



Clandestine migrants: Do the High-Skilled Return Home First?

Nicola Coniglio ^{a b}
Giuseppe De Arcangelis ^c & Laura Serlenga ^a

^(a) *University of Bari* and ^(b) *Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH)* ^(c) *Sapienza University of Rome*



Photo: Bari (Italy), 6th August 1991, ship “Vlora” and its 20.000 passengers from Albania

2nd International Conference on Migration and Development, Washington D.C. – 10 sept 2009

Plan of the talk:

1. *Motivations and introduction;*
2. *A simple Life-Cycle framework*
3. *The Survey of Illegal Migration in Italy (SIMI) and Survey of Mexican Migrants (SMM): brief overview of the data;*
4. *Intentions to return: main findings;*
5. *Final remarks*

Migration and Development: what is the role of (il)legal status?

Two main channels:



REMITTANCES



**RETURN
MIGRATION**

Why is it relevant to study return behaviour of illegal migrants?

- **increasingly restrictive immigration policies** enacted in developed countries → **the balance has shifted more and more from legal to illegal migrants** (US Dep.t of Homeland Security: **11.6 millions undocumented migrants in the US in Jan 2009**)
- We know very little for obvious reasons (*lack of data in primis*): **invisible population**
- Return migration (out-migration) of *legal* migrants is selective. Most authors find that return migration characterizes mainly (legal) low-skill migrants:
 - **Self-selection of the migration process** (e.g. Borjas et al. 1992)
 - **Failed migration or too costly migration** (Borjas et al. 1996, Dustmann, 1993, 2003a, 2003b; Faini 2003)

- **different constraints characterise illegal migrants**: what applies to the legal migrants might not be appropriate for illegals
- knowledge on the migration behaviour of illegal migrants is fundamental in **informing effective migration policies**

Main contributions of the paper

We shed some lights on the **determinants of illegal migrants' return plans** both “at the gate” (as they enter the destinations' country) and while working and living in the country of destination;

We find evidence on *a positive relationship between the skills and human capital of the migrants and the intention to return*: **highly skilled irregular migrants have a higher propensity to return home.**

→ **skill-waste effect** (i.e. illegality is like a tax on individual skills in the labor and “financial” markets of the destination country)

The ingredients

- **Two original datasets on irregular migrants: Survey of Illegal Migration in Italy (SIMI) and Survey of Mexican Migrants, (SMM);**
- **A simple life-cycle framework for the decision whether to stay or return home**
- **Probit model** on the intention to return of irregular migrants (both using SIMI and SMM)
 - ✓ intentions to return are more likely for irregular immigrants that are more skilled;
 - ✓ the presence of a network and experience in the host country may lessen the effect of the skill waste

The model:

Skills and migration: why illegal are different?

- ✓ Two-period inter-temporal problem of illegal immigrants **with heterogeneous level of skills** that have already arrived in the destination country
- ✓ **Period 1** — works in the destination country and saves
- ✓ **Period 2** — two choices:
 - (i) stays in the destination country as an illegal, but with a non-zero probability of becoming legal;
 - (ii) returns home, where the “normal” wage is lower, but there are no effects of illegality
- ✓ Log utility function

Period 1

earns an exogenous wage $w_1^j = a^j \tau w^B$, proportional to her skills $a^j \in [\underline{a}, \bar{a}]$, but “taxed” by illegality τ (w^B is the exogenous “normal” wage in the destination country B)

skills and illegality affect also the rate of return on savings:

- if stays in destination country B , the rate of return is $\tau a^j R$
- if returns home to country A , she obtains the rate of return $a^j R$ (e.g. entrepreneurial activity at home is proportional to one’s skills)

Period 2

choice (I): returning home to country A

- earns an exogenous wage $w_2^j = a^j w^A$
- consumes her savings from period 1

choice (II): remaining in the destination country B

- positive probability of becoming legal γ
- expected wage: $(1 - \gamma)\tau a^j w^B + \gamma a^j w^B$
- consumes her savings from period 1

