Annex 1  Terms of Reference

Desk-Based Synthesis of participation in PRSPs in Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

1. The inclusion of participation as a key element in the new policy framework around PRSPs marks a significant departure from past practice for the World Bank and IMF, and for many national governments. However, there has been little systematic analysis of how the principle of participation has been operationalised, and the implications of good and bad practice in participation for the development of effective national poverty reduction strategies.

2. To date, work on participatory processes linked to PRSPs has consisted mainly of reports on individual participation processes, with a focus on building capacity among government and civil society stakeholders. Syntheses of experiences across different countries have been rare, or limited in scope. The most ambitious recent study by IDS is more than a year old. Since then, more countries in sub-Saharan Africa have progressed in the formulation of I/PRSPs, and there is a richer and broader experience of participation/consultation processes to consider.

Objective

3. This project will comprise a desk-based synthesis of experiences in participation around the formulation of PRSPs in sub-Saharan Africa, with the immediate objective of updating existing knowledge and drawing out relevant policy issues for use in wider forums (such as the Strategic Partnership with Africa), and for feeding into the World Bank’s annual PRSP Review now under preparation. The project will also feed into the development of a Terms of Reference for a longer-term, multi-country study of participation processes.

4. More specifically, the project will aim to:

- update our knowledge of practice/experience around the participation of civil society in the development of national poverty reduction strategies, including a synthesis of good practice;
- provide an initial assessment of perceptions of how the poor have experienced and understood PRSPs, and whether PRSPs have changed the relationship of the poor to policy making processes and their influence on policy content;
- provide an initial assessment as to whether and how the inclusion of participation as a key element in the new framework of PRSPs had led to substantive changes in national government and IFI/donor behaviour in relation to policy making processes and poverty reduction programmes.

Scope of Work

5. Drawing on a collation of existing studies/knowledge and information about participation in PRS processes, the project will aim to isolate the following kinds of cross-cutting questions from existing experiences in Africa to date:

- How has consultation/participation influenced the policy content of PRSSs?
- How has consultation/participation influenced policy making processes in country, both formal and informal?
• What effect has consultation had on the political space for public policy dialogue?
• How has the consultation process affected the national discourse on poverty?
• Has the consultation process generated new, transformative processes by stimulating debate on issues such as inequality or ethnicity?
• What possibilities for institutionalizing consultation/participation have arisen, including around macroeconomic and structural reform programmes, public expenditure management and budget processes, service delivery, and poverty monitoring?
• How has the principle of participation been understood and supported by donors/IFIs?
• How has the principle and practice of participation influenced the nature of donor/government dialogue around PRSPs, PRGFs, PRSCs?

6. The study will bring together, collate and synthesise commissioned studies from specific countries, anecdotal information, and communications from DFID country programmes. Limited travel to Africa is also envisaged as opportunities arise to participate in forums/meetings that will substantially contribute to the information base of the project. In the course of synthesis work, the contracted agency/researchers will also look for opportunities to identify countries that are interested in participating in a second phase of work beyond this project, comprising a multi-country case study. The audience for the project will be DFID country programme staff, World Bank staff, members of the SPA, and national stakeholders engaged in PRS processes. The main output of the project will be a report to DFID.

Timeframe, Inputs, Outputs and Management

7. The main project output (Synthesis Report – see below) should be completed no later than mid-October 2001, in order to contribute information to the World Bank’s PRSP Review process (coordinated by PREM), and the upcoming meeting of the SPA Technical Group. The other output (draft TOR and identification of countries - see below) should be completed by mid-November 2001.

8. Inputs are expected to be 30 person days from a senior researcher and 50 days from a research assistant. Two person days are also added for experts to review and comment on a draft of the main report/findings. Travel will include the cost of five return trips Brighton-London, and two return trips to Africa, plus 15 days subsistence.

9. The project will produce two Outputs:

• Synthesis Report of not more than 25 pages, including Executive Summary and findings.
• Draft Terms of Reference and identification of countries for inclusion in a follow up phase of work, comprising a longer-term, multi-country study.

10. The project will be contracted to a UK-based research institution (IDS) with substantial knowledge of participatory processes. It will be coordinated within DFID by the APED Social Development Adviser.
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Annex 3 Country Profiles

Annex 3.1 Bolivia

Summary
At first glance, Bolivia’s PRSP process appears to have been a huge step forward when compared to its IPRSP process. It has been considered by some as an exemplary case whereby a co-ordinated effort between government and donors made possible effective and articulate participation of a broad-based and relatively representative civil society. Donor and INGO funding, guidance, and capacity building efforts directed towards CS made possible a CS-organised process built upon existing decentralisation mechanisms. The process consisted of departmental consultations and a National Forum (NF) to which the government was not invited, and from which CS would develop a position to present at the National Dialogue between government and CS. Concern existed over the degree to which government would ‘listen’ to CS at this event; but in the end NF conclusions were incorporated into the final PRSP. The process therefore went beyond CS capacity building and network building, possibly strengthening weak or embryonic institutions that have the potential to form the basis for a more participatory democracy. In addition a new legal institution was established in the process, the Dialogue Law. The PRS process had the beneficial effect of forcing CS to reflect on issues of its own representativity.

Background
In February 2000, IFIs (which in Bolivia include the Inter-American Development Back as well as WB and IMF) agreed that Bolivia would be eligible for additional HIPC assistance once the PRS was adopted. Bolivia’s IPRSP had been based on a ‘Poverty Action Plan’ (PAP) founded on the country’s first National Dialogue in 1997. The actual PRSP process has been centred around a second National Dialogue (ND). This was a government initiative run by an independent secretariat but funded by international co-operation through UNDP. Perhaps partially due to a legacy of CS mistrust of government, and the latter’s foot-dragging regarding the National Dialogue\(^1\), a parallel consultation process dedicated to discussions around the spending of debt relief funds, and the development of a PRSP was independently organised by CS: the National Forum (McCollim 2000).

The Foro Nacional Jubileo 2000, or National Forum (NF) was a Jubilee 2000 initiative set up by the Catholic Church, involving many other CSOs. In fact, 20 CSOs co-sponsored a consultation process organised by the Catholic Church to consult with CS on the development of the PRSP. The CSOs included Bolivia’s largest labour union (principally miners); private entrepreneurs’ union, union of rural workers, university, women, environmental and human rights groups\(^2\). The process consisted of 9 department-level consultations (February-April 2000) and a 3-day National Forum (April 2000). The department-level fora were divided into 8 thematic roundtables (macroeconomics and structural adjustment, employment and income, land and productivity, rural health, urban health, rural and urban education). Each

\(^1\) There was internal disagreement between young reformers and older ‘dinosaurs’ in GoB regarding whether or not the National Dialogue should take place at all. The first struggled to ‘keep alive the flame of decentralisation’ while the latter feared that the first ND had already ‘opened up a Pandora’s box in which all aggrieved interest groups now felt at liberty to challenge the State and weaken democratic institutions’ (Eyben 2001: 6-7).

\(^2\) It is to these groups and their member organisations, and local-based networks that we refer to when we use the term civil society (CS) in this country profile.
roundtable elected delegates to attend the NF. The Forum’s findings were presented at the ND in July 2000, and in June 2001, Bolivia’s PRS was presented to the IFIs for approval. The ND is legally supported by the Dialogue Law that was passed by Bolivia’s Congress in July 2001.

**Principle and practice of participation**

In 1982, Bolivia adopted a ‘Washington Consensus’ model of economic development. Shortly thereafter it was praised by the World Bank president, Wolfensohn, as a model for more inclusive and participatory frameworks for development practice. As such, it was seen as a strong candidate for the formulation of a ‘nationally owned’ and high quality PRSP. Donors saw broad-based ownership of the process in Bolivia as possible given previous experience in the country with Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Voices of the Poor exercises for the World Development Report 2000/1. Moreover, poor people’s participation had become considered an essential element in the design and monitoring of successful poverty reduction strategies (Eyben 2001).

Co-ordinated by the Vice-President’s office and with UNDP involvement, the first National Dialogue was considered a means of involving CS in the design of the Poverty Action Plan (PAP). The PAP formed the basis of the IPRSP – both of which were ill-received by CS, who felt that their involvement was token, allowed only thanks to donor pressure. Donors worked diligently to support more effective CS participation in the actual PRSP formulation process. They allocated grants of $300,000 among eight organisations\(^3\) with the aim of supporting a broad based consultation process. This process manifested itself in the form of departmental consultations leading up to a National Forum.

Different players seem to have had different ideas regarding the principle and practice of participation. Eyben (2001) observed that diverse opinions existed at different governmental levels with respect to allowing broad-based CS participation in the ND, ‘seeing them as having no apparent legitimacy in terms of representing poor people’s views’ (2001: 12). It was CS pressure, a conveniently timed social uprising, and the donor community decision to establish a specific fund to encourage CS participation that forced GoB to accept CS participation in the ND. GoB seems to have seen the PRSP more as a tool to secure debt relief than as an overarching framework for all public policies and expenditures. It was therefore satisfied if the process consisted of a broad-based consensus on the transparent and equitable use of funds made available from debt relief and the ND remained confined to a discussion around the allocation of debt relief funds (Eyben 2001). Similarly, understandings of a participatory dialogue seem to vary. A Minister commented that he saw the ND as a space where he could listen to CS interests and concerns, not necessarily share information with them (ibid.). Donor pressure for the use of participatory tools at more local levels in the process were overruled by the ND secretariat.

1706 representatives from 806 organisations participated in the departmental consultation process. In the NF, 93 departmental delegates with 230 representatives from 73 organisations and 63 observers, 20 of which were international participated (McCollim 2000: 3). Government officials were not invited to the Forum’s deliberations, but were invited to the closing plenary. Of 15 cabinet members invited, 4 attended. Quantity of participants is of course not the same as quality of the

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\(^3\) Two of the larger and more active CSOs here are the Episcopal Conference, and the Comité Nacional de Enlace Consulta de la Sociedad Civil (an association of urban and rural small producers).
process but these numbers indicate inclusiveness and broad coverage through the consultation process.

Interesting to note is that the ND process was designed by bilateral actors from donor projects trained in strengthening local government (Eyben 2001). Thus the process was one which attempted to strengthen local capacity towards ownership of the impressive consultation process. As the NGO sector observed, the assumption here was that local government reflected interests of the poor. In a political culture riddled with clientelism, this is a highly questionable assumption.

What value has participation added in terms of:

**Impact on PRSP process?**
With donor funding, CS designed Bolivia’s PRSP consultation process which culminated in the NF. The Forum aimed to operationalise roundtable conclusions, promote the independence of mechanisms established, set up commissions at departmental levels, and guarantee that the most vulnerable sectors be represented at the ND. The NF conclusions pointed to the need for an autonomous and legally-binding mechanism to oversee expenditure of funds. This was to be equipped with a technical team, and to participate in the drawing-up, follow-up, evaluation and reformulation of the PRSP, as well as to carry out social auditing functions. During the ND, CSOs offered their own proposals to be incorporated in the PRSP.

INGOs also supported CS involvement in the process. Oxfam GB, for instance, worked to inform CSOs about the process, contribute to their guiding poverty reduction policies, as well as broaden their knowledge and build capacity for influencing economic structural adjustment policies. At the same time, INGOs brought non-Bolivian actors into the process. Jubilee 2000 drew upon international networks. After the NF, they organised an international letter writing campaign calling partner organisations and their respective members to demand from the Bolivian president that NF findings be considered in the ND, and be incorporated into the PRSP. This action is perhaps another reflection of CS concern that if left to the GoB (or at least certain factions within), a less participatory and inclusive PRSP process may result.

The ND is legally supported by the Dialogue Law, ‘a legal instrument which will regulate, among other things, the way that funds from the debt relief will be distributed among the municipalities and the way in which these funds should be used for social investment’ (Delgado 2001). We have not been able to ascertain whether its introduction is related to the NF’s recommendation for a legally binding agency responsible for overseeing expenditure of funds.

**Impact on PRS content?**
An NGO source observed an IMF representative in Bolivia’s statement that the Forum’s conclusions should influence the ND but that these were limited to shaping allocations of HIPC funds, and that macroeconomic targets were not open to discussion. INGOs with Bolivian links are recommending contestation of this IMF position through by lobbying IFI boards in Washington (Delgado 2001). Oxfam complains that the causes of poverty were not discussed in the PRSP (ibid.).

Although not directly touching upon macroeconomic conditionalities, concrete proposals offered by CS at both the NF and the ND regarding investment of PRS funds did point to a need to address broader political economic structures. The land roundtable, for example, called for wealthy countries to open their markets to small country producers and for emphasis on self-reliance as opposed to food aid. The
Consultations generally concurred on the need to prioritise indigenous peoples, children, youth, the disabled, the elderly and migrants (rural and urban) in the PRS. Again, although we do know that NF conclusions were integrated into the ND, we lack information outlining the degree to which these recommendations were taken on board in the final PRSP. Presented discretely, issues such as gender were not treated as cross-cutting themes in the strategy (Delgado 2001). No proposals exist for specific measures that might work towards closing gaps of gender inequality, and that address the historical, structural disadvantages suffered by women (ibid.) Nonetheless, some groups were highly successful in taking forward their own agendas such as the Comité Nacional de Enlace Consulta de la Sociedad Civil who pushed for a livelihoods as well as social services role for municipalities in the PRS.

Thus it would seem that despite the exercise’s focus being limited to the use of debt relief funds, there was scope in the process to include issues – as reflected by the mention of livelihood for poverty reduction in the strategy’s final conclusions – illustrative of a more integrated model of social and economic development that would include tackling the deep-seated problems of Bolivia’s political economy. This was at least partially successful, thanks to the INGO and bilateral communities’ support throughout the process. The PRS is considered of a high standard, and was written by nationals.

**Impact on Government-donor dialogue?**

Donors played a critical, albeit behind-the-scenes role in Bolivia’s PRSP process. They seem to have convinced government to some extent of the need for a broadly-based consultation process. One of our donor sources interprets the government as seeing the donors as naïve agents in certain CS actors’ agendas of political destabilisation and as such, that they have extended themselves beyond their legitimate function. How this will affect government-donor dialogue in future remains to be seen.

**Impact on poverty discourse?**

CS pressed for an integrated model of social and economic development that would include tackling the deep-seated problems of Bolivia’s political economy. The final PRSP is said to reflect a new integrated approach to poverty reduction, with emphasis (although little policy prescription) on a need to tackle economic and social exclusion (Eyben 2001: 5). The discourse around poverty in Bolivia would therefore seem to have been broadened.

