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## WTO Accession: Moving the Goalposts?

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Since it was created a decade ago, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has welcomed 20 new members. On October 13, 2004, Cambodia became the WTO's 148th member, almost 10 years after it had first applied and just over a year after its membership package was approved at the Cancún Ministerial Conference. Cambodia is the second least developed country (LDC) to join the WTO, following Nepal's accession on April 23, 2004.<sup>1</sup>

Countries applying for WTO membership face a long and complex process. Some pending applications date back to the late 1980s (Algeria's, for example) and early 1990s (those of Belarus, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine). Applicants often need to implement substantive reforms to align their domestic institutions and policies with WTO disciplines. Many cannot engage effectively in accession negotiations for lack of trained personnel or because of institutional and financial constraints. Roughly one-third of the 30 governments now in the process of accession are LDCs. (See Annex 1 for a list of current applicants.)<sup>2</sup>

Notwithstanding these concerns, the demand for WTO accession remains strong. Moreover, as illustrated by the experiences of China and, more recently, Cambodia, WTO accession can be an effective lever to promote trade liberalization and substantive regulatory reform. In this note, we discuss the experience of developing countries with the WTO accession process and highlight the implications for policymakers in applicant countries and in existing WTO members.<sup>3</sup>

### **Why do nations join the WTO?**

Policymakers from countries seeking to join the WTO give a range of economic, legal, and political reasons for doing so. For some, the rationale is to further integrate their country into the world economy. The expectation is that more predictable access to foreign markets, which WTO membership can bring, will result in higher exports. Another economic rationale is to attract more foreign direct investment and, more generally, to use WTO membership as a seal of approval recognized by the international business community. The legal advantages of accessing a rules-based system and of using the WTO dispute-settlement process are often mentioned as well. Many nations join the WTO for political reasons. Transition economies, for example, often see WTO membership as a means to signal their commitment to joining the international community of market-based economies.

There is some overlap between these rationales and the potential benefits of WTO accession identified in economic research—particularly with regard to

bolstering exports and foreign direct investment.<sup>4</sup> Economists would point to the benefits that flow from better foreign access to the acceding nation's markets, specifically in terms of price and variety of imports. By binding national tariffs, committing to eliminate quotas on imports, and reforming other state measures, WTO membership can enhance the credibility of an acceding nation's policies and thus reduce the uncertainty faced by the private sector. It can also improve important components of the national business environment, which, in turn, has sizeable domestic payoffs.

### **The reality of the WTO accession process**

The experience of 20 members that have joined the WTO since 1995, and of the 30 countries and custom territories now seeking to join, form the basis of much of what is known about the WTO accession process. Not every aspect of the process is publicly documented. In particular, little is known about the numerous bilateral negotiations between an applicant and existing WTO members. Because of these lacunae, a certain amount of folklore has arisen concerning the accession process. Recently, studies have shed some light on the validity of the folklore. The main findings of those studies are described below.<sup>5</sup> However, readers, particularly stakeholders in applicant countries, should bear in mind that key steps in the WTO accession process remain confidential. It is also important to keep in mind that noneconomic considerations can play a role in shaping the process.<sup>6</sup>


The formal procedures that an applicant must follow to become a WTO member are well established. They involve at least 20 distinct steps.<sup>7</sup> The most important are the creation of a Working Party of WTO members to consider the application for membership,<sup>8</sup> the drafting of a memorandum on the applicant's foreign trade regime, satisfactory responses to questions about the memorandum posed by existing WTO members, the conclusion of bilateral negotiations with each of the Working Party members, and the adoption of the Protocol of Accession by the Working Party and then by the WTO's General Council or Ministerial Conference.

Throughout this process the onus is on the applicant to satisfy the demands of existing WTO members. This apparently one-sided procedure has given rise to the following perceptions:

- The WTO accession process is increasingly costly and complex and takes longer and longer to complete.
- The price of joining the WTO now includes commitments that go beyond the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO agreements.
- The accession process takes little account of the specific circumstances of applicant countries or their needs for special and differential treatment.

The underlying reason for the emergence of these perceptions is that the terms, rather than the procedures, of WTO accession are not well defined. Paradoxically for a rules-based organization, the WTO has no clear rules governing

**Figure 1. The lengthening process of WTO accession**  
Countries in order of accession to WTO



Source: Compiled by the authors on WTO data (2004a).


