PART 3

Practical Options and Recommendations
This chapter draws together practical country lessons and options to prevent organized criminal and political violence and recover from their effects. The audience is strategic decision makers in countries grappling with violence or attempting to prevent it—national reformers in government and civil society, as well as international representatives in the field. As this Report has emphasized throughout, efforts to build confidence and transform institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs need to be adapted to the local political context in each country, at each transition moment—and there is a need for humility, since lessons in how to combat changing patterns of repeated violence are being refined and expanded on the ground all the time. This chapter, therefore, lays out basic principles and a toolkit of options emerging from country lessons and illustrates how these can be adapted to different contexts.
Practical country directions and options

**Principles and options, not recipes**

This Report lays out a different way of thinking about approaches to violence prevention and recovery in fragile situations. It does not aim to be a “cookbook” that prescribes recipes—every country’s history and political context differs, and there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. As described earlier, recovering from fragile situations is not a short, linear process. Countries go through multiple transitions over a period of at least a generation before achieving institutional resilience. Because trust is low in high-risk environments, building confidence and political support among stakeholders in each round of change is a prelude to institutional transformation. Managing these complex dynamics and multiple transitions is the basis of statecraft, and this chapter draws heavily on lessons from national reformers and country experiences in chapters 4 and 5. There is no substitute for the judicious blend of political judgment, deep knowledge of actors, innovation, and tactical calculus that only national reformers can wield.

The first section presents basic principles emerging from many different settings where societies have been able to prevent and recover from episodes of violence and develop institutional resilience, as well as a framework for differentiating these principles in country strategies. The second section summarizes practical tools for confidence-building and gives examples of how these have been adapted to different country circumstances. The third section considers insights from program design to link early results with longer-term institution-building, again illustrating how common tools have been tailored to country contexts. The last section considers, more briefly, lessons on addressing external stresses and marshaling external resources. Some of the challenges in relation to external assistance and regional and global stresses are beyond the capacity of individual states and donor field representatives to resolve. So this chapter should be read with chapter 9, which considers directions for global policy.

**Basic principles and country-specific frameworks for sustained violence prevention and recovery**

**Basic principles**

The Report’s analysis underlines that institutions and governance, which are important for development in general, work differently in fragile situations. Restoring confidence through inclusion and early, visible results at the local level is important before undertaking wider institutional reforms. The princi-
pal tactic national reformers and their partners have used to restore confidence in the face of recent or rising violence and fragility is to build “inclusive-enough” coalitions. Coalition-building efforts will sustain success only if they can address the underlying weaknesses that increase the risks of repeated cycles of violence—deficits in security, justice, and job creation. Cycles of confidence-building and institutional transformation repeat over time. To galvanize and sustain this “virtuous circle” in the face of deep challenges of repeated violence and weak institutional capacity, four key principles emerge.

- **Inclusion is important to restore confidence, but coalitions need not be “all-inclusive.”** Inclusive-enough coalitions work in two ways. At a broad level, they build national support for change and by bringing in the relevant international stakeholders whose support is needed. At a local level, they work with community leaders and structures to identify priorities and deliver programs. Inclusive-enough coalitions apply just as much to criminal violence as to political violence, through collaboration with community leaders, business, parliaments, civil society—and with regional neighbors, donors, and investors.

- **Some early results are needed to build citizen confidence and create momentum for longer-term institutional transformation.** When trust is low, people do not believe grand plans for reform will work. Some early results that demonstrate the potential for success can generate trust, restore confidence in the prospects of collective action, and build momentum for deeper institutional transformation. Transforming institutions takes a generation, but political cycles are short—early results can both meet political imperatives and generate the incentives for the longer-term project of institution-building.

- **It makes sense to first establish the basic institutional functions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs** (and associated services)—and that ensure that new initiatives do not lose credibility due to corruption. Progress in these areas, and coordination among them, are the foundation for broader change. Other reforms that require the accrual of greater social consensus and capacities—political reform, decentralization, deeper economic reform, shifts in social attitudes toward marginalized groups—are best addressed systematically over time once these foundational reforms have made some progress.

- **Don’t let perfection be the enemy of progress—embrace pragmatic, best-fit options to address immediate challenges.** In insecure situations, it is generally impossible to achieve technical perfection in approaches to security, justice, or development. There is a need to be pragmatic, to address immediate challenges within political realities, with approaches that can improve over time. Sometimes these approaches will have temporary second-best aspects associated with them. For example, jobs generated may not immediately meet long-term goals for high skills and wages. Community and traditional structures may have drawbacks in their representation of women or youth groups. Anti-corruption initiatives may have to focus on major corruption while tolerating financial weaknesses in other areas.

