APPENDIX B: DATA-SET NOTES

for

PARTITION AS A SOLUTION TO ETHNIC WAR: AN EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE OF THE THEORETICAL LITERATURE

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A. GENERAL REMARKS

This document is a supplement to Nicholas Sambanis, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," WORLD POLITICS, July 2000, v52, 437-83. This document should be used as a codebook for the data-set "Civil Wars," available in any format from the author and downloadable in Stata 6.0 from this site.

The data-set includes 125 events of civil war. Included are wars that started since 1944 and terminated before 1997 and wars which were ongoing as of December 1999, but which had at least one significant settlement or truce or third-party peace operation, signaling the parties’ desire to terminate the war and start a peacebuilding process.

The following pages are organized in four sections. Section B defines civil wars and discusses various issues related to the sources and coding of war events. Section C describes the dependent variables used in "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature." It explains the sources and coding conventions for each of these variables. Section D describes a number of variables, including all the explanatory variables used in "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature." However, many more variables are described here and included in the data-set so as to enable other researchers to conduct sensitivity and robustness tests of my findings and to conduct additional studies on related issues.1 Finally, section E includes a number of country-specific comments, which are

1 If you use this data-set for any purpose, please cite Nicholas Sambanis, 2000, "Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature," WORLD POLITICS, v52, July 2000, 437-83.
intended to further explain the coding of specific cases.

**B. DEFINITIONS OF CIVIL WARS**

An armed conflict is classified as a civil war if it satisfies the following criteria:

a) the war has caused more than one thousand battle deaths;
b) the war represented a challenge to the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state;
c) the war occurred within the recognized boundary of that state;
d) the war involved the state as one of the principal combatants;
e) the rebels were able to mount an organized military opposition to the state and to inflict significant casualties on the state.

This definition of civil war draws on Singer and Small (1982, 1994) and Licklider (1993; 1995). The most significant difference between my definition and that of the other authors, is that I do not require 1,000 deaths on an annual basis, but rather 1,000 deaths for the duration of the war. At the same time, nearly all of the cases in my data-set actually did produce 1,000 deaths annually. My coding decision was based on the arbitrariness of the 1,000 annual death threshold and on the lack of available data on annual deaths in the Correlates of War (1994) project and in Licklider (1995). While mention of an 1,000 annual death threshold is made in Singer and Small (1982), the codebook of ICPSR study #9905, which includes the Correlates of War (COW) international and civil war data files does not refer to an annual death threshold and no annual death data are made available by the authors. Rather, the COW codebook (1994, 17) expressly states that "An internal war is classified as a major civil war if ... (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted during the civil war."

I have supplemented the above two sources for coding war-related variables from: Uppsala University project on civil wars (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, Journal of Peace Studies, 1997); The State Failure Project (1995); Licklider (1993); Mason and Fett (1996); Regan (1996); Walter (1997); Armand (1995); SIPRI yearbooks (1987-1998); CIA World Factbook (various years); World Almanac; as well as secondary texts, including case-studies and official reports, such as: LeMarchand (1987); Callahan (1997); Doyle, Orr, and Johnstone (1997); Rotberg (1998); Deng (1999); Stuart-Fox (1998); Sambanis (1999). I also consulted Human Rights Watch reports on Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Algeria; and U.S. State Department reports on Bangladesh, Laos, Burma, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau, Peru, and the Philippines.

Consultation of these sources has led me to revise some of the start- and end-dates of several wars. It has also led me to collapse two or more war events from other studies in one or vice-versa. I discuss my rationale for these changes in the section entitled
"Country-Specific Comments." My rule of thumb for coding separate war events was the following: If a war ended in a peace settlement and then restarted after a period of peace, I coded a separate war event. This was done to facilitate use of this data-set in the analysis of the effectiveness of peace settlements in ending war and to make the data-set compatible with a study of peace-building processes (a peace treaty would be considered the initiation of a peace process). Other rules of thumb for coding separate war events were the following: If a different war started while a previous war was ongoing in the same country, I coded separate war events (e.g. the Tigrean and Eritrean wars in Ethiopia). If the parties and issues to a war changed dramatically, I coded a separate event (e.g. the Afghan war before and after Taliban). I collapsed two or more war events in other data-sets in one if these war events if the parties and issues were the same; if less than 2 years intervened between the first and second event; if large-scale fighting continued during the intervening period, and if the case-study literature treats those wars as a single war. Mason and Fett (1996, fn. 8) also use that convention. In cases where this is done, I explain the rationale in the section on country-notes.

C. Procedures for Coding the Dependent Variables

Four dependent variables are used in the analysis: PARTV2, WAREND, NOVIOL, and IGURR. I explain how each was coded below.

1. PARTV2: Did the war result in a partition? Coded 1 if yes, 0 if not.

   - This variable is coded "v2" to indicate that it is the second version of the original dependent variable PART. The second version incorporates suggestions made by anonymous referees.
   - I have left the original PART variable in the data-set to allow researchers to perform sensitivity analyses, as desired.
   - The differences between the first and second versions of the dependent variable are the following: Lebanon and Yemen are not coded as partitions; Russia-Chechnya is coded as a partition; Kosovo is coded as a partition (but it is not part of the analysis given that no data are yet available to evaluate its outcome).
   - Sources: as for war variable; country-specific sources; State Department and Human Rights Groups reports; suggestions by anonymous referees.

2. WAREND2, -5: Did the war end (no war recurrence)? Coded 1 if yes, 0 if not.

   - I used the same sources to code this variable as I did to identify the number and dates of civil wars.
   - The variable is measured 2, 5, and 10 years after the end of the first war.
• There are many missing values for the 10-year period.

3. NOVIOL2, -5: Did low-level violence end after the war? Coded 1 if yes, 0 if not.

• I used the same sources to code this variable as I did to identify the number and dates of civil wars.
• NOVIOL is coded 0 if war recurred (i.e. if WAREND = 0)
• NOVIOL is coded 0 if the Wallensteen and Sollenberg (1997) data-set noted that an armed conflict occurred after the end of the war (their terminology for violence that causes 25 or more deaths but falls short of war).
• NOVIOL is coded 0 if a politicide or genocide occurred after the end of a war.
• See detailed comments with information for all cases on this site (NOVIOL_Table.xls).

4. GURR2, -5, -10: Gives the "polity" score from the Polity98 data-set, as the sum of: [Democracy + (10 - Autocracy)], measured 2, 5, and 10 years after the end of the war.

• The GURR variable ranges from 0 to 20.
• Maximum democracy is 20; Maximum Autocracy is 0.
• This variable has many missing values for the years and countries of interest. To avoid losing those observations, I imputed missing values in a new variable labeled IGURR2 (-5, -10).
• For those missing values, the imputations were based on the political rights index (GPOL variable) of Freedom in the World (London: Freedom House, 1999). This is also known as the Gastil index. That index ranges from 1-7, where 1 is most free and 7 not free. For the 8 ongoing conflicts in my data-set, I used the most recent available data (usually 1998-1999).
• Coding of the political rights variable in the Freedom House project started in 1972, thus I cannot impute any missing GURR values for years prior to 1972.

Notes on the Imputation of Missing Gurr values:

I assume a linear relationship between Gurr’s polity scale and the political rights index of Freedom House. Briefly, political rights are defined as “rights to participate meaningfully in the political process. In a democracy this means the right of all adults to vote and compete for public office, and for elected representatives to have a decisive vote on public policies” (Gastil 1988, p. 7).

Bollen (1993) finds that among available measures (he does not test the Polity measures) of democracy, Gastil’s Political Rights Index is the best with 93 % accuracy (i.e. it has the least systematic error). Further, the combination of the Gastil political rights and civil rights index (their addition and measurement on a 2-14 scale) generates an
index that is also very accurate, though not flawless, and it is used by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994). Bollen (1993) uses available democracy measures to create a baseline index for 1980 that corrects for the systematic error (method factor error). The 1980 baseline year can be used to normalize the Gastil measure for all other years.

I confirmed that there is a linear and significant correlation between the Polity democracy index and the Gastil index by means of a bivariate regression:

```
Regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs = 55
F( 1, 36) = 196.59
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.6990
Root MSE = 3.5976

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
gurr2 | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------
gpol2 | -3.229058 .2302988 -14.021 0.000 -3.696125 -2.76199
_cons | 24.09948 1.173494 20.537 0.000 21.71952 26.47943
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Bollen's (1993) analysis notwithstanding, there is some concern over the objectivity of the Freedom House index. I considered controlling for the Bollen 1980 index in my imputations of missing GURR values. I therefore input the variable `BOLLEN80` in my data-set: is a measure of democracy that minimizes systematic (method factor) and random error that is commonly found in the Gastil, Banks, and Sussman indices. It is a composite index of Gastil’s political rights measure, Banks’ political opposition variable, and Bank’s legislative effectiveness variable for 1980. These three composites are equally weighted. The weights and composition of the Bollen index was empirically-determined to minimize systematic and random measurement error. The 1980 index ranges from 0-100, with higher values corresponding to higher degree of democracy.

However, the BOLLEN index is not useful as a control:

```
Regression with robust standard errors
Number of obs = 44
F( 2, 29) = 83.43
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.6712
Root MSE = 3.8305

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
gurr2 | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------
gpol2 | -3.458503 .3359532 -10.295 0.000 -4.145605 -2.771402
bollen80 | -.0204648 .019809 -1.033 0.310 -.0609787 .0200491
_cons | 26.19202 2.086836 12.551 0.000 21.92396 30.46008
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Thus, the final imputations of the GURR variable were based on the Gastil political rights index alone.
D. OTHER VARIABLES

1. VARIABLES TO ORGANIZE THE DATA

**Dataset**: This variable denotes several categories of cases. It can be used to drop groups of observations for robustness tests or analysis of subgroups.

