The Security-Development Nexus in United States–Caribbean Relations

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Prepared for

The Conference on the Caribbean Expert Forum

19-21 June 2007
Washington, DC

18 May 2007
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Abstract

This paper argues that there is a mutually supporting interest with regard to security and development in United States-Caribbean relations that should be further developed. Prior to 9/11 the United States had a vested interest in securing its so-called “Third Border”. The post-9/11 period has redefined security and the call for the international community to combat terrorism. For the Caribbean region, this means dedicating more scarce resources to developing the security infrastructure. Given the context of the Caribbean’s dependence on tourism, trade and foreign investment and the US’s interest in the security of its borders and its international supply chain, the question of what standards should be enforced and by whom is explored.

Various international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Interpol and others, are constantly developing new security standards. The United States has been a driving force in this effort. While it behooves the Caribbean to protect its tourism sector from terrorist attacks that could potentially devastate their respective economies and to implement international standards required for them to have unimpeded access to world trade, these small countries are constrained by limited human, technological and financial resources. Furthermore it is difficult for any nation to constantly readjust to amorphous standards whose goals are constantly in flux.

This paper concludes that the forward agenda for the United States-Caribbean relations must establish a prioritized security agenda as well as a timeline and benchmarks for how to implement said standards, taking into consideration the high correlation between security and development.
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Introduction

The security-development nexus in US–Caribbean relations is a reflection of the convergence of interests with regard to the security imperatives of the United States and the future development of Caribbean countries. The United States has a national security interest in ensuring that its so-called “third border” is secure, thereby reducing its vulnerability to possible threats from terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration, human trafficking, smuggling of contraband, and the smuggling of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological materials that could be converted to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).¹ The countries of the Caribbean, in general, and CARICOM member states in particular, have an equally strong interest in ensuring a secure economic space conducive to the economic, social and political development of the countries of the region, including by enhancing and maintaining their traditional economic relationships with the United States.

Security in a globalised world has taken on new meaning in the post-9/11 period. Traditional notions of security have undergone thorough evaluations and transformation during this period. No issue, in recent history, has affected international, regional and national security as has the terrorism phenomenon. Acts of terrorism have taken many forms in the past. However, globalization has sharply increased the terrorist threat to the world community and has enhanced its potential for greater damage. Similarly, transnational criminal activities – drug trafficking, illicit trade in small arms, smuggling of contraband, and money laundering – now take place across national borders with greater ease and increasing levels of sophistication. There is increasing evidence to support the widely held view that there is a link between transnational organized criminal activities and terrorism.

As I have written in the past, the events of September 11, 2001, set in motion a new paradigm for the international community to combat international terrorism.²

¹ See Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 4, for a brief description of the types of WMDs, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2007, at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82737.htm>
That the United States, particularly in this period, has focused overwhelmingly on security and has required other countries to pay greater attention to US security concerns is not surprising. That developing countries, in this case the countries of the Caribbean, experience difficulties in prioritizing certain new security measures over more urgent development concerns, is equally not surprising. However, in this new environment, Caribbean countries are now recognizing security as an essential pre-requisite for sustainable development in the region.

Dealing with terrorism and transnational crime now require greater levels of cooperation and collaboration between governments, increased expertise, and use of sophisticated technology. New security risks have emerged on a global scale thereby increasing pressure on all states to meet new and emerging international standards of security. Traditional security measures no longer suffice and greater efforts are needed to keep pace with shifting security threats. For the Caribbean region, it means dedicating far greater resources to developing the security infrastructure.

While meeting United States security requirements may, in the short-term, pose significant burdens on Caribbean states, in the long term, Caribbean countries stand to benefit. The issue is not whether these security standards are required throughout the Caribbean region. Rather, the issues are: What standards are required and who pays to implement them? What are the respective roles and responsibilities of the United States and the Caribbean in advancing this agenda so that the burden and the benefits are shared proportionately? This paper provides some details on the security for development imperatives and takes a rational approach to possible solutions, thereby offering a basis for dialogue and decision-making and putting security and development-related issues on a forward agenda.\(^3\)

Throughout the security spectrum, new international standards are constantly being established, particularly in such areas as border control – immigration and customs control – and in maritime and aviation security. All of these impact upon important economic sectors within the Caribbean, in particular in areas of trade, tourism and other critical areas of foreign investment. The United States’ proximal relationship to the Caribbean guides America’s deep interest in the security regime in place in these critical economic sectors.

For the most part, generally accepted international security standards may suffice. However, the United States, an aggressive leader in creating new

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\(^3\) The UN International Meeting to Review Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (Barbados +10 Conference), Mauritius, 10-14 January 2005, identified two new emerging issues – HIV/AIDS and security – as threatening the sustainable development prospects of small islands developing states. At this Conference, the author elaborated the nexus between security and sustainable development for small islands developing states. The relationship between development and security in US-Caribbean relations was discussed briefly in Curtis A. Ward, “Security concerns vital to US-Caribbean relations”, Jamaica Observer, July 31, 2005.
international security standards through international specialized organizations and institutions, often requires of other countries standards that exceed international standards. This also raises the possibility that creating regional standards, based on international standards, may not be enough to meet United States' requirements. The burden on Caribbean countries to keep pace with changing security standards and new technology that are required by current and future U.S. laws could be further exacerbated.

The Caribbean has a vested interest in security in order to protect its citizenry from crime, in particular international criminal activities which spawn and support domestic criminal activities; to protect the assets and citizenry of the countries to which they play hosts – foreign investments, tourism and business; and of even greater significance to the future of the Caribbean, to provide a secure environment for domestic and foreign investment, trade, and economic and social development. The Caribbean has a vested interest in security in order to protect its citizenry from crime, in particular international criminal activities which spawn and support domestic criminal activities; to protect the assets and citizenry of the countries to which they play hosts – foreign investments, tourism and business; and of even greater significance to the future of the Caribbean, to provide a secure environment for domestic and foreign investment, trade, and economic and social development.