**A framework for tailoring country-specific strategies**

Within these general principles, each country needs to assess its particular circumstances and find its own path. National reformers will face different types of violence, different combinations of international and external stresses, different institutional challenges, different stakeholders who need to be involved to make a difference, and different transition opportunities. Throughout, this Report has covered some of the most important variations in country circumstances through a simple assessment (table
8.1). There are five factors to be considered in applying a tailored strategy—each, of course, tempered by political judgment.

First is the transition moment and opportunity for change. Some situations, because of political, economic, or security factors, offer greater space for change and a major break from the past—a peace agreement, a leadership or electoral succession, or even a crisis that spurs an opportunity for change. Other situations present more limited space for change—a sense of mounting problems that spurs debate, pressure for reform by groups outside government, or a new governmental reform plan. The type of strategy advocated needs to take account of this opening. Is this a moment to put forward a long-term transformational vision or to make incremental advances?

Second is the type of stress. In situations where the internal divisions between ethnic, religious, social, or geographical groups are a major factor in the mobilization for violence, strategies need components that address political, economic, or social inclusion. External stresses such as incursions from drug trafficking networks or global economic shocks clearly require working with regional or global partners.

Third is the type of violent threat. Successful approaches to address political, communal, or criminal violence have commonalities in the underlying institutional deficits that permit repeated cycles of violence—and common priorities to develop the institutions to provide citizen security, justice, and jobs. But the particular mix of different types of violence does make some difference.

Capacity for formal investigations and prosecutions in the police and civilian justice institutions is more important, for example, in situations of organized criminal violence than in civil war or communal conflicts—although it is important in both. Ideologically motivated violence may require more emphasis on security, justice, and social inclusion, since this form of violence appears to be less motivated by employment or economic considerations.

Fourth is the type of institutional challenges. Where states have fairly strong capacity but inclusion is weak, reform actions need to draw marginalized groups into decision making and ensure they benefit from national growth, service delivery, and welfare improvements. Where lack of accountability has been a source of tension, strategies need to focus on responsiveness to citizens and to act against abuses. Where both capacity and accountability are weak, it makes sense to make greater use of state-community, state–civil society, state–private sector, and state–international mechanisms in delivering and monitoring early reform efforts.

Fifth is the set of stakeholders. National or subnational political and economic leaders and current combatants or ex-combatants—while not among the poorest groups—can be crucial stakeholders in achieving security and early results, and they may need to see benefits from initial reforms if they are to support them. Where neighboring countries, international donors, and investors affect the success of a reform, they need to be brought into the debates on strategy and the delivery of early results.

### Table 8.1 Situation-specific challenge and opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of violence: Civil, criminal, cross-border, subnational, and/or ideological</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transition opportunity: Opportunities can be gradual and limited, or can present more immediate or major space for change.</td>
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<td>Key stakeholders: Stakeholder balances include internal versus external stakeholders, state versus nonstate stakeholders, low-income versus middle-high-income stakeholders.</td>
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<td>Key stresses: Situations pose different mixtures of internal versus external stresses; high versus low levels of division between ethnic, social, regional or religious identity groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional challenges: Degrees and mixtures of capacity, accountability, and inclusion constraints in state and nonstate institutions affect strategy.</td>
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For deeper analysis of each country context, national leaders and their international partners need tools to assess risks, develop priorities, and formulate plans for action. National governments can often draw expertise from their own line ministries or political parties, as South Africa did in developing its reconstruction and development program in 1993 and 1994, or as Colombia did in reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of previous efforts to address violence in the early 2000s.1

Where external actors play critical roles, national leaders can initiate a joint national-international assessment with help from regional institutions, the United Nations (UN), international financial institutions, or bilateral partners, as in Liberia following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2003 and in the post-crisis needs assessment in Pakistan in 2009–10. Many good international assessment tools exist for these purposes, such as the post-conflict/post-crisis needs assessments developed by the World Bank, UN, and European Commission. More formal national-international processes have the advantage of generating buy-in, as well as possible financial assistance, from international partners, though they may also set high expectations for immediate financial assistance that need careful management.

One key lesson on assessments and planning processes is that they have often been lengthy exercises that have difficulty in later adapting to new challenges. Recognizing the analysis of this Report on the repeated nature of violent threats and the succession of multiple transitions that countries go through to address them, lighter and more regular assessments of risks and opportunities make sense. Assessments can also be strengthened by

- considering where the society stands on the spectra of transition opportunities, stresses, institutional challenges, and stakeholders.
- explicitly considering the history of past efforts and the legacy of earlier episodes of violence.

