed two consecutive months, we compute the change in average hours $\Delta h_{it}$ and the change in overtime hours $\Delta v_{it}$, where overtime hours are any hours worked above 40, including those hours from secondary jobs. By studying only those employed two consecutive months, we isolate the intensive margin, as required by the theory.\textsuperscript{8} We construct the ratio $\frac{d v_{it}}{d h_{it}}$ for each individual and compute the average of this ratio for all individuals each month. We do this for all civilian workers as well as for all workers in manufacturing. The Appendix discusses the details of our method.

Because we also want to study longer sample periods, we use the relationship between the estimated $d v / d h$ and available aggregate data to impute this ratio for a longer sample. For the entire civilian economy, we explored how $d v / d h$ estimated from the matched CPS panel depended on aggregate average hours and the fraction of aggregate employment in each hours range, based on the Employment and Earnings data discussed above. We examined a variety of specifications and conducted multiple hypothesis tests. After eliminating variables that were not statistically significant and combining variables with similar coefficients, we estimated the following regression for all civilian workers over the period from 1976 to 2007:

$$
\frac{d v_t}{d h_t} = -0.077 + 0.018 h_t - 0.626 \frac{N_t^{30-40}}{N_t},
$$

where $N_t^{30-40} / N$ is the fraction of workers who work between 30 and 40 hours. The standard errors are Newey-West standard errors and account for autocorrelation up to 4 lags. None of the other variables, such as time trends, other moments of the distribution, or higher orders of average hours, were individually or jointly significant.

Figure 3 shows the actual and fitted value of $\frac{d v_t}{d h_t}$ for the aggregate economy from 1960 to 2009. The fit is very close, with an $R^2$ of 0.9. Thus, we feel comfortable

\textsuperscript{7} We are indebted to Steve Davis for suggesting this method for calculating $d v / d h$.

\textsuperscript{8} There are about 35,000–50,000 such observations per month.
using the fitted values for the entire sample.

Estimation is somewhat more complicated for manufacturing, both because the CPS-based estimates are for all workers where as the CES-based estimates are only for production workers and because we do not have manufacturing-specific information on the distribution of employment by hours. However, we found that the matched CPS estimate of $\frac{dv_t}{dh_t}$ for manufacturing was well explained by the aggregate variables we had available. We explored a variety of specifications and based on tests, we estimated the following regression for manufacturing:

$$\frac{dv_t}{dh_t} = -2.669 + 0.021 h_t + 1.343 \frac{N_t^{15-39}}{N_t} + 1.847 \frac{N_t^{40}}{N_t} + 2.800 \frac{N_t^{41+}}{N_t},$$

$$R^2 = 0.884, \text{ No. obs.} = 383$$

where $N_t^{15-39}/N_t$ is the fraction of workers working 15 to 39 hours, $N_t^{40}/N_t$ is the fraction working exactly 40 hours, and $N_t^{41+}/N_t$ is the fraction of working 41 or more hours. Note that these fractions refer to the entire civilian economy, not just manufacturing. Since they are only available starting in 1960, our manufacturing wage factor will also start in 1960. However, $h_t$ is average hours worked by production workers in manufacturing, based on CES data. The $R^2$ is almost as high for this regression as the previous one. The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows the actual and fitted values.

### 3.3 Estimating $\theta$

We now turn to the estimation of $\theta$, which is the fraction of hours worked over 40 hours per week that command a premium. For the CES data on production workers in manufacturing, $\theta = 1$ by definition, since overtime hours are defined as those hours that are paid an premium. For all manufacturing workers, $\theta$ is probably somewhat less than unity, since salaried workers typically do not receive overtime premia. However, since the average average overtime hours is similar across the CES and the CPS, we assume that $\theta$ is equal to unity.

Estimating $\theta$ is more difficult for the aggregate economy. The only direct information is from the May supplements to the CPS in 1969–81, which asked workers whether they received higher pay for hours over 40 hours per week.\(^9\) Using this question, along

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\(^9\) There were some anomalies with this question in the 1985 survey, so we did not use it.
with information on hours worked, we construct a measure of the percent of hours worked over 40 that are paid an overtime premium.\textsuperscript{10}

Unfortunately, the key question on premium pay was dropped from the May supplement after 1985. A potential alternative source of information is the BLS’s Employee Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) survey which provides information on total compensation, straight time wages and salaries, and various benefits, such as overtime pay, annually from 1991 to 2001 and quarterly from 2002 to the present. If one assumes a particular statutory overtime premium, then one can construct an estimate of \( \theta \) from these data. We assume that the statutory premium is 50 percent and construct a \( \theta \) accordingly.

Figure 4 shows annual estimates of \( \theta \) based on these two sources. From 1969 to 1981, \( \theta \) averages 0.33, meaning that only one-third of hours over 40 command a premium. From 1991 to 2009, \( \theta \) averages 0.27. Although it appears that the estimate of \( \theta \) from the CPS falls during recessions, regressing \( \theta \) on average hours does not yield a significant relationship.\textsuperscript{11} On the other hand, the fraction of hours paid a premium is slightly countercyclical in the ECEC data.\textsuperscript{12} It is difficult to tell whether the structure of the economy actually changed or whether the two surveys are simply not comparable. Because there is little cyclical variation in \( \theta \) in either survey, we assume that \( \theta \) is a constant equal to the average across the two surveys of 0.3.\textsuperscript{13}

### 3.4 Value of \( \rho \)

The last element needed to construct the marginal-average wage conversion factor is the premium paid for overtime hours. The Fair Labor Standards Act requires that employers pay a 50 percent premium for hours in excess of 40 per week for covered employees. Evidence from Carr (1986) indicates that in 1985, 92 percent of those who earned premium pay received a 50 percent premium.\textsuperscript{14}

Trejo (1991) has questioned whether the true cost of an extra overtime hour for those covered is actually 50 percent. He shows that the implicit cost of overtime hours

\textsuperscript{10} See Appendix.
\textsuperscript{11} The coefficient from this regression is 0.02 and has a \( t \) statistic of 1.40.
\textsuperscript{12} Regressing \( \theta \) estimated from the ECEC on CPS average hours yields a coefficient of \(-0.03\) with a \( t \) statistic of \(-3.2\).
\textsuperscript{13} If we instead assume that \( \theta \) is procyclical with the coefficient of 0.024 on average hours, our estimates of the marginal-average wage factor change little.
\textsuperscript{14} See Wetzel (1966) and Taylor and Sekscenski (1982) for other estimates.
is lower than 50 percent because straight-time wages are lower in industries that offer more overtime. Hamermesh (2006) updates his analysis and finds supporting results: the implicit overtime premium is 25 percent, not 50 percent. The following theory is consistent with these results. Workers and firms bargain over a job package that involves hours and total compensation. If workers’ marginal disutility of overtime hours is less than the statutory premium for overtime hours, then workers and firms in industries with higher average overtime hours will adjust to overtime regulations by agreeing to a lower straight-time wage. This implicit contract means that when the firm pays the worker a 50 percent premium for an overtime hour, part of that premium compensates the worker for the true marginal disutility of overtime, but part is simply a payment on a debt incurred to the worker because the contracted straight-time wage is lower.