**Impact on policy processes more broadly?**

In addition to providing a space in which Bolivian CS could mobilise, donor support further strengthened CS’s organisational capacity, as well as contributing to the building and strengthening of CS coalitions. INGOs have also played a key role here. There now exists a strong and articulate demand in Bolivia for greater transparency over the use of HIPC funds. Mechanisms and initiatives for monitoring social spending are being strengthened, thus challenging corruption and increasing accountability. In this context, innovative and far-reaching initiatives become possible. For example, Oxfam GB is working towards strengthening existing local monitoring organisations (‘Comites de Vigilancia’, or Social Watch Committees) at
the municipal level, where decisions on HIPC funds are taken. It is also strengthening organisations working on resource allocation and budget transparency (Delgado 2001). A further long-term impact of the participatory PRS process has been the election of indigenous and peasant men and women as Presidents of Municipal Boards, Presidents of Social Watch Committees, and future mayors – all positions with responsibilities of implementation, control and monitoring of funds (Delgado 2001). This is a huge step for a country plagued with racial prejudice and seems to support Eyben’s assertion that the PRSP process did contribute to a shift in the balance of power towards poor people as well as the establishment of poverty criteria for distribution of public resources for HIPC and social investment funds (2001).

The PRSP process has led some donors and CS to assess own experiences. One of our IGNO sources (Delgado 2001) observed the following. CS has recognised the need for more resources - both human and financial - to carry out effective international lobbying efforts. Policy debates need to move beyond NGO and CSO networks, presumably towards engaging more effectively with government. Furthermore, such reflections have called for an evaluation of the Church’s dominant position (consolidated through the NF) in the initiative, and for new actions and alliances to be developed. CS also seems to recognise a need for constant monitoring of state and IFI actions, something that might be attained through an allied effort with a more politically oriented advocacy process (ibid.). These CS reflections suggest both a long-term vision and maturity on the part of Bolivian CS, or at least their INGO counterparts4. It also strengthened mutual recognition between the state and CS, and the right for the latter to hold the former accountable. A further outcome of the PRS process, which is likely to be sustained, is a co-ordinated multi-level CS effort to hold discussions among the various CS organisations (Delgado 2001).

**Generating examples of good participatory practice?**

The National Forum, and its preceding departmental consultation process, are important examples of strong frameworks for participation, as are the Decentralisation and Popular participation legislation, including the unique Dialogue Law. These hold potential for effective participation to be built within them. (On the other hand, there is a risk that the density of top-down frameworks and measures for promoting participation in Bolivia stifles the development of bottom-up processes, which suggests that these frameworks should not be promoted uncritically as best practice examples without analysis of their impact on the political space for spontaneous, bottom-up initiatives to take place outside of them.)

**Other important issues or information**

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4 It is difficult to assess to what degree our INGO source’s views reflect that of national NGOs or CSOs.
Annex 3.2    Ghana

Summary
Ghana’s PRSP process seems to be riddled with contradictions and it is difficult to ascertain the degree of effective CS participation in the process, let alone the value it has added. Although apparently government-driven, certain sources have communicated an overly active behind-the-scene role of IFIs in the process. Government remains wary of CSOs and has handpicked those invited to participate. Donors seem to be playing a mediating role, acting partially on behalf of uninvited CSOs.

Background
Ghana’s IPRSP was submitted to the Bank and Fund in mid-2000. After national elections in December of that year, and under the new administration of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the timeframe for Ghana’s poverty reduction strategy, or GPRS, was extended from February to October 2001. It is now presented as the centre-piece of government planning and co-ordination. Under the aegis of the Ministry of Planning, Regional Economic Co-operation and Integration, a special Task Force within the National Development Planning Council (NDPC) is responsible for preparation of the GPRS. Seven-member core teams (CTs) focusing on five areas (macro-economy, gainful employment/ production, human resource development, basic services, and vulnerability and exclusion) have been established to produce frameworks and action programmes to be incorporated into the GPRS. CTs are chaired by ministry officials, and membership is made up of government, CSO and donor representatives. The Task Force has divided the process into three phases: situation analysis, preparation of strategic policy framework, development of programmes based on this framework. CTs are responsible for community-level consultations based on focus group discussions and regional consultation workshops (to be carried out by core teams). A detailed timetable also provides for a number of national level Harmonisation Workshops with NGOs, CSOs, donor representatives, and sectoral ministries to synthesise CT findings, as well as a National Economic Dialogue scheduled for May 2001.

The principle and practice of participation
In principle, ‘stakeholder participation was to be secured by a mixture of information dissemination, collaboration, co-ordination, and consultation’ at both national and local levels. ‘Community consultations were to be on the basis of focus group discussions, where representatives included groups previously identified as having benefited least from past reduction in poverty levels’ (Killick 2001). The practice of participation does not seem to coincide with this vision.

First of all, the IPRSP has been described by one CS source as an ‘innocuous policy statement written by our MoF and the World Bank’ in a closed and rushed way. And although the PRSP is considered to have been taken forward independently by the government, its ‘ownership’ is considered to be narrowly-based. Furthermore, the NDPC responsible for the GPRS process has been described as an under-resourced ad hoc council working outside of the civil service, and with uncertain political and formal status (Killick 2001: 23). This has meant poor communication with mainstream government, leading to weak integration with line ministries and other important implementing agents, as well as a lack of integration with other policy

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5 We lack information on the degree to which this has to do with the fact that Ghana is now applying for HIPC funds whereas, under the previous administration, it was not.
sector reform programmes, and uncertainty regarding how GPRS policies will be translated into the budget (ibid.; anonymous donor source).

Also significant is the fact that selection of core team members is not transparent and seems to have been done in an arbitrary and non-representative way, leaving the processes’ output largely in the hands of government officials. CT findings have also been critiqued for being too ‘Accra-centric’ with insufficient engagement with farming communities (anonymous donor source).

In Ghana there was no independent CS-led initiative. Interesting therefore is one CSO’s partial sense of responsibility for the PRSP, seeing it as an outcome for their campaign for debt relief directed towards the IFIs. Also, partially a consequence of the recent change in government, there was little involvement of Parliament or the District Assemblies. Perhaps as a result, there was little public awareness of the GPRS process and strong misperceptions of it. Only two events (of which we know very little) helped raise its profile: the radio debate and the National Economic Dialogue. There exists no evidence that NDPC is making an effort to increase public knowledge of the GPRS.

What value has participation added, in terms of:

Impact on PRSP process?
Not directly attributable to CS participation, but worth mentioning, is the fact that radio has become a major forum for policy discussion in Ghana. Essentially it made possible a popularised debate around HIPC, increasing public awareness of the GPRS. The National Economic Dialogue in May 2001 also drew in public participation. However, its effectiveness was doubtful as its size (over 200 participants) defied meaningful debate and in the end, decisions came from those who managed the process. The issue of information disparity was as problematic here as in other fora.

Impact on PRSP content?
There has been concern among Ghana’s CS that little attention has been paid to restrictive macro-economic adjustment conditionalities which are seen to undermine many poverty reduction initiatives. In the case of the IPRSP, government commitments seem to have effectively reversed commitments made to Ghanaians just months prior to the presidential elections. One anonymous donor source reported the IMF as having said that macro-economic strategies were not up for discussion. The same source saw insufficient attention being paid to restructuring trade relations and reducing debt and donor dependence. It was also observed that the macroeconomic group was dominated by ‘men from thriving business’. The GoG’s dependent position with respect to external funding is highlighted as being particularly problematic here. Related is CS’s lack of access to key analytical and planning documents. One recommendation has been the establishment of an independent body located within CS with the capacity to provide reliable economic poverty related data (Godfrey et al. 2001). This has not yet been addressed.

Nonetheless, the governance CT’s work seems hopeful. Its overall purpose is to ‘ensure efficient and decentralized management of public affairs; and to empower people to participate in, and influence the process of wealth creation and poverty reduction’ (Killick 2001: 20). And, in following, it brings to the table a list of interesting recommendations which address, among other things, issues of corruption and accountability. We do not know yet to what extent the government will respond to this group’s recommendations, nor can we say to what degree this is a product of CS participation in the process.
Also of concern is that community consultation did not feed into the analyses and recommendations of core teams. This has been attributed to the fact that consultation reports were not made available to them, highlighting again the issue of information disparity and secrecy among certain actors. How district level assessments contributed to the GPRS is also unclear. Existing information gathered through non-PRSP-driven PPAs and Social Assessments were not synthesised and incorporated into the paper either.

Impact on government-donor dialogue?
The relationship between GoG’s former administration and donors was problematic. Killick (2001) speculates that it is for this reason that donors have adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude with respect to the GPRS. If the process is considered a ‘credible’ one, the relationship between government and donors in Ghana might be improved, bringing donors on-board. A lack of participation however, might revert the relationship to one of ‘business as usual’ (ibid.). Donors have given consideration to how they might be able to deepen participation in the process. They are fairly critical of the process; one such source saw it as having allowed government and IFIs to exclude CS from discussions around macroeconomic issues; essentially a negotiation between GoG and the IFIs, dictated by the latter’s priorities and criteria (anonymous donor source 2001). It does not seem to be the case in Ghana that civil society participation has strengthened the government’s hand in negotiations with donors; but rather that, given GoG’s continued wariness about CS, donors are taking on a strong mediating role between the GoG and CSOs. Some CSOs are perceived as ‘government-linked’, others are seen by the GoG as mouthpieces for the opposition (Godfrey et al. 2001: 17).

Impact on poverty discourse?
Wealth creation and private sector development seem to be closer to the government’s heart than poverty-reduction. This, and the strong focus on growth through prioritising macro-economic issues, seem to limit the possibility for a broadening poverty discourse in Ghana. Neither gender issues nor their relationship with poverty in Ghana have been thoroughly assessed. Similarly, deprivation related to ethnicity or age, or even non-material aspects of poverty do not seem to have been considered in the GPRS. This is likely linked to the fact that the concept of poverty adopted in the strategy was not closely informed by findings from the earlier PPA (anonymous donor source).

Impact on policy processes more broadly?
CS participation in governance has been fostered by donors in Ghana who have used participation as a soft conditionality (Killick 2001). Although this may have opened up a space for inclusive decision-making, it also contributes to the perception that participation is donor-driven (ibid.). In donor documentation, there is evidence that CSOs are encouraging donors to influence GoG. Here it is important to note that a number of civil society sources communicated suspicions that the IFIs are micro-managing the process, threatening country ownership of the PRSP. Nonetheless, the development of a stronger working relationship between donors and CS in the PRS process may be sustained, with positive implications for other policy processes. The PRSP process was welcomed by many CS groups and is seen as a further step in asserting the rights of citizens and civil society to be consulted and the superiority of broad-based consensual approaches (ibid.: 3). Potentially relevant here is CS’s establishment of a watchdog that will overlook the work of the NPP president’s new public expenditure monitoring unit (Ahadzie, pers. comm.). According to an anonymous donor source, the role the latter will have remains unclear.
Generating examples of good participatory practice?

Other important issues or information
Various pre-conditions seem relevant in the case of Ghana. These include the recent change in administration, a period over which preparation for the GPRS crossed and, the existence of a number of existing donor-driven policy initiatives. Although many of the IFI-defined policy initiatives have contributed to an increase in CS participation, their existence makes it difficult for us to separate out from their impacts the value of participation in the GPRS process specifically.

The newly elected New Patriotic Party (NPP) heightened the GPRS’s status, perhaps partially attributed to their decision to apply for HIPC funds – something their predecessors had decided against. Irrespective of this shift, it is highlighted that the authors, and therefore the final document, may remain the same. More relevant then is the broader contextual changes that came with the new more ‘liberal’ (versus patrimonial) administration. Changes include the emergence of a free press and electronic media, and a more vibrant CS, but a donor source observed that opportunities for participation have actually diminished since the change of government (see Principle and practice of Participation). Ahadzie (pers. comm.) suggests that this may be because the government is in its early stages of consolidating power in the country. Potentially problematic, however, is that the new government is openly ‘pro-market’, focusing explicitly on wealth creation without addressing the potential contradictions this emphasis may have with respect to poverty reduction. In a parlous economic situation, the NPP’s primary priority is to improve its macro-economic condition, possibly at the cost of enabling CS participation.

Illustrative of this is CS’s mobilising around the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI). Here, a nation-wide, cross-cutting coalition was established in the form of a Civil Society Council (CIVISOC).
Annex 3.3  Kenya

Summary
Kenya is one of the few countries to date to have produced a full PRSP. The recent history of failing development initiatives in Kenya is dominated by a lack of focus on poverty reduction and poor governance: non-transparency, lack of accountability and corruption. In the light of this, support for the new focus by the PRSP on participation and the principles this engenders has seen civil society, NGO and the private sector unite their interests in support of fundamental reform of the development agenda and governmental reform (Hanmer et al. 2000). However, a rushed consultation process, and only limited impact on the MTEF has lead CS to remain sceptical of the commitment of the Government of Kenya to implement the policies CS prescribed in the PRSP. That said, new policy dialogue spaces have opened up in between government and CS and the evident mobilisation of CS to develop their capacity in policy formulation and advocacy. Kenya also provides especially noteworthy examples of how civil society participation helped make the PRSP gender-aware and cognisant of significant minority group issues (eg of pastoralists) which might otherwise have been excluded. The PRSP has helped to broker broad based participation around the issues of good governance and poverty reduction.

Background
Begun in 1999, the Kenyan PRSP is at the centre of the country’s 15-year vision outlined in the National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP). The participatory and poverty focused PRSP approach marks a major departure from failed past interventions (Hanmer et al. 2000). The IPRSP was prepared in July 2000 with the final PRSP completed in April 2001. A Civil Society Desk was established within the Treasury to co-ordinate seven thematic groups. A member of the Kenya NGO Council was seconded to work with the Ministry of Finance, the co-ordinating Ministry, on outreach, for a period of 7-8 months while the process lasted (Houghton pers.comm.).

Principle and practice of participation
For the donor community, participation as embodied in the PRSP process, was seen as an essential element in bringing together donors, CS and the private sector to support fundamental reform in Kenyan governance to increase accountability and transparency and reduce corruption (Hanmer et al. 2000). Donors appeared united in this aim. However, the principle and practice of participation has a long history in Kenya in the CS sector. This has lead to the popularisation of participatory methods and flourishing of people claiming to be ‘participation experts’. The PRSP led to a high demand from donors for CS practitioners in participation and in the rush, quality may have been compromised for quantity, especially with regards to the primacy of participatory behaviours and attitudes over methodology (Scott-Villiers pers. comm). The implication here is that many donors supported activities during the PPA which, on closer inspection, would be deemed to be consultation rather than participation (ibid.).

How GoK saw participation is less clear. Interestingly, the IPRSP included a three-day CS stakeholder dialogue even though CS participation is not a condition at this stage. It was at this stage that CS successfully lobbied for gender to be properly addressed in the full PRSP (Shiverenje n.d.). Whether this was purely a result of CS pressure or whether it also had to do with the Bank having just developed a new gender strategy is unclear. Inevitably, given the poor track record of the GoK in the area of participation, accountability and transparency, there was considerable scepticism by CS as to the government’s commitment to the principle and practice of participation from the outset: ‘some felt that it was only a dictate of donors and
therefore was only being carried out because government wanted renewal of loans from WB/IMF which would then be swindled again’ (Mueni 2001; Scott-Villiers pers. comm.). That said, academics, donors, private sector, some NGOs and government themselves have noted a ‘greater openness of government to the views of stakeholders’ than had previously been seen (Hanmer et al. 2000). The short time frame allotted for consultations in PRSP was agreed as necessary by governments, the Bank, academics and the private sector to try and ensure that irreversible reforms towards good governance [ultimately in support of participatory principles] were implemented before the 2002 elections (Hanmer et al. 2000). However, others felt that this short time frame meant consultations were too rushed for meaningful participation by CS and shows a lack of GoK willingness to engage in partnership with CS (Mueni 2001, Hanmer 2000, Kisopia 2001).