**US security rationale**

United States national security has always been, and will remain, the top priority of all United States Governments. And, as I have stated, the United States Government, in light of current threats, has good reasons for placing security at the top of its agenda in its relationship with all countries in general, and in this case with the countries of the Caribbean. United States President George W. Bush identified the rise of terrorism – manifested in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – as the “grave challenge” facing the United States, and stated that the “most solemn obligation” of the Government is “to protect the security of the American people.”

This also means that the U. S. Government’s resolve to use whatever means necessary to protect the American people and American interests from terrorism is not in doubt. As stated in the U.S. National Security Strategy:

> ‘It is an enduring principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage.”

Because of its thousands of miles of land border with friendly neighbors – Canada to the north and Mexico to the south – and vast expanses of water to the

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6 U.S. National Security Strategy, p.18
east, west and south, what once served as natural security barriers now poses significant challenges for the United States to secure from terrorism. The terrorist threat against the United States, including the threat of using a WMD against the United States, is real. And, as stated in the National Security Strategy: “There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD.” The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed U.S. vulnerability.

The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator on Terrorism most recently released data which lists 42 terrorist groups. The United Nations Security Council Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions committee, as of 12 December 2006, lists 362 individuals and 125 entities, which includes Al-Qaida, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities designated by the Committee. Most of the names on the list were designated by the Government of the United States and agreed to by all 15 Security Council members of the Committee.

The United States, being the world’s largest trading nation, has a vested interest in securing the safety and security of international trade. With 95 percent of U.S. imports moving by sea, some 11 million containers were off-loaded at U.S. ports in 2005. This volume of container traffic increases U.S. vulnerability, not only to the smuggling and use of WMDs, but also to drug trafficking. At the same time, the United States welcomes over 51 million visitors to its shores each year.

Estimates vary on the economic effect of a terrorist attack using a WMD. It also varies depending on the type of WMD used in the attack. According to the CBP, citing studies conducted on the economic cost of a WMD attack resulting in the closure of U.S. ports due to the discovery or detonation of a WMD, the cost to the U.S. and global economy would be enormous. One study indicated that a 12 day closure would cost US$58 billion dollars; another suggested that port closures could amount to US$1 trillion, assuming a prolonged economic slump due to an enduring change in U.S. ability to trade.

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7 Ibid. p.18
8 U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter 6, for a brief description of each terrorist group, at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm>
9 The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities.
10 The names of the individuals and entities on the Designated List is available on the 1267 Committee website at: <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml>
It is conceivable that the United States with its abundance of, but not unlimited resources could put in place an inspection regime for every container arriving at its ports; and could increase the likelihood of catching potential terrorists during the immigration and border control inspection process. However, such a solution would not ensure U.S. security.

Realistically, to conduct inspection of every container at U.S. ports of entry would slow international trade to a crawl creating back-ups of shipments in every port around the world. Moreover, should a container loaded with a weapon of mass destruction reach the U.S. port before it is discovered it would be too late to save the United States from another terrorist catastrophe. The same applies in the case of a terrorist on board an airplane bound for the United States. It is highly unlikely that such a terrorist would have any intention of passing through immigration inspection.

The United States is determined to stop the terrorists before they reach its shores. For these reasons it is imperative that the United States engages with its trading partners to establish screening and inspection processes before containers leave foreign ports destined for the United States. Also, it means ensuring that countries of embarkation have the capacity to screen airline passengers before boarding. This places the responsibility on trading partners to implement security standards developed and required by the United States to secure the international supply chain from being used as a vehicle to carry out terrorist acts on the United States. It means internationally recognized standards must be employed by all countries in the issuance and screening of travel documents.\textsuperscript{14} It requires cooperation and collaboration between the United States and countries around the world, including CARICOM member states.

In examining U.S. national security in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the Princeton Project\textsuperscript{15} made a number of very interesting observations and recommendations to guide United States posture in pursuit of security. It noted that a successful national security strategy for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century must, \textit{inter alia}, be “interest-based, not threat-based”, and explained that,

\begin{quote}
'a successful strategy must begin by identifying and pursuing common interests with other states rather than insisting that they accept our prioritization of common threats .... Finding ways to develop frameworks of co-operation based on common interests with individual nations or groups of nations minimizes frictions, maximizes common assets, and increases the likelihood of
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} ICAO standards and programs on travel documents and aviation security facilitation are available at: <http://www.icao.int/atb/sfbranch/index.asp?>

cooperative deployment of those assets to achieve common objectives.'\textsuperscript{16}

Furthermore,

`US strategy must include the creation of institutions and mechanisms whereby the international community as a whole can help strengthen government capacity and encourage sound practices within states without using force or illegitimate modes of coercion.'\textsuperscript{17}

The Princeton Project also suggested that the United States Government should integrate its soft power, as defined by Joseph S. Nye,\textsuperscript{18} with its hard power in pursuit of its objectives. And in so doing, its soft power would be used to attract other states to U.S. goals, rather than bending them to U.S. will.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Caribbean development rationale}

Caribbean states, due to their dependence on tourism, trade, and foreign investment, are confronted with evolving new demands on their already scarce resources to ensure a safe and secure economic space. The nature of their geographic construct and locations, and the vulnerability of their security infrastructure expose them to possible abuse by international criminal elements. The risks to them include situations in which each country, while not necessarily the ultimate target, could be used as a possible staging area for the criminal enterprise – whether it is terrorism, drugs trafficking, illicit trade in small arms, or smuggling of weapons of mass destruction or other sensitive materials for use elsewhere.

