Why are Income Distributions Different?:
A Comparison of Brazil and the United States

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Abstract: Although most people agree that differences in income distributions across countries matter, little is known about what determines them. This paper develops a micro-econometric method to account for differences across distributions of household income. Going beyond the determination of earnings in labor markets, we also estimate statistical models for occupational choice and for the conditional distributions of education, fertility and non-labor incomes. We use combinations of estimated parameters from these models to simulate counterfactual income distributions. This allows us to decompose differences between functionals of two income distributions (such as inequality or poverty measures) into shares due to differences in the structure of labor market returns (price effects); differences in the occupational structure; and differences in the underlying distribution of assets (endowment effects). We apply the method to the differences between the income distributions of the US and Brazil, and find that most of Brazil’s excess income inequality relative to the United States is due to underlying inequalities in the distribution of two key endowments: access to education and to sources of non-labor income, mainly pensions. Steeper returns to education in Brazil also contribute, but are of secondary importance. Differences in occupational structures are immaterial.

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1. Introduction

The distribution of personal welfare varies enormously across countries. Gini coefficients for distributions of household income per capita, for instance, range from 0.20 in the Slovak Republic to 0.63 in Sierra Leone (World Bank, 2002) and similar international variation can be found for most alternative measures of inequality. This international variation is much greater than the variation ever encountered in any single time-series of inequality measures for any given country – including both developed countries with long histories of reliable data, like the UK or the US (see e.g. Kuznets, 1955), and transition economies with dramatic recent distributional changes (see e.g. Milanovic, 1998).

One would think, then, that there ought to be considerable interest in understanding why income distributions vary so much across countries. After all, different inequality levels or poverty rates are likely to matter both for the current welfare levels of a society and for its long-term development and growth prospects. More unequal societies may create different institutions, with possibly persistent and deleterious effects on the development process (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997). The outcomes of similar political processes may, because of different income distributions, lead to different social contracts, including different choices about taxation and redistribution (Bénabou, 2000; Ferreira, 2001). Different income distributions may lead to different patterns of occupational choice; with consequently different labor market outcomes, which have been hypothesized to lead to multiple equilibria in the long-run (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). In fact, economic thinking about growth and development since the early 1990s has, as Anthony Atkinson (1997) put it, brought “income distribution in from the cold”, and back into the fairly central position it used to occupy for classical economists like David Ricardo.

Yet, surprisingly little is known about how and why income distributions actually differ across countries.\(^2\) Is it because the underlying distributions of wealth differ greatly, perhaps

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\(^2\) There has been a much greater concern with testing the proposition that inequality is bad for growth (e.g. Forbes, 2000). That literature has not been particularly conclusive (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000). But our concern here is with a basic empirical understanding of the nature – rather than of the effects - of distributional differences.
for historical reasons (Engerman et. al., 1998)? Or is it because returns to education are higher in one country than in the other (e.g. Blau and Khan, 1996)? What is the role of differences in labor market institutions (e.g. Calmfors and Driffl, 1988; DiNardo et.al., 1996)? Do different fertility rates and family structures play a role? And if, as is likely, differences in income distributions reflect all of these (and possibly other) factors, in what manner and to what extent does each one contribute?

Applied research on differences across income distributions has not been as abundant as one might expect. Increasingly, this seems to have less to do with lack of data and more to do with inadequate methodological tools. Through initiatives like the Luxembourg Income Study and the WIDER World Income Inequality Database, the availability of high-quality household-level data is growing. Methodologically, however, those seeking an understanding of why distributions are so different - and reluctant to rely exclusively on cross-country regressions with inequality measures as dependent variables - have often had to resort to comparing Theil decompositions across countries. We will argue below that, while these can be informative, their ability to shed light on the determinants of differences across distributions is inherently limited.

In contrast, much more substantial progress has been made in our ability to understand differences in wage (or earnings) distributions. Some of this work - such as Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros (1991), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Blau and Khan (1996) and Machado and Mata (2001) - draws on variants of a decomposition technique based on simulating counterfactual distributions by combining data on individual characteristics (X) from one distribution, with estimated parameters (β) from another, which is due originally to Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Another strand, which includes DiNardo, Fortin and

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3 As noted, theoretical models of why income distributions might differ across countries have been more abundant. Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Bénabou (2000) are two well-known examples. See Aghion et. al. (1999) for a survey.
4 Theil decompositions are also known as decompositions of Generalized Entropy inequality measures by population subgroups. They were developed independently by Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980).
5 Some of these studies - like Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Machado and Mata (2001) - decompose changes in the wage distribution of a single country, over time. Others, like Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros (for metropolitan areas within Brazil) and Blau and Khan (for ten industrialized countries) decompose
Lemieux (1996) and Donald, Green and Paarsch (2000), is based on alternative semi-parametric approaches. DiNardo et. al. (1996) use weighted kernel density estimators - instead of regression coefficients - to generate counterfactual density functions that combine population attributes (or labor market institutions) from one period, with the structure of returns from another. Donald et. al. (2000) adapt hazard-function estimators from the spell-duration literature to develop density-function estimators, and use these to construct counterfactual density and distribution functions (comparing the US and Canada).\(^6\)

These approaches have been very fruitful, but they have not yet been generalized from wage distributions to those of household incomes, largely because the latter involve additional complexities.\(^7\) The distribution of wages is usually defined over those currently employed. Taking the characteristics of these workers as given, earnings determination can be reasonably well understood by estimating returns to those characteristics in the labor market, through a Mincerian earnings equation: 

\[
y_i = X_i\beta + \epsilon_i
\]

Most of the aforementioned recent literature on differences in wage inequality is based on simulating counterfactual distributions on the basis of equations such as this, and many further restrict their samples to include prime-age, full-time male workers only. In addition, some authors are quite clear that they are interested in wages primarily as indicators of the price of labor, rather than as measures of welfare (e.g. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993). While this is perfectly adequate for their purposes, it does mean that these are not studies about international differences in the distribution of welfare. The latter, which would be better proxied by distributions of household per capita incomes or expenditures, are our focus here.

\(^6\) The distinction between "parametric" and "semi-parametric" methods is not terribly sharp. DiNardo et. al. (1996) use a probit model to estimate one of their conditional reweighing functions. Donald et. al. (2000) rely entirely on maximum likelihood estimates of parameters in a proportional-hazards model, and what is non-parametric about their method is a fine double-partitioning of the income space, allowing for considerable flexibility in both the estimation of the baseline hazard function, and in the manner in which it is shifted by the proportional-hazards estimates. Conversely, in the present paper, which follows a predominantly parametric route, some non-parametric reweighing of joint distribution functions is also used (see below). These techniques are often better thought of as complements, rather than substitutes.

\(^7\) From a conceptual point of view this should matter, since it is the distribution of household incomes, rather than that of individual wages, which is more likely to affect voting behavior or the educational credit available to the family.
Naturally, the distribution of household incomes does depend on the characteristics of the employed members of the household and on the rates of return to them, and we will thus draw on earnings models too. But it also depends on their participation and occupational decisions, as well as on choices concerning the size and composition of the family. In addition, changes in some personal characteristics - such as education - affect household incomes through more than one channel. Suppose we ask what the effect of “importing” the US distribution of education to Brazil might be on the Brazilian distributions of earnings and incomes. Whereas for earnings it might very well suffice to simply replace the Brazilian vector of years of schooling in the X matrix with the relevant US values, the distribution of household incomes will also be affected through changes in participation and fertility behavior. This greater complexity of the determinants of household income distributions seems to have prevented counterfactual simulation techniques from being applied to them, thus depriving those interested in understanding cross-country differences in the distribution of welfare from the powerful insights they can deliver.