In light of these results, we construct our markups under two alternative assumptions. First, we assume that the effective marginal overtime premium is equal to the statutory premium, so that the $\rho$ in both the numerator and denominator of equation 7 are equal to 0.50. Second, we assume that the effective marginal overtime premium is equal to Hamermesh’s (2006) estimate of 0.25. This means that the $\rho$ in the numerator of equation 7 is equal to 0.25; however, since the average wage data includes the 50 percent statutory premium, the $\rho$ in the denominator remains at 0.50.

### 3.5 Marginal-Average Wage Adjustment Factor

As our wage and markup data are quarterly, we convert the various components to quarterly values by taking monthly averages. Figure 5 plots our quarterly wage adjustment factors, $W_M/W_A$, for both the aggregate economy and manufacturing with a 25-percent and a 50-percent effective marginal overtime premium. In the aggregate economy (upper panel), the adjustment factor is above unity for both values of the overtime premium, indicating that the marginal wage is greater than the average wage. The factors are procyclical. The correlation of the cyclical components of the log of real GDP and the log of $W_M/W_A$ is around 0.8 for the entire sample using the fitted value. However, the magnitude of the cyclical fluctuations is exceedingly small. For the sample from 1976 to 2007, the correlation for the factor using the 50 percent premium is 0.65 when the actual estimate of $dV_t/dh_t$ is used and 0.82 when the fitted value from the regression is used. Thus, substituting fitted values for actual values

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15. Throughout the paper, we extract cyclical components using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a standard smoothing parameter of 1,600.
tends to bias the wage factor in the procyclical direction, which will bias the markup in
the countercyclical direction; however, it will make little difference because the magni-
itude of the fluctuations is so small. The correlations using the 25 percent premium are slightly lower.

In manufacturing (lower panel) the adjustment factor is also procyclical. The cor-
relation of the cyclical component of the adjustment factor in manufacturing with real
GDP is 0.34 for the 25 percent premium and 0.25 for the 50 percent premium for
the sample from 1960 to 2009, using the various fitted values. For the sample 1976
to 2007, the correlations are between 0.44 and 0.57 when the true values are used and between 0.51 and 0.81 when the fitted values are used. Again, the use of fitted
values tends to make the ratio of marginal wage to average wage more procyclical as
compared to when the actual estimates are used.

4 The Cyclical Behavior of Markups

As discussed in section 2, the average markup is proportional to the inverse of the labor
share. We study four measures of the labor share covering several broad aggregates.
Our first measure is the BLS’s index of labor share for the private business sector. This
is the broadest aggregate measure and it covers all compensation in this sector. We
also consider two labor share measures constructed from the U.S. national income and
product accounts (NIPA) that include only wage and salaries and exclude fringe bene-
fits. Labor shares for private business and manufacturing are constructed by dividing
wage and salary disbursements by total income. Finally, we consider a measure for the
nonfinancial corporate business sector that divides labor compensation by gross value
added less indirect taxes.\footnote{The first three measures do not subtract indirect taxes because of data availability. However, in nonfinancial corporate business we find that the tax-adjusted markup is more procyclical than the unadjusted markup. Thus, the measures that do not adjust for indirect taxes have a countercyclical bias.}
The Appendix provides additional details.

4.1 The Markup Measured with Average Wages

Figure 6 displays measures of the markup based on average wages, as defined in equa-
tion 10 (i.e., assuming Cobb-Douglas production). The top series is the markup in non-
financial corporate business, the measure favored by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
The middle two series plot the markup in private business using NIPA and BLS data.
The bottom series shows the markup in manufacturing. The most salient characteristic of all four measures is the propensity to trough during a recession and to peak in the middle of an expansion. That is, they all appear to be procyclical.

We assess the cyclicality of the markups more systematically in three ways. First, we test whether the markups are indeed lower during recessions by regressing the log markup on a quadratic time trend and a dummy variable for recessions:

\[
\ln M_t \equiv \mu_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 t^2 + \beta_3 I(\text{recession}_t) + \omega_t,
\]

where \( \omega_t \) is the error term. We consider a recession to start in the quarter following the business cycle peak, as dated by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and end in the quarter of the trough. As a second measure of cyclicality, we calculate the contemporaneous correlation between the cyclical components of the log of real GDP and the log of the markup, where the cyclical components are extracted using an HP filter. Finally, we study the contemporaneous correlation using a first-difference filter.

The first four rows in table 1 report our four measures of cyclicality for the markup using average wages for the period 1960:2 to 2009:4. The first column shows that in every case the markup is estimated to be significantly lower relative to trend during a recession, verifying the visual impression from the graphs. The second and third columns show that the cyclical component of the markup is positively correlated with the cyclical component of GDP, whether we use an HP filter or take first differences. The correlations range from 0.15 to 0.50. Thus, the average markup in all four broad sectoral aggregates is procyclical.\(^{17}\)

### 4.2 The Markup Measured with Marginal Wages

We next assess the cyclicality of markups measured using marginal wages. Our estimate of the markup is the ratio of the average markup and the marginal-average wage adjustment factor. We focus our analysis on the markup based on the NIPA labor share for private business, since it is broad and it excludes the part of compensation which might be tied to employment rather than hours worked. Also, since the unadjusted measure had the lowest procyclicality, we are biasing the findings away from procyclicality.

17. For the sample from 1947:1 to 2009:4, the correlations are slightly greater.
Figure 7 shows the average markup in private business along with two measures of the marginal markup that differ only in the effective overtime premium. The top panel plots the markup series and the bottom panel highlights only the cyclical component of the series extracted using the HP filter. The bottom panel shows that there is essentially no cyclical difference between the average and marginal measures of the markup. Rows 5 and 6 of table 1 show that the marginal markups measures are also significantly lower during recessions. The two filtered correlations are only slightly below the one for the average measure. If we instead use the BLS measure of labor share for private business, all measures of the markup are substantially more procyclical, ranging from 0.24 to 0.30 (not shown). We also investigated the effects of substituting the fitted values for the actual values in the period of overlap from 1976 to 2007. The correlations were very similar for the two series and similar for the entire period. Hence, both measures of the marginal markup for the broadest aggregate are slightly procyclical.

Figure 8 plots the cross-correlations of the cyclical components of the markup measures with GDP. The correlations for private business, shown in the upper panel, are positive for all leads and current values, indicating that an increase in the markup signals a forthcoming increase in GDP. The peak correlation occurs at a lead of three quarters. The correlations become negative for lagged values, meaning that a current decrease in GDP signals an upcoming increase in markups.

Figure 9 shows the average and marginal markups for manufacturing. The most noticeable feature is the extraordinary run-up between 2001 and 2006 in all three measures. The bottom panel removes these low frequency movements in order to focus on behavior over the business cycle. Adjusting for the marginal-average wage factor has little effect on the cyclicity of the markup in manufacturing. Rows 7 and 8 of table 1 show that the correlation with the cyclical component of GDP falls to 0.25 for the factor that uses the overtime premium of 50 percent. Thus, markups appear to be procyclical in manufacturing, even when we adjust for marginal wages.