Each country’s and the region’s economic development are threatened by weaknesses in the security regime across the region to protect certain critical areas of economic activity – tourism, maritime trade, mining and extraction, and the financial sector. With regard to the latter, prevent its abuse by transnational organized crime to money-launder the proceeds of ill-gotten gains, and the financing of other criminal enterprises, including terrorism. As Minister of National Security Dr. Peter Phillips of Jamaica pointed out, the perceived need for a regional approach to crime fighting and security has its roots in the 1992 report of the West Indian Commission on the Caribbean Community – Time for Action\textsuperscript{20} – which stated that there was an urgent need for the region to develop

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\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.} p.17 \\
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.} p.18 \\
\textsuperscript{18} Joseph S. Nye, Jr., \textit{The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s only Superpower can’t go it alone”} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) \\
\textsuperscript{19} Princeton Project Report, p. 17 \\
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Time for Action: The Report of the West Indian Commission}, published in 1992, is the response to the mandate given by the CARICOM heads of Government in the “Grand Anse Declaration”,
\end{flushleft}
regional security arrangements. He also opined that the need for major security expenditures had been exacerbated by the events of 9/11, the trade of illegal narcotics through the Caribbean, and the impending CARICOM single market and economy.21

A brief look at the importance of critical sectors of Caribbean economic development – tourism, trade and the foreign investment environment – follows:

Tourism
The tourism sector provides a disproportionate share of each Caribbean island’s economic activity or potential for growth and expansion. A World Travel & Tourism Council study estimated the economic impact of tourism on Caribbean states in 2004, directly and indirectly, accounted for: 15.5% of employment, 14.8% of total GDP, 18.4% of exports, and 21.7% of total investments. The study forecasted annualized real growth over the next ten years of: 4.1% of GDP, 2.8% of employment, raising tourism and travel’s share of GDP and employment 16.5% and 17.1%, respectively.22

This estimated growth in tourism can only be achieved in a safe and secure environment. The tourism sector, seen as a soft target, is regarded as most vulnerable where there is a lack of security in immigration and customs control and airport and seaport facilities security. Terrorism and other transnational crimes are now considered to be the greatest threats to tourism development.

The risk to U.S. interests is increased by the fact that a significant number of the tourists who visit Caribbean countries, numbering in the millions – hotel stays and cruise ships visits – originate in North America, particularly from the United States. As increasing numbers of the traveling public become concerned about the level of security when choosing their destinations lack of security could prove detrimental to the tourism sector of each CARICOM country and to the region as a whole. The fact is, as American travelers choose where to spend their vacations, now more than ever, their decisions are determined by the perception of the level of security at the destination. While tourism travel to certain Caribbean destinations has rebounded and in some instances has surpassed pre-9/11 travel, it is clear that security, or lack thereof, influences the decision of the American traveler. In order to sustain growth in the tourism sector, Caribbean governments must ensure a destination that is safe and secure.

which concluded the Grenada Summit Meeting in July 1989. The Commission, chaired by Sir Shridath Ramphal, inter alia, was tasked with formulating proposals for advancing the goals of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, which established CARICOM in 1973.
Trade:
The trade sector is particularly vulnerable to abuse by transnational criminal elements in the illicit drug trade, smuggling of contraband, illicit trafficking in small arms and sensitive materials. Traditional trading partners, in particular the United States, have imposed stringent new security requirements on the shipping and transportation of goods shipped from, or through the Caribbean and elsewhere. The United States being the Caribbean’s largest trading partner dictates the imperatives for greater threat-reducing modalities in the trade sector. It necessitates new and improved security measures to ensure the safety and security of the international supply chain from points of origin to destination, including where the Caribbean serves as a transshipment point for goods destined for the United States. The Customs Administration in each country, which exercises primary control over the entry and exit of goods, and the Port Authority charged with administration of port facilities handling these shipments have primary responsibilities in this area.

At a minimum, every Caribbean port engaging in international shipping must now meet certain security requirements as mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its International Ship and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code. Each such port facility is required to establish and implement a comprehensive security plan that outlines procedures for securing and controlling access to the facility, verifying credentials of port workers, employing risk assessment to determine which cargo requires invasive inspection, inspecting and screening cargo for tampering, designating security responsibilities, training, and reporting all breaches of security or suspicious activity, among other security measures, on a continuing basis. The ISPS Code was adopted by the IMO as a direct response to the terrorist threat in the post-9/11 period and in response to the requirements of UN Security Council resolution 1373.

In order to be competitive and otherwise participate in global trade, each CARICOM state needs a Port Authority that can effectively manage and maintain the physical infrastructure of a port, to include wharf, docks, piers, transit sheds, loading equipment and warehouses; is able to facilitate and expand the movement of cargo through the port; provides facilities and services that are competitive, safe and commercially viable.

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23 A list of the IMO conventions on safety and security, including on the ISPS Code, are available at: <http://www.imo.org>
24 UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001), was adopted by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. All Security Council resolutions are available at: www.un.org/documents/scres.htm. The members of the UN Security Council at the time of adoption of Res. 1373 were: Bangladesh, China, Colombia, France, Ireland, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Norway, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For a detailed discussion of the requirements of Res. 1373, see Ward, “Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism”, n.2. supra
In a statement in 2005, Prime Minister Denzil Douglas of St. Kitts and Nevis noted that adequate human resource, revenue generation and proper security to deter terrorism are among the challenges facing Caribbean ports. He noted further, that port security had grave implications for the region’s ability to trade and to trade efficiently. He also said that, “escalating security cost could have detrimental effects on future port viability.” An example of the high cost of port security required to ensure the safety of the supply chain is reflected in the initial expenditure of US$60 million by the Jamaican Government in 2004 for modern X-ray and gamma ray equipment. Significantly more expenditure are required in the medium- to long-term to create additional security layers and to keep updating and maintaining the equipment. The high cost of modern security-related technology is prohibitive for most CARICOM states, and is a significant financial burden for all.