Nevertheless, a more general version of the Oaxaca-Blinder idea – of simulating counterfactual distributions on the basis of combining models estimated for different real distributions - can fruitfully be applied to household incomes. What is required is an expansion of the set of models to be estimated, to include labor market participation, fertility behavior and educational choices. In this paper, we first propose a general statement of statistical decompositions applied to household income distributions; and then suggest a specific model of household income determination that enables us to implement the decomposition empirically. In particular, we investigate the comparative roles of three factors: the distribution of population characteristics (or endowments); the structure of returns to these endowments, and the occupational structure of the population. We apply the method to an understanding of the differences between the income distributions in Brazil and the United States – the two most populous countries in the Western hemisphere, both of which are very unequal for their per capita GDP levels.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and some preliminary description of income distributions in the two countries. Doing so also motivates the need for better tools to understand the large differences between them. Section 3 contains a general statement of statistical decomposition analysis, which encompasses all variants currently in use as special cases. Section 4 proposes a specific model of household income determination and describes the estimation and simulation procedures needed for the decomposition. The results are discussed in section 5, and section 6 concludes.


This section compares the distributions of household income in the two largest countries in the Western Hemisphere: the United States and Brazil. This choice of countries is not accidental: since we are, in some sense, interested in understanding inequality, we want places with lots of it. Decomposing differences between the distributions of Sweden and Slovakia would not have been a good first test of the approach. Secondly, we also want countries which are at different stages in development – and in particular which have truly different distributions of educational attainments – since this difference is a central candidate for explaining income differences. This makes a comparison between a large and unequal developing country with relatively low levels of education, and a large and relatively unequal industrial nation with very high levels of education, particularly interesting.8

The comparisons are based on the original household-level data sets: the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD) 1999 is used for Brazil, and the Annual Demographic Survey in the March Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS/ADS) 2000, for the United States. The PNAD income data refers to the month of September 1999. As always with the March Supplement of the CPS/ADS, total personal income data refers to the preceding calendar year, 1999, so that both surveys refer to the same year. The sizes of

8 Our emphasis here is purely comparative. We make no attempt to present a detailed analysis of inequality or poverty in each of these countries. There is a large literature on the subject for both countries. On Brazil, see Henriques (2000) for a recent compilation. For earlier studies comparing the Brazilian and US earnings distributions, see Lam and Levison (1992) and Sacconato and Menezes-Filho (2001).
the samples actually used are as follows: the CPS/ADS 2000 contained 50,982 households (133,649 individuals), and the PNAD 1999 contained 80,972 households (294,244 individuals).

We use income data, rather than data on consumption expenditures, because the decompositions described in the remainder of the paper rely in part on the determination of earnings.\(^9\) For Brazil, the income variable used was monthly total household income per capita, available in the surveys as a constructed variable from the disaggregated income questionnaire. In the US, the variable used was the sum (across individuals in the household) of annual total personal income and other incomes, excluding disability benefits, educational assistance and child support, divided by 12.\(^10\) Both income definitions are before tax, but include transfers. While total annual incomes are not top-coded in the CPS/ADS, some of their components might be. The US Census Bureau warns that weekly earnings, in particular, are "subject to top-coding at U$1923", so as to censor the distribution of annual earnings from the main job at U$100,000. Inspection of our sample revealed, however, that 2.1% (2.5%) of observations had reported weekly (annual) earnings above those value. The maximum reported weekly value was U$2884. We therefore did not correct for top-coding in the US. Incomes are not top-coded in Brazil either.

As always, there are reasons to suspect that incomes may be measured with some error. In the case of Brazil, the problem is particularly severe in rural areas, to the extent that the usefulness of any estimate based on rural income data is thrown into doubt.\(^11\) For this reason, we prefer to confine our attention to Brazil’s urban areas only.\(^12\) Care is taken to ensure that the distributions used are as comparable as possible, and this requires that we

\(^9\) And also because consumption data for Brazil is either very old (ENDEF, 1975) or incomplete in geographical coverage (POF, 1996; PPV, 1996).
\(^10\) These income sources were excluded from the analysis because non-retirement public transfers are proportionately much more important in the US than in Brazil, and their allocation follows rules which are not modelled in our approach. When they were included, the residual term of the decomposition was slightly larger, but all of our conclusions remained qualitatively valid.
\(^11\) For evidence on the weaknesses of income data for rural Brazil, see Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri (2000) and Elbers, Lanjouw, Lanjouw and Leite (2001).
\(^12\) For the US, since the CPS/ADS does not disaggregate non-metropolitan areas into urban and rural, and the former dominate, we included both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas.
work with data unadjusted for misreporting, imputed rents, or for regional price level differences within countries.\textsuperscript{13}

With 168 million inhabitants in 1999, Brazil’s population was approximately 60\% that of the United States (273 million). In the same year, Brazil’s per capita GDP from the National Accounts was 20\% that of the US. Mean per capita income as measured by the household surveys was slightly less, at 17\%. Brazil's urban inequality, on the other hand, is much higher. Its Gini coefficient of 0.569 was twelve and a half percentage points higher than that of the US. Brazil’s Theil-T (or E(1) index) was 0.644, whereas the US’s was 0.349. Bourguignon et. al. (2002) show that this pattern is robust to (considerable) variation in the degree of economies of scale in household consumption, allowed for through the Buhmann et. al. (1988) parameter. It is also robust to the choice of inequality measures, since the Lorenz curve for the US lies everywhere strictly above that for urban Brazil, indicating that inequality is unambiguously lower in the former (Atkinson, 1970).

But income distributions do not differ only with respect to their first two moments. One advantage of the approach we propose is exactly that it allows us to visualize the impacts of different factors on different parts of the distribution in an entirely disaggregated way. As a preliminary, then, it is useful to see that the income distributions for urban Brazil and the United States in 1999 did not differ only in mean and inequality. Figure 1 below plots kernel estimates of the (mean normalized) density functions for the distribution of (the logarithm of) household per capita income in both countries. The differences in skewness and kurtosis, for example, are immediately obvious, with Brazil’s distribution being more skewed to the left and having thicker tails.

We are not aware of empirical methods for comparing household income distributions which can account for these differences. As an example of a common approach, Table 1 reports on standard decompositions of E(0), E(1) and E(2) by population subgroups\textsuperscript{14}, computing the $R_B$ statistic developed by Cowell and Jenkins (1995). This statistic is an

\textsuperscript{13} Both datasets are well-known in their respective countries. For more detailed information about the CPS/ADS, go to www.census.gov. Information on the PNAD is available from www.ibge.gov.br.

\textsuperscript{14} See Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980) and Shorrocks (1980).
indicator of the relative importance of each attribute used to partition the population, in the process of "accounting for" the inequality. The idea is that the larger the share of dispersion which is between groups defined by some attribute - rather than within those groups - the more likely it is that something about the distribution of or returns to that attribute are causally related to the observed inequality. The attributes to be used include education of the household head; his or her age; his or her race or ethnic group; his or her gender; as well as the location of the household (both regional and rural/urban) and its size or type.

