FROM WELFARE TO WELL-BEING REGIMES: ENGAGING NEW AGENDAS

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Abstract: This paper moves us along from the comparative analysis of insecurity and welfare regimes across the world by Gough, Wood et al, 2004. It lays the foundations for linking theory and empirical analysis connecting ideas about well-being and social policy to the 'regime' conditions facing politically unsettled societies with large-scale poverty.

With the marriage between social policy and development studies, western social policy thinkers have moved towards a social development perspective where capacity building arguably becomes more significant than social protection. This takes us into discourses of capabilities, freedoms, competences and skill sets, well-being and the acquisition of resources for citizenship. These will involve a broader range of policy instruments than those associated with the more limited 'welfare' approaches to social policy, whereby state and non-state actors might act to engineer improvement.

Our previous work focused more upon the problematic of the state in terms of legitimacy and relative autonomy to act in technico-rational ways, and less on the cohesion and integration problems of politically unsettled societies. Thus the issue of political order needs to become more significant in our analysis as a precondition for social development. This implies that the business of social policy entails wider social development objectives and a corresponding broadening of instruments crucially including non-state actors.

Keywords: well-being, insecurity and welfare regimes, social policy, capacity building, social development, political order, non state actors

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Introduction

This paper is the beginning of a longer process of bringing together theory and empirical analysis which connects ideas about well-being and comparative social policy to the 'regime' conditions facing politically unsettled societies, characterised by large-scale problems of poverty. It seeks to lay the general foundations for such analysis by moving us along from recent work by Gough, Wood and others on the comparative analysis of insecurity and welfare regimes across different regions of the world (Gough, Wood et al 2004, Wood and Gough, forthcoming) towards an enriched concept of well-being regimes. This leads to an enriched agenda for social policy which takes it closer to a development studies discourse about social development (Wood 2000a).

The paper begins with a summary of this recent work on comparative welfare regimes. In doing so, it recognises several qualifications to an argument that in effect posits a continuum between the full statutory rights to welfare in the form of social protection at one end (i.e. the OECD welfare state model) through to chronic and pervasive insecurity at the other end, where the state enjoys minimal legitimacy and capacity. These 'qualifications' refer both to welfare and social policy as concepts, and to assumptions about the nation-state in terms of internal integration and social cohesion, as well as the disarticulation effects of globalisation. In the marriage between social policy and development studies, the intellectual and policy links between a welfarist approach to social policy and a well-being agenda of social development become more clearly exposed. And western social policy thinkers themselves are moving a long way towards a social development perspective in which capacity building (widely conceived) becomes arguably more significant than social protection, though there is never an 'either-or' trade-off. Such capacity building takes us into the discourses of capabilities, freedoms, competences and skill sets, and the wider acquisition of resources for citizenship. This capacity building and agency-enhancement discourse also requires us to recall the 'removal of alienation' as the partial flip-side to the improvement of well-being. This gathering together of concepts linking social policy to social development and well-being refers us to a broader range of policy instruments than those associated with the more limited 'welfare' approaches to social policy, whereby state and non-state actors might act to engineer improvement. The nation-state assumptions of our previous work focussed more upon the problematic of the state in terms of legitimacy and relative autonomy to act in technico-rational ways, and less upon the problems of
the social cohesion and integration in politically unsettled societies. Thus the issue of political order needs to become more significant in our analysis as a precondition for social development, recognising the circularity in that social development itself contributes to political order. Again, this implies that the business of social policy entails wider 'social engineering' objectives (captured by shifting from 'welfare' regimes to 'well-being' regimes), and a corresponding broadening of instruments and stakeholders crucially including non-state actors. Such non-state actors may be the familiar organised civil society and NGO leaders from the educated middle classes. They may also be sections of the unorganised middle classes with the potential to be mobilised into alliances with the poor around common interests, expressed broadly as public goods.

We explore these arguments by recalling the elements of the Wood and Gough comparative welfare regimes model (Figure 1 below), reviewing each of its components in turn against the criteria of broader well-being objectives and processes. This leads us to a revised model (Figure 2 below) which embraces more obviously the socio-political conditions of unsettled societies, the policy objective of enhancing the agency of the poor in societies with weak 'responsibility institutions' through support for their profile of 'negotiation resources', and the significance of non-state actors (organised and unorganised) in the construction of second-best political settlements for enriched social policy. While using illustration from Bangladesh and other countries throughout these arguments, the paper increasingly introduces more focussed case material from Bangladesh to demonstrate the normative and analytic propositions being advanced. One further note of caution before we proceed. For heuristic purposes, conceptual contrasts are drawn between politically settled and unsettled societies, between welfare and well-being, between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' agendas, between human capital and capabilities/agency, between social policy and social development. These contrasting dyads or ideal types are intended to indicate (or to stylise) directions of change in policy. The reality, of course, is greyer. Take the contrast between 'freedom from' in the sense of social protection and 'freedom to' in both a human capital investment sense and a broader agency sense. This is more about adding ambitions for policy rather than replacing or substituting new ones for old ones. Clearly 'freedom from' insecurity is a major precondition for the 'freedom to' act to bring about more well-being oriented political settlements in the future. Wood (2006 forthcoming) has made these arguments strongly in 'Using Security to Indicate Well-Being', and has explored them
recently with others (Wood, Malik and Sagheer Eds 2006 forthcoming) in the context of Northern Pakistan. Or, with the settled/unsettled contrast, in critiquing the state and highlighting the agency and non-state actors position, we are not assuming that the concept of 'political settlement' for policy priorities is missing and that the state is totally inactive in the relevant policy fields and services for poverty reduction. Rather we are observing that such efforts are significantly contaminated and attract limited loyalty or therefore legitimacy in society for such political settlements to be entirely functional. Thus political settlements themselves need to be improved through agency, alliance building, and the framing of ideology and discourses to support more progressive social policy.

**Comparative Welfare Regimes**

The idea of a welfare regime has recently been taken by Gough and Wood (2004) beyond Esping-Andersen's (1990, 1999) typology of welfare states for advanced capitalist regions of the world (OECD countries) towards a global framework of welfare regimes embracing a wider conception of welfare states alongside informal security and in/security regimes. Several principles underpinned that wider framework. **First**, that states in poor countries have problems of legitimacy and that well-functioning labour and financial markets are not pervasive. **Second**, that these problematic conditions limit the capacity of the state to act in a compensatory way for the inequitable outcomes of the market in highly unequal societies (both vertically and horizontally). **Thirdly**, that a comparative conception of social policy has to embrace non-state centred actors. This implies, **fourthly**, that rights and entitlements may also be found (in some instances, with some security) in the informal domains of social relationships and cultural expectations. Some of these domains are more formally organised (churches and mosques, charities, NGOs and philanthropy generally), while others are more personalised in a range of clientelist and reciprocal (perhaps kin) arrangements. **Finally**, attached to the notion of 'regime' is the assumption of path dependency, with outcomes from political economy and the deliberate interventions of state and non-state actors comprising the process of social reproduction—both simple (static) and extended (dynamic). Simple reproduction totally enshrines path dependency. Extended reproduction introduces possibilities of new mobilisations, identities and solidarities with the potential to alter the regime's direction.
The overarching model adopted for this comparative welfare regime analysis is represented (from Wood and Gough, forthcoming) in the Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1: Comparative Welfare Regimes Model**

Beginning at the right-hand bottom of Figure 1 the welfare outcomes of the population represent the classic objectives that social policy might be expected to meet with some help from other policy. These refer to the need-satisfactions of the population (the extent to which their basic and intermediate needs are met), the insecurity they experience and the extent of poverty and other measures of low or inadequate resources. But in our model, these welfare outcomes are not explained simply by the presence and practice of policy. Rather these outcomes are explained most immediately by the agency-structure interaction in the Institutional Responsibility Matrix (IRM) or welfare mix (top right of Figure 1): that is, the institutional landscape within which people have to pursue their livelihoods and welfare objectives, referring to the role of government, community (informal as well as organized, such as NGOs, CBOs), private sector market activity, and the household in mitigating insecurity and ill-being, alongside the role of matching international actors and processes. The welfare mix in turn is greatly shaped by the basic institutional conditions in a country (top left of Figure 1): the pervasiveness and character
of markets, the legitimacy of the state, the extent of societal integration, cultural values and the position of the country in the global system. Finally, under reproduction consequences the stratification system and pattern of political mobilisation by elites and other groups (bottom left of Figure 1) is both cause and consequence of the other factors. The stratification system refers to the existing distribution of power in society and the extent and nature of societal inequalities. These and the attendant mobilisations of different groups and coalitions will reproduce or change the institutional conditions of the society, and thus reproduce or change the welfare mix and patterns of welfare of the country. On the other hand, the welfare mix and welfare outcomes also influence the nature of political mobilisations in the future. As discussed below, these processes of reproduction can be simple and purely path dependent, or dynamic and altering the terms of political settlement.

