

Feedback on the User's Guide to Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA)¹

World Learning, Projects in International Development and Training²
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Executive Summary

World Learning welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback to the World Bank on the User's Guide. The principles upon which the PSIA is founded are commendable and the User Guide is quite thorough in its treatment of analysis issues and its promotion of eventual local ownership over the process. However, there are areas where clarification, strengthening or further thinking may improve not only the product but also its position in the overall PRSP process.

World Learning proposes that five areas of the PSIA require strengthening to be more effective in both reaching the poor and ensuring policy meets their critical needs.

1. Stakeholder groups for inclusion in PSIA should be selected on the quality and strength of their representation of and commitment to the poor, not on the basis of their ability to oppose proposed policy. This may require seeking out (and building capacity) of groups with an operational base and competencies beyond analysis and advocacy.
2. The PSIA must recognize the complexity of transmission channels within and among poor households, especially concerning the assets that they do not own and the informal social capital networks upon which they are critically dependent. In other words, more is needed on the macro-micro linkages.
3. The PSIA must, as a matter of necessity, deal openly with the recurrent costs for services that will have to be transferred to the poor as part of post-PRGF sustainability.
4. Members of Parliament, from both ruling and opposing parties, and the Press need to be brought into the PRSP through the PSIA process, as well as other PRSP-related mechanisms.
5. The mechanisms by which there is a transfer of ownership and absorption of costs into local systems have not been detailed. PSIA should be both a mechanism for analysis and one to increase participation in PRSP and local governance processes.
6. Effective participation requires capacity. Capacity requires building through training and access to information. While the Bank has promoted participation, it has not made resources available for capacity building. Capacity building refers to the transfer of skills, tools and capabilities to be able to both participate in and eventually take over the process.

This paper posits that the Bank should use the PSIA process to improve the nature of its engagement with southern governments and engage those not usually engaged in macro-policy processes (at least to date). PSIA can not be done effectively removed from the poor, who are supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of the Bank's new direction. PSIA can be both a tool for improving the process of governance (through building human resource and organizational capacity, participation and inclusion) and for economic and policy analysis.

World Learning has based its constructive comments on a close reading of the PSIA, the literature, and its experience working with community-based NGOs in more than 30 countries. World Learning's programs have focused on building the capacity of local organizations to manage themselves, deliver services, advocate on behalf of their constituents, become self-sustaining, and most importantly, effectively participate in national policy formulation and implementation.

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Stakeholder Identification and Participation of the Poor

The purpose of the PSIA is to analyze the distributional impacts of a policy (either ex ante or ex post) on the poor, presumably to ensure that the policy does not further damage the fragile existence of the poor (paragraph 15³). However, the PSIA methodology does little to directly engage the poor in the analysis.

Paragraphs 34-37 focus on the identification and engagement of stakeholders. However, this is couched in terms of identification of who can support or oppose the policy, rather than who is most adversely affected by it. Coupled with sections on compensation (see paragraph 70), one could surmise that the process is one of mollification and marketing rather than actual research, since ‘the ownership assessment is an estimate of... pressure government will experience in adopting a policy reform’(paragraph 36).

The poor are in most cases unorganized and not vocal (as paragraph 35 points out, the poor are not a cohesive group). Intermediary organizations are generally the only route the poor have for either participation or representation. Such intermediaries include the large body of indigenous non-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, and has been pointed out by many authors, many of the most sophisticated and vocal NGOs have not organically grown from a constituency of the poor, but rather are the creations of the donor community⁴. When an NGO actually represents the poor (or a particular constituency thereof), PSIA measures that organization not on the quality of that representation but on their ability to support or oppose the proposed policy (what is termed “political economy” in the PSIA). Even the record of local government as a representative and champion of the poor, one of the reasons stated for decentralization, can not be assured.⁵ In fact, decentralization coupled with lack of capacity building to overcome poor administration and regulatory oversight may actually impede poverty reduction⁶.

However, the poor need not be left out of the process. It may take a little more time and a little more effort, but isn't this better than continuing their marginalization? There is no shortage of literature on policy change and engaging the poor⁷. An ever-expanding body of knowledge and qualitative tools are available to bring policy-makers and poor people face-to-face.