The results are suggestive. In Brazil, education of the head is clearly the most important partitioning characteristic, followed by race and household type. In the US, household type dominates, with education a surprisingly low second, and age of head third. Education clearly accounts for more inequality in Brazil than in the US, although these decompositions can not tell us whether this is due predominantly to different returns or different endowments of education – i.e. a different distribution of the population across educational levels. Strikingly little of the overall US inequality is between different regions of the country, reinforcing the widespread perception of a well-integrated economy. In contrast, almost 10% of Brazil’s Theil-L is accounted for by the regional partition.\footnote{The regional breakdowns used in this decomposition were standard for each country. Brazil was divided up into five regions: North, Northeast, Centre-West, Southeast and South, while the US was broken down into four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South and West.}

**Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of the Distributions of Household Incomes, Brazil and the United States**

Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation

Note: Gaussian Kernel Estimates (with optimal window width) of the density functions for the distributions of the logarithms of household per capita incomes. The distribution were scaled so as to have the Brazilian mean. Brazil is urban area only. Incomes were converted to US dollar at PPP exchange rates (see Appendix).
Finally, it is interesting to note that inequality between households headed by people of different races – which one might have expect to be prominent in the US - is five times larger in Brazil.

Although this is a useful preliminary exercise, there are at least three reasons why one would wish to go further. First, none of these decompositions control for any of the others: some of the inequality between regions in Brazil is also between individuals with different races – given that racial compositions varies considerably across regions - and there is no way of telling how much. Second, the decompositions are of scalar measures, and therefore “waste” information on how the entire distributions differ (along their support). Although some information can be recovered from knowledge of the different sensitivities of each measure, this is at best a hazardous and imprecise route. Finally, even to the extent that one is prepared to treat inequality between subgroups defined by age or education, say, as being driven by those attributes – rather than by correlates – the share of total inequality attributed to that partition tells us nothing of whether it is the distribution of the characteristic (or asset), or the structure of its returns that matters. In the next section, we propose an alternative approach, which suffers from none of these shortcomings.


In order to understand the differences between two distributions of household incomes, $f^A(y)$ and $f^B(y)$, it seems natural to depart from the joint distributions $\phi^C(y, T)$, where $T$ is a vector of observed household characteristics which affect incomes - such as family size, the age, gender, race, education and occupation of each individual member of the household, etc.. The superscript $C (= A, B)$ denotes the country. Because a number (but not all) of the characteristics in $T$ clearly depend on others (e.g. family size, via the number of children, will vary with the age and education of the parents), it will prove helpful to partition $T = [V, W]$ where, for any given household $h$ in $C$, each element of $V_h$ may be thought of as logically depending on $W_h$, and possibly on some other elements of $V_h$, but $W_h$ is to be considered as fully exogenous to the household.
The distribution of household incomes, \( f^C(y) \), is of course the marginal distribution of the joint distribution \( \phi^C(y, T) : f^C(y) = \int \cdots \int \phi^C(y, T) dT \). It can therefore be rewritten as

\[
 f^C(y) = \int \cdots \int g^C(y|V, W) \xi^C(V, W) dV dW,
\]

where \( g^C(y|V, W) \) denotes the distribution of \( y \) conditional on \( V \) and \( W \), and \( \xi^C(V, W) \) is the joint distribution on all elements of \( T \) in country \( C \). Given the distinction made above between the “semi-exogenous”\(^{16} \) household characteristics \( V \) and the “truly exogenous” characteristics \( W \), this can be further rewritten as:

\[
 f^C(y) = \int \cdots \int g^C(y|V, W) h_1^C(v_1|V_{-1}, W) h_2^C(v_2|V_{-1,2}, W) \cdots h_\upsilon^C(v_\upsilon|W) \psi^C(W) dV dW
\]

In (1), the joint distribution of all elements of \( T = [V, W] \) has been replaced by the product of \( \upsilon \) conditional distributions and the joint distribution of all elements in \( W, \psi^C(W) \). Each conditional distribution \( h_n \) is for an element of \( V \), conditioning on the \( \upsilon-n \) elements of \( V \) not yet conditioned on, and on \( W \). The order \( n = \{1, \ldots, \upsilon\} \) obviously does not matter for the product of the conditional distributions. (1) is an identity, invariant in that ordering. However, the order does matter for the definition of each individual conditional distribution \( h_n(v_n|V_{1,\ldots,n} W) \), and therefore for the interpretation of each decomposition defined below.\(^{17} \)

Once we have written the distributions of household incomes for countries \( C = A, B \) as in (1), one could investigate how \( f^B(y) \) differs from \( f^A(y) \) by replacing some of the observed conditional distributions in the ordered set \( k^A = \{g^A, h^A\} \) by the corresponding conditional distributions in the ordered set \( k^B = \{g^B, h^B\} \). Each such replacement generates a counterfactual (ordered) set of conditional distributions \( k^i \), the dimension of which is \( \upsilon+1 \), (like \( k^A \) and \( k^B \)) whose elements are drawn either from \( k^A \) or \( k^B \).\(^{18} \) It is now possible to define a counterfactual distribution \( f^A\rightarrow B(y; k^i, \psi^A) \) as the marginal distribution that arises

\(^{16} \) This terminology is motivated by the fact that we do not pretend that our models of \( V \) should be interpreted causally, and make no claims to be endogenizing these variables in a behavioural sense.

\(^{17} \) Shorrocks (1999) proposes an algorithm based on the Shapley Value in order to calculate the correct "average" contribution of a particular \( h_n( ) \) or of \( g( ) \), over the set of possible orderings, to the overall difference across the distributions. Rather than constructing these values in this paper, we present our results by showing a number of different orderings explicitly, in Section 5 below.

\(^{18} \) Formally, \( s \) is an ordered sequence of country superscripts, such as \( s = \{A, B, A, A, A, \ldots, A\} \).
from the integration of the product of the conditional distributions in $k^t$ and the joint distribution function $\psi^A(W)$, with respect to all elements of $V$ and $W$. For example:

$$f^A_{A \rightarrow B}(y) = \int \cdots \int g^A(y|V, W) h^B_1(v_1|V_{1,1}, W) h^A_2(v_2|V_{1,2}, W) \cdots h^A_n(v_n|W) \psi^A(W) dV dW.$$ 

The number of possible such counterfactual distributions is the number of possible permutations in the set $k$.\(^{19}\)

For each counterfactual distribution, it is possible to decompose the observed difference in the income distributions for countries $A$ and $B$ as follows:

\[
(2) \quad f^B(y) - f^A(y) = [f^s(y) - f^A(y)] + [f^B(y) - f^s(y)]
\]

where the first term on the right-hand side measures the “explanatory power” of decomposition $s$, and the second term measures the “residual” of decomposition $s$.\(^{20}\) Since these are differences in densities, they can be evaluated for all values of $x$. Furthermore, any functional of a density function can be evaluated for $f^A$, $f^B$, or $f^s$, and similarly decomposed, according to its own metric.

So, we have the same decomposition relationship as (2) for the cumulative distribution

$$F^C(y) = \int_0^y f^C(x) dx.$$ 

Likewise, for the mean income of intervals between quantiles $q$ and \(q\) (where there are $Q$ intervals\(^{21}\)): \(\mu^C_q(y) = \frac{1}{Q} \int_{F^C(q-1)}^{F^C(q)} y f^C(y) dy\), we have:

\[
(3) \quad \mu^B_q(y) - \mu^A_q(y) = [\mu^s_q(y) - \mu^A_q(y)] + [\mu^B_q(y) - \mu^s_q(y)]
\]

And we have analogous decompositions for any inequality measure $I(f(y))$ or poverty measure $P(f(y); z)$, where $z$ is a suitable poverty line. In the applications discussed in

\(^{19}\) When we turn to the empirical implementation of these counterfactual distributions, we will see that is also possible, of course, to simulate replacing the joint distribution $\psi^A(y)$ by a non-parametric approximation of $\psi^B(y)$. Depending on how each specific conditional distribution is modelled, it is also possible to have more than one counterfactual distribution per element of $k$. These matters pertain more properly to a discussion of the empirical application of the approach, however, and we return to them later.