Intertemporal budget constraints

- In case of return in period 2:

$$c_1^j + \frac{1}{R}c_2^j = W_{\text{Return}}^j \quad (4)$$

$$W_{\text{Return}}^j = a^j \tau w^B + \frac{1}{R} a w^A$$


- In case of no return in period 2:

$$c_1 + \frac{1}{R}c_2 = W_{\text{no_return}}^j \quad (6)$$

$$W_{\text{no_return}}^j = a^j \tau w^B + \frac{1}{R} h a^j w^B$$

where $h \equiv \gamma + (1 - \gamma)\tau$.

A diagrammatic exposition of the main idea (1)



Summary of theoretical predictions

In this essential life-cycle model with skill waste:

- the decision to return is more likely for illegal migrants with higher skills;
- immigrants with a positive outlook of obtaining legal status (for instance because of dense networks) are less likely to go back home

✓**let's bring these hypotheses to the data**

Survey on Illegal Migration in Italy (SIMI)

WHO?

sampling unit:
illegal immigrants, 18-years-old+, in Italy
 ≤ 6 months
sample size: approx. 1000 illegal
migrants crossing Italian borders in Jan-
Sept 2003

WHERE?


data collected in “hosting centers”
(Centre of Temporary Residence),
helping centers, public canteen and
voluntary services. In 4 border regions
(Friuli Venezia Giulia, Apulia, Calabria
and Sicily)

HOW ?


dynamic sampling technique

*With the help of a multicultural and multi-
religion non-profit organization and the
cooperation of a group of linguistic and cultural
mediators*

Sampling ratio 10.82% and sampling error rate
3.05%



KEYNOTE

 Selected regions in the data collection process

The representative illegal immigrant in SIMI:

- ✓ is **young** (about 27), **literate** (85.8%) and has **high-skill qualification in about 18% of the cases**
- ✓ comes mainly from Iraq (9.6%), Liberia (9%), Sudan (5.4%), Morocco (5.1%), Senegal (4.8%), Turkey (4.8%)
- ✓ **has a monthly income of about 145 USD and expects a monthly wage of 500–1,000 USD** (an average of 937 USD)
- ✓ has paid around **2 years of family earnings to undertake the migration project**
- ✓ **intends to go back to the origin country** (with different time horizons) **in 60% of the cases**
- ✓ is inserted in a **migration network in about 1/5 of the sample** (19%)

Illegal immigrants' skills in SIMI

Variables	All	Estim. Sample
<i>Skill characteristics</i>		
Illiteracy	13.2 %	12.0 %
School degree		
primary	27.1 %	25.0 %
middle	30.8 %	34.0 %
high-school	21.7 %	21.2 %
university	5.0 %	4.2 %
Good host-country language proficiency ^a	20.2 %	16.0 %
Basic host-country language proficiency	26.6 %	34.0 %
Knowledge of 1 or 2 foreign languages	70.75 %	68.24 %
Job qualification ^b		
high-skilled	18.4 %	13.1 %
low-skilled	71.7 %	76.2 %
no qualification	9.9 %	10.6 %
Intention to return home	58.9 %	71.6 %
Intended length of stay (in years)	6.0 (3.7)	6.3 (3.4)

Survey of Mexican Migrant (SMM)

WHO?

sampling unit:
Mexican (documented and undocumented) immigrants, 18-years-old+, applying for a matricula consular
sample size: 4836 obs (our sample: approx. 2400 illegal migrants).
In 2005

WHERE?

data collected in 7 major Mexican Consulates in the US (Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, Fresno, Atlanta, Dallas and Raleigh)

HOW ?


by **PEW Hispanic Center**

Structured (anonymous) questionnaire

With the help of a linguistic mediators

Self-administered or assisted interview

Purposive sample: it is subject to certain bias toward those migrants who need a matricula consular