However, at the commissioning of the equipment at the Kingston Container Terminal in Jamaica, on March 2, 2004, then Prime Minister P. J. Patterson, in putting the issue of security in context, stated that by establishing proper security measures at the ports, the Government was protecting Jamaica’s ability to participate in international trade, particularly with its major trading partners – the U.S., Canada and Europe. Prime Minister Patterson noted that Jamaica’s trading relationships could be seriously jeopardized should the Government lack capacity to ensure that this sector is not used as a vehicle to carry out terrorist acts against another country. Mr. Patterson also stated that “no port is immune from such negative and destructive forces as the international drug trade, the smuggling of small arms and contraband, including the movement of nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological and other deadly materials.” These observations by the former Jamaican Prime Minister aptly reflected a reality for all CARICOM states.

**Investment environment:**
CARICOM states depend largely on foreign investments to complement domestic investments to sustain economic development. In order for Caribbean countries to attract foreign investments and sustain growth in domestic investments, the governments must ensure a safe and secure environment for potential investors and the security infrastructure necessary to sustain investment activities. As noted in the Task Force Report, new international security regulations, particularly those introduced after September 11, 2001, have had an impact on the Caribbean and have affected its tourist industry, with overall implications for the economies of Caribbean countries. The Task Force also recognized that security threats, concerns and other challenges in the hemispheric context are

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25 Press Release on statement of the Prime Minister of St. Kitts and Nevis, Dr. the Hon. Denzil Douglas to the opening of the 8th Annual General Meeting of the Port Management Association of the Caribbean at St. Kitts, July 4, 2005. (A copy is with the author.)
26 Jamaica Gleaner (Internet edition), March 3, 2004, “PM unveils new security system at port”.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
multidimensional in nature and scope, and that the traditional concepts and approaches must be expanded to encompass new and non-traditional threats. These observations by the Task Force led to the conclusion that programs and policies dealing with crime and security in the Caribbean required human, technological and financial support from international partners.

Prime Minister Patrick Manning of Trinidad and Tobago, who among CARICOM prime ministers has responsibility for ‘Regional Crime and Security’, noted in the Foreword to the Task Force’s Report that the task ahead for CARICOM was “to follow up urgently on the priority activities that would assist member states in fashioning their implementation program aimed at drastically reducing crime, and the related issues of illicit drugs and firearms.” He added that these issues “divert efforts away from planning for economic growth and development.”

Almost five years hence, most CARICOM states have been unable to implement fully the Task Force’s recommendations.

While recognizing the security threat to their development prospects and the obvious deficiencies in their overall security infrastructures – national and regional – CARICOM states are constrained by lack of financial, human and technological resources to put in place the requisite measures. A recent World Bank/United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (WB/UNODC) joint report underscores the negative impact of crime and violence on development of CARICOM states, due in part to a lack of adequate security, and noted that crime and violence present one of the paramount challenges to development in the Caribbean. The report also noted that CARICOM states cannot solve the problems of crime and security on their own – due in large part to the vast amount of resources required – and require significant support from OECD countries to do so. Such support should be based on a comprehensive and proactive approach to security recognizing its relationship to development.

The correlation between lack of security (and crime associated with lack of security) and development has long been recognized by CARICOM states, a fact reiterated in the WB/UNODC report. However, security needs pose a dilemma for the resources-strapped CARICOM states. Faced with no other option but to implement measures to effect change in the security dynamics of the region is a burden. Admittedly, taking appropriate action will result in

29 CARICOM Crime and Security Task Force Report, p. 6
30 Ibid., p.4
31 Ibid., Foreword
33 Ibid., p. xiii
34 See overall conclusions of the CARICOM Crime and Security Task Force Report
35 WB/UNODC Report, p. xiii
medium-to long-term benefits as each state and the region as a whole will have created an environment conducive to economic growth and development. Also, the state and the region, by being responsive to the needs of their international partners, in particular the United States, will be able to develop further and sustain their trading relationships. On the other hand, the United States, in the spirit of partnership and in its own self-interest, is expected to reciprocate with assistance at a level that significantly reduces the burden on CARICOM states.

Current and future security standards and best practices – international and United States requirements

International organizations – the United Nations, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and Interpol among others – are constantly developing new security standards and programs at the urging, and with the leadership and support of developed countries, including the United States, to deal with new and emerging problems associated with terrorism and international crimes. ICAO, WCO, IMO and Interpol offer international standards and best practices in areas such as, travel documents issuance and security, and aviation and airport facilities security, security of the international supply chain, maritime and port facilities security, and tracking and policing of international criminal networks and terrorists, lost and stolen travel documents.

The United Nations and a number of these organizations have elaborated a number of anti-terrorism, anti-crime and security-related conventions and protocols. And the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, has mandated through resolution 1373 that all states implement the 13 international anti-terrorism instruments, as well as non-proliferation measures, such as required by resolution 1540 in their national

36 ICAO, n. 14, supra.
37 The WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, when implemented should 'contribute positively to economic and social development, act as a deterrent to international terrorism, secure revenue collections and promote trade facilitation world-wide.' Further details are available at: <http://www.wcoomd.org>
38 A list of the IMO conventions on safety and security are available at: <http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=260>
39 Information on Interpol's programs are available at: <http://www.interpol.int>
40 Action taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter creates mandatory obligations on states to implement measures taken pursuant to Articles 39, 41, and 42 to address any threat to peace and to maintain international peace and security.
41 Res. 1373, paragraph 3(d). For a brief summary, full text, and status of each instrument, see United Nations Treaty Collection – Conventions on Terrorism at: <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp>; Also for a listing of, and chart of states parties, including CARICOM states, to the 13 international anti-terrorism conventions, see U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism – International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism.
42 UN Doc. S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004), adopted by the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter
legislation and to develop operational modalities for cooperation on security-related issues, intelligence sharing, and mutual legal assistance on a global scale.