**Enriching the Social Policy Agenda: an Imperative for Unsettled Societies**

However, these arguments were not exhaustive and, now, further refinements need to be addressed. In extending the embrace of social policy beyond OECD-type countries to the development context, further institutional, social and cultural complexities need to be recognised, and which were not fully dealt with in our former model. Basically the argument advanced in this paper is that first the welfare outcomes box (bottom right in Figure 1 above) needs to be converted into an enriched well-being outcomes box. And secondly, that the institutional conditions box (top left hand of Figure 1) requires more analysis, especially around the issues of socio-political integration—both vertical and horizontal—and thus making more of a contrast between politically settled and unsettled societies. As a result of these considerations, it is better re-labelled as ‘conditioning factors’. And thirdly, given the problematic nature of the state in unsettled societies, the principle underlying social policy needs to be more focussed upon the enhancement of agency among the poor and insecure. And fourthly, extending the same assumptions, that social policy has to comprise greater activity by non-state actors, whether in organised forms (e.g. NGOs, charities etc.) or informal, often local level, forms of philanthropy and mutual support.

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1 The term ‘political settlement’ refers to the de facto agreements or settlements which have evolved between different classes, groups and interests over time regarding the principal ways in which the society is run, de facto rights are distributed and resources are allocated. Such settlements can perpetuate welfare inequalities as a reflection of power and domination. They can also enshrine concessions to politically weaker groups, as well as the exclusion of others. They may also embrace commitments to public goods by elites, as part of enlightened self-interest.
The traditional question addressed by social policy is essentially Hegelian, modified by Polanyi. The argument is that society without some political ordering (Hegel) produces insecurity, and that the market economy, without some market regulation (Polanyi), produces livelihood inequities. Both outcomes store up political danger. Furthermore, market regulation is both symptomatic of political order as well as contributing to it. The preoccupation with welfare (as distinct from well-being) in social policy has led to an over-emphasis upon the Polanyian principle (that a purely commodified labour market under capitalism is no guarantor of basic livelihoods rights) rather than the Hegelian one. That emphasis betrays the ethnocentrism of social policy, having its intellectual roots in relatively settled societies, hitherto undisturbed by globalisation except to benefit from metropolitan positions in the imperial and post-imperial eras. This ethnocentricism comprises the liberal assumption that the ordering of society is only the business of the state insofar as societal disorder undermines the conditions for spreading universal but minimal welfare, itself a precondition for political order and simple social reproduction. Today's challenge is: what about societies that are not relatively settled in political terms, with the prospect of chronic societal disorder? And that question might also apply to societies that were relatively settled until disturbed by contemporary features of globalisation (migration, multi-ethnicity, refugees and asylum entitlements, amoral global capitalism without loyalties to local workforces). These conditions prompt the new agenda for social policy, and they are now as Hegelian as they are Polanyian: in other words, they need to be about political order and improved settlements, as well as about market regulation and taxed based re-distribution.

From Welfare to Well-Being (Bottom Right Hand Box, Figure 1)

One way to pose the challenge is to argue that social policy should be about well-being rather than welfare. This becomes an argument that well-being embraces a larger agenda in which individuals' senses of well-being is affected not only by their own welfare, but the welfare and well-being of others in other groups and the capacity of society-level institutions and social processes to guarantee this. Such a proposition is akin to the view that personal happiness is a function of utilitarian happiness. This clearly extends the remit of social policy towards, one might say, an interdisciplinary development one. However, the significance of non-state actors in this remit has to be acknowledged in relatively unsettled societies, so a well-being perspective
cannot just be an argument for social engineering by the state to bring about utilitarian outcomes. Rather, in these unsettled conditions, the agenda is about who has the power to bring about the collective advantage of utilitarian happiness rather than the competitive individualism of personal happiness, which is anyway dependent upon the happiness of others? And what are the positive and negative social conditions, which inhibit or enhance such a quest for collective advantage? It will be that configuration of power, and the associated forms of social reproduction, which will comprise a well-being regime. However, before examining further the political problems to be overcome in establishing a successful well-being regime, let us dwell upon the normative significance of a well-being perspective for social policy. It will, nevertheless, be difficult to keep the two dimensions, of social policy concepts on the one hand and the political conditions for their realisation on the other, separate and in sequence for the purposes of discussion, because it is our argument that they are theoretically interwoven.

In societies where neither the material resources nor the social capital permits reliance upon the state for statutory rights and entitlements in the form of welfare underpinning (insurance), the reliance upon individual agency has to be correspondingly stronger. It is the enhancing of this agency, or capabilities, which has to become the focus of someone's policy. It is the deconstruction of this individual agency which contributes to our understanding of well-being in unsettled contexts. If we consider the institutional landscape within which people pursue their survival--the institutional responsibility matrix (IRM)--then capabilities have to be specified across the domains (domestic and supranational) of that landscape: the state itself; but also market, community and household. And all the time we have to recognise the structuration principle that successful agency will induce dynamic (in contrast to simple) social reproduction which can be positive in the sense of enhancing the utility of structures and institutions to the ongoing pursuit of well-being. The key to this agenda in unsettled contexts is the distinction between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. Thus social policy in the relatively settled societies of the west (or North) has been able to focus upon the principle of 'freedom from', leaving 'freedom to' agendas to other more obvious human capital investment domains like education and health policy and implementing departments. By contrast, the social policy agenda in unsettled contexts, without deserting the 'freedom from' and human security agenda, has also to embrace the social development agenda and thus address the 'freedom to' and human development objectives, but not just in a simple human capital, competences and skills investment sense. This
is more than a semantic point about the labelling of what goes under the heading of social policy in settled and unsettled societies. It is about where the responsibility lies for addressing the richer capabilities and universal, human needs agendas as between individual agency and collective institutions (whether state or non-state).

Unpacking this further, and at the risk of over-simplification, 'freedom from' is here equated with a social protection function in both an Hegelian and Polanyian sense, but weaker in the former and stronger in the latter sense. That is to say a protection from disorder as a precondition for other freedoms and capabilities; and protection from basic income and livelihoods loss through labour market regulation and forms of social insurance and universal benefits. And in settled societies, protection from disorder is so generic and embedded as to be almost unnoticeable for much of the population until recent fears of terrorist induced insecurity, itself a function of globalisation, migration and new forms of alienation for an increasingly varied number of excluded groups. So broadly the more obvious social policy emphasis in settled societies has been income and livelihoods protection, and thus also protection in the narrower material resource sense. So the 'freedom from' agenda is security and livelihoods or welfare focussed, and represents only a partial account of the idea of well-being, though security surely underpins well-being (Wood 2006 forthcoming). The argument for us in this paper is that the more limited social policy agenda of social protection, while necessary, is not a sufficient option for even security and livelihoods objectives in unsettled societies, because the statutory, collective institutions are not there in the same strength to rely upon. That is the Wood and Gough argument about the weakness of the IRM in unsettled contexts. Thus while welfare regimes have been primarily focussed upon collective and institutional forms of the 'freedom from' and human security agenda, the more ambitious well being agenda in the sense of adding 'freedom to' and capabilities agendas is in effect forced upon social actors in unsettled societies because of the greater reliance upon personal agency in the context of greater uncertainty and informal rather than statutory arrangements. So is there a paradox here? The more ambitious 'freedom to' version of social policy is the greater imperative precisely in those societies where it is institutionally more difficult to achieve? We come to the institutional difficulties below, but having established the imperative we need still to dwell further on the nature of the 'ambition'.

2 'Social' policy because other policy headings like education and health, or agriculture and public works are less likely to engage with the subtlety of the 'freedom to' agenda.
The 'freedom to' agenda is informed by a well-being conceptual framework, in turn informed by the capabilities discourse. Unlike some of his colleagues in the WeD programme at UoB, Wood enters this discussion by reviving the theme of alienation, attaching it also to the widespread fear of insecurity among all classes, but with particular concern about the Faustian bargain faced by the poor in which their alienation is intensified compared to the non-poor. It seems to Wood that the whole discourse of 'development as freedom' leading on to the capabilities arguments via entitlement theory has its origin in the alienation problem. This has been expressed differently, but also compatibly, in Doyal and Gough's formulation of qualified autonomy as a universal human need alongside health. And the significance of autonomy to human functioning is a premise for Ryan and Deci in their dissection of how the principle of autonomy has to be qualified in human behaviour--i.e. no-one is suggesting that pure autonomy is possible or desirable. Clearly behind these propositions lies much classic social contract theory emanating from the Enlightenment philosophers. The beauty of alienation as an entry point to bring together the different facets of this argument is that it takes us directly into the process issues of power and agency (i.e. socially and culturally conditioned institutional landscapes with social reproduction outcomes circumscribed by power and agency) as well as the ontology of well-being (i.e. the experience of being alienated, as the more pervasive self-perception among non-elites around the world than the enjoyment of qualified autonomy). Thus, in a process sense, alienation is more obviously relational, pointing us towards the various dimensions of inequality in which agency (as choices, options and opportunities) of the many is constrained by the interests of the few. The Faustian bargain does not only express this headline problem of inequality and differential power, it also crucially adds the element of ongoing foreclosure of agency via the continuous reinforcement of dependency over autonomy. Thus in place of a normative capabilities approach about empowerment, alienation is more realistically analytical as a way of reporting actual behaviour and feelings. In an ontological sense, alienation draws attention to the threatened nature of well-being outcomes (i.e. the constant possibility of ill-being outcomes) and thus takes us beyond the more limited agenda of welfare outcomes (in the original Wood/Gough model) which can be criticised for assuming a positive, unmediated, connection between improvement in income, other HD indicators and well-being, without giving due recognition to the security of agency (i.e. the removal of alienation). It is this security of agency
which represents the enriched social policy agenda for unsettled societies, characterised by widespread poverty which ontologically entails insecurity of agency—the capabilities problem.