Broad-based consultations, including CS took place at the national level through a three-day seminar on the IPRSP and a Poverty Forum on the PRSP in Nairobi. District consultative forums and a PPA were carried out in communities of 25 of 71 Districts. Various CSO’s organised their own grassroots consultations e.g. the Pastoralist Strategy Group (PSG) and Centre for Gender and Development (see below)

**What value has participation added in terms of:**

**Impact on PRSP process?**
Commentating on the 2nd Draft of the IPRSP, the NGO Working Group set forth seven recommendations for the PRSP consultative and Participatory Process. These included a route map for participation, benchmarks for minimum standards of public participation in the PRSP and MTEF, greater information disclosure to media and CS and parliamentary debate of the PRSP (NGOWG 2000). Some of these were achieved through intensive lobbying. The GoK agreed to the formation of seven thematic groups to articulate specific issues with that theme. These included Pastoralists, Gender, Youth, HIV/AIDS, Finance, Media and Disability. These groups were charged with responsibility of ensuring that the issues of these groups were articulated and incorporated into the PRSP (Kisopia 2001).

The short time frame of the PRSP process was raised as a potential constraint to donors early on (Hanmer et al. 2001). Even where CS was successful in influencing the PRSP (for example on gender – see Shiverenje n.d.), it appears time constraints were only overcome because CS being well-positioned within government structures, had pre-prepared policy positions and a strong capacity to work under pressure. CSOs had a prominent role in the PPA and District consultation process, with CSOs put in charge of the PPA in five Districts and Oxfam made custodian of the PPA funds. CSOs also organised their own meetings with CBOs both for consultation, information dissemination and advising how CBOs could participate in local government consultations (Mueni 2001).

**Impact on PRS content?**
There are concerns by donors and GoK representatives that I-PRSP content was dominated by donors and government (Hanmer et al. 2000). CS also backs this view up for the full PRSP by noting that during national consultation workshops some CSOs felt that the government was reticent to consider issues which were not already mentioned in the IPRSP and that ‘even after some painful processes’ the CS input would simply be filed away (Mueni 2001).

The seven CS thematic groups covered Pastoralists, Gender, Youth, HIV/AIDS, Finance, Media and Disability. In the final document the government accepted water,
Health, Rural Access, Education Extension services (Livestock and agriculture) ‘as Core Priority areas and the budgets for these areas were ring-fenced to ensure the identified problems are addressed as fully as possible’ (Kisopia 2001). Due to the work of the Pastoralist Strategy Group, reviewed in detail below, pastoralist issues are now more prominent on the development agenda and for the first time ever, pastoralist areas have been given the highest budget for education bursaries targeting girls (Kisopia 2001). Perhaps the greatest impact of CS participation on the content has been the success of the Collaborative Centre for Gender & Development in engendering the PRSP, also detailed below.

**Impact on Government-donor dialogue?**
The WB, UNDP and DFID assisted the GoK in preparing a participatory process in PRSP formulation (UNDP 2001). ‘The Kenya PRGF had the dubious distinction of having the toughest conditionalties ever imposed by the IMF board’ (Hanmer et al. 2000). The press made claims that far from encouraging greater ownership, the PRSP thus represented a virtual relinquishment of national sovereignty. It is yet uncertain how serious the GoK’s commitment is to tackling corruption and increasing accountability and transparency, but there appears to be some recognition by some within government that conditionalties such as broad-based participation are required if reform is to occur (Hanmer et al. 2000). Likewise it remains to be seen whether GoK is committed to the principle and practice of participation beyond the PRSP, or is appeasing donors. GoK may learn from the PRSP experience that CS can strengthen its bargaining power with donors on certain issues, for example gender, which might lead it to recognise that CS does in fact have something to offer in policy-making.

**Impact on poverty discourse?**
The multi-dimensional view of poverty already existed in Kenya and the PPAs have helped to highlight specific issues in the PRSP such as natural resource management, land and access to productive assets, and perhaps most notably the mainstreaming of gender. Issues regarding specific vulnerable groups or previously unrecognised issues have also made it onto the national agenda for the first time, for example women and domestic violence (Mueni 2001), or the specific poverty problems faced by pastoralists.

**Impact on policy processes more broadly?**
From the outset donors asked ‘whether or not the PRSP process will be able to hold together the coalition of reformers through to the implementation stage and produce irreversible reforms in Kenyan government practices from which the poor can benefit’ (Hanmer et al. 2000). Early indications are that progress in this regard has been limited. The Poverty Forum was the first serious attempt by GoK to engage in CS dialogue (Marcus ND). One point of view is that the PRSP process has resulted in higher levels of engagement between government and civil society than was previously the case (DFID 2000); the CS Desk has been institutionalised within the Treasury, ‘a great achievement given the attitude government has on CS in general’ (Kisopia 2001); and similarly the Pastoralist Strategy Group is placed in the Office of the Prime Minister. However, scepticism exists over whether these moves were political expediets and whether in fact ‘the PRSP is not really changing anything, rather enforcing the status quo’ (Scott-Villiers pers. comm.). CS does at least now have access to the regional budget allocation mechanisms, including the criteria by which budgets to regions are determined. This is regarded as ‘a giant leap, as these used to be secret and a major cause of corruption, and of subsequent distrust by CS’ (Scott-Villiers pers. comm.).
Generating examples of good participatory practice?

*Pastoralist Strategy Group:* ‘The pastoralist peoples of Kenya live in the arid and semi-arid lands comprising 80% of the total landmass of Kenya, and supports 30% of the national population, and 60% of livestock wealth’ (PSG 2000). Despite this, pastoralist issues have been marginalised, misunderstood and lacked investment resulting in failed development and policy interventions in this sector. The IPRSP made little mention of pastoralism. Pastoralists therefore established a ‘Pastoralist Strategy Group’ to ensure this was reversed in the PRSP and, in the longer term, to monitor the implementation of the PRSP through CSOs. It includes representatives from pastoralist CSOs, INGOs, UNICEF and Office of the President/Arid Lands Resource Management Project. Its engagement with the PRS process activities comprised consultation and lobbying, and liaison with a ‘think tank’ at the centre to receive and disseminate information. Consultations took place at community level employing PRA, and results were fed to District and Provincial levels. Press and media were lobbied; concerns were represented at the National Secretariat and among Parliamentary groups and PRSP sector committees. Technical assistance was provided by national and international advisors. The PSG had a minimum agenda it lobbied to have incorporated as a separate chapter of the PRSP. The final PRSP does address pastoralist concerns over land and access to productive assets, natural resource management and extension services for livestock (Scott-Villiers pers. comm.), and higher-than-average funding for education bursaries in pastoralist areas (Kisopia 2001). ‘The PSG was perhaps too successful – they ended up being given a workspace within the Office of the President with which to lobby from inside government. But of course, they are rather trapped now as their institutional location means they are ill-positioned to be too vocal’ (Scott-Villiers pers. comm.). During the PSG programme, support came from an unlikely quarter: the white ranchers of Kenya on whose land many pastoralists depend for their livelihoods. ‘One can be cynical and say that this is a strategic move by the white ranchers who have half an eye on the current events in Zimbabwe; but nevertheless, a new dialogue space has been opened up between the two’ (Scott-Villiers pers. comm.).

*Engendering the IPRSP and medium-term Expenditure Framework (MTEF):* The ‘engendering’ of the IPRSP in Kenya, and subsequent PRSP, appears entirely a result of CS initiative. In spite of an extremely short consultation period, the Collaborative Centre for Gender & Development (national umbrella organisation for women’s CSOs) managed to ensure that gender mainstreaming, Affirmative Action and Targeting of Vulnerable Groups (women, children and the disabled) emerged as the top themes of the national stakeholders workshop (Shiverenje n.d.). ‘This is quite a significant shift from past events where gender comes in ...as an afterthought’ (ibid.). Included in this has been the approval of the National Gender Policy which ‘has remained a mirage since 1985’ (ibid.). This has brought gender to the fore in national public debate but, more concretely, appears to have influenced budget allocation. The clearest example of this again comes from CCGD; Shiverenje (n.d. p.26) summarises the process:

‘After broad consultation with CBOs and CSOs the Centre developed a concept paper on gender and poverty reduction that was used to lobby government officials and other stakeholders to take gender on board in the IPSRP and the subsequent implementation of in the MTEF. Various collaborations, networking, information sharing, consultations, lobbying and advocacy activities were carried out to ensure the women’s agenda found its way into the policy document followed by allocation of resources for implementation. Notable was the involvement of women leaders and organisations at both national [IPRSP National Stakeholders Workshop] and community levels [40 CSOs consulted] in the consultative process on IPRSP and MTEF’.
The 2000/2001 budget has been analysed and the findings indicate substantial re-directing of resources towards areas where women stand to benefit and activities designed to mainstream gender equity (Shiverenje n.d.).

**Other important issues or information**

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Annex 3.4  Lesotho

Summary
Lesotho’s PRSP is scheduled for completion in June 2002. The Government of Lesotho anticipates two favourable outcomes from participation in the PRS process: firstly, more efficient spending of the capital budget through intended outcomes being better linked to perceived needs and an increased sense of ownership. And secondly, increased legitimacy for the government through the focus on accountability, and dialogue with, civil society. However, GoL also queries why civil society participation is being pushed so strongly by members of the donor community when a democratically elected government is already in place. Overall though, new forms of dialogue between government and some CSOs have been initiated. It is too soon to reliably assess the quality of CS’s and poor people’s participation in the process so far, though early indications suggest that both currently lack the capacity to have a fully active and influential hand in shaping the PRSP. In the light of this, the Ministry of Development Planning, has submitted a proposal to donors to address this through capacity building for joint CS/GoL participation at every stage of the PRS process. It therefore promises much, both in terms of the extent to which CS could influence the PRS and, in the long duration, in policy processes more broadly.

Background
The PRSP process began while GoL was already struggling to orientate itself towards various other national strategic development initiatives progressing in near isolation from each other (UNDP 2001). The initial reaction of the government was exasperation at yet another over-arching strategy. However, this has changed as various strategies have been harmonised with the PRS. Vision 2020 is seen as the overarching statement of objectives, and the PRS as the tool to achieve it (UNDP 2001, Phororo 2001).

The GoL prepared its IPRSP in December 2000. The final PRSP is due to be completed in June 2002. Currently, preparation for the broad based participation throughout the PRSP process is underway. A Technical Working Group (TWG) was set up under the oversight of the Deputy Prime Minister (who is also the Minister of Finance and Development Planning) and the Poverty Council (made up of the principle secretaries of various line ministries and the governor of the central bank). The TWG consisted of members of line ministries, the Bureau of Statistics, the private sector, two CSO representatives from the Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN), the National University of Lesotho and the donor community. At the end of 2000, CS set up the Civil Society Poverty Reduction Forum (CSPRF) who have, since then, been an active partner in the implementation of the TWG’s work (TWG 2001).

Principle and practice of participation
There is a history of participatory practice in Lesotho. However, the condition for broad based participation in the PRSP process has brought new impetus to the principle and practice of participation with more focus on practice as opposed to rhetoric (Levine pers. comm.). As with many other countries, understandings of participation varied between government, donors and CS.

At the beginning of the PRS process, the GoL displayed an incomplete understanding of the principles and practice of participation, considering it an instrument to strengthen their legitimacy and to improve programme design (i.e. CS would be used to rubber stamp approval of GoL policies and to perfunctorily conduct the PPA). Increasing government transparency and accountability in the budgetting process were not specific objectives to be addressed. According to GoL this is not because of a lack of will towards increasing accountability and transparency, rather
because they simply lack the capacity and wish to ‘get their own house in order’ before opening up transparently to CS (Levine pers.comm.).

Parliament was not included in I-PRSP consultations but began relatively late in the process, with a meeting with the senate in July 2001 (TWG 2001). Thus, in the run-up to the elections, and with the public PPA consultations beginning, the main opposition party has pledged its own support for the PRSP in its election campaign resulting in a highly politicised process.

Within the government itself, there does not appear to be unanimity on the value that participation would add, nor on what constitutes good participation. The Minister for Finance and Development Planning actively supported CS participation, whereas the Principle Secretaries did not appear to be pursuing it with the same vigour (UNDP 2001a). However, in the final I-PRSP the GoL acknowledges ‘that (in the past) the government was not able to make a dent on poverty...and that top-down development and implementation of policies, without adequate community participation, may have been an important reason for failure’ (JSA 2001). Following this, an evaluation of the I-PSRP process (UNDP 2001a) and the formulation of the CSPRF, GoL has now committed itself to seeing CS as a joint partner in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP: ‘Overall the PRSP needs to strengthen the capacity of all partners in the process to listen, analyse, produce policies, monitor and adjust’ (TWG 2001).

‘The UNDP, Bank, EU and bilateral donors have indicated their willingness to support the GoL in its efforts to conduct a wide-ranging consultative process’ (TWG 2001). With no resident Bank mission, IFIs requested UNDP take the lead in assisting the participatory aspects of the PRSP. The IFI’s Joint Staff Assessment (JSA) recognises that the short timescale could impact on the quality of the participatory process and recommended that the GoL seek relevant technical assistance in enabling community monitoring of the impact of government policies on poverty – something they suggested could be funded by the Bank (IMF/IDA 2001). In reference to the TWGs proposal to design the first PRSP draft alone, it also cautioned the government that ‘it should avoid confronting stakeholders with a predefined policy strategy which could adversely affect the consultative process and undermine ownership’.

UNDP and other donors aim to support the setting up of a transparent monitoring and evaluation system for the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). At the same time as supporting CS, UNDP is anxious that participation should be seen as an approach for government to design and implement effective poverty reduction programmes, not as something which undermines the authority of an existing democratically elected government (Levine pers.comm.).

Bilaterals have also played an active role in the process. The DFID team, for instance, helped initiate poverty dialogue between CS and GoL for the IPRSP (SC UK 2001, Christian Aid 2001) and has also supported the costs of the CSPRF (TWG 2001). DFID also supported a seminar for both GoL and CS in which other countries further along in the PRSP process shared their experiences. Other donors have also supported aspects of the consultation process.

Nonetheless, resistance to CS involvement prevails and one confidential government source commented that the drive by donors for increased participation ‘would have made sense if the Lesotho people were living in a dictatorship rather than under a

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7 Imminent at the time of writing
democratically elected government’. CS has countered such assertions, keen to be as active and influential as possible in shaping the PRSP.

