BITTER HARVEST

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF STATE FAILURE IN RURAL KENYA

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Abstract: Over the last two decades, Kenyans have suffered serious reverses in economic and social wellbeing. This paper, based on research in six districts supplemented by a review of secondary sources, explores the causes and social consequences of economic decline in rural areas. Conceptually, three aspects of this process are distinguished. The driving factors responsible for the erosion of rural livelihood systems are identified as reduced access to land, the corruption or collapse of formal institutions, and declining human capital due in considerable part to the impact of HIV and AIDS. Second, the coping mechanisms by which individuals and groups have responded to declining assets, services and opportunities are explored. These strategies include economic diversification and new forms of local collective action. Thirdly, the paper describes the impacts of these processes of change on gender and inter-generational relations in rural households, in which livelihood stress is increasingly reflected in tension and violence. Social disintegration and anomie are signaled in the upsurge of crime, violence and insecurity which have become a recent characteristic of rural Kenya, and the paper goes on to consider the incidence and social consequences of these phenomena.

Keywords: Africa, Kenya, rural development, livelihoods, coping strategies, diversification, crime, violence, gender, social exclusion, anomie

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INTRODUCTION

In its early years of independence, Kenya was the most prosperous country in East Africa, its GDP per capita rising by 38 percent between 1960 and 1980. The following two decades to 2000, however, recorded a zero increase in per capita GDP, while per capita income in 2003, at US$360, was lower than in 1990. Poverty incidence rose from 49 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 2001. Kenya’s social indicators have declined in tandem with the economy: infant mortality rose from 63 (per 1,000 births) in 1990 to 78 in 2002. Life expectancy declined from 57 to 46 years, in part due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The persisting hunger of children is evidenced in the 19 percent of under-fives who are underweight, and almost one in three (31 percent) who are wasting (CBS 2004). These are averages, but Kenya is a highly unequal society, with exclusion and disadvantage reflecting stratification by class, gender, and region. Kenya’s Gini coefficient for household income, at 0.57, is much higher than that of its East African neighbors, Uganda and Tanzania, whose coefficients stand at 0.37 and 0.38 respectively (GoK 2003; UNDP 2005). This ranks Kenya as one of the ten most unequal countries in the world, and the five most unequal in Africa. Inequality has been increasing, especially since 1994, when Kenya’s Gini coefficient was 0.45. As a result, the richest 10 percent of Kenya’s households now control more than 42 percent of the country’s total income, while the poorest decile make do with well under one percent. Regionally, more than twice the proportion of children die in the first year of their lives in Nyanza Province compared to the Rift Valley (133 vs. 61 deaths per 1000 live births), while a person born in Meru district can expect to live twice as long as one born in Mombasa (67 vs. 33 years) (SID 2004).

This paper explores the causes and social consequences of economic decline in Kenya, especially as these have affected rural households. In doing so, we distinguish the key factors which have driven change, the coping responses of rural households, and the impacts of these responses on intra-household relations. A conceptual schema relating these phenomena is represented in figure 1. At the lowest level of the figure are the factors most responsible for driving changing conditions under which rural households operate: declining access to land, widespread institutional degradation and diminishing human capital. At the next level, we distinguish the responses through which rural households and communities have responded to the consequent pressures placed on their systems of livelihood. The third and top level represents
the social impacts of livelihood adaptation. These impacts impinge at both micro and macro levels. The predominant focus of our attention is on the household, and the strains which shifting circumstances and livelihood strategies have put both on relations between men and women, and between generations. At the societal level, we trace a disturbing upsurge in crime and violence, accompanied by other signs of social dislocation and distress in response to these processes of social change.

Methodologically, this paper represents an innovative approach to social analysis which attempt to use local voices and social analysis to create a systemic account of key trends in Kenya at a national level. It draws on both secondary material and primary research for a Country Social Analysis of Kenya. The Country Social Analysis was undertaken for the Government of Kenya and financed by the World Bank, with the purpose of identifying and analyzing the key social issues that shape the macro context for development in rural Kenya. Research was undertaken in six of Kenya’s districts representing six or its seven Provinces: Isiolo District (Eastern Province), Nakuru (Rift Valley), Bungoma (Western), Kisii (Nyanza), Kiambu (Central), and Kwale (Coast). Some key features of these sample districts are given in table 1. Data was collected using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods between February and May 2005.

FACTORS ERODING RURAL LIVELIHOODS

Three main driving factors have been responsible for the erosion of rural livelihoods in Kenya: the pressure on natural resources and particularly on access to land; the widespread decline or collapse of institutions and services; and the depletion of human capital due especially to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The factors are related and mutually reinforcing.

Access to land

Rural livelihoods depend critically on access to land and other natural resources, and ninety percent of rural residents (who accounts for some 4 out of 5 Kenyans), derive their livelihood directly from land (KLA, undated; GoK, 2002; Kimemia 2000). However, a combination of demographic pressure, highly unequal distribution, and a problematic and
corrupted tenure regime make access to land increasingly scarce and inequitable. The ratio of land under crop cultivation to agricultural population in Kenya (a rough proxy for per capita farm size) halved in between the 1960s and the 1990s (from 0.46 to 0.23 ha/person). Available land is very unequally distributed: the Gini Coefficient of land per capita in 1997 was 0.56, with the lowest two quartiles owning 0.08 and 0.17 hectares of land respectively, according to a survey of small-holders in agricultural (i.e. excluding pastoral) districts (FAOSTAT and Kenya Agricultural Monitoring and Policy Analysis 1997 quoted in Jayne et al. 2001). These figures, even though they exclude households that own no land at all, nevertheless indicate a high level of functional landlessness (we may also note that they further underestimate inequality by excluding large farms and estates). Significantly, variation in landholding size in Kenya is largely a within-village phenomenon, no doubt because of the history of land settlements and social and institutional factors involved in obtaining access to land (Jayne et al. 2001).

While figures on mean areas of land owned per household give an indication of the diminishing areas of land to which households have access, and its unequal distribution, they fail to capture other important dimensions of access to land and natural resources. There is enormous variation between areas. Only 12 percent of Kenya’s land is ‘high potential land’ (the remainder divided between 6 percent ‘medium potential’ and 74 percent ‘low potential’), and 87 percent of this is concentrated in Central, Eastern and Nyanza Provinces where agriculture predominates, and in Rift Valley, a mixed area. In the extensive arid and semi-arid peripheries of the country, the distinctive dynamics of pastoral land use systems predominate. Similarly, statistics on mean area per household lend no insight into land quality, although in many areas degradation and erosion are serious constraints on agriculture and grazing. Finally, household statistics on land access obscure the severely disadvantaged terms under which most women are obliged to gain access to land, which lock them into inferior relations with their husbands’ kin groups and may disenfranchise them on widowhood.

If there is one generalization that does hold about land across Kenya, it is the intense level of its politicization. Land has been at the heart of Kenya’s political economy at least since the Crown Land Ordinance of 1902 established a dual society in which the colonial government set aside 3.1 million acres of the most fertile lands in the colony for 3,600 European farmers expropriating its indigenous users (Kariuki 2004). During the lead up to independence, the colonial strategy switched to the creation of a class of yeoman farmers through the intensification
of agriculture, stabilized by the consolidation, conversion and registration of customary land to freehold tenure, while trust lands not so transferred became vested in county councils. However, both the registration process, and the fiduciary duties of county councils were open to abuse. From the 1980s, fraudulent allocations of public land, including forest reserve, increasingly became a central element in the system of political spoils in all parts of the country. The courts are clogged with land disputes, and resort to violence between rival claimants is an everyday occurrence (Cross 2002). While land reform is an urgent matter, there is little consensus as to its objectives or how they can be achieved. The issue was broached in the new draft constitution, and was uppermost in the debate that preceded the referendum on the document in November 2005. However, the rejection of that constitution leaves the future of land policy less certain than ever.

In the meantime, under the influence of traditional inheritance systems by which land is divided equally between sons on the death of the father, plot sizes in the agricultural areas continue to diminish generation by generation and increasingly are too small to be workable. In our survey areas, land pressure and fragmentation were found to be particularly intense in the districts of Western Kenya (Kisii and Bungoma). However landlessness was perhaps more striking where it was combined with gross inequality. In the Central Province district of Kiambu, largely landless rural slums are crushed between some of the largest tea and coffee estates in the country, some of which cover thousands of hectares. The livelihoods of the landless of Kiambu have now been further undermined by the enforcement of forest legislation which precludes them from what had become an established practice of cultivating temporary plots on land formally within forest reserves. In Nakuru district, similarly, squatters lived in miserable conditions, forced to rely on casual labor or scavenging for their livelihoods on the borders of expansive farms belonging to the political elite that often lie idle. Pressure on land is one source of tension within households. As an assistant chief in Bungoma observed:

Land is becoming small yet there are too many people who depend on it as the main source of income. Several families have fought due to land. Last night, a woman and her children killed a man because of land. He had two wives and he was in the process of applying for an Agricultural Finance Cooperative loan. Fearing that she would loose the land, the woman organized for the murder. Most fights come from land.
Institutional degradation and collapse

Corruption

The maladministration and corruption which have come to characterize land dealings are one aspect of a general degradation of the institutions which were established to serve rural Kenyans, but which have, under the predatory political economy of the last two decades, collapsed or turned against them. Corruption has become a widespread trait of Kenyan institutions and one of the main factors responsible for impelling rural households into poverty.