The lack of institutionalized participatory structures in the implementation of the PRSP (and hence, subsequent policy reform within the boundaries of the PRSP) has been identified as a crucial issue⁸. It would seem that the PSIA process need not be just an analysis of existent or proposed policy, but also an engine to improve popular participation and stimulate wider public debate (beyond the Bank and the finance ministry).

³ when “paragraphs” are mentioned, this refers to the text of the User Guide

⁴ A poignant article by Gino Lofredo is illustrative: Help Yourself By Helping the Poor, recently republished in 2002 in Development, NGOs and Civil Society, Oxfam publications (UK).

⁵ See Norton A and M. Foster, 2001. The Potential of Using Sustainable Livelihoods Approaches in PRSPs. ODI (UK), Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure Working Paper 148.

⁶ See Nyamugasira W and R. Rowden (2002), “New Strategies, Old Loan Conditions, The Case of Uganda”, Uganda Forum, Results international and ActionAid.

⁷ For example: Holland, J and J. Blackburn, editors, 1998. Whose Voice? Participatory Research and Policy Change, IT Publications. “Social analysis by local people produced local interpretations of social reality that could not always be knowable in advance, and that often surprised policymakers.”

⁸ See Eberlei W, 2001. Institutionalized Participation in Processes Beyond PRSP. Institute for Development and Peace, Gerhard-Mercator-University, Duisberg

Recommendations.

The emphasis within the PSIA should be taken off the political “power” of the groups who support or oppose policy, and put on the representational strength of intermediary organizations to accurately represent the interests of the poor. These true stakeholders may not be the most sophisticated, the most organized, or the most vocal, but are a legitimate gateway to those poor most affected by policy changes. This may require that the PSIA Team seek out both national representative Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and local groups from among the poor themselves. For the legitimate representatives of the poor to effectively participate some capacity building is called for prior to and during their actual participation in the PSIA. This would include economic literacy, analytical ability, and confidence-building.

Transmission Channels

The PSIA, in assessing distributional impact on poverty, relies on an understanding of the “transmission channels” through which a policy change is manifested. The PSIA recognizes five channels: employment (labor markets), prices (production, consumption and wages), assets, access (to goods and services) and, transfers and taxes. These are detailed in paragraphs 17-22 and 38-39. They have one thing in common – they reflect transaction costs that can be captured by the standard tools of the economic analysis trade. However, it must be questioned whether these transmission channels are the only ones to focus on when looking at the reality of the poor.

It does not take an exhaustive recitation of the literature to report that the poor live in a world of non-financial transactions, or better put, transactions that are not captured by the typical economic tools. What national level policy makers see as transmission channels do not touch the poor; rather they live in a world of coping strategies and non-financial transaction networks. For many of the poor, assets are not fungible and the phenomenon of asset illiquidity (what a trauma it takes for the poor to dispose of a cow or necklace) is a cultural reality⁹. In addition, many times the poor are dependent on assets they do not own¹⁰.

Credit among the poor is more informal than formal. If it is not the merry-go-round credit system (known as *osusu* in many parts of Africa), it is the money-lender. Intra-familial credit works at high velocity, but remains unseen. For example, studies in the Nairobi slum of Kariobangi showed that credit among traders have a repayment period of one day or less, but is the mainstay of many hawkers on a day-to-day or opportunity-to-opportunity basis¹¹. Macro-level credit policy (dealing with banks) has little to do with the credit mechanisms the poor depend on (the micro-environment). Throughout Africa mutual support labor on farms (women helping others in their traditional groups to cultivate each other’s fields and the like) is both a labor “cost” and an “asset” (I give my labor, I receive yours) in a constant dance of both sharing and hiding poverty. Can these be adequately captured in the analysis of transmission channels as described in the User Guide? That would require reaching the poor and seeing things in their terms.

Much of asset acquisition and tapping its value is outside of the economic sphere for the poor. Throughout coastal West Africa land in the hands of the poor can not be bought and sold, because

⁹ See among others, Parker Shipton, 1990. How Gambians Save and What Their Strategies Imply for International Aid. World Bank PRE Working Paper WPS395. Dr. Shipton has also been doing research on asset management among the poor in East Africa.

