“Failing to Capitalize? 
Urban Service Delivery in Opposition-Controlled African Cities”

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Abstract: Using the case of Lusaka, Zambia, this paper illustrates how inter-party competition can thwart the delivery of public services to, and increase the harassment of, the urban poor who live in cities controlled by an opposition party. Interviews conducted with local political actors are combined with a survey of 200 informal sector workers in the capital. This data reveals the tactics employed by the central government to weaken the popularity of the opposition in Lusaka and argues such tactics ultimately prove counterproductive. Donors can therefore help align the incentives of local and national actors to ensure that service delivery is not forfeited for political gain.

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Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the fastest urbanizing regions of the world, and future projections indicate no abatement of this process. In fact, the region’s urban population is expected to triple within the next 30 years, resulting in urbanites becoming the majority for the first time in Africa’s history (Kessides 2006, 6). Yet, analysts have noted that this demographic shift has been accompanied by an increase in urban poverty (e.g. Haddad et al. 1999; Mitlin 2004; Ravallion et al. 2007; Satterthwaite 2003). High unemployment and underemployment, environmental hazards, and sub-standard public service delivery represent the challenges created by the region’s rapid urbanization. Such challenges are compounded by African governments’ retention of legal frameworks for urban development that are aimed at containing settlement instead of confronting rapid growth (Hansen and Vaa 2004, 9). For instance, the region’s slum population nearly doubled within the last 15 years, prompting the United Nations to claim that urbanization in Africa is “virtually synonymous with slum growth” (UNFPA 2007, 16).

Rapid urbanization has occurred in concert with two other trends in the region: democratic consolidation and decentralization. During the 1990s, transitions to multi-party democracy occurred throughout a number of African countries, ranging from Benin to Zambia. Greater political liberalization, along with the growth of civil society and the need for African states to become more economically efficient, compelled many governments towards increased decentralization (Ndegwa 2002, 1; Stren and Eyoh 2007, 9-10). Donors likewise embraced this trend in the belief that local governments would be more effective in reducing poverty and delivering public services (Ndegwa 2002, 1). Yet, while multi-party competition has proceeded apace in the region, decentralization is predominantly stalled at the political and sometimes administrative levels. Fiscal decentralization, which refers to the transfer of financial resources
and responsibilities from the central government to sub-national units, remains minimal in most African countries. In fact, Ndegwa (2002, 5) found that in 19 out of 30 African countries, local governments control less than five percent of national public expenditures.

This paper argues that Africa’s urban development challenges are exacerbated by the combination of inter-party political competition with circumscribed fiscal decentralization. As indicated in Table 1, opposition parties are preferred in major urban areas in about half of Africa’s electoral democracies. Countries are classified as “ruling party dominant” if the incumbent party during the country’s most recent presidential elections received a majority of votes in the largest city. Similarly, a country is considered “opposition party dominant” if a party belonged to the opposition and received a majority of votes in the largest city. Those countries highlighted in bold have an opposition party in control of the municipal council of the largest city.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Urbanization</th>
<th>Ruling Party Dominance in Elections (year)</th>
<th>Opposition Party Dominance in Elections (year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (Below 35%)</td>
<td>Malawi (2009)</td>
<td>Lesotho (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mali (2007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique (2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanzania (2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia (2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Where the opposition administers a major city but possesses little revenue, it remains dependent on the central government for transfers. However, the central government possesses a disincentive to allocate adequate resources to city governments for addressing the challenges of
urban poverty. Indeed, this disincentive stems from the central government’s fear that the opposition will obtain the credit for ameliorating the conditions of urban residents and therefore will only increase its popularity amongst this constituency in subsequent elections.

The case of Lusaka, Zambia illustrates how the provision of goods and services for the urban poor can be used as a political tool when political decentralization is not accompanied by sufficient administrative and fiscal decentralization. Zambia is among Africa’s more urbanized electoral democracies. In 1991, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and its then leader, Frederick Chiluba, ended 27 years of rule by Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP). Yet, since 2006, the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) has proved immensely popular in Lusaka and key cities in the country’s Copperbelt Province. While PF officials now control the Lusaka City Council (LCC), their efforts to improve development in the city are hindered by the LCC’s dependence on intergovernmental transfers and obligation to adhere to the policy dictates of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing (MGLH), which is controlled by the MMD.