The bottom panel of figure 8 plots the cross-correlations of the cyclical components of the manufacturing markup measures with GDP. The average markup in manufacturing is positively correlated with real GDP for all leads and current values and has a slightly higher contemporaneous correlation than for all workers. Adjusting for the marginal-average wage factor reduces the correlation at leads and lags of one year or less and draws out the cyclical response relative to the average markup. The correlation becomes negative at several lags.
4.3 CES Production Function

We also consider a measure of the aggregate markup under the assumption that the production function has a lower elasticity of substitution between capital and labor than the Cobb-Douglas production function. This markup is based on the expression in equation 12. The extra term in this markup measure consists of output divided by the product of total hours and the level of technology \((Y/ AhN)\) raised to the inverse of the elasticity of substitution. Thus, this measure requires an estimate of the level of technology \((A)\), as well as the elasticity of substitution.

We consider two methods of estimating \(A\). The first estimates technology as the HP trend in labor productivity. This method assumes that all business cycle variation in labor productivity is due to factors other than technology. The second uses Gali’s (1999) structural vector autoregression (VAR) method for identifying a technology shock as the only shock that has a permanent effect on labor productivity. To do this, we estimate a bivariate VAR with productivity growth and the growth of hours per capita using quarterly data for 1948–2008. We define technology as the part of labor productivity explained by the technology shock. The estimates from this method imply that much of the cyclical variation in labor productivity is due to technology.

Chirinko (2008) surveys the literature estimating the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and concludes that the elasticity is in the range of 0.4 to 0.6. Thus, we use an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor of 0.5, along with the marginal wage factor with an overtime premium of 25 percent. Rows 9 and 10 of table 1 report the cyclicality of this markup with the two different estimates of technology. The first column shows that both measures are significantly lower during a recession. The third column shows that both measures are even more procyclical than the one that assumes Cobb-Douglas; the correlation with the cyclical component of GDP is around 0.3.18

To summarize our results, we find that markups measured using average wages are procyclical in the aggregate economy and in manufacturing. Adjusting the markup for the difference between marginal and average wage yields only slight procyclicality for our main measure. The procyclicality of the markup in manufacturing remains even after adjustment.

18. We do not explore non-Cobb-Douglas markups for manufacturing because there are no quarterly data on labor productivity before 1987.
4.4 Comparison to Bils’s (1987) Estimates

Despite building on his insights, we reach the opposite conclusion from Bils concerning the cyclicality of markups. Thus, in this section we investigated the potential sources of the differences.

There are numerous differences in the way the theory is implemented. We use individual level data on all manufacturing workers to estimate $d_{v/dh}$. We also study samples from 1960–2009 and investigate the cyclical correlation between the estimated markup and real GDP. Bils estimates a polynomial parametric specification using annual 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) manufacturing data on production workers for 1956–83, and investigates the cyclical correlation between the estimated markup and labor input. Thus, candidates for the source of the different conclusions are (i) the different methods and types of data for estimating $d_{v/dh}$; (ii) production workers versus all workers; (iii) the different time periods; (iv) the different frequencies of the data; and (v) whether output or labor input is used as the cyclical indicator.

To determine the source of the differing conclusions, we explore the effects of these implementation details. To bring our analysis closer to Bils, we replicate Bils’s data and parametric approach by using his polynomial specification for the estimation of $d_{v/dh}$. In particular, we estimate:

\[
\Delta v_{it} = b_{i0} + b_{i1} t + b_{i2} t^2 + b_{i3} t^3 + c_1 \left[ h_{i(t-1)} - 40 \right] + c_2 \left[ h_{i(t-1)} - 40 \right]^2 \\
+ c_3 \left[ h_{i(t-1)} - 40 \right]^3 \Delta h_{it} + a_{i0} + a_{i1} t + a_{i2} t^2 + a_{i3} t^3 \\
+ d_{i1} \ln \left[ N_{it}/N_{i(t-1)} \right] + d_{i2} \Delta \ln \left[ N_{it}/N_{i(t-1)} \right] + e_{it}.
\]

In this equation, all parameters listed as a function of $i$ indicate that the parameters are allowed to differ across industries. The interaction term with $\Delta h$ includes an industry-specific mean, an industry-specific linear time trend, a common quadratic and cubic function of time, as well as a cubic function of the deviation of the starting level of average hours from 40. The terms outside the interaction with $\Delta h$ allow for further industry effects and time trends. We also follow Bils in including the growth and change in the growth rate of employment.\(^1^9\)

We use monthly CES data for 2-digit SIC manufacturing industries. All hours and employment data are for production and nonsupervisory workers. We seasonally adjust

\(^1^9\) See Bils (1987), p. 844, for his motivation for including these terms.
the monthly data for each industry and remove outlier observations from holidays, strikes, and bad weather.\textsuperscript{20} The annual series we use is the annual average of not-seasonally-adjusted data.

When we estimate this equation on monthly or quarterly data, we use average hours in the previous month or quarter for $h_{t-1}$. When we estimate this equation on annual data, we follow Bils and use the average of average hours in the previous and current year for $h_{t-1}$. When we aggregate the 2-digit data, we take a weighted average of $h$, $v$, and $dv/dh$, using the industry’s share of total hours as the weight. For employment, we simply sum across industries.

Table 2 shows the effects of data frequency on the estimates of $dv/dh$ on the 2-digit data. All estimates are for Bils’s sample of 1956–83. The table shows that monthly and quarterly data give very similar estimates of the slope of $dv/dh$ relative to average hours. In contrast, the annual data imply a steeper slope. Thus, time aggregation appears to bias the slope estimate upward. From this we conclude that Bils’s use of time-aggregated annual data appears to make $dv/dh$ more procyclical.

Table 3 shows the effect of changing frequencies and using different cyclical indicators on the inferences about the cyclicality of markups. We focus mostly on the marginal markup measure that assumes a 50 percent premium to compare it to Bils. Because the markup data are not available on a monthly basis, we consider only quarterly and annual data. Row 1 shows the results of using quarterly data to estimate $dv/dh$ and applying it to quarterly markups for Bils’s sample from 1956–83. The correlation with HP filtered GDP is 0.3. The next column shows the correlation with the cyclical component of output in manufacturing, measured using the index of industrial production (IP) in manufacturing. The correlation is half that for GDP, but is still positive. The last column shows the effect of using total hours in manufacturing as the cyclical measure, which is closer to what Bils did. In this case, the correlation is near zero. Thus, it appears that in Bils’s sample, the procyclicality of the markup is attenuated both by using industry-specific output measures and by using industry-specific labor input measures. When cyclicality is measured relative to industry output, markups are still mildly procyclical for quarterly data. However, when cyclicality is measured using total manufacturing hours, markups become acyclical.