¹⁰ Norton and Foster (2001)

¹¹ ACTIONAID/Kenya (J. Atema, et. al.), unpublished PRA research with/for ILO, 1991.

it is ‘borrowed’ from families of older settlers to the area, perhaps hundreds of years ago. Even those they borrow from may have borrowed the land from older settled families.

During the formulation of the Poverty Alleviation Strategy in The Gambia¹², analysis of PRA data from around the country found that the definition of wealth, the definition of assets, and the “transmission channels” were substantially different among young men, old men, young women and old women. Different groups in different villages had different ways of tapping resources, moving assets around and actually had different inter-channel flows (for example, how women relate to labor markets or access credit or other services is very different than men).

Finally, there are particular classes of “social assets” recognized more and more in the literature. There are the non-monetary assets of things like self-esteem and the weight of the views expressed by the poor themselves¹³. To many a rural Filipino fulfilling an *utang nga loob* (a debt of face) is far more important than a credit repayment. The definition of “social capital” in the PSIA, which seems to limit itself to membership, does not include other forms of synergy, integrity, integration and autonomy¹⁴.

Recommendation

Researching the impact of a policy on non-transaction transmission channels may be difficult but it is necessary. Things that do not seem to adversely affect the poor on the surface often do. The question needs to move from the impact of the policy on the poor through the identified channels, to the impact of the policy on coping strategies and fragile but critical social networks of support (for many women the only transmission “channel” they have).

Transmission channels may dramatically change their form as they flow from top to bottom. While a particular policy may promote access, it need not promote actual use. As Fozzard¹⁵ points out, access does not necessarily translate into improved quality of life. Transfers may seem progressive at one end of the channel, but may be regressive at the other end. In Uganda, for example, the “cost” of free education and health has been “adjusted” by an increase in the taxes on second-hand clothes and plastic bags¹⁶. These two policies connect inside the pocketbook of a poor family. The analysis of “high and low feedback” on the economy needs to take into account that low feedback on the national economy many times results in high feedback on the economy of a poor family. The PSIA needs to better balance its view at both ends of the channel, weighing short-term distress on the poor realistically. Short-term distress is not economic theory for the poor; it may be the difference between the life and death of a child, getting a crop into the ground during a short window of opportunity, or the choice between putting a child in school or putting that same child to work.

¹² Saussier, J and S. Sanyang (1992). Community Perceptions of Wealth, Results of PRA Data. Presentation given to the GOTG and UNDP Poverty Alleviation Programme Formulation Conference (The Gambia). Republished in TANGO Talks, Vol.2, No.3, Sept. 1992.

¹³ See ODI Poverty Briefing 3: February 1999 by Simon Maxwell.

¹⁴ See Rowley, D (2001). Building Social Capital for School Governance in Southern Ethiopia, in World Learning’s SIT Occasional Paper #2. This is based on the work of Michael Woolcock, “Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework” (Theory and Society, vol.27, No. 2. 1998)

¹⁵ See Fozzard, A, 2001. The Basic Budgeting Problem: Approaches to Resource Allocation in the Public Sector and their Implications for Pro-Poor budgeting, ODI (UK) Working Paper 147.

¹⁶ See “Uganda hikes taxes to counter growing deficit”, by Paul Busharizi. Reuters, 13 June, 2002.

Sustainability and Development Burden

In paragraph 22 of the PSIA User's Guide the issue of policy sustainability is mentioned. Paragraphs 23-28 touch on the issue, especially in terms of impacts on and by institutions. However, the PRSP injects non-traditional resources¹⁷ into the economy to support pro-poor social spending, such as on education and health. A review of the PRSP cycle (see Figure 1) shows that resources are injected at three-year cycles, but a formal end-point for the in-flow of funds is not projected (when does the debt relief end, or better put, when does the subsidy end for social services?), nor do PRSPs generally deal with meeting long-term recurrent costs¹⁸.

Non-macro policies in the PRSP tend to focus on social spending, providing free (or heavily subsidized) services to the poor. As often as not, these services are available to and accessed by the non-poor as well as the poor.¹⁹ Paragraph 27 rightly states that the poor will be hurt if unsustainable services create fiscal collapse. Just as traumatic would be to create dependency on a service (free health care, free schooling) and then abruptly take it away. In either case, without a clear understanding of how these services will continue, they are by definition unsustainable. Knowing that the current subsidy must change (be it through user fees, reduction in service or allocation of internally-derived revenues) a priority for PSIA must be looking at whether free services are truly affecting poverty or creating dependency.