In addition, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), including by working through its regional bodies such as the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), offers 40 recommendations on anti-money laundering and nine recommendations on combating the financing of terrorism. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also offer model legislative recommendations and technical assistance to implement the FATF recommendations, including the establishment of financial intelligence units (or equivalent authorities) under its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) program.

Added to, and complementary to them are security-related requirements specific to the United States, in particular with regard to trade and maritime security, aviation security, migration control, and anti-money laundering and terrorist financing.

Following is a synopsis of certain security-related requirements and their relationship to U.S. and Caribbean security and Caribbean development:

**United Nations and specialized international organizations**

The United Nations – the international community as a whole – in the pre-9/11 period recognized the inherent dangers posed by international crimes, including terrorism, and explored ways to deal with the scope of the challenge by framing a series of international legal instruments against terrorism and transnational crime. Although a number of international instruments were elaborated, most countries, including the countries of the Caribbean, failed to become parties to these international conventions and adopt appropriate legislation to implement them. Consequently, there remained significant gaps in the international legal framework and in the legal and operational capacities of all states to deal with crime and security.

These efforts, which began in the early 1960’s, resulted in what is commonly referred to as the 13 international anti-terrorism instruments (12 of which were adopted in the pre-9/11 period) and the U.N. anti-crime conventions and protocols. The first anti-terrorism instrument, the 1963 Convention on Offences

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43 The FATF is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing
44 The FATF 40+9 recommendations are available at: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_Action_Task_Force_on_Money_Laundering#The_FATF_Forty_Recommendations_and_Special_Recommendations_on_Terrorist_Financing>
45 See “Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism: A Handbook for Legislative Drafting” (Legal Department, International Monetary Fund: 2003); and Paul Allan Schott, Reference guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (The World Bank/International Monetary Fund: Washington DC, 2003)
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, was elaborated by the ICAO, as were subsequent aviation-related conventions directly reacting to terrorist threats to civil aviation by hi-jacking and other related criminal acts. Similarly, reacting to hijacking and murder on the high seas, as well as threats to offshore oil platforms, the IMO led the way in elaborating a number of maritime-related conventions, defining certain related criminal acts as acts of terrorism.

Conventions were also adopted aimed at protecting members of the diplomatic community, prohibiting the taking of hostages, protecting nuclear material, and the marking of plastic explosives for the purpose of detection.

The landmark International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which was adopted on 15 December 1997, established new criteria for international cooperation in combating all forms of international terrorism. Of similar significance is the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1999, aimed at cutting off the financing of terrorism.

In the post-9/11 period, action intensified in the U.N., particularly in the Security Council with the adoption, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) and 1624 (2005). The U.N. also adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (13 April 2005), and the U.N. General Assembly, in September 2006, adopted unanimously resolution 60/288 which sets out the U.N. Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy for all states. All states pledge in the Global Strategy, inter alia, to take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism, including by implementing all Security Council counter-terrorism resolutions and becoming party to all anti-terrorism conventions; and to take measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including addressing contributing factors such as underdevelopment and its consequences for crime and security.

The U.N. General Assembly in its efforts to address transnational crime and security has adopted a number of international conventions. These include: the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols, including the Protocol against the illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, and the Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

A brief overview of some of the new security measures required by the United States, in the post-9/11 period, in order to maintain uninterrupted trade and economic relations with the United States is instructive. Primary among the U.S. initiatives are:

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46 UN Doc. S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005)
- **The Container Security Initiative (CSI)** enables the Customs and Border Protection (CBP),\(^{49}\) working with host government Customs Services, to examine high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States. The CBP screens 100 percent of all cargo before it arrives in the U.S, using intelligence and cutting-edge technologies and inspects all high-risk cargo. Any foreign port shipping directly to the United States must satisfy seven requirements, including X-ray/gamma ray screening capability, in order to qualify and benefit from the ensuing prescreening of cargo containers bound for the U.S.\(^{50}\) With 50 foreign ports now participating in the CSI, some 82 percent of container cargo entering US ports are shipped through CSI ports.

- **Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)**\(^{51}\) is a public-private and international partnership with over 6,000 businesses, including most of the largest U.S. importers, working together to improve baseline security standards for supply chain and container security. The C-TPAT program extends the zone of U.S. security outward to the point of origin of the container and allows for expedited processing and fewer invasive inspections of cargo originating with participants.

- **24 Hour Rule**\(^{52}\) requires transmission of manifest information by foreign Customs Administrations to the CBP 24 hours prior to the sea container being loaded onto the vessel in the foreign port. The CBP began enforcing the Rule on 2 February 2007. The CBP may deny the loading of high-risk cargo while the vessel is still overseas.

- **Hr.1/S.4:**\(^{53}\) The United States House of Representative and Senate both recently adopted legislation to implement certain recommendations of the 9/11 Commission which will establish new security conditions under which containers may enter the United States from a foreign port in the future. It will require that the Department of Homeland Security sets new security standards based on the latest technology in the scanning and sealing of containers, to be reviewed and revised every two years. While this is not expected to affect immediately those countries already participating in the CSI

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\(^{49}\) The CBP is the agency within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security with responsibility for management, control and protection of the U.S border, including inspections of people and goods (immigration and customs services) at ports of entry.

\(^{50}\) For a full description of the CSI program, see U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet, September 30, 2006, at: <http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/port_in_csi_xml> On September 30, 2006, the port of Freeport, The Bahamas, became the 50\(^{th}\) foreign seaport to become fully operational as a CSI port, joining Kingston, Jamaica, and Caucedo, Dominican Republic in the Caribbean.

\(^{51}\) C-TPAT information available at: <http://www.cbp.gov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat>

\(^{52}\) 24-Hour Rule information available at: <http://search.cbp.gov>

\(^{53}\) Improving America’s Security Act of 2007, available at: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c110:./temp/~c1106cmFF4>
program, it will have a medium- to long-term effect as new technology becomes available and the requirement applied to all foreign ports shipping cargo to the United States. This new requirement will compound the burden already imposed on CARICOM states.

