THE RESPONSIVE STATE:
OPENNESS AND INCLUSION IN THE POLICY PROCESS

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Abstract: This paper argues that the concept of the responsive state, i.e. a state characterized by
dense co-operation between public authorities and civil society supported by values of
participatory democracy, is nurtured by increasing wealth, but also adds an explanatory
dimension to traditional theories by arguing that responsiveness has consequences for political
outcomes. Furthermore, the concept of the responsive state seeks to escape the determinism
associated with modernization theory by combining values and organization, and remaining open
to the impact of international society.

This cross-sectional study is aggregated from elite surveys in fifteen post-communist
states. The paper seeks to 1) track variations in degrees of openness and inclusion, 2) contribute
to the debate about Europeanization, i.e. to ascertain if pro-active policies pursued in the
enlargement process encourage the development of participatory values and dense networks
between the state and civil society, and 3) explore if responsiveness reduces poverty and
promotes equality.

We find that state responsiveness can be fostered by international commitment and
institutional pressure, and that state responsiveness does impact policy outcomes. Responsive
states are, to paraphrase Lijphart (1999), kinder and gentler.

Keywords: corporatism, pluralism, inequality, poverty, responsive state, Europeanization, civil
service, civil society

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1. Introduction

The transitions to the democracy and the market in the former communist countries were, indeed, revolutionary. The governing ideology changed. The political system and the way in which leaders were selected, elected, and held accountable changed and, finally, in each country market reforms redistributed wealth and life opportunities between citizens.

The differences between the countries in terms of absolute poverty and equality are astonishing. Figure 1 illustrates that while some countries have succeeded in combining poverty reduction and equality, others are beset by both poverty and inequality. But we also find that poverty may go hand in hand with equality (Mongolia is a particular case), while poverty reduction may also go hand in hand with inequality (Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan). The central puzzle here is that these differences cannot be accounted for by economic wealth alone. Equality in life chances and wealth are considered normative concepts often associated with specific political programs. Our question is, however, if the differences can be ascribed to characteristics of the state, in particular to the development of a responsive state.
Figure 1: Absolute poverty and inequality. (pct. living for below 2USD a day; Gini-coefficient)

Sources: GINI coefficient: World Income Inequality Database found at http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm; Poverty (defined as percent of population living for under $2 a day): World Development Indicators (WDI) found at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline

The responsive state (Johannsen, 2002b), is defined as a state that is held accountable, not only through the normal procedures of competitive democracy, but also through cooperation with interest groups in the formulation and execution of political priorities, and as a state that retain a degree of autonomy for political action. The responsive state can therefore only emerge where a strong civil society meets a strong democratic state (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Bernhard, 1996). The concept of the responsive state combines three trains of thought. First, in democratic discourses from Tocqueville and onwards civil society is argued to be the ‘infrastructure and organizational bedrock of democratic societies’ (Zimmer, 2005, p. 11) balancing the state and
empowering the many by providing resources, experiences, and common identifications (Rueschemeyer, 1998). Secondly, it draws on the insight from Putnam’s (1993) concept of ‘civic community’, where civicness not only improves democracy qualitatively, but also enhances the capacity of political institutions to solve political, social and economic problems. Thirdly, the responsive state further develops insights from such diverse sources as Evans (1995), Leftwich (1995), and Weiss (1998) who, despite their differences and the key agendas, emphasize the importance of state-society linkages. Dense cooperation between public authorities and civil society supported by values of participatory democracy are the hallmarks of the responsive state. Thus when they point out that in the West European state type – in contrast to the minimalist liberal state – societal actors are involved in the policy process from formulation to implementation it is of particular relevance to the cases examined here. They thus argue that involvement of civil society should increase the legitimacy of policy decisions and the usability of the state in terms of making socially and economically viable decisions. Moreover, they are well aware of the flip side to responsiveness and the reverse side of involvement, namely the risk that the state is confined by particularistic interests, paving the way for state capture and increased inequality. In accordance with Evans’s (1995) concept of embeddedness, Weiss’s (1998) discussion of state capacity, and Bernhard’s (1996) discussion of consolidated democracy, the responsive state retains reformative autonomy.

To paraphrase Lijphart’s (1999) research on consensus democracy, the question raised in this contribution is whether the ethics and organizational features of the responsive state also have distributional consequences, making it a kinder and gentler species. Critics will undoubtedly be quick to dismiss this kind of research as normative. There is some obvious merit to this claim when we consider the branding as kinder and gentler species alone. However, while the democratization of the post-communist countries called for a new balance between state and society, governance is more than the formal rules of election and how government decisions are made. As posited by the World Bank (1991), governance also pays attention to the ends in terms of achieving levels of economic, human, and institutional development that ‘benefit the population as a whole’.

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The Demstar survey\(^1\) was originally designed to address the issue of state transformation and administrative capacity in 15 post-communist countries. A total of 982 current and former ministers of government and high-ranking administrators have been interviewed. Unfortunately, only some of the aspects of the responsive state were touched upon in the survey and the issues at hand have made it necessary to aggregate the variables to country level. With these caveats in mind this paper specifically seeks to 1) track variations in the degree of openness and inclusion in 15 post countries. 2) Contribute to the debate about Europeanization, i.e. whether the impact of European pro-active policies pursued in the enlargement process results in the development of dense networks between the state and the civil society. 3) Finally, we test if responsiveness reduces poverty and promotes equality.

The paper is organized in the following way. First, we outline some of the theoretical points of departure related to openness and inclusion. Second, we chart the values of participation and measure the density of state-society relations in the 15 countries. Third, we discuss the impact of a European model as an impetus for responsiveness and openness, while in the fourth section we develop a number of explorative models that demonstrate the consequences of responsiveness upon equality. We finally conclude – and backtrack – with a discussion of the issue of density, addressing if pro-active policies in fact promote responsive governance.