The following section examines the factors driving Lusaka’s growing urban inequality and current crisis in service provision and housing. Subsequently, data collected in Lusaka from February to April 2009 highlights the paper’s main argument. Surveys were conducted with 200 informal sector workers, and semi-structured interviews occurred with politicians, officials from the Lusaka City Council, donors, and local civil society organizations. The study then provides a brief overview of similar dynamics in other opposition-led cities in Africa and concludes with some policy implications.
Poverty and Inequality in Lusaka

Lusaka was founded in 1905 during the building of a railroad from Cape Town to the mining areas of today’s Democratic Republic of Congo (Hansen 2002, 80). By 1928, the city’s population stood at only 1,879 because the majority of economic opportunities were concentrated in the Copperbelt Province and colonial influx control measures limited growth (Myers 2005, 107). British town planning principles resulted in Africans living in so-called “compounds” on Lusaka’s periphery while wealthy Europeans and Asians resided in the city center. Moreover, Africans were only allowed to live in the city during the period of time that they were employed; otherwise, they were expected to return to their rural villages. Since permanent settlement was discouraged, housing options for Africans generally were limited (Taylor 2006, 71-72).

Since then, the city experienced two major waves of in-migration. When independence arrived in 1964, the removal of the control measures resulted in a dramatic influx into the city, resulting in the population reaching 195,170 people (Myers 2005, 107). A second wave occurred in the 1990s when the ruling MMD and then-President Chiluba implemented vast reforms under the auspices of a structural adjustment program. Privatization of unproductive manufacturing industries resulted in a 40 percent decrease in formal employment between the years 1991-1998 (McCulloch et al. 2000, 10). Many working in the country’s Copperbelt region migrated to Lusaka in the hopes of finding alternative opportunities. This internal migration, combined with the fact that Lusaka’s young population experience a higher natural population growth than any other region of Zambia (Mulenga 2003, 4), contributed to the city’s growth rate of 3.3 percent over the 1990s (CSO 2003, 43).

Due to the dearth of government housing initiatives or private sector development, this
demographic expansion placed pressure on scarce housing in the shanty compounds bordering the city center (Hansen 2002, 81; Mulenga 2003, 11). Such housing consists of concrete block walls and corrugated iron or asbestos sheet roofs. Roads in such communities are gravel with no drainage, making many impassable during the rainy season (World Bank 2002, 9). According to the director of housing and social services for the LCC, approximately 35 such compounds exist in Lusaka, seven of which are considered illegal (Rose Phiri, interview by author, April 8, 2009). Illegal settlements, however, are not eligible to receive government investment in physical infrastructure or social services (Hickey 2005, 75). In all, the shanty compounds contain the highest density of the city’s population and are home to 70 percent of Lusaka’s residents (UN-Habitat 2007, 14). Each rainy season brings a new outbreak of cholera, and overcrowding in these compounds increases susceptibility to air-borne diseases, such as tuberculosis (Hansen 2002, 85; UN-Habitat 2007, 14). Moreover, due to a lack of proper infrastructure and internal plumbing, the communities in these compounds often are forced to share the same pit latrines and communal water taps (Taylor 2006, 73).

As has been documented elsewhere (e.g. Tacoli 2001; Myers and Murray 2007), structural adjustment often hurts urban consumers by ending currency controls and price subsidies on staple foods while simultaneously forcing uncompetitive domestic industries to either shed workers or impose wage freezes. As a result of these measures, between 30,000 and 50,000 formal sector workers lost their jobs between 1992 and 1996 (Rakner 2003, 96). By the mid-1990s, so many Zambians resorted to laboring in the urban informal sector that sidewalks were covered with street vendors and tuntembas, which are makeshift market stalls crafted out of wood and plastic. As Hansen (2004, 62) notes, street vending in the capital had reached “anarchic proportions” by Christmas 1998: “Main streets, alleyways, and shop corridors in the
city centre, and many other spots besides, had turned into one huge outdoor shopping mall where thousands of street vendors were selling all manner of goods.” Today, 56 percent of the country’s urban workers and 69 percent of Lusaka’s works in the non-agricultural informal sector (World Bank 2007, 81; CSO 2007, 46). Lusaka’s shanty compounds are almost entirely comprised of these informal sector workers (World Bank 2007, 82&83).