Note: All 20 countries in question are those identified in Annex 2.

the “price” of membership. Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement, the legal instrument covering the accession process, merely states that new members may join the WTO “on terms to be agreed.” This sparse guidance leaves the door wide open for an expedited, hassle-free accession or a drawn-out, decade-long, and burdensome one. The latter occurs more often. The time required to complete the WTO accession process has steadily grown over the past decade (figure 1). Recently acceded countries have needed approximately a decade to negotiate their WTO entry.<sup>9</sup>


Turning to the price of accession, it is important to distinguish between the two broad types of commitments made by acceding countries: those relating directly to market access and commitments on rules.

With respect to market access for agricultural and nonagricultural (i.e., manufacturing) products, there is clear evidence that the price of accession—expressed in terms of the concessions made by acceding countries—has grown over time. Separating out the accession of LDCs (which happen to be the last two countries to join the WTO) from other acceding developing countries, a clear pattern emerges (figures 2a and 2b). For both agricultural and nonagricultural goods the average tariff binding allowed to acceding countries has fallen over time, standing now at levels well below those agreed by developing countries in the Uruguay Round.<sup>10</sup> From a mercantile perspective,

**Figure 2a. Recent WTO members face tighter commitments on agricultural products**



**Figure 2b. ...and on manufacturing products**



White bars = Nepal and Cambodia.

Source: Compiled by the authors on WTO (2004a).

therefore, the relative price of WTO accession is high in comparison to Uruguay Round commitments made by peer nations—and it is growing over time.

The picture that emerges concerning services commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) tells a similar story. Taking the number of services subsectors (of the 160 identified in the WTO's classification list) committed by countries as a proxy for the price of becoming a WTO member, one observes that LDCs that were founding members of the WTO committed on average 20 subsectors. The averages for founding members in the developing and developed categories were 44 and 108. Countries in all categories that have acceded since 1995, by contrast, have committed an average of 104 subsectors.<sup>11</sup> This figure is a crude measure of the services-related price of accession because it does not capture either the depth (for example, the extent of explicit limitations) or the breadth (modes of delivery) of the commitment. Still, it is illustrative that countries that went through the WTO accession process typically committed a much higher number of subsectors than did GATT contracting parties at a similar level of development in the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986–94).<sup>12</sup>

Turning to rules commitments that countries have made when joining the WTO, the picture is more mixed. With the exceptions of China and Taiwan (China), accession countries signed around 25 such commitments related to a wide range of state measures, some of which are not obviously trade-related. Bulgaria, for example, made commitments with respect to domestic price controls, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and excise taxes on alcohol, as well as many other measures related to trade policy.

A controversial question is whether these commitments go beyond those agreed during the Uruguay Round (so-called WTO+ commitments) or require an accession country to forgo rights available to other WTO members (so-called WTO–commitments). Whether an accession commitment goes beyond an existing WTO agreement depends in large part on how the latter is interpreted, and so it should not be surprising that disagreement is rife on the extent of WTO+ commitments. Some WTO+ obligations may involve no more than consultation with, or reporting to, existing WTO members and thus are of limited developmental significance. Others may be more fundamental, such as Jordan's commitment that if any of its laws or state acts are subsequently found to contradict international treaties (not just WTO agreements), then the latter will have precedence. WTO–commitments are easier to identify, such as Ecuador's commitment to eliminate all subsidies before the date of accession and its commitment never to introduce them afterwards. China's acceptance of product-specific transitional safeguard provisions, which can be more easily triggered than regular WTO safeguards, provides another example. WTO+ and WTO–commitments differentiate WTO members and could be interpreted as contributing to a multi-tier

multilateral trade system. Also of concern are the adverse developmental effects that may result from these commitments.<sup>13</sup>

In sum, there is evidence that the accession process is becoming more demanding in terms of market access commitments. WTO's "July package" (WTO 2004c) recognizes as much by stating that new members should be granted more flexibility in market access negotiations under the Doha Round in consideration of the extensive commitments already made in the WTO accession process. Whether there are trends in WTO+ or WTO–commitments is unclear, but the very fact that existing WTO rules allow for them is a source of concern.

