

Comprehensive Development Framework and Conflict-affected Countries

Issues Paper

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Abstract

This paper seeks to identify the major challenges or issues in applying CDF principles in conflict-affected countries. This paper is an initial contextual desk study based on World Bank in-house interviews. The paper asserts that the four CDF principles (*ownership, comprehensive analysis, accountability for development results and partnership*) are indeed applicable for assistance to countries in or at risk of violent conflict.

If the contribution towards peace and stability for meeting the Millennium Agenda goal of halving poverty by 2015 is to be met it is essential to mitigate the negative effects of violent conflict that deter economic development and poverty reduction efforts.

The best preparation for responding quickly and effectively in post-conflict situations— while taking the CDF principles into account— is a timely presence on the ground, with operational resources to facilitate inclusive dialogues and effective partnerships. The paper suggests adopting the UN terminology of peace-building to incorporate the prevention of violent conflict in the future Bank country support strategies.

A qualitative shift in aid relations assumes the integration of the CDF principles in the corporate business practice of the Bank. The four CDF principles will need to be transformed into performance criteria that can be monitored and good practices rewarded with incentives. This applies both to borrowing countries and Bank staff practices.

Executive Summary

Poverty reduction is the core objective of the Bank, as defined in the new strategic framework for the World Bank Group. It aligns the Bank's efforts with the international development goals (IDGs) as accepted in the UN's Millennium Declaration. However, the objective of reducing by half the proportion of people living in absolute poverty by 2015 is not likely to be met unless armed conflicts are replaced by systems of democratic governance that manage conflicts peacefully.

In the last decade alone, 90 new conflicts, largely intrastate in nature, erupted. There are currently 37 countries considered conflict-affected, of which 12 fall within the current PRSP/CDF group of 46 countries or 26 percent. There are 13 more HIPC countries for which there is no I-PRSP or PRSP yet, 10 of which have been listed as conflict-affected. Out of a total of 47 HIPC/CDF countries, 20 are marked conflict-affected or 43 percent.

Although intra-state violent conflict has touched both rich and poor societies, the affect on low-income countries and their population—particularly women and children—has been devastating. 15 of the 20 poorest countries have had major armed conflict during the past 15 years. Conflicts have spilled across borders into neighboring states. Nearly every low-income country is adjacent to a country that has experienced breakdown and war.

Undoubtedly, there is a shared urgency in dealing with the challenges of creating the conditions for peace and stability as essential preconditions for meeting the Bank's mission of poverty reduction. Peace-building, that includes the prevention of violent conflict and post-conflict transitions, is thus a primary concern. This needs to be fully reflected in the Bank's country strategies.

The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) has been formulated as the contemporary synthesis of the hard lessons learned in development cooperation. To improve much needed aid effectiveness, the four CDF principles have to be applied integrally rather than partially. The decision to implement the principles as corporate business needs to be followed through (internally and externally) with the formulation of performance criteria that can be monitored and with the provision of incentives to reward good practice.

A country-led, inclusive process of dialogue contributes to increased consensus on ownership of the development goals and actions based on a comprehensive analysis of the challenges. The focus on development results will enhance accountability. Partnership relations with the major national, regional and international stakeholders should focus on the adherence to and application of these essential lessons while implementing more efficient divisions of labor based on comparative strength.

The application of the CDF approach is just as valid in conflict-affected or in post-conflict countries as elsewhere, perhaps even more so. Applied consistently, it enhances consensus in divided societies. The need to respond quickly in post-conflict situations

should not be accepted as an excuse to negate the lessons learned. The best preparation for a fast and tailored response in post-conflict situations—while taking the CDF ground rules into account—involves a timely presence on the ground with sufficient operational resources used to facilitate inclusive dialogues and partnerships.

Given that violent conflict has such a pervasive effect on the Bank's core mission to reduce poverty, and with the introduction of the CDF principles as the new business approach, it is timely to examine how the principles apply in countries affected by conflict. The paper, largely contextual at this stage, identifies *an agenda of issues* for further reflection, elaboration and action. In addition, it recommends five practical ways of pursuing the issues identified.

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*Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?*

(Andrea del Sarto' by Robert Browning)

1. Introduction

- 1.1. Economic and social stability and human security are pre-conditions for sustainable development. Violent conflict, within or between countries, results in loss of life and destruction of assets, contributes to social and economic disintegration, and reverses the gains of development, thereby adversely affecting the Bank's core mission of poverty reduction.¹
- 1.2. In the fifty years since World War II, some 45 million people perished as a result of armed conflict.² In the last decade alone, 90 new conflicts, largely intrastate in nature, erupted. There are currently 37 countries considered conflict-affected³, of which 12 fall within the current PRSP/CDF group of 46 countries⁴ or 26 percent. There are 13 more HIPC countries for which there is no I-PRSP or PRSP yet, of which 10 countries have been listed as conflict-affected. Out of a total of 47 HIPC/CDF countries, 20 are marked conflict-affected or 43 percent.
- 1.3. Although intra-state violent conflict has touched both rich and poor societies, the affect on low-income countries and their population—particularly women and children—has been most severe. 15 of the 20 poorest countries have had major armed conflict during the past 15 years. Conflicts have spilled across borders into neighboring states. Nearly every low-income country is adjacent to a country that has experienced breakdown and war.⁵ Recent research shows that on average, there is a 0.55 probability that a country neighboring a conflict will also slide into war.⁶ Furthermore, that there is a 0.5 probability that countries that have had an armed conflict return to war within five years of a peace agreement.
- 1.4. Poverty reduction is the core objective of the Bank, as defined in the new strategic framework for the World Bank Group. It aligns the Bank's efforts with the international development goals (IDGs) as accepted in the UN's Millennium Declaration. However, the objective of reducing by half the proportion of people living in absolute poverty by 2015 is not likely to be met unless armed conflicts are replaced by systems of democratic governance that manage conflicts peacefully.
- 1.5. The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) represents a new way of doing business for the Bank and its members. This development approach helps countries become the leaders and owners of their own development actions. The CDF brings together substantial analysis and process in a dynamic framework; it sets out country-driven mechanisms for development stakeholders to reach consensus and work together, and allows donors—including the World Bank—to be more selective in what they do to help countries achieve concrete results.