The MMD versus “King Cobra” at the Ballot Box

Chiluba’s successor, Levy Mwanawasa, considerably improved Zambia’s economic circumstances during his first term in office, which spanned 2001-2006. The country’s inflation dropped to single digits and economic growth averaged approximately five percent, buoyed by improved copper prices and substantial external debt forgiveness (Economist 2006; Larmer and Fraser 2007, 619). Mwanawasa also engaged in a concerted effort to combat corruption, including establishing a corruption taskforce and revoking Chiluba’s immunity from prosecution on corruption charges (Mthembu-Salter 2007, 1263).

Yet, life for the urban poor did not necessarily improve under Mwanawasa. Though poverty slightly decreased between 1998 and 2004, approximately 48 percent of Lusakans still lived below the poverty line (Simler 2007, 3). Service delivery also remained sub-standard. For example, despite paying very high electricity bills relative to their incomes, residents in Lusaka’s shanty compounds were also burdened by frequent power outages that could last up to eight hours a day (Bupe 2006, 9). Just two months previous to the October 2006 elections, the monthly cost of basic food staples and essential non-food items totaled 1,421,650 Kwacha, or $387 at 2006 exchange rates. This exceeded by more than double the average monthly income of 645,326 Kwacha found in most of Lusaka’s low-income neighborhoods (JCTR 2006).
Michael Sata, the leader of the opposition PF, capitalized on urban disgruntlement with living conditions in the 2006 presidential elections. Relying on a populist campaign strategy, Sata espoused an anti-elitist message oriented around the PF’s slogan of “lower taxes, more jobs, more money in your pockets.” In addition, the PF’s rallying cry of *Pabwato*, which is Bemba for “get on the boat,” implied that Zambians should join the party to escape the country’s deluge of economic hardships. Such a strategy proved fruitful in the 2006 elections; Sata obtained significant shares of votes in all of Lusaka’s urban constituencies, ranging from the poorest, Chawama, to the wealthiest, which is Kabwata (see Table 2). In the 2008 elections that followed Mwanawasa’s death, Sata increased his vote shares in all seven of these constituencies.

Table 2: Presidential Election Results for Sata in Lusaka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lusaka’s Urban Constituencies</th>
<th>Poverty Headcount Rates</th>
<th>Share of Votes (%) 2006</th>
<th>Share of Votes (%) 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chawama</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabwata</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanyama</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka Central</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandevu</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matero</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munali</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sata’s popularity translated into support for PF politicians who ran in the 2006 parliamentary and local elections. Not only did PF Members of Parliament (MPs) win all seven constituencies in Lusaka District but PF loyalists also won a majority of the local election seats. Since the LCC is comprised of the seven MPs and 30 councilors (Mbolela 2004, 44), these victories provided the PF with control of the LCC, even as Mwanawasa retained the presidency and the MMD still possessed a majority in the National Assembly. Initially, Sata proclaimed that he would rule via the municipal councils (Chilemba 2006, 1), which the PF not only
controlled in Lusaka but also in a number of other cities in the country, particularly those on the Copperbelt. This resulted in a major clash between the MMD and the LCC, with Lusaka’s urban poor suffering as a result. In order to fully understand this dynamic, it is first necessary to recognize the structure of local governance in Zambia.