- Dataset = 1: all cases where the war has ended for at least two years and there is sufficient data to include in the analysis of war recurrence and to evaluate post-war outcomes.
- Dataset = 2: all cases where the war is ongoing, but still included in the analysis because there was a serious attempt to end the violence through negotiation or third-party peace operation.
- Dataset = 3: CODING APPLIES TO ANOTHER PAPER -- IGNORE
- Dataset = 4: all cases that have excessively internationalized civil wars.
- Dataset = 5: cases where there is a persisting problem of divided sovereignty
- Dataset = 6: all cases that are too recent to be included in the analysis
- Dataset = 7: cases that some researchers have argued that they may not qualify as civil wars, but rather as purges of civilians, or where the violence need not include the state as one of the main participants, but is rather concentrated between rival ethnic groups.

**cluster**: 3-letter country abbreviation used for clustering same-country observations

**clust2**: same as cluster except that this variable clusters together all former Soviet Republics and, in a separate cluster, all former Yugoslavian Republics. This version of cluster is used in my analysis.

**ccode**: 3-letter code used to identify specific conflicts

**cname**: Name of the country where civil war took place.

**cnumb**: individual conflict number
2. WAR-RELATED VARIABLES

**yrbeg:** First year of the civil war -- same sources used as for coding of wars

**yrend:** Last year of the civil war -- same sources used as for coding of wars

**geo:** Geographical area to which the country belongs. Europe = 1, Latin America and Caribbean = 2, Middle East & North Africa = 3, Asia = 4, Africa = 5.

**decade:** variable intended to pick up any effects of the chronological period on local capacity variables mainly. Coded as follows: 1 = 1944-54; 2 = 1955-64; 3 = 1965-74; 4 = 1975-84; 5 = 1985-94 6= after 1995 Coding is based on the initial year of the war.

**Wartype:** Type of war.
- Coded 1 for ethnic/religious/identity conflict.
- Coded 0 for ideological/revolutionary war.
- **Sources:** revised Licklider data (version 2.1), Mason and Fett (1996); Walter (1997); Regan (1996); various country-specific sources, State Department and Human Rights Groups reports, and State-Failure Project.
- **Note:** There are discrepancies in the coding of the war-type variable in the different sources. These discrepancies may (or may not) have an impact on the potentially the statistical analysis. For greater transparency, I list the WARTYPE coding of all cases in a Table in the main text. Among those cases where Licklider and State-Failure project disagreed on the type of war, I coded the case by consulting additional sources.

**Typelick:** type of war with coded according to Licklider (1995).
- Observations in my data-set and not in Licklider’s are coded missing, unless the difference is due to differences in the periodization of wars (see country notes for explanation of such changes, where applicable).
- There are significant differences in the coding of this variable in Licklider’s (1995) data-set and other data-sets (e.g. State Failure Project 1995; Mason and Fett 1996).
**Typestf**: type of war based on information from the State-Failure Project (1995).

- According to the State-Failure Project, "Ethnic wars are episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status."
  - See: http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail/.
  - Further details on the classification of cases according to the State Failure Project: "Most ethnic wars since 1955 have been guerrilla or civil wars in which the challengers have sought independence or regional autonomy. A few, like the events in South Africa's black townships in 1976-77, involve large-scale demonstrations and riots aimed at sweeping political reform that were violently suppressed by police and military. Rioting and warfare between rival communal groups is NOT coded as ethnic warfare unless it involves conflict over political power or government policy. As with revolutionary wars, the minimum thresholds for including an ethnic conflict in the updated state failure problem set are that each party must mobilize 1000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops) and an average of 100 or more fatalities per year must occur during the episode. The fatalities may result from armed conflict, terrorism, rioting, or government repression. As with revolutionary wars, if a government perpetrates political mass murder against unarmed members of a rebellious communal group, then two analytically-distinct events are codable: ethnic war and geno/politicide."
  - You can gauge at the coding differences between Licklider and the State-Failure project by comparing the Typelick and Typestf variables. Reference and comparisons are also included in my paper.

**Battle**: denotes the number of military deaths that occurred in battle.

- **Main Sources**: COW (1992); Licklider (1995); 
- **Supplementary Sources**: Mason and Fett (1996); Regan (1992); SIPRI yearbooks (1987-1998) are used for: Angola II; Algeria II, Bangladesh; Burma I; Zaire II & III; Iraq II; Rwanda III; Sierra Leone I. State Department Reports (various years). Human Rights Watch Reports (various years).
- **Notes**: If more than one country fought in the war, I combine deaths for all countries. This is particularly relevant for heavily internationalized civil wars.

**Dead**: denotes the total number of dead, including civilians and battle deaths.

- This combines sources on battle deaths with reports on civilian deaths attributed to the war.
- **Sources**: For specific wars sources on deaths are given in the section on country notes. **Notes**: Harff and Gurr (1988) estimates are used for civilian deaths, were available (the mean of the difference between the low and high estimates given) are reported for Algeria I, China I, II & III; Burundi I; Pakistan I; Cambodia (the massacres of civilians between 1975 and 1979 are added to the war-related deaths because they resulted from the
same conflict and we believe that they affected the intensity of the political conflict); Indonesia/East Timor; Iran II.

- Efforts have been made to use the same source for as many wars as possible. Where a range rather than a precise number is given, the highest estimate is reported, under the assumption that deaths are often underreported in civil wars, especially deaths that result indirectly from the war.
- If precise and reliable data on the total war-related deaths are unavailable, then the battle-death data is used instead. I use the COW data on battle deaths when more reliable data are not available.

**Ridp:** number of people displaced both internally and externally due to the war.

- **Sources:** UNCHR (various issues up to 1998); Weiner (1996); Holbron (1975a, b); Kibreab (1985). See also country notes.
- **Notes:**
  - Figures reported are lower estimates.
  - Figures may include not returned refugees from previous wars.
  - Estimates for countries with wars that ended in 1997/99 or with ongoing wars will have to be revised upwards at a later date.
  - In some cases, only refugee data are reported, as reliable data on internally displaced persons are harder to find, especially for older conflicts.
  - Data for Haiti are only for the post-1991 period. There were as many refugees during the 1985-1991 period.
  - Most of the Algerian refugees in 1962-63 were the result of the war of independence, not of the subsequent coup. We do not include white settlers who returned to Europe.
  - Data for Congo/Zaire II includes the forced resettlement of 600,000 Rwandan refugees in Zaire.
  - Data for India 1 are from Weiner (1996) and show movements of Hindu refugees to India during 1950s and 1960s as a result of the partition.
  - Data for India 2 are from Weiner (1996) and show movements of Muslim refugees from India to Pakistan after the 1965 war.
  - Data for Chad 1980-94 are for refugees only and come from Weiner (1996)
  - Data for Burma 1983-1995 are from Weiner (1996) and report refugees only.

**pw10:** binary variable denoting if there was another international, civil, or colonial and extrasystemic war in the 10-year period before the start of the current war. Variable takes the value 0 if there were no previous wars and the value 1 if there was at least one war.

- **Source:** COW (1994) and other civil and international wars data-sets (see above).
- **Notes:**
  - I exclude World War Two, following similar practice in the democratic peace literature.
• I code \textbf{pw10} =1 for the second Colombian observation, because the case-study literature suggests that wide-spread violence persisted throughout the period between the two wars.
• Sri Lanka is a borderline case (the first war ended 11 years before the start of the second, so we code it as 1).

\textbf{Outcome}: Variable coding the final outcome of the war as follows: if the war is ongoing = 0; military victory (by either side) = 1; formal settlement/treaty = 2; informal cease-fire/truce =3.
\textbf{Outcome2} is coded: 0=ongoing; 1=military victory by government; 2=military victory by rebels; 3=truce; 4=treaty.
• \textbf{Sources}: COW; Licklider (1995); Walter (1997); Mason and Fett (1996); various country-specific sources, State Department and Human Rights Groups reports.

\textbf{Notes}:
• I understand truce as an informal arrangement between combatants that does not necessarily denote the end of a conflict, but rather a stalemate, which ends large-scale fighting.
• A truce may be temporary and can include enforced or internationally-monitored truces, as in the case of Cyprus.
• The variables VREBEL, TRUCE; MILOUT used in the analysis are binary variables created from this variable.

\textbf{Wardur}: Duration of the war measured in months.
• \textbf{Source}: COW (1994); Mason and Fett (1996); Licklider (1995) and various country-specific sources, State Department and Human Rights Groups reports.

\textbf{Notes}:
• The COW (1994) data-set includes war-durations of zero months for those wars during which the majority of deaths occurred in a few days/weeks. I replace zeros with a duration of 1 month so as to be able to calculate battle intensity (defined as total deaths per capita per month).
• I follow COW (1994) where possible, except in cases where other authors have made a convincing cases about a different start date for the war. I find the coding in Licklider (1995) and especially the State-Failure Project (1995) to be especially sensitive to the conflict’s history and explanations are often provided by these two sources on each conflict.
• If the only available war duration information I have on a specific conflict is in terms of years, I estimate war duration by multiplying the number of years by 12 (months) except in the case where 1 year is noted, in which case I code 6 months (since most conflicts did not last a full calendar year (see, e.g. the Algerian war of 1962-63). 
• If the war is ongoing, we calculate its duration from its start until 1999.

\textbf{garm}: size of the government army (thousands of troops).
• \textbf{Sources}: SIPRI yearbooks (1988-1998); COW data; CIA World Factbook
Notes:
- Pre-war and early-war data is reported, as available.
- If COW (1994) is the source and there are several parties to the war listed in the COW dataset, then the size of the militaries is added (e.g. in Iraq 91, India, Lebanon).
- Where there is a discrepancy between the three data sources listed above (which is often the case), I use SIPRI data.
- Serbian military figures are reported in the Bosnian case.
- South African military figures are reported in the Namibia case.
- The number for Lebanon (after the first observation) represents the sum of the militaries of all the governments involved in the conflict.