This new way of doing business—or new type of aid relationship⁷, along the interrelated principles formulated in the CDF, if applied consistently by countries, the Bank and other international partners—can contribute towards a peaceful management of conflicts. .

- 1.6. Within this context, this paper seeks to identify the major challenges or issues that the CDF approach is likely to encounter in conflict-affected countries. Presently, the scope of the paper is primarily contextual, based on a desk study and interviews with a limited, but well-informed, number of staff at the Bank's headquarters during July 2001. A number of concrete suggestions address these issues.
- 1.7. The issue paper was requested by the CDF Secretariat. Substantial cooperation and inputs were received from the staff of the Post-Conflict Unit (PCU), the Poverty Reduction Group of the Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Network (PREM), the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), the Africa and Asia Regions and the Balkans Region.
- 1.8. The author thanks the CDF secretariat and all other Bank staff for contributing to this exercise and for making time available to share their insights. The views and recommendations formulated in this report do not necessarily represent Bank views, however, and are the sole responsibility of the author.
- 1.9. Undoubtedly, there is a shared urgency in dealing with the challenges of creating the conditions for peace and stability as essential preconditions for meeting the Bank's mission of poverty reduction.

2. Context poverty reduction and violent conflict

- 2.1. The OECD Policy Statement of May 1997 on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation⁸ on the threshold of the 21st century recognizes that 'helping strengthen the capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence must be seen as a foundation for sustainable development'. Development cooperation should strive for an environment of 'structural stability' as a basis for sustainable development. Development assistance—designed and timed to address the root-causes of violent conflicts, as well as the precipitating factors, in ways that are relevant to local circumstances—will have the most impact on conflict prevention. These may include the imbalance of opportunities within societies, the lack of effective and legitimate government, or the absence of mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of differing interests within society at the local, national and regional levels.

- 2.2. Earlier this year, the European Commission issued a *Communication on Conflict Prevention*⁹ which states that development policy and co-operation programmes are the most powerful instruments at the community's disposal for treating the causes of conflict. Taking a genuinely long-term and integrated approach, which will address all aspects of structural stability in countries at risk, is essential. The European Commission defines the characteristics of structural stability as sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without resorting to conflict.
- 2.3. Conflict is a natural element of plural societies. In discussing post-conflict and conflict prevention, it would be incorrect to suggest that societies can exist without conflict. Rather, the challenge is to encourage and facilitate the development of systems of governance that manage conflicts peacefully¹⁰. In a February 2001 statement, the UN Security Council introduced 'peace-building' as the umbrella term for a comprehensive goal 'aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and, therefore, encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes and mechanisms'.¹¹
- 2.4. In his contribution to a Policy Dialogue at the UN's ECOSOC¹², World Bank President Jim Wolfensohn recently stated, in addressing the situation in Africa specifically, that broad consensus and agreement exists about what needs to be done to reduce poverty and achieve equitable and sustainable development: 'First and foremost improving governance and resolving conflict.' He observed that over the past decade, dysfunctional governance has taken a heavy toll on Africa's development: endemic corruption, low public productivity, and skewed budget allocations are deterrents to private investments, undermining the potential for successful development. The impact of dysfunctional governance has hit the poor especially hard. To see any real benefits of globalization, Africa will need a quantum improvement in governance of not only the executive branch of government, but also of the judiciary and parliaments. Our recent research shows that in countries with very poor governance, external financial assistance has on average been counterproductive.'
- 2.5. A Bank discussion paper on *Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa: A proposed agenda for the Africa Region*¹³, assesses the evolution of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa and concludes that many of Africa's internal conflicts are no longer short-term solutions to political disputes. . 'They have become almost stable situations of instability'. 'Because of their very nature, conflicts in Africa have become a development issue. They severely damage many countries' development prospects, setting them back after years of efforts. In this context, achieving the IDGs by 2015 in Africa is conditional on reducing the number and intensity of conflicts.' The implications are that 'while the ultimate objective is poverty reduction and sustained economic development, peace and stability are conditions for any other goal to be reached – and in the aftermath of armed conflict their consolidation must be an objective per se, rather than a positive byproduct of other initiatives.'