Transparency International publishes an international index of perceptions of corruption, according to which Kenya’s performance has been consistently very poor. A CPI score of 2 or less (out of a maximum of 10) indicates severe, endemic or pervasive corruption, and Kenya’s rating has hovered around this level since surveys began (table 2).

However, national surveys of the incidence of bribery in Kenya suggest that in recent years, corruption has declined in some respects. The overall level of corruption encountered by the public declined in 2003, and again in 2004, though by significantly less than in the previous year (Aggregate Indices were 25.6 for 2002; 18.2 for 2003; and 14.9 for 2004). However, it would appear that, while the number of bribes paid per person has declined, their average size has increased to almost Ksh 5,000 ($67). This trend was most marked in the case of law enforcement where the size of bribes paid increased by a factor of 3, reflecting a sharp escalation in the size of bribes paid to police in rural areas. There was a substantial increase (from 25 to 42 percent), in the proportion of people who declined to pay bribes (Transparency International 2002, 2004, 2005).

The six organizations (out of 34) ranked by the public as the most corrupt in the Transparency International Kenya surveys were, in order: Kenya police, Teachers Service Commission, Local Authorities, Judiciary, Ministry of Lands, and Provincial Administration. Since all of these institutions impinge regularly on rural households, this ranking underlines that part that corruption has played in the declining quality of public services used by rural households. In our survey, only 11 percent of respondents considered that their roads were in reasonably good condition, while the equivalent figures for other services were 11 percent for

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1 US$ = Ksh 74.7 (1 April 2005)
markets, 13 percent for health facilities, 28 percent for schools, and 63 percent for water supply.\(^2\)

Below we consider briefly the services provided by some key institutions to rural dwellers: agricultural market organizations, primary and secondary schools, the police and courts, local government and nongovernmental organizations.

**Agricultural marketing services**

Given the widespread reliance of rural households on the production of export and food crops for sale, the increasing unreliability, ineffectiveness and inefficiency of agricultural marketing organizations has been most damaging to their livelihoods. Agricultural marketing in Kenya has since the colonial period been dominated by the state, typically through monopolistic marketing boards twinned with local marketing cooperatives. Households covered by our research had depended on such institutions for the marketing of coffee, tea, pyrethrum, cattle and milk.

In the case of coffee, for example, the mismanagement, politicization, and uneconomic fragmentation of cooperatives due to local factionalism, combined with huge levels of indebtedness, have made the transaction costs of marketing very high. Kenyan smallholders continue to receive less than one-half of the auction price – a measure of marketing efficiency which compares unfavorably with other countries such as India (around 80 percent) or Tanzania (65 percent). As a result, coffee does not provide an adequate livelihood for smallholders: a family with an acre under coffee, or about 500 trees was estimated to make only Ksh 1,900 ($25) in 2002 (Karanja and Nyoro 2002). As a result, Coffee production by Kenyan smallholders, who account for 70 percent of the production area of coffee and produce some of the highest quality crop, has been in decline.\(^3\) Farmers are locked into this inefficient system by their obligation to sell through their village cooperative societies.\(^4\) Even more dramatically, many pyrethrum growers were left stranded by the virtual collapse of marketing activities by the parastatal Kenya Pyrethrum Board, leaving farmers unpaid for several years of production.

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\(^2\) This last figure does not accord with the vast distances that many women have to travel for water or its poor quality. It may be that informants were referring to the quality of management of existing water sources rather than their accessibility.

\(^3\) In the case of coffee, world prices (falling at a rate of 3 and 5 percent per year for Arabica and Robusta respectively between 1970 and 2002) have also contributed to declining output.
The marketing vacuum for many commodities left by underperforming public agencies has increasingly drawn informal private buyers into rural areas, who, in the case of some crops, operate illegally. Informal buyers now account for 80 percent of sales of milk, a market which has been liberalized (Karanja 2001). Many farmers voiced their sense of powerlessness at being forced to be price takers, and also at the sharp practices in which they alleged informal buyers to engage. Nevertheless, even if they offer lower prices, informal traders deal often dealt in ready cash, which was especially important for households with precarious livelihoods.

**Education**

Schooling has long been seen by Kenyan families as a path out of poverty, and in the past, given the relatively small numbers who benefited from formal education, the quality of teaching, and the prospects of employment for school graduates, this has been a realistic assessment. However, as all of these factors have shifted unfavorably in the last two decades, growing numbers of educated and-semi-educated youth have been left unemployed and frustrated, and parents have begun to show some ambivalence about investing in education. Fees for secondary schooling have risen relative to rural incomes, while unemployment rates for 15-19 year olds and 20-24 year olds in Kenya are as high as 24 percent and 27 percent (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999). At the same time, the collapse of state-sponsored boarding schools and the corruption of the bursary (scholarship) system for patronage purposes, has closed other avenues of social mobility for gifted but poor children.

The policy of Free Primary Education (FPE), implemented from 2003 by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government and which increased school enrolment from 87 to 104 percent, was widely welcomed. Textbooks and learning materials provided through the FPE program were evident in most all primary schools in sample communities. However, this expansion has come at the cost of poorer quality. Classes have become unmanageably numerous and large relative to the number of teachers: one primary school in Nakuru had 14 streams, but only seven public service teachers, who were supplemented by three more paid by the community. Large classes, combined with the age of some of the new recruits (in 2004 an 84

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4 While recent legislation liberalized the sale of partially processed coffee, this does not appear to rule on the disposal of the cherry produced by smallholders.
year old man enrolled in Kapkenduiywa school in the western town of Eldoret sparking a debate in the national press), could lead to disciplinary problems. The freeze on teacher recruitment since 1999 meant that it was impossible to redress the question of class size without putting further strain on already stretched community resources. These trends were seen as reinforcing a longer-term trend in the quality of schooling: parents complained of teacher absenteeism and the inadequate preparation of their children for exams. Teachers, in turn, faced an increasing workloads on inadequate salaries. Dilapidated, crumbling facilities put a brake on learning, especially during the rains. Poverty and distance from the school meant that many pupils went all day without eating, leading to inattentiveness in the afternoon. In spite of the policy of notionally free education, the costs of uniforms, building levies and other school development charges was prohibitive for the poorest.

The gross enrollment rate in secondary schools in Kenya is now around 30 percent, though there is considerable variation between districts, and, overall, rural rates are lower.\(^5\) Enrollment has been declining since the 1990s (UNDP 2005). Secondary schools are relatively few and far between in rural areas, and reverses of the rural economy have made the costs of secondary education high relative to incomes. Given the high probability of unemployment facing school leavers, parents are beginning to question the value of the sacrifice required to put their children through secondary school. Parents were in any case generally unhappy about teaching standards while indiscipline, alcohol and substance abuse were said to be widespread. There were also a number of gender biases operating against girls: sexual abuse (not only on the way to school, but in the classroom itself); the burden of domestic chores when they arrived home; and being taken out of school for early marriage (e.g. in Nakuru and Isiolo).

**Local government**

The poor performance of public services in rural areas is in part owed to the structure and functioning of the Kenya’s local government system. Because of its fragmented organization, limited devolved powers and constrained resources, local government remains too weak to play

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\(^5\) Measured in terms of actual attendance, access to secondary school looks considerably worse, especially for rural areas: Net and gross attendance rations for rural secondary school attendance were only 10.3 and 20.3 percent respectively, according to the 2003 Demographic and Health Survey (CBS 2004:20) (Net AR = percentage of
an effective role in the oversight and coordination of investments and services. While, with the advent of the NARC government, resources have been made available at sub-national levels, these are not coordinated with any process of district planning and are thus open to use for the purposes of political patronage.

The fragmentation of local government stems from the parallel operation of several systems. Provincial and District Commissioners are appointed by the Office of the President, while key sector line ministries operate through deconcentrated District Offices, and elected local councils fall under the purview of the Ministry of Local Government. A recent assessment describes Local Authorities as operating with a ‘lack of financial resources, weak financial management discipline, insufficient planning and implementation capacity, ineffective monitoring, oversight and disciplinary action, and a relative absence of effective citizen participation’ (World Bank 2002).