**major**: binary variable denoting major power participation in the war.
- Coded 1 if a major power was involved militarily and 0 otherwise.

Notes:
- This variable measures direct major power military participation or extensive political support for one or more of the parties to the conflict. Major powers are the five permanent members of the UN security council. All Central American wars are coded as having experienced major power involvement by the US. If a major power participates in a UN peace operation, this is not coded as major power involvement and the cases is noted in the **Interven** variable (e.g. US participation in Bosnia and Somalia).

**Interven**: Binary variable denoting external intervention in the war
- Coded 1 if there was intervention and 0 otherwise
- **Source**: Regan (1996); see also sources for **major**.
- In COW, the intervention in Laos starts in 1963 and lasts for the duration of that war. Since I have combined two observations for Laos, I coded this observation as 2, since there was intervention for the larger number of years of the conflict. In Guatemala, intervention started in 1978, so we code our last observation as 2.
3. **Socio-Economic Variables**

**Area**: geographical area measured in square kilometers (includes land and inland water).
- **Source**: World Bank, Social Indicators of Development (SID). Source for Bosnia is Brogan (1992);
- **Notes**: The same figure is used for North and South Yemen.

**Popst**: population at starting year of the war;
**Popen**: population at end year of the war;
**Popgro**: percent population growth (average for the 10-20 year-period in percent terms).
- **Notes**: In few cases where precise figures were not available, I calculated the population using earlier figures and data rates of population growth for the relevant period (growth rates used are from UN and World Bank publications).
- In cases of ongoing war, or if the war ended less than five years ago, I report **popen5** midyear population figures from the US Census Bureau for 1997 so that per capita measures of other variables can be used.

**Urbst; urbend**: percentage of the population living in urban centers.
- **Notes**: US Census Bureau data used for the following countries: Angola (1970); Burma (1988); Colombia (1973); Ethiopia (1977); Laos (1970; 1975; 1980); Malaysia (1970); Namibia (1970); Peru (1981); Romania (1981); Sierra Leone (1974); Sri Lanka (1981); Vietnam (1975; 1980; 1985). Western Sahara (1970); Yemen (1973).
- Same figures are used for the two observations for Iran, given that they are only 1-2 years apart. Similarly, the first observation value for urbanization for Liberia, Peru, Rwanda, Sri Lanka is used for the second observation, for which data is not available.
- Costa Rica, Greece data are for 1965 (World Bank, SID).
- Haiti data are for 1997 from World Bank country data.

**Infst**: deaths of infants reported per 1,00 live births
- **Source**: World Bank SID; and http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata
- **Notes**: 
• Data reported for the calendar year preceding the start of the war.
• This is a very good proxy for income inequality.
• Data for start of the war is reported, or for closest year.
• Costa Rica data is for 1965 (World Bank SID).

**GDP60 & GDP85:** GDP per capita for the years 1960 and 1985. US$.
• **Source:** Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1985).
  **Notes:**
  • South Africa data are used for Namibia.
  • For GDP60, real GDP per capita data for the following variables is supplemented from Collier and Hoeffler (1999): Sierra Leone; Sudan; Turkey; Greece;

**rgdpcaps; rgdpcape:** Real GDP per capita in US$.
• **Source:** World Bank, Country Data and WDI; Banks Crossnational Survey, 1949-1991; Penn World Tables 5.1. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) for the years 1960, 1985, 1990 (year closest to start of war is reported).
  **Notes:**
  • Measured before the start of the war (rgdpcaps) and after the end of the war, but before the end of the period of measurement of the dependent variable (rgdpcape).
  • Measuring problems with these variables and possible errors
  • Combines the data from the GDP variable above with data from Banks, after dividing the World Bank data with the size of population in 1976, 1986, or 1996 (depending on which data was used for each observation).
  • World Bank data reported reflects 5-year period averages; that data is available between 1960-1995.
  • If war is more than 11 years from 1976, 1986, or 1996 (whichever is available), we do not report World Bank data, but rather we report Banks' data.
  • GDP in the Banks data is consistently lower than in the World Bank data for the same countries and years. I use Banks' data for the following countries: Algeria I, Argentina, Bolivia, Cambodia (data for the first observation used in the second), China I & II, Colombia I, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Rep., Ethiopia, Guatemala I, India I, Indonesia I & II & III, Iraq I & II, Korea I &II, Laos, Lebanon I & II, Paraguay, Philippines I, Rwanda I, Sudan I, Uganda I, Yemen II.
  • Banks' data are not necessarily for the beginning year of the war, but the year closest to that was selected, as available.

**Rgdpch:** Real GDP, purchasing power parity-adjusted
• **Source:** PWT 5.6; World Bank; CIA World Factbook
  **Notes:**
  • Measured for the start of the war in short-lived wars, or for the last year of the war in long wars (so as to capture the effects of the war on the country’s capacity level).
• Concern over comparability of these data -- may have to be rebased.
• Data for the following countries has been supplemented from other sources: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Cuba, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Burundi 1, Moldova.
• Data for Yemen is used for Yemen Arab Republic and Yemen People’s Republic.
• Data for Yugoslavia is used for Bosnia and Croatia.
• Data for Ireland is used for Northern Ireland.
• Data for Israel is for 1953
• Data for Iran and for 1979 in both bases.

En1: energy consumption per capita in a (0-1) index.
• Source: Rummel (1994); Raw data: Global Data Manager (1989).
Notes:
• Data is reported for the late 1970s/early 1980 or for specific regimes/war periods, whichever is available.
• Energy consumption is considered a good proxy for the level of economic development of a country (see, e.g. Hegre, Gledisch, Gates, et. al. 1999).
• For Namibia, we use data for South Africa. For Western Sahara, we use data for Morocco. For Vietnam, we use data for South Vietnam.

En2: energy consumption per capita in terms of kg of oil equivalent.
• Source: World Bank (SID)
Notes:
• Two variables created: En2st gives data for start year of the war or year closest to it; and En2end gives data for 5-10 years after the end of the war. The highest available figure from that interval is reported. If war is ongoing or if it has not been 5 years since its end, then give latest available figure.
• Use as alternative to en1 variable.
• Earliest available data is for 1965. Use earliest available data in observations before 1965.
• Latest available year is 1993.
• For Algeria, data for 1971 are reported.
• For Argentina, data for 1971 are reported.
• For Azerbaijan, data for 1991 and 1993 are reported.
• For Bolivia, data for 1971 are reported.
• For Myanmar, data for 1972 are reported.
• For China, data for 1971 are reported.
• For Colombia I, data for 1971 are reported.
• For Zaire, data for 1971 and 1993 are reported.
• For Costa Rica data for 1970 are reported.
• For Cuba, data for 1971 are reported.
• For Cyprus, first entry is for 1971.
- For Dominican Republic, first entry is for 1971.
- For Georgia, data is for 1991 and 1993.
- For Greece, data is for 1970.
- For Guatemala, first entry is for 1971.
- For India, first entry is for 1971.
- For Indonesia, first entry is for 1971.
- For Jordan, first entry is for 1971.
- For Korea, data for 1971 is reported.
- For Malaysia, data is for 1970.
- For Nigeria, first entry is for 1971.
- For Paraguay, data is for 1971.
- For Rwanda, first entry is for 1970.
- For Tajikistan, data is for 1991 and 1993.
- For Vietnam, first entry is for 1971.
- For Croatia, data is for 1991 and 1993.
- For Kosovo and Bosnia, data is for Yugoslavia 1990 and 1993.

**Gini1**: Average gini coefficient (average over the number of observations) for various years, not corresponding to the years of the war.

- **Notes**:
  - Only low-quality data available for some countries.
  - In some cases, the only available data is for several years (up to 20) from the war.
  - Gini for Armenia is used for missing Azerbaijan observation, since Armenia is part of that war.
  - Gini for Moldova is used for missing Georgia observation, since Moldova is part of that war.
  - Gini for Yugoslavia is used for missing Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo observations.
  - Gini for USSR is used for Chechnya and Tajikistan.

**Life**: Life expectancy at birth.

- **Source**: World Bank, World Tables of Economic and Social Indicators & Social Indicators of Development (SID); WDI published and unpublished databases.
- **Notes**:
  - This is a good proxy for inequality, but mostly for development; use in place of GDP.
  - Two variables coded: “lifes” denoting life expectancy during the year before the war; and “lifee” denoting life expectancy at end of war or, if war is ongoing, for the latest available year. Life expectancy data for years before 1950 are unavailable, so all wars that started before 1950, we use the 1950 figure for the respective country. The first year for which data is available for Yemen is 1952.
  - If data for precise years are unavailable, data for the year closest to the desirable year are reported.
• Source is World Bank for: Angola; Bangladesh; Burma; Iran; Liberia; Namibia; Philippines; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Yugoslavian statistics for 1992 are used for Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo.
• Costa Rica data are for 1965 (World Bank, SID).
• Life expectancy data at end of war for countries whose wars ended after 1991 are drawn from World Bank country-at-a-glance data.

**Illicit, illitend:** adult illiteracy rate percent (year before and at end of war).
  • **Source:** World Bank SID; GDF; WDI.
  • **Notes:**
    • Data unavailable for years preceding the war for several conflicts.
    • Data reported for total population above 15 years of age.
    • Angola: data for 1985 and 1990 reported.
    • Argentina: data for 1970 reported.
    • Burma: data for 1973 reported.
    • Colombia: data for 1973 and 1981 reported.
    • Costa Rica: data for 1973 reported.
    • Cyprus data is for 1976.
    • Ethiopia data for 1970
    • Greece data is for 1971.
    • Guatemala data is for 1973.
    • For India, 1971 is the source-year for the first two observations.
    • For Indonesia, 1971 is the source-year for the first three observations.
    • For Iraq, the data in the first two observations are for 1965.
    • For Lebanon, data is for 1985.
    • For Malaysia, data from 1970 is used.
    • For Uganda, data is for 1980.
    • For Vietnam, data if for 1979.
    • For the Yemens, data is for 1985.