Figure 1. PRSP Cycle

¹⁷ meaning these supplements to the country's budget are not generated by local revenue collection, nor are they part of regular bilateral or multi-lateral aid packages

¹⁸ BMZ Contribution to the WB/IMF PRSP/PRGF Review (2001, work in progress)

¹⁹ See Foster, Fozzard, Naschold and Conway, 2002. ODI Working Paper 168

This issue has not been a discussion that has been had with the poor, that some day the “goodies” go away. There is an unspoken premise that the macro-economic scenario will eliminate poverty and those that used to be poor will be able to afford services at a sustainable (from the provider’s point of view) cost, or through the emerging private sector.

There is also the unspoken premise that if the poor get relief from health and education costs they will put their meager resources to work to increase their productivity and their income, raising themselves out of poverty. The spoken premise is that education and better health are gateways for the next generation to arise from poverty. However, the future costs (and how to prepare for them) has not been the subject of public debate, policy review or even public information campaigns.

Recommendation

While the PRSP demands that economic reform be sustainable, it should demand as much from social policy. It is here where the PRSP process seems to be weak. The process would benefit from research around the key questions of: How will these services be paid for (by government and the poor) when the subsidies run out? What are the current real costs, and future expected costs, of these services? When will cost-sharing begin and at what rate will the excess costs be transferred back to the population? What macro and micro conditions must be place first?

The sustainability of the currently subsidized social services should be a key part of the agenda. The recommendations from such an analysis will have wide-reaching impact on the selection and formulation of other policies, be it the re-introduction of user fees, changes in tax structure to increase revenue for social services, changes in the mix of public and private sector services, changes in levels of civil service staffing and infrastructure inventory, all the way down to a change in the quantities and qualities of services provided.

This is not a call for perpetual free services. It is a recognition of the fact that the present provision of heavily subsidized services, from the PRSP initiative as well as from bi-lateral donors and even NGOs, is not sustainable. Finding how to make them sustainable, and at the lowest cost to the lower economic strata of society in the long run, is a responsibility of all of the key players.

The discontinuity between the costs of the social sectors and the growth model have been raised before.²⁰ The economic growth and policy side of the PRSP seems divorced from the social services spending side. The PSIA may be the vehicle to relate growth to services sustainability. While DFID and BMZ put the question in terms of the contribution of improved health and education to economic growth, it begs the question of how (how much, for whom and when) economic growth will contribute to provision of social services.

Currently, World Learning in partnership with the Uganda Debt Network, has been conducting a study of how the rural poor define and accumulate “assets” and how they prepare for shocks. We have considered the loss of subsidy as a potential shock and have engaged communities in a discussion of how they will meet the recurrent costs of services. We hope to share the results of this on-going research later in the year.

²⁰ DFID Views on the PRSP Process (December, 2001) and BMZ Contribution to the WB/IMF PRSP/PRGF Review (work in progress)

Is PSIA a Technocratic or Political Process ?

The track record in PRSP development vis-a-vis participation has been spotty. While participation was made a conditionality on preparation, the Bank and IMF allowed individual governments to define the “who, how and how much” of that participation.

The PSIA User Guide has been admittedly written for Bank operational staff, national teams, “counterparts” (which is assumed to mean Ministries of Finance) and “policy-makers” (though these were not defined).

Perhaps the greatest questions that need to be asked about PSIA are: what triggers the process? Who decides, either ex ante or ex post, that a particular policy should undergo PSIA? Related to that: How is the process institutionalized into an on-going internal policy review system? How will costs of PSIA be transitioned to local budget sources?

PSIA is admittedly a time-consuming and expensive process, though the use of qualitative tools can reduce the expense and time dramatically. In the ex ante scenario, leads must be followed until the team can project the impact of the policy on the poor; as ex post analysis it must be able to elucidate corrective action when necessary. However, after a successful PSIA one can easily imagine that a necessary precursor to policy implementation (or change) would be some sort of legislative enactment to provide the enabling environment (change in tax laws, deregulation or regulation, anti-corruption parameters, empowerment of a particular body to implement a policy). What is worrisome about the PSIA and the “trigger” is the absence of consideration of legislatures in the process.