In addition to the foregoing trade-related security initiatives, the United States has imposed new requirements in the banking and financial sectors, and in aviation- and travel-related security which require security-related technological responses from CARICOM states.

In a presentation I made to the CARICOM Legal Affairs Committee meeting in St. Vincent on 15 November 2002, I raised the alarm as to the adverse consequences to Caribbean tourism and development should a terrorist act targeting foreign nationals were to occur anywhere in the Caribbean region. On that occasion, I pointed to the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, which had brought that island’s tourism to a grinding halt. I confirmed this a month later when I visited Bali and saw first hand the devastation to its tourism industry. It has taken years to recover, and the danger to Caribbean tourism remains today; not so much with respect to the targeting of CARICOM states, but, as I pointed out then, by possible use of their territories as a staging area for a terrorist attack on the United States mainland or on U.S. citizens traveling throughout the Caribbean. The lack of security in the region heightens that possibility.

In as much as there is no guarantee against a terrorist attack or against transnational criminal activities, it behooves all CARICOM states to take appropriate action to implement fully international anti-terrorism standards and best practices. By being proactive, that is, by demonstrating the political will to act according to each state’s capacity and resources, it reduces the possibility of CARICOM states’ territories being used as a haven for criminals and terrorists, or being abused by them. Furthermore, putting in place laws and operational mechanisms according to international standards and best practices serve to mitigate the circumstances emanating from such possible abuse.

**Caribbean security for development architecture: benefits vs. burdens**

One of the core principles, which under-gird U.S. strategy for relations with the main centers of global power, is that these relations must be set in their proper context. Further, bilateral policies that ignore regional and global realities are unlikely to succeed. Another principle is even more succinct in what it conveys. It states that while the U.S. does not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make, the U.S. does seek to influence the calculations on which those choices are based; and, that the U.S. must hedge appropriately in case states choose unwisely. These principles are set out in the National Security Strategy of the United States as elaborated by the administration of President George W.

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54 Acting in the capacity of an Adviser to the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee
Bush.\textsuperscript{55} A restatement of these fundamental principles of U.S. national security strategy is not to suggest that the U.S. government regards the Caribbean as one of the “main centers of global power.” Understanding U.S. global and hemispheric policies and strategy, however, is to understand the context in which U.S.–Caribbean relations is developed and executed.

As regards these principles, in direct reference to U.S. policy towards the Western Hemisphere, the National Security Strategy states:

‘These principles guide our relationships within our own Hemisphere, the frontline of American national security. Our goal remains a hemisphere fully democratic, bound together by good will, security cooperation, and the opportunity for all our citizens to prosper. Tyrants and those who follow them belong to a different era and must not be allowed to reverse the progress of the last two decades. Countries in the Hemisphere must be helped to the path of sustained political and economic development. The deceptive appeal of anti-free market populism must not be allowed to erode political freedoms and trap the Hemisphere’s poorest in cycles of poverty. If America’s nearest neighbors are not secure and stable, then Americans will be less secure.’\textsuperscript{56}

It goes on to state:

‘We must also solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values. And we must continue to work with regional partners to make multilateral institutions like the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region’s stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress. Together, these partnerships can advance our four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people.’\textsuperscript{57}

The “Third Border Initiative” (TBI),\textsuperscript{58} announced by President Bush at the Third Summit of the Americas in April 2001 was developed in the context of U.S. national security strategy. In light of the fact that it preceded the events of September 11, 2001, it did not emphasize U.S. security as the basis for U.S.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid. p.37
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. p.37 (The italics is the author’s for emphasis.)
Hemispheric policy towards the region. The dynamics changed with 9/11. There was a paradigm shift not in how the U.S. views its national security, but in how it explains and executes its policies. According to a USAID overview of the region, one of the “five themes around which the TBI was developed is “security and law enforcement”.

The Joint Statement of the governments of the United States, CARICOM states and the Dominican Republic, issued on the margins of the Americas Summit, Monterey, Mexico in January 2004, while reiterating the tenets of the Third Border Initiative, emphasized the issue of security in U.S. Caribbean relations. The statement was specific in this regard:

‘We are further bound by a determination to protect our region from terrorists and criminals who would destroy our way of life and by a belief that terrorists acts, such as the terrorists attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, represent a serious threat to international peace and our hemispheric security and require our governments to continue our efforts to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism. …

‘We recognize our interdependence and the importance of close cooperation to combat new and emerging transnational threats that endanger the very fabric of our societies. By virtue of their small size and geographic configuration and lack of technical and financial resources, Caribbean States are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to these risks and threats, especially those posed by illicit trafficking in persons, drugs, and firearms, terrorism and other transnational crimes.”

The Joint Statement went on to pledge cooperation “in combating transnational crime and terrorism, promoting regional security and justice, and ensuring the safe and secure transportation and flow of people, goods and services in the region, thereby contributing to the defense and security of the hemisphere.” It further acknowledged “that trade furthers prosperity and development and that trade and investment ties between the Caribbean and the U.S. are essential to promoting economic development and improving the well being of our citizens.”

Designation as the U.S. “third border” brings certain responsibilities, obligations and the potential for significant benefits to both sides of U.S.–Caribbean

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
relations. Caribbean countries with limited resources carry a greater burden in this partnership. The U.S. government has a far greater capacity to deliver.