**The State of Local Governance in Zambia**

Though Zambia’s first president, Kenneth Kaunda, espoused a commitment to strengthening local governance during the early years of his rule in the 1960s, the imposition of one-party rule in 1980 stalled such efforts. The 1980 Local Administration Act largely viewed local government as an extension of the administrative structure of the ruling party, which at the time was UNIP (Chikulo 2009, 100). With democratization in the 1990s, the 1980 Act was repealed and replaced with the 1991 Local Government Act. This Act not only introduced elections for local offices but also de-linked the relationship between the ruling party and the central government on the one hand and local government on the other (Chikulo 2009,102).

Nevertheless, the government openly admitted that the Act did not result in a full devolution of functions and responsibilities to local government (Republic of Zambia 2006, 242). The councils possess 66 functions, among which include the provision of water, sufficient sewerage, and adequate housing (Chikulo 2009, 103). Yet, the MLGH is responsible for overseeing all of the country’s councils (Republic of Zambia 2006, 242), and possesses the authority to suspend a council if its members are suspected of abusing their offices (Mbolela 2004, 44). Furthermore, the MLGH is required to approve local government decisions in the area of setting by-laws and budget planning (McClean *et al.* 2006, 50), which limits the autonomy of local governments to engage in their own agenda-setting. Most significantly, the
extent of fiscal decentralization remains negligible. For instance, the LCC theoretically should raise revenue through licensing fees, levies, charges, and property rates (UN-Habitat 2007, 17). In reality, local councils are severely constrained financially due to, among other factors, the privatization of national utility companies over the last decade and tax exemptions for some property owners (Hampwaye 2008, 351-352; see also Republic of Zambia 2006, 242).

Moreover, the councils in Zambia cannot borrow or receive grants from foreign organizations and governments (UN-Habitat 2007, 17). According to the LCC’s director of Housing and Social Services, the LCC can work directly with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but donor funding only reaches the LCC via the discretion of the MLGH (Rose Phiri, interview by author, April 8, 2009).

These factors have resulted in a significant vertical imbalance, which occurs when local governments possess expenditure responsibilities that far outweigh their revenues and therefore have to rely heavily on transfers and grants from the central government. In fact, during a survey conducted in 2002, Lusaka’s Town Clerk admitted that the city depends almost 100 percent on central government transfers in order to fulfill its administrative responsibilities (IDEA 2004, 142). Yet, grants from the central government typically are allocated on an ad-hoc basis, transfers are paltry, and the councils’ decisions on expenditure priorities ultimately are subject to the MLGH’s approval (McClean et al. 2006, 20; UN-Habitat 2007, 16).

Indeed, based on traditional indicators, Zambia does not represent a genuinely fiscally-decentralized country. One traditional measure is the expenditure ratio, which captures sub-national expenditures as a share of national expenditures (Oates 1972). For Zambia as a whole, this ratio is an incredibly small 3 percent (Olowu 2003, 42). Ndewa (2002, 4) measures fiscal decentralization according to an index that takes into account both the expenditure ratio as well
as whether there is an established formula for fiscal transfers from the central government. He finds that Zambia does quite poorly according to this index, obtaining a 1.5 out of a possible 4.

Observers of Zambia’s political and economic scene, as well as PF members, concur that financial constraints and administrative dictates are a major challenge towards improving services within the city. The PF’s Director of Research, Dr. Chileshe Mulenga, notes, “At the present moment, Lusaka City Council doesn’t control any resources. The MMD government decides how much money to give the Council. And even when they give it to them, the Council doesn’t have the authority over how they will use the money” (interview by author, February 24, 2009). Likewise, a former Lusaka town clerk and the PF’s current chairman for local government, Wynter Kabimba, claims, “No grants reach the LCC because the Ministry of Local Government is in charge of releasing money to the LCC. When the Ministry does release the money, it wants to take the credit for the program it is funding” (interview by author, February 5, 2009). According to an anonymous governance specialist at the Department for International Development (DfID), government grants for the LCC are dispersed on a limited basis, and most of the LCC’s resources are only sufficient to cover staff wages (interview by author, March 11, 2009). Furthermore, according to a World Bank representative with expertise on Zambia’s public sector, no one really knows how the MLGH decides how to allocate money to the LCC (Patricia Palale, interview by author, February 25, 2009).