What value has participation added in terms of:

**Impact on PRSP process?**
The initial extent of CS participation in the PRS process did not bode well, but this has evolved into an apparent grasping of participatory practice by GoL. Although it is not a conditionality for the IPRSP to arise from broad-based participation, these documents often contain policy recommendations which a broad selection of stakeholders would have been eager to have a hand in. However, ‘[d]ue to IMF and IDA imposed time constraints consultation for the IPRSP was limited to line ministries and Lethotho’s development partners resident in the capital’ (IMF/IDA 2001). This was lamented by CS (SC UK 2001). Other CS representatives bemoaned that the Bank did not define participation at the outset, claiming this left CS in a weak position to negotiate for increased participation (Motsamai pers. comm.). However the Lesotho IPRSP JSA (IMF/IDA 2001) does address this, suggesting that poverty diagnostics, monitoring and evaluation should all be carried out in a participatory way. For the IPRSP the TWG itself was largely made up of economists and had only two CS representatives. A major oversight noted by the UNDP evaluation was the exclusion of the Ministries of Environment, Gender & Youth Affairs and Labour and Employment. Putting these two together, the TWG lacked significant expertise and awareness in social issues and the channel for CS to voice concerns was slim. Given the centrality of these two ministries to poverty reduction the evaluation suggested that the TWG integrate these changes as soon as was feasible (UNDP 2001a). It also suggested that the number of CS representatives be increased from two to four. The UNDP assessment of the PRSP process outlined in the IPRSP proposed that ‘the procedures were designed to conduct the broad based participation after the PRSP draft was already prepared instead of before’ (UNDP 2001a). This was reflected by initially poor attendance of CS at meetings because of a perceived lack of relevance to them (ibid.). When the IPRSP was being written, the LCN pushed for the inclusion of a chapter on the participatory process to be adopted in producing the full PRSP. The approach they proposed comprised three steps: sensitisation of the TWG by the LCN to the need for CS participation; consultation with communities; and thematic workshops at which the TWG would hold dialogues with CS (Motsamai pers. comm.).

CS lobbying of GoL, backed by the UNDP evaluation led to significant revisions in the participatory process with TWG recognising that all actors (including CS) require capacity building for the consultations including line ministries, lead ministry and planning (TWG 2001). Additionally, for the government, at both central and local level, a lack of a culture of evidence-based policy-making in the GoL existed, leading to a poor awareness of why CS should participate so fully (ibid.). A sub-committee on Participation was subsequently established in February 2001. CS and GoL recognised that they currently lacked sufficient capacity in working in a participatory manner. For CS this meant a lack of capacity in advocacy, policy analysis and economic literacy skills. Although an umbrella body, LCN was not felt by all CSO’s to represent them (Levine pers. comm). The CSPRF was thus initiated as a new vehicle to address CS participation in the PRSP.

‘Good cooperation has now been established between the TWG and CSPRF. This is illustrated by the fact that ‘the Coordinator of the CSPRF was asked by the GoL to facilitate …the first major planning exercise of the PRSP as well sessions within the next Strategic Planning Meeting’ (TWG 2001). There is now GoL recognition that ‘At the core of the PRSP methodology is the consultation process’ (ibid.). To date, this
has included mapping exercises by joint CS/GoL teams to liaise with District commissioners, Village Development Councils, and CS structures to introduce the PRSP and plan the district and local consultations. Additionally, the TWG, CSO’s, and GoL officials directly participating in the PPA were trained in PRA. This was facilitated by a team made up of NGO, Ministry of Local Government and a resource person from the Uganda PRSP. This has been organised by the Ministry for Local Government on behalf of TWG and CSPRF. The consultative and participatory process entails a five-month countrywide PPA process followed by District and national workshops. CSO and local government capacity in participatory principles and practice (including PRA) will be built up in this process. Media sensitisation and publicity materials (T-Shirts, Caps, Pamphlets) are proposed. A popular version of the PRSP for the average citizen is also planned. Publication of occasional papers on poverty will also be produced for broad debate (ibid.). Consultations organised to date have been considered ‘empowering’ by some CSOs (CCL 2001). At present the planning has begun, but is not yet clearly set out for the effective involvement of communities in the actual delivery and monitoring of PRSP results throughout the three year duration (TWG 2001).

However, there are certain problems regarding the nature of the PPA which may jeopardise its quality, or pervert the process towards political ends. The PPA is currently being undertaken in the immediate run up to national elections. Some are concerned that the arrival of CSO research teams in government vehicles is bound to arouse suspicion in communities that this is part of the electoral campaign gimmick, or that people will be guarded about what they say (Levine pers.comm., IMF/IDA 2001). However, the opposition has bought into the PRSP process and this has made it highly political – something that donors perhaps do not fully appreciate (Motsamai pers.comm.). The PRSP has yet to be produced, so it is too early to assess what impact these CS concerns and the current political climate will have on it.

‘CS is planning a programme to continue its support for the creation of poverty reduction strategies and programmes, and contribute to national policy formulation’ (TWG 2001). Its specific objectives are ‘to strengthen the capacity of CS to contribute to the development of poverty reduction policy in general, and in the PRSP in particular; and would include training, capacity and building and policy work within CS.’ (ibid). The budget for this has been jointly submitted with the GoL’s own capacity building proposal. This suggests a significant sea change in GoL from seeing CS as an instrument for implementing GoL policy as at the beginning of the IPRSP to a useful partner in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

**Impact on PRS content?**

No draft of the PRSP has yet been produced. Although the IPRSP did involve (limited) consultation, some NGOs are concerned that the IPRSP focused on economic growth to the neglect of pro-poor strategies (SC UK 2001). The LCN echoed this expressing concern that the IPRSP concentrated too much on economic growth and not enough on issues of inequality of rights or development of the social sector (ibid.). Again with regards to the IPRSP, some sections of civil society are dismayed, for example Save the Children (SC) UK suggest that given 49% of the population is made up of children, there is a distinct lack of focus on them (SC UK 2001). To what extent the consultation process will have a significant impact on the content of the final PRSP will depend upon the degree to which TWG and GoL (at central and district levels) have accepted the principle and practice of participation promoted during the preceding sensitisation workshops, and implemented these during consultations.
Impact on Government-donor dialogue?
The PRS process has led to closer links developing between CS and donors (Levine pers. comm.). The CSPRF has developed its own draft budget plan for carrying out the implementation of the PRSP over the three-year period in partnership with the GoL. This budget is included in the overall indicative budget proposed by TWG\(^8\) (TWG 2001). This GoL and CS collaboration will undoubtedly put added pressure on donors to work together on the PRS towards supporting measurable poverty reduction outcomes.

Impact on poverty discourse?
‘In accepting the PRSP process as a national priority, the [TWG] saw poverty and its reduction in a new perspective that meaningfully related to their respective professional duties’ (UNDP 2001a). Within the TWG, the mix of CS, donor and GoL representatives has led to new positive attitudes to poverty that are being cultivated through learning-by-doing processes (ibid). For example, it was noted that with CS representation on the TWG, ‘[r]epresentatives from the MoF and the Central Bank began to appreciate dry budget and monetary figures in more human terms’ (ibid).

That said, there are still some noted shortcomings in the IPRSP which seem to restrict the poverty discourse to a rather conventional realm. For instance, there is still a superficial treatment of the geographical distribution of poverty (e.g. statements that the rural poor are worst off) and too little on social factors (SC UK 2001). Additionally, SC UK noted that the IPRSP concentrates too much on economic growth and not enough on issues of inequality of rights, or the development of the social sector (ibid.). This may be a reflection that the GoL has tended to see poverty reduction as a technical issue with a technical solution instead of focusing on policies which address the multi-dimensional nature of poverty (Levine pers.comm.).

Limited poverty discourse appears to have been addressed to some extent in the process of formulation of the PRSP in which the TWG has noted the need to fill out certain information gaps for long term poverty monitoring, including regional and gender distribution of poverty, and factors contributing to poverty. The poverty monitoring approach ‘recognises the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, which requires a variety of measures...[including] vulnerability and exclusion’ (TWG 2001). Much of the impetus for this view of poverty came from a previous UNDP supported PPA conducted by CS which highlighted non-income poverty, vulnerability and livelihood strategies for the poor (ibid.). To what extent the current PPAs will broaden and deepen this view of poverty is yet to be seen.

Impact on policy processes more broadly?
Participation is expected to add currency to explicitly addressing the needs of the poor (Levine pers. comm.). It has also led to the forging of new relationships between government and donors and the first interactions between government and CS. A Basotho civil servant who attended a national consultation workshop commented: ‘This is amazing! I have never seen civil servants and civil society organisations interact like this before’ (ibid.). The coherence of other strategies with PRSP towards Vision 2020 is part of GoL’s desire to provide greater clarity and public understanding of government planning in general (TWG 2001).

At present, both donors and government see CS as relatively weak, with a history of focusing on service delivery and not advocacy. As the TWG recognises, it will take

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\(^8\) GoL and CS are working together on building their capacity to formulate and implement the PRSP and jointly submitting proposals to donors – this will have undoubtedly strengthened the hand of GoL in negotiations with donors.
considerable capacity building for CS to effectively contribute to the policy debate (TWG 2001). Through the TWG, the GoL have made significant commitments themselves to preparing for active CS participation in policy processes. These have included the integration of line ministry projects with Communities Action Plans, Building capacity in budget advocacy and management, Enhancing local structures in PRA and Social Exclusion training. As previously noted, the PRSP has galvanised CS to work not only on policy issues regarding the PRSP, but also poverty reduction in general (ibid.). To fulfil this, some have requested support from INGO partners in building research, advocacy, economic literacy and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) capacity (TRC, CCL 2001). CS is also keen to improve on its capacity to participate in the monitoring and evaluation of the PRSP. CS participation in the M&E of GoL policy processes more broadly will undoubtedly increase accountability and transparency of government in Lesotho. The current possibility of the TWG being institutionalised as the coordinator of all national development strategies would allow for CS to have a permanent active and influential voice in GoL policy making.

A critical independent voice has yet to fully flourish in Lesotho but, pending capacity building of CS, we can assume that the second PRS, and governance in general, will be more participatory in Lesotho. As one confidential source notes, the WB expects countries to instantly internalise and own the process – something that cannot be expected to happen quite so quickly.

Generating examples of good participatory practice?
In the face of balancing conflicting obligations between their parent institutions and the PRSP the TWG found that retreats proved effective in interacting intensively with each other over PRSP issues. Retreats were chosen above remunerative incentives (UNDP 2001).

Other important issues or information
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Annex 3.5 Malawi

Summary
The government’s ‘consultative’ approach to participation in its PRSP formulation process appears to have been effectively enhanced thanks to the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN)’s active involvement in the process, and perhaps just as important, the network’s open dialogue with the Bank and the Fund. MEJN has made good use of the ‘invited’ space provided by the IFI’s in-country mission, and international NGO support. Substantive contributions include success in extending the process by 6 months, involving CS in thematic working groups, successful campaigns for public PRSP adverts, and integrating PRSP findings into the budget. Furthermore, mechanisms are being developed that may have long term implications both in terms of establishing and strengthening both international and national CS/NGO networks and mechanisms for budget expenditure monitoring. There is little doubt that the PRSP has contributed to capacity building for CS, and in so doing has had a positive impact on broader policy processes.

Background
PRSP formulation process is being organised by a three-tiered government committee structure headed by the Cabinet Committee chaired by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) ; under this is the Inter-Ministerial Committee headed by Principle Secretary for Economic Affairs at the MoF. Day-to-day organisation of the process and drafting is carried out by the Technical Committee (TC), made up currently of members of the MoF, the National Economic Council (NEC) and the Reserve Bank.

Civil Society in Malawi has mobilised in response to the PRSP. MEJN emerged from a Jubilee 2000 meeting organised in November 2000 by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace. It is a self-appointed taskforce made up of representatives from Church, Academia, NGOs, Trade Unions, Students, Professional Associations, and the Media and also has strong, working relations with international NGOs (i.e., OXFAM and Christian Aid). MEJN holds among its key tasks the involvement of CS in the PRSP process, the co-ordinating of CS involvement in the budget cycle and of increasing the economic literacy of CS and of Malawis as a whole (MEJN 2001b).

The IPRSP was approved by the Bank and the Fund in December 2000. With IFI support the MEJN’s lobbying got the PRSP finalisation date postponed from April to September 2001. District consultations were carried out over a two week period in March and thematic Working Groups (WGs) have met throughout the process. A PRSP ‘Findings to Date’ document was produced meant to be fed into the budget in July. At the time of writing this report a small group of MoF staff and two CS representatives were involved in drafting the final paper.

The principle and practice of participation
Many involved with the preparation of the draft IPRSP ‘stated that the original understanding of the purpose of the IPRSP was that it was simply a requirement for reaching the HIPC decision point’ (Jenkins and Tsoka, 2000: 7). There was neither a strong level of awareness of PRSP as a concept among CSOs during the IPRSP

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9 We do not know to what degree the MEJN task force is representative of Malawi’s CS . Although the level of Church and Union involvement in the process is outstanding, there still exists the criticism that CS involvement remains capital-centric. MEJN and the term ‘civil society’ will be used synonymously throughout this country profile.
process, nor a structured process of consultation outside of government (ibid.)\(^\text{10}\). Government officials considered the PRSP schedule outlined in the IPRSP optimistic; those who saw it as realistic ‘indicated that this was because the government was not interested in serious consultation, which would require additional time investment [and those] who supported a more inclusive consultation process believed that the participatory processes outlined in the Bank/Fund Sourcebooks and Technical Notes were highly unlikely ever to be used’ (ibid.).

CS has actively engaged in the PRSP process, pushing back the boundaries of the government’s understanding of participation as ‘consultation’. However, GoM has not been open to their involvement and it has been up to CS to push itself into the process, as well as to demonstrate that CS has added value to it (Lawson, pers. comm.). In contrast, MEJN’s involvement has been welcomed by the IFIs (MEJN 2001c). IMF’s Deputy Director Chief Southern Africa Division is cited as having said ‘It’s not a question of being consulted; it’s a question of participating’; a statement interpreted by MEJN as ‘very encouraging…showing a real commitment to genuine and meaningful participation by the IMF’ (MEJN 2001c). In their support for CS involvement in the process, IFIs are seen as allies by means of whom which the principle and practice of participation can be enhanced.

The nature of District Consultations illustrates a need for this. They have been critiqued on a number of fronts. First, little notice was given to participants and therefore, CSOs lacked time for preparation and consultation (with their broader bases). Second, very few women, NGO and Church representatives were made aware of the Consultation process, raising issues of representation. Third, the Consultations consisted of a presentation made by MoF, NEC, and Reserve Bank economists, plus half-day feedback sessions at each site. As such, it is a process with the hallmarks of information-dissemination and consultation rather than participation or joint-decision making or collaborative agenda-setting. Nonetheless, MEJN did urge regional CSOs to participate in these consultations ‘if only to make the point that the district consultation process…is simply a rubber stamp…’ (MEJN 2001d) – an act reflective of CS’s approach to involvement in the PRSP.

In its position paper, MEJN outlines clearly its definition of meaningful participation (MEJN 2001c). In working towards realising this definition, Malawi’s CS is contributing towards an improved principle and practice of participation in the country’s PRSP process and beyond it.