- 2.6. In his ECOSOC speech¹⁴ in Geneva, President Wolfensohn announced that ‘we must leverage our work on post conflict recovery’. The Bank has already built up a track record investing in peace and stability. In Africa alone over 50 projects worth \$3 billion are supported in post-conflict reconstruction in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Chad, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, ‘ranging from demobilization and reintegration to providing basic household goods and services to scaling up HIV/AIDS interventions’. Financial assistance to African countries emerging from armed conflict has been provided since the mid-1980s and now focuses beyond the demobilization and integration programmes to community-based reconstruction and comprehensive economic recovery. But, quotes the recent discussion paper¹⁵, ‘such assistance has often been ad hoc rather than part of a strategic vision’.
- 2.7. The Bank is currently involved in post-conflict activities in all regions: Latin America and the Caribbean (e.g., Guatemala, Colombia), Middle East and North Africa (e.g., West Bank and Gaza), East Asia and Pacific (e.g., Cambodia, East Timor), South Asia (e.g., Sri Lanka), Europe and Central Asia (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Armenia, Georgia), and Africa. The most extensive engagement is taking place in West Bank and Gaza, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor. Due to the specific circumstances of these countries, Bank and other donors facilitated an overall framework for effective donor coordination over and above the traditional functions of making funds and technical advice available.
- 2.8. As the latest World Bank research¹⁶ indicates, relative higher prevalence of war in Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to high levels of: 1) poverty, 2) failed political institutions, and 3) economic dependence on natural resources.
- 2.9. In the Economist, Jeffrey Sachs¹⁷ refers to three variables that are most predictive of state stability or instability: 1) the openness of the economy (closed economies carried an increased risk of state collapse), 2) democracy (authoritarian regimes were less stable) and, 3) infant mortality (a high incidence of disease raised the risk of collapse). Earlier, Amartya Sen, Nobel Price laureate for Economics in 1998, found that in democracies famine has not occurred in the last 50 years. The World Bank’s Elbadawi and Sambanis argue that the best and fastest strategy in reducing the prevalence of civil war in Africa and preventing future civil wars is to institute democratic reforms that effectively manage the challenge facing Africa’s diverse societies¹⁸.
- 2.10. Democratic institutions of governance are the most effective guarantor of good governance economically and politically. Democratic governance provides for open markets that can be integrated into the international economic systems and openness and freedom for citizens to gain access to knowledge provided through the new communication technologies¹⁹. But more importantly, it provides levers to manage conflicts of interest within societies and among population groups peacefully,²⁰ by building cohesion and trust among the polity that prevent a

breakdown of societies. A democratic system of governance gives a voice to the poor, increasing their ability to shape their own lives. Democracies are inherently more responsive to the needs of the poor than other systems of governance.

- 2.11. The lessons learned during the past decade in development cooperation and in peace-building (incorporating the notions of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction) demonstrate that a comprehensive and integrated analysis and approach, based on inclusive national dialogue, are essential. They provide the only assurance that assistance contributes to the structural stability needed for effective poverty reduction programmes.

3. New modalities for development cooperation

- 3.1. Another major lesson learned in development, in addition to identifying challenges through a comprehensive and integrated analysis, is *how* the cooperation is practiced. Some analysts go as far as elevating the importance of the 'how' over the 'what'. In this context Timothy Garton Ash²¹ observed: 'Two hundred years ago, the mantra of the French revolution asserted that the goals justified the means. This resulted in numerous heads rolling down the guillotines. The lesson learned in the peaceful transitions in Eastern and Central Europe, South Africa and Chile is that the means used to drive the revolutions determine their outcomes. In these successful transitions, the revolutionary means was 'dialogue'. The dialogue processes resulted in peaceful transitions that prepared the way for new open societies with generally positive socio-economic performances.
- 3.2. The Bank, with support of the main international donors, has formulated a new way of going about the development business—the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)²² introduced in 1999 and piloted in 12 countries in different regions. With the implementation of the debt relief programme (HIPC), the PRSP process that is required to obtain debt relief has expanded the number of countries adopting the CDF approach to 38. The Strategic Framework of the World Bank Group of January 24th, 2001, sets out the CDF principles as 'the guide for our approach to working with our client countries. This should enable the country and its partners to take a holistic view of what is being done in a given country, and thus make appropriate decisions about the division of responsibilities.' The CDF recognizes that the key to better development results lies in the processes that are put in place.²³
- 3.3. The CDF principles stand for a new type of aid relationship. A consistent implementation of and adherence to the principles is expected to make a positive impact on structural stability and poverty reduction. The principles are:
 - *Clear country ownership of development goals and actions;*
 - *A long-term vision and strategy*
 - *Strategic partnership among stakeholders; and*
 - *Accountability for development results.*

Annex 2 presents the CDF principles in an input and output model to facilitate the development of performance parameters on both sides of the equation.

- 3.4. A consistent implementation of the principles requires a change in how the Bank goes about its business in relating to partners in countries and in the international community. New roles identified for Bank-staff in the Strategic Framework of the World Bank Group refer to ‘convening’ and ‘facilitation’ functions. The Bank is a value-driven organization with learning and high performance key aspects of the corporate aspiration. If this new approach is to be successful, measured in terms of greater development impact, the changes will have to be internalized in the way the Bank works. In relation to country partners, the traditional expert role will need to take a back seat to that of facilitating dialogue and convening of partnerships. Providing support to fragile and conflict-affected societies reinforces the importance of this change in roles, along with the subsequent need for new skills and expertise. Maintaining open dialogue with, and where needed, facilitating national dialogues between the main stakeholders, contributes to consensus building on national development goals and aid allocation priorities.
- 3.5. Part of this new aid relationship, that is based on the acknowledgement that the old ways of doing business have not been good enough, should be the recognition that the Bank does not enter countries without a historical context. The new principles of the Bank may well be captured in a set of ‘Guidelines for Partnership’ (or a similar name). Making principles of engagement explicit and providing them up-front when establishing new relationships, say in post-conflict countries, is useful and necessary for creating a relationship of trust and confidence between the Bank and its interlocutors. Annex 5 provides a preliminary outline that may assist discussions on this subject.
- 3.6. Transparency and accountability in all dealings between Bank and interlocutors will have a positive impact on redressing the ‘reversed’ accountability that has grown during the last decade as a result of conditionalities between governments and the international donor community. Making in-country Bank operations fully transparent by publicizing all activities – perhaps with the exception in situations of violent conflict when confidentiality would override other interests—will strengthen the role of the local media and empower citizens to make governments accountable to them.