2. The point of departure

Theories on openness and inclusion fall into in two models that differ in the way in which civil society actors gain access to decision making. Pluralism underlines the politics of competition between multitudes of freely-organized interest groups that compete for influence and that responsive governments listen to all voices before taking decisions.

Pluralism thus questions the importance of representation through election as the basic element in a democracy, pointing out that organized groups do possess the capability to influence policy (Dahl, 1967), and that group pressure is a way to limit the power of the state, giving rise to a more democratic society. Critics of the pluralist model have maintained that societies were in reality not plural by pointing to unequal access to power due to structurally related differences

\(^1\) For more information about the DEMSTAR survey (Democracy, the State, and Administrative Reforms), see www.demstar.dk and appendix. The program was initiated and headed by professor Ole Norgaard, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark, and supported by the Danish Social Science Research Council and the University of Aarhus Research Fund.
in political and economic resources (Schattschneider, 1960), and to the fact that some groups have preferential (and undemocratic) access to decision making (Lindblom, 1977). Moreover, corporate strategies using money to win political support by establishing advocacy groups or orchestrating ‘AstroTurf’ campaigns (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004; Deal & Doroshow, 2003) cannot be seen as evidence of an empowered civil society in the way pluralism traditionally does.

In contrast, corporatism emphasizes a coordinated and centralized bargaining relation between the government and key interest groups representing business and labour, emphasizing that government decision making positions are facilitated through the political recognition of interest groups, while the organizations in question in turn become subject to more or less formalized obligations, for example to behave responsibly and predictably, and to refrain from nonnegotiable demands and unacceptable tactics (Offe, 1981:135). The problem exposed by the corporatist model is that granting preferential status to peak organizations representing the divide between capital and labour does not necessarily guarantee social consensus. Furthermore, if the consent of both sides of industry is required for all major policies of the state, corporatism can prevent policy innovation even where it is badly needed as in the case of post-communist society. This aspect is pointed out by two anonymous Slovenian ministers, who on the one hand state that: if you please trade unions, you achieve social peace. Still, this is expensive and causes budget deficit, and on the other that: They (business associations) wanted to implement their interests, exclude competition, and achieve a price level that would require no rationalization.

Pluralism and corporatism are often viewed as two extremes, each generating its own specific consequences for state-society relations. The critique against the core of pluralism as well as corporatism is re-raised as capture, that is, if decisions are made to appease specific interests as opposed to the public interests aggregated and mediated through democratic processes we have a case of state capture (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann; 2000). Consequently, and with the critique of pluralism as a point of departure, neo-pluralists argue the necessity for the state to play a proactive role in nurturing and supporting civil society organizations (other than the peak organizations) thereby levelling the playing field of interest access to the political processes (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; Petraca, 1994). Thus, the neo-pluralist advocacy for an active state can be seen as a critique of both the corporatist and pluralist models. In trying to come up with a solution to at least some of the problems created by either model, neo-pluralism has a more fragmented view of public authorities, while recognizing the existence of extra-
constitutional structures both in different segments of government as well as through the tripartite arrangements involving the peak organizations. Recognized as legitimate participants, the interest groups establish stable relationships with ministries. These institutional arrangements become battlegrounds for clearing demands and setting priorities with interest groups not only provide input to the governing process. They also help ease the implementation of policy for the public authorities (Pierre & Peters, 2000; 35).

Going beyond the traditional clustering of state-society relations the degree of openness and inclusion of political and administrative systems involves two related aspects. The first aspect emphasizes that the values that guide policy makers and administrators are important factors when it comes to practice (Blyth, 2001). The questions is in this case just what kind of democracy is preferred by the elite and whether they find that something can be gained by including interests groups in the policy process? These questions gauge the willingness, receptiveness, and eagerness of the state-elite to develop a responsive state by fostering openness and inclusion.

The second aspect involves the character of the contacts between policy makers and civil society in terms of frequency and institutionalization. First, while the number of access points is definitely increased by factors such as multilevel government, specialization, the growth of the public sector, and economic development, this is even more so in countries facing a transition to market and welfare society. Consequently, the number of possible contacts in state-society relation has multiplied during the last ten to fifteen years. Second, while pluralism stresses access to decision making by various pressure groups, ensuring that nobody dominates, corporatism implies that inclusion is institutionalized at least to some extent. Without having gone into the discussion of pluralist or corporatist modes of governance, several of our respondents note that civil society access to decision making should be regulated and transparent in order to avoid irregularities. To quote a Georgian minister: Forcing lobbyists to comply with the legislation would minimize hidden private interests that are incorporated into the lobbying. Their statements imply that regular and open contacts between government and civil society decrease the risk of state capture, or to put it differently, ad hoc and personal contacts may undermine executive capacity to make transformative policies (on the Polish case, see Pedersen and Zubek, 2005). Due to lack of data the Demstar program only has preliminary results that demonstrate
that there are differences between countries where inclusion is institutionalized and countries that rely on ad hoc formation and access depending on policy issue (Johannsen & Pedersen, 2005).

To complete the picture two additional issues should be highlighted. These issues are a natural extension in view of the character of the contacts. First, a distinction must be made between the constituent parts of the policy process. One is to focus on the decision-making process, that is, the co-optation of interests into bargaining and policy formulation. Another is to focus on the implementation process, where researchers since Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) have argued that configurations of interests and the organizations have consequences for the efficiency and success of a policy program. Finally, as implicitly recognized within the neo-pluralist accounts, a more fragmented view of the public authorities has emerged. In accordance with this perspective different sectors may not only have different traditions and be more or less open; they may also vary in the density and character of their relations with different interests organizations given the sector responsibility (on this particular aspect see, for example, a five-sector comparison by Johannsen & Norgaard, 2005).