**What value has participation added, in terms of:**

**Impact on PRSP process?**

Extensive lobbying by MEJN led to the extension of the PRSP formulation process. The taskforce was also successful in its push for CS participation in the thematic WGs; both MEJN-nominated CSOs and GoM-nominated CSOs joined the WGs. The government also decided to adopt the MEJN recommendation to produce a ‘PRSP-Findings to Date’ document. This document would list key findings, as based on Poverty Priority Expenditures (PPEs) designed according to extensive consultation and discussion in respective sectors (Lawson n.d.), and was to be incorporated into

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\(^{10}\) Here it is interesting to note that the Finance Minister did open up an IPRSP Consultative Group meeting in March 2000. CSOs were invited and welcomed the chance to be involved. At this time, the report was distributed to officials and donor agencies and although some did reach some elite-level CSOs, the document was not presented as a draft. Consequently while CS awaited for the full PRSP to get underway over the summer, work continued on the draft quietly.
the budget and announced during the budget speech. Also, as suggested by MEJN, public PRSP adverts are appearing, thus increasing transparency and awareness of the process among the public. Finally, after considerable lobbying, in August GoM agreed that MEJN representatives sit on the Donor/Government Economic Affairs Group and the PRSP Technical Committee.

Impact on PRS content?
CS participation in thematic working groups has highlighted the need for cross-cutting themes to transcend all policy sectors. Themes such as HIV/AIDS or gender may be integrated throughout the document as their respective working groups organise to liaise with one another. Participation of CS also has the potential of broadening the content in terms of introducing problems that, without their presence may not have been mentioned. For instance, WaterAid’s guiding principles and recommendations for the working group which covers water and sanitation issues (Infrastructure Group) include aims such as depoliticising development, reducing a dependency culture as well as corruption and fraud. Unfortunately, although there exists an extensive knowledge collected through the ‘Voices of the Poor’ initiative, its findings have not been translated into policy through the PRSP (Lawson pers. comm.). Concern regarding the relationship between other completion point conditions and the PRSP was raised (i.e. implementation of the programme activities under the IMF PRGF such as privatisation or liberalisation, to some extent pre-empt the content of the PRSP). Although this was expressed in this document as an issue to be raised by CS to the IFIs, no reference is made in subsequent MEJN documents to which we have access. This begs the question as to whether IFI support of certain changes (that do not contradict IFI mandates/ status quo) are expedited while more radical and controversial suggestions are not. The fact that the macro-economic stability thematic group has minimal civil society involvement but strong Bank and Fund presence and had not even met at the time of his report is interpreted by Lawson (n.d.) as a lack of open discussion around such issues.

Impact on Government-donor dialogue?
Jenkins and Tsoka (2000) observe that, at least during the formulation of the IPRSP, government officials saw the initiative as one driven by the IFIs from its outset. Moreover, GoM complained of ‘mixed signals’. These might be attributed to the fact that discussions around ways in which the PRSP would be based on an action plan to be determined by Malawian authorities were carried out by the same staff, and simultaneous to talks related to the imposition of conditionalities (PRGF, HIPC II and the Bank’s Adjustment Operation Loan) (ibid.). Bilateral donors and UN agencies have also been critical of the IPRSP process, though Jenkins and Tsoka (2000) point out that their critiques may be born of a feeling that the Bank’s influence was excessive. In its defence, the World Bank says that it needs to take control of the process due to time constraints imposed by the HIPC process. Otherwise, there is little that explicitly documents the way in which participation in the actual PRSP formulation process has had direct impact on government-donor dialogue in Malawi. The information available suggests that government responses to CS may be largely a consequence of IFI’s support of CS participation in the process.

11 It is difficult to ascertain to what degree the inclusion of these themes in the paper is a consequence of CS participation. That they coincide closely with OXFAM-Malawi’s programme objectives does suggest that it may, at least in part, be a consequence of it.
12 These authors also question the Bank’s excuse, highlighting the fact that even under its influence, and with limited consultation, the IPRSP process extended itself over a year.
Impact on poverty discourse?
The establishment of MEJN, its independent research on the PRSP process, and its attempt to engage more actors in the process demonstrates a broadening and diversification of the group of actors considered by GoM to be valid interlocutors on policy issues. Its endeavours will also undoubtedly lead to a more multidimensional understanding of poverty, especially through its efforts to ensure that themes such as HIV/AIDS and gender be placed on the agenda transversally. This is illustrative of a move towards a more pluralist discourse in which there is more space for the orthodox concept of poverty to be widened.

Impact on policy processes more broadly?
New dynamics between CS and donors, as well as CS and government appear to have emerged out of the PRSP. Despite some persistent misgivings one CSO considers that the PRSP process has ‘led to the beginning of a more positive and constructive relationship being established between Civil Society and Government’ (Lawson n.d.: 2). The establishment and mandates of MEJN are particularly significant here, insofar as they reflect CS’s decision, after deliberation, to exploit an ‘invited’ space for policy influence. Also, MEJN has dialogue with IFIs while also drawing upon existing international support networks (i.e., Eurodad, Jubilee 2000, Bretton Woods Project), as was the case with their extension campaign. The MEJN has also drawn upon other country PRSP success stories in their recommendations. Their promotion of the PPE initiative, for example, was taken from the Uganda’s success with establishing a virtual fund for key expenditures; and the campaign to extend the PRS process, from Zambia’s similar extension campaign (MEJN 2001b). CS sees participation as ‘an effective condition to ensure that progress is being made; [that] strict conditions are necessary [without which] it is easy for the politicians not to take their responsibilities seriously’ (Dambula 2001). Moreover, it allows CSOs to hold government more accountable, using PRSPs as a monitoring tool.

In addition to establishing key links with other international NGOs (MEJN 2001d), MEJN’s with work seems to be strengthening Malawi’s national CS network. According to Oxfam GB (Lawson pers. comm.) they have been successful in involving organisations such as churches and unions in the policy dialogue ‘to an extent never seen before’. The Christian Service Committee (Mhango 2001) provided evidence of the potential this may have in strengthening Malawi’s CS: among other plans, this organisation intends to build capacity at the grassroots level with the aim of enabling communities to implement their own reduction programmes. Another example of positive CS outcome is MEJN’s budget-monitoring activities – something with the potential of improving government accountability and transparency in the area of government expenditures. In praising the government’s positive efforts, the taskforce’s reference to ‘interim measures’ and ‘building blocks’ is evidence of long-term thinking. (MEJN 2001a, 2001b).

Public policy spaces which are not time-bound nor constrained by the terms of an ‘invitation’ issued by government, seem to be opening up through the PRSP formulation process. It is important to note however that what Malawi lacks is the capacity or political will to implement their ideas and that, in following Dambula’s (2001) advice ‘[e]mpowerment is key, no need [exists] to create more implementing bodies’.

Generating examples of good participatory practice?
Some strong examples of good participatory practices in Malawi include the involvement of CS in thematic working groups, and the use of adverts.
Other important issues or information
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Annex 3.6  Mozambique

Summary
Starting conditions were not favourable for a good quality participatory process and the process itself – definitely consultation rather than participation – left much to be improved on in subsequent rounds. Consultation by government was limited, and civil society lacked the capacity and experience to set up its own process to compensate for limitations of the official process. Thus civil society had little impact. This calls into question the degree of broad-based commitment to the PRSP, and the appropriateness of its content from the perspective of poor people, whatever about the perspective of private sector organizations, which do seem to have achieved some influence. One lasting positive outcome is the establishment of relationships between some CSOs and some government officials; another is the analysis of weaknesses of this consultative process in the PRSP document itself and the statement of commitment there to improving GoM’s capacity to consult with civil society in the future; and another is the support that bilateral donors not previously close to GoM are now offering to support it in these endeavours.

Background
Mozambique published and disseminated its I-PRSP in April 2000. This was its ‘Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2000-4’ (PARPA in its Portuguese acronym) which it had begun to develop before the PRSP framework was introduced. The full PRSP (PARPA 2001-2005) was finalised in March 2001 and endorsed by the Boards in August 2001. The Ministry of Planning and Finance led the PARPA/PRSP process and its Macro-economic Programming Unit was the main contact point with CS. CS’s inputs were largely channelled through the Mozambique Debt Group, a loose and large network of mainly national and Maputo-based NGOs with a small secretariat. It must be borne in mind that the development of the PARPA/PRSP was taking place in a post-conflict context where GoM’s overriding concern was with maintaining political stability and promoting reconciliation and national unity. Such a context ‘limits the degree to which a purely rationalistic-technocratic approach to planning is feasible in Mozambique’ (Falck Lund et al. 2001). Given the strong political opposition that GoM still faces in the north and centre of the country, it is hardly surprising that Government appears to prefer a slow and gradual approach towards increased openness, pluralism and decentralisation in governance and policy issues.

The principle and practice of participation
Studies of the Mozambican PRSP process (Falck Lund & Landfald 2000, Falck Lund et al. 2001, McGee & Taimo 2001) reveal that there is a particular Mozambican understanding of ‘participation’ which does not quite match that enshrined in the PRSP model. GoM considers there to be a long tradition of consultations on national and sectoral policy priorities in the country (Republic of Mozambique 2001: 92) but, as a relatively centralist government, understands participation in terms of maintaining political stability and promoting reconciliation and national unity. Such a context ‘limits the degree to which a purely rationalistic-technocratic approach to planning is feasible in Mozambique’ (Falck Lund et al. 2001). Given the strong political opposition that GoM still faces in the north and centre of the country, it is hardly surprising that Government appears to prefer a slow and gradual approach towards increased openness, pluralism and decentralisation in governance and policy issues.

GoM initially demonstrated questionable commitment to the entire PRSP process, including its requirement of CS participation, since it had already advanced considerably on producing its own national poverty reduction plan and resented what it regarded as a directive to start afresh (Falck Lund & Landfald 2000). A CS document observes in May 2000: ‘Government contends that it has already consulted on the PARPA with District governments and in rural areas and another process of civil society consultation is not required’ (Cuinica & Siddharth 2000: 4);
according to some government sources, ‘the IFIs and other donors exercise undue pressure on the government to consult more than is needed or useful’ (Falck Lund & Landfald 2000: 12). Low parliamentary involvement in the PARPA is taken by some to indicate low overall GoM commitment and by others as a product of the ambiguity with which the PRSP was treated by GoM for much of its duration (Falck Lund & Landfald 2000; Falck Lund et al. 2001). In Cuinica & Siddharth’s (CSO) view (2000: 1) ‘although there isn’t opposition to involving civil society in the formulation of these policies, the government has not made a concerted effort to involve [us]. Part of this attitude may stem from resentment about the imposition of yet another initiative. Like many civil society groups, the Mozambican government seems to view the PRSP as yet another conditionality that has been imposed […]’.

Engaging in extensive consultation or participatory processes of course carries heavy opportunity costs for an ill-equipped government. GoM lacked personnel with suitable expertise for facilitating a national-scale participatory exercise. Also, Mozambican CS and the public at large suffer from ‘participation fatigue’ and scepticism about the value of participating, having been repeatedly disillusioned under the previous socialist regime by consultations, meetings and promises that never produced tangible outcomes (Falck Lund & Landfald 2000).

In practice, the whole PRSP process was undoubtedly compromised by time pressure, self-imposed by GoM, keen to access debt relief, rather than by the IFIs who were conscious that a rushed process would compromise quality. As detailed in the PARPA/PRSP document (Republic of Mozambique 2001, section V) the consultation process (it is not called participatory) included sectoral consultations on earlier versions of the PARPA for key sectors; consultations and dissemination at central and provincial level of provincial poverty profiles and the I-PRSP; general and theme-specific meetings with civil society at later stages of full PRSP formulation, and the establishment of mechanisms for long-term consultations. Most consultation activities got crammed into the last few months of the process.

The sectoral consultations conducted in priority sectors in preparation of the PARPA 2000-4 (I-PRSP) are held by GoM to be the keystone of its consultation process, yet the mechanisms used are not spelt out. GoM notes that ‘most sectors do not have a standardised and permanent model of consultation’ (Republic of Mozambique 2001: 92). Recognizing that consultative practices in PARPA/PRSP formulation left much to be desired, the PARPA document notes the need for greater clarity in future on how the State and civil society should be represented in consultative processes, how the agenda for consultation should be developed, and the frequency and format of meetings. Outputs and capacity formed in the course of a PPA conducted in Mozambique in 1994-6 were hardly used until very late in the process; reference to ‘participatory qualitative surveys’ (Republic of Mozambique 2001: 103) implies conceptual vagueness about the specific contributions that participatory research could make; and hints of building PRSP implementation onto ongoing participatory district planning processes are also vague. Many CSOs, including several important private sector actors, were dissatisfied with the degree of consultation and suspected GoM of listening for the purpose of appeasing the IFIs, without any intention of incorporating the opinions of those considered (Falck Lund & Landfald 2000: 14).

Many CSOs do not share GoM’s view that their attendance of sectoral consultation meetings in 1999 and early 2000 constituted participation in the PRSP. While it is clear that a range of provincial and central government officials attended the consultation meetings it is not always clear how many CS actors did. A seminar held by GoM in June 2000 to disseminate the draft PRSP and get feedback was the first time many NGO participants heard of it (McGee & Taimo 2001). Information has
been severely restricted throughout, even to the GoM’s main CS interlocutors in Maputo, possibly due to poor organization rather than reluctance: ‘reportedly a large number of copies of the I-PRSP are in storage waiting to be distributed to stakeholders’ (Falck Lund & Landfall 2000: 14). Provincial CS’s awareness of the PARPA is very low, and no popular version has been produced, nor translations of key messages into local languages. Donors also complain of poor information flow. The Mozambique Debt Group, considering that GoM was not informing or consulting widely enough especially outside Maputo, ran its own awareness raising process, with limited success.

Altogether, under time pressure, with the little in-country experience of participatory processes, and scepticism on both Government and CSO sides, the conditions were not favourable for a good quality participatory process.

**What value has participation added, in terms of:**

**Impact on the PRS process?**
The limited nature of participation (or more accurately, consultation) precludes a strong impact on the process. Possibly the need for GoM to demonstrate a stronger commitment and consult further did slow up the process especially in its later stages (early 2001). GoM’s rather unsatisfactory attempts to engage with CS in the formulation stage has led to a recognition that CS can still play an important role in monitoring implementation and outcomes, and to encouraging gestures in this regard; but the form this might take remains unclear. It is noted by GoM that CS involvement in monitoring would enhance the credibility of the PARPA/PRSP and of the consultation process as a whole (IMF & IDA 2001).

**Impact on PRS content?**
Likewise, the limited scope of the consultative process precluded CS participation from influencing the PRSP’s content significantly. On the positive side, the PARPA/PRSP is the first GoM document to recognize the need to address corruption, an issue raised by the public in consultation meetings. Consultations seem to have confirmed that the I-PRSP (PARPA 2000-4) had identified the right priorities, but added as priorities governance and corruption, and poor policy implementation and delivery, and unethical behaviour by public servants (IMF & IDA 2001: 2, 6). GoM in the PARPA/PRSP states its intention to incorporate into future iterations of the strategy findings from the Participatory Rural Appraisals carried out hurriedly in early 2001 in 7 provinces; these have already been drawn on for the poverty analysis section of the existing PARPA/PRSP to describe the multiple dimensions and regional variations in poverty. The PARPA/PRSP’s stress on ‘mega-projects’, to the relative neglect of direct poverty-reducing growth measures (as noted by the IMF & IDS 2001: 4) suggests that private sector organizations had a strong influence on content.