Local-National Government Tensions in Lusaka

The fact that councils possess few resources and that LCC staff members must adhere to the MLGH’s policies has resulted in the LCC becoming involved in measures aimed at alienating the PF’s main constituency base: the urban poor. Specifically, the late President Mwanawasa
invested 200 million kwacha into the “Keep Zambia Clean” campaign early in 2007 (Times of Zambia 2007a). Designated to improve cleanliness and hygiene around the city, the campaign involved adding more stringent provisions to Zambia’s Street Vending and Nuisances Act, which levies fees on those who are engaged in street vending or who purchase from vendors (Times of Zambia 2007a). Crackdowns on street vendors and illegal marketers ensued because they supposedly worsened traffic congestion and street littering and contributed to cholera outbreaks. For example, in mid-2007, the four-lane Freedom Way in downtown Lusaka was cleared of street vendors whose activities had made the road virtually impassable (Father Henriot of the JCTR, interview by author, January 30, 2009). In June 2008, 400 makeshift stalls in Lusaka’s Town Centre Market were razed by the LCC without warning and without offering traders alternative space (Times of Zambia 2008).

The crackdowns were not only limited to street vendors but also extended to shanty compounds. In March 2007, the Mwanawasa government announced full backing from the cabinet to proceed with plans to demolish illegal shanty compounds in Lusaka, some which were in existence for decades. Human rights groups warned that such actions would create a humanitarian emergency since alternative accommodation had not been provided for the displaced (Jere 2007). Nevertheless, under the protection of anti-riot police, the LCC proceeded to destroy 100 homes in the Kalikiliki compound alone (Mwanangombe 2007). Many suspected that the demolitions were a punishment to urban residents for supporting the opposition in the previous elections (Jere 2007).

Such actions were met by vocal protests from both elected LCC representatives as well as members of the PF hierarchy. After the March 2007 housing demolitions, Sata proclaimed that he would sue the state on behalf of the people who lost their homes (Mwape 2007). When asked
if the PF agrees with the crackdown on vendors, Sata responded, “No, we have told the Minister of Local Government, ‘hands off.’ Give us the money, we will listen to these people [vendors]. We don’t want any coercion, we don’t want any aggression of these people” (interview by author, January 28, 2009). The PF’s vice-president, Dr. Guy Scott, is the MP for the constituency of Lusaka Central and therefore a councilor for the LCC. He notes that the elected councilors cannot dictate to the LCC permanent staff to ignore the MLGH and so, “They [LCC staff] keep getting forced into these operation clean-ups, which we do our best to sabotage” (interview by author, January 21, 2009).

In addition to harassment of informal sector workers and residents in illegal shanty compounds, the MLGH and Lusaka’s PF councilors fought over the installation of proper drainage in the shanty compounds to avoid flooding and cholera outbreaks during the rainy season. Approximately 16 billion kwacha was allocated towards improving sewage and drainage facilities within compounds such as Chibolya, Misisi, and Kanyama. Though such activities fall under the remit of the LCC, the money was to be released into an account within the Office of the Vice-President where it would be managed by a task force selected by the MLGH (see Zambian Parliament Tenth Assembly 2008). Both MP Scott, as well as the MP for Lusaka’s Kabwata constituency, Given Lubinda, inquired in September 2008 from the Minister of Local Government and Housing why the funds had not proved forthcoming despite the imminent rainy season, but they received no answer (Zambian Parliament Tenth Assembly 2008, 14). Insufficient funding coupled with poor capacity failed to thwart the flooding and the ensuing cholera outbreak, leading Dr. Scott to suspect political machinations in the whole affair:

You want to do something practical and then it gets worse if you get a fellow like our president or the Minister of Local Government who thinks this is a good idea to deprive us of support in the urban areas by blaming us for cholera. So, now the discourse is, ‘Who’s responsible for the cholera?’ Not how to cope with it, but who is to blame for what we’ve seen so far (interview by author, January 21, 2009).
Inter-party wrangling also turned the LCC into an arena for political competition rather than an institution targeted at improving the welfare of the city’s residents. The PF was not blameless in this respect. For instance, Sata expelled from the PF a former Lusaka mayor, named Susan Nakazwe, because as part of her ceremonial functions she joined MMD members in welcoming a visiting Chinese delegation at the national airport (*Times of Zambia* 2007b). At the time, the PF professed a policy against Chinese intervention in the economy and therefore Sata banned any interaction between PF members and Chinese officials. Removing her required the councilors to hold a new set of elections and left the municipal entity without a leader for a substantial period. Such incidents contribute to complaints by the LCC staff that they feel like they are working in a highly politicized environment, which is highly disruptive to their mandate to manage the city (Rose Phiri and Matawe Bornwell, interviews by author, April 8, 2009).

Yet, notwithstanding Sata’s own behavior, there does appear to be a political impetus underlying many of the decisions of the MMD and the MLGH with respect to the management of Lusaka. In 2002, the government announced a National Decentralization Policy as one of the three components of the country’s Public Service Reform Program (PRSP) and which aimed to rectify the lack of *de facto* powers among the country’s local councils (Republic of Zambia 2006, 236 & 243). However, eight years later, the Plan has not yet been implemented. Among other factors, including the lack of local capacity within these councils, the Government’s reluctance is due to fears over opposition-led urban councils receiving credit if services begin to improve (Patricia Palale, World Bank public sector specialist, interview by author, January 25, 2009). By contrast, under the *status quo*, Lusaka’s residents regularly complain about paying taxes and levies to the LCC but receiving poor services in return (Mbolela 2004, 44). As such, there is a
strategic desire by the MMD-led national government to exploit the fiscal and administrative weaknesses of the LCC for political gain.

**Views of the Poor**

Yet, a survey of the urban poor conducted between February and April 2009 reveals that this strategy not only deprives the urban poor of basic services but also fails to reduce the PF’s popularity. The survey’s sampling frame included 200 individuals who were eligible to vote based on age and citizenship and who labored as informal sector workers in the markets of Lusaka. Informal sector workers in Zambia earn an average monthly income of 107,124 Kwacha, or 23 dollars, in current prices (CSO 2007, 53). Markets represent an appropriate location for sampling informal workers because they are almost entirely comprised of such individuals.

This working population was surveyed according to a two-stage clustered sampling procedure. In the first stage, ten markets were selected in Lusaka that spanned different electoral constituencies. Cluster sampling is an appropriate technique when the working population is so large that it would be prohibitively costly and time-intensive to randomly survey all of it (Rea and Parker 2005), and sub-sampling through multiple stages is a common approach under circumstances where a list of the population is completely lacking (Groves et al. 2004). Cluster sampling can be problematic in that it assumes that those within a cluster may be more homogeneous, and therefore less statistically independent, than those across clusters. One way to correct for any possible “design effect” variance between clusters is to only sample a small but fixed number of respondents over a wider number of clusters (Groves et al. 2004). As such, only
20 respondents were surveyed across the ten markets. In the second stage, respondents were stratified according to gender.

When asked who they supported in the last elections, the survey respondents confirmed that they were indeed enthusiastic supporters of the PF. As Figure 1 reveals, the PF increased the share of its vote from an already high 55 percent in the 2006 presidential elections to about 62 percent two years later. At the same time, the MMD’s actions helped to further undermine its popularity within the capital city. During the same period in which much of the hawker crackdowns, housing evictions, and stalled inter-governmental transfers occurred, the MMD’s popularity dropped by almost ten percentage points amongst these respondents. The third party, the United Party for National Development (UPND), only obtained a marginal share of the votes in both elections.

**Figure 1: Share of Votes obtained by Party from Survey Respondents, 2006 and 2008 Elections**

Furthermore, as seen in Table 3, supporters of the PF were those who would be more likely to be affected by the MMD’s measures. For instance, a large share of those without access
to piped water or electricity in their homes was more likely to have voted for the PF in the 2008 presidential elections than for the MMD. Likewise, almost 69 percent of those respondents who personally experienced, or knew someone who experienced, harassment by government officials voted for the PF. A similar trend occurred with respect to those whose homes were demolished or threatened with demolition.