4. CDF/PRSP and peace-building

- 4.1. Because of the negative impact violent conflict has on reducing poverty, and with the recent introduction of the CDF principles as the new business approach, it is timely to take a closer look at how these principles apply in countries affected by conflict, and related to this, which operational issues should be addressed. This section of the report will identify a number of concepts and lessons learned that can help in developing generic and more targeted approaches in answering these questions.

- 4.2. The CDF/PRSP March 2001²⁴ Country Progress Report gives a first indication of differences in implementation of the CDF principles in countries affected by conflict and those who are not. The April 11th, 2001, World Bank Quarterly Monitoring Report for the period January – March 2001 lists the following 13 countries: Albania, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, CAR, Djibouti, Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, FYR Macedonia, Rwanda, Tajikistan, and West Bank and Gaza. It is interesting to note that within this group, (see annex 1), the African countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea and Rwanda, together with Cambodia, score considerable higher on the long-term vision and ownership principles. Is this because of the nature of the regimes that emerged after long and violent armed struggles (African countries and Cambodia) as opposed to regime changes from authoritarian systems of governance to democratic transitional governments (Albania, Georgia, FYR Macedonia and Tajikistan)? (West Bank and Gaza is still in conflict and falls outside these two categories.) However, the sample presented here is too small and the data not specific enough to make significant comparisons between conflict-affected and the other countries in the CDF/PRSP group. For the future, a more interesting and systematic comparison could be based on the assumption that adherence to the principles is valuable in societies trying to overcome or prevent violent conflict.
- 4.3. A helpful overview has been provided by Dunstan W. Wai, World Bank, in *A Review of Transitional Support Strategies (TSS)*, June 5th, 2001.²⁵ In this report he investigates five post-conflict case studies drawn from three of the Bank's six regions. He studies the TSS of East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. The TSS is a short- to medium-term plan for Bank involvement in post-conflict countries and as such, is a key instrument in the Bank's operational policy for post-conflict countries (OP 2.30). He studied six different parameters. Under 'partnerships' he looked into whether or not the TSSs are consistent with the CDF principles. Although the focus is on partnership, the overview of each of the cases gives an indication of how the other CDF principles are applied as well. Although partners and division of roles are well described in all TSSs, what appears to be lacking is reference to any consultative process (implications for ownership?) and the analysis of the causes of war. Also, the socio-political setting of the country is missing in three of the five TSSs. Dunstan Wai concludes, that 'the CDF principles should underpin partnership in post-conflict countries. Client ownership and commitment are essential prerequisites for success. The TSSs do not adequately describe the role of national leadership and governments. Several programmes seem to be donor driven'.
- 4.4. In a separate paper²⁶, Alison Scott of the IMF Africa Department, noted in a case study on the Angola PRSP that an analysis of conflict does not feature at all in the document. This indicates that the analysis on which the PRSP is based lacks the comprehensiveness demanded by the CDF principles, considering that Angola and its people have been devastated by a protracted armed conflict, Consequently, the ownership of the document is likely to be limited. She recommends that in conflict-affected countries, 'conflict reduction and peace

building should be seen as integral part of poverty reduction' and feature prominently in the PRSP. This is consistent with views expressed elsewhere.

- 4.5. Every country follows its own trajectory and every armed conflict creates its own specific conditions that should inform the strategy and aid priorities for turning conflict into peace and socio-economic development. There are no 'one-size-fits-all' approaches. Every country is unique, thus requiring that one listen carefully to the main national stakeholders in order to understand the needs and the dynamics of change. That also applies to the institutional development that needs to take place to consolidate the no-war or peace situation into sustainable rules of the game to manage societal conflicts without resorting to violence. Democratic communities differ in their social, cultural and institutional arrangements, for reasons of both historical accident and genuine difference in the composition of populations, geography, and national preferences²⁷. Constitutional arrangements, forms of government, relations between the executives and parliaments, labor-market institutions, financial systems, social insurance arrangements, etc. differ, for example, extensively among the US, Japan, Europe, and even within the countries of the European Union. The reality is that all of these different institutional forms have proven equally successful over the long run, producing roughly equal amounts of wealth. The need of institutional diversity applies even more to developing countries. The form that institutional development should take needs to be determined by the national stakeholders while taking into account and respecting universally accepted principles. Economic development and governance, considered as a system to manage conflicts peacefully, require analysis rooted in local knowledge and historical context. The concept of governance needs to be deepened to include the democratic levers of governance for managing conflicts peacefully.
- 4.6. However, despite each country's uniqueness, certain patterns have emerged that can serve as templates for organizing and learning. The evolution of countries, or *phases of conflict*, are generally summarized in five rubrics: countries at risk of armed conflict, countries in armed conflict, countries in peace negotiations, post-conflict countries in transition, and countries consolidating peace and development. The rubrics of this typology may be labeled differently and one or more phases can be grouped together, but these five rubrics by and large cover the current typologies in use.

This typology is related to the input – output model of the CDF principles presented in annex 2. Annex 3 presents a matrix of the phases of conflict in relation to the CDF. It would be useful to undertake concrete country studies in each of these rubrics to yield, in an interaction with the country teams, the particular experiences and lessons learned. Each of the blocks of the matrix should identify the key issues of substance (the what), the process in the particular circumstances (the how), a stakeholder analysis of who the key reformers and spoilers are (the who), and the instruments and resources that are required for an effective response.