Elected local councils have had limited resources and a marginal role in planning and service delivery. However, resources at their disposal were significantly augmented in 2000 with the introduction of the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF). In 2004, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) fund was passed, putting enormous resources into the hands of Members of Parliament. In addition to these funds, MPs were subsequently granted control of further substantial sums: an annual Ksh 5 million ($67,000) Bursary Fund for secondary school scholarships, and a Ksh 5-7 Constituency Roads Development Fund. All of these funds completely bypass all branches of the local government system, while the constituency, being an electoral rather than a local administration unit, lacks any administrative infrastructure. One district commissioner remarked that the government is spending a lot of money paying staff who are idle most of the time.

Overall it is too early to reach any conclusion about the likely impact of the LATF and CDF on rural wellbeing. However, because of its scale, and the lack of correspondence of the constituency with any administrative unit, the CDF raises particular concerns. MPs themselves

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*secondary-school-age (14-17 years) population that is attending secondary school; Gross AR = total number of secondary school students as percentage of official secondary-school-age population."

6 The size of LATF is linked to national income tax, and constitutes at present 5 percent of the revenue for this tax.

7 The Constituency Development Act (no 10 of 2004) requires the Minister for Finance to allocate not less than 2.5 percent of all Government ordinary revenue collected every financial year for development programs in the constituencies. This translates to approximately Ksh 5.2 billion ($79 million) per annum at the current revenue collection levels. The allocation for 2004-05 was Ksh 20 million ($270,000) per constituency, and this is set to increase for 2005-06.
appoint the Constituency Development Committees, which were supposed to administer the CD Fund: a clear potential conflict of interests, to which, we were told, the interests of transparency and equity had often succumbed. At the same time, as a result of publicity, constituents were increasingly questioning their MPs about the use of these funds. In one constituency, a systematic and transparent process had been institutionalized for broad participation in decisions about the CDF. In another, water supply, road repair and projects had been instituted, and a stalled secondary school project revived and completed. Other MPs, it was said, used the fund to continue the culture of occasional, personalized, politicized, and developmentally arbitrary largesse on their infrequent visits to their constituencies which had so characterized the previous political era. One of our discussants in Kiambu put this quite simply: ‘CDF ni rungu wabunge wamepewa kugonga wapinzani wao’ (‘CDF is a weapon MPs have been given to beat their opponents’).

At the local level, then, the fragmented nature of local government was reflected in the three-way division between the councilors, chiefs (the local representatives of the provincial and district administration system), and the local clients of MPs. Since decisions about neither LATF nor CDF funds are guided or constrained by any process of district level planning, the politicization of decisions over their allocation could result in either inequity or paralysis as each group of local political actors sought to frustrate the plans of its rivals. This was especially the case where these actors were affiliated with different political parties, or where the allocation of benefits was used to reinforce the fault lines of populist political mobilization, exacerbating clan and ethnic divisions in the process. With little information about the funds available or the rules governing their allocation, ordinary citizens remain open to manipulation.

**Police and access to justice**

With increasing levels of crime and violence, security and access to justice are increasing concerns in rural Kenya. Yet both police and Administrative Police (their local authority counterparts) in rural area are held in such great distrust that they are considered as part of the problem of crime, rather than its solution. Allegations that police assisted, protected, and armed

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8 A finding consistent the ranking by Transparency International’s, reported above, of the police as the most corrupt institution in the country.
criminals, hired out their uniforms, received stolen goods, and even undertook crimes themselves were so regular as to be commonplace. In one Kiambu research site, the community noticing assiduousness with which a certain Criminal Investigation Officer collected inventories of stolen goods from crime scenes grew suspicious that he was using it to cross-check goods received from thieves. Taking the law into their own hands, they ransacked his house and found stolen goods there. When the community protested to the police department, the offender was allegedly promoted and transferred to Nairobi. Because of their knowledge, networks, and unemployment, former police who had been retrenched were also said to be active criminals.

The links between police and the formal justice system are also tenuous: even when criminals were arrested, they were said to be released without action being taken against them if they had the means for a bribe. In Gesonso (Kisii) the assistant chief (the appointed representative of the district administration at the sub-locality) said he found it was impossible to control sales of illicit alcohol because as soon as the culprits are apprehended they buy their way out of police cells immediately.

Nongovernmental organizations

One response to the decline in the provision and quality of public services in Kenya has been the burgeoning of activities by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The number of NGOs increased from a few hundreds in the early 1990s to about 3,000 by 2003. The civil society sector has an expenditure of about US$ 267.7 million and its share of GDP is about 2.5 percent. Notwithstanding the enormous contributions of the NGOs and civil society organizations to the development process, there are some worrying trends in the sector. A recent survey on the sector in Kenya shows that corruption, nepotism, authoritarianism and other features characteristic of certain state institutions are now also increasingly found among civil society organizations (CSOs) (Kanyinga, 2002). Despite their large numbers nationally, the presence of NGOs in the study communities was surprisingly low, suggesting that their outreach to poor rural areas may not be that effective.

Even where evident, NGO activities remain poorly coordinated with each other and with government programs, and this can result in duplication of activities. While, formally speaking, NGOs are required to coordinate their activities through District Development Committees
(DDCs) the weakness of local institutions means that they generally operate with only minimal
government guidance, coordination or constraint. Further, driven by the imperative of obtaining
and sustaining external funding, NGOs may feel obliged to change their program priorities in
line with those of international donors.

Among NGOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs) have been particularly active in Kenya.
Being founded upon a confession and often centered on a long-established membership, are
liable to be more stable and rooted in communities than other organizations, and to be linked by
networks to the most remote and marginal areas. FBOs have a long history in the provision of
education and health services all over Kenya, and this role continues to be important in marginal
areas such as Isiolo. However, FBOs faced two challenges in their community development
efforts. The first was the limited inclusion which often accompanied the restriction of benefits to
the membership of the confession. This can be especially problematic given the plurality of
religious life in Kenya. The second was the dependency which resulted from some FBOs giving
insufficient attention to the building of local capacity to manage initiatives after their departure.
A specific challenge affecting the work of Islamic NGOs was the US pressure said in recent
years to have led to the obstruction of the flow of funds supporting legitimate social development
programs.

Despite heroic achievements, then, and considerable international support over the last
two decades, NGOs suffer from systemic weaknesses and have not been able to fill the yawning
gap that has opened in the provision of public services. Indeed, the dependence on external
support and management may only add to vulnerability when outside organizations withdraw.

HIV/AIDS and the erosion of human capital

As we have seen, health indicators remain poor in Kenya. There are many reasons for
this: 70 percent of its population is at risk from malaria, which kills an estimated 34,000 children
under five each year (that is, some 93 each day) and accounts for about one in three outpatient
visits. Children are also vulnerable to diarrhea and pneumonia. There was anecdotal evidence of
a rise in typhoid in several of our sample points, due to increasingly difficult access to clean
potable water, poor sanitation and overcrowded housing conditions.
The single most devastating impact on Kenyan health has been that of HIV/AIDS. 7 percent of Kenyan adults, and 6 percent of rural residents, are infected with HIV. Rates of infection amongst women are almost twice as high as those of men (8.7 percent to 4.6 percent), reflecting the particularly vulnerability of young women to HIV infection compared with young men (CBS 2004).

The devastating impact on households is indicated by the statistic that in Kenya one child in nine is orphaned (i.e. has lost one or both biological parents): 9 percent of children under 15 years of age have lost their fathers, 4 percent have lost their mothers, and 2 percent have lost both of their parents. Only 58 percent of children live with both parents. (CBS 2004). In 2003, there were 650,000 AIDS orphans in Kenya. (UNAIDS 2004). There is considerable regional variation in this as in other social statistics: in Nyanza province, almost one in five (19 percent) of children are orphaned). In rural areas (as to a large degree in urban), the fostering of children is largely a family responsibility. However, we came across a few faith-based initiatives providing support to orphans.

There is clear evidence that orphaned or fostered children are disadvantaged in schooling compared with children of non-HIV-infected parents. Fostered children also tend to be more undernourished than children of non-HIV-infected parents. Children of HIV-infected parents are more likely to be underweight and wasted, less likely to be attending school, and less likely to receive medical advice and treatment when sick with ARI or diarrhea than children of non-HIV-infected parents, according to analysis of the Kenya DHS data by Mishra et al. (2005).

AIDS also has an impact on labor productivity. Under the relatively controlled conditions of a Kericho tea estate, AIDS sufferers show significant declines in productivity in the three years prior to demise (Fox et al 2004).