\(^{20}\) A decomposition is defined (by (2)) with respect to a unique counterfactual distribution $s$, and is thus also indexed by $s$.\)
Section 5, the results are presented exactly in this form: Table 3 contains inequality and poverty measures, evaluated for \( f^A(y) \), \( f^B(y) \) and for a set of counterfactual distributions \( f(y) \), so that the reader can make his own subtractions. Figures 2-6 plot the differences in the (log) mean income of “hundredths” \( (Q = 100) \), in a graphical representation of Equation (3). In recognition of their parentage, we call these the Generalized Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions.

4. **The Decompositions in Practice: A Specific Model**

The essence of the approach outlined above is to compare two actual income distributions, by means of a sequence of “intermediate” counterfactual distributions. These are constructed by replacing one or more of the underlying conditional distributions of A by those imported from B. In practice, this requires generating statistical approximations to the true conditional distributions. This may be done either parametrically - following the tradition of Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973) and Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros (1991) - or using non-parametric techniques – as in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996).22

Because of the direct economic interpretations of the parameter estimates in our approximated distributions, we find it convenient in this paper to follow (mainly) the parametric route and approximate each of the true conditional distributions by a set of standard econometric models, with pre-imposed functional forms.23

In particular, we will find it convenient to propose two (sets of) models:

\[
(4) \quad y = G \left( V, W, \varepsilon; \Omega \right) \text{ and } \\
(5) \quad V = H \left( W, \eta; \Phi \right),
\]

where \( \Omega \) and \( \Phi \) are sets of parameters and \( \varepsilon \) and \( \eta \) stand for vectors of random variables, with \( \varepsilon \perp \{ V, W \} \), and \( \eta \perp W \), by construction. \( G \) and \( H \) have pre-imposed functional forms.

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21 Or \( Q \)-quantiles. So, for instance, \( Q = 4 \) (10, 100) for quartiles (deciles, percentiles).
22 Although, as noted earlier, these authors too rely on parametric approximations to some conditional distributions, such as the probit for the conditional distribution of union status on individual characteristics.
23 This is an advantage of our approach vis-à-vis, for instance, the hazard-function estimators of Donald et. al. (2000), who "note that the estimates of the hazard function for wages, earnings or incomes are difficult to interpret" (p.616)
We can then write an approximation \( \hat{f}(y) \) to the true marginal distribution \( f^C(y) \) in Equation (1) as:

\[
(1') \quad f^C(y) = \int_{G(V,W;\epsilon;\Omega)} \pi^r(\epsilon) d\epsilon \int_{H(W,\eta;\Phi;\Psi)} \pi^r(\eta) d\eta \Psi^C(W)dVdW
\]

where \( \pi^r(\epsilon) \) is the joint probability distribution function of the elements of \( \epsilon \) and \( \pi^r(\eta) \) is the joint probability distribution function of the elements of \( \eta \).

Just as an exact decomposition was defined by (2) for each true counterfactual distribution, we can now define the (actually operational) decomposition in terms of the approximated distributions \( f^*(y) \), as follows:

\[
(2') \quad f^B(y) - f^A(y) = [f^C(y) - f^A(y)] + [f^B(y) - f^C(y)] + [f^*(y) - f^y(y)].
\]

Recall that a counterfactual distribution \( s \) is conceptually given by \( f^A(y; k', \psi^A) \), and is thus defined by \( \psi^A \) and the simulated sequence of conditional distributions \( k' \), which consists of some original distributions from \( A \), and some imported from \( B \). Analogously, an approximated distribution \( f^{*,s}_{A\rightarrow B}(y; \Omega^s, \Phi^s, \Psi^A) \) is defined with respect to \( \psi^A \) and the two sets of simulated parameters \( \Omega^s \) and \( \Phi^s \), which consist of some original parameters from the models estimated for country \( A \), and some imported from the models estimated for country \( B \).

The last term in (2') gives the difference between the true and the approximated counterfactual distributions. We therefore call it the approximation error and denote it by \( R_A \). Clearly, how useful this decomposition methodology is in accounting for differences between income distributions depends to some extent on the relative size of the approximation error. The comparison between Brazil and the United States, discussed in the next section, illustrates that it can be remarkably small.

Following from (1'), our statistical model of household incomes has three levels. The first corresponds to model \( G(V, W, \epsilon; \Omega) \), which seeks to approximate the conditional...
distribution of household incomes on observed characteristics: \( g (y | V, W) \). This level generates estimates for the parameter set \( \Omega \), which we associate with the structure of returns in the labor markets and with the determination of the occupational structure in the economy. The second level corresponds to model \( H (W, \eta; \Phi) \) which seeks to approximate the conditional distributions \( h_n (v_n | V_{-1},...,n, W) \), for \( V = \{ \text{number of children in the household (nch)}; \text{years of schooling of individual } i (E_{ih}); \text{and total household non-labor income } (y_{0h}) \} \)

In the third level, we investigate the effects of replacing \( \psi^A(W) \) with a (non-parametric) estimate of \( \psi^B(W) \). This largely corresponds to the racial and demographic make-up of the population.

First-level model \( G (V, W, \varepsilon; \Omega) \) is given by equations (6-8) below. Household incomes are an aggregation of individual earnings \( y_{hi} \), and of additional, unearned income such as transfers or capital income, \( y_0 \). Per capita household income for household \( h \) is given by:

\[
y_h = \frac{1}{n_h} \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{n_h} \sum_{j=1}^{J} I_{hi} I_{hij} y_{hij} + y_0 \right]
\]

where \( I_{hi} \) is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if individual \( i \) in household \( h \) participates in earning activity \( j \), and 0 otherwise. The allocation of individuals across activities (i.e. labor force participation and the occupational structure of the economy) is modeled through the familiar discrete choice multinomial logit model:

\[
\Pr \{ j = s \} = \Pr \{ U^s = Z \lambda_s + E^{u_s} \geq U^k = Z \lambda_k + E^{u_k}, \forall k \neq s \} = P^s (Z_{hi}, \lambda) = \frac{e^{Z_{hi}^s \lambda_s}}{\sum_{k \neq s} e^{Z_{hi}^k \lambda_k}}
\]

where \( P^s(\cdot) \) is the probability of individual \( i \) in household \( h \) being in occupational category \( s \), which could be: inactivity, formal employment in industry, informal employment in industry, formal employment in services or informal employment in services. Separate but identically specified models are estimated for males and females. The vector of characteristics \( Z \subset T \) is given by \( Z = \{ 1, \text{age, age squared, education dummies, age interacted with education, race, and region for the individual in question; average endowments of age and education among adults in his or her household; numbers of adults and children in the household; whether the individual is the head or not; and if not whether the head is active} \}.\)
Turning to the labor market determination of earnings, \( y_{hi}^j \) in (6) is assumed to be log-linear in \( \alpha_j \) and \( \beta_j \), and the individual earnings equation is estimated separately for males and females, as follows:

\[
\log y_{hi}^j = \alpha_j + x_{hi}^j \beta_j + \epsilon_i
\]

where \( x \subset T \) is given by \( x = \{ \text{education dummies, age, age squared, age} \times \text{education, and intercept dummies for region, race, sector of activity and formality status} \} \). In the absence of specific information on experience, the education and age variables are the standard Becker - Mincer human capital terms. The racial and regional intercept dummies allow for a simple level effect of possible spatial segmentation of the labor markets, as well as for the possibility of racial discrimination. Earning activities are defined by sector and formality status. To simplify, it is assumed that earnings functions across activities also differ only through the intercepts, so that the sets of coefficients \( \beta_j \) are the same across activities (\( \beta_j = \beta \)). We interpret these \( \beta \) coefficients in the usual manner: as estimates of the labor market rates of return on the corresponding individual characteristics.