Openness and inclusion in a post-communist context, however, highlights the specific character of its civil society organizations as a third important issue. Post-communist states are for many reasons dominated by a weak and deformed civil society (Bernhard, 1996), making inclusiveness problematic from the outset, as pointed out by one of our respondents, a Polish minister in one of the first governments after 1989: It was hard to have regular contacts with business associations because there were no such organizations at the time. There were no employers' organizations to have contact with. Communism not only did its best to stamp out socio-economic differences (at least in theory); it also did its best to destroy civil society (in practice as well). At the dawn of democracy in 1989, Linz & Stepan (1996; 352) thus find that the number of independent movements is discouragingly low, being able to account for just 60, 21, and 13 organizations in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, respectively. This situation has fortunately improved considerably. For example, Ágh (2001; 17) finds that the number of civil associations in Hungary exceeded 60,000 by the year 2000 and Mansfeldová et al. (2005; 103)

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2 It is reasonable to assume that values of participatory democracy and inclusion in policy implementation would go hand in hand. However, our data show that the two values do not correlate. We believe this is because the policy-makers and administrators in our sample, and given the background of systemic communism perceive democracy as only decision-making and accordingly have difficulties in conceiving of a role for civil society organizations in implementation. Implementation is regarded as a mere technical cum administrative process.
find the period of 1989 to 1993 to be one of massive growth in the number of associations. On the other hand, Howard (2000) argues that measured by membership the organizations in post-communist Europe remain weak.

As argued earlier, the responsive state requires a substantive democracy were citizens are encouraged to participate, to organize, and to seek influence and a transparent, autonomic state in order to avoid civil society capture. The following section maps and compares the values and practices in the countries we have surveyed.

3. Mapping values on and practices of openness and inclusion

The questions posed by the Demstar survey cannot tap all of the aspects of values and actions mentioned above in an exhaustive manner. However, the questions still suffice for a substantial description and discussion. Thus, in the following we will first focus on the values of inclusion and, secondly, address the density of the contacts between civil society and the policy-makers and administrators.

The value of participation

The intrinsic values policy-makers and administrator accord to citizens’ participation and civil society inclusion in the policy process are tracked through a number of generalized questions that focus first, on the values of participatory democracy in contrast to elite democracy, and second, in the attitudes towards lobbying and the effect of incorporation of concerted interests in policy formulation and implementation, i.e. how civil society is appraised in their approaches to decision making and implementation.

The values ascribed to participatory democracy are traced though a question where the respondents are asked to choose between three alternative forms of democracy ranging from pure elite democracy and to participatory democracy, where citizens are to be active and organized in various political and civil society organizations in order to gain influence. As illustrated in figure 2, there are at a general level striking differences in the desired form of democracy. Overall, little more than 56 percent of the policy-makers and administrators surveyed support participatory democracy and, as depicted in figure 2, there is a striking variation between the countries. Thus, more than 80 percent of the respondents in the Czech Republic are supportive of participatory democracy, whereas little more than 10 pct. hold this view in Azerbaijan. This fits nicely with Inglehart’s (1997) argument that economic development and modernization result in more
democratic values. It is important, however, that despite the apparent correlation between development and participatory democratic values, the distribution also shows that significant minorities among the more prosperous countries support elite democracy.

Figure 2: Support for participatory democracy. Pct.; Country.

Note: The question was not asked in the Kyrgyz Republic. Values express the percentage in each country who have answered: ‘The public should become actively engaged in parties, associations, local government, etc. in order to gain greater influence on politics’ to the question ‘What role should the public primarily play in politics and government?’ See appendix for alternatives.

The second aspect we use to depict values of participation is attitudes toward lobbyism. Lobbying is a difficult concept because it has both positive and negative connotations. Its negative aspects are closely related to the corporate-sponsored ‘grassroots campaigns’, i.e. the above mentioned ‘Astro Turf’-phenomenon. In our context, however, negativity is more closely related to capture in its most concrete form, as plainly stated by a Slovenian minister: Lobbyism leads to corruption. The question of corruption, its commonality, causes and consequences in the

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3 Pearson correlation: =0.543; significant at the 0.05 level.
surveyed countries is dealt with elsewhere (Pedersen & Johannsen, 2005). However, in a less value-laden connotation the word ‘lobby’ simply describes an attempt to persuade a political representative to support or oppose a policy. This positive understanding of lobbyism is developed somewhat further in a comment, again by a Slovenian minister: *Civil servants might overlook some situations (in legislation) - someone may draw their attention to the fact that this can be the case in the Western countries but not here.* In this case national lobbyism is seen as a bulwark against too much pressure from the international society, in this case the EU.

Table 1: Attitudes to lobbying and the value of including interests in policy formulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lobbying is positive because it provides the information needed (0;1)</th>
<th>Lobbying is negative because the information is biased (0;1)</th>
<th>it erodes the impartiality of the ministry (0;1)</th>
<th>Formulation: decisions improved when concerned interests are incorporated (1;4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions: 27. Concerning lobbying, that is, when outside interests attempt to influence the decision making process, would you in most cases agree or disagree with the following statements: Lobbying is positive because it provides the information you need to make the right decision (0=disagree, 1=agree); Lobbying is negative because the information you receive is biased (0=disagree,1=agree); Lobbying is positive because you get support from the concerned groupings (0=disagree,1=agree); Lobbying is negative because it erodes the impartiality of the ministry (0=disagree,1=agree); 28. Do you believe that decisions are improved when concerned interests are incorporated or heard in the process of policy formulation? (Ranges from 1=no worse to 4=yes, mostly)

The lobby questions (table 1) were of course interpreted by our respondents, but we have tried to avoid the negative discourse by framing the questions into the specific positive and negative associations. While the positive association is connected to ‘provision of information’
and ‘policy support’, i.e. the two separate and distinct aspects of inclusion, negativity is connected to ‘information bias’ and ‘erosion of impartiality’. Because of the duality of the concept of lobbyism we include a related aspect of participation, asking the respondents how they evaluate the positive impact on decisions when concerned interests are incorporated.