The second row of table 3 shows the results when we continue to use quarterly data to estimate $dv/dh$ but then time aggregate it and apply it to annual data. In each case,

\textsuperscript{20} See the Appendix for details.
the correlations drop. The correlation is 0.2 when real GDP is used, but essentially zero when either manufacturing output or hours is used. The third row shows the results when we use annual data to estimate dν/dh and to calculate the markup, which is what Bils’s did. In this case, the markup is acyclical or countercyclical for all three indicators of the business cycle. The markup is most countercyclical (a correlation of −0.25) when using total hours—the indicator Bils used—as a cyclical indicator.

To gain insight into the effect of the sample, the fourth row replicates the procedure used in previous row, but extends the sample through 2002. The fourth row shows that the cyclicality falls to near zero when the sample is extended for an additional nineteen years. As in the shorter sample, the markup is more countercyclical when measuring the cycle with manufacturing IP, and still more so using total hours in manufacturing, than when using real GDP. The fifth row shows how assuming a 25 percent wage premium rather than a 50 percent wage premium changes the results. In this case, the correlation with GDP and industrial production is positive and the correlation with hours is zero.

In sum, Bils’s use of time-aggregated annual data and his choice of cyclical indicator for his sample period were all necessary conditions for finding a countercyclical markup. In contrast, we find that markups in manufacturing are procyclical to acyclical in quarterly data, whether we use our CPS panel data to estimate dν/dh or use 2-digit manufacturing data with Bils’s parametric model and even with a 50 percent overtime premium.

5 Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock on Markups

In many New Keynesian models, such as those by Goodfriend and King (1997) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), money is nonneutral because all prices do not adjust immediately. A contractionary monetary policy shock raises the markup because marginal cost falls more than price. Thus, the markup should move countercyclically if the business cycle is driven by monetary policy. However, because these models also imply that the markup increases in response to a technology shock, a procyclical markup does not, by itself, necessarily invalidate the models.

To test the mechanism of these models more directly, we investigate the response

21. The sample does not run through 2009, as our aggregate analysis does, because the SIC-based industry data are not available after 2002.
of our markup measures to a monetary policy shock. To do this, we add the markup to a standard monetary VAR. The VAR consists of the log of real GDP, the log of commodity prices, the log of the GDP deflator, the log markup measure, and the federal funds rate. We include four lags of each variable and a linear time trend. Following standard practice, we identify the monetary policy shock as the shock to the federal funds rate when it is ordered last. We estimate the VAR using quarterly data over 1960:3–2009:4.

We consider the average markup in private business and several measures of the marginal markup in the private business and manufacturing sectors. Figure 10 shows the impulse response of these markups to a positive shock to the federal funds rate—a contractionary monetary shock. The impulse response functions for the other variables (not shown) are similar to those in the literature; in particular, output falls and stays below trend for about four years.

In every case the markup falls in response to a contractionary monetary shock. Furthermore, the responses are below zero at conventional significance levels. The markup in manufacturing falls more than the markup for the overall economy. Thus, the behavior of markups is contrary to the mechanism of the New Keynesian model. However, one should not confuse statistical significance with economic significance. Our results imply that a monetary shock that leads GDP to fall by one percent leads the markup to fall by just under one percent. Thus, if the markup starts out at 1.20, then it falls to just 1.19.

One possible omission of our markup measure is its failure to capture the cost channel. Barth and Ramey (2002), Christiano et al. (2005), and Ravenna and Walsh (2006) have argued that a contractionary monetary policy shock might raise firms’ costs by raising interest rates. If firms must finance working capital, then an increase in interest rates raises their marginal cost. To include this effect, we multiply the wage measure of marginal cost by the gross nominal interest rate. For this we use a quarterly average of the prime interest rate. The middle right panel of figure 10 shows the aggregate marginal markup with an effective overtime premium of 25 percent, including the gross nominal interest rate as a part of marginal cost. Allowing for a cost channel does little to change the procyclicality of the markup.

To summarize, the New Keynesian model requires markups to rise in response to a contractionary monetary shock in order to generate monetary nonneutrality. In the

22. Details of the data sources are in the Appendix.
data, none of the markup measures rises in response to a monetary shock. In fact, all estimates of markups fall. Thus, our finding of procyclical markups in the previous section cannot be explained away with technology shocks. Moreover, these results are potentially consistent with Chirinko and Fazzari (2000), who find that inflation raises markups.

6 Discussion of the Aggregate Results

In one sense, our results should not be surprising since procyclical markups are a direct consequence of countercyclical labor shares. However, the New Keynesian literature seems to have overlooked the potential contradiction between the transmission mechanism required by the theory and the variables that perform best empirically.²³ For example, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) improved the performance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve by substituting a measure of real marginal cost for the output gap. Previously, the output gap had been used to predict inflation, but the estimated coefficient was negative, in contradiction to the theory. Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) argued that “real marginal cost” or “unit labor cost” was the more theoretically-correct variable. Their measure of real marginal cost was, in fact, the labor share. This variable predicted inflation very well, and entered with the correct positive sign. The output gap and the labor share perform so differently because they are negatively correlated with each other, i.e., the output gap is procyclical and the labor share is countercyclical. This negative relationship is in direct contradiction to the theory.²⁴ Unfortunately for the model, the countercyclical labor shares that work so well in the New Keynesian Phillips curve imply procyclical markups (measured using average wages).

Our results are also not surprising in the sense that procyclical markups imply a procyclical capital share. As Hall (2004) argues, cyclical patterns in firm rents are linked to adjustment costs on capital. Although he estimates very low adjustment costs, most estimates in the literature suggest higher adjustment costs that are completely consistent with procyclical capital share.²⁵ Moreover, as Christiano et al. (2005) note, profits increase significantly in response to an expansionary monetary shock in the data.

²³. We are indebted to Olivier Coibion for pointing this out to us.
²⁴. See, for example, Woodford’s (2003) equation 2.7 on page 180.
Because Christiano et al. (2005) allow for a cost channel of monetary policy in their theoretical model, an expansionary monetary shock can lead profits to increase slightly. However, as their figure 1 shows, the greatest gap between the data and model is in the behavior of profits; profits rise much more in the data than in the model. The evidence on markups that we present provides further cause for concern about the extent to which the current New Keynesian models capture the transmission of demand shocks.

Why then do Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) argue that markups are countercyclical? Figure 2 of their chapter shows that labor share rises significantly during every recession. Their table 1 also shows that labor share is countercyclical, with most correlations between labor share and cyclical indicators being negative. Since labor share is the inverse of the average markup, their figure and table imply a very procyclical average markup. Their ultimate conclusion that the markup is countercyclical is thus somewhat puzzling. After showing a procyclical markup using labor share data, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) consider more general specifications, such as non-Cobb-Douglas production functions and overhead labor, and find some evidence that markups move countercyclically. However, many of their calculations were based on educated guesses about parameters that were not well-measured at the time, such as the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and the fraction of labor that is overhead labor. We use richer data, and more recent estimates of key parameters, to analyze the key generalizations and show that the markup continues to be procyclical.