- 4.7. Conflict affected countries can also be classified according to the *type of conflict*. The typology again lists five rubrics: inter-state wars, civil wars, spill-over from neighbors, pacted transitions (from authoritarian to transitions to democracy), and collapsed or failed states. Annex 4 introduces a matrix of this typology in relation to the CDF principles. Again field and case studies could be undertaken to determine the what, how, who. The typology is a slight variation on the one used by PCU/DECGR in their Collaborative Policy Research Project²⁸: countries at risk, countries in conflict, countries in transition from war to peace and reconstruction and all countries.
- 4.8. Major characteristics of countries in conflict have been summarized as follows: Delegitimized or fragmented political power and institutional authority, extremely weakened or non-existent governance institutions, loss of control and often on-going conflict over state territory and natural resources; uprooted social fabric and destructed social capital; social anomie brought by militarization of daily life with consequences such as high degree of psycho-social trauma and domestic violence; massive migration, displacement and dispossession of people, destroyed infrastructure, environment and disrupted economies; spread of disease and in particular HIV/AIDS coupled with breakdown of elementary programmes and services; breakdown of the rule of law and security; threat to food security; and fragile research and policy-making capacity.
- 4.9. The analysis of countries at risk for violent conflict is expected to be aided by a number of indicators and tools currently prepared by a Collaborative Policy Research Project²⁹ jointly undertaken by PCU – DECGR with links to international research networks that focus on the development of conflict and peace indicators. The objective of the research undertaken by the Bank is to develop a set of *at risk indicators* to identify conflict-prone countries before large-scale violent conflict actually occurs; a set of conflict-intensity indicators to assess the extent and escalation potential of ongoing conflicts; a set of performance indicators to measure the likelihood of post-conflict countries' successful peace-building and economic development; and finally, a set of peace and conflict impact assessment tools to ensure that the Bank's programmes do not exacerbate conflict.
- 4.10. A *reconstruction agenda* for peace building will take all these aspects into account. In the PCU-DECGR study, the different components of a peace-building agenda have been clustered into four blocks: 1) security, 2) social cohesion, 3) governance (democracy level, legal and institutional framework and corruption), and 4) economic performance. The four clusters used within the CDF framework are: 1) structural/institutional, 2) social/human, 3) physical/rural/urban, and 4) macro-economic/financial. It should be possible and useful to integrate these two sets of agendas and their underlying parameters or variables into a consistent agenda framework.
- 4.11. At first glance, the principles of the CDF are used as a framework for reflection. In countries affected by violent conflict or peace building countries, With reference to the interrelationships of the principles, the next section starts with a

few *general* observations. It focuses next on the *analysis* and diagnosis of violent conflict situations, the *ownership* of analysis and agenda and the *partnership* to support the key objectives of establishing lasting peace and stability and within that context the reduction of poverty. The *accountability* principle should assure a focus on results.

5. Mapping of issues, proposing an agenda

5.1. Issues relating to the CDF framework in general

- 5.1.1. In conflict-affected countries the application of the CDF principles is especially relevant given the fact that the national stakeholders take the risks and carry the losses when violent conflict erupts. The fragility of the situation requires the highest level of sensitivity and diplomacy in order not to add to the burdens of overstressed local capacities. Additionally, the overall performance by the international system in conflict situations has so far remained weak, slow in response and disbursement of funds, and inconsistent³⁰. Modesty and dialogue with international partners to establish an effective framework for a division of work (complementarities) remains a key assignment to assure enhanced impact and aid effectiveness. *Is the assumption that the CDF principles are equally valid in conflict-affected countries accepted?*
- 5.1.2. In the discussions in the course of preparing this paper and in reading through internal documents, the application of the CDF principles is now referred to regularly. However, the interpretation of the framework appears to differ. Often, one finds a reference to the partnership concept without the mention of the equally important principles of comprehensive analysis, ownership and accountability. *Is there a need to give this matter concerted attention?*
- 5.1.3. The PRSP development has been a significant lift for the diffusion of the CDF principles. However, the specific focus on poverty reduction and the time pressures of delivering debt relief appear to have resulted in less than comprehensive or holistic analysis or visions. The PREM unit expressed interest in the development of a comprehensive checklist of dimensions to be included in a comprehensive or holistic analysis. There are certain drawbacks to a checklist, as it tends to be prescriptive. But that being understood, models of good practice can be shared or a generic model (not becoming the standard model!) can be generated. The PREM division suggested the establishment of a task force between PREM, PCU, and CDF to discuss operational matters including cooperation in the pre-mission clinics and the provision of back-stopping to country directors and country teams working in complex peace-building situations. PCU also expressed interest. *Is this an opportunity that can be taken up by the CDF secretariat to enhance positive synergies and coherent implementation of the principles?*
- 5.1.4. In a paper given at a World Bank conference on Evaluation in July 2001, Kwesi Botchwey³¹ addressed the issue of lessons learned from the brief accumulated experience with the PRSP/CDF processes in the areas of

national capacity and improved aid coordination. He observes that ‘by most accounts, the lack of capacity has been a major constraint to the preparation and timely submission of PRSPs by the affected countries. While this may indeed be true in a number of countries, it is important to put matters in their proper context from the standpoint of the recipient countries.’ He mentions specifically:

- The decision to adopt the PRSP (both as a document and process) initially as a trigger mechanism for access to HIPC resources, and now for all development assistance, was not taken through a credible process of consultation with the countries. Neither were the decisions on the structure – the form and content – and timeframe for the submission of the PRSPs;
- The PRSP was introduced in situations of already on-going and active aid relationships with all their complexity and call on scarce capacity. It was not introduced in conditions of what we may call ideal partnerships. The objective conditions prevailing in these countries clearly did not inform the launching of the new process, at least not sufficiently;
- In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the absence of capacity would become a constraint to country-led PRSP processes in some countries;
- Even so, it is pertinent to observe that in many instances, little space and time was allowed for the countries to digest the full importance of the PRSPs and to mobilize available capacity to lead the process. In many cases, a torrent of donor-funded consultants was to descend on them to offer assistance even before they had time to catch their breath.