**To summarise** this progression towards ‘Well-Being Outcomes’ (Bottom Right Hand Box): While the idea of ‘welfare’ is strongly associated in a Polanyian sense with ‘freedom from’ objectives with some ‘freedom to’ support, for example via state support for poor people's education, we have argued above that it insufficiently embraces a stronger ‘freedom to’ agenda about agency and overcoming alienation. Of course the two dimensions are intimately connected, as Wood has argued elsewhere in linking security to agency to well-being (Wood 2003 and 2006 forthcoming). However, we have to be explicit in highlighting the primacy of agency to the removal of alienation, and thus the enhancing of well-being, in unsettled societies. Thus well-being is not just enjoyment of outcomes, but enjoyment of the *means* of enjoyment. To this end, Sen (1985) and others have emphasised capabilities, Doyal and Gough (1991) have emphasised autonomy, Ryan and Deci have emphasised critical/qualified autonomy (2000) and eudaimonic happiness (2001), Wood has emphasised security (2003), McGregor (2004) has emphasised the enhancement of resource profiles, and earlier Schaffer (1975) emphasised access. All are headed in the same direction of an enriched social policy agenda that resembles social development. This also critically means that while the arrow may go from the IRM to well-being outcomes, it crucially has to go in the reverse direction too.

**Negotiating the Institutional Responsibility Matrix (IRM): Resources Profiles (Top Right Hand Box, Figure 1)**

The next element of the modified well-being framework as the guide to an enriched social policy agenda is resources profiling. This enables the link to policy to be established from the ontological understanding of well-being as experience of happiness both as process and end-state (eudaimonic and hedonic respectively). The propositions about resources profiles arise from the livelihoods literature which extended the understanding of poverty to a multi-dimensional level, requiring inter-disciplinary analysis, and included the dimensions of vulnerability and insecurity as they affect the near poor as well as the poor. Resources profiles, as a heuristic device for understanding a wider portfolio of ways in which people survival, cope and advance or defend their interests, thus connects to Rawlsian ideas about citizenship, Sen’s approaches to
entitlements and capabilities, and the asset capital frameworks associated with Swift, Sandford, Moser and later Carney (see Wood 2005 for a review of this literature). However the emphasis upon ‘resources’, in the well-being framework, rather than ‘capitals’ does signal a variation of approach. Thus people, as individuals, households, small groups and wider communities, have to deploy a range of resources beyond just material and human capital ones (i.e. social, cultural, political) to negotiate the various parts of the welfare/well-being regime framework: the structural, social and cultural conditions; the institutional responsibility matrix (IRM); and the processes of social reproduction. But these resources are both enjoyed hedonically and have to be continuously maintained eudaimonically. Unlike the idea of ‘capital’, which implies a stock which can be depleted and replenished, ‘resources’ are more a ‘flow’ concept, only existing when maintained through continuous social interaction and demonstrations of cultural belonging (McGregor 2004). It is the fluidity of ‘resources’ which drives much human interactive behaviour, requiring people’s continuous investment in process as a means of reducing uncertainty and insecurity, and either intensifying the Faustian bargain or actually managing to remove alienation and gain the ‘freedom to’ as well as the ‘freedom from’, capabilities as well as social protection.

The link to policy from this epistemology lies in the principle of not only enhancing the quality and therefore utility of these resources but also the capacities to maintain the value of such resources: i.e. improving poor people’s agency. This is the enriched agenda of social policy: enabling more people to negotiate successfully the welfare regimes framework, thus converting it into a well-being regime. And crucially it does not assume that enhancing only material or human resources is a sufficient guarantee or condition for such successful negotiation. Thus social policy cannot be successful if it only works ‘indirectly’ through the more limited conception of material poverty: e.g. in the form of income support, or through investment in human capital (health, skills, competences and so on). The whole point of an autonomy/alienation discourse is to draw attention to the needs for direct engagement with these less tangible dimensions of social and cultural functioning. Another way of expressing this is to see the strengthening of social and cultural resources as a process of alliance building with other classes and interests, as the route to improving the quality of political settlement. This leads directly into the need to focus more upon the role of non-state actors. This is how the social

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3 Joe Devine in the WeD group reinforces this view that poor people in Bangladesh have a short term preference for dependency over autonomy.
development agenda associated with development studies takes forward the more limited, social protectionist approach to social policy (which includes productivist approaches also, since they rely upon breadwinner concepts of social insurance support, as well as investment in training). But this more subtle social development aspect of social policy also has to interact with the socio-political realities of unsettled societies where autonomy/alienation problem is most acute and widespread: namely the issues of social cohesion and socio-political integration. How to achieve successful social and cultural functioning in unsettled societies?

To summarise: the Institutional Responsibility Matrix (Top Right Hand Box) needs to give more analytic recognition of resources, non-state actors and alliance building. As a reflection of the conditions of unsettled societies, Wood (2000b) and Wood and Gough (2006 forthcoming) have described the problematic nature of these institutional arenas and the negative permeability between them in terms of rules and practices which reduce the security of outcomes for disadvantaged people. In this paper, we emphasise two further aspects of this landscape in terms of understanding and policy options. First 'understanding': people negotiate their way around this institutional landscape (at domestic and supra-national levels) via their profile of resources. For poor people, there is an instant problem of the extent to which they are included in these problematic rules and practices but under adverse conditions, which ultimately disempower them, reinforces their alienation and sets limits to improving well-being. At the same time the social and cultural dimensions of their profile are also likely to keep them excluded from ideological and operational alliances with power-holders, especially the emergent middle classes, benefiting from globalisation inter alia. Secondly, as politics is about linking one's own specific interests to more universal ones, the capacity for alliance building between the poor and non-state actors is crucial. This is the policy link between capabilities and overcoming the problems of vertical integration: improving the profile of resources in ways, which enable alliance building and sharing of well-being agendas. Thus, in terms of policy options in unsettled societies with severe state legitimacy, integrity and competence problems, we have to look to the significance of organised non-state actors. In societies with rapidly growing middle classes the potential for alliances around public goods should not be overlooked. The case of Bangladesh will be used below to illustrate this. It is worth recalling the significance of such classes to the evolution of
progressive social movements in rich European, Latin America and East Asia democracies which have only emerged in the last century from excessively regal or dictatorial regimes.

Conditioning Factors in Unsettled Societies (Top Left Hand Box, Figure 1)

In moving from the determining conditions for welfare regimes (i.e. the emphasis upon state legitimacy and labour and financial markets, derived from Esping-Andersen’s original formulation) towards a broader account of societal conditions, we need to embrace the issues of integration and social cohesion, alongside culture and values. Well-being outcomes will be a function of two kinds of social integration: vertical and horizontal. 'Vertical' refers to the quality of linkage between citizen and meso/macro institutions (especially those responsible for the delivery of social policy in its broadest sense) to the point where inclusion and equity is assured. 'Horizontal' refers to the extent of cultural and social diversity, which, under malintegrated conditions, can result in mutually destructive conflict and over-strong, negative conceptions of the other. In relatively unsettled societies, both forms of integration are highly problematical—perhaps that is a tautology. Thus integration becomes the essential problem of societal disorder and individual alienation to the point where well-being is unattainable, in other words the central challenge for an enriched understanding of social policy.

This integration agenda is not new. The US Development Administration Group (DAG) of political academics and commentators throughout the 60s and 70s (i.e. Lucian Pye, James Coleman, Gabriel Almond, Fred Riggs) were heavily preoccupied, like S.E.Finer in the UK, with the problematic of political culture and social integration under poor, post-colonial conditions. Their normative stance was a modernisation, nation-building agenda. In the context of an enriched social policy, overcoming problems of vertical and horizontal integration move centre stage, because they set the scene for everything else. But what does 'overcoming' mean? This is normatively clearer for vertical integration through the familiar agendas of participation and civil society involvement in the context of societies pervaded by clientelism and adverse incorporation (another dark side of social capital--Wood 1999). That agenda occurs alongside other classic indicators of democratic engagement such as accountability and strong norms about rights--the liberal bourgeois agenda of achieving political equality even under conditions of severe

4 This reference to ‘sharing’ will be explored later, through the Bangladesh example. But it is an argument about the common interests between the poor and the non-poor in the development of public goods.
economic inequality (and simply not possible if the critique of Barrington-Moore is accepted\(^5\), hence illusory). But successful vertical integration is itself also a function of horizontal integration, where the post-colonial legacies of cultural and social diversity have often reinforced by the differentiating influences of globalisation. How does social policy cope with extreme heterogeneity and mutual social closure, or reciprocal exclusion---the other dark side of social capital (Putzel 1997)?

This poses a central question about the legitimacy of nation states in highly divided societies, where the state is frequently associated with either elite domination (the vertical integration problem) or ethnic domination (the horizontal integration problem). How can the state, and other non-state centred actors seeking neutrality as the basis for universal philanthropy, remove itself from specific interests in order to be seen as transcending, disinterested authority?\(^6\)

And today, the additional level of complication is globalisation, further reducing the claims by advocates of the nation state to be able to develop policy for all. The key point here is that the control or reach and legitimacy of nation states is constrained by both internal problems of integration as well as the disarticulation effects of globalisation. This inhibits their room for manoeuvre in terms of control of their own economies and thus the ability to decommodify them for collective advantage (i.e. for welfare/social protection). Thus the policy area which is available to them is more restricted. This, as a result, focuses more attention, as a policy option, upon the equalisation of advantage between diverse groups through cheaper (financial and political) forms of affirmative action and positive discrimination to engage with 'freedom to' objectives.