Caribbean governments face a number of challenges in developing the security architecture for sustainable development. CARICOM states are called upon to implement security standards established by relevant international organizations and obligations attached to maintaining a mutual beneficial relationship with the United States – delivering on its side of the Third Border Initiative. On the Caribbean side, some critical elements that support the partnership include:

- Having appropriate policy, legislation, regulatory and institutional framework for managing security in the movement of people and goods between the countries of the region and the United States, and between the countries in the region;

- Establishing and maintaining the operational systems used to support and enact the policies, including border management technology and travel document issuance systems;

- Engaging in the human resources development systems that support the various cadres working in security training and management functions; and

- Establishing the mechanisms for collaboration with the United States and other countries, including real time access to information and information exchange, in addressing challenges of common concern

The foregoing elements of the security infrastructure span all areas of economic and social development in the Caribbean. The islands’ tourism, trade, and their ability to attract investment, all critical areas of their economies, require a secured environment. It requires an environment that is secure from potential terrorist attacks against the millions of American citizens and U.S. economic interests hosted by Caribbean countries. It requires security to prevent the territories of CARICOM states from being used to plan or stage a terrorist attack against the American mainland. The rationale for linking security to sustainable development in the Caribbean is quite apparent yet not taken sufficiently into consideration in the delivery of security-related capacity-building assistance by the United States and other donor countries, as well as by the international financial institutions, when determining levels of funding and assistance programs for the islands of the Caribbean.

The traveling public now factors in security in a broader sense in choosing its destination. The Caribbean islands, largely dependent on American tourists, stands to benefit significantly from increased tourism as American citizens shun travel to other distant destinations in response to real and perceived threats to their safety. Their security when traveling to the Caribbean must be assured and
perceived as significantly less threatened by possible terrorist attacks than their travels in other regions. It inevitably makes the Caribbean a more attractive travel destination.

**Migration administration and control:**
Border management regimes should reflect broad strategic national and international objectives – meeting international standards and best practices – in order to operate in the global environment. Regardless of whether these objectives emphasize the facilitation of tourism, the enhancement of business travel or a desire to maintain entry/departure records, migration management must be accomplished within a framework of national security. Determining who may enter, depart, or remain is an important aspect of a state’s responsibility to protect its own population and its sovereign territory. Increased mobility in the global population increases this responsibility.

Governments, while maintaining a balance between security and facilitation, require greater efficiency and use of modern technology in order not to sacrifice one for the other. Smugglers or traffickers often exploit uneven application of these objectives, and terrorist organizations may be facilitated by these groups to travel undetected. All governments in the region need to develop the tools to properly assess their ongoing border management capabilities, deficiencies, or strengths.

It is important, on an on-going basis, to assess the strengths and identify the gaps in selected areas of national migration management structures and procedures, and continue the process of identifying potential measures for improving the effectiveness of migration management and control in each country and throughout the CARICOM space.

**Airport facilities security:**
Among the major forces driving change in the tourism and travel industry is traveler safety and security. Air transportation provides the primary mode of tourism travel to the region. All of the Caribbean countries must meet the safety oversight standards of the ICAO and have the International Air Safety Assessment Program 1 classification. Lack of implementation of these standards will prove to be a serious impediment for air access. The inclusion of Annex 17 – Security (standards and recommended practices for aviation security) to the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*, has imposed further obligations on Caribbean countries to significantly enhance aviation security.63

It also includes new security capacity building measures in airports to ensure that criminals and terrorists do not pass undetected through Caribbean airports due to lack of modern security measures, including centralized computer data bases and verification of travel documents capability meeting the latest acceptable international standards. This includes direct access to Interpol's databases.

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63 ICAO, n.14, *supra*
Trading with North America requires employing measures which contribute to securing the international supply chain. It requires new security-related capacity-building measures in customs, port facilities, and migration management and control throughout the Caribbean in order to reduce their vulnerability to abuse by terrorists and other international criminal networks and the potential to becoming a vehicle for targeting the United States through smuggling of WMDs and other sensitive materials. It also means providing new and additional security to ensure the safe berthing of, and service to cruise ships.

**Customs administration and control:**
In light of the need to adjust to emerging trends and other developments in international trade, including in securing the international supply chain, Customs Administrations are obliged to implement measures which will effectively secure and facilitate the movement of legitimate trade and promote economic security. It is recognized that all modes of transport, including sea, air and mail operations are susceptible to exploitation and are used to perpetrate organized criminal activities and terrorism. Customs Administrations are, therefore, required to develop control regimes which provide enhanced security while at the same time facilitating trade by guaranteeing the unimpeded flow of goods and services.

The WCO has created certain instruments relating to security and facilitation, including certain standards required to be implemented by Customs Administrations.\(^64\) Implementation of modern customs procedures and administrative measures, such as information and communication technology and risk management techniques, are embodied in the revised WCO Kyoto Convention.\(^65\) The assurance of standard and simple procedures embodied in the Convention and harmonized across administrations will facilitate and boost international trade and investment, and facilitate intra-regional travel and trade throughout the CARICOM region.

**Seaport facilities security:**
The level of security in the ports and ports facilities of island nations has a direct bearing on their capability to participate in international trade and to attract cruise ships. Recognizing the growing threat from transnational crime and terrorism to world trade, in particular the shipping industry (cargo and passenger), the IMO adopted amendments to the 1974 *Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS)*, incorporating the new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which entered into force for all countries on 1 July 2004.\(^66\) The ISPS Code contains mandatory detailed security-related requirements for governments, port

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\(^64\) See n. 37, *supra*


\(^66\) IMO n. 23, *supra*
authorities, and shipping companies. Failure to implement fully and maintain new international standards and best practices will significantly affect each country’s participation in international trade and in developing a viable cruise ship industry.

Banking and financial sector supervision to prevent money laundering:
Transnational crime poses a significant threat to the safety and security of each Caribbean state. For the most part, the activities of transnational criminal enterprises operating in the Caribbean region includes such activities as illicit trafficking in arms, drug trafficking, smuggling of contraband, and money laundering. It has been determined that there is a growing link between organized crime and terrorist financing. Transnational criminal activities have a multiplying effect on domestic crime. Traditional anti-money laundering laws and unsophisticated banking and financial sector supervision mechanisms are no longer capable of coping with the current and growing threat. Therefore, preventing money laundering of the proceeds of crime has become a critical element of any effective crime fighting strategy for Caribbean states. Caribbean states have a significant stake in preventing their territories from being used by transnational criminal enterprises both for staging of criminal activities and for laundering of the proceeds of crime.