- identifying both the early results needed for stakeholder confidence-building and the path toward long-term institutional transformation.
- keeping strategies simple, and being realistic about the number of priorities identified and the timelines, as with the changes recommended to the joint UN–World Bank–European Union (EU) post-crisis needs assessment.
- ensuring that political, security, and development actors at national and international levels have joint ownership of assessments and strategy exercises. Where assessments and plans are led by only one ministry, for example, other ministries may resist implementation. Equally, for strategies to bring to bear a range of diplomatic, security, and development assistance from external partners, all need to be consulted in their preparation.

Practical approaches to confidence-building

Basic tools

When confronted with a rising crisis or transition opportunity, national reformers and their international partners have a variety of tools available for confidence-building and the development of “inclusive-enough” coalitions, based on lessons from a range of country experiences (table 8.2). Key stakeholder groups whose support has often been sought in coalition-building (in different combinations according to country circumstances) include the leaders and populations affected and targeted by violence; security actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, combatants; political leaders with influence, both in ruling and opposition parties; business, and civil society, whose support may be needed to undertake reforms; and neighbors and international partners. Including women leaders and women’s groups has a good track record in creating continued pressure for change.
To build national and local-level support, political and policy signals that demonstrate a break with the past are important. Signals that help to build political support among stakeholder groups are particularly effective when they are based on immediate actions rather than only on announcements of intent.

Signaling through immediate action can include credible government appointments (national and local) who can command the confidence of stakeholder groups. Redeployment of security forces can restore confidence by signaling an increase in civilian protection—as when Colombia redeployed military contingents to protect civilian road transit in 2002–03. Similar effects can be achieved by removing units that have a history of abuse or mistrust with communities. In some cases, the quick removal of legal regimes seen as discriminatory or abusive—apartheid laws, collective punishments, government restrictions on hiring from specific identity groups—can help restore confidence. Transparency in budgets and expenditures can be an important signal of improved governance, as with Timor-Leste’s public budget debates and reporting systems to parliament after the renewed violence and instability of 2006–07. Most successful signals require a mix of security, political, and economic content—with credible resource allocations and transparency measures, for example, backing up political and security plans.

Some options for signaling a break with the past will necessarily constitute announcements of future action rather than immediate action. For example, clear signals on approaches and timelines for political- and security-sector reform, decentralization, and transitional justice have often been part of confidence-building—drawing lessons, however, on the generational timelines often required to complete the comprehensive institutional reforms described in chapter 3.

Signals on political reform may include rapid action toward elections or laying out of a series of preparatory steps—as with the transitional executive bodies and constitutional reform processes in South Africa, supported by civic education and national and local action to maintain security during the political process through the National Peace Accords. Where elections will take place quickly, indicating that these are not an end but a step toward transformation of institutions and democratic practices (as described in the inputs by Lakhdar Brahimi and Nitin Desai in chapter 5, box 5.11), is important. Particular attention is also merited on local participatory processes—such as a commitment to involve violence-affected communities in identifying priorities and delivering programs in their areas.

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<th>TABLE 8.2 Core tools for restoring confidence</th>
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<td><strong>Signals: Future policy and priorities</strong></td>
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<td>• Citizen security goals</td>
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<td>• Key principles and realistic timelines for addressing political reform, decentralization, corruption, basic justice services, and transitional justice</td>
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<td>• Utilize state, community, NGO, and international capacities</td>
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Source: WDR team.
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.
To generate support of stakeholders in low-trust environments, special commitment mechanisms to persuade key political and economic stakeholder groups and citizens that announcements will be carried through have proved useful. These include the creation of special independent agencies to implement programs, as with Indonesia’s reconstruction agency in Aceh, and independent third-party monitoring of commitments. Third parties can be national—as with independent agencies or local civil society monitoring—or involve joint national and international cooperation, as with the Governance and Economic Management Action Plan in Liberia and the Commission against Impunity in Guatemala. They also can simply be international and provide either monitoring or direct execution for a transitional period, as with United Nations or regional peacekeeping missions’ electoral monitoring, or the ASEAN-European Union Aceh Monitoring Mission, which supported implementation of the Aceh peace agreement.

Several supporting actions can help in confidence-building and in persuading stakeholders whose support is sought of the benefits of collaboration. In some situations, there may be great unwillingness in the national discourse to recognize the potential for an escalation of violence and the depth of challenges. Where the risks of crisis escalation are not fully recognized by all national leadership, providing an accurate and compelling message on the consequences of inaction can help galvanize momentum for progress. For example, technical analysis can be produced on the costs of violence and the benefits of restored security—as for the regional benefits of peace in Afghanistan and for the costs of crime to business in several countries. Economic and social analyses can also show how rising violence and failing institutions are causing national or subnational areas to lag far behind their neighbors in development progress, or how other countries that have failed to address rising threats have faced severe and long-lasting development consequences.

