

# **Challenging Orthodoxy on Governance and Corruption: *Lessons from Worldwide Empirics***

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**[www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance)**

**www.govindicators.org**

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***Note: The research included in this presentation reflects collaboration with co-authors, notably with Aart Kray and Massimo Mastruzzi on the WGI, among others. Any data on governance and investment climate is subject to margins of error and ought to be interpreted with caution. The WGI is not used for official resource allocation decisions by the World Bank. Errors are the authors'.***

# **Challenging Convention on Governance from an Empirical Perspective**

- 1. Governance Unmeasurable?: The WGI, and the disaggregated data: major Governance Databank**
- 2. Only ‘De Jure’ & Rules-Based Data Matters while ‘de facto’ does not?: *Ignoring informal rules at our peril?***
- 3. Little change feasible in Governance in Short Term?**
- 4. Governance Matters for Development?**
- 5. Historical Origins deterministic for today’s outcomes?**
- 6. Africa: Fatalism vs. Irrational Exuberance, or else?**
- 7. Some Practical Policy Implications: on Capture, Informality, Voice & Transparency**

## **Empirical Frameworks: from aggregate to disaggregate indicators of governance**

- **The Macro-Aggregate Level, e.g. WGI, TI, CPIA**
- **The Mezzo Level, e.g. WEF, BEEPS, Doing Business**
- **The Micro, in-country, in depth diagnostic, e.g. WBI GAC diagnostics, scorecards (Bangalore), randomized experimental projects**
- **Complementarities and Hybrids**

# **Six Dimensions of Governance**

***Governance as the set of traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised-- specifically:***

- **The process by which those in authority are selected and replaced**
  - **VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
  - **POLITICAL STABILITY & ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE/TERRORISM**
- **The capacity of government to formulate and implement policies**
  - **GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS**
  - **REGULATORY QUALITY**
- **The respect of citizens and state for institutions that govern interactions among them**
  - **RULE OF LAW**
  - **CONTROL OF CORRUPTION**

# Worldwide Governance Indicators Project

- **WGI: Six aggregate governance indicators covering 212 countries over past decade**
- **Annually released, based on 33 data sources, capturing views of tens of thousands of informed stakeholders**
- **Used by analysts, officials, civil society, and researchers to monitor governance and study its causes and consequences**
- **Transparent availability of the aggregate and disaggregate indicators (and margins of error, methodology, answer to critics, etc.) in the web, at [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org)**

# Sources of Governance Data

- **Cross-Country Surveys of Firms:** Global Competitiveness Survey, World Business Environment Survey, World Competitiveness Yearbook, BEEPS
- **Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals:** Gallup International Voice of the People, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometer
- **Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating Agencies:** DRI, PRS, EIU, World Markets Online, Merchant International Group, IJET Travel Consultancy, PERC
- **Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks:** Reporters Without Borders, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Amnesty International, Bertelsmann Foundation, Columbia University, International Research and Exchanges Board
- **Expert Assessments from Governments, Multilaterals:** World Bank CPIA, EBRD, AFDB, ADB, State Dept. Human Rights Report, Trafficking in Persons Report

# Why Aggregate Indicators of Governance?

- Governance viewed as a much broader notion than ‘formal rules of the game’
- Individual data sources provide a noisy “signal” of broader concept of governance, e.g.:
  - trust in police → RULE OF LAW
  - freedom of press → VOICE & ACCOUNTABILITY
- Benefits of Aggregation--through U.C. Method
- aggregate indicators are more informative about broad concepts of governance
- broader country coverage (*than individual indicators*)
- generate explicit margins of error for country scores
- less likelihood of outliers

# Building Aggregate Governance Indicators


- Use Unobserved Components Model (UCM) to construct composite governance indicators, and margins of error for each country
- Estimate of governance: *weighted average* of observed scores for each country, re-scaled to common units
- Weights are proportional to *precision* of underlying data sources
- Precision depends on how strongly individual sources are correlated with each other
- Margins of error reflect (a) *number of sources* in which a country appears, and (b) the *precision of those sources*



Good  
Governance  
2.5

# Control of Corruption

## Selected Countries, 2006




**DISCLAIMER:** The data and research reported here do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources or for any other official purpose.