Our results do support one of Rotemberg and Woodford’s (1999) conclusions. In the first part of the introduction they argue that “there exists of great deal of evidence in support of the view that marginal cost rises more than prices in economic expansions, especially late in expansions.” Although our results contradict the first part of that statement, we find that markups begin to fall during the last part of the economic expansion. However, it is a mistake to infer that markups are countercyclical from this one feature of the data. The rise in markups in the first half of an expansion might be linked to adjustment costs on capital. During the second half of the expansion, capital has adjusted so that rents are dissipated.

One key assumption made in our work, as well as in virtually all of the New Key-

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26. The main exceptions are when they detrend hours using a linear trend. However, Francis and Ramey (2009) show that hours worked per capita exhibit a U-shape in the post–World War II period because of the effects of the baby-boom and sectoral shifts. Thus a linear time trend does not adequately capture the low frequency movements.

nesian models, is that wages are allocative and that firms are on their labor demand curves. If wages include insurance aspects, as suggested by Baily (1974) and Hall (1980), then our measures of marginal costs based on wages may not indicate the true marginal cost of increasing output. Also, while our method allows for adjustment costs on the number of workers, if firms engage in labor hoarding and are prevented from lowering hours per worker below some threshold, then the true marginal cost of an extra hour of labor may fall much more in a recession than suggested by our measure. In any case, these same considerations apply to any analysis, including the New Keynesian models, that use wage data to estimate parameters of the model.

Unfortunately, other methods for inferring the cyclicality of marginal cost or markups are fraught with their own weaknesses. For example, Bils and Kahn (2000) argued that one could infer the cyclicality of markups from the cyclicality of the inventory-sales ratio. They presented a stock-out avoidance model in which sales depended positively on the level of inventories. Based on that model, they showed that the countercyclicality of the inventory-sales ratio implied countercyclical markups.

However, it turns out that this result is model specific. For example, in a standard linear-quadratic production-smoothing model with a target inventory-sales ratio and a monopolist facing linear demand, a positive demand shock can easily lead to an increase in the markup and a decrease in the inventory-sales ratio. In Khan and Thomas’s (2007) general-equilibrium $S,s$ model, the inventory-sales ratio is strongly countercyclical, even though the markup is constant in their model. It is difficult to choose one model over another because most of them are rejected when subjected to formal econometric tests. Moreover, Bils (2005) tested the hypothesis of Bils and Kahn (2000) using microdata from the consumer price index (CPI). According to the Bils-Kahn model, stock-outs should be procyclical. For a sample of durable goods, Bils (2005) found that stock-outs are completely acyclical. In the context of the Bils-Kahn model, this implies that markups are acyclical. Thus, the behavior of inventories is not particularly informative about the markup.

In sum, we have found that measures of the markup based on the inverse of the labor share are procyclical in both the aggregate economy and the manufacturing sector. This measure is identical to the inverse marginal cost measure used in New Keynesian Phillips curve models. Adjustments that convert the average wage to the marginal wage do not significantly mitigate the procyclicality positive correlation with GDP.
7 Industry Analysis

We now turn to an analysis of a panel of 4-digit SIC manufacturing industries. As discussed in the introduction, industry- or firm-level studies such as those by Domowitz et al. (1986) and Chirinko and Fazzari (1994) tend to find procyclical markups. None of these studies, however, adjusted for marginal wages.

Using detailed industry-level data has several advantages. First, since sectoral shifts might drive the aggregate results, it is useful to examine the cyclicality of the markup at the industry level. Second, the industry data allow us to use gross output rather than value-added output. As discussed above, Basu and Fernald (1997b) argue that standard value-added measures are only valid under perfect competition. Thus, it is inconsistent to use value-added measures to explore the cyclicality of markups. Third, the industry data allows us to compare results for production workers and all workers. Some have argued that overhead labor is an important factor in estimating markups; we test whether our results are sensitive to including nonproduction workers, who are more likely to be overhead labor. Fourth, the industry data allow us to create much richer variables for testing New Keynesian explanations of the effects of aggregate demand shocks. In particular, we are able to use detailed industry-specific changes in government spending as instruments for studying the behavior of markups. The New Keynesian model predicts that the markup falls in response to an increase in government spending. Thus, it is particularly interesting to study this potential mechanism in detail.

There is one disadvantage of this data source, however. The data are only available at annual frequency. As discussed in the previous section, it appears that time-averaging the data tends bias the results toward finding countercyclical markups. This weakness should be kept in mind.

7.1 Data Description

We use the data set constructed by Nekarda and Ramey (2010), which builds on the ideas of Shea (1993) and Perotti (2008). The dataset matches 4-digit SIC level on government spending and its downstream linkages calculated from benchmark input-output (IO) accounts to the NBER–Center for Economic Studies (CEcS) Manufacturing Industry Database (MID). The data extend from 1958 to 2005. Merging manufacturing SIC industry codes and IO industry codes yields 272 industries. The Appendix of

The government demand instrument is defined as:

\[ \Delta g_{it} = \bar{\theta}_i \cdot \Delta \ln G_t, \]

where \( \bar{\theta}_i \) is the time average of the share of an industry’s shipments that are sent to the federal government and \( G_t \) is aggregate real federal purchases from the NIPA. Thus, this measure converts the aggregate government demand variable into an industry specific variable using the industry’s long-term dependence on the government as a weight. As discussed in Nekarda and Ramey (2010), this measure purges the demand instrument of possible correlation between industry-specific technological change and the distribution of government spending across industries. Since all regressions will include industry and year fixed effects, this instrument should be uncorrelated with industry-specific changes in technology or aggregate changes in technology.

The remaining variables are constructed using data from the MID. This database provides information on total employment, as well as employment in the subcategories of production and nonproduction workers. Unfortunately, the MID provides information on annual hours only for production workers. To create an hours series for all workers, we constructed two measures of total hours. We consider two extreme assumptions: (a) nonproduction workers always work 1,960 hours per year and (b) nonproduction workers always work the same number of annual hours as production workers. The results are similar under both assumptions; we report the results using the conservative assumption that nonproduction workers’ hours are not cyclical.

We next create series on average weekly hours for production workers and for all workers in the industry data by dividing total annual hours by 49 times production worker employment. We use 49 weeks rather than 52 weeks because the MID does not include vacation and sick leave in its accounting of hours. Our assumption yields a series on average hours for production workers in the industry database with a mean of 40.5, equal to the mean in the CES manufacturing data over 1958–2002.

The average wage for production workers is the production worker wage bill divided by production worker hours. The average wage for all workers is the total wage bill divided by total hours. Converting average wages to marginal wages is more difficult in the industry data because the MID has no information on overtime hours. To fill this gap, we use the 2-digit manufacturing data from the CES employed earlier in
our Bils replication to estimate the relationship between $v/h$ and average hours. Table A.1 of Nekarda and Ramey (2010) shows the coefficient estimates. We use those estimates with the annual average hours data at the 4-digit level from the MID to construct overtime hours.

For $dv/dh$, which appears in the numerator of the adjustment factor, we follow an estimation strategy similar to our Bils replication, estimating a version of equation 14. To match the frequency of the MID data, we take annual averages of the $\eta_t$ series estimated from monthly data. Finally, we consider wage adjustment factors with a 25-percent and 50-percent overtime premium.