HIV/AIDS has had multiple and compounding effects on rural households: decreasing the income and productivity of household providers; creating extraordinary needs for the care of the sick; increasing the burden of dependency as able bodied working adults suffer illness and die; increasing household expenditures on health and related costs; necessitating withdrawal of children from school both to provide care and because of diminishing household income; occasioning neglect and abuse of foster children. The pandemic is creating growing number of households headed by children or grandparents. Widows are also highly vulnerable as their property rights may be severely compromised after their husbands’ death. As a result, women
and children may be the victims of sexual exploitation. Secondary effects on rural households include the impact on HIV/AIDS on the quality of schools and other services as trained personnel fall to the epidemic.

**RESPONSES**

How have rural households adapted to the pressures which declining access to land and services the AIDS pandemic have placed on them? This section considers the shifts in livelihoods at individual and household levels, and the ways in which these have been supported by collective responses.

**Livelihood Diversification, coping and failing to cope**

Perhaps the main response to the challenges outlined in the last section has been diversification. Livelihood diversification has been widely recognized phenomena in Africa in recent decades as households have sought to sustain themselves by means of a wider array of economic activities (Ellis, 2000). Often, diversification may be a positive response to new opportunities. In rural Kenya, however, it has often involved a forced shift into more marginal activities as earlier livelihood systems have become unviable. Forms of diversification recorded in our study included shifts to new farm enterprises, to off-farm sources of income, and to non-farm activities.

In Nakuru, farmers had uprooted their pyrethrum in response to nonpayment for the crop which arose from the crisis of the PBK. One standby had been milk sales, but the instability of the Kenya Cooperative Creameries left this, too an unreliable option. Farmers were obliged to rely upon growing potatoes and tomatoes instead. However, these crops being both bulky and perishable, only made the lack of roads and market infrastructure more problematic. For both these crops, and for such marketing of pyrethrum and milk as continued, farmers were now largely reliant upon small, private traders. While these often paid cash up front, farmers felt that the prices were offered low, and alleged that some buyers engaged in sharp practices.

In Kisii District, some former pyrethrum and coffee farmers had switched to tea production, the scarcity of suitable land, together with the time taken for the crop to establish, meant this option was not viable for most. In both Kisii and Kiambu districts, farmers had begun
tree farming – most commonly Eucalyptus which can be used or sold as fuel or building material. Stall fed cattle were a new enterprise for many households, especially in densely populated districts such as Kiambu. Poultry also required little land or capital (though yielded only small returns). Options for diversification, of course are limited by land availability and quality, climatic factors, access to capital and markets, the availability of labour, and technical knowledge. Since these are unevenly distributed, actual patterns of diversification varied widely within and between communities depending on factors such as the nearness of a road, membership of a credit group, the number of able-bodied adults in the household, the presence of buying agents, or access to extension advice. For example, although the proximity of Nairobi meant a ready market for vegetable production, for areas such as Kiambu, the lack of cultivable land (and competition from other producers) meant that for many poorer households, this was not an option.

While work on their own farms remains an important activity for many rural dwellers, it has become increasingly difficult for households to sustain themselves from their own farms alone. In more remote settlements, casual labor on the land of better-off neighbors was one of few stand-bys. Others commuted daily to urban settlements for work. Rates of pay for casual labor are low, especially for women, and tend to be inversely related to distance from urban or trading centers. Typical rural daily wage rates for rural women were KSh 50 to 60 ($0.67 to $0.80) – hardly sufficient for a meal.

The growing importance of non-farm income for African rural households has been described as ‘de-agrarianization’ (Bryceson 1996). Increasingly, rural Kenyan households look beyond farming to occupations such as petty trading (most commonly in foodstuffs and second-hand clothes), retail kiosks or eating-places. In land-short Kiambu district, many young men had taken up the itinerant hawking of household goods. Although low purchasing power in rural areas limits the market for services, other increasingly common niches include boda boda (bicycle ‘taxis’), brick making, brick laying and water sales. Beer brewing has become an important source of income for rural women.

Unemployment and growing land shortages have resulted in out-migration to both rural and urban areas. Often these movements follow long established patterns. From Kisii district, the most densely populated rural district in Kenya (758 persons per km²), people have migrated to Molo, Narok and Bomet districts where farmland could still be obtained. Young people from all
areas migrate to urban areas in search of employment, for example from Kwale to Ukunda or Mombassa. Some young men had been able to go overseas.

Strategies of migrants vary from district to district, often depending on the networks of information and contacts established by earlier waves of migration. The unqualified go into domestic service or join the urban casual labor force, while those with some education hold out for better opportunities. In Isiolo, these networks seem largely restricted to low-paying jobs as night-watchmen in urban areas and out-migration was seen as a strategy for those who are unable to farm or find and alternative means of survival nearer home. The ambiguous attitude to education and migration is captured in the views of one elder from Rapsu (Isiolo District), who remarked that the current education system was creating misfits: ‘Young people are not competitive in the job market due to their low education levels, but at the same time they cannot be herders because of their changed aspirations.’

While migration results in new employment, and often in remittances for those left at home, it can have negative impacts, in reducing labour available for agriculture, and adding to the vulnerability of households headed by women, and the elderly, especially when traditional collective and reciprocal labour arrangements have broken down, as was the case in most areas.

Diversification within and beyond farm enterprises and migration are widely documented responses to stress on livelihoods in Kenya and neighboring countries. However, as pressure on livelihoods continues to intensify under the influence of the factors already noted, two dimensions of the change are worth particular emphasis. First responses are highly gendered. Male-centered livelihood systems, such as cash cropping, pastoralism and migrant labor have tended to be eroded, while new opportunities (food crop production, petty trade, beer brewing, etc.) tend to fall into women’s domain. As we shall see, this differential has far-reaching consequences. Second, as poverty drives desperation, there is a marked trend towards the criminalization of livelihoods. This is so in two senses: there is, first, a rise in activities such as robbery and assault, which would readily be classified as crimes. Second, often the only few activities to which household members can turn (for example, forest exploitation, charcoal burning, commercial sex work, and the brewing, distillation and sale of alcohol), are themselves formally illegal. We shall return to these points in subsequent sections.
Collective responses to livelihood erosion

The shifting livelihood strategies described above have often been accompanied or facilitated by local collective action. Community-based organizations have a long history in Kenya. They vary in size, form and function, and include women’s groups, welfare associations, youth groups, communal self-help groups and savings and credit associations (Wanyama 2003). Table 3 shows membership of different types of groups in the study areas. The table indicates that group membership is quite widespread, but also variable, both in the types of groups to which informants belonged, and between districts. For example, while micro-finance groups are widespread, only a minority are members in any district, and in some districts (Bungoma and Isiolo), this amounts to a fairly small percentage.

One marked feature of local organizations is their gendered nature. Single-sex groups tended to predominate over mixed groups, and female over male. Informal women’s groups have long been a hallmark of social organization in Kenya. Traditionally, these groups served as collective self-help organizations, providing economic and labor assistance to women during childbirth and family crises. In the 1980s, the government promoted women’s groups as a development strategy, and by the early 1990s there were estimated to be 24,000 to 30,000 such groups in Kenya, a trend which has no doubt continued up to today (Boulay and Valente 1999). The present study found women’s groups to be quite widespread in some districts (Bungoma and Kiambu) but much rarer in others (Kisii, Nakuru and Kwale districts). The likely reasons for this, discussed further below, seem to combine cultural constraint (on the freedom of women to associate and make decisions), and women’s lack of control of the resources essential to the reciprocity of group life. In the areas where they were present, women’s groups promoted quite a range of income-generating activities (dairy cows, tree planting, and some instances of collectively-farmed plots), as well as promoting educational activities in areas such as health, family planning and agriculture, and providing assistance to their members during illness and bereavement.

A common format for female, and, to a lesser extent, male and mixed groups, is the rotating savings and credit associations often known locally as ‘merry-go-rounds’. Members meet regularly to contribute money, paying the total proceeds to each member in turn. A variant on this arrangement is known as ‘table banking’ where funds contributed by the membership may be borrowed by either individual members or outsiders at an interest rate set by the group.
Profits are shared out periodically or reinvested. Women use the proceeds to pay school fees and meet household expenses. In some groups in Bungoma district, contributions are used to buy an animal (typically a dairy cow or goat) for each member in turn. Smaller sums fund purchases such as clothes and kitchen utensils.

Frequently communities come together to supplement the failing services of the state through the provision of infrastructure or personnel: building or refurbishing schools, dispensaries, houses for teachers and health workers, and tea or coffee buying centers. Even in relatively poor communities, contributions are made by all households to hire teachers in order to supplement the inadequate numbers of government staff. In Chemaner (Nakuru) the community had recruited three teachers to support the seven Teachers Service Commission teachers in the local primary school and was paying their salaries. In Ndavaya (Kwale), the community had hired a community health worker to support the government-paid nurse. While able to mobilize resources in the short run, taking on responsibility for recurrent expenditures and for the management of facilities often proved a challenge, especially with given failing rural incomes.