**Source for data:** 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007, [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org). Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country is in the bottom 10<sup>th</sup> percentile rank ('governance crises'); Light Red: between 10<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; Orange: between 25<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; Yellow, between 50<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup>; Light Green between 75<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90<sup>th</sup> and 100<sup>th</sup> percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.

# Quality of Rule of Law, 2006

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


Source for map: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org). Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country is in the bottom 10<sup>th</sup> percentile rank ('governance crisis'); Light Red: between 10<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; Orange: between 25<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; Yellow, between 50<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup>; Light Green between 75<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90<sup>th</sup> and 100<sup>th</sup> percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.

# **Application 1: Does Governance change so little in the short term?**

- **A few insights from empirics...**

# Change in Voice & Accountability, 98-06




Changes were calculated on the basis of the differences in country estimates from 1998 and 2006. Classification for major deteriorations and improvements were based on 75% confidence interval. Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org)

# Governance Indicators for Ghana, 1998-2006

## GHANA

Comparison between 2006, 2002, 1998 (top-bottom order)




Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007

(<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/>); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; Light Red between 10<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup>; Orange, between 25<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup>; Yellow, between 50<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup>; Light Green between 75<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup>; Dark Green above 90<sup>th</sup>.

# Governance Indicators for Zimbabwe, 1998-2006

Comparison between 2006, 2002, 1998 (top-bottom order)



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007  
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## **Application 2: Governance Matters for Development?**

- **Governance Matters for Development?**
- **Taking seriously the challenge of Causality Direction**

# Governance Matters around the world:


## The 300% 'Dividend'

- Large Development Dividend of Good Governance: *a one-standard-deviation improvement in governance (say, in rule of law or in corruption control) raise incomes per capita in a country by about 300% in long-run*
- But is such a decline in corruption unrealistically large?: NO -- *One S.D. is the difference from: Somalia → Togo or Guinea-Bissau → Namibia or Rwanda → Botswana or Portugal → Netherlands or Sweden*
- The impact is from governance to incomes, and not viceversa -- *higher incomes alone will not automatically do*




# Governance Matters -- The 'Development Dividend'

## Isolating Causality: From governance to income




# Development Dividend From Good Rule of Law



Data Source for calculations: KK 2004. Y-axis measures predicted GDP per capita on the basis of Instrumental Variable (IV) results for each of the 3 categories. Estimations based on various authors' studies, including Kaufmann and Kraay.

# Rule of Law is Associated with Lower Infant Mortality for the Population, 2006




# **Application 3: De Facto Data Matters?**

- **De Jure vs. De Facto data**
- **Why disconnect in development?:  
Informality of Rules: Limits to de Jure...**
- **Corruption and Capture matters**


# **‘Subjective’ vs. ‘Objective’ Measures**

- **Perceptions data are very useful even when objective measures exist**
  - But often only type of cross-country data available (e.g. corruption)
- **Perceptions matter directly!**
- **Perceptions data add insight over *de jure* measures when such objective measures exist, e.g. comparison of:**
  - statutory number days to start a business from Doing Business database (*de jure*)
  - firms perceptions of ease of business entry from Global Competitiveness Survey (*de facto*)
  - two are weakly correlated in developing countries
  - prevalence of corruption explains much of gap between the two


# Subjective and Objective Measures of Ease of Business Entry: OECD/NIC Sample



# Subjective and Objective Measures of Ease of Business Entry: Developing Country Sample



# Explaining Difficulty in Starting a Business (*de facto*): Corruption Matters more than De Jure Regulations




Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005). The vertical axis measures the estimated impact on firms' responses to a survey question regarding the difficulty of starting a business (the 2004 Global Competitiveness Survey) corresponding to a de jure measure (capturing the number of days required to start a business) moving from the 50th percentile to the 75th percentile (first bar) and from also having overall corruption levels move from the 50th to the 75th percentile (second bar).



# Unbundling Different Manifestations of Bribery, EOS 2006

% Firm Report High Bribery (1-3)




Source: EOS firm survey, WEF2006. Questions: In your industry, how commonly firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with permits / utilities / taxation / awarding of public contracts / influence laws and regulations / judiciary? (common...never occurs).