**Water:** percent of population with access to safe drinking water.
  • **Source:** World Bank SID and GDF/WDI.
  • **Notes:**
    • Data reported for the year closest to the start of the war.
    • **Water85:** Data reported for 1985, or for the closest year to that, as available.
    • For Afghanistan, **Water90** data is for 1997 from World Bank country data.

**ELF60:** ethnolinguistic fractionalization index.
  • **Sources:** Mauro (1995)
  • **Notes:**
• The raw data is drawn from the *Atlas Narodov Mira* [Department of Geodesy and Cartography of the State Geological Committee of the USSR 1964]. The index was constructed by Taylor and Hudson (1972). For a definition see Taylor and Hudson (1972) and Mauro (1995).

• The index ranges from 0-100 and higher values correspond to higher degrees of ethnolinguistic fractionalization in the country.

**Eh**: Ethnic heterogeneity index  
**Source**: Vanhanen (1999)  
**Notes**:  
• Based on coding of racial, religious, and linguistic divisions within each country.  
• The data refers to conditions present in the late 1980s and 1990s.  
• The index ranges from 0 (minimum heterogeneity) to 144 (maximum heterogeneity).

**Borders**: Categorical variable denoting the number of land borders.  
**Source**: CIA World Factbook.

**Gurrlag5 & GurrlagX**: democracy average 5 and 10 years before onset of civil war.  
**Source**: Jaggers and Gurr; Polity3 data-base.  
**Notes**:  
• Same computation used: democracy + (10-autocracy).  
• The mean for the 5- and 10-year periods are reported.  
• Since these variables are measures of indigenous democratic and political institutions, I coded 1 (very low) those countries that just emerged from colonial rule/wars during the period of interest.  
• I used the Polity score for Russia for 1982-1992 for Tajikistan and Georgia.  
• If the entire 5-year period falls on a previous war and if the Polity scale does not have a score but rather notes an interregnum, I coded this as a 0.  
• Israel is coded 1 because the war started with the inception of the state.  
• The score for Bangladesh before 1971 is that for Pakistan.

**Electric**: electric power consumption (kwh per capita) for 1980.  
**Source**: World Bank, CIA world factbook.  
**Notes**:  
• The 5-year period closest to the end of the war is selected. World Bank data are the main source. I supplement them with data from CIA world factbook, where necessary.
4. International Assistance Variables

**peaceop:** all third-party peace operations
- **Source:** United Nations (1996) *Blue Helmets*; and UN DPKO website; Doyle, Johnstone, and Orr (1997).
- **Notes:** Combines UN and non-UN; type operations.

**Transf85:** net transfers to the balance of payments in current US$
- **Source:** World Bank (GDF; WDI 1999).
- **Notes:** Figures reported for 1985 for all countries except for countries that were not constituted by then (1993 figures are reported for those). Data was unavailable for all countries for the immediate post-war period or the pre-war period, so we decided to measure this variable by taking a fixed date. Although this technique might introduce some endogeneity, this would only be true for those countries that ended well before 1985.

**Aid/GNP:** Aid as percent of GNP for 1991; measure of aid dependency.
- **Source:** World Bank WDI, 1998.

**Nettransf:** Net Current Account Transfers, BoP, Current US $; **trnsfcap:** nettransf divided by population at the start of the war.
- **Source:** IMF; World Bank.
- **Notes:** For most countries, we report data for 1975-85 average
  - Data for Azerbaijan is for 1991.
  - Data for Cambodia is for 1992.
  - For Eritrea, data is for 1992.
  - Data for Georgia is for 1993.
  - Data for Lebanon is for 1989.
  - Data for Moldova is for 1994.
  - Data for Namibia is for 1990
  - Data for Romania is for 1990
  - Data for Russia is for 1994
  - Data for Tajikistan is for 1993.
E. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC COMMENTS

In this section, I explain the coding of some variables with reference to specific countries, to supplement and clarify the notes presented above. Other information relevant to the wars is also provided.

Afghanistan

- Two separate war events are coded because the parties and issues changed after 1992.
- The size of the army: if I add the figures for all parties (including Russians) the size of the army is 3,458,000 + 110,000. I report only data for the Afghan army of 110,000.
- Parties to the conflict were: Afghan government; USSR; National Islamic Movement; Hezb-I-Islami; Hezb-I-Wahdat; Taliban (Brown 1996).
- Source for RIDP and total dead variables is Brown (1996). Data for migrants and deaths per 1,000 population is for 1980.
- GDP data, refugee and IPD data for second observation from CIA World Factbook.

Algeria

- Factions in the 1962-63 war: Ben Kheda; Boumedienne; Ben Bella (Armand 1995).
- Parties to Algeria II are the government, FIS, and GIA (SIPRI).
- Data for migrants and deaths per 1,000 population is for 1966 (earliest available from Census Bureau).
- Algeria 2: the war started in 1992 and an unconditional truce was declared by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) in 1997, which marks the end of the war. However, violence escalated markedly after the truce by the actions of a small faction called Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which created Algeria 3 and caused Algeria 2 to be considered as a separate event.
- Algeria 3: I consider 1999 to be the end of this war since the AIS has officially declared an end to its armed struggle and has accepted the authority of the state. It is still too early to evaluate the success of this peace, which is quite tenuous (dataset=6). This case not used in the analysis

Angola

- The war is broken in two observations due to the official cease-fire with plans for the demobilization of troops that was negotiated in 1991.
- Licklider (1995) has one observation for the Angolan war; COW has two (75-91; 92-ongoing). I follow COW, which also agrees with the Mason-Fett data (which is case-study-based). This allows me to highlight the important truce that occurred in 1991.
• Angola 2: the war is ongoing at the time of writing.
• Parties to the war: Gov’t of Angola; UNITA (Brown 1996).
• Source for RIDP and total dead variables is Brown (1996).
• Life expectancy, water access (’85 and ’90) data for Angola II are from World Bank country data for 1997.

Argentina

• Parties were Government of Argentina; Military (Brogan 1992).
• Earliest available year for education statistics is 1960.
• Earliest available deaths/migrant data from US Census Bureau is for 1980, so I leave these variables empty for Argentina).

Azerbaijan

• COW lists this as an international war; Licklider (1995) and others as a civil war.
• Battle death figures are drawn from the COW (1994) international wars data-set.
• The war has ended but not the conflict. The armies are standing down, though there are occasional skirmishes.
• The Eheter score and Lespeyers GDP figure listed are for the USSR (war started when Azerbaijan was part of the USSR and no independent data are currently available).
• Parties: Ajeris, Armenians, Baku, Gov’t of Nagorno-Karabach (Brown 1996).
• Total dead and RIDP figures from Brown (1996).
• Major variable is coded 0 on the basis of Durch (1996).
• The end-date for the war is also based on Durch (1996).

Bangladesh

• This war was listed only in the first version of Licklider’s data; the revised version (2.1) of Licklider’s data does not include it; further, there is no observation in COW (1994), Walter (1997), Mason and Fett (1996).
• This observation refers to the was against the Hill tribes. The war has started since the mid-1960s and ended recently in a peace settlement which gave the Hill tribes some autonomy. An end to the conflict was reached with a political settlement in 1994.
• RIDP data from Brogan (1992).
• Parties are: government and JSS/SB (SIPRI).
• Continuing low-grade insurgency and violence until 1994.
**Bolivia**

- The war and conflict and lower-level violence ended resolutely.
- None of the sources I consulted listed further large-scale violence in Bolivia after 1952 and up to the end of the fighting after the "sextenio" turmoil that preceded the 1952 coup. A number of electoral, agrarian and other economic reforms were implemented after 1952.
- Parties to the war were: MNR; Military (Armand 1995).
- Earliest available year for education statistics is 1960.

**Burma**

- Licklider (1995) has only one observation for this war (1948-ongoing). COW (1994) has three observations. Given that there was a significantly long break between the first and second Burma wars in the COW data, while the second and third wars were very close, I collapsed the second and third wars into one observation, which gives a total of two Burma observations.
- The battle death figure reported for the last Burma war is from the COW data for the years 1983-1992. The deaths figure for the first Burma war is found by subtracting the COW estimate for the second war from Licklider’s figure for the entire period after 1948.
- Parties to the conflict: Government of Burma; Karen National Union; Mong Tai Army (Brown 1996). Burma I parties were: government; communist parties; KNLA; other (SIPRI).
- RIDP and total death figure from Brown (1996), though his data are for the entire period since 1948, but they appear to be far too conservative for that period in comparison to COW data (hence we use them for the second Burmese war).
- Earliest Census Bureau deaths/migrant data is for 1973, which we use in the second Burma observation.
- Data on infant mortality, life expectancy and military power from CIA world factbook.
- Burma 1 gets a very high democracy score in Polity 3, which seems implausible.
- Burma 2: this is separated from Burma 3 on the basis of previous literature. The war re-started after the truce.
- Burma 3: The war ended for more than 2 years and there was an overall improvement in the human rights record of the country since then.

**Burundi**

- COW (1994) has 3 observations (last one is Burundi 1991-ongoing with a borderline 1,000 deaths).
• Licklider (1995) only has 1 observation; Mason and Fett (1996) have two observations for Burundi. Given the inaccuracy of data on Burundi and the continuing large-scale violence in the countryside during the period between the last two COW war observations, I collapsed the 2nd and 3rd COW observations into one and we consider that the civil war in Burundi ended in 1988, though purges of civilians in the countryside are still continuing today.

• Burundi 1: after President Micombero took power, there were widespread killings of Hutu leaders and peasants in 1965 that continued throughout the rest of the decade (Callahan 1997).

• Burundi 2 & 3 & 4: While the general situation calms down after each war, there are still extrajudicial killings (for example the assassination of President Ndadaye in 1993 as well as assassinations of other prominent political figures). Hence, we code these cases as PB failures. Vigilante groups and members of the armed forces continue to oppress minorities and engage in violent acts. According to Human Rights groups, hundreds of people are killed by these groups.