The representative mexican immigrant in SMM:

- ✓ is **young** (about 31), **literate** (98%) and has **high-skill qualification in 11.2% of the cases**
- ✓ **since 9-10 years in the US**
- ✓ **Weekly individual earnings of about 340 USD (current 2005 US\$)**
- ✓ **intends to go back to the origin country** (with different time horizons) **in 37.4% of the cases**
- ✓ on average has 12.7 relatives living in the USis inserted in a **migration network in about 1/5 of the sample (19%)**
- ✓ **main occupation in the US**: construction (16,3%), manufacturing (16,4%), low-skilled services such as hotel, bars, restaurants (15,1%), cleaning, maintenance of buildings (8,9%) agriculture (8,4%).

Illegal immigrants' skills in SMM (sample used: undocumented, aged 18-60)

Variables	All	Subsample
General		
Observations	4836	2439
Median age (in years)	31 (10.63)	28.2 (8.1)
Skill characteristics		
Illiteracy	2.0 %	1.5 %
School degree		
primary	32.3 %	29.5 %
middle	37.1 %	40 %
high-school	22.3 %	23.6 %
university	6.3 %	5.4 %
Good proficiency in English	13.6 %	9.1 %
Job qualification (a)		
high-skilled	11.2 %	11.2 %
Migration network / social and economic integration in the US		
Number of relatives (people cohabiting)	12.7	8.6
already in the destination	(14.8)	(11.9)
Migration spell (months in the US)	112.9	71.4
	(99.8)	(66.4)
Intention to return home	37.4%	45.5 %
Intended length of stay (in years)	4.34	3.88
	(4.28)	(3.71)

Why two datasets? Main differences

- 1) **Migrants' destination countries:** Italy vs US;
- 2) **Migrants' origin countries:** several countries of origin (SIMI) vs Mexico (SMM);
- 3) **Migration spell:** migration at the gate (SIMI) vs longer migration experiences (SMM)
- 4) **Density of networks:** mostly front-runners in SIMI while migration in SMM is embedded in consolidated networks

All these elements might have important effects on illegal migrants' return plans.

Empirical model

A probit model on the individual **intentions to return** regressed on:

- individual **skills** (parameter a) measured by:
 - years of schooling
 - individual qualifications
 - language proficiency
- Other covariates, in particular the presence of a network of established migrants (ambiguous effects)

Control variables (1)

The **presence of a network of established migrants** (ambiguous effects):

➤ **negative effect**, since the cost of migration is lower when migrating within a network;

➤ **positive effect**, since the lower costs of migration may encourage more temporary migration (even more risk-averse individuals decide to migrate)

an **interaction between network and skills**: does the presence of a network has heterogeneous effects according to individual's human capital?

Control variables (2)

Individual's covariate:

family and cultural ties to approximate differences in consumption preferences (see Dustmann, 2003a)

Experience of **past migration (in SIMI)**: **duration of migration spell in the US (in SMM)**: (expected sign: -)

(in SMM): Measures of (revealed) **social and economic integration**: *US bank account / preference toward US english TV stations* (expected sign: -)

(in SIMI): **Unemployed in the country of origin** (expected sign: -)

Control variables (3)

Country-of-origin variables (SIMI):

- proxies for the **state of development** of the country of origin, (GNI per capita) (expected sign: +)
- **social conflicts** and **economic crises** in the country of origin
- log of physical **distance** (expected sign: +)

Other controls: degree of **cultural distance and diversity** (a dummy for Muslims) (expected sign: +) /

Macro area dummies.