There are also negative indications: a CS commentary cites an occasion early in the PRSP process when at a public meeting CS asked how Mozambique’s Poverty Reduction Growth Facility would differ in substance from its earlier Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and got no answer because a World Bank representative judged this ‘an unfair question, as IFIs were already moving in the right direction’ (Cuinica & Siddharth 2000). The same document states: ‘Early evidence suggests that although the PRSP has increased openness and the level of exchange between IFIs and governments with civil society, the content of the policies is essentially the same […]. In Mozambique [the presentation of alternative policy proposals by NGOs] will be especially difficult for several reasons: the size and diversity of the country, the dearth of information and civil society’s lack of experience
with this type of analysis’ (2). Falck Lund & Landfald (2000) and Falck Lund et al. (2001) note little change in PRSP content vis-à-vis previous policy documents and little impact by the Mozambique Debt Group on policy content. The fact that the PARPA/PRSP is not well imbued with a gender perspective (IMF & IDS 2001; Republic of Mozambique 2001) suggests that women’s rights organizations were not heard even if they did get consulted.

Several reasons are identified for the apparently low impact of CS on PRSP content: the PARPA/PRSP is so broad that in infrequent consultation meetings it was hard to go into depth on any one issue. Most Mozambican NGOs and religious bodies, being operational rather than advocacy-focused, are not well-equipped to engage with policies and many have little interest in doing so, at least at the macro-level (some do engage in provincial planning processes). At a more general level, it seems evidence-based planning is not well-advanced in Mozambique, let alone participation-based planning: Falck Lund & Landfald (2000) note that although female education is stressed in Mozambique’s last Poverty Assessment as vital for poverty reduction, it is barely mentioned in the PARPA 2000-4/I-PRSP.

Impact on Government-donor dialogue?
The low level of participation attained precludes a significant impact. It should be noted, though, that ‘there are no great divergences between government and donor views on appropriate poverty reduction strategies’ – meaning that, unlike come other countries, GoM did not need or want CS participation to give it a stronger negotiating position or a wider range of policy alternatives to put forward in its dialogues with the donors and creditors. (This raises the question of the incentives GoM had for carrying out a far-reaching consultative process). Some bilateral donors’ vocal support for participatory processes provided a platform that brought them closer to government, who previously associated closely with the IFIs and relatively little with most bilaterals (eg DFID which used a consultancy as a starting point for this – see McGee & Taimo 2001). GoM’s good relationship with the IFIs continued throughout the process despite the initial resentments of the PRSP mentioned above (Falck Lund et al. 2001).

Impact on poverty discourse?
Cross-cutting poverty issues such as HIV/AIDS, vulnerability and gender discrimination are poorly covered in the PARPA/PRSP (IMF & IDS 2001). Experience elsewhere with PPAs suggests that these issues would have arisen strongly had a participatory approach informed the poverty diagnosis more substantially. The concept of poverty dominant in the I-PRSP is of consumption shortfall. The PARPA/PRSP retains this strongly although it contains more discussion of multi-dimensionality, mentioning non-consumption indicators of wellbeing and qualitative perceptions of poverty and promising that future iterations will use alternative concepts of poverty more centrally (Falck Lund et al. 2001).

Impact on policy processes more broadly?
The range of factors on both government and CS sides which are noted earlier as impediments to a meaningful participatory process also limit the likelihood of a sustained transformation in the nature of policy processes in Mozambique as a result of the PRSP experience. Some note that although very imperfect, the consultative process has been a promising start for ‘a new and strengthened government approach to consultations’ (Falck Lund et al. 2001), with stakeholder involvement broadening at all levels and all stages of poverty reduction policy processes (Falck Lund & Landfald 2000). This diversification of the poverty ‘policy community’ can be expected to increase pressure on government to deliver on its poverty reduction commitments. Moreover, GoM signals that efforts are under way to make
consultative processes more systematic and permanent (Republic of Mozambique 2001: 92), and has taken some steps in this regard. Government openness has increased somewhat since a CSO document stated in 2000 that ‘although government is not closed, it does not have a political understanding of the role of civil society at the global level in advocacy for debt relief and pro-poor policies vis-à-vis the international financial institutions’ (Cuinica & Siddharth 2000: 5).

Less positively, after the consultation process was over ‘it was felt among some stakeholders that its main purpose was not to let people participate but to satisfy donor requirements for consultations [...The Mozambique Debt Group] claims that it was used by the government to legitimize the consultation process’ (Falck Lund et al. 2001: 35). Heavy donor dependency does increase the chance that GoM’s actions are donor-driven. Although this could lead to a stronger focus on poverty reduction given donors’ current emphasis on this, it could also mean that GoM is acting less in response to its own electorate than to outside pressures.

Involvement has left civil society a little more able to participate in such processes in future should the opportunity arise. Cuinica & Siddharth (2000) and LINK (2001) mention the beneficial effects of meeting and exchanging experiences with Central American advocacy NGOs at a meeting organised by the Mozambique Debt Group in an attempt to prepare CS for the PRSP process. However there are still great capacity gaps which would need to be filled before CS could participate in such a way as to achieve a significant impact (LINK 2001, McGee & Taimo 2001).

Generating examples of good participatory practice?
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Other issues
The holding of consultations – as one element of the several that IFIs were insisting on – shows that donors and CS have been listened to in the PRSP process, but the very low involvement of Parliament suggests that these actors have been listened to more than the elected representatives of Mozambican polity. Falck Lund et al. (2001) point out that a strengthening of government/donor relationships and government/CS relationships at the expense of closer relationships between elected government representatives and their constituencies is surely not what donors hoped to achieve.
Annex 3.7  Rwanda

Summary
Participation had been strongly promoted in the Rwandan PRSP process. With international technical assistance, GoR has sought to incorporate grassroots participation at every stage, with CSOs assigned a role mainly in implementation and monitoring. The PRSP process included a Participatory Poverty Assessment at diagnostic stage. A Policy Relevance Test was carried out for clarifying and improving sectoral policies and assessing the relevance of new ones and monitoring their implementation. Simultaneously, indigenous concepts of participation, such as Ubudehe, will be incorporated into the process with the aim of empowering poor people to become active partners in implementing the national Poverty Reduction Strategy and parallel decentralisation process. This approach arose from the recent traumatic history of Rwanda and the idea that poverty reduction and reconciliation are inextricably linked and were best tackled, especially the latter, with a participatory approach at the grassroots level. To what degree these new approaches will be accepted by, and beneficial to, the general population remains to be seen. Nonetheless, there are pioneering participatory practices underway in the Rwandan PRSP process which merit close attention as they could offer lessons relevant to other contexts, particularly post-conflict countries.

Background
The PRS process began in Rwanda in 1999 with the final draft of the I-PRSP produced in November 2000. The first draft of the PRSP was published in October 2001. The PRS is co-ordinated by a National PRSP steering committee led by the Ministry of Economics, Finance and Planning (MINECOFIN 2000). Its stated role is to co-ordinate consultations and the development of policies ‘to identify the genuine priorities of the whole population of Rwanda’ (ibid). This unit has a steering committee with two CS representatives and technical committee which includes a Participation Task Force. The Technical Committee’s mandate is to ‘lead and assume on behalf of the GoR and CSOs, the definition, the implementation, the M&E of PRS and programs in line with the GoR [commitment] to working for greater participation and transparency in government and society’ (ibid).

Principle and practice of participation
Despite the mainly instrumentalist role of CSOs in formulation, at the community level participation has been broad and deep through the employment of the PPA, PRT and ubudehe approaches (Christiansen pers. comm.). The GoR has committed itself to a radically participatory PRS process recognising that ‘Poor people and communities know exactly the problems they face …the best information about their situation and what changes would have a real impact on their lives’ (MINALOC 2001).

Sources report that both the Bank and the Fund in country have not been actively involved in the PRSP participatory process and lack understanding of the principle, practice, attitudes and behaviour of participation. Rather, the Bank in country has continued to provide sectoral support to line ministries along the line of SAPs and apparently ignored the PRSP process. This has lead to confusion within line ministries and an undermining of what the central government is trying to achieve. This has resulted in approval of the first Country Assistance Strategy being postponed by the WB Board until it is realigned with the PRSP (Christiansen pers. comm., Howe pers. comm.).

13 In this profile, ‘CSO’ refers to any indigenous civil society organisation including trade unions, churches, local NGOs etc. ‘NGO’ refers to development and relief organisations.
Multilateral donors such as DFID, EC, SEDA, SNV and others have actively supported participation and ownership in the PRSP process (Christiansen pers. comm.). For example, DFID has supported technical assistance for the design of the PPA, the engendering of the PRSP and the design of other participatory processes (Zuckerman 2001, Howe, pers. comm.).

The I-PRSP process defined central and prefecture level government priorities. Broad CSO contribution to this analysis process was not evident (Christian Aid 2001). The draft PRSP was produced with consultation at the commune, sector and, most influentially at the cellule (community) level through a five month Participatory Poverty Assessment and a Policy Relevance Test (PRT), facilitated in communities by CSOs14. This was followed by prefecture level consultations, but in CSOs’ view, these were more information dissemination exercises (Christiansen pers. comm). Running parallel to and beyond the PRS is the ubudehe participatory governance approach which links the national priorities of poverty reduction and reconciliation through decentralisation. The analysis of the policies presented in the PRSP will be undertaken with the participation of academic institutions, ministries, local government and CS at a national consultation workshop.

What value has participation added in terms of:

Impact on PRSP process?
‘The need for broad consultation is particularly acute in a country which is emerging from a period of acute conflict. Consultation can sometimes slow decision-making down, but it is essential in order to win consensus” (MINECOFIN Sept)

While community participation in the PRSP process to date has been strong, local NGOs have generally had a limited input (Christian Aid 2001). This is in part because there is no effective national umbrella body for local NGOs at present. International NGOs have their own co-ordination body and were theoretically better placed to formulate a cohesive strategy towards the PRSP. However, both international and local NGOs are still largely operationally focused on rehabilitation and the provision of services and generally lack advocacy, policy and economic literacy skills. Rightly or wrongly, they were therefore perceived by the government to lack the capacity to engage and make a significant impact on influencing the PRSP process and only a few INGO’s were invited to national and provincial consultations (Christiansen pers. comm., Christian Aid 2001). However, both local and international NGOs were actively engaged in facilitating the PPA process within the cellules.

DFID funded a technical advisor from Action Aid India, an NGO renowned for its participatory practice, to design the participatory bottom-up approach of the Rwandan PRS. This single INGO advisor appears to have made an invaluable contribution to the overarching participatory theme of the Rwanda PRSP through the PPA, PRT and Ubudehe approaches (Howe pers. comm.). Although this single individual does not of course represent Rwandan CS, the Participation Action Plan suggests the advisor did draw heavily upon the indigenous experience of participation and on the lessons learnt by NGOs in Rwanda to date.

Neither the I-PRSP nor the PRSP draft were published into Kinyarwanda in time for broad-based stakeholder comment (Christian Aid 2001), despite original intentions to have a widespread media campaign through newspapers, radio and a popular soap opera. The Ubudehe approach will be publicised nationally through the radio

14 See below for details
(MINALOC 2001). A popular version of the final PRSP is presently being mooted by the government (Christiansen pers.comm.). PRS monitoring by the same communities will be carried out once per year through the same PPA methodology.

Impact on PRSP content?
The National Poverty Assessment\(^\text{15}\) was used at District level to develop poverty profiles of well-being/poverty, community problem ranking, service delivery assessment, gender roles and land issues.

The main text of the draft PRSP contains a table of priorities as ranked by cellules participating in the PPA. The top sixteen of these priorities are all addressed to some degree in the actions the government pledges itself to do during the implementation of the PRSP. It is unclear whether this table is a result of the PPA or the PRT. In the PRT ministries set the agenda and cellules appraised and ranked them (the methodology did not allow them to add new and unforeseen policy priorities). The PPA was less pre-determined, with cellules defining their own priority problems. Nevertheless, these cellule priorities in the PRSP covered a full range of issues and are both sectoral (eg agriculture, health and education) and thematic (eg security and governance). They include some very specific ones (eg the need for candles and fuel for oil lamps). These priorities feed straight into the budget prioritisation and protection mechanism (Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, MTEF) (Christiansen pers. comm.). In contrast to most PRSPs, the section on macro-economic policies is located at the very end of the paper, which perhaps indicates CS’s sense of priorities.

We have no conclusive evidence that CSOs made a direct impact on the content of the draft PRSP. However, a DFID consultant hired to engender the PRSP did carry out consultations with CSO representatives on the issue of gender (Zuckerman 2001). The PRSP zero draft (MINECOFIN 2001, May) explicitly identifies gender as a cross-cutting issue, making specific reference to the needs of widows and female headed households and committing itself to mainstreaming the national gender policy across ministries. We can only speculate as to how far the consultant’s inputs were instrumental in achieving this.

Impact on Government-donor dialogue?
The Rwandan PRSP is being implemented at a time when the scars of recent history are still fresh in peoples lives. Organised civil society is weak, distrust still exists within communities and many international donors and INGOs are still focused on post-emergency rehabilitation projects (MINECOFIN May 2001, Christiansen pers.comm.). The GoR recognises that the PRS process offered a comprehensive vehicle for Rwanda to move towards economic and social development and reconciliation. However, World Bank staff in-country have continued to provide sectoral support to line ministries, apparently failing to grasp the new demands of the PRSP process and the wishes of the Rwandan central government. This has lead to confusion within line ministries. In turn, this has lead to a lack of joined up policies between line ministries and the MOFEPs’ PRSP. It is for this reason that the CAS approval has been postponed by Washington until the PRSP has been completed and the GoR has accordingly fully aligned itself (Christiansen pers. comm., Howe pers. comm.).

Since the main architect of the PRS process was a representative of civil society supported by DFID, one can assume that the relationship between the government and this particular donor is close and valued. Although the \textit{Ubudehe} approach has

\(^{15}\) Part of the PPA together with the PRT and Butare Pilot– formerly referred to in Rwanda as the CPA: ‘Consultative Poverty Assessment’. 
yet to be implemented nationally the pilot in Butare province has already had a major influence on DFID-Rwanda’s thinking on governance issues (Howe pers.comm.).

The zero-draft of the PRSP recognises that NGOs will have important roles to play in implementing the PRSP. These include intervening where they have a comparative advantage over the state in dealing with specific vulnerable groups; contributing to public debate by advocacy and research on particular issues and monitoring the outcomes of government policies (MINECOFIN Sept 2001). Although this has yet to occur, this commitment by the government is leading donors such as DFID, SEDA and the EC to shift their orientation from supporting civil society in relief and rehabilitation work towards more support for longer term development within the PRSP context (Howe pers.comm.). Additionally all bilateral donors have committed themselves to either writing their own strategies for Rwanda within the framework of the PRSP or support sections of it outright (anonymous source).

It can be confidently asserted that GoR commitment to institutionalising a bottom-up policy making process will be matched by sympathetic donor support to such processes. Thus, combined with a participatory budget monitoring system, the negotiating hand of the government with donors looks likely to be strengthened.