Among the surveyed countries, it is evident that the policymakers and administrators are aware of both aspects, but also that they place different emphasis on them. Thus, the Estonians and Poles place more value on lobbyism because it can provide information and political support, whereas the Azerbaijanis seem to be acutely aware that this information can be biased and the impartiality of a ministry eroded. Moreover, a considerable number of the Azerbaijanis pointed to the fact that lobbying in their country is only in its early stages. This could indicate that lobbyism in the formative period of civil society may emphasize the negative aspect, while the positive impact is better achieved at later stages.

Despite our efforts to frame the questions in positive and negative functions of lobbying, it is obvious that lobbying in the opinion of the policy-makers and administrators constitutes a distinct form of openness. Thus, none of the four items assessing the value of lobbying correlates with the generalized view of democracy or the view that policy decisions can be improved by incorporating concerned interests. Moreover, and as could be expected, there is a rather strong correlation between the generalized value of democracy and the perceived value of including various interests in the policy formulation process.  

Table 2: Participation and effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Component</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are decisions improved when concerned interests are incorporated in formulation?</td>
<td>0.920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ranges from 1=no worse to 4=yes, mostly)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory view of democracy</td>
<td>0.920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Initial Eigenvalue: 1.691; 84.56 percent of variance explained*

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4 Pearson correlation: =0.691; significant at the 0.01 level.
Using a factor analysis as reported in tables 2 and 3, we feel it is safe to state two separate dimensions on the value of openness and inclusion exists. First, a belief in participatory democracy and the belief that openness, in addition to the inherent democratic value, improves policy decisions (table 2) load well into a single factor. Second, as mentioned earlier, attitudes and values placed on lobbying are not related to the general value of participatory democracy, but the four items loads well into two components (table 2).

The first dimension (the participation factor) covers the fundamental perspective on how democracy ought to be and the potential for increasing efficiency by co-opting non-state concerned interests in the process of policy formulation. The participation factor thus measures not only the extent to which participatory democracy as a fundamental value is shared by a country’s policy-makers, but also the extent to which they feel it is beneficial, that is, that inclusion improves decision-making. It is difficult to argue that the participation factor is an alternative measure for democracy, even though many autocrats, when confronted with the underlying question and option, would fall into the elite democracy bracket. However, it is more straightforward to argue that the participation factor measures the extent to which degree the state should be responsive between elections, the form this responsiveness should take, and the value in economic terms inclusion provides. The second dimension (lobbyism) consists of two components, each measuring the positive and negative political aspects of lobbying. As part of the political process lobbying can provide both information about issues at hand and political support to the, in our case, incumbent policy maker. However, policy makers not only run the risk that the information they get is biased, but also that the impartiality of the ministry is compromised. In its most dire form the erosion of impartiality is ‘capture’, a phenomenon that...
was much discussed at the time of the survey (Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, & Schankerman, 2000). We believe that the two components demonstrate that policy-makers do distinguish between the political benefits and costs of lobbying, but also that these views are less related to the question of civil society inclusion.

**Density**

The previous discussion sought to tap the value placed on openness and inclusion. When we in the following focus on the actual involvement it is worthwhile to emphasize that these two aspects need not be correlated. For example, policy makers can hold values of participatory democracy dear, but actual involvement may be low due to the weakness of civil society. To embed the state in civil society, civil society needs to evolve, as discussed in an earlier section. Trying to ascertain the density of state-civil society relations we therefore not only included a number of question concerning the use of external advisors in policy making, the reliance on NGOs for information, and the extent of working relations, but also a question trying to tap if policymakers and administrator had ever felt under pressure to initiate new legislation.

Evidently, some feel the pressure more than others. In table 4 the first column clearly demonstrates that policy makers in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland feel the heat in comparison with their colleagues from Georgia and Azerbaijan. However, the wording of the question cannot lead us to conclude that the Czech civil society is more vibrant than the Georgian one. In can only be a plausible hypothesis because the pressure felt by ministers and administrators could be due to the presence of strong economic actors and/or international organizations trying to force the agenda. Ever since Lipset’s (1959) path-breaking study of the relation between modernization and the existence and development of democracy it has been argued that economic development makes authoritarian rule increasingly difficult. Economic development not only changes values (Inglehart, 1997), but a pluralized economy also makes for more contact points (Johannsen, 2002a). Thus the likelihood that a strong civil society pressures the government is even greater considering that pressure correlates strongly with development (GDP per capita).\(^5\)

The second column in table 4 reveals that the use of external advisors is more frequent in Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia than in Armenia. Moreover, Czech and Bulgarian ministers more

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\(^5\) Pearson correlation: \(\rho=0.792\); significant at the 0.001 level.
often base policies on information from NGOs than their Kazakh colleagues (column 3), and finally, Latvian civil servants work less closely together with NGOs, whereas Hungarian and Mongolian civil servants are likely to have more permanent relations with NGOs (column 4).