### 7.2 Empirical Specification and Results

Our goal is to estimate how the markup responds to a change in output induced by shifts in demand. To construct our markup measure, we add industry ($i$) and time ($t$) subscripts to equation 10 and take annual log differences. The log change in the markup over average cost can be written as

$$\Delta \mu_{Ait} = -\Delta \ln(s),$$

which is the negative log change in the labor share, defined as the wage bill divided by the value of shipments. Similarly, the markup over the marginal wage is:

$$\Delta \mu_{Mit} = -\Delta \ln(s) - \Delta \ln\frac{W_{Mit}}{W_{Ait}}.$$  

The last term is the log change in the wage factor used in the average-marginal wage adjustment factor.

Our estimation involves regressing the change in the markup, $\Delta \mu$, on the change in the natural logarithm of real shipments, $\Delta \ln Y$. In particular, we estimate:

$$\Delta \mu_{it} = \gamma_{0it} + \gamma_{1} \Delta \ln Y_{it} + \epsilon_{it},$$

where $\epsilon_{it}$ is the error term. The coefficient $\gamma_{0}$ depends on both $i$ and $t$ because we include industry and year fixed effects. The coefficient $\gamma_{1}$ describes how the markup

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28. In the present case, we use quarterly seasonally adjusted data and estimate the model separately on each 2-digit industry.
responds to a change in shipments.

In order to isolate demand-induced changes in shipments, we instrument for shipments with our industry government demand variable. The first-stage fixed effects regression of the growth of shipments on our demand instrument produces an $F$-statistic for the instrument of 193. Thus, despite purging the instrument of possible correlations with technology, the instrument is very relevant, with an $F$ statistic well above the recommended cut-off of an $F$-statistic of 10.

We estimate the instrumental variables regression on our panel of 12,009 observations over the period from 1958 to 2002, including year and industry fixed effects. The sample end is dictated by the availability of the 2-digit CES data for creating the wage factors. Table 4 reports estimates of $\hat{\gamma}_1$ under several specifications. The first row shows the average markup, the second, the marginal markup assuming an overtime premium of 25 percent and the third, the marginal markup assuming an overtime premium of 50 percent. The first column shows the results for production workers. Whether we use the markup based on average wages or adjust it for 25 or 50 percent overtime premia, the coefficients uniformly signal that the markup does not respond to demand-induced changes in shipments. The coefficients are economically and statistically equal to zero.

Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) argued that the standard markup measure might be biased toward being procyclical if overhead labor is important. As Ramey (1991) argues, however, production worker hours are much less likely than total worker hours to include overhead labor. Thus, a comparison of our results for production workers to those for all workers might shed light on the potential bias. The second column shows the results when markups are calculated using all workers. The coefficients are slightly higher, suggesting more procyclicality for the case with total workers, but they are still indistinguishable from zero. This result supports the notion that including overhead workers may make the markup more procyclical. Nevertheless, the differences are very small.

In sum, we find no evidence that markups are countercyclical in response to government demand changes. Moreover, we have reason to believe that our results are biased against procyclicality, since our earlier results of the effects of temporal aggregation suggest that annual data biases results toward finding countercyclicality.
8 Conclusion

This paper has presented evidence that markups are largely procyclical or acyclical. Whether we look at broad aggregates or detailed manufacturing industries, average wages or marginal wages, we find that all measures of the markup are procyclical or acyclical. We find no evidence of countercyclical markups. These results hold even when we confine our analysis to changes in output driven by monetary policy or government spending. A monetary shock appears to lead to higher markups in quarterly data. In annual data, changes in government demand have no effect on markups.

Our results call into question the basic mechanism of the leading New Keynesian models. These models assume that monetary policy and government spending affect the economy through their impact on markups. If prices are sticky, an increase in demand should raise prices less than marginal cost, resulting in a fall in markups. Even with sticky wages, most New Keynesian models still predict a fall in markups. Our empirical evidence suggests that the opposite is true.

A number of the New Keynesian models are estimated on aggregate data. How then are they able to fit the data if markups do not move as predicted by the model? Typically, the models start with a prior of significant fixed cost, which often show up in posterior estimates at values as high as 60 percent (e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007)). The high fixed cost creates a large wedge between the markup from the model and the inverse labor share from the data, so this feature enables the model to fit the data. As Levin et al. (2005) point out the posterior estimate of fixed costs is significantly affected by the priors assumed on this parameter. High fixed costs are not supported by detailed micro studies, however. Most find that fixed costs are ten percent or less, consistent with mild increasing returns to scale or constant returns to scale (e.g. Basu and Fernald (1997b), Nekarda and Ramey (2010)). Thus, this particular factor that makes the New Keynesian models consistent with macroeconomic data does not have strong microfoundations.

Recently, some researchers have begun to study sticky wages in more detail (e.g. Baratierri et al. (2010)). It is possible that a return to this traditional focus of Keynesian models on sticky wages might render these models more consistent with the microeconomic evidence.
# Appendix

## Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Frequency and source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Average weekly hours                    | M Aggregate economy: BLS *Employment and Earnings*; see “Marginal Wage” below  
M Manufacturing: BLS series CEU3000000007                                                                |
| Average weekly overtime hours           | M Aggregate economy: BLS *Employment and Earnings*; see “Marginal Wage” below  
M Manufacturing: BLS series CEU3000000009                                                                |
| Labor share, nonfinancial corporate business | Q Compensation of employees divided by Gross value added of nonfinancial corporate business less Taxes on production and imports less subsidies; all series from NIPA table 1.14 |
| Labor share, private business (NIPA) & manufacturing | Q Wage and salary disbursements divided by National income without capital consumption adjustment; wages from NIPA table 2.2A/B, national income from NIPA table 6.1B/C/D |
| Labor share, private business (BLS)    | Q BLS series PRS84006173                                                                                                                                  |
| Labor productivity                      | Q BLS series PRS84006093                                                                                                                                  |
| Real GDP                                | Q NIPA table 1.1.6                                                                                                                                 |
| Implicit GDP price deflator             | Q NIPA table 1.1.9                                                                                                                                 |
| Commodity price index                   | M BLS series WPU00000000                                                                                                                                  |
| Federal funds rate                      | M Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System H.15 release                                                                                           |
| Prime loan rate                         | M Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System H.15 release                                                                                           |
Seasonal Adjustment

Both the Current Population Survey (CPS) and Current Employment Statistics (CES) surveys ask respondents to report actual hours worked during the week of the month containing the twelfth. Two holidays, Easter and Labor day, periodically fall during the reference week. When one of these holidays occurs during the reference week, actual hours worked falls substantially. However, because there this pattern is not regular, the seasonally-adjusted series published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) do not account for this reference-week holiday effect.