This first level of the methodology generates estimates for the set \( \Omega \), comprising occupational choice parameters \( \lambda \), and (random) estimates of the residual terms \( \epsilon_{hi}^{\text{tr}} \), as well as for \( \alpha_j, \beta \) and for the variance of the residual terms, \( \sigma_{\text{tr}}^2, \sigma_{\text{tr}}^2 \).

In the second level of the model, \( H (W, \eta; \Phi) \), we estimate the conditional distributions of \( V = \{ \text{number of children in the household} (n_{ch}); \text{years of schooling of individual} i (E_{ih}); \text{and total household non-labor income} (y_{0h}) \} \) on \( W = \{ \text{number of adults in the household} (n_{ah}); \text{its regional location} (r_h), \text{individual age} (A_{ih}), \text{race} (R_{ih}) \text{ and gender} (g_{ih}) \} \). This is done by imposing the functional form associated with the multinomial logit (such as the one in Equation 7) on both the conditional distribution of \( E_{ih} \) on \( W: \text{ML}_E (E \mid A, R, r, g) \) and on the conditional distribution of the number of children in the household on \( \{E, W\}: \text{ML}_C (n_{ch} \mid E, A, R, r, g, n_{ah}) \).

\footnote{For details on how the latter may be determined, see Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998).}
Unlike Equation (7), these models are estimated jointly for men and women. The education multilogit MLE has as choice categories 0; 1-4; 5-6; 7-8; 9-12; and 13 and more years of schooling, with 13 and more as the omitted category. Estimation of this model generates estimates for the educational endowment parameters, $\gamma$. The demographic multilogit MLC has as choice categories the number of children in the household: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and more, with 5 as the omitted category. Estimation of this model generates estimates for the demographic endowment parameters, $\psi$. Finally, the conditional distribution of total household non-labor incomes on $\{E, W\}$ is modelled as a Tobit: $T(y|E, A, R, r, g)$. Estimation of this model generates estimates for the non-human asset endowment parameters, $\xi$. These three vectors constitute the set of parameters $\Phi = \{\gamma, \psi, \xi\}$.

After each of these reduced-form models has been separately estimated for the two countries (Brazil and the United States), the approximate decompositions in (2') can be carried out. Each decomposition is based on the construction of one approximated counterfactual distribution $f_{A \rightarrow B}^{s}(y; \Omega^s, \Phi^s, \Psi^A)$, defined largely by which set of parameters in $\Omega^A$ and $\Phi^A$ is replaced by their counterparts in $\Omega^B$ and $\Phi^B$. All of our results in the next section are presented in this manner. Table 3, for example, lists mean incomes, four inequality measures and three poverty measures for a set of approximated counterfactual distributions, denoted by the vectors of parameters which were replaced with their counterparts from B. Similarly, Figures 2-6 depict differences in log mean incomes for each hundredth of the distribution, between actual and approximated counterfactual

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25 We also experimented with an alternative approximation for the conditional distribution of non-labor incomes. This was a (non-parametric) rank-preserving transformation of the observed distribution of $y_0$, conditional on earned incomes in each country. In practical terms, we ranked the two distributions by per capita household earned income $y_e = y_h - \frac{y_0}{n_h}$. If $p = F_B(y_e)$ was the rank of household with income $y_e$ in country B, then we replaced $y_{op}^B$ with the unearned income of the household with the same rank (by earned income) in country A, after normalizing by mean unearned incomes: $y_{op}^A \frac{\mu_B(y_0)}{\mu_A(y_0)}$. The results, which are available from the authors on request, were similar in both direction and magnitude to those of the parametric exercise reported in the text.
distributions, where these are denoted by the vectors of parameters which were replaced with their counterparts from $B$ to generate them.

As an example, consider line 4 of Table 3 (denoted “$\alpha$, $\beta$, and $\sigma^2$”). It lists the mean income and the inequality and poverty measures calculated for the distribution obtained by replacing the Brazilian $\alpha$ and $\beta$ in equation (8), with those estimated for the US; scaling up the variance of the residual terms $\varepsilon_i$ by the ratio of the estimated variance in the US to that of Brazil; and then predicting values of $y_{ih}$ for all individuals in the Brazilian income distribution, given their original characteristics ($\psi^A$). The density function defined over this vector of predicted incomes is

$$f^*_{A \rightarrow B} (y; \Omega^*, \Phi^*, \Psi^A)$$

for $\Omega^* = \{\alpha^B, \beta^B, \sigma^{2B}, \lambda^A, \eta^A\}$ and $\Phi^s = \Phi^A$.

Whenever $\lambda^B \in \Omega^*$, individuals may be reallocated across occupations. This involves drawing counterfactual $\varepsilon_U$’s from censored double exponential distributions with the relevant empirically observed variances. The labor income ascribed to the individuals who change occupation (to a remunerated one) is the predicted value by equation (8), with the relevant vector of parameters, and with $\varepsilon$’s drawn from a Normal distribution with mean zero and the relevant variance. And when $\Phi^s \neq \Phi^A$, so that the values of the years of schooling variable and/or the number of children in households may change, these changes are incorporated into the vector $V$, and counterfactual distributions are recomputed for the new (counterfactual) household characteristics. As the discussion in the next section will show, the interactions between these various simulations are often qualitatively and quantitatively important. The ability to shed light on them directly and the ease with which they can be interpreted are two of the main advantages of this approach.

The third and final level of the model consists of altering the joint distribution of the truly exogenous household characteristics, $\psi^C(W)$. The set $W$ is given by the age ($A$), race ($R$), gender ($g$) of each adult individual in the household, as well as by adult household size.

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26 The censoring of the distribution from which the unobserved choice determinants are drawn is designed to ensure that they are consistent with observed behaviour under the alternative vector $\lambda$. See Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (1998) for details.
(n_{ah}) and the region where the household is located (r). Since these variables do not depend on other exogenous variables in the model, this estimation is carried out simply by recalibrating the population by the weights corresponding to the joint distribution of these attributes in the target country.\(^{27}\)

In practice, this is done by partitioning the two populations by the numbers of adults in the household. To remain manageable, the partition is in three groups: households with a single adult; households with two adults; and households with more than two adults. Each of these groups is then further partitioned by the race (whites and non-whites) and age category (six groups) of each adult.\(^{28}\) The number of households in each of these subgroups can be denoted \(M_{n,C}^{a,r}\), where \(a\) stands for the age category of the group, \(r\) for the race of the group, \(n\) for the number of adults in the household, and \(C\) for the country. If we are importing the structure from country \(B\) (population of households \(P^B\)) to country \(A\) (population of households \(P^A\)), we then simply re-scale the household weights in the sample for country \(A\) by the factor:

\[
\phi_{a,r}^n = \left( \frac{M_{n,C}^{a,r}}{M_{n,C}^{a,r}} \right) \frac{P^A}{P^B}
\]

Results for this final level of simulations are reported in Table 3, under the letter \(\phi\).