The bypassing of parliaments have featured in criticism of the PRSP by both Germany and the UK. DFID has said that the PRSP should not “over-privilege” NGOs at the expense of political institutions²¹. And BMZ echoed the same sentiments, calling participation by elected bodies unsatisfactory to date, and that civil society should not become a ‘substitute’ for legitimate political institutions²². Even a World Bank Report suggests that parliamentary hearings may achieve better participation²³.

Throughout the last half century the technical approach to resource allocation has replaced the political approaches. In Westminster-style parliamentary systems, this rationalist approach²⁴ meant that policy-making was limited to the highest levels of the ruling party of the government (the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, possibly a few of the line ministers). With a majority there is little need for public debate.

PRSP and other Bank/IMF policies (from decentralization to private sector development, from opening markets to reducing the size of civil services) should not be separated from another “primary” process – democratization. A successful PRSP resulting in a reduction of poverty but at the cost of exclusion or oppression seems like an unnecessary and potentially dangerous trade-off.

²¹ DFID Views on the PRSP Process (December, 2001)

²² BMZ Contribution to the WB/IMF PRSP PRGF Process (2001 work in progress)

²³ Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2001. Macroeconomic Policy, PRSPs and Participation, cited in Eberlei.

²⁴ See Fozzard A, 2001. The Budgeting Problem

Whether it fits into the economic models or not, the role of elected officials is, at least theoretically, that of the representatives of the people who elected them. They are a cohesive stakeholder group (a vocal and organized interest), and may be the only one that occupies that niche, whether they currently fill it well or not. Building their capacity to represent, their capacity to contribute to analysis, their integrity to be effective public servants, is as important to the long-term sustainability of an economy as any particular trade law. By engaging the entire political process, there is a better chance for fruitful debate and presentation of opposing views, as well as a peaceful transition of power²⁵. By reserving information and skills only to those in power, the Bank has made democracy more difficult. Using the PSIA as an engine to broaden the debate at all levels would be a major contribution to the improvement of good governance, a *sine qua non* for poverty reduction.

This can be done by first recognizing the legitimate political institutions and the political processes in place in a country. As has been pointed out, these may be strong or weak, informed or uninformed, crippled by corruption or cowering in naivete. It must be remembered that Ministers of Finance, with whom the Bank must deal in the future, do not come from the civil service – they come out of the political establishment. And sometimes they come from what is now the opposition.

PSIA may actually become a tool of political oppositions to validate their criticisms; those in power would use equivalent methodologies to prove their point. While such promotion of politicizing PSIA may be anathema, it would be true local ownership over a process. Finally, with increased capacity, an ultimate goal would seem to be that effective southern Civil Society Organizations and Public Policy Institutes would be able to launch, conduct, analyze and present their own PSIA studies.

Recommendation

The PSIA process, to achieve true local ownership, has to reside somewhere in the local policy analysis “system”, realizing that policies have both financial-fiscal and sectoral dimensions. It would seem reasonable that legislative bodies have a role in such analysis, especially within their committee (and staff) structure. Elected officials need information and the skills to use that information to discharge their duties as representatives and resource allocators, and as a check and balance on the executive.

In Malawi the national budget process is less than transparent. There is a short 21-day window in which to comment on a lengthy and complicated document and plan. This puts legislators at a disadvantage. World Learning has assisted its civil society partner, the Malawi Economic Justice Network, MEJN, to produce analysis on the budget and make it available to Members of Parliament and other sectors of the public. We hope to use this as a launch for a bigger project: a layperson’s guide for understanding and interpreting the national budget.

Finally, World Learning has realized that the Press can play an important role in the PRSP process. They may investigate and serve as an anti-corruption watchdog, as well as a balancing force in policy debate. They also can be an important conduit for information. In collaboration with the World Bank Institute, members of the media attended our first Uganda-Malawi PRSP Workshop and benefited from a video conference with Washington. The media must be brought

²⁵ Recent elections in Mali has brought into power a new set of players. How long will it take for them to catch up with the processes?

further into both the PRSP and PSIA processes, as a matter of promoting transparency and accountability, as well as information dissemination. Finally, the PSIA process can be an important vehicle for promoting economic literacy, if complex economic analysis are turned into more easy-to-understand messages.