• Ongoing civil war in Burundi. According to Human Rights Watch World Report, in 1996, Bugoya took power and attacked insurgents and in 1997 massacres of thousands of civilians were reported.


• Estimates of deaths in purges for 1972 range between 103,000-205,000 (Harff and Gurr 1988).

• Mortality data for 1972 unavailable from Census Bureau, so we use the figures for the 1964-65 period.

• Migrant data is reported for 1970-71.

• Start/end year data are reported for the second observation.

Cambodia

• Licklider (1995) has one observation (1967-ongoing). COW (1994) has 2 observations. Mason and Fett (1996) and COW all use 1970 as the start year for the war. I also use 1970 as the start year.

• Cambodia 1: although the fighting between rival armies stopped, the conflict persisted and led to purges of between 800,000 to 3 million civilians during the period between 1975-79 (see Harff and Gurr 1988).

• Cambodia 2: large-scale violence ended after 1991 and some measure of political normalization was restored (at least until the coup of 1997).

• Parties: Government of Cambodia; Khmer Rouge (Brown 1996).

• Total dead and RIDP figures from Brown (1996) and from Doyle and Suzuki (date?). Note that those figures in Brown are from 1975, so they include the civilian massacres during the interregnum. We are using those figures because the massacres are
intricately linked to the war and are necessary for an understanding of the dynamics of the war in Cambodia.

- For the second Cambodia observation, deaths/migrant data are reported for 1978 to capture some of the effects of the massacres.
- Water90 and urban5 data from WB country data for 1997.

Central African Republic

- UN peacekeepers maintained stability and order in the capital.
- Increase in crime in the countryside.
- Data on deaths and refugees from US State Dept. human rights report of 1996.
- The 1998 State Dept. report reports no signs of political killings and growing judicial independence, although security forces were accused of some human rights abuses.

Chad

Chad 1:
- The war started as a tax revolt but soon took on an ethnic hue. French forces intervened. The insurgency was never quelled. Tombalbaye staged a coup in 1975, installing Gen. Felix Malloum, a southerner, as head of state. In 1978, Malloum's Government was broadened to include more northerners. Internal dissent within the government led the northern Prime Minister, Hissein Habre, to send his forces against the national army at N'Djamena in February 1979. This act led to intense fighting among the 11 factions that emerged. The war ended in 1979 with an OAU-sponsored conference that led to the signing of the Lagos Peace accord in November 1979. The accord created a coalition of forces and a National Union Transition Government with a mandate to rule for 18 months.

Chad 2:
- The war started again in 1980. Parties: 3 main factions (Habre; Kamougou; Goukouni); Libya; USA (CIA and US mercenaries), France, source: Brogan (1992). Total dead and displaced source is Brogan (1992). 7,000 Libyan troops entered and finally withdrew to the Aouzou strip in 1981. They were eventually replaced by 3,500 OAU peacekeepers. Widespread fighting between rival factions continued with attacks from outside the border and Libyan as well as Zairean, French, and US involvement. During accords held in Libreville, Gabon, in 1985, two of the chief exile opposition groups, the Chadian Democratic Front and the Coordinating Action Committee of the Democratic Revolutionary Council, made peace with the Habre Government. By 1986, all of the rebel commando (CODO) groups in southern Chad came in from the forests, rallied to President Habre's side, and were re-integrated into the Forces Armees Nationales Chadiennes (FANT). FANT staged an offensive
against Libyans, ending in August 1987 with the taking of the town of Aozou. With continuing fighting and intermittent negotiations, finally Habre’s-led FANT took power in N’Djamena. In 1989, Idriss Deby, a former general of Habre, launched guerilla attacks from Sudan and in November 1990 he entered N’Djamena without a battle, defeating Habre. A new government was set up in 1991 by the Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) with Deby as President. Note: First available education statistics are for 1984. Until March 1992, the MPS was the only political organization permitted. Since then, a moderate multi-party system has been created. The Libyans withdrew eventually in 1994, which we take to be the end of the war. A new constitution was passed by referendum in March 1995. Some unrest still remains in the Tibesti region especially and due to the Toubou rebellion. Minor incidents of terrorism are reported. Human rights groups report scores of extrajudicial killings and FARF rebels have killed several civilians. At the same time, the human rights situation has been improving.

- This is a difficult case. The war was prolonged and complicated and the country has been in political turmoil since its creation. It is difficult to demarcate clearly the different periods of the war as well as to evaluate the overall peacebuilding situation objectively. I consider the end of the war to be 1994, when the Libyan troops withdrew. There are human rights reports of extrajudicial killings and low-level rebellion in remote parts of the country. However, the main rebellion has ended and there has been a remarkable improvement in the country’s human rights record as well as its process of democratization.

China

- China I (Taiwan) coded as an ethnic/identity war by Licklider (1995) and Regan (1996) but as a non-ethnic ideological war by Mason and Fett (1996) and by the State-Failure Project (1995). I follow the later two studies, which agree with case-study analyses explaining the ideological bases of the war.
- The NOVIOL variables for China 1 were coded on the basis of information about persisting purges of hundreds of thousands of landlords, rich peasants and Kuomintang cadres during the years following the war. Harff and Gurr (1988) estimate total civilian deaths in those purges between 800,000-3 million.
- China 2: war over continuing competing territorial claims and low-grade violence with Tibet. An ethnic/identity war.
- China 3: ambiguous case: qualifies more as a politicide (so dataset=7). Purges of 450,000-850,000 civilians during the cultural revolution between 1966 and 1975.
- First available infant mortality statistics are for 1952.
- Census Bureau data for China unavailable for years preceding 1990.

Colombia

The second Colombian war has a start date of 1984 in COW, but Licklider’s start date is 1978. I use the Licklider data, since it is based on more detailed case-historical research. See also State Failure Project (1997).

Colombia 1 gave way to persisting low-level violence in the inter-war period

The parties to the two Colombian conflicts are: the government, RAFC, NLA, PLA, Grupo Jaime Bateman Cayon, Paramilitary groups (>2), cocaine cartels (>2), most of which have been active in the second war (Brown 1996).

Official peace talks and a truce has been discussed especially between FARC leader Manuel Marulanda and current President Andres Pastrana.

Battle death figures for Colombia II are only available for the 1984-1992 period.

The Colombia II total dead and displaced figures are from Brown (1996). I use the more conservative estimate from the range given by Brown because his includes deaths since 1964, whereas the start date for the second war in our data set is 1978.

First available infant mortality statistics are for 1952.

Census Bureau data for Colombia unavailable for years before 1973. No data available for urban, so the figure for urban5 is used.

Congo-Brazzaville

The first period of violence was between 1992-1994, which ended with the Libreville Accords of 1993. The full-blown civil war started in June 1997 and resulted in a coup occurred in October 1997, bringing the current military government to power.

Parties: Lissouba with Mbochi Northerners; Sassou-Nguesso with Southerners. The government has lost control of some territories. Violence persisted in 1998 (State Dept. Reports).

Congo 1: ongoing war after the Libreville accords.

Congo 2: lower-level violence ongoing up until recently, so code dataset=6.

Congo/Zaire

Zaire 1: War over the attempted secession of Katanga.


Deaths/migrant data reported are for the period 1955-57; no data available between 1957-1984.

• Zaire 3: First and second Shabba crises. No reports of continuing large-scale violence after 1979.
• Zaire 4: Kabila-Mobutu war. Resumption of war after Kabila’s victory.
• Zaire 5: end to the war too recent. Peace process with fragile truce is ongoing (dataset=6).
• Parties to Zaire 4 and 5: the government; ADFL; Rwanda; Uganda (SIPRI).
• Values for most of the variables for Zaire 3 are the same as for Zaire 2 (same sources are used).

Costa Rica

• The war and violence ended quickly after 1948.
• Death/migrant data reported are for 1950 (earliest available).

Cuba

• Education statistics are for 1960.
• Following the revolutionary war, Cuba had a stable and sovereign government and there was an absence of mass killings, though quite a large refugee flight and political repression.

Cyprus

• I follow Licklider, who agrees with case-study literature (Joseph 1997; Sambanis 1999). The two wars are separate observations since there was very little ethnic violence in Cyprus between 1965-1973 (see Sambanis 1999; Brogan 1992).
• Size of the government military: I exclude the military of Turkey and Greece and report only the size of militaries on the island.
• Parties: during 1963-64, Greek Cypriots; Turkish Cypriots; Greece; Turkey.
• Parties during 1974: Greek Cypriots; EOKA B; Turkish Cypriots; Greece; Turkey. Turkish invasion in July 1974.
• RIDP estimates: Sambanis (1999).
• Death/Migrant data unavailable for the 1963/64 war.

Djibouti
• The civil war ended for 5 years or more with a peace agreement, as did large-scale political violence.
• Evidence of some extrajudicial killings and state-sponsored violence after 1991 in State Dept reports.
• Two ethnic groups: the Issa and Afar (US State Dept 1996).
• Peace agreement signed between the government and the FRUD party in 1994. FRUD members entered the government, but part of the FRUD rejected the peace accord. Few reports of continuing violence by some FRUD guerillas.

**Dominican Republic**

• First version of Licklider (1995) data codes this as an identity war. The second version codes it as an ideological war and lists Stedman as a source (in Licklider, 1993). I agree with Stedman, based on additional information on the war (Armand 1995).
• The civil war ended resolutely, as did large-scale political violence short of war.

**Egypt**

• Parties: Islamic Group vs. Government (start date was in 1992).
• Low-intensity religious civil war. In 1998, there was a “sustained if sporadic” campaign of violence by the military wing of the Islamic Group.
• Violence has abated in 1999 with no visible end to the conflict.