**Table 4: Forms of inclusion in 15 post communist states**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Have you felt under pressure from outside actors to initiate new legislation? (0;2)</th>
<th>Extent to which external advisors are used in policymaking process (1;4)</th>
<th>Relied upon NGOs for information? (0;1)</th>
<th>Do civil servants have close working relationship with NGOs? (0;2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions: 4a To what extent are external advisors used in the policymaking process? (The question refers to the ministry in general) (ranges from 1=rarely to 4=always); 4. If you needed external advice, whom would you prefer to rely on, or have you relied on, to get the information you need? (4) NGO specialists (0=no, 1=yes); 26 Do the civil servants in your ministry have close working relationship with major interest organisations within the ministry’s resort? (Ranges from 0=no to 2=Yes, most of the time); 24 Have you ever felt under pressure from outside actors (non-state organisations, peak level business, etc.) to change the existing or initiate new legislation? (Ranges from 0=never to 2=often)

There are differences between the countries, but the number of within-country differences is truly noteworthy. A few examples may serve to illustrate this. First, Mongolian ministers feel little pressure but report having close working relationships with NGOs. Second, the Moldovan political and administrative elite frequently rely on information from NGOs, but have few working relations with them, and finally, the Armenians rarely use external advisors, feel little

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6 A sector comparison further clarifies the picture. In general, presidential administrations have surprisingly few working relations with NGOs, use fewer external advisors, and are under less pressure compared with ministries with sector regulatory functions. These results suggest that within-comparison may be as fruitful as between-comparison. Consequently, it may be possible to speak of more or less responsive governance centers within a country’s political and administrative system.
pressure and report close working relations. These differences led us to construct a simple additive index depicting the density of state-society relations. It should be noted, however, that this additive index can only be considered explorative because the limited number of cases means that we cannot make a full-scale test of robustness. Consequently, the additive Density Index will only be used for explorative purposes in addition to the direct test of its constituent parts when we seek to measure if responsive states lead to more equal societies.

The map of inclusion and participation

The additive Density Index has yet another advantage. Together with the participation factor it allows for a simple empirical map of openness and inclusion. A quick glance at Figure 3 confirms the intuitively grasped differences and commonalties between the countries.

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7 The Density Index runs from 0 to 9. We are acutely aware that the implicit weights may need a full test because what we examine seems somewhat subjective, but given the limited number of cases we have chosen to initially adhere to the original questionnaire coding.
Figure 3: The map of inclusion and participation. (Participation factor; Density index)

The relation between values and practice marked by the regression line in Figure 3 is striking and unmistakable. All the new EU-member states are situated in the upper right hand corner. They are characterized by shared support for participatory democracy and understanding of the value of including civil society in the policy-making process. They are also characterized by greater density in state-society relations. These countries are thus more responsive, in the terminology of this paper, than those in the lower band stretching from Armenia to Kazakhstan, which are all characterized by a lower degree of density, but are otherwise diverse in their participatory values, the Armenians being less likely to believe in participatory democracy and finding little added value associated with including interests into decision-making. Last we find Azerbaijan, which exhibits the fewest contacts and, like the Armenians, see little value in participation.
A quick comparison of figures 3 and 1 is in order here. Figure 1 in the introduction served to introduce the variation in the dependent variable (in the comparative research jargon) we were about to explain. Specifically, we hypothesized that responsiveness as defined by values and density would make for more equal societies. The quick comparison between figures 3 and 1 supports this hypothesis. It graphically illustrates that the countries in the lower left quadrant of figure 1 that exhibit less absolute poverty and a more equal distribution of incomes are the found in the upper right hand corner of figure 3.

Figure 3 may also suggest that the very process of moving towards EU membership may contribute to values and practices of participation. While this will be the subject of discussion in the next section, we shall return later to see if the intuitive proof of a relation between inclusiveness and outcome can be substantiated.

4. The European model of inclusion

Inclusion of civil society actors in the policy making process requires two elements. First, it depends on the willingness of politicians and administrators to include non-state actors, and second, it requires that non-state actors exist if they are to be included in decision-making. The degree of closeness to the European Union is imperative in both cases.

The first aspect touches directly upon the value of participatory democracy as it was mapped in the previous section. A European model of democratic inclusion of civil society interests can be traced back to the historical development of the European Union, reflecting the logic of both neo-pluralism and corporatism (Hix, 2005; Falkner, 2000). According to the Community Treaty additional power is given to social partners in the negotiation and formulation of social and economic politics at the EU level as well as at the national level. With respect to social and economic policy the European model of inclusion takes the form of a compulsory and institutionalized tripartite social dialogue through which labour and business actors express their views on government policies in their respective areas. Recognizing that not all interests have equally easy access to the political arena, the European commission adopts a pro-active role in policy areas such as, for example, consumer- and environmental politics.

The EU requirements for prospective member states were set in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993. Among others items, a functioning democratic government was included as an absolute requirement. Although the inclusion of civil society actors in policy decision is not traditionally
associated with the concept of democracy, that being mostly restricted to the formal representative model, the accession process did promote participatory democracy in the sense that the commission required all relevant social groups to be included in negotiations over the 31 chapters of the *acquis communautaire*. In this way EU put direct pressure on the applicant countries to engage in direct negotiations with the community whether the politicians intrinsically held participatory values dear or not. Changing values is, as we know, a difficult and often long-term matter. However, changing the institutional setup as required by the EU may have affected the perceived value of participation.

The second aspect refers to whether groups exist that can be included. In the negotiation guidelines the Commission explicitly had to ascertain if ‘social partners are sufficiently developed in order to discharge their responsibilities at the EU and national level’ (Negotiation guide, 2004: 47). Thus, a country’s readiness for EU membership is also contingent upon the development of participatory democracy. This process made the applicant countries fully aware of gaps they had to fill before becoming acceptable to the EU. Moreover, the EU has in substantive ways encouraged and financially supported civil society organizations, making it clear to the applicant counties that civil society organizations were and should be looked upon as essential to democratic societies.