# **Application 4: Revisiting Historical Origins Determinism?**

- **Search for fundamental antecedents to institutional outcomes today: *important***
- **But deeper empirical scrutiny raises questions:  
i) for developing countries, &  
ii) normative outcomes of LO (and others?)**
- **Statistical Effects Significant with worldwide data?: Somewhat...**
- **Magnitude large with worldwide data?: No**
- **Significant and sizeable effects for emerging economies: not really**

# Governance and Legal Origin, World (POP>1M)



# Governance and Legal Origin, Emerging Economies (POP>1M)



# Rule of Law & Legal origin, Emerging Economies (POP>1M)

Today History	<b>Bottom Half WGI Rule of Law 2006</b>	<b>Top Half in WGI Rule of Law 2006</b>
<b>Common Law Origin</b>	swaziland jamaica liberia sierra leone papua new guinea somalia zambia zimbabwe nepal kenya sudan nigeria bangladesh pakistan	trinidad and tobago gambia botswana lesotho namibia united arab emirates malawi sri lanka ghana saudi arabia malaysia uganda tanzania south africa thailand india
<b>Civil Law Origin</b>	guinea-bissau albania congo central african republic eritrea Nicaragua libya laos togo paraguay Honduras burundi haiti bolivia guinea chad guatemala ecuador niger cambodia angola cameroon Ivory coast yemen venezuela iraq peru afghanistan algeria colombia myanmar Congo DR iran ethiopia indonesia	mauritius gabon kuwait oman mauritania panama lithuania uruguay lebanon puerto rico costa rica jordan el salvador benin dominican republic rwanda tunisia senegal burkina faso mali chile madagascar syria mozambique romania morocco argentina turkey egypt vietnam philippines mexico brazil

Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 - [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org). and Djankov et al (2005). Full Sample included 98 countries. Top half/Common Law=16; Top Half/Civil Law:33; Bottom half/Common Law=14; Bottom Half/Civil Law: 35 countries.

## Application 5: Revisiting Africa – Fatalistic Pessimism vs. Irrational Exuberance?

### Moving Away from Fallacies:


- Unmeasurability of Governance & only rely on objective or ‘official’ data
- ‘Afro-pessimism’ – lack of governance changes, and poor performers, or
- ‘Irrational Exuberance’ – by focusing on growth in very recent short term, declaring victory prematurely
- Generalizations about the whole African continent – excessive averaging
- Governance a ‘Luxury Good’

### Towards a new Reality:

- Governance is measured
- ‘Governance Matters’ for development
- Understanding the variety and contrasts across countries in the continent
- Learning from good performers: some leaders, countries, and institutions showing ‘the art of the possible’
- Role of the ‘Demand Side’ of Governance, & of the International Community & Private Sector


# The 'Long View' – Sobering but some hope... While Africa Stagnated, East Asia Soared

GDP per capita: Africa & East Asia, 1960-2006



-- Chart depicts income per capita in 2000 constant terms. In 1960, actual per capita income of East Asia region was \$141, while Sub-Saharan Africa average was \$432; in 1974 it was \$202 and \$595, respectively, in 1994 it was \$677 and \$486, and in 2006 it was \$1473 for East Asia and \$583 for Africa.  
-- Source: WDI, Low-income economies are those in which 2006 GNI per capita was \$905 or less (53 countries of which 33 from Sub-Saharan Africa).

# AFRICA'S FIVE FASTEST GROWING ECONOMIES STACK UP WELL WITH ASIA...




Source: WDI, 1960-2005




# Macroeconomic Management has improved

## *Inflation Rates, 2000-06 (in %)*




Source: IMF, SSA Regional Economic Outlook.

# Growth has recently picked up in a number of countries in Africa, yet very diverse




# Control of Corruption, 2006: Africa Map




Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 (<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/>); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10<sup>th</sup> percentile rank; Light Red between 10<sup>th</sup> and 25<sup>th</sup> ; Orange, between 25<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> ; Yellow, between 50<sup>th</sup> and 75<sup>th</sup> ; Light Green between 75<sup>th</sup> and 90<sup>th</sup> ; Dark Green above 90<sup>th</sup>.