The equalisation of advantage is the enabling arena of opportunity and choice creation, and takes social policy beyond its welfare and social protection themes towards social development via support for various elements of the resources profile required by individuals and groups to thrive. Thus, nation states would be acquiring legitimacy precisely through their demonstrable ability to positively support a universally agreed set of essential resources\(^7\) required for agency, regardless of class, caste, race, ethnicity or creed. This is why the argument for the universality of human needs (Doyal and Gough 1991) is so important, because meeting those needs offers the best chance for nation states to overcome vertical and horizontal

\(^5\) Barrington-Moore (1969) argued that politics cannot be democratized unless property is also democratized.
\(^6\) The model of nation-state building across the fissiparous 19\(^\text{th}\) century Germany was clearly the Hegelian project, but driven by Prussian identity and still ending up with the Landes system as an institutionalisation of regional, sub-national identities.
integration problems. But this is also why 'human needs' have to be translated into a recognisable framework (profile) of resources, which are also self evident to the absolute poor and those experiencing relative deprivation and/or vulnerability and insecurity. And in the realm of perceptions (i.e. the reference to self-evidence), senses of well-being and happiness\(^8\) are key dimensions of any understanding of the resources and needs to be enhanced. In policy terms, there is a discourse and framing issue here. Do state and non-state leaders rely upon what ought to be the logical perceptions of diverse groups and individuals about their well-being needs, or do such leaders act more proactively to convince their diverse, heterogeneous constituencies that whatever divides them is less significant that what should unite them in the form of universal needs? If so, then successful social policy is as much about the framing of a discourse about universal needs\(^9\) as the implementation of positive intersection with them. At this point in the argument, hedonic and eudaimonic distinctions are again necessary--the contrast between delivering immediately pleasurable goods and services, and delivering or ensuring the sustainable means by which they can be achieved more autonomously and continuously--the certainty of such means being itself a key ingredient of happiness.

Before specifying the universal elements of well-being regimes in more detail, we must reflect further upon the position of the nation state and non-state-centred actors in these arguments. With the nation state appearing as the central problem in a globally comparative account of social policy, the roles of other actors above and below the nation state are thus significant in any analysis of power relations, social reproduction and policy outcomes. It is clear that in many of the poorer countries, with which we are primarily concerned for this analysis, the problem for state actors is that power, authority and, more problematically, legitimacy lies significantly elsewhere. This was captured in our earlier formulation of the institutional responsibility matrix (IRM), with global and national level dimensions across the domains of state, market, community and household. The presence of these other loci of power, together with the contaminating permeability between them arising from a deployment of personalised social and cultural resources rather than accessible social capital (i.e. transparent and accountable), reduces the capacity of state actors to act in open democratic ways. Importantly,

\(^7\) Or ‘needs satisfactions’ in the Doyal and Gough formulation.
\(^8\) As exemplified in the quality of life indices being generated through the WeD research, drawing on the wider debates about subjective well-being.
\(^9\) The MDGs have, of course, been a globally negotiated attempt to do this, but falls short on many of the dimensions discussed here and in other arguments about agency, autonomy and capabilities.
aspects of globalisation can interact directly with sub-national entities thus by-passing and undermining the state. MNCs deal with ethnic power structures and local warlords to access minerals, precious metals and diamonds, sometimes via interlinked money laundering and arms agreements--thus promoting regional bases of power at the expense of central authority. International donors (including charities) sometimes leapfrog the state to implement projects via regional governments and NGOs. Remittances avoid the taxing capacity of the state. Wider faith movements operate directly with their congregations. Cross border ethnic solidarities represent secessionary challenges to their respective, weakly embedded 'nation' states. Large ethnic concentrations substitute themselves for the national identity as the price for remaining part of a larger whole. Economic and political transactions are conducted through the personalised networks of kin, clan, ethnic, race, caste and other such identities, entailing exclusion and preferentialism. This is clearly a complicated institutional landscape within which to formulate the idea of responsibility for social policy. Equally, it is silly to ignore and wish away such realities.

Of course, as indicated in 'Insecurity and Welfare Regimes' (Gough, Wood et al 2004), countries vary in the capacity of their IRMs to overcome the problems cited above. For example, within sub-Saharan Africa it is difficult to over-generalise because of variations. At the same time we cannot presume a linear movement towards the liberal-democratic pluralism from which OECD social policy evolved. Indeed, we might reasonably observe that the liberal orthodoxies and SAPs which were inflicted upon Africa through the 70s and 80s set back state performance decades, by dismantling areas of authority (e.g. state marketing boards, state managed cooperatives, public input supply agencies, food procurement, ration shops and subsidies) which might have become the object of democratic accountability over time, while doing little to improve the openness and transparency of markets which were charged, as replacements, with enhancing productivity and overall welfare. And it is clear from experience in East and SE Asia, that productivist welfare regimes have emerged and have been sustained over time through the retention of central control over levers of economic and social policy. And it is also clear that India, in contrast to its neighbours, continues to reflect a sufficiently strong sense of the state, within a framework of relatively stable democracy, to effect a degree of decommodification--albeit falling short of mass need. Hence the informal security regime classification (in Gough,
To summarise this more elaborated account of conditioning factors (Top Left Hand Box): We have now focussed more upon the conditions of unsettled societies, especially in terms of integration (vertical and horizontal) and cohesion variables. These variables, themselves reflect issues of identity, social closure, mutual exclusion and thus a stronger sense of differentiation between culture and values. In other words, the value consensus about priorities and agendas across the policy unit of reference (e.g. nation-state, country) is weak and conflictual, thus also contributing to the problem of legitimacy for state actors. These integration problems are reinforced by the increasing significance of globalisation, since not only nations, but different parts of nations are located differently in the global political economy in terms of opportunities, recognition and identity. This is the local-universal issue in the overall WeD framework at Bath. How is the agenda of well-being culturally constructed and socially articulated in ways which lend or detract from the more universal creation of policy? Take the different countries in the Middle East/West Asia region for example, or further East in Bangladesh. The struggle for universality between secular and spiritual criteria ebb and flow, underpinning chronic conflict and the oscillatory formation of strong and weak political regimes. Sometimes those conflicts are geographical, sometimes tribal and ethnic, and sometimes a function of neighbouring identities in the region (the regional parts of Afghanistan are mirrors to their cross-border neighbours) as well as the differentiating effects of globalisation (as in Bangladesh, Pakistan or Iran). Peru is a particularly strong case of distinct regions (coastal, Andean and Amazonian) with deeply differentiated cultural and social conditions, reinforced by centuries of globalisation in various forms and not unified by the sense of Spanish universality. Thailand, although often understood through strong notions of Thai-ness as part of royal and state ideology, is increasingly revealed as a composite of discrete cultural and social forms from the Muslims in the South, to the Lao and Cambodian identities in the East and North-East, and the Indo-Burman cultures of the hilly North-West among the Karen. Ethiopia, it seems, is many nations, relying on the 'construction' of Eritrea as external enemy as a crucial part of state management of 'integration'.

Wood et al 2004), which applies even more strongly in the other countries of the South Asia region.
In other words the competition for hearts and minds about concepts of well-being is widespread and ongoing, and an important anti-dote to Western discourses about universality as embodied in MDGs, HDIs, and Bank attempts to set the global social policy discourse. Can we be more meta than meta in order to have consensus? Only if we value a single hegemonic version over diversity. But as argued earlier in this paper, the 'trick' is to ask when does diversity harm people, and to what extent can universality at some level of abstract principle overcome the harmful effects of diversity while preserving its contribution to more local versions of well-being? This question thus has to be captured in a modified bottom right hand box, otherwise it exists independently and thus unrealistically of the conditioning factors.

Reproduction Consequences (Bottom Left Hand Box, Figure 1)

In the original regimes model, the issue of path dependency has been central. Esping-Andersen (1991) essentially argued for the ‘regime’ idea precisely because he could detect continuous political settlements around social policy, with stratification outcomes which reinforced existing arrangements. In expanding the comparative reach of the welfare regime idea, Gough and Wood et al (2004) accepted the strength of path dependency as a factor in determining differing routes taken by different societies towards welfare. In other words, we cannot be unrealistic and utopian about prospects for radical change. But at the same time, since we are all broadly assuming that change is a sine qua non for development strategies towards poverty reduction and the pursuit of improved well-being, we must look to those features of agency which go beyond acting within known constraints and which are pushing at the frontiers of room for manoeuvre. That is precisely the object of an enriched agenda of social policy, wherever the drivers and leaders of it can be found. Success will then be understood in terms of expansion of opportunities and the emergence of new forms and loci of power. These in turn challenge prevailing political settlements; set in motion institutional reform, new aspirations, expectations and confidence; and thus alter the conditioning factors in a conducive direction. It is most likely that such a general process will be the cumulation of minor advances: incrementalism rather than outright revolution. And the key principle, as enunciated in Wood and Gough (forthcoming) is the encouragement of processes of de-clientelisation as the stepping stone towards de-commodification. Take, for example, the potential to transform highly informal and personalised claims (for social protection and safety support) more towards an acknowledgement
of rights and needs-based entitlements in Northern Pakistani villages. Where the philanthropy of
the local mosque is in effect the exercise of patronage by a group of village elders with all kinds
of hidden criteria to meet, this can be replaced by more explicit and transparent criteria of
allocation as a result of pressure from the poor and the agencies working with them. This
becomes, in effect, an element in a revised political settlement at the village level with
demonstration effects across other allocation issues (e.g. irrigation, grazing access, subsidised
charges for electricity supplied from micro-hydel, and so on). Such changes, added up across
the valleys, amount to a minor alteration in the terms of power through mobilisation and set up
prospects for a process of reproduction which is dynamic rather than simply path dependent.
Such examples are more realistic of the change process in societies with highly institutionalised
authority structures than looking for big bang, large-scale mobilisation. However, Bangladesh
provides much more obvious examples (through the NGOs movement) of attempted large-scale
mobilisation as an expression of enhanced agency and resources profiles, seeking to change at
the macro level the terms of political settlement across the country. Such attempts are, naturally,
meeting their own resistance, and may be more successful through also building strategic
alliances with more powerful classes around the common interest in public goods.