When we examined the results from our survey we did find that influence from international actors relates to, first, the values of participation, and second, to the practice of including civil society actors. Thus, influence from foreign actors correlates with the value ascribed to the inclusion of interests into policy formulation and the extent to which participatory democracy is the preferred model. Furthermore, influence from foreign actors correlates with three of the density variables, that is, the use of advisors, reliance upon NGOs for information and finally, the perceived pressure to initiate new policies. On these aspects the correlations appear significant and carry the right sign as expected. Moreover, these observations correspond

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8 Did foreign actors try to influence policy and regulations? X Is decisions improved when concerned interests are incorporated in formulation? (Pearson Correlation 0.709; significant at 0.005); Did foreign actors try to influence policy and regulations? X Participatory view of democracy (Pearson Correlation 0.920; significant at 0.000).

9 Did foreign actors try to influence policy and regulations? X Extent to which external advisors are used in policymaking process (Pearson Correlation 0.712; significant at 0.004)

10 Did foreign actors try to influence policy and regulations? X Relied upon NGOs for information? (Pearson Correlation 0.570; significant at 0.033)

11 Did foreign actors try to influence policy and regulations? X Have you felt under pressure from outside actors to initiate new legislation? (Pearson Correlation 0.773; significant at 0.001)
with the fact that the new EU countries to a larger extent than the non-EU candidates believe that foreign actors have attempted to influence policies and regulation.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, the responsive states from Figure 3 are also the ones that have felt under influence from abroad. Finally, preliminary research shows that this is likely an effect of the EU accession process and that it is more important than the conditionality associated with aid donations. However, this argument is somewhat falsely conceived as a number of the countries included in the analysis have never had any intention of applying for EU membership. Thus, for these countries aid conditionality may be very relevant.

The impact of the European Union on participatory values and inclusive practices is probably related to an asymmetrical power relation (Grabbe, 2001). The negotiation process has been dominated by an EU which is in a position of power to reject or accept a membership held extremely dear by the applicant countries. Consequently, as pointed out by Szabo (2005: 20), the EU as the realm of modernity and democracy has served as an inevitable “reference group” for all political camps in the East-Central European countries, forcing the governments and the elite to keep up with the EU in their partnership with civil society.

5. Reducing poverty and inequality

International pressure can be included in the explanation as to why dense state-society relations develop. Much of this pressure is, as we have seen in our cases, related to the development of European-style democracy and governance. However, as we turn our attention to poverty and equality, we ask if responsiveness also has consequences for output.

When we developed the empirical models we soon realized the necessity of developing an explorative design because 1) of the restricted number of cases available, 2) the survey had not been ideally specified to contribute to this debate, and 3) the divergent opinions on how to gauge poverty and equality. We thus decided not only to use a full battery of explanatory variables and vary between using the four density variables from table 4, but also to substitute these with the simple density index developed earlier. Our explanatory package therefore consists of three groups. First, three variables: the PARTICIPATION factor, PRO_LOBBY, and CON_LOBBY covering the value dimension. Second, PRESSURE, ADVISORS,

\textsuperscript{12} Mean (EU member 2004)= 1.25; Mean (non-EU member by 2004)= 0.55; Mean difference significant at 0.000.
INFORMATION, and WORKING RELATIONS swapped with DENSITY as the variables measuring density, and finally, using wealth as a control.

Measuring poverty and equality is not simple. We therefore decided to test our hypothesis using a number of indicators as dependent variables. First, our models specifications include inequality measured by the gini-coefficient, which measures the national relative distribution of disposal income. Thus, in absolute terms people may be better off in a rich country with a high degree of inequality than in a poor one with much equality. Second, we also employed the percentage of the population living on below 2 USD a day as a measure of absolute poverty. These two variables were briefly discussed in the first section and the variation in our sample depicted in figure 1. However, acutely aware that the ‘2-dollar-a-day’ definition would strongly reflect wealth, we introduced poverty as the percentage living below the national poverty line as a third variable. Although we believe that this variable could be more precise in terms of revealing the national context of poverty, we cannot substitute the ‘2-dollar-a-day’ measure because not all surveyed countries, and especially the richer ones, have decided to have nationally fixed poverty line.13

Taking these three variables together, we constructed two indices to measure inequality INE (1), and INE (2) reflecting the gini-coefficient and either of the two poverty measures, respectively.14 Finally, we have chosen to include a spending item as a separate indicator – in this case public expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP – in order to check if the implicit causality argument would be validated. In other words, does responsiveness have an impact not only on overall social measures like poverty and equality, but also a concrete impact on socially related policy issues? Thus, we believe that higher public expenditure on health may indicate a socially more concerned and caring state.

Before moving on to the results of the analysis, a little product labelling or merchandise description is in order. First, it is imperative to recall that these results are based on a limited number of cases. We have therefore in our regression model, in order not to throw away contributory variables, decided to use relatively ‘liberal’ criteria. When verifying hypotheses the alpha level should on the one hand be set low to avoid rejecting a true null hypothesis (type I

13 We may speculate why these countries do not decide upon a national poverty line, but that question beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, there are also difficulties in applying this relative measure. Question, for example, if lowering the national cut-off makes fewer people poor in absolute terms.
14 INE (1): Factor of Gini + 2 USD; initial Eigenvalue of 1.352; percent of variance explained 67.6. INE (2); factor of Gini+ National poverty; initial Eigenvalue of 1.393; percent of variance explained 69.7.
error), but on the other hand, when trying to reject a hypothesis the alpha level should be sufficiently high to guard against the failing to reject a false hypothesis (type II error). In our case we have thus applied a probability level of 0.1 to enter and 0.2 to remove. However, given the limited number of cases we believe that robustness, i.e. consistency across the models, is more important than statistical significance.