(**In SMM** for both meso-region of origin in Mexico and areas of destination in the US)

Skills and return intention at the gate (SIMI)

Table 3: Estimates of the Probit Model for the Intention to Return:
Some Specifications

Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(7)	Marginal effects
Skills					
<i>Years of schooling</i>	0.106 ⁺ (0.059)				
<i>High-Skilled worker</i>		0.553* (0.23)		0.507* (0.234)	0.178** (0.088)
<i>Knowledge of foreign languages</i>			0.198** (0.075)		
<i>Host-country language proficiency</i>				0.275** (0.108)	0.087*** (0.03)
Individual covariates					
<i>Migronetwork</i>	0.312 ⁺ (0.177)	0.352* (0.176)	0.288 (0.178)	0.332 ⁺ (0.183)	0.100* (0.051)

.....other controls included (see paper).....

<i>Observations</i>	430	438	436	427
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.168	0.173	0.176	0.190
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-214.9	-219.6	-217.5	-209.1

Standard errors in parentheses / Probability of return (baseline) = 0.754

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Skills and return migration: mexican undocumented migrants (SMM)

Table 5: Estimates of the Probit Model for the Intention to Return in SMM

Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable: Intentions to return					Marg. Effects
Skills					
School (> 2ndary)	-0.177** (0.077)			-0.217*** (0.077)	-0.085*** (0.031)
Highly skilled		0.319*** (0.116)			
Good English			-0.466*** (0.147)		
School (> 2ndary) * Less than 6 months in US				0.467*** (0.141)	0.185*** (0.055)
Social Integration / network in the US					
US Bank account	-0.281*** (0.100)	-0.303*** (0.107)	-0.278*** (0.101)	-0.262*** (0.100)	-0.099*** (0.037)
US Television programs	-0.163* (0.095)	-0.174* (0.105)	-0.1 (0.098)	-0.155* (0.094)	-0.059* (0.036)
Number of relatives in the US	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)

.....other controls included (see paper).....

Observations	1658	1442	1661	1658	1658
Pseudo R2	0.16	0.157	0.16	0.165	0.165
Log likelihood	-954.7	-836.8	-956.5	-948.8	-948.8

Column (5): marginal effects based on column 4 (discrete changes for dummy variable (baseline prob.: 0.421
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Findings (1): Human capital and return intentions

- positive self-selection in return plans: **relatively highly skilled migrants have a significant higher probability of returning home** (see Zhao, 2002 on internal migration in China; Borjas and Bratsberg 1996 hypothesis of reinforced selectivity via out-migration);
- more ambiguous pattern for the undocumented mexican in the US...but similar results for recent immigrants (less than 6 months like in SIMI)
 - **revision of plans or actual outmigration of the most skilled?**
 - **Is the skill-waste effect less important for undocumented mexican migrants in the US?** (illegal immigrants are probably less able to employ their human capital in Italy / it might also be that the skill-waste is not particularly different for a mexican migrant whether he/she is undocumented or not (Mattoo et al 2008)

Findings (2): Network and return intentions

Migration within a network has a positive effect on the intention to return in SIMI (enables migration or more risk-averse target savers?) but not for the mexican in SMM

Hypothesis (to be verified ...): Non-linear network externalities

Over time as a network of established migrants becomes bigger and more consolidated it offers multiple (and new) sources of externalities:

Initial stage → "logistic" support

Intermediate stage → "logistic" support + job search support

Mature stage → "logistic" support + job search support + consumption externalities (production of non-tradable ethnic goods; Coniglio 2004)

Other results: summary

- ✓ **Importance of family and cultural ties** in the home country (in particular children back home, family in Mexico) (+ sign)
- ✓ Good economic conditions in the country of origin significantly increases the probability of return
- ✓ Higher **physical and cultural distance** between country of origin and destination increases the probability of return for (SIMI data)
- ✓ The presence of **social conflicts** in the country of origin permanently discourages return, whereas **economic crises** have only a temporary effect

Conclusive remarks

- irregular immigrants with high skills are more likely to return home: **un(beneficial) brain gain?** It is very likely that return migration of irregular migrant has a lower pro-development effect in origins' countries
- Need more research on the behaviour of irregular migrants (an increasingly important phenomena);