Any evidence of trends should be interpreted with care in view of the possibility of an adverse-selection bias in the sample of recently acceded countries. After all, most of these countries were transition economies with highly distorted trading regimes. It could be argued that the higher demands of WTO members reflect this reality rather than a systemic trend.

### **Tough love or power plays?**

The critical question, however, is not whether the price of WTO accession is rising, but whether the price is worth paying given the developmental impact of WTO membership. If it is, then the demands made by existing WTO members might be characterized as "tough love." Otherwise, the WTO accession process may be seen as a one-sided power play in which current WTO members wring commercial advantage out of weaker economic partners.

When considering the developmental impact of WTO accession, two important points should be borne in mind. The first is that a comprehensive evaluation of WTO accession should examine post-accession performance on many metrics and should consider the state measures taken before and after WTO accession. At present, few accession countries have five or more years of post-accession data to use in identifying the effect of WTO accession, so the available evidence is necessarily limited. Second, most of the country-specific studies on WTO accession relate to China and involve predictions of the likely effects of its accession, rather than evaluations of actual impact.

Much of the available evidence concerns the impact of WTO accession on national exports and imports. This evidence is useful for assessing whether accession really does help integrate developing countries into the world's trading system. There are two main strands of recent literature analyzing aggregate studies of trade flows and the role of the WTO/GATT in influencing them. In a series of papers, Andrew Rose (2003 is a prominent example) has called into question whether membership in the GATT/WTO has actually increased trade above the levels expected from the "standard gravity" determinants of bilateral trade.<sup>14</sup> Analyzing the same data in a different way, Subramanian and Wei (2003) find that GATT/WTO membership has been

associated with a significant increase in the imports of industrialized countries, although the same cannot be said for developing country members.

There is little reason, however, to expect that exporters in acceding countries respond similarly to the different opportunities created by their nation's WTO accession—an assumption implicit in the above two analyses. Recent country-by-country estimates of the impact of WTO accession on imports and exports vary a great deal, probably because national experience varies a great deal.<sup>15</sup> For example, after stripping out the effects of nontrade policy determinants on its trade, Ecuador's manufacturing imports fell after its WTO accession in 1996. This apparently surprising finding is easy to understand when one notes that Ecuador raised its applied tariffs across the board in the years after WTO accession, something that was possible in view of the binding overhang of its WTO tariff commitments. Another problem with these aggregate studies is that they do not shed light on the mechanisms by which WTO accession influences national trade flows. For example, did accession bolster sales of traditional exports to existing markets or did it encourage entry into new markets?

Disaggregated product-line studies of Ecuador's and Bulgaria's exports to the industrialized Quad countries shed some light on whether the incentives created by WTO accession are working or not.<sup>16</sup> Kennett, Evenett, and Gage (2005) found that, once other determinants of market entry were controlled for, sales of long-standing exports to new markets were not helped by WTO accession. In contrast, sales of long-standing products to existing foreign markets were found to rise after WTO accession, suggesting that Bulgarian and Ecuadorian exporters responded positively to the incentives created by WTO accession.

Modest supply-side responses to WTO accession may be due to two potential factors. First, foreign barriers faced by some exporters in countries that joined the WTO may have changed little after accession. Second, exporters may have been unaware or unable to take advantage of improved market access abroad. This could be due to a lack of information, to expensive and inefficient infrastructure in the acceding country, or to a lack of experience in shipping goods abroad. In short, whether joining the WTO bolsters a nation's exports depends not only on the changes in market access that are supposed to follow from accession (in terms of greater predictability), but also on the steps taken by the government and firms in the applicant country.

To summarize, when comparing the grand objectives of nations that seek to join the WTO with the available empirical evidence on what happened to those countries after they joined, there is an evident mismatch. Although odd at first glance, this may not be surprising given the short-time elapsed since WTO accession occurred. The apparent mismatch certainly has not stopped many countries from applying for WTO membership. In addition, it is important to keep in mind that WTO accession can induce reforms that promote transparency and that

strengthen domestic policies to cope with balance-of-payments crises and the like—important additional benefits for developing countries.<sup>17</sup> Over the past 12 months more information has come to light as to how nations can successfully make the most of WTO accession, a subject to which we now turn.