Botchwey adds: ‘to the extent that capacity is really a problem, donors and the MDBs have been slow to embrace coordinated country-driven capacity-building programmes. As recent reviews have correctly noted, donor and Bank policies have tended to be ineffective, costly and mostly supply driven, and, in many cases have tended to weaken capacity at the national level.’ It leads one to believe that, now that the first pressure is off for submitting the bulk of the PRSPs, a major effort is required: 1) to enter into dialogue with the recipient countries, with governments, civil society and the private sector, to discuss the new changes in development practice, and 2) to realign the practices of the Bank and other donor agencies and the behavioral attitudes of their staff to live up to this new relationship. The challenges this new paradigm poses on the Bank and on others are of a defining character. *How does the Bank monitor whether in action and behavior this change in development practice is implemented? How can the call for a ‘major effort’ to enter into dialogue with all in-country stakeholders to discuss the new changes in development practice be taken up?*

5.1.5. International donors are often criticized for not responding fast enough to the needs of countries that are emerging from armed conflict. Political settlements for violent conflicts, humanitarian needs, the rebuilding of government institutions, the reconstruction of destroyed basic services and infrastructure all require an immediate response. Time is of essence when responding to situations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, East-Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea, etc. and when the space to respond is determined by the political realities in which the violence was stopped and the conflict often frozen. These realities, however, should not result in sidestepping the principles on which the new approach in aid relations is based. On the contrary, these principles are just as much, and perhaps even more, valid in post-conflict situations. Why? Because the immediate post-conflict period is usually the brief window of opportunity for fundamental economic and political restructuring before things fall in place again in settled patterns. The implications need to be elaborated and addressed in the organization and application of available resources. Furthermore, the risk of renewed conflict is high in post-conflict societies.³² In this regard the following lessons are emerging from the experience gained in the conflict-affected countries:

- Prepare the ground for future assistance with an early presence on the ground during violent conflicts and peace negotiations (rather than the withdrawal practiced in the past) with flexible resources. . The 'watching brief' has proven a valuable instrument in this regard provided sufficient resources (still relative small amounts) are available;
- Facilitate Informal and/or parallel dialogues, preferably and if possible in partnership with other key international agencies, with national stakeholders to help foster consensus about a vision and strategy to tackle the challenges in a post-conflict situation;
- Prepare a stakeholder analysis of the reform-minded and the spoilers in the country and a data base of available local capacity to be used in the post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction process;
- Facilitate an analysis of the root-causes of the armed conflict and the political economy of the conflict, and identify potential strategic areas of assistance that may emerge in a post-conflict situation that will assist in stabilizing the causes of conflict and provide the opportunity to tackle poverty;
- Prepare, if applicable, a strategy to deal with the history of arrears in the post-conflict situations so as to avoid it becoming an obstacle when international response really matters;
- Provide advice during peace negotiations about the economic and financial policies for the post-conflict period, with a priority of reversing the logic of the economics of war;
- Network with the main international stakeholders involved in the country and prepare operational mechanisms for a coordinated response once a political settlement opens the possibility for international assistance.

- Discuss with the international partners approaches and a programme of action to address the external aspects that contribute to the conflicts, such as repatriation of stolen wealth, activities of resident diaspora communities, market access of products of which the earnings fuel armed conflicts, the trade in arms, drugs trade, trade in human trafficking, etc.;

This constitutes essential ‘homework’ that needs to be attended to *before* an armed conflict ends and post-conflict assistance is required. It is based on the CDF principles and avoids that international agencies get off to a wrong start in the time pressures of post-conflict situations. *Does this provide a useful framework for an elaborated ‘watching brief’ and what are the operational and resource implications?*

- 5.1.6. Early experience shows that it is necessary to complement the CDF principles with input and output performance criteria that can systematically be monitored. The current space for interpretation of the principles does not provide guarantees that the qualitative change, that forms today’s corporate identity of the Bank, will be achieved. *To underline the seriousness of the shift in development practice, should the CDF principles not be translated into criteria that can be included in, for example, the performance indicators (CPIA) that determine the IDA allocations? Could the governance discount or factor be supplemented with a CDF bonus, for example, rewarding genuine national ownership of development priorities? Should similar questions be raised regarding the other instruments and tools of the Bank?*³³
- 5.1.7. OP 2.30 does not refer to the CDF as the principles that guide the Bank’s approach. Obviously, in the sequence of decision-making the OP preceded the new Strategic Framework. *Would this require attention and should OP 2.30 be amended?*

5.2. **Issues relating to the holistic analysis**

- 5.2.1. A profound and holistic analysis cannot be made without national ownership³⁴. Outside experts can make a very intelligent analysis of countries fully compliant to the standards required by the donor community. But how often do they fail to read the real dynamics of change within countries? Whereas elites usually speak the international lingo demanded to gain access to funding decisions of international donors, the language in coffee houses often is of a different tone. While international and national experts may play a supportive or facilitating role, and assist with the collection of reliable data, a comprehensive analysis should be based on inclusive consultative processes that cover all main stakeholders identified in a comprehensive stakeholder analysis. Investing in a careful process to obtain a comprehensive analysis is investing in the social capital of a nation. It will result in more realistic visions and strategies rooted in the local realities and will pay back in better and more sustainable strategies. Because of the multitude of missions undertaken by donors to obtain comprehensive

assessments or analysis, it would be a significant breakthrough if the major international stakeholders could agree on one *country-led* comprehensive analysis *facilitated* by either one international agency or, alternatively, to agree on a joint approach to such a process. This would reduce the cumulative effect of the many demands the donors make on the policy-makers in recipient countries. *Would it be possible to establish partnerships to facilitate—possibly by an impartial agency—holistic country-driven analysis and agenda setting processes?*