The above account suggests a fairly dense network of social capital in some rural communities. However, it should not be assumed that, even where this is the case, systems of solidarity and reciprocity encompass the whole community. Most of the groups encountered consisted of peers of similar socio-economic status and existed for the purposes of mutual support. In fact, our survey revealed that, while there was general recognition of the level of need in the community, and while the adoption of orphans was quite widespread, the level of material transfers between better off and poorer households was relatively modest. A growing social differentiation is emerging in communities villages as the ties of extended kinship are attenuated, and differences in class and status emerge based on incomes, and patterns of consumption (including use of private schools and health facilities). Declining social solidarity is also reflected in increases in criminal behavior, while increasing insecurity has lent a spatial dimension to social stratification as the better-off move to the relative safety of towns (see further below).

This observation leads us to consider the relationship between the poverty of individuals and communities, and the prevalence of groups. While collective local action is often a response to state failure and poverty, the poorest, lacking any surplus (including, often, time for group activities), may simply be unable to participate in group activities. It would thus appear that
something of an inverted ‘U-shaped curve’ exists in the relation between wealth and group formation, with the poorest and wealthiest communities and individuals being less involved in communal life than those in the middle range. The reason for the dearth of women’s groups in Rapsu, Isiolo district, women said, was that they could not afford to sustain group activities and financial obligations. Similarly, in Bongoloa (Nakuru) women reported that such groups were only active when food was plentiful but tended to disintegrate during droughts as funds became scarce and attention became focused on household survival. In other areas, even where solidarity groups are common, many, especially the very poor, the chronically ill and the disabled, do not belong to any group. These vulnerable groups are increasing in size because of the impact of HIV/AIDS.

In this regard, both poverty and diversification can act as forces for individualization. In many areas, traditional mechanisms of reciprocity and support for the vulnerable were found to be breaking down. For example, in Isiolo, the well-defined traditional arrangements by which wealthier herd owners would lend cattle to assist the less fortunate in establishing herds have now fallen into desuetude. More generally, the growing number of widows, widowers and orphans in rural communities, have strained traditional mechanisms of support (such as the tilling the land for widows in Kwale), to breaking point. Time poverty and spatial dislocation, too, intervene to inhibit support for the vulnerable as diversification and migration intensify.

**Social Impacts**

The economic decline of recent decades has not only eroded livelihood systems but also brought about radical shifts in relations between household members. Despite the widely differing ways in which crisis has impinged on the six districts, a similar pattern emerges across the country. Collapsing services and livelihood opportunities have put increasing strains on social roles and obligations, in particular on relations between men and women and between parents and children. Sometimes, indeed increasingly, these strains reach breaking point, or spiral into a pathology of abuse and violence.
Gender relations and gender violence

The context for the shift in gender relations is the collapse of established sources of income from cash crops such as coffee, pyrethrum and sugar, the decline of pastoralism for political, security and ecological reasons, and the falling off of the forms of labor migration established during the colonial period.

To generalize rather broadly, the livelihood systems which have thereby been most severely eroded (though underpinned by female productive and domestic labour), tended to be dominated by men. In the case of cash crop production, male dominance was secured through patriarchal land tenure systems and the customary norms controlling the disposal of cash income. Pastoralism was also largely a male preserve, small ruminant and dairy marketing sometimes excepted. Likewise, men were the main agents in labor migration.

Concurrent with this ‘demasculation’ of the rural economy, new opportunities often extend to what were traditional female roles. These include food crop production, petty trade, informal services, beer brewing, casual labour, domestic service, and the gathering of forest products such as wild fruit of firewood.

These factors have conditioned the very different ways in which men and women have responded to change: that is to say, the responses outlined in the last section have been markedly gendered. Men, with unreliable markets for traditional produce, crumbling niches for migrant employment, and (for pastoralists) their herds in decline, have increasingly found themselves unable to meet their long-established roles in supporting the household. Their characteristic response has been one of withdrawal. Women, finding themselves responsible for filling a growing gap in household provisioning, have sought to ensure their own and their children’s survival through a multiplication of means: a combination of intensification, diversification and cooperation. As a result, women have become not only the domestic but the economic heart of households, while men have moved to the periphery, in fact, if not in ideology. This is also reflected in patterns of residence: more than one-in three rural households are now headed by women (CBS 2004).

Findings from Isiolo district illustrate some of these points. In Manyatta Demo, Isiolo district, where the pastoral economy has never recovered from the brutal government counter-insurgency activities in the 1960s and raiding by ethnic groups from the east in the 1980s, men are engaged in relatively few economic activities. In fact, for those without capital (which is
most) about the only available occupation is the precarious, low return, and illegal activity of producing and selling charcoal. Women, on the other hand, have a much wider set of pursuits: collecting and selling of firewood, selling miraa (khat), milk, eggs and honey; gathering wild fruits, herbal medicines and incense; weaving baskets and mats; and making bread. While most of these activities are small-scale and low-return, they nevertheless amount to a portfolio on which their households survive.

Similarly, in Nakuru, pyrethrum production for export has been replaced by the cultivation of food crops for the domestic market, which women are mainly responsible for cultivating. As one woman put it: ‘the children have to eat and attend school’.

Alongside with the rising demands placed on women by changing livelihoods systems, the burden of domestic care has also increased. The high incidence of HIV/AIDS, as well as other health problems such as malaria and tuberculosis, and the lack of alternatives, mean that most care for the sick is ‘home based’. This burden falls largely on women, along with the already demanding set of chores which include childcare, cooking and the collection of water and firewood.

Socio-economic change has undermined social value, identity and self-esteem of men, leading to what Silbershmidt (2005) has termed their ‘disempowerment’. For women, on the other hand, the ubiquitous triple burden – in the economic, domestic and community spheres – has intensifying in all three dimensions. However, these processes are not translated into the empowerment of women, since the recognition of the feminization of the rural economy is obscured and muted by patriarchal ideology. Although women are increasingly the generators of household income, men still control immoveable and moveable property, and seek to retain decisions making power over disposal and expenditure. As one Bungoma man put it: ‘if she [my wife] buys sugar, I have bought it. If she buys a cow, it is mine because she lives in my house and tills my land free of charge.’ The increasing divergence between the patriarchal ideology reflected in this view and the material reality of household provisioning leads to tensions that more and more overflow into violence.

Half of all Kenyan women have experienced violence since they were 15, and one in four in the twelve months prior to being interviewed (three in ten in the case of currently married women). There is substantial regional variation in these figures, with domestic violence most endemic in the west of the country: proportions of women having experienced violence were 73
percent in Western and 60 percent in Nyanza Provinces, compared to the lowest figure of 30 percent in Coast province. Husbands (58%) are the main perpetrators of this violence, followed by teachers (25.7%), mothers (23.8%), fathers (14.5%) and brothers (8.2%) (CBS 2004).

Regional variations in domestic violence appear to relate both to cultural norms and to increasing pressure on land and livelihoods. In Bungoma and Kisii the ‘disciplining’ of wives was described as if it were an elemental component of local culture. A typical view expressed by a Bungoma man was that ‘a woman must be beaten by the man to instill respect and a sense of discipline.’ Women, too, appeared to accept that, that once bridewealth has been paid and they have borne children, there was nothing to be done to avoid beating.

Such expressions of timeless patriarchy aside, there are indications that, far from being a hangover from a primitive past, domestic violence in Kenya is in fact increasing not only in incidence but in severity. Most importantly, our interviews with women consistently indicated that this was the case. In particular, women emphasized the connection between increasing alcohol abuse in their communities and domestic violence. In support of this view, there is evidence that at least some traditional systems, while permitting a man to beat his wife, also circumscribed these rights: if he used violence without pretext, drew blood or broke a limb, he would have to answer to, and compensate, his in-laws. With the fragmentation of extended family ties, these limited protections have largely broken down. A second, though inconclusive, indication that wife-beating is not simply an aspect of tradition comes from the KDHS statistics: by many measures, the incidence of gender-based violence is lowest among the social groups with no education. Indeed the fact that, of all education groups, gender violence is most prevalent amongst those with incomplete primary education suggests a link between with frustrated aspirations and violence in the home.

Growing violence against women is also manifested in the escalating incidence of rape in Kenya, which also increasingly accompanies other crimes. Rape is not reported for many reasons, not least because of the limited seriousness with which it is taken by the authorities, and so official statistics are of limited utility in establishing trends. However, Police statistics show that 2,800 cases of rape were reported in Kenya in 2004, an increase of 500 compared to the previous year, and over five times higher than in 1990, when only 515 cases reported. Kenya’s

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9 Since the 2003 Health and Demographic Survey, is the first survey in which gender-based violence in Kenya has been systematically surveyed, there is no statistical evidence on trends in domestic violence.
coalition on Violence against Women estimates that only 8 percent of women report the attack to health officials or police. Rural women, frequently obliged to fetch water or forest products during the night, are vulnerable to sexual assault.