### **Making the most of the WTO accession**

Developing countries need not see themselves as being at the mercy of existing WTO members during the accession process. Concrete steps have been taken by governments in developing countries before, during, and after accession to push the ratio of costs to benefits in a pro-development direction. Moreover, many donor agencies and international development institutions offer programs to build trade-related capacity and expertise. The overriding goal is to choose the mix of national and international initiatives that best meets the applicant's development objectives. The following remarks, based on developing country experiences, are offered with this goal in mind.<sup>18</sup>

As early as possible in the WTO accession process, it is desirable to identify precisely how binding commitments before the WTO can further reform and help attain national priorities. Cambodia, for example, identified textiles, clothing, and tourism as sectors that could benefit from reform and developed its negotiating priorities accordingly. Identification of goals, analysis of economic options, and formulation of negotiating priorities and fallback positions are required at this point. Binding commitments can influence the behavior of importers, foreign investors, and regulators, and knowing the likely economic and social impact of different legal commitments will help an acceding country to determine which legal commitments are priorities. Such reasoning will involve matters far beyond the typical reach of the ministry of trade, and ideally the national government should come to a collective view of the appropriate strategy with respect to WTO accession. Accession should not be treated as a technocratic negotiating exercise controlled by a small number of officials in the trade ministry.

Another important step is for applicant countries to form realistic expectations of what the WTO accession process involves. Applicants should expect the process to take at least five years. Given ministerial and staff turnover, a broad base of government, civil society, and private sector support for the accession initiative is required. This is possible only with broad consultation and a clear sense of the costs, benefits, and priorities of WTO accession.

On the basis of recent accession experience, current and future developing country applicants can expect to have their agricultural tariffs bound at an average rate well below 20 percent and nonagricultural goods below 10 percent. (Least developed countries appear to have been given more lenient treatment.) The implications of these market access commitments for import-competing sectors should be considered.

Applicants can also expect to sign around 25 rules-related commitments, some of which will have implications for sensitive policies such as protection of intellectual property rights. With respect to this class of commitments, applicants ought to develop the capacity to document and demonstrate why a proposal from an existing WTO member is against the applicant's development goals. Identifying national priorities is not enough. Being able to respond effectively to the negotiating proposals of other nations is important if flexibility is to be preserved. If pressed to accept expensive rules-related commitments, applicants should at a minimum insist on technical assistance to mitigate the implementation costs.<sup>19</sup>

Given the duration, complexity, and wide-ranging scope of the WTO accession process, accession countries should develop, in partnership with the providers of technical assistance, a road map that identifies the different types of assistance required at each stage of the accession process. The diagnostic tools associated with the Integrated Framework—successfully applied in Cambodia, for example, and currently being used in Ethiopia's accession—provide a comprehensive assessment of national needs. In this regard it is also important to avoid overlooking post-accession implementation needs, as deficits here can undermine the ability of the private sector to capitalize on any export opportunities created by joining the WTO.

Officials in developing countries have benefited from the experience of experts in other developing countries that have recently acceded to the WTO. Such so-called South-South learning can be very valuable. Jordan, for example, offers expertise to countries in the Middle East and North Africa that are seeking to join the WTO.

Shrewd officials from applicant countries have also sought to optimize the value of the technical assistance they receive by playing an active role in drafting the terms of reference for international consultants and participating in the process of selecting such consultants. It is also important to ensure that workshops and consultant visits are tailored to country-specific circumstances and involve follow-up. Picking the right officials to attend workshops and promoting the learning in official WTO languages contributes positively as well.

### **Concluding remarks**

The first 20 completed WTO accessions have raised systemic concerns that ought to be of interest to existing WTO members as well as to applicants. The first is that the growing price of WTO accession is creating a multi-tiered world trading system in which recently acceded countries have more obligations and fewer rights. This, in turn, is manifesting itself in demands from some recent applicants to be treated differently in liberalization efforts under the Doha Development Agenda. Some observers have called for applicants to pay a price for accession that is both commensurate with their level of development and with the obligations of existing

WTO members at the same level of development.<sup>20</sup> The need to calibrate the process by level of development has been partially recognized by the WTO membership and was manifested in the WTO General Council's guidelines for the accession of least developed countries in December 2002.<sup>21</sup> To date, however, the call for parity, has been rejected by WTO members.