Building Capacity

Almost all of the numerous references provided in this paper, as well as the PSIA User Guide itself, lament the lack of capacity in the south to conduct PSIA-like analysis. Some feel that such capacity needs to be built within government, while others make a case for civil society and its institutions (including the media), and still others promote building capacity in political institutions. This should not be a case of “either-or” but one of “and-both”.

This paper has made the assertion that PSIA needs processes that reach the poor rather than just the organized and vocal stakeholders that can support or oppose policy, that legitimate political institutions that have been by-passed have a role to play, and that economic growth models need to better define how social spending will be sustained (and if not, what the ‘phase-over’ strategy is). PSIA is a mechanism for transparency and accountability, especially if there is open participation, representation and information. These are, or should be, concerns of civil society organizations.

The introduction of PSIA provides an opportunity for the Bank and IMF to change the nature of the relationship (isolation within the halls of ministries of finance) and turn rhetoric about capacity building and participation by those that represent the poor into reality. While the User Guide and its appendices detail some sophisticated tools of analysis, there is also a call for the use of simpler and more qualitative tools such as Poverty Mapping, PPAs and Social Risk Assessment, to name but a few. These are inexpensive techniques, though they require: a) actual reach to the poor; and, b) a certain level of labor intensity, time consumption and coverage. Qualitative techniques have become the realm of the non-governmental organization (NGO) because they can meet these conditions.

The “Framework Proposal: Country Cases on PSIA”²⁶ is welcome because it proposes to “benchmark” PSIA, identify best practices through real-time use, and build capacity. However, the idea of this series of studies to build capacity could be expanded and made the focus of a new phase in the PRSP process – facilitating a new relationship between southern governments and their people through participation and joint ownership.

This is an opportunity to build a new partnership among the Bank and IMF, the international NGO community, southern NGO/CSOs, political institutions, universities and public policy institutes, not as much around a single PSIA, but as a much larger agenda built around a common framework for data collection, analysis and real debate on policies and alternatives. Rather than keep the PSIA process in the realm of the Bank and transfer the ownership later, start from a truly participatory framework.

The Framework Proposal suggests what types of PSIA studies should be done in the different countries. It charts out 7 major policy areas (which are really are policy “clusters”, while PSIA suggests dealing at the specific reform level). It would seem that the selection of “reforms” to

²⁶ Dated 12/2001, and published on the web, it proposes PSIA activities in 7 countries over a two-year period. In addition, 5 other PSIAs are to be done with other funding mechanisms and DFID is supporting an additional 6 studies, towards a total of 21 studies (3 each in 7 policy areas).

analyze should be a process in itself, based on the priorities and perceptions of the wide range of stakeholders, including the poor.

Recommendation

Therefore, it is recommended that PSIA not be seen as an analysis exercise but as a mechanism to build broad southern capacity. It should be seen as a major training input into the PRSP and provided with the resources, both human and financial, to be used primarily as an enabling process for civil society organizations, universities and public policy institutes, legislatures and the media. Such a change in emphasis from isolation to inclusion would certainly not hurt the Bank's reputation.

There is one note of caution, though. The User Guide calls for NGOs to be "employed" in the PSIA process (paragraph 86, bullet 4), and the Framework proposal frequently mentions "consultants". Non-governmental organizations need to have greater technical capacity and they need funding in order to participate (it has been amazing how much call there has been to build capacity of NGOs and southern institutions and so little money actually allocated for it). However, NGOs should not be seen by the Bank, governments or their constituencies as 'employees'. This could jeopardize their status, their independence and their relationship with their constituencies. The mistakes we have made in the North (of making NGOs dependent contractors) should not be recreated in the South. Civil society will always be dependent on funding (whether it comes from donations, members or grants), but they must be allowed to continue their philosophical role as an independent "Third Sector", mission-driven rather than paid servants.

Finally, capacity building is a deliberate process, not one of intermittent short seminars. It is a process of building real skills, changing attitudes and behaviors. It introduces new practices and new tools, allows for practical application and follow-up mentoring. Training of individuals needs to be in the light of improving the capability and performance of institutions. Such a training framework is more cost effective than large workshops in the long run, since it results in a cadre of trained personnel across the institutional spectrum, integrates and improves linkages among those institutions and creates a common framework for the future.