5.2.2. There is a difference between facilitating a holistic analysis on the one hand and focusing on the comparative advantages in the implementation and delivery of assistance on the other hand. There is no banker who does not include the key dynamics of the political realm in, for example, risk analysis. Making an investment requires insight in the economic prospects and requirements as well as an understanding of the imbalances and gaps in the political system. *Shouldn't a holistic analysis always include an analysis of the political economy and of the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the governing system?*

5.2.3. Where remedies in the evolution of political systems are required, partnership is the answer to address gaps in the roadmap that cannot be addressed by the Bank because of its Articles and focus on comparative advantage. Confidential ad hoc interventions may be very helpful to overcome certain temporary obstacles but are no answer for facilitating the institutional development of inclusive and democratic systems of governance that can manage conflicts peacefully. *Are strategic alliances to close this gap needed, possible and with whom?*

5.3. **Issues relating to ownership**

5.3.1. Country ownership can be defined in terms of *legality*, a government approved strategy that meets the endorsement of the legislature. However, how that formal approval comes about is key to determining ownership. The *legitimacy* of the process, through which the strategy comes about, depends very much on the inclusiveness of the process of consultations. Based on a transparent stakeholder analysis that brings into the process all major actors of key population groups, sectors of interest, and covering the full geography, efforts should be aimed at achieving *substantial consensus* about the major priorities in the long-term vision. This does not only improve the analysis, but also builds the essential commitment and acceptance for implementing the strategy. The process may sometimes appear cumbersome, but is a relatively cheap investment in capacity building, in practicing consensus building and in sustainability of the development efforts that flow from it. This approach is more valid in divided societies or countries in conflict. *To move beyond the 'sovereignty trap' of ownership being equated by government decision-making could it be useful to recognize in addition to the formal aspects also the legitimacy aspects of an ownership process?*

- 5.3.2. Botchwey³⁵ argues that ‘countries need to be more pro-active and donors need to step back and make a conscious effort to be less and less intrusive and to allow more space and time, *even if this is at the cost of delayed programmes and financial flows*, for national debate and policy making guided by a thorough understanding of both the universality and the particularity of their development challenges’. Applying the CDF principles consistently would provide such space. *Are the Bank, and the donor community in general, willing to accept that time needed for proper national dialogues and decision-making may require delayed funding?*
- 5.3.3. To develop more uniform understandings of what is meant by country ownership of the development agenda, it may be useful to disseminate good practices, for example the Ghana case and the South African ‘forum democracy’ model so successfully practiced during its peaceful transition to democracy. The outcome of the WB/IDEA workshop in El Salvador of December 2000³⁶ on National Dialogue is an important step in this regard. Ownership matters as World Bank research confirmed³⁷. *What can be done to develop the modalities of ownership more specifically and to give the concept further operational meaning?*

5.4. **Issues relating to partnership**

- 5.4.1. In interviews with World Bank staff, the general picture emerges that no successful experiences in donor coordination in conflict-affected countries have been registered. Botchwey³⁸ acknowledges some progress in rationalizing donor programmes, in harmonizing donor procedures, in decentralizing decision-making authority to the field and in fostering greater involvement of stakeholders in policy making and debate in the recipient countries. However, he also observes that progress has been rather limited. This observation is reinforced by the first-hand accounts of those working in the field. On the donor side these obstacles include: the influence of commercial and political interests in donor aid decisions and the almost inherent tendency for the aid agencies to compete rather than collaborate among themselves in support of the national strategy. Nevertheless, there is a much higher political awareness today of the need to rationalize resources, to look for complementarities and to focus on comparative advantages. The acceptance of the CDF/PRSP framework by the major international players is an indication of the importance attached to donor coordination. Also, positive examples on the ground of inter-agency cooperation between the Bank, the MDBs, the UN system, the European Union and the bilateral agencies on a division of tasks has occurred in some of the post-conflict countries. However, this cooperation is lacking in the facilitation of a country-led comprehensive and holistic analysis. It has also been reported that the cooperation appears to run out of steam after the initial media hype in the wake of peace settlements with old habits creeping back with the passing of time. *Should further initiatives be taken to forge stronger alliances among the main international stakeholders about the implementation of the new aid relations?*

5.5. Issues relating to accountability for development results

- 5.5.1. This principle does not feature prominently in reflections about conflict-affected countries. Yet, from the Bank's perspective it is important that a country build up a track record in attending to the priorities set for achieving peace and stability and the policies that have a positive impact on poverty reduction. The Guatemala peace accords of 1997 provided a good example of a programme of action that addressed political and economic concerns, the implementation of which, amongst other the increase of the income tax revenue base, could easily be monitored. It is an instructive example because the government failed to deliver and the international donor community was divided in its response. Lending continued despite the fiscal and economic paragraphs of the Peace Accords not meeting the agreed targets. The matter of donor coherence should feature in future activities such as suggested under 5.4.1. *What are the implications of a divided donor responses on aid effectiveness?*
- 5.5.2. Populations coming out of an armed conflict normally expect a 'peace benefit' from their new government. After the suffering, people look to the government for a quick restoration of basis services. Again, by applying the CDF principles,—and in particular the accountability principle of result oriented programmes, in which governments specify expected tangible outcomes and time-frames—it will be easier for citizens to keep governments accountable. This will help establish responsive governance, not only to the donor community, but also more importantly to their own constituency. It appears that output-oriented programming (moving away from the traditional project planning) and performance-based funding incentives need far greater attention in reconstruction programmes for post-conflict countries. *How can the accountability principle be better incorporated in the support programmes for conflict-affected countries?*