**Intergenerational conflict**

In many Kenyan households, tension between the generations is high. Levels of unemployment among young people are such that many lack the resources to establish their own households and are forced to remain in the parental home. Unemployment, combined with the expectations created by education breeds a hopelessness and frustration. Youth, and even adults, wishing to farm are often constrained by the limited land available and its control by the older generation. On their part, parents complain that their grown-up children contribute insufficiently to household expenses. Parental disapproval of their children’s lifestyles and anxiety about the risks of their engagement in risky behaviors such as substance abuse and crime adds further tension. Media reports suggest that violence between parents and children is not uncommon.

Our survey asked what caused intergenerational violence in their communities. Results are given in Table 4. Land was the leading cause of tension in densely-populated Kiambu (562 persons per km$^2$) and Bungoma (424 persons per km$^2$) districts, as well as in Nakuru (164 persons per km$^2$) where land shortage was compounded by severe inequity. By custom in many groups, land is not transferred to children until the death of the father. Thus access to land on the part of sons may remain provisional for many years, leading to their reluctance to invest in agriculture. Tradition is only one reason for parent’s reluctance to apportion land: in the three most land-short districts, there were complaints of children, typically those with some education and little interest in agriculture, selling off family land to offset debts or simply for immediate consumption. Land was much less of an issue for intergenerational conflict in Kwale (60 persons per km$^2$), and pastoral Isiolo (4 persons per km$^2$). Interestingly, in Kisii, the most densely populated of all rural districts (758 persons per km$^2$), the leading cause of contention was school fees. It would seem that the fragmentation of land has by now proceeded so far that agriculture is no longer considered a viable livelihood, so that education is seen as the only route out of poverty (though, as we have seen, it has become an increasingly unreliable one). In Kwale, tensions between generations were mostly said to be fueled by alcohol, and the same was true of
Bulla Pesa in Isiolo (Bula Pesa is an ethnically mixed settlement. At the other two sample points in Isiolo district, intergenerational violence was reportedly minimal. These sites were predominantly Moslem, and alcohol was hardly used. *Khat* was the recreational drug of choice.)

Violence against children is also endemic in schools. As we saw above, the perpetrator of the violence they had experienced during the last twelve in the case of 26 percent of women had been a teacher. According to Human Rights Watch:

> For most Kenyan children, violence is a regular part of the school experience. Teachers use caning, slapping and whipping to maintain classroom discipline and to punish children for poor academic performance. The infliction of corporal punishment is routine, arbitrary, and often brutal. Bruises and cuts are regular by-products of school punishments, and more severe injuries (broken bones, knocked-out teeth, internal bleeding) are not infrequent. At times, beating by teachers leave children permanently disfigured, disable, or dead (1999: 2).

**Crime, violence and insecurity in rural areas**

As a United Nations report notes, crime:

> impairs the overall development of nations, undermines spiritual and material well being, compromises human dignity and creates a climate of fear and violence, which endangers personal security and erodes the quality of life (1992:6).

The crime rate in Kenya rose by 51 percent between 1994 and 2000. High levels of violence have long been a feature Nairobi and other urban areas, but perhaps the most striking finding of our research was the extent to which crime and violence has permeated rural areas. The trend towards rural criminality is a relatively recent phenomenon, traced by most respondents to the last five years. The new wave of rural crime is also associated with unprecedented levels of brutality, robbery increasingly being accompanied by murder, rape, and the wanton destruction of property. Sometimes such acts of violence are not even accompanied by theft, suggesting that they were driven only by frustration, anger and resentment. In Bungoma district just before our fieldwork, a gang had attacked ten households, gang raping women and
girls, assaulting men and destroying property, but stealing nothing. One informant observed that ‘it is as if they wanted to humiliate their victims’.

Changing patterns of rural crime are associated with changing weaponry. In the past, as we were told in Kiambu, thieves used sticks or stones, but now they came with guns, making resistance by victims or neighbors futile or fatal. Decades of instability in surrounding countries as well as much of Kenya’s pastoralist periphery have made small arms cheap and readily available. Increasingly, thieves act with the arrogance born of impunity:

‘they come during the day and some even give notice of their intended visit, and there is nothing anyone can do’ (Bungoma informant).

In Ngecha (Kiambu) a woman commented that:

We are producing clever thieves. Young people are educated up to university level but they are jobless. Such people will use their knowledge to steal or they become so frustrated to the extent of venting their anger on innocent community members.

Instances of petty theft – of food from farms and minor items from houses had increased at all sites as poverty had intensified, local enforcement systems and sanctions declined in authority, and the effectiveness of formal policing and justice systems deteriorated. In Nakuru, we were told that food might be stolen while still cooking on the fire, or clothes filched while drying. That these instances were said to be seasonal suggested that they were driven by immediate needs during hungry periods. In Kiambu and Bungoma, on the other hand, petty theft was generally blamed on the need of young men to feed their alcohol and substance abuse habits.

Stealing from the government such as forest products from reserves or water pipes from government stock was not locally considered as culpable compared to stealing from individuals. In fact, as noted above, one aspect of the buckling of livelihood systems has been recourse to activities which are formally illegal, such as charcoal production, beer brewing and prostitution. Given the lack of alternatives, the illegality of these activities, while exposing them to extortion from police, local government or forestry officials, tended not to reduce their incidence, but only their profitability. In Nakuru, men and women would set out at dusk with their bicycles walking 20 or more km into the forest to collect a load of charcoal and transport it under cover of darkness to Nakuru town. Being caught by officials would mean a fine, a beating, or both.
Commercial sex work was well established in two of our sample communities. In Bulla Pesa, a suburb of Isiolo town, in which there is a high military presence, prostitution has become the mainstay of the economy. Clients are said to prefer young girls: children as young as 8 years old are involved in the trade, and command the highest prices. This is reflected in the nomenclature: girls aged from 8 to 14 years were known as “nice”, teenagers as “coca cola” (‘sweet but not as good as “nice”’) and girls 19 and over as “mitumba” (second hand). The drawing of children into commercial sex work at such a young age is a reflection both of the extreme desperation of the situation in which many households find themselves, as well as a critical breakdown in the moral fabric and norms of the community. The ravages of HIV/AIDS could be seen in the number of households consisting only of the children and the aged. Commercial sex workers complained that their clients were often unwilling to use condoms, and were willing to pay higher prices for unprotected sex. Desperation is echoed in the word of one young woman: ‘it is better to live now rather than worry about HIV which will kill you 10 years later’.

The exchange of sexual favors for food or money is not limited to a class of commercial sex workers. Many women, we were told in Sirisia (Bungoma), and Karia (Kiambu), and elsewhere, resorted to extra-marital relations to meet their household needs. One man in Karia (Kiambu) described a deep, but unfortunately far from rare, form of humiliation in these words: ‘as a jobless husband you watch and eat the food knowing well that another man paid for it because you have no alternative.’

The corruption and ineffectiveness of the police was noted in an earlier section, and failure of the government to provide security to its citizens has led many rural communities to safeguard their lives and property through the formation of vigilante groups. In Bogiakumu (Kisii), for example, where levels of crime had risen to unmanageable levels, the community formed groups to patrol at night, systematically ostracized suspected criminals, and on occasion went as far as destroying their property. Most people considered, the response to have successfully restored security in the community.

Quite often, community vigilantes will go further than destroying property. Lynching has become an established practice in all districts as communities’ frustration at the unwillingness or inability of the government to control crime and violence in the rural areas mounts. This was particularly true in the districts of Kiambu and Kisii (in the latter, lynching could sometimes be
justified in the idiom of witchcraft). Lynching was considered not only to purge the community of persistent troublemakers, but to serve as a disincentive to others. It also appeared to manifest an element of protest against the authorities at their failure to act more decisively and who are believed to facilitate or actively assist criminal activities. Most considered the effectiveness of mob action to outweigh its fundamental injustice and the inability of the victims to defend themselves.

Community policing, and even the excesses of vigilantism, are generally condoned by the authorities. Nevertheless, the organization of bands of youth to protect the community has created its own problems. Service is generally on a voluntary basis, and hence it is hard to sustain interest among young people, who are in any case a mobile group in search of employment. Sometimes, once created, vigilante groups have turned to crime and extortion themselves, or been manipulated to pursue goals unrelated to crime prevention, such as to settling grudges or political scores.