Table 1: Summary Statistics of SMM 2005, Survey of Mexican Migrants
 Entire dataset and sub-sample used for the estimation (undocumented; age 18-80)

Variables	All	Subsample
General		
Observations	4836	2439
Median age (in years)	31	28.2
	(10.63)	(6.1)
Weekly individual earnings declared (median, in 2005 current US\$)	340	305.9
	(192)	(164.2)
Number of children (mean)	1.85	1.53
	(1.65)	(1.49)
children in the US	1.40	1.02
	(1.55)	(1.3)
Intention to return home	37.4%	45.5 %
Intended length of stay (in years)	4.34	3.88
	(4.28)	(3.71)
US location	Los Angeles, CA (35.6%); New York, NY (10.8%); Chicago, IL (19.5%); Atlanta, GA (7.7%); Dallas, TX (20.2%); Raleigh, NC (6.2%)	Los Angeles, CA (29.7%); New York, NY (11.2%); Chicago, IL (20.9%); Atlanta, GA (8.6%); Dallas, TX (20.4%); Raleigh, NC (5.2%)
Mexican meso-state	Centre: 29.8%; Centre-West: 43.4%; North-East: 4.1%; North-West: 5%; South-Southeast: 17.7%;	Centre: 35.8%; Centre-West: 36.3 %; North-East: 3.5%; North West: 4.5%; South-Southeast: 19.9%;
Skill characteristics		
Illiteracy	2.0 %	1.5 %
School degree		
primary	32.3 %	29.5 %
middle	37.1 %	40 %
high-school	22.3 %	23.6 %
university	6.3 %	5.4 %
Good proficiency in English	13.6 %	9.1 %
Job qualification (a)		
high-skilled	11.2 %	11.2 %
Migration network / social and economic integration in the US		
Number of relatives (people cohabiting)	12.7	8.6
already in the destination	(14.8)	(11.9)
Migration spell (months in the US)	112.9	71.4
	(99.8)	(66.4)
Owens a US bank account	29.8	13.6
Prefers US english stations	18.9	16.8

(a) High-skilled qualification is considered for the following (declared) jobs: owner/proprietor of a business; administrator/manager of a business; professional

Table 2: Summary Statistics of SIMI 2003, Survey on Illegal Migration in Italy: Entire Sample and Subsample of Clandestines used for the Estimation (standard errors in parentheses).

Variables	All	Estim. Sample
<i>General</i>		
Number of sample units	920	482
Median Age (in years)	27.2 (6.20)	26.6 (5.78)
Family monthly income at home (median, in 2003 current US\$)	218 (282)	196 (170)
Expected monthly income at destination (median, in 2003 current US\$)	877 (550)	906 (409)
Number of children per head (mean)	0.57 (1.09)	0.59 (1.12)
children left home per head (mean)	0.45 (0.95)	0.48 (0.99)
Cost of the trip (median, in 2003 current US\$)	1,645 (1,417)	1,527 (1,316)
Intention to return home	58.9 %	71.6 %
Intended length of stay (in years)	6.0 (3.7)	6.3 (3.4)
<i>Sample composition</i>		
Clandestines	53.5 %	100 %
Asylum Seekers	34.4 %	-
Others	12.1 %	-

Table 3: Estimates of the Probit Model for the Intention to Return:
Some Specifications

Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Skills							
<i>Years of schooling</i>	0.106 ⁺ (0.059)				0.099 ⁺ (0.059)		
<i>High-Skilled worker</i>		0.553 [*] (0.23)			0.42 ⁺ (0.242)	0.467 [*] (0.236)	0.507 [*] (0.234)
<i>Knowledge of foreign languages</i>			0.198 ^{**} (0.075)			0.173 ⁺ (0.077)	
<i>Host-country language proficiency</i>				0.299 [*] (0.107)			0.275 ^{**} (0.108)
Individual covariates							
<i>Migronetwork</i>	0.312 ⁺ (0.177)	0.352 [*] (0.176)	0.288 (0.178)	0.392 ⁺ (0.183)	0.310 ⁺ (0.178)	0.293 (0.179)	0.337 ⁺ (0.184)
<i>Unemployed in the home country</i>	-0.175 (0.15)	-0.125 (0.153)	-0.208 (0.15)	-0.207 (0.152)	-0.118 (0.154)	-0.128 (0.154)	-0.127 (0.157)
<i>Children in the home country</i>	0.418 [*] (0.177)	0.396 [*] (0.177)	0.434 [*] (0.177)	0.405 [*] (0.178)	0.384 [*] (0.178)	0.395 [*] (0.179)	0.359 [*] (0.180)
<i>Past migration</i>	-0.385 [*] (0.164)	-0.43 ^{**} (0.163)	-0.412 [*] (0.164)	-0.422 ^{**} (0.165)	-0.412 [*] (0.165)	-0.436 ^{**} (0.165)	-0.451 ^{**} (0.166)
Country of Origin							
<i>GNI per capita (log, 2001)</i>	0.497 ^{**} (0.139)	0.530 ^{**} (0.138)	0.471 ^{**} (0.140)	0.489 ^{**} (0.140)	0.513 ^{**} (0.139)	0.493 ^{**} (0.140)	0.511 ^{**} (0.141)
<i>Social conflict</i>	-0.775 ^{**} (0.181)	-0.758 ^{**} (0.178)	-0.717 ^{**} (0.179)	-0.695 ^{**} (0.181)	-0.791 ^{**} (0.182)	-0.740 ^{**} (0.180)	-0.721 ^{**} (0.182)
<i>Economic crisis</i>	0.524 [*] (0.227)	0.561 [*] (0.227)	0.441 [*] (0.230)	0.463 [*] (0.234)	0.552 [*] (0.228)	0.476 [*] (0.231)	0.496 [*] (0.235)
<i>Distance(in log)</i>	0.233 ^{**} (0.077)	0.257 ^{**} (0.077)	0.268 ^{**} (0.078)	0.249 ^{**} (0.080)	0.239 ^{**} (0.077)	0.273 ^{**} (0.078)	0.261 ^{**} (0.081)
<i>Muslim</i>	0.379 ^{**} (0.139)	0.318 [*] (0.157)	0.354 [*] (0.159)	0.303 ⁺ (0.160)	0.372 [*] (0.160)	0.349 [*] (0.159)	0.301 ⁺ (0.160)
<i>Asia</i>	-0.746 ^{**} (0.254)	-0.769 [*] (0.250)	-0.691 ^{**} (0.256)	-0.730 ^{**} (0.256)	-0.758 ^{**} (0.255)	-0.725 ^{**} (0.258)	-0.763 ^{**} (0.259)
<i>South America</i>	-2.65 ^{**}	-2.837 ^{**}	-2.707 ^{**}	-3.049 ^{**}	-2.74 ^{**}	-2.818 ^{**}	-3.171 ^{**}

continued on next page

Table 3: continued

Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Europe</i>	(0.950) -0.012 (0.329)	(0.947) 0.048 (0.326)	(0.942) 0.310 (0.336)	(0.967) -0.038 (0.336)	(0.951) -0.042 (0.330)	(0.915) 0.243 (0.338)	(0.959) -0.0005 (0.338)
<i>North Africa</i>	(0.379) -0.128 (0.379)	(0.374) 0.009 (0.374)	(0.378) -0.034 (0.378)	(0.383) -0.070 (0.383)	(0.380) -0.116 (0.380)	(0.378) -0.034 (0.378)	(0.384) -0.067 (0.384)
<i>Constant</i>	(1.000) -3.70** (1.000)	(1.026) -4.195** (1.026)	(0.996) -3.70** (0.996)	(1.009) -3.47** (1.009)	(1.044) -4.188** (1.044)	(1.039) -4.238** (1.039)	(1.058) -4.104** (1.058)
<i>Observations</i>	430	438	436	427	430	436	427
<i>Pseudo R²</i>	0.168	0.173	0.176	0.181	0.174	0.183	0.190
<i>Log likelihood</i>	-214.9	-219.6	-217.5	-211.4	-213.5	-215.5	-209.1