5. **Results.**

The decompositions described in the previous section were conducted for differences in distributions between Brazil and the United States in 1999. The estimated coefficients for equations (7) and (8), as well as those for the multinomial logit models for the demographic and educational structures and the tobit model of the conditional distribution of non-labor incomes are not reported here due to space constraints, but can be found in Tables A1-A5 in Bourguignon et. al. (2002). Table 2 presents the results for importing the parameters from the US into Brazil, in terms of means and inequality measures for the individual

\(^{27}\) The spirit of this procedure is very much the same as in DiNardo et. al. (1996).
earnings distributions, separately for men and women. Table 3 displays analogous results for household per capita incomes, and includes also three poverty measures.\(^{29}\) Figures 2 to 6 present the full picture, by plotting differences in log household per capita incomes between the distributions simulated in various steps and the original distribution, for each hundredth of the new distribution.\(^{30}\)

Looking first at individual earnings, the observed differences between the Gini coefficients in Brazil and the US are nine points for men, and ten for women. Brazil's gender-specific earnings distributions have a Gini of 0.5, whereas those of the US are around 0.4. Roughly speaking, price effects (identified by simulating Brazilian earnings with the US \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) parameters) account for half of this difference. As we shall see, this is a much greater share than that which will hold for the distribution of household incomes per capita. Among the different price effects, the coefficient on the interaction of age and education stands out as making the largest difference.

Differences in participation behavior are unimportant in isolation. Importing the US participation parameters only contributes to reducing Brazilian earnings inequality when combined with importing US prices, as may be seen by comparing the rows \(\alpha \beta\) (viii) and the row \(\lambda, \alpha, \beta\). Educational and fertility choices are more important effects. The former raises educational endowments and hence both increases and upgrades the sectoral profile of labor supply. The latter leads to increased participation rates by women. This effect accounts for nearly all of the remaining four to five Gini points. As one would expect, demographic effects are particularly important for the female distribution, where, in combination with the effect of education, it reduces the Brazilian Gini by a full five points.

\(^{28}\) In the case of households with more than two adults, this is done for two adults only: the head and a randomly drawn other adult. In this manner, the group of single adult households is partitioned into 12 sub-groups, and the other two groups into 144 sub-groups each.

\(^{29}\) In order for the poverty comparisons to make sense across two countries as different as the US and Brazil, the US earnings distributions were scaled down so as to have the Brazilian mean. This was done by appropriately adjusting the estimate for \(\alpha^{29}\), as can be seen from the means reported in Tables 2 and 3. Accordingly, counterfactual poverty measures are not reported for simulations which do not include an \(\alpha\) estimate. The three poverty measures reported for the various distributions in Table 3 are the standard ones from Foster et. al. (1984). A relative poverty line was adopted, equal to one half of the median income in each distribution.

\(^{30}\) Analogous figures for differences in log incomes by percentiles ranked by the original distribution – which show the re-rankings induced by each simulation - are available from the authors on request.
even before any changes are made to prices. Reweighing the purely exogenous endowments - including race - has no effect.

Table 3, which reports on the simulations for the distribution of household incomes per capita, can be read in an analogous way. The first two lines present inequality and poverty measures for the actual distributions of household per capita income by individuals in Brazil and the US. In terms of the Gini coefficient, the gap we are trying to "explain" is substantial: it is twelve and a half points higher in Brazil than in the US. The difference is even larger when the entropy inequality measures E() are used.

The first block of simulations suggests that differences in the structure of returns to observed personal characteristics in the labor market can account for some five of these thirteen points. When one disaggregates by individual \( \beta \)'s, it turns out that returns to education, conditionally on experience – as for individual earnings - play the crucial role. Overall, it can thus be said that differences in returns to schooling and experience together account for approximately 40 per cent of the difference in inequality between Brazil and the US. The order of magnitude is practically the same with E(1) and E(2) but it is higher with E(0), suggesting that the problem is not only that returns to schooling are relatively higher at the top of the Brazilian schooling scale but also that they are relatively lower at the bottom. This is confirmed by the fact that importing US prices lowers poverty in Brazil, even though (relative) poverty is initially comparable in the two countries.

Importing the US variance of residuals goes in the opposite direction, contributing to an increase of almost 1.5 Gini points in Brazilian inequality. Two candidate explanations suggest themselves: either there is greater heterogeneity amongst US workers along unobserved dimensions (such as ability) than among their Brazilian counterparts, or the US labor market is more efficient at observing and pricing these characteristics. This is an interesting question, which deserves further investigation. In the absence of additional

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31 The relative importance of each effect varies across the four inequality measures presented, but the orders of magnitude are broadly the same, and the main story could be told from any of them. All are presented in Table 3, but we use the Gini for the discussion in the text.

32 This result is in line with the earlier findings of Lam and Levinson (1992), who noted that the variance of residuals from earnings regressions such as these was considerably higher in the US than in Brazil.
information on, say, the variance of IQ test results or other measures of innate ability, orthogonal to education, we are inclined to favor the second interpretation. It may be that the lower labor market turnover and longer tenures that characterize the US labor market translate into a lessened degree of asymmetric information between workers and managers in that country, with a more accurate remuneration of endowments which are unobserved to researchers. We thus consider the $\sigma^2$ effect as a price effect, which dampens the overall contribution of price effects to some 3.5 to 4 points of the Gini.

The next block shows that importing the US occupational structure ($\lambda$) by itself, has almost no impact on Brazilian inequality, but lowers average incomes and raises poverty. This is a consequence of the great differences in the distribution of education across the two countries, as revealed by Table 4 below. Since education is negatively correlated with inactivity, and positively with employment in industry and with formality in the US, when we simulate participation behavior with US parameters but Brazilian levels of education, we withdraw a number of people from the labor force, and 'downgrade' many others. Figure 3 shows the impoverishing effect of imposing US occupational choice behavior, combined with its price effect, on Brazil's original distribution of endowments.

Turning to the second-level model, $H(W, \eta, \Phi)$, we see further support for the aforementioned role of education in determining occupational choice. When US educational parameters are imported by themselves, this raises education levels in Brazil substantially, thus significantly increasing incomes and reducing poverty. Education endowments increase more for the poor (as expected, given the bounded-above nature of the education distribution), and inequality also falls dramatically. The $\gamma$ simulation alone reduces the Brazilian Gini by six points and, crucially, eliminates the impoverishing effect of the occupational structure simulation. The latter result suggests that the most important difference in the distribution of educational endowments between Brazil and the US might actually be in the lack of a minimum compulsory level in Brazil – see Table 4.

At this stage, it might seem that almost all of the difference in inequality between the US and Brazil is explained by education-related factors. Six points of the Gini are explained by
the differences in the distribution of education and five points by the difference in the structure of earnings by educational level (that is, the coefficients of the earning functions). Yet, when these changes - i.e. $\alpha$, $\beta$ and $\gamma$ - are simulated together, as in row 8a in Table 3, it turns out that their overall effect is not the sum of the two effects (eleven points), but only eight points. The two education-related effects, distribution and earnings structure, are therefore far from being additive. The same is true in the decomposition of earnings inequality in Table 2.

The explanation for this non-additivity property is straight-forward. As can be seen in Table 4, only a tiny minority of US citizens have fewer than 9 years of education, whereas practically 60% of the Brazilian population do. At the same time, the structure of US earnings for the few people below that minimum level of schooling is essentially flat, possibly because of minimum wage laws. In Brazil, on the other hand, earnings are strongly differentiated over that range. People with less than full primary education earn on average 70% of the mean earnings of people with some secondary education. The equivalent proportion in the US is 95%. Thus, importing the earnings structure from the US to Brazil contributes to a drastic equalization of the distribution when the Brazilian distribution of education remains unchanged. The many people with less than secondary education are then paid at practically the same rate as people with completed secondary.

Doing the same exercise after the US conditional distribution of education has been “imported” into Brazil clearly has a much smaller effect, because there are then very few people left with less than secondary education. This is shown clearly in Table 3, by comparing rows 1 and 3 on the one hand, and rows 8 and 8a on the other. The basic effect of switching to the US earnings structure when the US conditional distribution of education is used comes from the fact that the relative earnings of college versus high school graduates is substantially higher in Brazil.