**El Salvador**

• Parties: Chirstian Democrats, Arena, Democratic Revolutionary Front/FMLN; FPL/People’s Liberation Forces; People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP); FARN; FAL/Armed Forces of Liberation (Brogan 1992).
• Total death and RIDP figures from Brogan (1992).
• Death/migrant data reported for 1981 (in 1979: deaths—11.82; migrants: -4.41, do not capture the huge displacement of people during the war).

**Ethiopia**

• Licklider (1995) lists 1967 as the start year, all other sources use 1974 as the start date. See also State Failure Project (1997).
• Note that this war is part of the extra-systemic war data-set in COW and not part of the COW civil war data-set.
• Death/migrant data reported for 1984 (earliest available).
• Ethiopia-ideological war is coded as a separate event (Regan 1996).
• No Gurr scores for Eritrea or Ethiopia during 1993 (code 88 in Polity data). But Ethiopia’s score for 1994 is 9).
• There is only one total casualty & displaced figure available, so I divided it by the three wars and use the same figure in all three.
• The Eritrean war was transformed into an international war in 1999.

Georgia

• Two overlapping secessionist conflicts.
• Parties: Georgian government vs. Abkhazian Republic; and Georgian government vs. South Ossetians.
• These wars have ended and the opposing armies are standing down but there are still ongoing disputes over sovereignty and lower-level violence. For example, the Human Rights Watch 1998 World Report reports 200 deaths in armed conflict against Abkhaz militias.
• RIDP and total dead figures source is Brown (1996).
• According to the World Political Handbook, the Georgian war has ended, though some violence continues and the conflict persists, so we code this case as -10 with respect to peacebuilding.
• Information on the conflict and data on Russian peacekeeping is from Durch (1996).
• Both Georgian conflicts get a 1 in “major” because of Russia’s initial role as instigator of the conflict, before Russia took up the role of peacekeeper.

Greece

• Parties to the war: Republican forces; Communist forces; Britain; Yugoslavia (Iatrides 1993).
• Earliest available infant mortality rate is for 1952.
• The battle death figure of 160,000 seems too high and it is equal to the total deaths figure found in Brogan (1990) so it must be dominated by civilian deaths. Data on battle deaths and ridp from Iatrides (1993).
• Deaths/migrant data unavailable for relevant period.

Guatemala

• Licklider (1995) lists fewer months for the duration of the first war than the COW (1994) data-set. I use the COW measure instead because Licklider is missing the Guatemala III and IV (from COW data), which he Licklider adds to the second war.
I merge the last two COW (1994) Guatemala war events into one, since most case-studies treat that as one protracted conflict (this is also done in Mason and Fett 1996).

Parties: Gov’t; Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (Brown 1996).

RIDP and total dead figures from Brogan (1992).

**Guinea-Bissau**

- The war was between the forces of President Joao Bernardo Vieira and Army Chief Brigadier Ansumane Mane. It started in May 1998 and ended in May 1999. Hundreds of dead and hundreds of thousand of displaced reported (Economist, May 15-21, 1999). Military intervention in favor of the President by Senegal and Guinea. Peacekeeping forces (West African) also deployed. The intervention failed because the President fell after the troops departed. The outcome is therefore coded as a military victory for the rebels.
- The was motivated by socio-economic grievance and aimed at the overthrow of the government.
- The war ended in the spring of 1999 (so code dataset=6).

**Haiti**

- Two cases coded. The first refers to the violence associated with the Cedras regime. The second denotes the failure of the Governor’s island accord and subsequent violence and US involvement.
- UN peace operation (civilian police mission) deployed.
- Data on battle deaths and ridp are from Tessitore and Woolfson (1998) and Murphy (1996).

**India**

- **India—partition**
  - Two Indian settlements (1948; 1965) -- Licklider’s data.
  - Duration for the first Indian war is drawn from Licklider.
  - Death/migrant data for the first Indian observation are unavailable, so I use data for the 1951-61 period. Similarly, I use data for the 1961-71 period for the second observation.
- **India/Kashmir 1965 & 1989**
  - Battle deaths data for the Kashmir wars are from Licklider (1995).
  - Ongoing lower-level violence in the Kashmir region; war skirmishes in 1999
  - Refugee data (on displaced Hindus) are from Ganguly (1997).
- **India/Sikh**:
• war/violence ended with political settlement
• Parties: government of India and Sikh insurgents.
• Total dead and RIDP figures are from Brown (1996).

Indonesia

• Parties: government, Frettin; other (SIPRI).
• Indonesia 1 sources Licklider (1995); Regan (1996).
• Indonesia 3: persisting political violence that culminated in the purges of 500,000-1 million people between 1965 and 1966 (Harff and Gurr 1988).
• Indonesia 4: persistent lower-level violence in East Timor long after the end of that war. Most observers view the conflict as ongoing for 23 years since its inception. Further, Indonesian army garrisons in East Timor are backing up militias and there are pro-Indonesia and pro-independence local militia. War/violence ended with the 1999 foreign intervention and UN mission.
• Death/migrant data for the first three observations are unavailable, so we use data for the 1961 (no migrant data).
• Earliest available infant mortality data is for 1952.

Iran

• COW (1994) has two observations; Licklider (1995) only has the 1978-79 rebellion. State Failure project agrees with COW, so also code two separate events.
• First event was revolution against Shah; second war was religious/identity war
• Parties: Government; Mujahideen 3-Khalq; Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran.
• RIDP sources: Brown 1996; SIPRI.
• No death/migrant data for relevant period.

Iraq

• COW (1994) has one observation (1985-ongoing) for both Kurdish and Shiite rebellions. Licklider (1995) separates those two wars in two distinct events. I follow Licklider (1995) because the parties are different.
• The start dates also differ across data-sets: COW uses 1985; Licklider uses 1981 for the Kurdish war and 1991 for the Shiite war.
• Parties: government; Kurdish parties; Mujahideen, communists; other (SIPRI).
• Despite the end of the wars, there were continuing purges of Kurds and Shiites and competing claims over sovereignty of territories of Iraq.
• Data on battle deaths for Iraq-Shiite and first Iraq-Kurdish conflicts are drawn from Licklider (1995). Further: war against Kurds in 1960s and 1970s: 90,000 dead; 100,000 refugees; 800,000 Kurds forcibly moved; 1988 war—more than 200,000

- School enrollment data for Iraq-Shiite conflict is available for 1988.
- RIDP and total dead figures are from Brown (1996). Brown reports figures since 1981 and combines them for both the Kurdish and the Shiite revolt. We divide the total figures over the two revolts. Despite the fact that our observations start in 1991, I include the 1981-1995 Brown figures because they are good indicators of the civilian death toll of the war and of its overall intensity.
- Death/migrant data unavailable for periods relevant to the first two observations. Data for 1990 is reported for the third observation, so as not to capture deaths from Gulf War in 1991.

**Israel/Palestine**

- Licklider (1995) lists the Palestinian-Israeli war, but says that the death toll is too low in this conflict and omits it from his analysis. COW (1994) does not have this observation.
- I include it in my analysis, given that this war is at the core of several Middle-eastern conflicts and that it has caused 10,000 deaths over its duration. Also, according to the State-Failure project, the violence has exceed 1,000 deaths at certain years (especially if we also consider related international wars).
- The war ended with the establishment of the Palestinian authority.

**Jordan**

- This war is also known as the “Palestinian war”
- Parties were the government of Jordan and the PKO
- Ethnic/identity war (Regan 1996)
- No residual violence or war recurrence listed in any other data-sets.
- Census Bureau death data reported for 1972 and migrant data for 1979.

**Kenya**

- This case is listed in Regan (1996) and State Failure project (1997).
- This is a potentially ambiguous case (dataset=7) because the violence does not directly involve the state, but is rather concentrated between rival ethnic groups.
- Large-scale tribal warfare and criminal violence in the countryside, especially the Western end of the country. The violence is especially between the government-supported Pokot people and the Turkana, who have suffered most of the casualties. This type of violence is ongoing.
- The violence has displaced up to 300,000 people according to Human Rights Watch reports.

**Korea**

- Source is COW(1994) and Licklider (1995).
- The battle deaths and army size figures for the 1950-53 war are taken from the COW (1994) international war data-set and represent the sum for sixteen countries that participated in the war.
- This case can be omitted and the war could be considered an international one (on the grounds that the country had been divided well before 1950).
- No death/migrant data available from US Census Bureau.

**Laos**

- COW (1994) has two observations, but Licklider (1995), Mason and Fett (1996) and Walter (1997) all merge these into a single observation. I follow the majority.
- No death/migrant data available for relevant period from US Census Bureau.
- Refugee and total deaths figures from Stuart-Fox (1997). Refugees: about 300,000; dead: about 200,000.
- State Failure Project codes this as an ethnic war; Licklider as an ideological conflict.
- I have made changes to start-end dates from other data-sets based on the case-history (Stuart-Fox 1997). Other data-sets code either 1973 or 1975 as the end of the war. However, foreign involvement and large-scale fighting between organized armies continued for several years after that, so I present a summary of the case based on Stuart-Fox’s (1998) book:
- The war officially ended in 1975 and realistically in 1977 (which is the date I use).
- It was a heavily internationalized war with military interventions by US, China, USSR, Vietnam. Cease-fire agreement reached in February 1973; major parties to the talks were US-backed Suvanna Phuma and the Marxist insurgent group Pathet Lao. Agreed on a plan to establish a Provisional Government of National Union and a National Council within 30 days. A coup against Suvanna, who headed the government, failed in 1973. Pathet Lao was given half the cabinet seats on the new Provisional Government. Provision of unanimity was introduced for executive decisions. In December 1974, few hundred soldiers rebelled in Northern Laos demanding the repeal of a 1971 law against the cultivation of opium. These incidents were quelled. In 1975, some student protests and in 1975, Suvanna banned public protests and meetings. In mid-April 1975, fighting in Cambodia/South Vietnam ignited fighting in Western Laos in the Plain of Jars. A new revolution occurred in 1975 and by June 1975 Pathet Lao seized power in the entire country, establishing Lao People’s Revolutionary Party. Incarcerations of senior officials and re-education of junior officials. Major flows of refugees (up to 10% of the population). However, voluntary participation of senior officials in re-education programs. Restoration of
territorial sovereignty and unity of the country. Peaceful abdication of the King. The
new regime was internationally recognized, even by the US. Throughout 1976 and
1977, there was fighting between small rebel groups in the South and North. In South:
resistance fighters entered through Thailand. In North, CIA’s Hmong “Secret Army”
was active. Major fighting took place in village of Menang Nan between former
Vietnamese soldiers and Hmong. Several thousand Hmong were killed and that
marked the end to the resistance to the new regime. Later, when the Vietnamese
invaded Cambodia and China intervened, the fighting did not spread to Laos as it had
in previous times.