# Government Effectiveness, 2006: Africa Map




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# Government Effectiveness, 2006: Selected Countries





Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi 2007: Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006

# Over-time Changes in WGI's Voice & Accountability, selected African Countries, 1998-06




Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org). Dark and light Green reflect significant improvement at 90 and 75% confidence level, respectively, and likewise regarding light and dark Red for deteriorations. By contrast, changes in Yellow (only selected countries shown) are not highly significant statistically (once margin of error taken into account).

# Press Freedom (FRH) in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1995 vs. 2006



Source: 2006 Freedom House. Y axis measures percentage of countries in the region with free press (rating of 30 or below), partly free (ratings between 30 and 60) and not free (rating above 60). In 1995 there were 45 countries divided into red (21), yellow (20) and green (4). In 2006 there were 47 countries divided into red (21), yellow (19) and green (7).

# Freedom of the Press is associated with better Control of Corruption *(& civil liberties more generally is associated with better performance of World Bank-funded projects – see WBER article 1997)*



Source for control of corruption: : 'Governance Matters V: Governance Indicators for 1996-2005', D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, September 2006 (<http://www.govindicators.org/>). Source for Press Freedom: 2006 Freedom House's Press Freedom Report. Terciles divided according to Press Freedom ratings (190 countries total). Free: 0-30 (69); Partly Free: 31-60 (54); Not Free: 61-100 (67).



## **Complementing WGI: Country-specific, in-depth Governance & Anti-Corruption diagnostic surveys**


- **A demand-driven, participatory action-oriented process to improve governance**
- **Key features:**
  - ***Three surveys:* households, firms, and public officials**
  - **Questions focus both on *experience* and *perceptions***
  - **Questions are tested and adapted to local realities**
  - **Rigorous technical requirements in *implementation***
  - ***Local institution* implements, with advise from outside**
- **Outcomes: enhanced local capacity, baseline governance data, and action plan for policy reform**
- **In Africa, examples of such diagnostics in Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Guinea, Nigeria, Malawi, Benin, and Burundi.**

# **The power of diagnostic data and key dimensions for analysis**

- 1. Participatory and Transparency Tool, for all stakeholders within the country to be involved**
- 2. ‘Unpackage’ corruption – administrative, state capture, bidding, theft of public resources, purchase of licenses**
- 3. Identify weak and strong institutions**
- 4. Assess the costs of corruption on different stakeholders**
- 5. Identify key determinants of good governance**
- 6. Input to develop concrete policy recommendations**

# Corruption acts as a regressive tax, and small firms pay more in bribes, 2000-2005

(% of gross monthly revenue paid in bribes, as reported by firms)



# Governance Indicators, by agency

(based on responses of public officials from 20 agencies, Guinea 2004)

	Audit Mechanisms	Enforcement of Rules	Quality of Rules	Politicization	Resources	Transparency	Citizen Voice	Wage Satisfaction	Service	State Capture	Overall Corruption
Ministère de la justice	63	51	55	44	37	47	72	19	67	44	39
Ministère de la Sécurité	62	50	57	44	38	47	74	18	69	38	35
Ministère de l'Administration et de la Décentralisation	61	53	54	42	39	49	75	29	70	45	45
Ministère des Finances	76	72	60	40	43	58	80	28	67	51	30
Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieurs et Recherche Scientifique	62	50	56	44	35	46	74	20	69	47	42
Ministère de l'Urbanisme et Habitat		76		42	33		64	75	38	5	
Ministère de la Santé Publique	70	63	57	43	35	60	70	30	58	40	44
Service Communal		62	51	34	40	52	64	13	49	49	
Service Sous Préfectoral	58	43	55	45	32	43	72	13	64	52	37
Ministère de la Communication		52	61	44	38	46	75	42	65	69	
Ministère de la Jeunesse et Sports	60	52	56	42	42	53	73	11	71	52	42
Ligue Islamique Nationale	62	60	59	41	41	49	75	28	64	43	33
Ministère de l'Agriculture	61	58	57	42	38	45	77	30	65	36	36
Ministère de l'enseignement Pré Universitaire	67	69	57	41	50	50	72	42	76	45	31
Ministère de la Fonction Publique		44	60	45	44	44	71	25	56	10	
Organisation Non Gouvernementale (ONG)		59	53	41	48	44	82	8	70	54	
Entreprise Micro-Finance					32		73	8	80	13	
Ministère de l'Energie, Mnes et Environnement		70		49	55		52	25	74		
Whole Country	62	50	57	45	34	46	75	20	68	42	37