In the analysis we use all the above mentioned variables, leaving us with the twelve models reported in table 5. Models 1-6 report the results using the explanatory variables pressure, advisors, information, and working relations separately. Models 1D-6D report the results when we use the density index. All twelve models produce consistent results. The variables carry the expected signs across the board, indicating that dense state-society relations do indeed reduce poverty and inequality when controlled for economic wealth. Furthermore, in the two spending models dense relations increase the relative expenditures on health. These results are indicative of a rather robust

---

Table 5: Responsiveness reduces poverty and inequality. Standardized Coefficients reported except when otherwise noted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Gini (1)</th>
<th>Gini (1D)</th>
<th>Poverty (2 USD) (2)</th>
<th>Poverty (2 USD) (2D)</th>
<th>INE(1) (3)</th>
<th>INE(1) (3D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.509**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro-Lobby</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Con-Lobby</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>Advisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working Rel.</td>
<td>-0.369*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density</td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>-0.794***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>GDP (per capita)</td>
<td>-0.812***</td>
<td>0.669***</td>
<td>0.661***</td>
<td>-0.452*</td>
<td>-0.482***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad.Just R²</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.596</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>0.856</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** *0.01; **0.05; *0.10; INE(1)=Factor of Gini and Poverty (2USD); INE(2)=Factor of Gini and Poverty (national definition). Models labelled with D following model number reflect that Density Index is used instead of Pressure, Advisors, and Information and Working relations. See table 4 for the distribution on these variables. Stepwise regression applied. (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= ,100, Probability-of-F-to-remove >= ,200). Only significant results are reported in the final model.

Sources: see appendix.
Table 5 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Model</th>
<th>Poverty (national) (4)</th>
<th>Poverty (national) (4D)</th>
<th>INE(2) (5)</th>
<th>INE(2) (5D)</th>
<th>Expenditure Health (6)</th>
<th>Expenditure Health (6D)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>-0.525**</td>
<td>-0.729***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Lobby</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Con-Lobby</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.800***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.633***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>-0.529**</td>
<td>-0.500***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Rel.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density Index</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.847***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.467*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control GDP (per capita)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.475*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad.Just R²</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td>0.682</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ** *0.01; **0.05; *0.10; INE(1)=Factor of Gini and Poverty (2USD); INE(2)=Factor of Gini and Poverty (national definition). Models labelled with D following model number reflect that Density Index is used instead of Pressure, Advisors, and Information and Working relations. See table 4 for the distribution on these variables. Stepwise regression applied. (Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter <= .100, Probability-of-F-to-remove >= .200). Only significant results are reported in the final model. Standardized Coefficients reported except when otherwise noted. Sources: see appendix.
explanation. That is, despite the variation discussed below, dense state-society relations measured by a variety of explorative indicators on a variety of indicators for poverty and inequality come across as having an impact.

Model 1 shows that close working relations with NGOs reduce inequality as defined by the gini-coefficient. Relatively, wealth appears to be the stronger explanation, but a closer look at the unstandardized coefficients reveals that an increase in working relations on the three-point scale is expected to reduce the gini-coefficient by a dramatic 18 points. A 1,000 dollar increase in wealth is in turn expected to reduce the gini-coefficient by some 3 points. Model 1D, where the four density indicators have been replaced by the density index, confirms the pattern from model 1.

The importance of wealth in relation to poverty when the ‘2-dollar-a-day’ measure is used is evident from models 2 and 2D. In these models, poverty shows a correlation with wealth alone. It is also noteworthy, however, that the rather strong correlation is at the expense of a reduced overall explained variance compared to models 1 and 1D. Consequently, using the index combining gini and the ‘2-dollar-a-day’ measure in models 3 and 3D is problematic in the sense that the poverty measure gives a too great dependence on wealth, which is also immediately picked up by the pressure variable (model 3) and reflected by the density index in model 3D.

Beside models 1 and 1D the four models (4 to 5D) produce some of the most interesting results. In models 4 to 5D we have replaced the 2-dollar-a-day definition with the nationally defined poverty measure. In models 4 and 4D we find that values of participation add to our explanation. In model 4 participatory values go hand in hand with reliance on information from NGOs, i.e. the factual consequence of the value of civic participation. However, in 4D only participation turns out to be significant, but evidently at the cost of reduced explained variance. One can hypothesize that the significance of participatory values in this model is due to the fact that a national poverty line is defined by a political process. In confirmation of our findings, advisors and information are important when using the poverty index in 5 and 5D.

Finally, we ran regressions on public expenditure on health in models 6 and 6D. The results are consistent with the now apparent pattern. Increased density and wealth increase public expenditure. The result in model 6, where we look at the density variables one by one, is that the respondents’ experience of pressure for inclusion is highly significant, while the results from running the test using the density index (6D) only adds a little to the overall explained variance.
This may indicate that pressure may not exclusively be in the interest of the neediest, but might have a tendency to benefit various providers. To test this assumption it is necessary to look into differences sector-wise. This is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper.

In our explorations of the relation between state responsiveness and output consequences we found that the most persistent relation is that between our density variables and performance. However, in two of the models (4 and 4D) the participatory values also became significant, whereas the attitudes towards lobbying did not come across as important in any of the models. This was a small surprise, but supported what we have discussed previously, namely that lobbyism is considered a distinct phenomenon correlated with neither participatory values, nor with, in our case, political outcomes.