The question which remains is: how much of the excess inequality in Brazil with respect to the US is due to the distribution of education, and how much is due to the structure of
The foregoing argument makes it tempting to place greater weight on the distribution of education effect. This is because the structure of educational returns at low schooling levels is relevant to very few people in the US, and yet it has such an important effect when imported to Brazil. One may also hold that the structure of returns actually reflects the educational profile of both populations. There are positive returns at the bottom in Brazil because many people in the labor force have zero or a very low level of schooling, whereas this is exceptional in the US. There are also larger returns in Brazil at the top of the schooling range because there are relatively fewer people with a college education.

Moving on to demographic behavior, we observe a similar role for education. As with occupational structure, importing $\psi$ alone hardly changes inequality – it would even increase it slightly. However, fertility is negatively correlated with educational attainment, particularly of women. If the change in fertility were taking place in the Brazilian population with US levels of schooling and participation behavior, inequality would drop by 1 percentage point of the Gini coefficient and poverty would fall. This seems to mean that fertility behavior differs between the two countries mostly for the least educated households.

When the effects of some of the “semi-exogenous” endowments (embodied in the approximations to the educational and demographic counterfactual conditional distributions) are combined with occupational structure and price effects (as in the row for $\psi, \lambda, \gamma, \alpha, \beta, \sigma^2$), we see an overall reduction of seven points in the Gini. Most of this (around five points) seems to be associated with adopting the US endowments of education, either directly or indirectly, through knock-on effects on participation and fertility. The remainder is due to the price effects. This still leaves, however, some five Gini points in the difference in inequality between the two countries unexplained. Figure 5 illustrates the results of the combined simulations for the entire distribution: while the simulated line has

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33 This is not a new question. In fact, it was at the heart of the public debate about the causes of increasing inequality in Brazil during the 1960s. See Fishlow (1972) and Langoni (1973) for different views on the matter at that time.
moved much closer to the actual (log mean income per hundredth) differences, it is not yet a very good fit.

Of the various candidate factors we are considering, two remain: the differences in the joint distributions of exogenous observed personal endowments: $\psi^A(W)$ and $\psi^B(W)$; and non-labor incomes. The two final blocks of simulations show that it is the latter, rather than the former, which account for the remaining inequality differences. While reweighing the households in accordance with Equation (9) actually has an increasing effect on Brazilian inequality (see line 21) - thus weakening the explanatory power of the overall simulation by about one and half Gini points - importing the conditional distribution of non-labor incomes has a surprisingly large explanatory power. As may be seen from line 20 of Table 3, it actually moves the simulated Gini coefficient for Brazil to within 1.7 Gini points of the true US Gini.

When reweighing the joint distributions of exogenous observed personal endowments is combined with all the previous steps, in line 23, the difference is further reduced to 1.3 Gini points. It also does remarkably well by all other inequality measures in Table 3. Figure 6 shows the simulated income differences for two different counterfactual distributions with non-labor incomes - one with and the other without reweighing. The fit with regard to the actual differences is clearly much improved with respect to the preceding simulations, and it is evident that reweighing the exogenous endowments has a limited effect. The fact that the curve for simulated income differences now lies much nearer the actual differences curve graphically illustrates the success of the simulated decomposition. This suggests that the approximation error $R_A$ is very small, at least in this application.

In order to identify the relative importance of the various components of non-labor income, we considered the effect of each source separately. Private transfers are responsible for a drop in the Gini coefficient equal to 0.7 percentage points, certainly not a negligible effect. But most of the effect of unearned income is due to retirement incomes. Retirement income is inequality-increasing in Brazil, whereas it is equalizing in the US. This can be seen in

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34 Details of this analysis are available from the authors on request.
Figure 7, which shows the share of retirement pension income in total household income, for each hundredth of the distribution of household income per capita, in Brazil and the US. Although the Brazilian series is quite noisy below the median, one can nevertheless discern an ascending trend: retirement pensions tend to be a larger share of total income for richer families than for poorer ones in Brazil. In the US, in contrast the share declines with per capita income, from the first quintile upwards.

The evidence suggests that this unequal distribution of pension incomes in Brazil is not only the result of an unequal distribution of lifetime labor earnings, which is simply reproduced beyond retirement through pension contributions. While the inequality in lifetime labor incomes clearly must play a part, studies of Brazil’s retirement pension system (the “Previdência”) suggest that low coverage at the bottom of the distribution – induced by large numbers of self-employed workers excluded from the system – and very generous terms and conditions in the public pension system at the high-end, contribute separately and substantially to pension income inequality. Retirement income in Brazil concentrates among retirees of the formal sector who tend to be better off than the rest of the population. See, e.g., Siqueira et al. (2002). Our findings imply that a switch from the Brazilian to the US retirement income distribution is very strongly equalizing, reflecting first of all the near-universal nature of access to pension benefits in the US and the relative privilege that it still represents in Brazil.

Overall, the bottom line seems to be that differences in income inequality between Brazil and the United States are predominantly due to differences in the underlying distribution of endowments in the two countries, including among endowments the rights of access to retirement income. Of the almost thirteen Gini points difference, almost ten can be ascribed to endowment effects. Among these, the data suggest almost equally important roles to inequalities in the Brazilian distribution of human capital (as proxied by years of schooling), and other claims on resources, measured by flows of non-labor income.

See Hoffman (2001) for an interesting analysis of the contribution of retirement pensions to Brazilian inequality. His findings confirm the importance of this income source to the country’s high levels of inequality, but he shows that this effect is particularly pronounced in the metropolitan areas of the poorer Northeastern region, as well as in the states of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo. The effect appears to be much weaker in rural areas.
The remaining three points of the Gini are due to price effects and, in particular, steeper returns to education in Brazil than in the US. Combined to the more unequal distribution of educational endowments themselves, this confirms the importance of education (prices and quantities) in driving Brazilian inequality, as previewed by the Theil decompositions reported in Section 2. While human capital remains firmly at the center-stage, our results suggest that it is joined there by the distribution of non-labor incomes and, in particular, of post-retirement incomes.

6. Conclusions

This paper proposed a micro-econometric approach to investigating the nature of the differences between income distributions across countries. Since a distribution of household incomes is the marginal of the joint distribution of income and a number of other observed household attributes, simple statistical theory allows us to express it as an integral of the product of a sequence of conditional distributions and a (reduced order) joint distribution of exogenous characteristics. Our method is then to approximate each of these conditional distributions by pre-specified parametric models, which can be econometrically estimated in each country. We then construct approximated counterfactual income distributions, by importing sets of parameter estimates from the models of country B into country A. This allows us to decompose the difference between the density functions (evaluated at any point) of the two distributions - or any of their functionals, such as inequality or poverty indices – into a term corresponding to the effect of the imported parameters, a residual term, and an approximation error. The decomposition residual can be reduced arbitrarily by combining the sets of parameters to be imported into a given simulation. The approximation error is shown to be small for the application considered.

The sets of counterfactual income distributions constructed in this paper were designed to decompose differences across income distributions into effects due to three broad sources: differences in the returns or pricing structure prevailing in the countries' labor markets; differences in the occupational structure of the economy; and differences in the distributions of household asset endowments, broadly defined. By comparing the
counterfactual distributions corresponding to each of these effects and to various combinations of them, we hope to have shed some light on the nature of the inter-relationships between returns, occupations, and the underlying distributions of endowments. These can lead to interesting findings, such as a quantification of the impact of educational expansion on inequality through a specific channel: its effect on women’s fertility behavior and labor force participation.