To summarise the alternative trajectories for reproduction: Tendencies to success or
failure in the IRM and well-being outcomes boxes essentially determines the issue of path
dependency in the conditioning factors box. This is why we have to distinguish sharply between
simple and extended/expanded reproduction, borrowing the term from Marxian discourse about
the contrast between the formal and real subsumption of labour under capital (Brenner 1977).
Thus mere survival in well-being as a function of subordinated, subaltern negotiation of the IRM,
in which permeability remains negative, simply reproduces that inequality, exclusion or adverse
incorporation, and actually reinforces it. There is no conducive structural or ideological change
as a result. The well-being of the poor has been capped at low levels of dependent and insecure
survival. The relationships of intermediation within the institutional landscape (the IRM) remain
intact and reproduce path dependency. Interests and power have been protected and consolidated.
In Bangladesh, this could be summarised as continuation of the mastaani culture (local mafia-
type, patronage and broker hierarchies). But options for establishing more dynamic trajectories in
place of path dependency are clearly evident. They may be at local levels in the society,
cautiously expanding the room for manoeuvre through an incremental conversion of personalised claims into more acknowledged rights. They may occur as an outcome of more deliberate, larger-scale mobilisation through NGOs, seeking to break the mastaani culture. And they may take the form of new alliances between the poor and organised fractions of the middle class (for either altruistic motives or enlightened self interest in public goods: see the Bangladesh case below). All such options offer the prospect of disturbing present intermediation arrangements (i.e. de-clientelisation) and reproducing something else that sets in motion a virtuous cycle across the model. But given the significance of non-state actors in this scenario, we need to consider ‘second-best’ political settlements for well-being as the medium-term regime form, and as stepping stone towards more state-led de-commodification.

Given these revising arguments above, Figure 2, below, now represents a well-being version of the previous model.

Figure 2: Revised Model for Well-Being Regimes

### Conditioning Factors
- Societal integration and cohesion (identity, social closure, adverse incorporation)
- Differentiation in cultures and values
- Location in global political economy (influence of globalisation)
- Framing of policy agendas & priorities (universal vs local)
- State form: legitimacy & competences
- Labour markets
- Financial markets

### Institutional Responsibility Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONDITIONING FACTORS</th>
<th>RESOURCE PROFILES</th>
<th>ALLIANCE BUILDING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Domestic Governance</td>
<td>Domestic markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Domestic markets</td>
<td>Civil Society, NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Domestic markets</td>
<td>Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supra-national</td>
<td>International Organisations, national donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Global markets, MNCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Household Strategies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Reproduction Consequences
- Simple reproduction: Reproduction or reinforcement of stratification outcomes (inequality, exclusion, exploitation, domination). Mobilisations of elites to maintain status quo to buttress own power resources
- Extended/expanded reproduction: New alliances established between poor and different actors within IRM (e.g. middle class) to enhance agency to negotiate IRM and manage resource profiles, starts a virtuous circle to improve wellbeing outcomes and mobilise the poor

### Well-Being Outcomes
- HDI
- MDGs
- Need satisfactions
- Subjective well-being
- Security of Agency (avoidance of alienation)
- Freedom to + freedom from: i.e. capabilities, rights and citizenship
- Universal sense of wellbeing to overcome negative diversity but allow local conceptions of well-being
Achieving Second Best Political Settlement as the basis for a Well-Being Regime: Non-state actors and building alliances

With the significance of non state-centred actors on the one hand, and these variations in the composition and permeability characteristics of the IRM on the other, we have to take up the notion of 'political settlement' as the basis on which social policy is pursued through path dependent combinations of plural institutions, with varying implications for simple or extended social reproduction. The Esping-Andersen typology of welfare states is derived from variations in political settlement between competing interests, framed by the history of cultural values about the distribution of responsibility for welfare across the institutional landscape of public sector, market, charity/community, household and individual. As we extend the geographical reach of this method, it becomes more difficult to offer a parsimonious typology—though this was attempted in 'Insecurity and Welfare Regimes' (Gough, Wood et al 2004) and more recently in Wood and Gough (forthcoming). Furthermore, the Esping-Andersen framework was more one dimensional with its main focus upon the decommodification variable. As we spread the focus of social policy to the enabling of resources profiles (social development, in effect) but within a universal consensus about human needs and well-being (such as capabilities and happiness), so we need a more complex, meta-framework for understanding the variations of political settlement between countries.

The enormous modernisation literature on comparative political systems was characterised by functionalist analyses of interest groups and aggregating political parties (as loose coalitions organised either ideologically or factionally) representing the resolution to problems of vertical and horizontal integration and social cohesion. However, this stance has limited value to an understanding of political settlement in societies without traditions of liberal, pluralist politics. This was always the problem with the epistemology of Almond and Coleman's comparative structural-functionalism (Almond and Coleman 1960). Just too ethnocentric, teleological and decontextualised to be realistic. Much of the later writing about ‘3rd World Politics' has wrestled, mainly unsuccessfully, with this problematic ever since. Clearly, we cannot survey that literature here. But there are two particular, and to some extent interlinked, issues to explore within our argument about the significance of non-state actors to understanding

\footnote{Wood (2000b) added the community domain to this landscape to reflect conditions in poorer, non OECD-type countries. Within 'community' are many sub-categories of organised and informal welfare behaviour, both reciprocal, hierarchical, and deliberate collective action at different levels from large-scale civil society to localised institutions.}
the link between political settlement and social policy in poor countries. The first is the more familiar theme of organised non-state actors in pursuit of poverty reduction and well-being outcomes. The second is a less familiar argument about building strategic alliances between the poor and sections of the middle classes who themselves have few exit options but whose loyalty to present state-led policy management is weak. We explore this second issue further below in the context of Bangladesh, with cross references to other 'WeD' countries.

But first, what do we learn from the more recently honed literature about civil society, governance and the theme of 'working with government'? Although we can extract some useful concepts from this literature, much of it nevertheless remains ethnographically innocent about the power of embedded cultural values, informal social relations and the mutually reinforcing dimensions of class with caste and ethnicity. The governance/civil society discourse focuses more upon the organised sector of non state-centred actors in their relation to the state: i.e. in the NGO movement and civil society more generally. To model these relations we have to pose an initial set of questions about organised powerful actors (the non-powerful are of little interest for the analysis of political settlement): first about the separateness or interrelatedness of actors in pursuit of social policy objectives (i.e. parallel tracks or partners); second whether they are protagonists or antagonists (i.e. pursuing similar, or dissimilar, contrasting objectives); third whether they are innovators or advocates (i.e. doing things themselves or trying to influence others). These questions have to be mapped onto a second set about what policy does (we can further specify the 'social' later). Remember we have posited the enriched social policy agenda as the deliberate intersection between external goods and services and the resources for well-being (universally conceived) of those requiring the benefits of policy intervention. To achieve some kind of functional intersection, there are a series of policy 'verbs': prioritise, label, justify, initiate, create, promote, support, build, start, release, mitigate, redistribute, invest, give, supply, maintain and exaggerate; and they also comprise: avoid, reduce, stop, withdraw, defend, dismantle and prevent. Thus a political settlement embraces both sets of questions: about actors and functions they perform (i.e. verbs).

11 This is why Wood entitled his 2000 article in Public Administration and Development 'Prisoners and Escapees', to capture the argument that social actors in Bangladesh pursued policy and public institutional performance within a social and cultural 'prison' (drawing on Goffman's ideas about 'total institutions'), characterised by patron-clientelism, kinship loyalties, status recognition and so on.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Goals (Ends)} & \textbf{Dissimilar} & \textbf{Similar} \\
\hline
\textbf{Preferred Strategies (Means)} & Co-optation & Cooperation (Occasional Mode) \\
\hline
\textbf{Similar} & (A By-product of Success) & (Predominant Mode) \\
\hline
\textbf{Dissimilar} & Confrontation (Avoided, if possible) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Working with Government: A 4C’s Approach}
\end{figure}

The dominant relation out of these 'C' options will be a function of the similarity/dissimilarity of strategies (means) and goals (ends). On any given issue between state and non-state actors, goals will either be similar or not; and each set of actors will have preferences for the strategies/means for pursuing those goals, which will also either be similar or dissimilar. This, Najam argues, leads to one of four possible combinations: first, seeking similar ends with similar means (cooperation); second, seeking similar ends but via dissimilar means (complementarity); third, seeking dissimilar ends via similar means (cooptation); and fourth, seeking dissimilar ends via dissimilar means (confrontation). In the first combination, governmental and nongovernmental organizations are likely to work jointly towards joint objectives; in the second, they are likely to act separately but towards converging objectives; in the third, they may seem like acting jointly, but do so towards different objectives and are likely to attempt to co-opt the goals of the other; and in the fourth, they tend to have opposing interests and act to thwart each other’s efforts.