Given the limited number of cases we have, as discussed earlier, looked at the consistency of our hypothesis throughout our twelve models. However, much to our surprise we found that most of our models demonstrated high levels of significance in addition to overall robustness. Moreover, the regression models demonstrate the proverb that ‘everything good goes together’. In our case it is the trinity of wealth, participatory values, and density that form a cluster. This is naturally also why it was essential to include wealth as a control. However, wealth does not do it alone. The input provided by values and density to the explanation is hence a meaningful contribution to the understanding of political outcomes.

6. Responsiveness – some causes and consequences

Anyone making the journey from Budapest (Hungary) to Chisinau (Moldova) can be expected to return with tale of stark differences in absolute poverty and relative equality. Differences that is obvious between and within the former communist countries.

Whereas traditional modernization and development theories lay a strong claim to the correlations between wealth, poverty reduction, and increasing equality, theories that focus on the role of the state are only in their formative stages. As argued in this paper the concept of the responsive state, i.e. dense co-operation between public authorities and civil society supported by values of participatory democracy, is nurtured by increasing wealth, but an explanatory dimension is added by arguing that responsiveness has consequences for political outcomes. Much is obviously to be gained by developing state theories and thereby build on the insights gained from modernization and development theory. Thus, the concept of the responsive state
seeks to escape the determinism associated with modernization by combining values and organization and remaining open to the impact of international society. In this paper we therefore discussed the conditionality associated with the EU accession process and found that the states applying for membership use the EU as a “reference group”, overruling any other political conflict.

Associating responsiveness with political outcomes modelled on explaining ‘between countries’ differences in poverty and equality, we found that responsiveness reduces poverty and promotes equality. In other words, responsive states are, to paraphrase Lijphart (1999), kinder and gentler.
References


Appendix

About the survey

The survey was conducted as part of the 5 year research program Democracy, the State, and Administrative Reforms (DEMSTAR) (2000-2005) focusing on the role of the state and state administrations in former communist countries (www.demstar.dk). The working hypothesis of the program is that state and administrative capacities are important for economic and political development. The program was initiated and headed by professor Ole Norgaard, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark, and supported by the Danish Social Science Research Council and the University of Aarhus Research Fond.

During 2001 – 2003 the DEMSTAR research program conducted surveys consisting of semi-structured interviews with ministers and centrally placed, high-ranking officials in government institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, and Slovenia. The surveys were nick-named Sots (State of the State).

Database variables

A database has been created that combines general macro variables expressing the different societal characteristics of each country with aggregated variables from the micro database (the DEMSTAR survey data). The variables are aggregated from the micro database using country as break variable, thereby creating an average score for each country on the selected variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sots</th>
<th>Sots for this country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>country</td>
<td>Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdpcap00</td>
<td>GDP per capita, Constant 2000USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP per capita is measured in constant year 2000 US$ (units). GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy, plus any product taxes, minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without deducting depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant US dollars. Source: World Development Indicators <a href="http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/">http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gini95-04</td>
<td>Gini coefficient, Measured as difference in disposable income.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The GINI coefficient is measured as difference in disposable income. The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1 where 0 corresponds to perfect equality (everyone has the same income) and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality (one person has all the income, and everyone else zero income). The Gini index is the Gini coefficient expressed in percent and is equal to the Gini coefficient multiplied by 100. Disposable income is measured as total income (sum of employee income, income from self-employment, income less expenses from rentals, except rent of land, property income, current transfers received,) minus current transfers paid (employees’ social contributions, taxes on income)

Source: World Income Inequality Database
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm


Poverty (percent of population living for under $2 a day)

Poverty is measured by poverty a headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (percent of population): Population living for below $2 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $2.15 a day in 1993 international prices. Because of revisions in PPP exchange rates, poverty rates cannot be compared to rates reported previously for individual countries. Data indicating 2.0 signify a poverty rate of less than 2.0 percent.

Poverty applied: all countries year 1998, except Poland (1999); Lithuania, Kyrgyz Republic, Georgia and Moldova (2000); Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Bulgaria (2001)

Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population): National poverty rate is the percentage of the population living below the national poverty line. National estimates are based on population-weighted sub-group estimates from household surveys.


EU Candidate Country in 1997
EU Member country in 2004
EU Candidate country for 2007

Public expenditures on health as % of GDP year 2000.
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP): Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.


Relied upon NGOs for information
(0=no,1=yes)
q4amean  Extent to which external advisors are used in policymaking process (ranges from 1=rarely to 4=always)
q7mean   Commons practise in ministry to have close workings relationship with NGOs (0=no, 1=yes)
q22mean  Did foreign actors try to influence policy and regulations? (0=no, 1=yes)
q24mean  Have you felt under pressure from outside actors to initiate new legislation? (Ranges from 0=never to 2=often)
q26mean  Do civil servants have close working relationships with NGOs? (Ranges from 0=no to 2=Yes, most of the time)
q27_1mea Lobbying is positive because it provides the information needed? (0=disagree, 1=agree)
q27_2mea Lobbying is negative because the information is biased (0=disagree, 1=agree)
q27_3mea Lobbying is positive because you get support from the concerned groupings (0=disagree, 1=agree)
q27_4mea Lobbying is negative because it erodes the impartiality of the ministry (0=disagree, 1=agree)
q28mean Are decisions improved when concerned interests are incorporated in policy formulation? (Ranges from 1=no worse to 4=yes, mostly)
q41mean  It is better that concerned interests participate in implementation? (range 1=strongly disagree, to 5=strongly agree)
q45mean  Participatory view of democracy: Percent expressing: ‘The public should become actively engaged in parties, associations, local government, etc. in order to gain greater influence on politics’.