**Lebanon**

- COW (1994) lists one war between 1975-90. Licklider (1995) has two observations:
  1975-76 and 1982-ongoing. Walter (1995) has two different observations: 1958 and
  1975-76. I follow Licklider (1995) and the State-Failure project (1997), so I code the
  war as having ended with the peace agreements of 1991-92. However, there is large-
  scale violence in South Lebanon (so this case could be re-coded as an ongoing proxy
  war).
- Battle death data are drawn from Licklider (1995)
- Total death and RIDP data are from Byman (1997) and from the Economist (24
  February 1996).
- Earliest school enrollment data is for 1960.
- For the second conflict, schooling data is reported for 1979.
- Parties: Lebanese government; PLO, Druses; Amal Militia/Shiites; Hizbollah; Syria;
  Israel; USA (Brogan 1992). Different parties have been active during different phases
  of the ongoing civil war. For the first observation, no death/migrant data available for
  relevant period from US Census Bureau.
- RIDP data from Al-Mashat (1996, 253) reported for the entire 1948-1991 period and
  used for all three observations. Since there has been a peace operation in place and a
  peace agreement at some point during the conflict in Lebanon, we include the third
  case in our sample as a PB failure (due to the ongoing sporadic fighting and lack of
  government authority over all parts of the territory of Lebanon).
- Lebanon 2 and 3: the war ended in 1992, but there is persistent violence and bursts of
  war between regular and irregular armies. Further, several areas of Lebanon are
  beyond the control and authority of the government and Israel has been controlling the
  so-called security zone since 1978. The South Lebanon Army (Israel’s proxy) has
  been in operation since then.

**Liberia**

- COW (1994) includes two observations while both Licklider (1995) and Mason and
• I have merged these two war observations, following the case-study literature and I have combined the battle deaths from the two COW observations.
• Liberia 2: The second observation in my data-set refers to a new bout of violence after 1992. However, Liberia 2 is an ambiguous case. There is persistent violence in the countryside and a huge refugee problem. At the same time, after Taylor’s election to the Presidency, the violence has largely ended by Liberian standards. Thus, this case could be deleted by other researchers.
• The size of the army figure for Liberia is missing in COW and seems too high (at over 2 million) in Mason and Fett (1996), so it is omitted.
• RIDP and total death figures are from Brown (1996) for the period since 1989. Since we report the total in 1992, we leave those observations for the 1995 war blanc. Since data for deaths and ridp are usually reported for the entire 1989-1996 period, the same figure is reported for both observations.
• The parties are: the government, ECOWAS, national patriotic forces of Liberia.
• Death and migrant figures reported for 1990 and 1995. Formal settlement reached.

Malaysia

• This is coded as an ideological war on the basis of Regan (1996).
• Earliest available infant mortality data is for 1952.
• No death/migrant figures from Census Bureau.

Mali

• The war lasted from 1990/1 with the overthrow of the Moussa Traore regime until 1995, when a peace agreement was signed between Tuareg and Maur rebel groups. Since then, the country remains a constitutional democracy and the agreement holds (State Dept. docs; 1997).

Mexico

• Separatist war by indigenous groups in the Chiappas region against the government
• The war was mostly active between 1994-96. Still today, there are ongoing abuses by the military and human rights violations, but the war has been over, while the conflict remains alive.
• Still evidence of lower-level violence: e.g. 45 people were massacred on December 22, 1997 in Acteal.

Moldova
• Secession/partition and war in 1990.
• War largely over, though some low-level violence and ongoing internal disputes between Russians and Ukrainians in the Nistru region and Gagauz Turks in the North.
• Gurr score for Moldova is for Moldova, not Russia.

Morocco

• This observation refers to the war in Western Sahara
• Parties: from the start of the Western Sahara conflict until about 1988 there were four parties to the conflict (the Moroccan government, Polisario guerillas, also known as SPLA, the Algerian government, and the Mauritanian government. Today there are two parties with Algeria and Mauritania having abandoned their claims and political involvement in the conflict. I code 4 parties because that was their number for the greater duration of the conflict from its conception until the present. Parties: Morocco government; Algeria; Polisario; Mauritania (Brogan 1992).
• RIDP and total death figures in Brogan (1992).
• Death/migrant figures reported for 1972. Death/migrant figures reported for 1987 for Western Sahara.

Mozambique

• Parties: Renamo, Frelimo, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa (Brogan 1992).
• RIDP and total death figures from Brogan (1992).
• Death/migrant figures reported for 1980.
• Formal settlement reached that ended the war (Synge 1992).

Namibia

• Parties: SWAPO; SWANU; SWATF; South Africa; Zambia; FNLA; MPLA; UNITA (Arnold 1995).
• Death/migrant figures reported for 1990.
• Formal settlement reached. UN peace operation/election monitoring.

Nicaragua

• Parties to the first war: Sandinistas and Somoza; parties to the second war: Sandinistas; FARN; Miskitos/ARD; USA/Contras; Cuba (Armand 1995).
• RIDP and Dead data for Nicaragua I from Armand (1995).

Nigeria

• The first observation refers to the Biafran war (1967-70).
• Parties to the 1967-70 war: F/NMG (government); Ibo/Biafrans (Armand 1995).
• No settlement—peace talks after military defeat of the Biafrans. RIDP figure from Armand (1995).
• Despite the fact that there was a military outcome to the Biafran war, the army was integrated and the country divided into three regions and several districts as a result of the end of the war, which implies a political settlement.
• The second observation refers to ethnic/religious violence in the North. The COW has two observations, one war event between 1980-81 and another in 1984. Licklider (1995) combines them as a single observation for 1980-84.
• The battle death figure for Nigeria 80-84 combines two separate observations from COW (for 1980-81 and 1984).
• Death figures for the second observation from Banks (1989).

Northern Ireland:

• Gurr 2 – 10 scores are missing.
• Code dataset=6, since the end of war too soon and implementation of the Good Friday agreement just agreed in December 1999 (the agreement was reached on 10 April 1998).
• Low-intensity war (about 3,000 people killed). It can be considered as an armed conflict.

Oman

• Regan (1996); State Failure Project (1997).
• The war was between the sultanate and a Marxist opposition group, which acted with the support of Yemen People’s Republic. The sultanate had the support of the British. Significant external intervention. The violence ended and the opposition given incentives to cooperate.
• The end of the war and lower-level violence led to the integration of part of the main opposition group in Dhofar into the government. July 14 1970—Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id assumed power in a palace coup directed against his father, Sa'id bin Taymur. In an effort to curb the Dhofar insurgency, Sultan Qaboos expanded and re-equipped the armed forces and granted amnesty to all surrendered rebels while vigorously prosecuting the war in Dhofar against the insurgent PFLO. He obtained direct military support from Iran and Jordan. By early-1975, the guerrillas were confined to a 50-square-kilometer (20-sq.-mi.) area and shortly thereafter were defeated. As the war
drew to a close, civil action programs were given increasing priority throughout the province and since then have become major elements in winning the allegiance of the people.

**Pakistan**

- Parties to the 1971 war: Awami League; PPP; India (Brogan 1992).
- The 1971 war led to the partition of east and West Pakistan (and the independence of Bangladesh).
- Parties to the 1973-77 war: Pakistani government; Baluchis; Iran (Brogan 1992).
- Death/migrant figures reported for 1976.

**Papua New Guinea**

- Eight-years of secessionist movement in Bougainville.
- Continuing low-level ethnic violence in the highlands and political violence between government troops and pro-Indonesian Free Papua Movement (OPM) which has been pursuing terrorist activities. Further, sharp rise in the level of crime (U.S. State Department reports 1996-98)
- Death figures from Regan (1996).
- Parties are the government, the Free Papua movement (OPM) and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA).
- Cease-fire agreed on 1994—end of the war. But BRA repudiated and violence continues.

**Paraguay**

- Parties to the war: Colorados and RPF (Armand 1995).
- Earliest available infant mortality data is for 1952.
- Death/migrant figures are unavailable.

**Peru**

- I follow COW, revising the dates according to the case-study literature and SIPRI yearbooks, which show that there was one war in Peru, lasting from 1980 until about 1994/96.
- RIDP and total death figures are from Brown (1996) for the period since 1980.
• Parties are: the government, Sendero Luminoso, Tupac Amaru. Death/migrant figures reported for 1981 and 1982.
• Persisting political conflict in isolated regions of the country, especially the Upper Hualagá valley and continuing low-grade guerilla violence despite the capture of guerilla leader Guzman and the leaders of the MRTA. However, in most of the country the civil war has ended.

Philippines

• Data for battle deaths in the war against MNLF are from Licklider.
• Earliest available infant mortality data is for 1952.
• RIDP figures are from Brown (1996). A total figure of 900,000 is given for both wars since 1986. We divide the figure equally between the two wars.
• Death/migrant figures reported for 1960 for first observation and 1970 for the other two observations. The war has ended but low-grade violence against guerillas in parts of the country persists, so we code this a PB failure.
• Philippines 2&3: persisting political conflict in isolated regions of the country and low-grade guerilla violence in the Southern part between government soldiers and MILF guerillas especially.