Interestingly, of those who believed that the national government was responsible for the delivery of public services, a majority were PF supporters. However, the PF also attracted a large share of voters who believed that public service delivery is the LCC’s responsibility. At first, this appears counterintuitive given the expectation that the urban poor would be less likely to support the PF if they attribute the responsibility for their well-being to the LCC, which has not been sufficiently delivering services and was forced by the MMD to get involved in harassment of street vendors and housing demolitions. Yet, when asked directly about this apparent paradox, respondents noted that though the LCC is dominated by the PF, it is the central government which still controls it.

Table 3: Public Services and Harassment by Party Supported in the 2008 Presidential Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Voted PF (%)</th>
<th>Voted MMD (%)</th>
<th>Voted UPND (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No access to piped water in house</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No access to electricity in house</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have been harassed, or know someone who has been harassed, by government officials</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing has been demolished or threatened with demolition</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal economic conditions have worsened over the last 12 months</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who do you believe is responsible for the delivery of public services in Lusaka?</th>
<th>Voted PF (%)</th>
<th>Voted MMD (%)</th>
<th>Voted UPND (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National government</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility companies</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N=123 respondents who actually voted in 2008
For instance, a woman over 40 years-old selling merchandise in the street in front of Matero market knew that the LCC had destroyed stalls in Kanyama market but said that she blamed the MMD for this rather than the PF. Similarly, a man between 25-30 years-old who sells goods from a makeshift stall in Chelstone market claimed that even though his previous stall at Matero was destroyed, he did not hold the PF responsible because he believes the MMD effectively controls the LCC. These views tend to be held more widely as well. According to Nelson Ncube, who directs the People’s Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia, an NGO aimed at providing housing for the poor, the city’s residents tend to attribute development outcomes to the national government: “I think that everything goes back to the central government. I think that no one really blames the local [government]… no matter how much I cry for the local authorities to deliver houses, I know how incapacitated they are resource-wise” (interview by author, February 17, 2009). Likewise, Edward Chisenga, who is an informal sector worker and publicity director for Lusaka’s Street Vendors Association, likewise attributes crackdowns on vendors to the national government and the MLGH: “the LCC has no option but to follow what the national government orders” (interview by author, March 3, 2009). If these attitudes are broadly reflective of the general sentiment, then the MMD’s strategy for reducing the PF’s popularity appears to have backfired and damaged the ruling party’s reputation instead.

**Beyond Zambia**

The challenge of improving service delivery for the urban poor in cities led by an opposition party is not unique to Zambia. In South Africa, which is one of Africa’s more decentralized countries, the tension between the ruling African National Congress (ANC) and the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) recently came to the fore in the country’s Western
Cape Province. The ANC feared losing the Western Cape to the DA in the April 2009 elections because the latter possessed a strong reputation with improving service delivery in the province’s capital, Cape Town, which the DA has controlled since 2006. The day before the elections, the ANC provincial minister transferred authority for 1000 hectares of land in the Western Cape from the province to the National Housing Agency (Ensor 2009). The suspected intention of this maneuver was to deprive the DA, which did eventually win control of the province, of its ability to fulfill its campaign promises to deliver key services. Specifically, the DA originally had planned on using the land for the construction of at least 100,000 houses, flood relief, and other service delivery projects (Ibid). As Ensor (2009) observes, “The bottom line, ideologies aside, is that this ANC-DA fight is ultimately about securing votes, for which successful service delivery is the key.” Since then, the ANC-led government also has made overtures to reverse progress on devolution and potentially even eliminate the country’s nine provinces (Bownes 2009).