6. Recommendations for follow-up

Five follow-up activities in taking this paper forward are suggested:

- 6.1. The actions suggested in the questions raised in chapter five of this report require reflection and decision-making;
- 6.2. The establishment of a 'working and learning' group between PREM, PCU and CDF, together with colleagues from each of the six regions, will enhance the synergies in the implementation of the CDF principles in conflict-affected countries. Harvesting lessons learned in practical situations, developing tools and instruments, and backstopping Bank-staff at the frontlines in conflict-affected countries could be part of the mandate of the 'working and learning' group (see also paragraph 5.1.3);
- 6.3. Targeted country 'learning-lessons' studies should be undertaken in five countries that fall within the typology of conflict affected countries as presented

in annex 3 of the report. These studies, undertaken in close liaison with the activities of the group referred to in para. 6.2, should look at the specific challenges that the application of the CDF principles pose in these countries and draw lessons for an improved operationalization of the principles in conflict affected countries. These studies should be completed before the end of this year and presented at an internal workshop on the subject of: *'the Application of the CDF principles in Peace-building'*. The results of this workshop could form the basis for a subsequent workshop with the major international partners and some country representatives participating;

- 6.4. At the same time, these studies could possibly contribute to the development of conflict analysis and conflict indicators as is currently undertaken by the PCU – DECRG Collaborative Policy Research Project;
- 6.5. The paper should be made available and disseminated among the interlocutors within the Bank that cooperated in the production of this issue paper to encourage a discussion, reflection and action on the topics identified.

annex 1:

(see .pdf file for annex)

CDF/PRSP Country Progress for conflict-affected countries: as at July 2001

Input Output model of CDF principles

INPUT

participation and inclusivity

holistic long-term vision/strategy

accountability/transparency

partnership

OUTPUT

ownership

agenda setting/roadmaps

focus on outcomes and results

complementarities and aid effectiveness

CDF and phases in evolution of countries

	Pre-conflict	Countries in conflict		Post-conflict		
	Countries at risk of armed conflict	Countries in armed conflict	Countries in peace negotiations	Post-conflict countries in transition	Developing countries consolidating	
CDF Inputs						CDF Outputs
Participation						Ownership
Integrated Analysis						Agendas/ Roadmaps
Accountability						Results/ Outcome Orientation
Partnerships						Complement arity/Aid effectiveness
Regional approach						Reinforcing peace and stability

* Each block should in principle address the *what, how, who* and which *instruments*

CDF and types of armed conflict

	Compacted transitions	Inter-state wars	Civil wars	Spill-overs from neighbors	Collapsed states	
CDF Inputs						CDF Outputs
Participation						Ownership
Integrated Analysis						Agendas/Roadmaps
Accountability						Results/Outcome Orientation
Partnerships						Complementarity/Aid effectiveness
Regional approach						Reinforcing peace and stability

* Each block should in principle address the *what, how, who* and which *instruments*

Guidelines for Partnership

- The Bank recognizes that development is about expanding the ability of people to shape their own lives;
- The Bank recognizes that people need at all times be the owners of their development process;
- The Bank recognizes that people need a voice and an opportunity to participate in the policy making process about national development priorities;
- The Bank recognizes the need to invest and support in local capacities and to focus its assistance on sustainable activities;
- The Bank undertakes to listen to and to learn from national analysis and make expertise available upon demand;
- The Bank applies an even-handed approach in relation with all non-violent stakeholders;
- The Bank recognizes the universally accepted human rights of each individual;
- The Bank undertakes to provide its services in a way that national consensus building about development priorities is facilitated;
- The Bank provides national stakeholders access to knowledge, policy advice and financial resources.
- The Bank favors programmatic approaches that are result-oriented, thus making it possible to link resources to results allowing people to monitor the outcomes and policy-makers to account for them;
- The Bank lets quality prevail over quantity;
- The Bank seeks to cooperate with other international stakeholders to rationalize resources and enhance the impact of assistance;
- The Bank undertakes to enact full transparency and accountability in all its operations aware of its high responsibilities as an international public institution.

Biography

Mr Roel von Meijefeldt, Director of Programmes, joined International IDEA (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) in March 1996 and assisted in the establishment of an innovative Capacity Building Programme for Sustainable Democracy.

He is a political scientist by training with a degree from the Free University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

At International IDEA, he produced comprehensive democracy assessments on Romania, Nepal, Burkina Faso, Guatemala, Nigeria and Indonesia. Also, he produced a Handbook on Dialogue for Democratic Development. He has worked with the CDF unit at the WB in developing participatory and inclusive methodologies, with UNDP and governance and with the EU on the dimension of political dialogue.

Prior to International IDEA, he worked in Brussels as an independent adviser of the European Union on democracy, development and human rights and was the Secretary General of a European wide network that supported the transition to democracy in South Africa and Namibia. During the 80s he lived in Harare, Zimbabwe, and worked as regional coordinator for Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation (NOVIB) in the southern African region.

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 - Executive Type: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism
 - Electoral Systems for Divided Societies
 - Legislatures for Post-Conflict Societies
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 - National Conferences
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 - Truth commissions and War Crimes
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