Romania

• Listed as a war in COW (1994), but only as an armed conflict (i.e. under 1,000 deaths) in the Wallensteen and Sollengerg data-set (1997).
• Death/migrant figures reported for 1992.

Russia

• Start of the war can be considered the Russian military offensive of December 11, 1994 against the secessionist government of Major General Dzhokar Duolayer.
• Chechnya war ended in 1996 with Russian defeat and Chechnya autonomy (this level of autonomy following a war classifies as partition).
• Ongoing political conflict since 1996. Chechnyan separatists supported terrorist activity in Russia and ethnic armed conflict in neighboring Dagestan so code the war as not having ended for more than two years. Full-scale war resumed in 1999.
• No Gurr score for Chechnya or Russia.

Rwanda

• COW (1994) list the start date of the second war in 1990.
• Licklider (1995) does not have any observations for the post-1990 period in Rwanda, so I follow COW.
• Total death and RIDP figures for the third Rwanda war given by Brown (1996).
• Parties to the war: Government, Hutu Militia, RPF. Death/migrant figures reported for 1970 for the first observation.
• Refugee/IDP data for 1994 are from Cohen and Deng (1998).
• Persisting extrajudicial killings, though at a small scale.

Sierra Leone

• Two events coded, separated by the 1996 peace accords in Abidjan, which collapsed in new violence.
• Ongoing West African peace operation deployed.
• Second war ended with the Lome Agreement and amnesty of July 8, 1999, leading to government power-sharing.
• Too soon to evaluate outcome of second observation, so code dataset=6.
• UN peace operation (observer mission during late stage of the war; peacekeeping operation being planned in Fall 1999).
• Total Death and RIDP figures for 1st event from Brown (1996). Total death and displacement data for 2nd event from the Economist (August 1999).
• Note that more recent figures are needed since the war is continuing. Parties: Government and RUF.
• Coded as peace enforcement mission by Nigerian peacekeepers. Included in the sample of cases with settlements/peace operations because of peacekeeping presence and because all parties signed the November 30, 1996 Abidjan Accords.
• Data on urbanization and infant mortality are for 1997 from World Bank country statistics.
• The second Sierra Leone war ended with settlement talks in June 1999 (according to New York Times and Washington Post), but massacres of civilians continued, which implies that we label this as a peacebuilding failure (tentatively, until more time passes).

Somalia

• COW has no battle death figures for this war, so we use a (seemingly) conservative estimate from Brogan (1992).
• Somalia 1: war against government of Syiaad Barre.
• Somalia 2: interventions of 1992 and subsequent clan war.
• Information is missing on several of the parties in this case, so the size of the army and casualties is probably understated in the data.
• RIDP and total death data from Brown (1996).
• Although this war is continuing, we include it in the data because there was a multilateral peace operation launched in 1990-92, which can be considered as the start of a peacebuilding process which has obviously failed.

South Africa

• Coded as an ethnic war in State-Failure project and in Licklider (1995)
• Data on deaths from Licklider (1995).
• Significant democratization of the country after the end of the war.

Sri Lanka

• COW (1994) has three observations and Licklider (1995) has two. Mason and Fett (1996) only list the 1971 war.
• Sri Lanka 2: ongoing war between the government and the LTTE in the North of the island (Vanni region).
• Death/migrant figures reported for 1981 for the first observation.

Sudan

• Two events coded because of the peace accord and end to the violence after the first war.
• Sudan 1: no evidence of continuing low-level violence after 1972; improvement of political rights. See Banks (1989).
• Sudan 2: separatist and religious war is ongoing despite several cease-fire agreements.
• Parties: Government, UDSF factions (see below).
• Displaced and total dead data from (Brown 1996).
• Death/migrant figures for the first observation are from Banks (1989).
• Signed peace agreement on April 21, 1997 between government, the South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), comprising of: The South Sudan
Independence Movement (SSIM); The Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP); The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM); The Equatoria Defence Force (EDF); The South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG).

**Tajikistan**

- Persistent challenges to the sovereignty and ongoing violence, though mostly low-level. Many abductions and civilian violence. Peace process was collapsing in 1998. Presence of the UN peace operation continued. Large-scale violence has ended.
- Parties: Tajiki government; Russia; Uzbekistan; Popular Democratic Army (SIPRI).
- Data on peacekeeping and Russian activities in Tajikistan is from Durch (1996).

**Thailand**

- Code dataset=7.
- This case is drawn from Regan (1996).
- Coded as an ethnic war based on the State-Failure project (1997).
- War end led to democratization.

**Turkey**

- The size of the Turkish army is based on secondary sources—no information available in COW.
- Parties: Turkish government and the PKK.

**Uganda**

- Uganda 1: The end of the war resulted in the exile of the Kabaka of the Baganda and no mass refugee movements or continued violence was observed. The Baganda accepted the political solution/integration of their region to the rest of country. The period of upheaval and ethnic violence that came with the rise of Idi Amin to power started in 1971, more than five years after the end of the war.
- Uganda 2: This is the case of the Tanzanian intervention and overthrow of Amin. We code this as a PB failure because of the resumption of fighting in Museveni’s war
against Obote and Okello in 1980. For the second Ugandan war, COW’s dates are 1980-88; Licklider’s dates are 1981-87.

- Parties to the first war: Buganda; Obote’s government. Parties to the second war: Obote/UPC; Tanzania; Uganda Freedom Movement; Museveni/NRA; Okello faction (Arnold 1995).
- Uganda 3: There is general stability in most of the country and not excessive oppression by Museveni, which by Ugandan standards can be considered a PB success.
- However, there is a persisting insurgency with LRA in parts of the country and raids of rebels from outside the borders. Continuing insurgency in the Northern part of the island listed as an ethnic war by the State-Failure project.

**Vietnam**

- COW (1994) lists this as a civil war between 1960-65 and an international war between 1965-75.
- Death/migrant figures unavailable from US Census Bureau.
- No data past 1975 are available for the Republic of Vietnam.

**Yemen 1**

- Parties to the 1948 war: YAR; PDRY.
- The first war resulted in government victory and the 1948 was unsuccessful as the son of the President succeeded him and ruled until 1962.

**Yemen 2:**

- Parties to the 1962 war: YAR monarchists; the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF). British assistance of rebel groups; Egypt; Britain; Saudi Arabia. That war resulted in the creation of YAR. The end of the war was marked by the withdrawal of Egyptian troops in 1967. By 1968, most of the opposing groups reached reconciliation.
- Infant mortality data is not available before 1952.

**Yemen 3:**

- Parties were the YSP/President Ali Nasir Muhammad and former President Abdul Fatah Ismail.
- Soviet assistance of Marxist-led government of South Yemen. More than 10,000 Soviet troops and Soviet tanks were deployed in South Yemen.
- By 1979 treaty with the government.
- Death/migrant figures reported for 1975.
• RIDP data for North Yemen are from Al-Mashat (1996, 253) reported for the entire 1948-1991 period and used for both observations.
• For Yemen 3, death and ridp data from State Dept. reports.

Yemen 4
• After continued low violence between the Yemens, negotiations for unification and agreement on a unity constitution in 1990. A coalition of parties was formed and elections held with international assistance. A UN envoy was sent. Conflicts within the coalition resulted in the self-imposed exile of Vice President Ali Salim Al-Bidh to Aden beginning in August 1993 and a deterioration in the general security situation as political rivals settled scores and tribal elements took advantage of the unsettled situation. Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas (former southern Prime Minister) continued to serve as the ROY Prime Minister, but his government was ineffective due to political infighting. Continuous negotiations between northern and southern leaders resulted in the signing of the document of pledge and accord in Amman, Jordan on February 20, 1994. Despite this, clashes intensified until civil war broke out in early May 1994. The fighting took place almost entirely in the South. Southern leaders declared secession and the establishment of the DRY, which was not recognized. Ali Nasir Muhammad assisted operations against the secessionists around Aden and the secession was crushed. The violence ended and political reforms implemented after that victory.

Yugoslavia – Bosnia
• Bosnian partition from Yugoslavia in 1992.
• No functioning government in several parts of Bosnia. However, there has been an end to the violence and reconstruction efforts have started.
• Parties are: Gov’t of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatia; Serbia; Bosnian Croats; Bosnian Serbs (Brown 1996).
• RIDP and total dead figure from Brown (1996).
• Infant mortality data are for 1997 from World Bank.
• Dead and RIDP data for 1995 are from Cohen and Deng (1998)

Yugoslavia – Croatia
• First was start date is 5/91. Croatia recognized as separate state in 1991. The 1991 war did not stop the violence around the country nor did it result in a stable sovereign country over the entire territory.
• Second episode of war in 1995, leading to new expulsions and territorial partition.
• Parties: Croatia; Serbia; Serb secessionists.
• RIDP and total dead figures, see (Brown 1996).
• Dead and RIDP data for 1995 are from Cohen and Deng (1998)
Yugoslavia -- Kosovo
- No economic and political data is yet available and the end of the war is too soon to allow an assessment of its outcome, so this case is excluded (dataset = 6).
- War duration coded as 1.5 years between Serbs and Kosovars and 2.5 months between Serbs, and NATO.
- Three factions.
- End of the war was June 1999.

Zimbabwe
- COW only has first war (1972-79), while Licklider also has a second observation for 1980-84. I include both cases.
- Parties to the war: Rhodesian government/Smith; South African troops; ZAPU/ZIPRA guerillas; ZANU/ZANLA/Mugabe guerillas; Savory’s Rhodesia Front/Party; UANC/Muzorewa.
- Parties after 1980 were: Mugabe/ZANU; Nkomo/ZAPU; UANC; Rhodesia Front (Arnold 1995).
- Zimbabwe is coded as having had an intervention during the first war due to Britain’s involvement with mediation and Mozambique’s and other African countries’ efforts to pacify the conflict. Death/migrant figures reported for 1969 for the first war.