We used this approach to ask what makes the Brazilian distribution of income so unequal. In particular, we considered the determinants of the differences between it and the US income distribution. We found that differences in the structure of occupations account for very little. The structure of returns to human capital had a more substantial effect, due largely to steeper returns to education in Brazil. But the most important source of Brazil’s uniquely large income inequality is the underlying inequality in the distribution of its human and non-human endowments. In particular, the main causes of Brazil's inequality - and indeed of its urban poverty - seem to be poor access to education and claims on assets and transfers that potentially generate non-labor incomes.

The importance of these non-labor incomes was one of our chief findings. Income distribution in Brazil would be much improved if only the distribution of this income component was more similar to that of the United States - itself hardly a paragon of the Welfare State. In particular, it seems that if social security reforms succeeded in reducing the excessive generosity of non-contributory pension schemes which largely serve rich former civil-servants, and in extending pension coverage to poorer workers in the informal sector, this could have a very considerable impact in terms of inequality reduction.
References.


### Table 1: Theil Decompositions of Inequality by Population Subgroups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RB(0)</td>
<td>RB(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Type</td>
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<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban / Rural</td>
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<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender of the Head</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race of the Head</td>
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<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level of the Head</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Group</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNAD 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation

Note: Entries reflect share of overall inequality which is between subgroups for each partition. See Cowell and Jenkins (1995).
Table 2: Simulated Means and Inequality for Brazilian earnings in 1999, Using USA coefficients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: PNAD 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p/c</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \alpha, \beta \)

i. Intercept

636.3 | 0.517 | 0.467 | 0.510 | 0.902 | 0.837 |

ii. Education

636.3 | 0.513 | 0.479 | 0.485 | 0.783 | 0.948 |

iii. Experience

636.3 | 0.575 | 0.609 | 0.644 | 1.244 | 1.120 |

iv. Race

636.3 | 0.515 | 0.463 | 0.507 | 0.893 | 0.830 |

v. Interaction: Age/education

636.3 | 0.439 | 0.332 | 0.344 | 0.504 | 0.642 |

vi. Sector of activity

636.3 | 0.513 | 0.457 | 0.502 | 0.884 | 0.817 |

vii. Formal/Informal

636.3 | 0.517 | 0.476 | 0.509 | 0.900 | 0.887 |

viii. All Betas

636.3 | 0.460 | 0.379 | 0.376 | 0.545 | 0.768 |

\( \alpha, \beta, \sigma^2 \)

i. Intercept

636.3 | 0.540 | 0.516 | 0.562 | 1.039 | 0.927 |

ii. Education

636.3 | 0.536 | 0.528 | 0.536 | 0.910 | 1.038 |

iii. Experience

636.3 | 0.594 | 0.659 | 0.697 | 1.415 | 1.210 |

iv. Race

636.3 | 0.538 | 0.512 | 0.559 | 1.030 | 0.920 |

v. Interaction: Age/education

636.3 | 0.465 | 0.379 | 0.392 | 0.600 | 0.733 |

vi. Sector of activity

636.3 | 0.536 | 0.506 | 0.554 | 1.020 | 0.907 |

vii. Formal/Informal

636.3 | 0.538 | 0.523 | 0.557 | 1.028 | 0.977 |

viii. All Betas

636.3 | 0.484 | 0.434 | 0.421 | 0.638 | 0.857 |

\( \lambda, \gamma \)

722.9 | 0.502 | 0.434 | 0.475 | 0.803 | 0.772 |

636.3 | 0.442 | 0.336 | 0.345 | 0.492 | 0.649 |

636.3 | 0.468 | 0.382 | 0.392 | 0.584 | 0.735 |

1210.0 | 0.477 | 0.408 | 0.400 | 0.572 | 0.825 |

1306.8 | 0.464 | 0.382 | 0.375 | 0.526 | 0.769 |

636.3 | 0.428 | 0.322 | 0.315 | 0.421 | 0.654 |

636.3 | 0.455 | 0.367 | 0.361 | 0.505 | 0.741 |

1235.3 | 0.469 | 0.397 | 0.381 | 0.529 | 0.818 |

636.4 | 0.441 | 0.346 | 0.333 | 0.447 | 0.717 |

636.4 | 0.465 | 0.391 | 0.378 | 0.532 | 0.808 |

1281.8 | 0.463 | 0.385 | 0.369 | 0.506 | 0.796 |

636.3 | 0.430 | 0.328 | 0.315 | 0.413 | 0.681 |

636.3 | 0.455 | 0.373 | 0.359 | 0.486 | 0.722 |

818.7 | 0.528 | 0.492 | 0.518 | 0.865 | 0.907 |

704.3 | 0.448 | 0.362 | 0.349 | 0.484 | 0.751 |

Source: PNAD 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation
### Table 3: Simulated Poverty and Inequality for Brazil in 1999, Using USA coefficients.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Income</th>
<th>Inequality</th>
<th>Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P(0)</td>
<td>E(0)</td>
<td>E(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>294.8</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>294.8</td>
<td>0.445</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α, β</td>
<td>294.9</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α, β, σ²</td>
<td>294.9</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>0.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ</td>
<td>277.9</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, α, β</td>
<td>255.4</td>
<td>0.535</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, α, β, σ²</td>
<td>255.5</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ</td>
<td>454.0</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ, α, β</td>
<td>283.9</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ, α, β, σ²</td>
<td>283.9</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, γ</td>
<td>469.0</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, γ, α, β</td>
<td>274.2</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, γ, α, β, σ²</td>
<td>274.2</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψ</td>
<td>295.2</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψ, γ</td>
<td>464.6</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψ, γ, α, β</td>
<td>287.1</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψ, γ, α, β, σ²</td>
<td>287.1</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, γ, γ</td>
<td>507.2</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, γ, α, β</td>
<td>299.2</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>λ, γ, α, β, σ²</td>
<td>299.2</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>0.462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ξ</td>
<td>317.5</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψ, λ, γ, α, β, σ² ; ξ</td>
<td>356.3</td>
<td>0.428</td>
<td>0.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φ</td>
<td>404.7</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φ, ψ, λ, γ, α, β, σ²</td>
<td>387.7</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>φ, ψ, λ, γ, α, β, σ² ; ξ</td>
<td>436.4</td>
<td>0.432</td>
<td>0.359</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNAD 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation

Legend:
- α: importing the estimated constant term from the US earnings regressions.
- β: importing the other estimated coefficients from the US earnings regressions.
- σ²: importing the estimated variances of residuals from the US earnings regressions.
- λ: importing the estimated coefficients from the US occupational structure model.
- γ: importing the estimated coefficients from the US educational structure model.
- ψ: importing the estimated coefficients from the US demographic structure model.
- ξ: importing the estimated coefficients from the US tobit model for non-labor income.
- φ: reweighting exogenous population characteristics.

### Table 4: Distribution of Education in the two Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of schooling</th>
<th>Share of the Population (16 years and older)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 4</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 6</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 to 8</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 to 12</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 or more</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNAD 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation
Figure 2: US - Brazil Differences, Actual and Simulated, Price Effects

Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation

Figure 3: US - Brazil Differences, Actual and Simulated, Occupational Effects

Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation
Figure 4: US - Brazil Differences, Actual and Simulated, Educational Endowment Effect

Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation

Figure 5: US - Brazil Differences, Actual and Simulated, Education and Fertility

Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation
Figure 6: US - Brazil Differences, Actual and Simulated, Non Labor Incomes and Reweighting

Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation

Figure 7: Incidence of Retirement Pensions in Brazil and the US

Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999, CPS/ADS 2000 and author's calculation