Standard errors in parentheses / Probability of return (baseline) = 0.754

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 4: Marginal Effects of Model (7) for SIMI

Regressors	Marginal effects
<i>Highly skilled worker</i>	0.178** (0.088)
<i>Host-country language proficiency</i>	0.087*** (0.03)
<i>Migroneetwork</i>	0.100* (0.051)
<i>Unemployed in the home country</i>	-0.040 (0.049)
<i>Children in the home country</i>	0.106** (0.050)
<i>Past migration</i>	-0.152*** (0.058)
<i>GNI per capita (log, 2001)</i>	0.161*** (0.044)
<i>Social conflict</i>	-0.214*** (0.048)
<i>Economic crisis</i>	0.173** (0.088)
<i>Distance(in log)</i>	0.082*** (0.025)
<i>Muslim</i>	0.096** (0.053)
<i>Asia</i>	-0.268*** (0.096)
<i>South America</i>	-0.754*** (0.041)
<i>Europe</i>	-0.001 (0.108)
<i>North Africa</i>	-0.021 (0.124)
<i>Observations</i>	427

Probability of return (baseline) = 0.757

0.833

Note: for dummy variables the marginal effect is referred to change from 0 to 1

Standard errors in parentheses

** significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%*

Table 5: Estimates of the Probit Model for the Intention to Return in SMM

Regressors	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable: Intentions to return					Marg. Effects
Skills					
School (> 2ndary)	-0.177** (0.077)			-0.217*** (0.077)	-0.085*** (0.031)
Highly skilled		0.319*** (0.116)			
Good English			-0.466*** (0.147)		
School (> 2ndary) * Less than 6 months in US				0.467*** (0.141)	0.185*** (0.055)
Social integration / network in the US					
US Bank account	-0.281*** (0.100)	-0.303*** (0.107)	-0.278*** (0.101)	-0.262*** (0.100)	-0.099*** (0.037)
US Television programs	-0.163* (0.095)	-0.174* (0.105)	-0.1 (0.098)	-0.155* (0.094)	-0.059* (0.036)
Number of relatives in the US	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.003** (0.001)
Other covariates					
Family in Mexico	0.351*** (0.073)	0.348*** (0.078)	0.347*** (0.074)	0.331*** (0.073)	0.129*** (0.029)
Age (years)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.008* (0.005)	0.01** (0.004)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.004** (0.002)
Male	0.514*** (0.071)	0.518*** (0.075)	0.503*** (0.071)	0.521*** (0.071)	0.200*** (0.026)
Migration duration	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.0002)
US location: Los Angeles, CA	-0.173 (0.116)	-0.211* (0.125)	-0.168 (0.116)	-0.183 (0.116)	-0.071 (0.045)
US location: Chicago, IL	0.167 (0.121)	0.116 (0.131)	0.153 (0.12)	0.151 (0.121)	0.059 (0.047)
US location: Atlanta, GA	0.301** (0.148)	0.288* (0.160)	0.289** (0.147)	0.293** (0.148)	0.116** (0.058)
US location: Dallas, TX	0.016 (0.128)	0.038 (0.138)	0.009 (0.127)	0.014 (0.128)	0.005 (0.049)
US location: Raleigh, NC	0.278 (0.171)	0.236 (0.179)	0.312* (0.169)	0.295* (0.171)	0.117* (0.067)
Mexican State: Centre-West	-0.157* (0.085)	-0.199** (0.090)	-0.15* (0.085)	-0.146* (0.085)	-0.056* (0.033)
Mexican State: Northeast	-0.137 (0.188)	-0.207 (0.202)	-0.143 (0.189)	-0.100 (0.186)	-0.038 (0.071)
Mexican State: Northwest	-0.252 (0.172)	-0.354* (0.187)	-0.24 (0.171)	-0.231 (0.171)	-0.088 (0.062)
Mexican State: South-Southeast	-0.063 (0.095)	-0.088 (0.101)	-0.049 (0.095)	-0.045 (0.095)	-0.017 (0.037)
Constant	-0.192 (0.185)	-0.24 (0.183)	-0.291* (0.171)	-0.222 (0.185)	
Observations	1658	1442	1661	1658	1658
Pseudo R2	0.16	0.157	0.16	0.165	0.165
Log likelihood	-954.7	-836.8	-956.5	-948.8	-948.8