At a time when the world trading system is supposed to be taking the interests of developing countries more seriously, the lengthening of the time required to negotiate accession and the uncertainty created by the lack of a clear legal definition of the price of WTO accession are issues that merit attention. One has to ask whether it is reasonable to expect developing country's officials and civil society to sustain interest in a process that could take a decade and involve considerable complexity in return for uncertain and deferred rewards. Protracted negotiations give opponents of trade and investment reforms opportunities to exaggerate the negative and undermine support for the accession process. Leaders with anything but the longest time horizons are unlikely to support seriously an accession effort that may not begin to pay off for a decade. It is also worth noting that the WTO is probably the only international economic organization that asks nations to stick to a program of such length. Developmental needs and the necessity of sustaining initial support for joining the WTO should drive the design and operation of the WTO accession process and associated technical assistance. Failure to do so risks creating a growing group of disgruntled participants in the world trading system whose support for further trade reform is likely to be tepid.

Finally, it is important to recognize that the WTO accession process can play a useful role in the political economy of trade reform. Governments that are able to clearly identify their reform objectives *ex ante* are in a much better position to use the process to their own advantage, leveraging the multilateral process to advance domestic reform.

#### Notes

1. This paper was written by Simon J. Evenett, Professor of International Trade and Economic Development at the University of St. Gallen and a nonresident Senior Fellow of the Economic Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, and Carlos A. Primo Braga, Senior Adviser, International Trade Department, World Bank. Comments and assistance from U. Dadush, C. Fink, B. Hoekman, A. Hussain, P. Low, K. Lucenti, F. Maertens, W. Martin, P. Reichenmiller, P. Schuler, and C. Tully are gratefully acknowledged.

2. The working party on the accession of Vanuatu concluded its work in 2001. Vanuatu has not, however, completed its domestic ratification procedures. If one includes Vanuatu in the list of countries and custom territories pursuing accession to the WTO, the total number is 31.

3. Throughout this paper we define developing countries as encompassing low- and middle-income economies, according to World Bank definitions. Developing country status in the WTO, in turn, is determined by self-selection. Another country grouping used in the paper—and

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recognized by the WTO—is the UN classification of least developed countries (LDCs).

4. See list of suggested readings and the references provided in this chapter.

5. These studies are part of a project entitled “Preparing For and Evaluating WTO Accessions” that was funded by the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada.

6. Iran’s request to initiate accession procedures, first presented in 1996, was blocked 21 times by the United States for reasons unrelated to trade. It was finally accepted by the WTO General Council on May 26, 2005.

7. See WTO (1995, 2004a and 2004b) for details about the accession process.

8. Any current member of the WTO can join the Working Party established to consider the accession of a new member.

9. If one considers only the time taken from the submission of the Trade Memorandum until the completion of the process in the case of new WTO members, the time required falls to roughly five years.

10. The following figures provide useful comparators. According to Finger and others (1996) the average bound MFN tariff rate on imports of all merchandise goods by a group of 26 low- and middle-income countries was 25.2 percent. For industrial goods the comparable average bound MFN tariff rate was 20 percent. Anderson and Martin (2005) point out that by 2001, the average weighted agricultural import tariffs were 48 percent for developing countries (WTO taxonomy) and 78 for LDCs.

11. Nepal and Cambodia, the two LDCs that have joined the WTO since 1995, committed to 76 and 93 subsectors, respectively, in contrast to the average of 20 subsectors that LDCs had committed to during the Uruguay Round. For further details about services commitments in the GATS see Marchetti (2004).

12. Grynberg, Ognitsev, and Razzaque (2002) came to a similar conclusion. They summarize their findings as follows: “At the most aggregate level, while WTO members have on average taken up some kind of commitment in six sectors out of a maximum of 12, the comparable figures for acceding countries is ten. At the 2-digit level, acceding countries took commitments in 36 sectors compared to only 17 taken by WTO members. Finally, at the most disaggregated level, acceding countries have commitments almost two and a half times bigger—103 as against 42. The accession negotiations have resulted in countries undertaking commitments that apparently bear no relationship to their level of economic development as reflected in per capita income” (page vii).