**Impact on poverty discourse?**
The GoR recognises ‘poverty as a complex, dynamic, multi-dimensional phenomenon’ (MINALOC 2001), an approach which seems to go deeper than rhetoric (Christiansen pers. comm.). Statisticians have been trained in the analysis of qualitative data from the NPA (ibid.). ‘A central aim of the GoR’s [PRS] policy is physical and financial re-capitalisation, but within an approach that also aims to rebuild the social and human capital so tragically destroyed’.

The language of a multi-dimensional view of poverty is used throughout the draft PRSP. The NPA included many themes which reinforce this understanding of poverty, including a concerted attempt to engender the PRSP, issues of vulnerability, definitions of wellbeing and poverty and the (rare) recognition of time poverty (MINECOFIN May 2001, MINECOFIN Sept 2001). The ubudehe approach encourages communities to take a similarly holistic view of poverty.

**Impact on policy processes more broadly?**
The participation requirement of the PRSP framework has fallen on fertile ground in the Rwandan government. Reconciliation and poverty reduction are urgently required and an institutionalised bottom-up participatory PRS process appears to the government to be the best way to achieve them: ‘national reconciliation is fundamental and can best be achieved through devolving power to the local level so that communities work together in solving the problems they face’ (GoR 2001). The Rwandan PRSP therefore runs in parallel with ubudehe, part of the decentralisation process aimed to facilitate reconciliation and poverty reduction. This process is also intended to harbour greater transparency in the policy-making and budget allocation process.

There is muted concern from some stakeholders that the concept of ubudehe may in fact be a coercive top down move by the government to appease the Hutu (anonymous source 2001).

**Generating examples of good participatory practice?**

*Policy Relevance Tests:* The aim of this participatory exercise is to check and increase the relevance of proposed policies and policy priorities using insights of people who are affected by them or implementing them. An independent body
prepared short summaries of current policies and those contained within the I-PRSP, which were checked and agreed by the appropriate ministries. They were then appraised through questionnaires and ranking by affected stakeholders at the prefecture, commune and cellule level, as well as a representative group from 25 communes. The appraisals were then collated in quantitative form and fed directly into the writing of the PRSP, forming the basis for budget negotiations (MINALOC 2001, Christiansen pers.comm.).

Ubudehe: ‘the traditional Rwandan practice and cultural value of working together to solve problems… the objective of ubudehe is to revive and foster collective action at the community level. It is designed to work with and reinforce the on-going political and financial decentralisation process and to provide a direct infusion of financial capital into the rural economy, aimed at overcoming one of the main obstacles to pro-poor economic growth’ (MINALOC 2001). 9000 cellules in Rwanda will be trained to use participatory methods to come up with an analysis of priorities they wish to address. Local government, District, Provincial and National government then work towards producing information packs to help refine the community plans. The community development committee refines the plan and presents it back to the community for relevancy testing. Each cellule is then assigned $1000 per annum towards the community project of their choice. The plan is made public for monitoring by the government and community. Additionally, cellule representatives selected by the community will be trained so that they are confident to advocate at the district and provincial levels. The Ubudehe approach has been published for public debate (MINALOC 2001).

Other important issues
This PRSP’s participatory approach arose from the GoR recognition of the inextricable link between reconciliation and poverty reduction if sustainable development is to occur. With conflict affecting so many African countries, the Rwandan PRS represents a welcome set of new approaches to reconciliation and poverty reduction, with the potential to generate lessons for use elsewhere and as such it merits close monitoring.

16 Despite concern that some groups maybe further marginalised within communities (e.g. women) the government is calculating that this will be compensated for by reconciliation through joint community action. The pilot in Butare suggests this is possible and that done well, may even increase community awareness of the diversity of needs (MINALOC 2001).
Annex 3.8  Tanzania

Summary
Tanzania had some prior history of policy consultations. For the PRSP, two parallel participatory processes occurred. The government-led one consisted of a series of zonal and national consultations, plus the incorporation of selected civil society figures into key drafting and monitoring committees. The civil society one consisted of the formulation of an alternative strategy and lobbying for the integration of this with the draft produced by GoT. In the view of many CS actors and even some GoT actors, neither process had significant impact on the PRSP. Although the PRSP experience has greatly strengthened CS's capacity to engage in participatory policy processes, there is some doubt that GoT has undergone a similar increase in capacity or become more willing to open up its processes to CS involvement.

Background
Tanzania produced an I-PRSP in March 2000 and had a full PRSP endorsed in December 2000. The PRSP process is led by a Committee of Ministers and the Governor of the Bank of Tanzania (Tanzanian Authorities 2000). This committee was also the main GoT point of contact for the Civil Society PRSP Steering Committee, which along with five sectoral committees composed of sector-specialist CSOs was the structure whereby CS engaged in the process. GoT invited CS to participate, without specifying means, by letter in December 1999. Tanzanian Social and Economic Trust (TASOET), Tanzania Coalition on Debt and Development (TCDD) and Oxfam Tanzania have been key CS players, organising the first CS round table meeting in January 2000 at which the CS structure was developed. Most of the 40 CSOs involved in this are Tanzanian-based. Donor support was secured by this CS Steering Committee. From the information available to us we could not discern how far ‘civil society’ in Tanzania embraced any organizations other than NGOs – eg religious associations or private sector organizations.

The principle and practice of participation
The principle of participation had already been embraced by GoT before the introduction of the PRSP, as evinced by the incorporation of a consultative process into the formulation of the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (Evans et al. 2000). In GoT’s view, promoting participation enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of a policy process (KK Consulting Associates 2001). However, intra-governmental participation is said to have been restricted to senior officials, and to have failed to generate deep and broad understanding of the principle of participation even in government (ibid.), suggesting that the principle was understood narrowly. NGOs are sceptical about why the IFIs and GoT have embraced participation, claiming that even a participatory process is only ‘business as usual’ if its product has to be endorsed by Washington (Evans et al. 2000), and that the consultations were actually a validation process (Mbilinyi 2001).

In practice, a range of opportunities were provided for CS to participate (Evans et al. 2001). Yet even senior officials recognize that ‘the timetable had precluded a sufficiently broad participatory process’ (Evans et al. 2001: 6), and in CS documents and commentaries criticisms of the process abound. All the common defects are cited: poor information provision, rushed timetable, government vagueness over process and objectives, and superficial consultation rather than opportunities for meaningful participation or collaboration by CS (Eurodad 2000, Evans et al. 2001, TCDD 2000, Mbilinyi 2001). The seven zonal workshops were held all on the same day, precluding adequate preparations or meaningful interaction. At national level the process was considered more authentic, but even at that level was riddled with procedural flaws (Eurodad 2000). The selection of CS representatives is severely
questioned by NGO commentators, the selection criteria not having been made transparent (TCDD 2000). Government sources (Evans et al. 2001: 8) and the PRS document itself state that the poor at village level could have been better represented at the formulation stage and will need to be improved later (KK Consulting Associates 2001). GoT’s failure to disseminate the finished PRSP beyond the capital has fuelled CS scepticism as to the degree of government commitment to implement it (Evans et al. 2001). The composition of Poverty Monitoring Working Groups (for monitoring implementation), has also attracted accusations of exclusivity and lack of mechanisms for responsiveness or accountability. Some note that GoT is not solely responsible for the flawed process, citing weaknesses in co-ordination among key CSOs as well (Evans et al. 2001).

The problem-ridden process effectively led CSOs to establish a parallel process of analysing poverty, drafting sector strategies and presenting them to the GoT drafting team. Their inputs were formulated through a transparent, consultative process involving sector-specialists as well as generalists; and resulted in a well-structured document giving a detailed and coherent analysis of the nature of poverty in Tanzania, clear policy prescriptions, and a strong bid for sustained participatory approaches in the policy context. The document also identified lessons that CS has learnt already about how to do better next time.

What value has participation added, in terms of:

Impact on PRS process?
CSOs adopted the strategy of setting up their own, as noted above, presumably after making a negative assessment of their chances of influencing the PRS by only working through the GoT-led consultation process.

CS’s endeavours within the constraints of this ‘parallel’ process have been recognised to create potential for later stages of the PRSP process to be more participatory. Evans et al. (2001) note that GoT now faces the challenge of building on participatory practice to date in establishing more systematic mechanisms for participation in implementation, especially in monitoring. The Bank and IMF Joint Staff Assessment considered that PRS consultations in the formulation stage had provided beginnings which could be developed further, into the later stages of the PRS and beyond it into sustainable and institutionalized forms of public accountability.

Impact on PRS content?
GoT officials claim that the PRSP as a whole shows very little change in policy content with respect to previous policies, suggesting that public consultations have achieved no shifts in content (Evans et al. 2001). CS complains that its participation was restricted to ‘safe’ areas of policy and not permitted in economic decision-making (‘Not all issues were open for CS to discuss’, Mbilinyi 2001). Others complained of the lack of any feedback to CS on its submissions, which suggest that its inputs were not taken seriously. Gender and environmental issues are said to have been poorly addressed in the PRSP, and policy measures such as user-fees to have passed unchallenged, because of the government’s failure to elicit and take sufficient heed of people’s priorities and opinions of policies at the grassroots (Tanzania Gender Networking Project 2001). ‘On the whole the PRSP document does not demonstrate any gender perspectives and civil society inputs in a meaningful way’ (ibid.): CS inputs are said to have been heard out at the national workshop and then to have vanished, not appearing in the final version, leaving CS actors feeling ‘cheated’. The fact that after the completion of the PRSP CS groups are still pressing GoT to take a harder line rejecting user fees in its negotiations with
the IFIs (ibid.) is further evidence that such pressure groups did not see their views reflected in the paper itself.

**Impact on Government--donor dialogue?**
IFI and donor behaviour towards government are seen by GoT officials to have been changing for some time, as indicated by the participatory PER process in 2000 and then the PRS process (Evans et al. 2001: 10). GoT welcomes this. While expectations of changes in donor behaviour are high, some doubt their feasibility and certain NGOs are convinced that the IFIs’ new focus on ownership and promotion of participation are only cosmetic (Evans et al. 2001: 11).

Despite these negative attitudes, however, CSOs have thrown themselves into the PRS; but our information suggests that their efforts have not been allowed to make sufficient impact on the PRS process or contents to actually affect GoT’s negotiating position vis-à-vis donors.

**Impact on poverty discourse?**
The concept of poverty put forward eloquently by CS in its submission document (TCDD 2000) is firmly multidimensional and sees poverty as rooted in unequal power relations. The IPRSP does not show such a multidimensional or rich understanding of poverty (Tanzanian Authorities 2000)17, but plans for poverty monitoring which were developed in the course of PRSP formulation, with CS inputs, do set out proposals for participatory poverty assessments, recognizing that poverty may have many dimensions which are not all amenable to quantification or capture through standard data-gathering techniques. This implies that future iterations of the PRSP are likely to be imbued with a far richer understanding than the current one, going well beyond mere consumption shortfall.

**Impact on policy processes more broadly?**
The PRSP process is widely regarded to have provided a basis for much more productive interaction between GoT and CS in future, with less suspicion of the latter by the former. While the participatory process is see as very imperfect, it has created potential for future initiatives to work better (Eurodad 2000; Evans et al. 2001). CS itself recognises that it is better prepared now than at the outset for such processes, and is occupying the spaces that the PRS has opened to demand of government the institutionalisation of pluralist, participatory and deliberative policy processes (FEMACT 2001).

There are also signs on the government side that nothing has changed. GoT continues unwilling to accept criticism from CS, which will impede the further development of meaningful dialogue (Evans et al. 2001). The Consultative Group meeting in Dar es Salaam in September 2001 has been conceived and prepared by GoT as just as much a ‘closed-doors’ affair as ever (FEMACT 2001). But CS’s response to this provides an example of the PRS process’s broader impact on policy processes: Cooksey (2001) reports that CS has orchestrated a multi-pronged and strategic response to it, including media coverage which criticises GoT for failing to learn from past mistakes.

**Generating examples of good participatory practice?**
‘Tanzania with out Poverty: A plain-language guide to the PRSP’ (Hakikazi Catalyst & Masoud 2001): an excellent example of the popularising of complex policy messages to inform the public about the PRSP. Supported by DFID and distributed by Coca-Cola throughout the country. Counts itself as one contribution to realising the GoT

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17 Shortage of time prevented us from examining this in the full PRSP.
commitment in the PRSP to ‘seek fuller representation of the poor and other stakeholders in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the poverty reduction strategy’ (1). Provides actual PRSP targets, explaining and putting them into context. Gives an overview of the history of public policy-making in Tanzania to show how the current approach has evolved; and ends with a section on ‘What the Big Words Mean’, where economic and policy terms are unpacked. The guide has been produced in local languages as well as English and Kiswahili.
Annex 3.9  Uganda

Summary
Uganda undoubtedly presents one of the most comprehensive and country-owned participatory PRS processes to date. A large-scale, lengthy Participatory Poverty Assessment, started earlier, prepared the ground so that both Government and civil society were ready and poised to enter into constructive consultations. Uganda presents several good practice cases. Not all of these will be replicable in other contexts where the circumstances and attitudes in government, donor agencies and civil society are less favourable to a participatory process than they were in Uganda.

Background
Uganda had its own Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in place from 1997 and by late 1999 had showed demonstrable progress in implementing it. Thus no IPRSP was needed and the full PRSP, finalised in March 2000, is a revised PEAP (PEAP II). The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development leads on the PEAP for GoU, with Sector Working Groups (SWGs), including representatives of line Ministries, contributing to the revision and overseeing implementation and monitoring. MFPED was also responsible for co-ordinating the participatory process, helped by the existence since 1998 of the Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) under MFPED auspices, which strengthens the Ministry’s interface with civil society. Civil society participation in revising the PEAP was co-ordinated by a Civil Society Task Force (CSO TF), established by CS using independently-acquired donor funding, to complement the SWGs’ competences. The CSO TF was led by the Uganda Debt Network (UDN), a vociferous advocacy coalition, with GoU approval. Other members of the TF are national and international development and advocacy NGOs, religious bodies and research institutions.

Principle and practice of participation
Pre-dating the PEAP revision, UPPAP had produced relevant, high-profile findings through a participatory process, and UDN had demonstrated to GoU that collaboration with civil society poverty advocates was feasible and even beneficial. Donors and IFIs in Uganda have understood participation in terms of enhancing understandings of poverty and how policies could benefit the poorest. GoU understood it in similar terms, recognizing the value of opening up poverty reduction policy processes to participation (Yates & Okello, forthcoming). GoU may also recognize political benefits (increased popular legitimacy, broadened support base etc), compensating for the implications a no-party system has for political participation.

In practice, the participatory process has been higher quality, more sustained, much more country-owned, higher-profile and influential than in any other country, not least because of the favourable pre-conditions which existed and substantial donor support (eg DFID, Sida and WB support to UPPAP). UPPAP started in 1998, producing detailed findings in early 2000 when PEAP revision was commencing. Key policies of PEAP I have clearly been modified in PEAP II to reflect UPPAP findings (Bird and Kakande 2001). Findings fed into PEAP II through UPPAP representatives on key SWGs and UPPAP. Information provision from GoU to the public and CSOs, often via the CSO TF but not exclusively, was relatively abundant and free-flowing.