This framework cannot be accepted, uncritically, for our broader analysis of political settlement and regime characteristics, but it is a start, if only for its parsimony. Clearly there are other Cs: competition and conflict. There is also mutual accommodation. It is not clear where
advocacy fits in to this model. It is not sufficiently sensitive to the ethnography of power, especially when we understand that for many poorer countries, kinship and clan groups stretch across the state and non-state domains. In other words, any understanding of political settlement for social policy has to embrace a more subtle and nuanced account of partnership, ownership and engagement. These are then further arguments for converting the initial comparative Welfare Regimes model (Figure 1) into a revised model Well-Being model (Figure 2 above). Thus, in addition to shifting from welfare to well-being, the revised model offers refinement in terms of contextualised political settlements between state and non-state actors for the pursuit of well-being. The central question for country analysis is therefore: How are the ‘verbs’ of social policy distributed between state and organised non-state actors, as determined by conditioning factors and the ‘C’ options?

Part of the answer to this question concerns the motives of such non-state actors, and this brings us to the second issue raised above about building alliances between the poor and sections of the emerging middle classes around common interests. Organised non-state actors, as expressed through NGO activity and civil society activity more generally, may be motivated in three ways. By altruism (i.e. renegade behaviour); or by an enlightened self-interest, which is shared among broader sections of the unorganised middle classes; and by the related political calculation, based on fear of destabilising mobilisation by the disaffected poor, which calls for limited 'safety valve' redistribution via concessions. The expansion of this sense of enlightened self-interest (i.e. turning latent interests into manifest ones) represents a key dimension of room for manoeuvre in the development of a more conducive political settlement for the pursuit of well-being outcome among the poor. Here, we report upon a focus group exercise conducted by Wood with middle class activists in Bangladesh through 2002. The characteristics of poverty in Bangladesh were agreed amongst these activists. This was followed by a mapping of coinciding middle class interests, expressed as commitment to public goods in one form or another. This was then followed by identification of concessions needed to defuse threats to the achievement of these common agendas. The content of each of these steps is summarised as follows:

13 4 interacting domains: (i) Conditioning Factors for the (ii) IR Matrix; leading to both (iii) well-being outcomes and (iv) social reproduction (simple and extended).
14 e.g. professional associations, chambers of commerce, charities, philanthropic foundations, social and cultural movements, clubs, discussion groups, labour unions, religious institutions.
15 This was conducted as part of a strategic planning exercise for the next activity phase of one of the major NGOs in Bangladesh, with a comprehensive rights and services portfolio covering much of the country.
Step 1: Agreed characteristics of poverty beyond the material resources of income and asset possession:

- Lack of choice
- Lack of security
- Fragile rights and entitlements
- Lack of access to the means of present and future livelihoods
- Lack of protection from the discriminatory behaviour of powerholders (economic, political and cultural)
- Lack of access to common property and public goods
- Vulnerability to hazards and shocks
- High discount rates for the future
- Lack of support from an accountable state (and its governing party occupants)
- Social exclusion and (more likely) problematic inclusion or adverse incorporation
- Compulsion to use renewable resources unsustainably

Step 2: Middle Class 'Public Goods' interests:

- Security: personal, municipal and national
- Protection of private property
- Non-discriminatory law and order (with rights based justice)
- Freedom of movement and expression
- Political stability under democratic principles
- Parliamentary rather than 'street' forms of government and opposition
- Independent judiciary
- Economic growth sufficient to absorb entrants to the labour market at different skill levels
- An expanding education and information/knowledge based economy
- Non-segmented (open) labour market for professional skills
- Low inflation and a stable currency for investment purposes
- Public investment in quality infrastructure
- Incorruptible civil service and politicians as basis for equitable taxation
- Incentives for entrepreneurial risk taking, protected from excessive taxation and rent-seeking
- Appropriate levels of regulation (i.e. enabling rather than constraining, directed to ensure fair competition)
- Equitable delivery of services
- A wider tax base
- Fiscal encouragement to remit incomes from abroad

In comparing these two boxes, the main point of comparison is not that the items in the second box are all in the primary interest of the poor, as evidenced by the first box, but that none of them are antithetic to the poor except insofar as the normal surplus value principles of
capitalism apply when x is employed by y in the private sector. But there is also significant overlap between the interests of the poor and non-poor in the context of the imperfect, rent-seeking, patron-dominated political economy that is Bangladesh. This second box can be understood as a modernist, secular agenda of 'capitalism with a human face' or 'progressive capitalism' and of course represents de-clientelisation themes alongside de-commodification ones.

In Bangladesh, what could essentially motivate the middle classes to sign up for 'capitalism with a human face' since their own emergence has actually occurred under 'prison-like' conditioning factors (Wood 2000b)? Our pursuit of enriched social policy for well-being is conducted in the context of unsettled and rapidly changing societies, strongly characterised by a rapidly growing and urbanising middle class comprising a range of sub-classes, sometimes recently migrated and only partially educated. These are unlike the longer established narrower elites (with roots in ancestral property and rent-seeking professional groups, such as lawyers, doctors, engineers and comprador banking) who do have exit options, as argued in different contexts by Deacon (Deacon, Hulse and Stubbs 1997) and Figueroa for Peru (2002). The new middle classes are certainly *nouveau*. In Bangladesh, and Peru too, their routes to new status via the social and cultural resources of kin, clientelism, segmented labour market access and transitory sponsorship by the aided state are not the conditions for sustainably consolidating that new-found status. Thus their motivation for 'signing up' is security, private property and political stability. The political costs to the middle classes in Bangladesh of over-exploitation and socio-economic exclusion of poorer classes is continuous low level disruption, violence, crime and sabotage alongside the prospect of the capture of alienated poorer classes (including those on the bottom rung of the middle category, desperately clinging to differentiated status while being excluded from the knowledge economy) by conservative, repressive anti-modernist regimes. Under these quasi-fascist conditions, the common interests of a generic, newly arrived, middle class cannot be fulfilled. So there is political convergence too, with middle class employers and owners of capital (or debt) having at least a short and medium term interest in concessionary capitalism in order to protect gains made so far. This is now evident, for example, in the

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16 Of course other societies will offer variants on this theme. But whereas up to 3 decades ago in the hey-day of neo-Marxian optimism, the normative and predicted conclusion might have been revolution, political outcomes have more familiarly been as above, or other forms of chaos and civil war. So, for example, the gated communities of the super-rich in many parts of urban Latin America do not represent a long term stable solution for such classes, but they usually have overseas exit options too, and so are unlikely to get caught up in the co-variance of domestic political chaos.
garments industry, where a steady transformation of labour conditions reflects an interest in stable, skilled and loyal workforces.

### Step 3: Agreed Indicators of Concessionary Policy:

- Improved wages
- Improved conditions at work (including sickness, maternity and retirement packages)
- Willingness to pay higher taxes and see them re-distributed to the interests of the poor via targeted infrastructure, services and welfare (including universal social insurance)
- Public investment in education in recognition of the need for a skilled and educated labour force, as the basis for also raising the relative surplus value of labour (NB This was a key breaker of apartheid in South Africa)
- Regulation (or self-policed civil society substitutes via clubs, kite marks and standards) to ensure level playing fields on the gross costs of employing labour (including regulated apprenticeships and nationally recognised qualifications) (NB This is a trust and thus social capital issue)
- Decent living conditions for the workforce (extended beyond the garments example to embrace leather goods, jute goods, shrimp/prawn production, rural works labour, especially creches and toilets for women, and the rising petro-chemicals sector)
- Meaningful and affordable access to legal services in the pursuit of statutory rights (this can be especially important in the realm of family law for female garments workers)
- Equal status before the law

Historically, in the evolution of bourgeois societies in the West, the state has behaved in a relatively autonomous manner from the immediate interests of fractions of capital in order to ensure that such concessions were made to the working classes. This is the origin of Western social policy and the more recent analysis of rich country welfare regimes. But the state's relative autonomy in such societies derived from the intrinsic competition between fractions of capital (i.e. finance and industry) leaving such propertied classes collectively vulnerable to popular overthrow unless economic concessions were accompanied by political ones, which became the universal franchise. The mediation of such concessions further reinforced the relative autonomy of the state, and the political classes managing it. This has been the foundation for the state's independence from particular elites and the room for manoeuvre to compensate for the unmediated logic of market forces, especially in the regulation of labour markets. In other words the long term interests of the property owning middle classes were protected from their own short term, rapacious follies by the relatively autonomous, and thereby legitimised, state. However, this scenario is currently not on offer in Bangladesh and other unsettled societies,
partly due to the immaturity of capitalism in its commodified form, and partly therefore because state capture becomes a key route to property accumulation and an extension of personalised and clientelist forms of power. Thus, rather than the state compensating for the market (in either its commodified or imperfect forms), the historically prior imperative is for critical civil society (underpinned by support from alliances between the threatened new middle classes and the vulnerable poor) to transform the state, through some of the ‘C’ options outlined above, into being ‘fit for the compensation purpose’. This is the route to 'first best' political settlements, and is tactically (because realistically) enacted through a concentration upon the expansion of public goods (step 2 above), thus meeting cohesion and integration objectives.