13. Another example of systemic change in the accession process from the GATT-era to the WTO years concerns the nonapplication provision, which allows a member not to apply the GATT as a whole or its schedule of concessions to an acceding member. In the GATT years, a contracting party could not invoke this provision after it had entered into bilateral negotiations with the acceding party. Under WTO rules, however, this provision can be invoked even after bilateral negotiations have started.

14. These determinants are the national incomes of the two trading partners and the geographical distance between them. Other determinants that are usually included in such analyses include proxy variables to pick up the effect of two nations sharing a common language and a common border and their respective memberships in regional trading agreements.

15. See, for example, Kennett, Evenett, and Gage (2005).

16. That is, to Canada, the members of the European Union, Japan, and the United States. Given the delays in the availability of international trade data, in 2004 Bulgaria and Ecuador were the only medium-sized nonlandlocked countries to join the WTO for which five years of post-accession trade data were available. The choice of these countries was, therefore, not arbitrary.

17. See, for example, Bacchetta and Drabek (2002).

18. The experiences of six developing countries in organizing for WTO accession can be found

in Evenett (2005a). Evenett (2005b) summarizes the interventions of several developing country participants on this subject at a joint World Bank-GTZ workshop held in November 2004. See Zarccone, Fink, and Primo Braga (2005).

19. It is said that certain developing countries have successfully used this approach in their WTO accession negotiations.

20. See, for example, Michalopoulos (2002) and Kennett, Evenett, and Gage (2005).

21. These Guidelines call on existing members to exercise restraint in seeking concessions on trade in goods and services from acceding LDCs. See WTO (2002).

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**Annex 1. Countries currently seeking accession to the WTO (with application date)**

Europe and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa	East Asia and Pacific	Sub-Saharan Africa	South Asia	Latin America and the Caribbean
Russia (June 1993)	Algeria (Jun. 1987)	Vietnam (Jan. 1995)	Sudan* (Oct. 1994)	Bhutan* (Sep. 1999)	Bahamas (May 2001)
Belarus (Sep 1993)	Saudi Arabia (Jun. 1993)	Tonga (Jun. 1995)	Seychelles (May 1995)	Afghanistan* (Dec. 2004)	
Ukraine (Nov 1993)	Lebanon (Jan. 1999)	Vanuatu*(a)	Cape Verde* (Nov. 1999)		
Uzbekistan (Dec 1994)	Yemen* (Apr. 2000)	Lao PDR* (Jul. 1997)	Ethiopia* (Jan. 2003)		
Kazakhstan (Jan 1996)	Libya (Jun. 2004)	Samoa* (Apr. 1998)	Sao Tome and Principe* (May 2005)		
Azerbaijan (June 1997)	Iraq (Dec. 2004)				
Bosnia-Herzegovina (May 1999)	Iran (May 2005)				
Andorra (July 1999)					
Tajikistan (May 2001)					
Serbia <sup>(b)</sup> (Feb 2005)					
Montenegro (Feb 2005)					

*Note:* <sup>a</sup>. The Working Party on the Accession of Vanuatu concluded its work on 29 October 2001. Vanuatu has not, however, followed up on its accession.

<sup>b</sup>. Serbia and Montenegro made a joint application on January 2001. In February 2005 they withdrew that application and replaced it with two individual applications.

\* = least developed country.

*Source:* Compiled by the authors on WTO data (2004a).

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**Annex 2. Chronological list of countries that have acceded to the WTO**


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No.	New member	Date of membership
1	Ecuador	Jan. 1996
2	Bulgaria	Dec. 1996
3	Mongolia	Jan. 1997
4	Panama	Sep. 1997
5	Kyrgyz Republic	Dec. 1998
6	Latvia	Feb. 1999
7	Estonia	Nov. 1999
8	Jordan	Apr. 2000
9	Georgia	Jun. 2000
10	Albania	Sep. 2000
11	Oman	Nov. 2000
12	Croatia	Nov. 2000
13	Lithuania	May. 2001
14	Moldova	Jul. 2001
15	China	Dec. 2001
16	Taiwan, China	Jan. 2002
17	Armenia	Feb. 2003
18	FYR Macedonia	Apr. 2003
19	Nepal	Apr. 2004
20	Cambodia	Oct. 2004

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*Source:* Compiled by the authors on WTO data (2004a).