Factionalism within parties can also influence the degree of political will to improve urban service delivery. Rakodi et al. (2000) illustrate how during the 1990s, Kenya’s ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), created disincentives for improving citizen welfare in municipalities controlled by its own party members. In the city of Mombasa, intra-party in-fighting prompted KANU to remove the mayor Najib Balala, amid large-scale public protests, because he was too successful at reducing municipal corruption and improving refuse collection (Ibid, 161). Therefore, Balala threatened to overshadow the popularity and power of elites in the upper echelons of the KANU hierarchy. A similar dynamic occurred more recently in Mozambique’s port city of Beira. Davíz Simango, the mayor of Beira since 2003, belonged to the country’s main opposition party, the Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO). A highly effective mayor, Simango won international prizes for his administration of the city.
Fearing his growing popularity as well as disgruntled by his refusal to offer jobs in the city council to former guerrilla fighters, RENAMO’s leaders refused to back Simango’s bid for a second term in office and expelled him from the party in 2008 (see EIU 2008).

**Conclusions and Policy Implications**

This paper argued that inter-party and even intra-party competition can be detrimental to the functions of local governance and the provision of public services. The case of Lusaka demonstrated that competition between the ruling MMD and the opposition PF, in a context of stalled decentralization, hindered efforts to improve sanitation, water delivery, and proper housing. In addition, the MMD has attempted to involve the PF-dominated LCC in crackdowns on informal sector workers and demolitions of shanty compounds. While intended to undermine the PF’s support amongst the urban poor, survey results and election outcomes demonstrate that this strategy resulted in the opposite effect. The PF received a much higher share of the votes amongst Lusaka’s urban poor in both the 2006 and 2008 elections. Moreover, the existing evidence suggests that many residents recognize the LCC’s circumscribed authority and therefore attribute the lack of services and the increase in harassment to the central government, rather than the local one.

The key dilemma highlighted in this paper is the concern by both central and local governments that neither will receive the proper credit, or one will incur more blame than the other, for the state of urban services. However, donors can play a significant role in helping central and local governments align their incentives. For instance, donors could earmark certain resources for inter-governmental transfers to sub-national governments. In consultation with both central and local governments, donors could then derive a set of indicators by which to
evaluate how timely the government transferred this money to the local government and how much progress occurred with respect to housing, sanitation, and service delivery. Progress with meeting each of these indicators could be published annually in local media outlets. This would allow the public to understand which level of government to attribute blame or credit for the state of service delivery and housing. As such, both levels of government would possess a greater incentive to deliver on their commitments.

In addition, this paper highlights that certain aid modalities may be inappropriate for improving urban welfare. Specifically, some donors have decided to fund governments through budget support, meaning that they allocate resources to the Ministry of Finance to be invested according to the governments’ priorities (DfID 2004, 3; Kolstad 2005, 2). However, budget support may not represent the most effective means for addressing urban service delivery in a context of intense political competition, particularly because the central government possesses little incentive to bolster the credentials of the opposition. Precisely because cities represent the seat of economic power and are where opposition parties usually dominate in Africa, their oversight and administration is particularly vulnerable to political machinations. Therefore, international funding towards the urban sector requires greater oversight than budget support traditionally allows.

More broadly, this paper illustrates that rapid urbanization and the accompanying increase in urban poverty places incredible strains on African governments to generate jobs for the millions laboring in the informal sector, provide proper homes for those living in slums, and ensure access to safe water and a sanitary living environment. The introduction of decentralization efforts in many African countries was intended to bring decisions over these public services closer to those citizens who are most directly affected by them. Yet, incomplete
decentralization processes in the context of young, multi-party democracies presents a significant bottleneck. As the target year for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) rapidly approaches, determining how to ensure that politicians’ desire for votes complements, rather than competes with, commitments to citizens’ well-being will prove critical for achieving significant development outcomes.

1 Using the definition of Lindberg (2007, 227-228), those countries included have held at least two elections, not endured an electoral breakdown caused by a coup or other military intervention, and obtained a rating of 4 or better on “political rights” by Freedom House at the time of their last elections.

2 Translated from Bemba, tuntemba literally means “area of operation” and in Hansen’s (2004) view, is a term that captures how vendors and marketers claim public space for their survival activities.

3 All survey respondents were assured of anonymity, especially given the sensitive nature of the survey questions.
References

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