There is also an international dimension to this argument, given the significance of the Bangladeshi diaspora abroad and the remittances from it to Bangladesh. Those abroad also seeking to invest back in Bangladesh, perhaps accompanied by their own return to the country, have shared interests with the domestic new middle classes in improving the overall quality of the political economy in terms of security, respect for private property and political stability. These remittances are potentially highly important wealth creators for the economy (already the largest source of foreign exchange) and therefore represent important employment opportunities for the expanding urban and peri-urban workforce from among the poor and near poor. However, the present conditions of the political economy are a strong disincentive for such investment, especially among diaspora classes familiar with 'capitalism with a human face' in NW Europe, UK, North America and the Australasian countries where they are currently settled.

**Fusing Social Policy with Social Development: the Enriched Agenda**

What are the implications of these arguments for a more enriched social policy agenda? So far, we have argued that as we move towards a well-being regimes model we need to recognise more strongly contextualised settlements between state and non-state actors. Considering the other amendments to our model, this would require ‘social’ policy to focus on addressing issues of vertical and horizontal integration and well-being rather than only welfare via the policy ‘verbs’ in ways that positively enhance poor people’s ability to negotiate their resource profiles (i.e. their agency) for survival and happiness. It also requires a balance between the resource profiles conceived as self evident and universal (a la Doyal and Gough) across a national and global policy universe with the more localised and therefore diverse interpretations...
of need which constitute the problem for integration and societal cohesion. It is with this enhanced agenda for comparative social policy, crucially defined through replacing welfare regimes with well-being regimes, that a broader agenda of intervention across a range of development sectors comes into view. This is the fusion of social policy and social development that a focus upon well-being entails.

The consequence of such an argument is the need to evaluate a broader range of sectoral interventions for their impact upon well-being than is traditionally considered under the 'social policy for welfare' conception. This 'policy' mix has to be de-constructed by responsibility and strategic purpose. Who, across state and non-state actors (above and below, as well as alongside the state) is most appropriate for carrying this out? In the previous section we have made the case that an alliance between the middle class and the poor should be forged. And secondly what category of activity is contemplated: structure and ideology (i.e. the altering of framing and discourse conditions for action); services (i.e. direct provision of services for 'freedom to' as well as 'freedom from' objectives); and support for processes and resources profiles (i.e. of mobilisation and empowerment among non-elites with limited influence on the previous two categories). Figure 4, below, demonstrates how this can be visualised as operating across a ‘policy’ mix or ‘strategic purpose framework’ over the arenas of the family (household), community, market and state. It is through this mix that more enriched social policy should be implemented.

We now turn to preliminary findings from WeD research in Bangladesh\textsuperscript{17} and the recent welfare regimes work at Bath of Davis (2001, 2004) to provide some insight into the

\textsuperscript{17} With its focus on well-being, the WeD research programme at the University of Bath, UK is researching a holistic, but also practical vision of well-being that is sensitive to local realities. Human well-being is taken here to be not just a set of objective circumstances, such as having enough food and shelter, but these combined with people’s own evaluations of whether they are achieving what they are aspire to achieve. The conceptual framework places people at the centre of the analysis and focuses on the well-being outcomes they achieve and the processes they engage in to achieve them. This involves studying their relations to other people and their interactions with the social, political and cultural...
contextualised settlements between state and non-state actors for the pursuit of well-being. In doing so, we will highlight problematic areas within this mix of strategic purpose that would need to be addressed by a more enriched social policy agenda.

1. Structure and ideology

Customary cultural and social institutions comprising a complex interplay of kin, bangsho, samaj and caste structures crosscut by religion have historically constituted important mechanisms of social protection and mutual support\(^\text{18}\). They have consequently played a crucial role in social cohesion and integration within Bangladesh communities. On the one hand, they have been an important form of social safety net to alleviate the shortcomings of state provision that has occupied a monopolistic position over public resources characterised by widespread rent seeking and corruption. On the other hand, these same structures have been underpinned by a pervasive system of vertically aligned patron-clientelism that reinforces processes of adverse incorporation (Wood 2003, Blair 2005, Davis and McGregor 2000). It is the loyalty between patrons and clients which has been essential for maintaining social cohesion by weakening horizontal class solidarity amongst the poor, thus restricting mass opportunities for mobilisation against interests of the rich (again, Davis and McGregor, 2000).

Evidence from WeD study sites suggests that these traditional forms of social cohesion and integration are being challenged by new forces largely to do with the liberalisation of Bangladesh’s economy (i.e. related to its location within global political economy). Expansion of rural infrastructure and opening of labour markets has contributed to the creation of new economic opportunities outside of agriculture (Kabeer, 2004). Within the family, greater occupational mobility is being blamed for the decline of the extended family and its associated

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\(^{18}\)The poor receive loans, employment, meals, help with dowry and medical costs, help with access to land and disputes over it from such institutions. Davis would argue that the impact of socio-economic change on these forms of support has been insufficiently analysed.
forms of social security, hence undermining social cohesion. Many informants reported concern about being supported by their children in old age. Indeed, WeD’s quality of life research reaffirmed this by highlighting the importance of ‘close relationships’ (i.e. importance of ‘family harmony’ to happiness and subjective well-being). This is symptomatic of broader tensions between older and younger generations at the community level that have manifested themselves in declining respect towards elders.

Many informants linked this to the growing importance of income and wealth which has transformed social and cultural relationships both within the family and the community. Of far greater significance to our argument is how these trends have challenged long established social and cultural forms of authority and control (e.g. shalish). Money (i.e. economic strength), new party politics and new educational status, instead of ethnicity, caste, age, popularity and respect, have transformed the traditional landscape of power and have become the new signifiers of status and authority. However, the resulting network of new power brokers comprising Union Parishad leaders and sub district level officials, local gang leaders, community leaders and other levels of mastaan continue to maintain the prevailing vertically aligned patron-client relations. Hence, although the actors have changed, the prevailing circumstances remain, thus restricting opportunities for positive extended reproduction as per the bottom left hand box of the revised model (Figure 2). In effect, and as reported, social and cultural institutions are continuing to play an important role in the marginal re-distribution of wealth, via short-term safety nets, to the poor, albeit as a process now increasingly dominated by these new local elites. At the same time, other traditional charitable practices do continue in the form of religious festivals amongst the Hindu and Muslim communities that encourage donations from elites to support the poor. It is also important to acknowledge the significance of what White (1992) referred to as ‘minor markets’ in which significant informal exchange occurs between women of neighbouring families (often within extended families) to smooth consumption difficulties.

In spite of the new challenges to social cohesion within the family and community, patriarchal cultural values continue to legitimate the widespread subordination of women and legitimisation of their unpaid labour within Bangladesh communities. WeD findings reinforce much of the literature within this area (Kabeer, 1994, White 1992) by reasserting how this has constrained the agency of women to negotiate resource profiles. It is still widely believed that a

19 Shalish: traditional form of village level court for dispute settlement, comprised of male elders.
woman’s place is within the home with the family. This has placed restrictions on their physical mobility and their ability to seek employment (i.e. by imposing cultural barriers). Those who do find employment are paid less than men. However, our research did reveal that this varied amongst different classes of women. In particular, the institutions of dowry and marriage were identified as restricting opportunities for mobilisation. For example, there is a high prevalence of younger girls dropping out of education to get married in order to avoid paying the higher dowry required for older brides.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the framing of policy agendas and priorities needs to be appropriately sensitive to the local realities, particularly with reference to the landscape of power. In the Bangladesh context, these are characterised by a complex and dynamic intermeshing of economic, social and cultural mechanisms of social integration and cohesion that are not necessarily beneficial to everyone. Alongside the evidence of informal safety net transfers, these mechanisms aggravate existing patterns of social closure and mutual exclusion. And with the arrival of new patrons, they both maintain and add new forms of adverse incorporation. This amounts to a reproduction of path dependency neither purely simple, nor positively extended. Thus the de-clientelisation agenda remains an imperative under these conditions. It is in this context that consensus in Bangladesh between state and non-state actors (including the unorganised middle class) on human needs and well-being in the senses of ‘freedom to’, agency and social development remains essential to enforcing more progressive change.

2. Services

It is widely acknowledged that the provision of services for ‘freedom to’ and ‘freedom from’ objectives from the state in Bangladesh has been problematic (World Bank 2002). It is in this context that the role of civil society, particularly organised non-state actors in the form of NGOs facilitated by bilateral and multilateral donor funding, took on a significant role in the enhancement of welfare outcomes. However, their impact has not been without controversy.

Evidence from WeD sites confirmed the importance of NGOs in providing a host of different services to improve human resources such as education (non formal primary education, adult literacy, skill training), improved health care, agricultural extension and various public

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21 Many informants reported that a generation of new, young political leaders were challenging the power base of older, traditional leaders.
works schemes. These have been implemented with the aim of enhancing the agency of the poor and excluded to negotiate resources in the arenas of the family, community and market. By far their greatest activity has been the provision of microfinance and savings and credit facilities. Although such services have reduced overall dependence on traditional moneylenders and enhanced individuals’ ability to negotiate resource profiles, it continues to exclude the poorest who cannot afford the initial costs of membership. In this respect, these services have visibly increased access to certain welfare outcomes but have been arguably less successful in enhancing well-being outcomes (i.e. rights). In other words, they have not sufficiently engaged with socially embedded patronage relations that are a key constraint to genuine social mobilisation as argued by Davis (2001, 2004).