We seasonally adjust the CPS data we construct on employment and average hours for all workers in the aggregate economy using use the Census Bureau’s X-12-ARIMA program. We allow the program to remove all large outliers from the final seasonally-adjusted series. Because the seasonally-adjusted series on production workers in manufacturing are seasonally adjusted at a highly-disaggregated level, we do not perform our own seasonal adjustment. Instead, we use X-12-ARIMA to identify outliers from the seasonally-adjusted series and remove the outlier component from the seasonally-adjusted series.

Average Markup

We construct measures of the price-average cost markup as the inverse of the labor share. Details of the data are provided in the table above.

For the private business sector using BLS data, the markup is 100 divided by the index of labor share. For the private business sector using national income and product accounts (NIPA) data, the markup is wage and salary disbursements divided by national income without capital consumption adjustment. The markup in manufacturing is constructed analogously to NIPA private business. Finally, the markup for nonfinancial corporate business is constructed from the NIPA by dividing compensation of employees by gross value less taxes on production and imports less subsidies.

Economy-Wide Hours Data

Data on the distribution of hours for civilian workers come from the BLS’s monthly Employment and Earnings publication. We use three categories of data: persons at work by hours worked, total persons at work, and average hours worked by persons at
Data on total persons at work and average hours worked by persons at work are from Cociuba et al. (2009). Data on persons at work by hours worked are from two sources. Data are available on the BLS web site for June 1976 to present, but earlier data are taken from Employment and Earnings. Presently we are missing data for May 1963. This missing value is interpolated using Gómez and Maravall’s (1996) Time Series Regression with ARIMA Noise, Missing Observations, and Outliers (TRAMO).

**Distribution of Workers by Hours of Work**

The table below lists the BLS series for persons at work for June 1976 to December 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Series</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–4 hours</td>
<td>LNU02010044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–14 hours</td>
<td>LNU02010385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–29 hours</td>
<td>LNU02010726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34 hours</td>
<td>LNU02011067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39 hours</td>
<td>LNU02011501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 hours</td>
<td>LNU02011797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–48 hours</td>
<td>LNU02012093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49–59 hours</td>
<td>LNU02012389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+ hours</td>
<td>LNU02012685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total at work</td>
<td>LNU02005053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average hours, persons at work</td>
<td>LNU02005054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hour bins into which the BLS classifies workers change in 1967. The table below shows the concordance of which bins are combined to create categories that are consistent for the entire sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–14</td>
<td>1–4</td>
<td>1–14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5–14</td>
<td>1–14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–21</td>
<td>15–29</td>
<td>15–29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22–29</td>
<td></td>
<td>15–29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>30–34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>35–39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We use data from the CPS’s Annual Social and Economic Study ("March") supplement to calculate the average actual number of hours worked for the bins above. This allows us to calculate the total number of hours worked and total overtime hours worked. We use data from the March supplement rather than monthly data because the annual supplement data are available back to 1962.

Using the March supplement instead of a monthly series is relatively innocuous. Average hours worked per week in March is generally representative of average hours worked over the entire calendar year. Also, hours calculated from the monthly Basic CPS data are very similar to actual hours reported in the March supplement.

Figure A1 plots the annual average of hours worked per bin calculated from the monthly Basic CPS together with average hours calculated from the March CPS. Because the annual average and the March level are not always the same, we scale the March CPS data to the annual average. To account for the difference following the 1994 redesign, we calculate the adjustment factors over two subsamples: 1976–93 and 1994–2009. We apply the pre-1994 factors to all data before the redesign. The adjustment factor is simply the difference between the period average of the annual average and of the March CPS. The table below reports the mean adjustment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bin</th>
<th>Pre-1994</th>
<th>Post-1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–14</td>
<td>−0.063</td>
<td>−0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–29</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>−0.030</td>
<td>−0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–48</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49–59</td>
<td>−0.024</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because the March CPS data begin in 1962, we must estimate the average hours per bin for 1960 and 1961. We estimate a linear trend over the 1962–67 period and project that trend backward to obtain estimates for 1960 and 1961. The remaining years use the actual value from the March CPS for average hours per bin. The table below reports summary statistics of the adjusted average hours per bin in the March CPS over 1960–2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bin</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–14</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–29</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–48</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49–59</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We calculate total hours worked in bin \( b \), \( H^b_t \), using the number of persons at work by bin, \( N^b_t \), and the number of hours worked per bin, \( h^b_t \). We seasonally adjust \( N^b_t \) and apply the annual average of hours (\( h^b_t \)) to create the seasonally adjusted series of total hours per bin as \( H^b_t = h^b_t N^b_t \).

We calculate total hours as the sum of all bins:

(A.1) \[ H_t = H^{1–14}_t + H^{15–29}_t + H^{30–34}_t + H^{35–39}_t + H^{40}_t + H^{41–48}_t + H^{49–59}_t + H^{60+}_t \]

and overtime hours as

(A.2) \[ H^{OT}_t = (h^{41–48}_t - 40) N^{41–48}_t + (h^{49–59}_t - 40) N^{49–59}_t + (h^{60+}_t - 40) N^{60+}_t. \]

**Share of Overtime Hours That Are Paid a Premium**

We calculate share of overtime hours that are paid a premium using data from CPS May extracts provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (http:
The overtime variable (x174) is a dummy for whether an individual receives higher pay for work exceeding 40 hours in a week. (Note that the value 0 indicates that a worker received premium pay.)

We drop all individuals that do not report total hours (variable x28). We calculate overtime hours as hours worked at primary job (variable x182) less 40 when this is reported; otherwise, overtime hours is calculated as total hours worked less 40. An individual's paid overtime hours is the product of overtime hours and the indicator for whether overtime hours are paid a premium. We aggregate overtime hours, paid overtime hours, and total hours by year using the individual sampling weights (variable x80). For a given year, the share of overtime that is paid a premium is the ratio of paid overtime hours to total overtime hours.

**Longitudinal Population Database**

These data were constructed by Nekarda's (2009) by matching respondents from the monthly CPS.

(More details to come.)
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Table 1. Cyclicality of Price-Cost Markup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Markup Measure</th>
<th>Recession indicator</th>
<th>HP filter</th>
<th>First difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average markup</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Nonfinancial corporate business</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Private business (NIPA)</td>
<td>-0.022***</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Private business (BLS)</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Manufacturing</td>
<td>-0.041***</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marginal Markup</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Private business, $\rho = 0.25$</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Private business, $\rho = 0.50$</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Manufacturing, $\rho = 0.25$</td>
<td>-0.041***</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Manufacturing, $\rho = 0.50$</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marginal Markup, CES production function</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. HP-filtered technology$^e$</td>
<td>-0.038***</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. SVAR technology$^f$</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations using quarterly data from the BLS and NIPA. Data are for 1960:2–2009:4

Notes: a. Reports $\hat{\beta}_3$ from regression $\mu_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 t^2 + \beta_3 I(\text{rec}_t) + \omega_t$ (equation 13), where $\mu_t$ is the logarithm of the markup, $I(\text{rec}_t)$ is an indicator for a recession in quarter $t$, and $\omega_t$ is the error term. A recession begins in the quarter following the business cycle peak, as determined by the NBER, and ends in the quarter of the trough. Standard errors (not reported) incorporate a Newey-West adjustment, allowing for 2 lags in the autocorrelation structure. *** denotes significant at the one percent level.
b. Contemporaneous correlation of cyclical components of log real GDP and log markup, $\text{corr}(y_t, \mu_t)$. For HP filter, detrended using $\lambda = 1,600$.
c. Markup measure is NIPA private business. $\rho$ is effective overtime premium.
d. Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor $\sigma = 0.5$; see equation 12. Markup measure is NIPA private business with $\rho = 0.25$.
e. Technology is the HP trend in labor productivity.
f. Technology is identified using a bivariate VAR with labor productivity and hours per capita in first-differences.
Table 2. Effect of Time Aggregation on the Slope of $dv/dh$, 1956–83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>39 to 41</th>
<th>36 to 43</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Monthly</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Quarterly</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Annual</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ regressions using 2-digit CES manufacturing data.