Column (5): marginal effects based on column 4 (discrete changes for dummy variable (baseline prob.: 0.421

Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

C Variables Description on the SIMI Estimation

	Description	Exp. sign	Mean	St. Dev	Type	Source
<i>Years of schooling</i>	number of years the individual attended school (categorical variable: 0 none, 1 from 1 to 5 years, 2 from 6 to 8 years, 3 from 9 to 11 years, 4 more than 12 years)	+	3.37	1.21	categorical	Questionnaire
<i>Host-country language proficiency</i>	equals 2 if the migrant has good or advanced knowledge of the language of the intended destination country, 1 if she has a basic knowledge and 0 otherwise	+	0.58	0.74	categorical	Questionnaire
<i>Knowledge of foreign language</i>	equals the number of foreign languages known with at least a basic level of proficiency	+	1.87	1.04	categorical	Questionnaire
<i>Highly skilled worker</i>	equals 1 if the individual possesses highly qualified job skills (translator, secretary, financial advisor, doctor or chemist, lawyer, teacher, manager, consultant, entrepreneur) and 0 otherwise	+	0.19	0.39	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Migro-network</i>	equals 1 if the individual has relatives and friends in the intended country of destination, 0 otherwise	+/-	0.18	0.39	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Unemployed in the home country</i>	equals 1 if the migrant is not employed before departure, 0 otherwise	-	0.56	0.5	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Social conflict</i>	equals 1 if the migrant declares that there was a social conflict in the village or city of origin (residence) in the last 5 years, 0 otherwise	-	0.68	0.46	dummy	Questionnaire

continued on next page

continued from previous page

	Description	Exp. sign	Mean	St. Dev	Type	Source
<i>Economic crisis</i>	equals 1 if the migrant declares that there was an economic or financial crisis in the village or city of origin (residence) in the last 5 years, 0 otherwise	+/-	0.86	0.94	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Children in the home country</i>	equals 1 if one or more children are in the home country, 0 otherwise	-	0.06	0.24	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Relatives in the home country</i>	number of relatives that are left in the country of origin	-	5.17	3.98	continuous	Questionnaire
<i>Past migration</i>	equals 1 if the individual has already done a migration experience (internal or international), 0 otherwise	-	0.27	0.44	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Distance</i>	distance in 1000 Km (Geographical co-ordinates were used to calculate distance; rounded latitude and longitude figures were used for the purpose of finding the approximate geographic center of the origin and destination countries)	+/-	3.62	204	continuous	Gazetteer of Conventional Names, Third Edition, August 1988, US Board on Geographic Names and on other sources.
<i>Muslim</i>	equals 1 if the individual declares to be a Muslim; 0 otherwise	-	0.59	0.49	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Europe</i>	equals 1 if the individual country of origin is in Europe, 0 otherwise	+	0.25	0.43	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>North Africa</i>	equals 1 if the individual country of origin is in North Africa (Afro-Mediterranean countries), 0 otherwise	+	0.13	0.34	dummy	Questionnaire
<i>Asia</i>	equals 1 if the individual country of origin is in Asia, 0 otherwise	-	0.27	0.44	dummy	Questionnaire

continued on next page