Similar criticisms can be directed towards the provision of education and health services by the state. Both sectors have the potential to enhance agency to negotiate resource profiles and subsequently play important roles in catalysing opportunities for mobilisation and overcoming stratification. First, it needs to be emphasised that there have been considerable increases in government spending on these services. As a result, most of our sites have access to government provided healthcare and education. Indeed, the improvements in welfare outcomes are considerable if we consider, for example, how widespread campaigning for immunisation has reduced child mortality. Nevertheless, there were numerous complaints across all of the WeD study sites concerning the quality of service provision in these sectors. Many stated that medicines were never available (often because they had been given to relatives or political supporters of government officials) and doctors were never present (partly because they got paid more when they went private). Although there was an awareness about the value of education, particularly as it has increasingly become a signifier of status and respect, many expressed feelings of demoralisation and disillusion. This was largely attributed to the difficulty of securing employment afterwards. This was particularly the case for girls who were doubly disadvantaged when pulled out of school for early marriage. This supports work of Davis (2001; 2004) who identified anti rural, anti poor and anti female biases in the provision of health care and education.

These dynamics are currently being analysed further by WeD.

Davis (2001, 2004) gives a comprehensive account of how NGOs were initially motivated by a strong social mobilisation agenda framed by an understanding of the need to tackle patron-clientelism as the root cause of inequality in Bangladesh. With increasing pressure to contribute to their own running costs in the 1990s, many NGOs refocused their activities towards the provision of technocratic services such as microfinance.

Sen and Hulme 2004 and Davis 2004 confirm these trends.
There was also widespread discontent amongst the WeD sites directed towards state provided social protection services. There were numerous complaints that local government officials (who are responsible for implementation) were misappropriating benefits from the Vulnerable Group Development and Vulnerable Group Feeding Schemes, winter clothes and pensions. Rather, they used them to benefit relatives or strengthen their position of power within the community. The overall impact has been to undermine the ability of such schemes to mitigate existing patterns of social stratification and enhance the mobilisation of the poorest. Unfortunately, these practices are not confined to WeD sites and have been widely observed amongst a number of rural food for work programmes.

Taken together, these prevailing circumstances show that services have the potential to enhance individual and community agency over resource profiles. Yet, the tendency has been to focus on ‘freedom from’ rather than engaging with the more eudaimonic dimensions of ‘freedom to’. This can largely be attributed the interests of new patron elites to retain the status quo via misappropriating both state funded safety net intervention, as well as the new opportunities associated with education and health services. This has the effect of reducing the potential of such services to enhance agency, thus maintaining the problems of vertical integration. As a result, prevailing systems of informal brokerage and intermediation are sustained. Khan (2000) referred to such systems as public ‘bads’. Realistically overcoming them, in our view, has to be via expanding the societal commitments to public goods through stronger alliances between the middle classes (with a more obvious potential for voice) and the fragmented poor around common agendas, as discussed earlier. This is, therefore, more than just a reassertion of the familiar rights based approach, because we are also indicating the strategic means by which that agenda can be realised.

3. Support for processes and resources profiles

Based on the above discussions, it is clear that the ability to negotiate resources amongst the poor and marginalised (e.g. women) is constrained on a number of fronts. In spite of the evidence from WeD sites that intervention from non-state actors (particularly the NGO sector) and some intervention from the state have contributed towards the improvement of human resources and material resources, we see little change to prevailing stratification systems or

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24 See Davis (2004) for a discussion of these schemes.
evidence of mobilisation amongst the poor and marginalised. In other words, it has not been matched by increasing capabilities and entitlements that is crucial for well-being.

Although the provision of services is an important entry point into facilitating processes of mobilisation and empowerment, it is meaningless if it is not matched by equal attention to codifying rights for security and risk reduction in the arenas of the family, community, market and state. Hence, our argument for an enriched social policy agenda with a reorientation from welfare outcomes to well-being outcomes. So, what does this mean for empowerment and mobilisation?

We have identified patriarchal and patron-clientelist relationships, as well as the problems of social integration more widely as key constraints within and between Bangladeshi communities. To deal with the first, social policy could encourage intervention that initiates defamilialisation (Esping-Andersen 1999) as argued by Davis (2001; 2004). This involves policies such as the provision of childcare (e.g. via crèches at work sites) and support for girls’ education, which enables women not only to enter the labour market (WID) and but also to enhance their agency to negotiate their resources profile within the patriarchal family arena (GAD). Such agency outcomes thus also mitigate cultural values that legitimise a woman’s subordinated place in the home as expressed, for example, in the issue of women’s unpaid labour without value or associated rights. To address the second, as discussed at various points above, we need to encourage processes of de-clientelisation. Micro finance in Bangladesh has been a major strategy for de-linking clients from their patrons. More generally, the social mobilisation efforts of NGOs have been directed at increasing the confidence of the poor to trust their solidarity. However, these efforts get easily broken up by the large, competing political parties, offering divisive patronage, as well as by the resurgence of religious conservatism. Thirdly, to engage with these broader problems of social integration, the common agendas between middle and poor classes in Bangladesh around public goods (as noted earlier) needs to embrace middle class support for the enhanced agency among the poor to negotiate resource profiles. In this sense, the agency of the poor is not a threat to the middle classes (as always classically conceived), but actually part of their salvation because therein lies the route to the universals of expanded public goods and economic growth, necessary if not sufficient for collective well-being.

25 Particularly in terms of infrastructures which facilitates access to markets.
Clearly, all these three areas of strategic purpose are closely connected. The success of services in enhancing agency to negotiate resource profiles is dependent on prevailing cultures and values, systems of social integration and cohesion. Our evidence suggests that constraints within the arena of structure and ideology, crosscut by a problematic institutional landscape, is inhibiting these positive feedback mechanisms which in turn have negative repercussions for stratification and mobilisation outcomes.

**Conclusion**

Overall this paper has been concerned to move us along from a welfare to well-being discourse in terms of specifying social policy regimes in unsettled societies, characterised by problems of vertical and horizontal socio-political integration. Some features of this argument are quite familiar, the emphasis upon social development in terms of agency and the role of non-state actors for example. It has heuristically used a series of conceptual dyads to convey the rich, holistic conceptual agenda that has to be contained in this discourse shift: between politically settled and unsettled societies, between welfare and well-being, between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to' agendas, between human capital and capabilities/agency, between social policy and social development. It has structured the paper by displaying ‘progress’ between two versions of a social policy regime model (Figures 1 & 2), using these dyads. In highlighting the key problems of state legitimacy to conduct social policy in unsettled societies, it has drawn attention to two ‘process’ imperatives to bring about non-path dependent change: enhanced agency of the poor to negotiate resource profiles across the institutional responsibility matrix; and the significance of non-state actors in overcoming some of those legitimation problems. We have referred to a classification of the different types of relationship that might obtain between state and non-state actors in the 4 ‘C’s model (Figure 3).

As the discussion increasingly draws upon summarised empirical evidence from Bangladesh, accumulated through several decades of research, as well as more recently in the WeD research group, so the arguments about the non-state actors and agency become more specific. While acknowledging that Bangladesh has been a laboratory for the development interventions of some of the largest NGOs in the world, results in agency and rights terms have not succeeded, fundamentally, in shifting the path dependency which reproduces poverty, inequality and insecurity across the society. This point is reinforced through the preliminary
findings from the WeD research group, from 6 community level sites across the country. With such analysis, it is not good enough just to have a policy wish list, assuming that eventually the state, with or without collaboration from non-state actors, will implement that agenda. We have pondered on the question: what forces and interests within the society exist that might alter present path dependency? Thus we have focussed upon an argument about unorganised non-state actors among the middle classes (especially those without exit options via globalisation and private sector provisioning of essential services) and their shared interests in the expansion of public goods within the society. This is a concept of public goods which extends beyond familiar notions of collective or national infrastructure and services to a ‘public goods’ understanding of ‘process’ in the form of improved and wider citizenship, capabilities and agency among the poor. We have indicated these overlaps in the paper, based upon focus group discussions in Bangladesh, carried out in 2002.

As these arguments are explored in further research, so we will need to test this ‘public goods’ proposition in various ways. As part of this exercise, we will also need to map more closely the relationship between such shared interests and responsibility for different fields of public policy within the strategic purpose framework outlined above: namely, structure and ideology, services, and processes and resource profiles. Considering these problematic areas of strategic purpose, what forms of intervention would an enriched social policy agenda propose, given that there is still a need to map responsibility? We believe it would require a broader range of quality sectoral interventions than traditionally considered under the ‘social policy for welfare’ banner. This is how we arrive at an investment in capabilities and well-being, in addition to direct income support and market regulation, such as: education; curative health; infrastructure (e.g. transport, communications, energy, markets for improving productivity, as well as for preventative public health); law and order; opportunities for participation; support for collective action; creation of community level and national level public goods; codifying rights for security and risk reduction; tolerant and respectful space for cultural, values and belief diversity to underpin basic cognitive freedoms and pride in identity that do not exclude and subordinate; security for remittance transactions; incentives for inter-generational transfers; expansion of risk pools (e.g. extension of micro/meso informal/formal finance products, including crucially insurance and mutual assurance).
References