It is imperative for Caribbean countries to take the steps necessary to implement international standards established to enhance the efficiency and integrity of customs administration and control. It is also of great importance to the trade sector that security is enhanced significantly in shipping- and air-port facilities and in modal transportation mechanisms and controls.

With the international organizations constantly reviewing and revising standards to meet current and future threats, and with the US Government imposing its own standards and requirements, it is imperative for the Caribbean to develop and implement region-wide standards. CARICOM states cannot achieve optimum results acting on their own.

Enhanced level of US support

Is there a U.S. commitment to provide significant capacity-building assistance for Caribbean security? At least, commitment has been made in a number of statements and declarations on Caribbean security and development issues. Recognizing the importance to U.S. security of a secure and safe Caribbean, the U.S. has on a number of occasions pledged its support.

In order to address this challenge, it is necessary to carry out an assessment of each country’s and the region’s vulnerability to security threats and the country’s and region’s capacity to respond to these threats in each target area. Identifying the deficiencies in the existing legal and administrative mechanisms of each
sector, and bringing them together in a comprehensive format, will help the Governments of the region to determine what, if any, assistance is needed to help each country achieve international standards in each of the designated sectors. It will also provide to the donor community, in particular the United States, and the international financial institutions a comprehensive analysis of the needs associated with each sector in each country and in the region as a whole. It would allow for setting clear benchmarks and establishing timelines for achieving a security platform for the region.

In order to further the objectives that are often repeated, the United States may wish to consider establishing a special Caribbean Security–Development Fund (CSDF) to be administered under an administrative structure such as the one established for the administration of the Millennium Challenge Account. Administration of the CSDF would be based on criteria established upon assessments and evaluations carried out to determine country-specific needs and on strengthening of regional security rather than on simple political considerations, which often militate against the flow of technical assistance, resource and technology transfer to those areas of greatest need.

At the outset, the CSDF, at a minimum, should be endowed with US$1 billion appropriated through normal Congressional budget process and renewed as needed. This would allow for greater certainty in forward planning in order to change the security-development dynamics of the region. If the Caribbean is as important to U.S. security as is stated in the various declarations and the TBI, then this approach should find favor in the U.S. Congress if advanced by current and future U.S. Administrations. It is essential for Caribbean development and United States security that there is a clear and unambiguous demonstration of political will on both sides of the third border. Success in achieving the stated objectives can only be guaranteed if there is a realistic apportioning of the needed resources.

Parallel to the CSDF, there should be established a Security for Development Trust Fund (SDTF) in the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank or the Caribbean Development Bank (or a combination as appropriate) to which other Caribbean partners may contribute to efforts to remedy the security concerns of the region.

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67 For information on the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), see State Department Fact Sheet, 3 February 2004 at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/28848.htm>; and information on the administration and programs by the Millennium Challenge Corporation at: <http://www.mcc.gov>

68 I first mooted the idea of a Security Trust Fund at the 2nd Special Meeting of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee with Regional and International Organizations at the OAS in October 2003. The World Bank representative at the meeting was receptive of the idea.

69 A Trust Fund is recommended which would provide grants rather than loans to Caribbean states already struggling under a heavy debt burden.
In making the case with regard to the correlation between security and development in the Caribbean, this paper is not advocating that the donor community should shift its focus from development assistance to security assistance. Development assistance should not be diverted to security capacity-building but donors should earmark new funds for that purpose, while still maintaining the goals and objectives of the U.N Millennium Development Goals. And, as aptly stated in Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report, *In Larger Freedom*:

> ‘We will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.’

While there is a strong correlation between development and security as argued in this paper, there is a different context for security assistance and separate modalities and assistance instruments must be developed to accommodate this new and evolving threat.

**Conclusion**

As I have argued, there is a convergence of mutually supporting interests with regard security and development in United States–Caribbean relations. The interests of the countries of the Caribbean and of the United States are interconnected and dependent on cooperation and collaboration between the United States and the Caribbean.

The forward agenda for United States–Caribbean relations must address these issues – security and development – as a matter of priority by establishing a specific timetable and benchmarks and the means to implement them. Without a firm commitment to provide adequate resources to address security and development in CARICOM states, not much progress on either front – security or development – should be expected in the near future. Without certainty of quality and quantity of support, which could be assured through such funding sources as the proposed Caribbean Security-Development Fund and Security for Development Trust Fund, CARICOM states cannot hope to plan and execute the capacity-building programs that are needed to correct the deficiencies in national and regional security.

Without international standards (implemented region-wide) linking the countries of the Caribbean and each country and the region to the international community, the region will become increasingly vulnerable to exploitation by criminal

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elements and increases the potential for devastating consequences to its economic activities and relations with the North.

A number of the Caribbean states have been responding as best they can within their limited resources to the new security measures. Many advances have been made, but, with a very few exceptions much more needs to be done. While hoping to catch up over a period of time, the goal keeps moving as new standards are developed and demands made for their implementation. Also, transnational criminal elements constantly seek new ways to conduct their illicit activities to avoid detection adding to the difficulties facing Caribbean states.

There is no lack of recognition of the obligations to implement security-related measures, or political will to do so on the part of the governments of the Caribbean. The fact is that many of these governments, constrained by limited human, technological, and financial resources, are struggling to deal with the challenges posed by the effects of drug trafficking and the illicit trade of firearms, which are causing significant increases in criminal activities in their territories.

In the final analysis, ignoring the nexus between security and development in United States–Caribbean relations is a failure to recognize the possible consequences that could flow from a lack of security on the development of Caribbean states and the region. It also ignores a real threat to United States national security.

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Selected Bibliography