Notes: Reports coefficient on $\Delta h$ from regression $\Delta v_{it} = b_{i0} + b_{1t} + b_{2t^2} + b_{3t^3} + c_{1}\left[h_{i(t-1)} - 40\right] + c_2\left[h_{i(t-1)} - 40\right]^2 + c_3\left[h_{i(t-1)} - 40\right]^3\Delta h_{it} + a_{i0} + a_{1t} + a_{2t^2} + a_{3t^3} + d_{i1}\ln\left[N_{it}/N_{i(t-1)}\right] + d_{i2}\Delta \ln\left[N_{it}/N_{i(t-1)}\right] + e_{it}$ (equation 14). Data are annual and cover 1956–83.

Table 3. Effect of Time Aggregation on the Cyclicality of the Markup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of $dv/dh$</th>
<th>Frequency of markup</th>
<th>Correlation of markup with</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Real GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-digit industry data, 1956–83, 50 Percent Premium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Quarterly</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Quarterly</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>−0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-digit industry data, 1956–2002, 50 Percent Premium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Annual</td>
<td>Annual</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Quarterly</td>
<td>Quarterly</td>
<td>0.208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations using 2-digit CES manufacturing data.

Notes: Contemporaneous correlation of cyclical components of log markup and cyclical indicator, where cyclical component is extracted using HP filter. Industrial production and total hours are for manufacturing.
Table 4. Regression of Markup on Gross Shipments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specification</th>
<th>Production workers</th>
<th>All workers</th>
<th>No. obs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.005 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.057 (0.046)</td>
<td>12,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal ($\rho = 0.25$)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.066 (0.046)</td>
<td>12,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal ($\rho = 0.50$)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.070 (0.047)</td>
<td>12,009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's regressions using data from MID, BEA benchmark IO accounts, and CES data from 1958 to 2002.

Notes: IV Regression of $\Delta \mu_{it} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \Delta \ln Y_{it} + \epsilon_{it}$ (equation 18) for industry $i$ in year $t$. Average markup is given by equation 16. $\Delta \ln Y_{it}$ is instrumented by $\Delta g_{it}$; see section 7.1. *** indicates significance at 1-percent, ** at 5-percent, and * at 10-percent level.
Figure 1. Average Weekly Hours per Worker, All Workers

Average Weekly Hours per Worker

Average Weekly Overtime Hours per Worker

Percent of Overtime Hours

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Employment and Earnings and the CPS covering 1960–2009.
Notes: Seasonally-adjusted monthly data. Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the NBER.
Figure 2. Average Weekly Hours per Worker, Manufacturing Production Workers

Average Weekly Hours per Worker

Average Weekly Overtime Hours per Worker

Percent of Overtime Hours

Source: Authors’ calculations using CES data covering 1960–2009.
Notes: Seasonally-adjusted monthly data. Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the NBER.
Figure 3. Estimated Relationship between Change in Overtime Hours and Change in Average Hours


Notes: $\eta_t = \beta_t + \gamma(h_{t-1} - 40)$ is estimated from the regression $\Delta v_t = a + \Delta h_t \left[ \beta_t + \gamma(h_{t-1} - 40) \right] + e_t$. Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the NBER.
Figure 4. Fraction of Overtime Hours Worked Paid a Premium

Source: Authors’ calculations using data from May CPS extracts (NBER) and Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (BLS).

Notes: The implied $\theta$ for the early sample is based on individual worker reports on hours and whether they are paid a premium from the May CPS extract. The implied $\theta$ for the later sample is based on aggregated data on wages and salaries and overtime compensation from the Employer Cost survey, coupled with our constructed measure of $v/h$. 
Figure 5. Marginal-Average Wage Adjustment Factor


Notes: Adjustment factor is $W^*_t \over W^*_t = \frac{1+\rho(dv/dh)}{1+\rho(v/h)}$; see equation 7. Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the NBER.

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Figure 6. Aggregate Price-Cost Markup

Source: Authors’ calculations using quarterly data from the NIPA and the BLS.
Notes: Markup in nonfinancial corporate business is compensation divided by gross value added less taxes on production; other NIPA markups are wage and salary disbursements divided by income without capital consumption adjustment. BLS markup is 100/index of labor share. Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the NBER.
Figure 7. Marginal Price-Cost Markup, Aggregate Economy

Source: Authors’ calculations using quarterly BLS data on labor share for private business.
Notes: Unadjusted plots average markup; remaining series are marginal markup with indicated overtime premium. Cyclical component extracted using HP filter ($\lambda = 1,600$). Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the NBER.
Figure 8. Cross-Correlations of Markups with Real GDP

Source: Authors’ calculations using quarterly data. Markup for aggregate economy is inverse labor share for private business over 1960:3–2009:4 from the BLS; markup for manufacturing is inverse labor share over 1956:1–2009:4 from the NIPA; real GDP is from the NIPA.

Notes: Correlation of cyclical components of \( y_t \) and \( \mu_{t+j} \). Detrended using HP filter (\( \lambda = 1,600 \)). Unadjusted is average markup; remaining series are marginal markup with indicated overtime premium.
Figure 9. Marginal Price-Cost Markup, Manufacturing

Source: Authors’ calculations using quarterly NIPA data on labor share for manufacturing.
Notes: Unadjusted plots average markup; remaining series are marginal markup with indicated overtime premium. Cyclical component extracted using HP filter ($\lambda = 1,600$). Shaded areas indicate recessions as defined by the NBER.
Figure 10. Response of Markup to a Contractionary Monetary Policy Shock

Source: Authors’ calculations using quarterly data for 1960:3–2009:4. Markup is inverse of labor share for private business from the NIPA; real GDP and GDP deflator are from the NIPA; commodity prices are from the BLS; federal funds rate and prime rate are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

Notes: Impulse responses estimated from VAR(4) with log real GDP, log commodity prices, log GDP deflator, markup measure, and federal funds rate; also includes a linear time trend. Monetary policy shock identified as shock to federal funds rate when ordered last. Specification with interest rate includes the prime rate in marginal cost. Dashed lines indicate 95-percent confidence interval.
Figure A1. March and Annual Average Hours per Bin


Notes: Annual average of monthly CPS data.