The indicators above take values between 0-100. To interpret them please keep in mind that:

- The higher the value of the governance indicator the better the quality of that dimension .
- The higher the value of the corruption index, the more severe the problem.

## **Application 6:** ***Limits to Incrementalism?***

- **Superficial reforms tackling ‘symptoms’ do not work?: one does not ‘fight corruption by fighting corruption’**
- **Limited Impact of Incremental or Partial Reforms in misgoverned settings?**


# WGI: Application of Rule of Law, *Regional Averages, 2006*



Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006', by D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 - [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org). New Europe Countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.


# Quality of Institutions, Rule of Law, *view of the firm, EOS 2006*

% Firms reporting satisfactory quality



Source: EOS firm survey, WEF2006.

# WGI: Rule of Law, 2000-2006, Selected Countries





## **Some Conclusions – *for debate***

- 1. Governance can be measured and empirically analysed**
- 2. Not relying on one single source – WGI & others: triangulation and aggregation, *while also using disaggregated sources, & taking margins of error seriously***
- 3. Limits to De Jure measures: Perceptions Matter; measuring de facto phenomena, & Informality in Development**
- 4. Acknowledging & Learning from large Country and Institutional Variation – *in Africa & other regions***
- 5. Less focus on symptoms and superficial reforms by ‘fiat’**
- 6. Addressing capture, patronage & systemic corruption -- & *focus on deeper incentive-driven reforms: raise the cost***
- 7. Focus on fundamentals?: Contestable Politics, Competition, Transparency, ‘Voice’ & Free Press; Judiciary Reforms**
- 8. Limits to Incrementalism: some shocks?**
- 9. Revisiting Role of Donors, Privates & Multinationals**


# Concretely: 10 Transparency Reform Components

1. Public Disclosure of Assets & Incomes of Candidates, Public Officials, Politicians, Legislators - & *dependents*
2. Public Disclosure of Political Campaign contributions by individuals and firms, and of campaign expenditures
3. Public Disclosure of Parliamentary Votes, *w/out exceptions*
4. Effective Implementation of Conflict of Interest Laws, separating business, politics, legislation, & government
5. Publicly blacklisting firms bribing in public procurement
6. Effective Implementation of Freedom of Information Law, with easy access to all to government information
7. Fiscal/Financial transparency: EITI, *budgets, ROSCs*
8. E\*procurement: transparency (web) and competition
9. Media Freedoms & Media Development
10. Country Diagnostic (& Scorecard) on Governance & A-C

# Power of Data, Transparency and Citizen Oversight


## Tracking Education spending in Uganda

*equiv. US\$ per student*



Source: Uganda Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys

# Entrenched Corruption Networks: The Case on Montesinos in Peru



Source: "Robust Web of Corruption: Peru's Intelligence Chief Vladimiro Montesinos," Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Case C14-04-1722.0, based on research by Professor Luis Moreno Ocampo; Peru: Resource Dependency Network, 2000

# **Data for Analysis and Informing Policy Advice, Not for Precise Rankings**

***Any data on Governance, Institutions, and Investment Climate is subject to a margin of error. It is not intended for precise country rankings, but to highlight relative strengths and weaknesses and draw analytical and policy lessons. The data and indicators do not necessarily reflect official views on rankings by the World Bank or its Board of Directors. The WGI, a decade-old research project led by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kray, is not used to determine official allocation of resources by the World Bank. Errors are responsibility of the authors.***

**Further materials & access to interactive data:**

**General: [www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance)**

**Data: [www.govindicators.org](http://www.govindicators.org)**