The CSO TF contributed in two ways. It facilitated regional consultation workshops in 8 locations, producing a professional synthesis of findings (UDN 2000) and feeding these into the MFPED-led drafting process. It also set up sectoral groupings, mirroring the GoU SWGs and each led by one CSO, to gather views from CS actors
well-informed about the sector and channel these into the SWGs’ deliberations. It is not clear from our information whether any of the TF also had their own internal channels for consultation of their stakeholders or members, besides the broad constituencies of poor people consulted in regions and the CS sector ‘experts’ consulted by sectoral groupings. Some CSOTF members feel justifiably, that all they did was consult and feed in views, rather than take a more significant part in decision-making (Meenu Vadera, pers. comm.). While this is technically true, in contrast to other countries the agenda for consultation had been set through a broadly participatory process in which UPPAP and CS lobbying played a strong part; and the consultations arose from proactive organising and proposals led by CS rather than in response to a GoU invitation.

What value has participation added in terms of:

Impact on PRSP process?
Overall, participation in the form of UPPAP proved to be a vital forerunner to a relatively high-quality, consultative PEAP revision process, and also ensured that the agenda advanced by GoU to initiate the revision was itself the product of a joint effort with heavy public and NGO input, more broadly owned than was possible for most countries’ I-PRSPs or draft PRSPs. The creation of a CSO Task Force enriched the quality and range of debate in the PEAP revision, as acknowledged by the Minister of Finance (Ssendawaula 2000). A large-scale and high-profile media campaign along with the regional consultation workshops spread information about PEAP II process to the public, CSOs and local government personnel, and the consultations extended the circle of stakeholders beyond Kampala. Through CSO TF’s efforts, civil society was well-integrated into the May 2001 Consultative Group meeting.

Impact on PRS content?
The contribution UPPAP made to re-orienting national poverty reduction policies has been recognised by GoU (MFPED 2000: vii). Specifically, Bird & Kakande (2001) note a new policy focus in PEAP II on water provision, governance and accountability, and the performance of service delivery agents resulting from UPPAP’s highlighting of these issues.

Impact on Government-donor dialogue?
GoU sees itself has having pre-empted in its own national processes the PRS requirements for participation, and goes so far as to claim the IFIs borrowed the PRSP concept from ongoing processes in Uganda in 1999 (Bird, pers. comm., Yates & Okello forthcoming). Its hand has undoubtedly been strengthened in negotiations with donors and IFIs as a result of its ever-closer links with CSOs, starting with its recognition around 1998 that UDN’s debt advocacy could be beneficial rather than detrimental, in gaining the country concessions from the IFIs. There is much evidence that GoU feels itself in a strong negotiating position partly as a result of the progress it has made on civil society participation: claims by some high-level GoU officials that the IFIs borrowed the PRS model from Uganda (Bird, pers. comm., Yates & Okello forthcoming); President Museveni’s very confident interactions with donors at the 2001 Consultative Group meeting, including in response to their criticisms of the absence of full democratic process; and the producing by MFPED of a ‘PEAP III’ (MFPED 2001) in which GoU sets out its understanding of the poverty reduction partnership which exists between itself and donors, an indication that it feels its own house is in order on this issue.

Impact on poverty discourse?
Poverty in Uganda no longer means consumption shortfall alone; the multi-dimensional concept - including powerlessness, voicelessness, isolation - which
emerged from UPPAP has been taken up widely (McGee 2000). Recognition of the
diverse poverties of the nine Districts covered by UPPAP in 1998-9 led GoU to allow
Districts more flexibility in their use of conditional funds issues from central
Government; and gave a boost to the concept of decentralised, bottom-up planning
to better contend with such diversity. UPPAP’s finding that ‘powerlessness’ is one
dimension of poverty led to GoU commitments to increase the provision of
information to poor communities on their rights and how to claim entitlements (Bird &
Kakande 2001). The actors considered legitimate participants in national poverty
discourse have greatly increased in number and diversity, to include NGOs,
academics, even informal traders’ associations attending Poverty Forum meetings
(Okello, pers. comm.). The video produced by UPPAP testifies to new awareness
among high-level GoU officials of the poor’s capacity to contribute to poverty
discourse; and also to a new meaning of poverty gaining currency in the MFPED
(UPPAP 2000). While poverty language has also changed in the line Ministries,
these have been less central in the transformations that have taken place and it is
less clear here than in the MFPED that a new discourse is fuelling changes in
practice.

Impact on policy processes more broadly?
More broadly, the ongoing dialogue which had been developing since the mid-1990s
between an initially wary GoU and a civil society growing in confidence and advocacy
capacity had by 2000 matured into a constructive and mutually advantageous
collaboration which is improving GoU responsiveness to poor people’s needs. The
partnership model of UPPAP (including international and Ugandan NGOs, GoU, CSO
networks and academics) was an extraordinarily mixed case of collaborative policy
research which changed attitudes on all sides, seeding further open, pluralistic and
deliberative policy processes. The headway since made by some CSO partners of
GoU in advocating around even sensitive issues like corruption shows how GoU’s
tolerance, and CSOs’ confidence to engage in such processes, have grown. The
development of the Plan for Modernization of Agriculture (2000-01) drew from
UPPAP both content and aspects of its process, including dissemination of outputs.
UDN’s participation in the MFPED committee established to monitor use of debt relief
resources (Poverty Action Fund, PAF), a spin-off from UDN’s role in PEAP revision,
sets a precedent for civil society scrutiny of local and central Government budget
execution and strengthens transparency and a culture of accountability to civil society
watchdogs protecting the poor’s interests.

GoU’s willingness to invite CSOs into policy processes in Uganda is not unrelated to
the country’s ‘no-party’ political system, based on the inclusion of all Ugandans by
birthright in the ruling National Resistance Movement. In political rhetoric, in many
people’s understanding, and in the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, an active
role for civil society in the policy arena is a substitute for party-based political
opposition. There are Ugandans and CSOs who, while taking up the opportunity to
participate, do not consider it a fair substitute and it is likely that scepticism among
such actors will grow as long as the Movement’s pro-consultation rhetoric continues
without any sign of change in the political model.

Generating examples of good participatory practice?
UPPAP - although not without problems, and dependent on heavy external support
and unprecedented donor flexibility, undoubtedly a good model for a PPA (Yates &
Okello forthcoming; Norton et al. 2001).
UDN’s PAF Monitoring Committees (UDN 2000a; UDN 2000b) set a good precedent
for independent CSO monitoring of use of HIPC funds, although they do not use
participatory approach to monitoring (yet?) nor monitor the quality of the participatory
bottom-up process through which use of funds should be determined.
National Poverty Forum - set up by UPPAP and partners (2000); GoU, donor, academic, NGO and other CS actors debate poverty issues arising in UPPAP, some quite controversial, eg the inequitable impacts of taxation. 

Poverty Eradication Working Group - started in response to CS pressure, composed of CS and GoU members, to maintain a focus on poverty reduction throughout the budgetary process by scrutinising sector plans and budgets. 

Other important issues or information
Zambia

Summary
Zambia has only been a multi-party state for ten years and there is a lack of a culture of government-CS consultation or participation. In the light of this, any movement towards a more open dialogue between the Government of the Republic of Zambia and Civil Society should be seen as a significant step. Both GRZ and CS recognise that they both lack the full capacity to engage in the PRSP in full partnership with each other. Nevertheless, significant strides have been made – most notably in the formulation of an active CSO coalition on poverty reduction – which have strengthened CS representation and therefore country ownership of the PRSP, helping to keep poverty reduction at the centre of the PRSP agenda. To what degree this coalition will hold together to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the PRSP has yet to be seen.

Background
The IPRSP was produced in July 2000 and the Draft PRSP in September 2001. The PRSP process is managed by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. A Technical Secretariat is responsible for day-to-day planning, budgeting and implementation of the consultative process. Civil Society established its own network for engagement with the PRSP – the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) - which produced its own paper as an input into the process (CSPR, n.d.). Our information from and about CS’s involvement is drawn mainly from CSPR. Zambia has only been a multi-party state for ten years and there is a lack of a culture of CS consultation or participation. ‘The NGOs are highly critical of the way in which consultation has been conducted in the past […] they feel there is a pattern in which NGOs are initially invited to provide input and, where government does not agree with suggestions, they are ignored; [so] the participation itself is used to lend legitimacy to the exercise’ (Situmbeko 2000).

The Principle and Practice of Participation
There is not a culture of broad based stakeholder involvement in policy making in Zambia. However, an early workshop in the preparation of the IPRSP led the GRZ to realise that, to engender broad country ownership rather than just government ownership, Parliament should also have a role in endorsement of the PRSP, (Situmbeko 2000). After broad stakeholder consultation, the PRSP participatory process was redesigned to allow for more CS participation (ibid.). However, CS was still sceptical that GRZ participation was merely a public relations legitimisation exercise (CSPR 2001). The eight thematic working groups appeared to CS as pre-defined by government and focused more on macro-economic growth and governance issues than on poverty reduction. The planned provincial consultations, in CS’s view, did not allow for broad grassroots participation (CSPR 2001). The GRZ set up a PRSP Advisory Unit under the Ministry of Finance for the exchange of ideas and information sharing. However, with the limited information flow due to the Official Secrets Act (Kasutu 2001), CS realised that the unit was of limited usefulness both in terms of providing information and in terms of making independent decisions drawing on CS perceptions (Musamba 2000).

It was as a result of all these factors that the CSPR undertook their own national and grassroots consultation exercises and produced their own thematic priority areas. CS organised itself under the umbrella of the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) and through their own provincial consultation process identified their own priorities for poverty reduction. The CSPR then hired technical expertise to draft a paper which was submitted to GRZ (SAPRN 2001). This was submitted not as a parallel PRSP, but a contribution to the final document to enrich it (CSPR n.d.).
During the consultations, there was much common ground between donors, GRZ and CS on ‘soft issues’ such as health and education. However, when it came to governance and macroeconomics CS and GRZ views diverged (especially on the relative prioritising of growth and poverty reduction). In the eyes of CS, the GRZ was wary of ‘destroying international relations with donors and the IFIs’. Whether this was the real concern of GRZ is unclear, but if it was, then it is indicative of how exactly the PRSP principle of country ownership has been understood by GRZ.

Co-ordination by donors with respect to CS participation was good (Musamba pers. comm.). The IMF took a purely observatory role rather than actively supporting CS participation (ibid.) and, in the eyes of CS, was inflexible in incorporating the views of those representing the poor into their own analysis (Musamba 2000). Other donors took a more proactive role with UNDP helping to organise consultation workshops between parliamentarians, CSO and senior government officials (UNDP 2001). The World Bank was active in promoting participation in the process, even sharing pertinent documents which the GRZ would not disseminate to CS (Musamba pers. comm.). CSPR noted that international NGOs and ‘donors have encouraged the participation of civil society, with some expressing interest in supporting most of the civil society intentions in the PRSP’ (Musamba 2000).

**What value has participation added in terms of:**

**Impact on the PRS process?**
From the outset, CS organised itself efficiently and took a proactive role in the PRS process in lobbying for a more conducive environment for meaningful participation (SGTS 2000, Musamba pers. comm.). The formulation of the first draft of the IPRSP took place with little consultation, and under time pressure because the GRZ wanted to have a draft ready for an impending WB and IMF mission. A second draft of the IPRSP was discussed in a broader stakeholder workshop which included CS. CS critiqued the participatory process proposed in the initial IPRSP, demanding that representation on the working groups be increased and claiming that the thematic groups of GRZ were not all encompassing (Musamba 2000). Their concerns were only partly addressed, leading them to set up their own thematic groups and grassroots consultations. CS was successful in securing a commitment that participation should not be a one-off process but should continue through implementation and monitoring and evaluation (Situmbeko 2000). CS was only given one day to review the final draft of the PRSP. While inadequate, this was an improvement on the original role assigned to them, in their words to review the paper for typographical errors (Musamba pers. comm.).

**Impact on PRSP content?**
Historically, the churches have taken a leadership role on the question of poverty reduction issues and promoting a broader view of poverty. Some noted that many CSOs within the CSPR were often unable to make the connection between their own operational issues and the broader issues which influence policy-making (Kasutu 2001). Despite this CSPR mobilised itself and came up with their own ten thematic working groups:

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<th>Government</th>
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As mentioned, GRZ and CS could largely agree on ‘soft policy areas’ such as health and education. However, when it came to issues about governance and macroeconomics their views diverged. CS’s main contribution to the PRSP seems to be in trying to centre poor people at the heart of the PRSP. To what extent the CSPR’s specific proposals of this nature will be incorporated into the PRSP is still unknown as, despite the initial plan to include CS in the PRSP drafting committee, this was not the case and drafts have not been circulated to date (Kasutu 2001). Some CS representatives are confident that they will have made an impact (Nyirenda 2001).

**Impact on government-donor dialogue?**

It is unclear to us how much CS participation has influenced the nature of GRZ/donor dialogue and broadened the GRZ’s options in its negotiations with donors. During the PRS process, CS often lacked the necessary information to form a cohesive policy strategy. Some CS representatives suggest that closer links between CS, GRZ and the IFIs would have ameliorated this (Kasutu 2001).

**Impact on poverty discourse?**

The appointment of district administrators (drawn from the ruling party) to head the rural consultations caused concern among CS. It was felt that these political appointees would possibly not take heed of the poor’s analysis of their own poverty (SGTS 2000) – especially if these voices were dissenting of current GRZ policies (Bread for the World 2001). CS believes it has a comparative advantage over the government in being closer to the needs and aspirations of the poor (Nyirenda 2001), so has taken the lead on researching pro-poor growth and advocating for a broader view of poverty beyond income/consumption indicators (SGTS 2000). The extent to which this has had an impact on PRSP is not yet known.

**Impact on policy processes more broadly?**

As recently as 2000 observers have commented that ‘in Zambia, the governing party has poor relations with civil society, is defensive about its poor governance record and repressive towards the independent and human rights sector’ (SGTS 2000). But most now agree that GRZ/CS dialogue is better as a result of the PRSP process. Some comment that government is more open and realises, perhaps the first time, that rather than being a threat, CS does have something to offer policy processes (Musamba pers. comm.). The PRSP has strengthened CS capacity to influence policy processes with regards to advocacy, economic literacy and ‘political speak’ (SGTS 2000 June), it is also recognised that there is some way to go before CS’s capacity to play a policy role can really measure up to GRZ’s (Musamba pers. comm.). Lessons have been learnt by CS: ‘that CSOs have to pool their individual energies and resources under an umbrella body if they are to have maximum impact […] and that they must be able to reach out to research agencies and sectoral policy specialists who can draft intricate policy proposals in collaboration with the umbrella body’ (SAPRN 2001). At present, CSPR is hoping that they will continue to be supported by donors and thus be able to apply their new capacity through the implementation and M&E of the PRSP (Musamba pers. comm.).
Generating examples of good participatory practice?

Other important issues.