In Isiolo district, self help for community security took a still more radical form. After years of cattle raiding from their neighbors to the east, alleged to have been actively assisted by the national armed forces, the Boran communities of Isiolo district in the early 1990s systematically armed themselves, obtaining small arms from a neighboring country for this purpose. More recently, communities in Isiolo district have established peace committees, in coordination with the provincial administration and an NGO, that are having some success in maintaining peace and security in the district.

The epidemic of crime and violence in rural areas is having an impact on the social composition of rural communities as the better-off are increasingly unwilling to live in, invest in (or even in some cases to visit) their home communities. Many rural communities had witnessed this phenomenon, though it was reported to be most marked in those areas with the highest incidence of crime, such as Kiambu and Kisii. Persistent gang attacks in Karai (Kiambu) have driven better-off members of community from their houses in the village to the nearby towns of Kikuyu or Limuru. Although these towns are themselves far from being crime-free, protection is easier since, houses are clustered together so as to facilitate joint security arrangements in a way that is not possible in dispersed rural settlements. In Kisii, middle-class migrants increasingly avoid even staying overnight when visiting their communities of origin for fear of becoming the target of robbery and violence.
Retail and other businesses are also being driven by crime from smaller rural communities to the relative safety of towns. Crime compounds the costs of doing business enormously, though direct losses to criminals, the costs of evasive and protective measures, and the physical, psychological and health costs of violence. A women store-keeper in Karai (Kiambu) told us that she had twice been robbed in the last year on her way to the bank. She now varied her patterns and means of transport, hoping to avoid another incident, but was considering abandoning her store as her profits had been decimated.

Insecurity in many rural areas has a seasonal dimension, peaking at times when payments are made for tea, coffee or sugarcane crops, and it is common knowledge that farmers have money in the house. A seasonal calendar produced by residents of Kimabole (Bungoma) showed close variation of crime and violence to the climatic /crop cycle, food availability and festivals such as Easter and Christmas holidays.

Substance abuse and psychological anomie

In the final part of this section, we turn our attention to the ways in which the economic and social changes outlined above – collapsing institutions, increasingly marginal and precarious livelihoods and a growing culture of violence – have affected states of mind. Development literature has given little attention to the relationship between social structure and subjective states of mind and feeling, and yet there are at least two strong reasons for doing so. First, from the point of view of society as a whole, and especially for those likely to be the victims of violence, one of the main impacts of insecurity is a psychological one. Second, the explanation of spiraling violence appears to lie not only in part in the rational calculation of economic ends on the part of perpetrators – that is in crime as a rational livelihood strategy. More and more, violence is the acting out of emotional states of resentment and frustration. With this in mind, we look briefly at three indicators of psychological disequilibrium in Kenya: alcohol abuse, depression and suicide.

Alcohol abuse is a very widespread problem in Kenya, affecting 70 percent of households according to the Kenya Medical Research Institute. In rural areas, drinking is predominantly, though by no means exclusively, a male activity. Problem drinking seems to have become entrenched relatively recently, and to be associated with the unemployment and demoralization
of men. In Nakuru, for example, opinion was quite specific about dating the onset of alcohol abuse to the collapse of the pyrethrum market and the resulting underemployment of men. Locally brewed beer was customarily consumed at festivals and celebrations, and was generally the preserve of older men. Today, drinking has increasingly become an everyday activity, starting early in the day and locally distilled spirits have increasingly replaced beer. Youth have taken over from elders as the most diligent drinkers. Discussions with teachers showed that drinking by both primary and secondary school children is now a widely recognized problem. A recent survey for the National Agency for the Campaign Against Drug Abuse showed that of a sample of 10 to 24 year olds, 60 percent of non-students and 9 percent of students had used alcohol within the last month. Other common intoxicants used by young people include tobacco, marijuana, khat and inhalants such as glue and petrol (of these, only marijuana is illegal) (NACADA 2004).

In most survey areas (Kwale on the coast and Isiolo are exceptions) women are responsible for the brewing and sale of alcohol. Often brewing was the most profitable of the limited sources of livelihoods open to women. Yet, as the main victim of its consequences (lost household income and productivity and aggravated domestic violence), women are also most vocal in condemning the epidemic of alcohol abuse which has beset so many rural communities. In Kiambu, women considered alcohol abuse to be the greatest problem facing their community, above infrastructure, land, credit and services. The tension between women as brewers and as wives on occasion at times emerges as social conflict: with women acting collectively to pour away alcohol and isolate the brewers in protest at the damage that drinking was doing to their families.

According to WHO, depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide in terms of years lost to disability, and the fourth leading contributor to the global burden of disease (and the second, in the 15-44 age group).\(^\text{10}\) Given the low state of development of mental health services in Kenya, evidence on the incidence of depression there is patchy and inconsistent.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^\text{10}\) If current trends continue, depression is set by 2020 to become the second leading cause of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost for all age groups and both sexes.

\(^\text{11}\) Ndetei and Muangi (1979) found a 20 percent incidence of psychiatric illnesses, especially depression and anxiety, among 140 rural medical walk-in patients in Kenya, while Sebit (1996) found a prevalence rate of psychiatric disorder of only 0.43 percent among 186 patients at primary care facilities. Dhadphale et al. (1989) found a prevalence of depressive disorders of 9.2 percent, about a third having moderate to severe depression, among a sample of 881 primary health care patients. Other research in Kenya and elsewhere (Maj et al.) has shown a
quantitative survey included several questions on depression and hopelessness, and the results, summarized in table 5 indicate an average or 37 percent had been depressed, varying between 59 percent in Kiambu and 27 percent in Kwale. Poverty and money matters were the main reasons given for being depressed, followed by health, unemployment and domestic violence.

Other sources indicate high rates of depression among young people – with 10 percent of young men and 7 percent of young women reporting being depressed nearly all the time to the point of giving up (Centre for the Study of Adolescence 2003). These rates of depression — especially for males — are significantly high relative to global rates, which are generally higher for females than males.12

Young people in Kenya also have an alarmingly high rate of attempted suicides. Official statistics for actual suicide are unreliable: because of the intense social stigma, cases are rarely reported or even mentioned. However, in a recent survey, 7 percent of males and as many as one in ten young Kenyan women reported having attempted suicide at least once (Table 6) (Centre for the Study of Adolescence 2003).13

The corruption, violence and the resulting insecurity and psychological alienation described in this paper can be seen as manifestations of anomie, the absence of rule, law, principle or order, as accepted social norms break down under the impact of social and cultural change but are not replaced by replaced by common understandings or agreed constraints. We have seen that a culture of violence has increasingly taken hold of Kenya with violence expressed not simply in crime, but permeating social and political life more generally: in domestic violence, rape, the violence of teachers against school children, the violence of under-aged prostitution, political thuggery, and the violence of struggle over land. Finally, violence is turned inwards on the self as substance abuse, and mental illness. Poverty in Kenya is spread across ethnic groups, rather than being regionally concentrated and it is possible that this vertical stratification, while perpetuating inequality has saved the country from civil war. However,

12 Globally, it is estimated that the point prevalence of unipolar depressive episodes (i.e. those suffering depression at any particular time) is 1.9 percent for men and 3.2 percent for women, and that 5.8 percent of men and 9.5 percent of women will experience a depressive episode in a 12 month period. (Global Burden of Disease surveys 2000, quoted in WHO 2001).

13 Based on countries for which complete data is available, the global age standardized-suicide rate for 1996 was 15.1 per 100,000. The rate for males was 24 per 100,000, and that for females 6.8. The rate of suicide is almost universally high among men compared to women by an aggregate ration of 3.5 to 1. Male suicide rates are also rising much more rapidly than female.
rather than overt conflict, violence has taken a pervasive introjected form within social institutions themselves.

**CONCLUSIONS**

We may reprise our findings by referring back to the conceptual schema represented in figure 1. The process of immiseration in rural Kenya has been driven by three main factors: access to land; the corruption or collapse of the formal institutions which provide services to rural areas; and the impact of HIV/AIDS. Population pressure and the inequity of the land tenure system have reduced access to key livelihood assets, while institutional malfunction has debilitated agricultural marketing, health, education and other services. HIV/AIDS has increased the burden of sickness and dependency in rural households, as well as impinging on service providers through the loss of staff.

Faced with these circumstances, rural households have been obliged to adapt their livelihood strategies, at times forced into marginal and even illegal activities. Widespread strategies include diversification into new farm enterprises, off-farm and non-farm activities, though limited assets severely limit room for maneuver. New forms of local collective action have also emerged, yet these often fail to include the poorest and most marginal.

Livelihood shifts have had a markedly gendered character. Those livelihood systems which most severely eroded the driving factors enumerated – cash crop production, pastoralism, labor migration – were those dominated by men (though underpinned by female productive and domestic labour). In contrast, new opportunities such as food crop production, petty trade, informal services, beer brewing, casual labour, domestic service, and the gathering of forest products and firewood often extend what were traditionally female activities. As a result, men find themselves unable to meet their long-established roles in supporting the household while women’s burdens in the economic, domestic and collective spheres intensify. These shifts in gender roles have had a destabilizing effect on households, which, while not empowering women in any real sense, leave men feeling disempowered. The strain placed on relations between men and women leads increasingly to tension and violence. At the same time, declining opportunities for youth have increasingly put relations between the generations under strain.
In this paper, we have mainly been concerned with the impacts of key driving factors at the household and community levels. Corruption reduces access to public services, as well as their cost and quality. Poverty is intensified as a result, and the options imposed on the poor become fewer and increasingly stark. However, it is also clear that the driving factors are reflected at the macro, societal level as well as in individual households. The manipulation of institutions for individual ends promotes more widespread antisocial behavior by eroding standards and values. As corruption infects from the top downwards, the transgression of norms becomes increasingly routine and expected, creating a climate of anomie that has contaminated and demoralized the society as a whole. In this way, corruption begins to corrode the very conditions which make society possible.

A similar interaction between micro and macro, is exhibited in the epidemiology of crime and violence, increasingly the defining characteristics of contemporary Kenya. While the two phenomena intersect in the phenomenon of violent crime, they ramify across the entire social landscape. For the wealthy and the political classes, as we have seen, the criminalization of public life is pursued with relative impunity. For the marginalized, not only has crime become a livelihood but their very livelihoods have become criminalized: the pursuit of marginal activities such as charcoal burning, beer brewing and commercial sex work leaves the poor open to harassment by officials. The increasingly violent character of rural intra-household relations can be seen as a facet of the spread of violence at all social levels – against women, against children, against political opponents, in disputes over land, in schools and on the street as well as in the home.

Further, the increasingly brutal nature of this violence, expressive as it is of extreme anger, frustration and resentment, bears witness to a psychological anomie, of which alcohol and substance abuse are also symptomatic. It is clear that the devastating impacts of lack of opportunity, inequality and corruption are mediated by destructive emotions as much as rational coping strategies, and that these have damaging social consequences. Perhaps, indeed, these responses could be characterized as a ‘refusal to cope’.

The gaping inequalities in power and resources that have come to characterize Kenyan society can be seen as both the start and the end point of the processes of social dislocation described in this paper. Inequality, by centralizing rather than diffusing power, stifles
accountability, facilitates corruption, and creates a climate of despair and desperation amongst the poorest.

Our analysis of the links between economic, institutional and social change in rural Kenya has been a systemic and in some ways speculative one, and does not alone have the specificity to yield sectoral or technical recommendations. Perhaps one contribution of such analysis is to raise awareness of the issues identified so that future policies can at least acknowledge their importance and not aggravate them. A second may be to suggest that, given the extent of state failure in Kenya, some form of overall reform of the rules of the game for governance and political economy needs to precede tinkering with specific sectoral problems. Thirdly, our overview of social trends points to a number of areas where more in depth analysis seems warranted. That said, the preceding analysis does suggest some broad implications for approaches to development policy.

Most fundamentally, the social impacts of economic policy and (mis)management have been devastating, and have reached deeply into the foundations of society itself. Even discounting the moral values of equity, fairness, justice and peace, and the social and psychological costs enumerated in this paper (if that were possible or desirable), the sheer economic costs of the rending of Kenya’s social fabric in the last two decades has been incalculable. Further, once established, processes of social fragmentation are difficult to reverse. These then, are economic as well as social issues, and must be considered as such.

Next, given the impact of unequal and insecure access to natural resources on rural immiseration, measures which would introduce more equitable and secure access to land are urgent. The fact that land inequality is a within-village phenomenon suggests that regional targeting will not be sufficient to reduce poverty.

The need for institutional reform and reorientation is also clearly pressing. Three particularly priorities can be identified in this sphere. First, a continuing focus on attacking corruption at both national and local levels. Second, the introduction of a more meaningful system of decentralization, which both integrates technical capacities and allows scope for local democracy. Third, given the growing importance of human security concerns, improvements in policing and access to justice would do much to improve rural welfare. These would need to include more consistent guiding framework for community policing initiatives.
Finally, gender and youth concerns both emerged strongly from our analysis. This is hardly an original finding, and yet the evidence is that policy makers and practitioners need not only to give priority to gender and youth concerns, but also to be willing to rethink their approaches to these issues. The evidence is that something is seriously amiss in the state of intra-household relations in Kenya, and that it is imperative to address not only the growing burden of labor and responsibility falling on women, but the simultaneous ‘disempowerment’ experienced by men and youth. One way of going beyond the zero sum of gender conflict may be a new focus on the empowerment of the family unit as a whole.
References


Ellis, F., 2000, Rural Livelihoods and Diversity in Developing Countries, Oxford: Oxford University Press.


Figure 1: Driving factors, coping responses and social impacts: a conceptual schema for social change in rural Kenya

**SOCIAL IMPACTS**

**Household level**
- increasing burden on women
- male disempowerment
- growing tension and violence between genders and generations

**Societal level**
- increasing crime
- growing violence
- desperation and psychological anomie

**RESPONSES**

**Household level**
- Gendered diversification into farm, off-farm and non-farm activities – trade, services, etc.

**Community level**
- group formation
- joint enterprises
- rotating credit mechanisms
- community initiatives to assure social services

**DRIVING FACTORS**

**Declining natural resource base**
- Land maldistribution, fragmentation, degradation
- Loss of herds, pastures, forest access

**Institutional degradation and collapse**
- Corruption
- Collapsed marketing services
- Poor social services
- Politicization of local development

**HIV / AIDS**
- Loss of economically able
- Growing dependency
- Stigma, fear and suspicion
### Table 1: Key characteristics of sample districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population density</th>
<th>Agro-Ecology</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Livelihood systems</th>
<th>Major economic features / challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>Fertile highlands</td>
<td>Kikuyu</td>
<td>Coffee, tea,</td>
<td>- Inequality (land/estates/village reserves)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Nyanza</td>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>Mixed high potential and marginal uplands</td>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>Tea, Coffee, Pyrethrum, Small scale mixed farming</td>
<td>- Land fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- FGM</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Marketing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Bungoma</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>Mixed high potential and marginal uplands</td>
<td>Luhy (Bukusu) Tachioni</td>
<td>Sugar, tea, Small scale mixed farming</td>
<td>- Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Marketing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Land fragmentation / degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rift Valley</td>
<td>Nakuru</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Mixed semi-arid and agropastoral</td>
<td>Maasai Kikuyu Kisii Kipsigis</td>
<td>- Large scale farming, Small scale mixed farming, Tree planting</td>
<td>- Large scale farming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Small scale mixed farming</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Political and land clash (ethnic dimension)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>Kwale</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Marginal agricultural land</td>
<td>Digo Duruma</td>
<td>Fishing, Small scale mixed farming, Migration (Mombasa)</td>
<td>- Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Soil fertility/degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tenure conflict (customary vs. formal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Formal and informal leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Isiolo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Semi arid and arid rangelands</td>
<td><strong>Borana</strong> Somali Meru Gabra</td>
<td>- Pastoralists, Farmers</td>
<td>- Climate risks (drought)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Conflict with agriculturists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Infrastructure (social, roads)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Land / ethnic clashes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cattle rustling</td>
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</table>


P. Francis et al., conference paper
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPI score (max = 10)</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>No. of countries ranked</th>
<th>Ranking in % terms*</th>
<th>No. of countries ranking worse</th>
</tr>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

n.d. = no data

* = ranking / no of countries ranked x 100

Source: Transparency International CPI reports 1996-2005

http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#cpi
Table 3: Membership of types of group by district (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Kiambu (n=118)</th>
<th>Kwale (n=90)</th>
<th>Isiolo (n=85)</th>
<th>Kisii (n=57)</th>
<th>Nakuru (n=84)</th>
<th>Bungoma (n=96)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-help</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro finance</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic based</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers groups</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age-set groups</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vigilante</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
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</table>
Table 4: Reasons for intergenerational violence (% of respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Kiambu  (n = 78)</th>
<th>Kwale  (n = 10)</th>
<th>Isiolo  (n = 5)</th>
<th>Kisii  (n = 58)</th>
<th>Nakuru  (n = 39)</th>
<th>Bungoma  (n = 78)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of food</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate access to livestock</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to land</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol consumption</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of school fees</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Money/finances</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arranged Marriages</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents fighting</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Table 5: Percent Proportion of Reports on Depression per District**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Presence of depressed people in the community</th>
<th>Ever been depressed</th>
<th>Household member ever been depressed</th>
<th>Know someone who is depressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isiolo</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakuru</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bungoma</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisii</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiambu</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwale</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>66.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>52.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: survey data