This Report’s analysis also provides some clear messages from global experience to underpin efforts to persuade stakeholders of the urgency of action:

• No country or region can afford to ignore areas where repeated cycles of violence flourish or citizens are disengaged from the state.

• Unemployment, corruption, and exclusion increase the risks of violence—and legitimate institutions and governance that give everyone a stake in national prosperity are the immune system that protects from different types of violence.

• Citizen security is a preeminent goal, underpinned by justice and jobs.

• Leaders need to seize opportunities before violence escalates or recurs.

Strategic communication on the need for change and for a positive vision for the future is crucial—no one can be persuaded to support new initiatives if they do not know they exist, or if their intent and content have been distorted in reporting. Common lessons on strategic communications include ensuring that different parts of government communicate consistently on the vision for change and specific plans; fostering supportive messages from civil society and international partners; and directing communications to assuage concerns while avoiding promises that cannot be kept. Traditional consultation mechanisms and new technologies also offer the potential to mobilize broader citizen input into debates, as with the use of traditional community meetings in West Africa or youth activists using social networking tools to mobilize popular support and oppose violent actions by the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia.

It helps to produce clear plans and budgets that identify early results as well as the approach toward longer-term institution-building early on, informed by a sense of realism in timelines and availability of resources. The key lesson from country experi-
ences is that it is not necessary to generate early results in every area. Two or three early results are sufficient in each period of confidence-building. Once the pursuit of these results is properly resourced and achieved, other available capacities (leadership and managerial, technical, and financial) can be targeted at institutional transformation. Of course, results have to be repeated at regular intervals and help rather than hinder longer-term institution-building.13

Early results can take the form of progress on political and justice, security, or development outcomes and often involve successful combinations of all three. In South Africa, transitional mechanisms that ensured broad participation in political, security, and economic decision-making during the transition played a key role. In Kosovo, highway security was a crucial early result to support increased trade, and hence employment.14 In Liberia, basic improvements in security, electricity, and action against corruption were crucial in restoring confidence.15 In Afghanistan16 and in the Democratic Republic of Congo,17 reopening key transit routes for imports and exports through linked security and development efforts increased supplies in the capitals and lowered producer prices. In Chile and Argentina, responsible macroeconomic management, social protection, and initiation of transitional justice measures helped restore confidence following transitions from military rule.

The choice of early results and how they are delivered is important because it sets incentives for later institution-building. For example, if services and public works are delivered only through national, top-down programs and social protection only through international humanitarian aid, communities have few incentives to take responsibility for violence prevention; neither do national institutions have incentives to take on the responsibility for protecting all vulnerable citizens. Using partnerships in delivering early results with civil society, communities, faith-based organizations or the private sector has two benefits: it expands the range of capacity available to states, and it creates a sense of broader stakeholder and citizen engagement in crisis prevention and recovery. For these reasons, short-term confidence-building and longer-term efforts to transform institutions need to be linked.

**Differentiating confidence-building tools to match country circumstances**

The particular mix of transition opportunities, stresses, stakeholders, and institutional challenges makes a difference in selecting types of confidence-building approaches. Where political power is contested and opposition groups have the potential to derail progress, developing collaborative capacities among political parties is crucial. Where political leadership is uncontested, more focused approaches to building coalitions between the ruling party and key stakeholders whose support is needed, such as subnational leaders, civil society, the military, and business interests, can be inclusive-enough to create momentum for change. Where the engagement of external partners—investors, donors, diplomatic partners, neighboring countries—can provide additional support or help manage external stresses, signals that build their confidence become more important. (Box 8.1 contrasts the experiences of Colombia and South Africa in initial confidence-building and constructing of inclusive-enough coalitions.)

Two trade-offs to be decided within each country context with regard to using inclusion strategies to build confidence are inclusion versus justice for perpetrators of past abuses and inclusion versus efficiency. With regard to inclusiveness and justice for groups, country experiences indicate that groups may be legitimately excluded from political dialogue where there is an evolving belief among the population that they have sacrificed their right to participate due to past abuses, as the FARC were excluded from political talks in Colombia. But that exclusion can pose dangers when it is driven by international opposition to engagement by groups that have

| Types of violence: Both countries had faced long-standing civil conflict and high levels of criminal violence. |
| Transition opportunity: South Africa faced a more fundamental transition in the run-up 1994 election and the end of apartheid. Before its 2002 election, Colombia faced a sense of rising crisis due to failed peace talks and growing violence, but initially had less space for major institutional change. |
| Key stakeholders: In South Africa, key stakeholders for the two main protagonists, the ruling National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC), were their own members and allied constituencies, Inkatha and other smaller parties, security forces, domestic and international businesses, and neighboring states. In Colombia, before and during the presidential election, key stakeholders in setting a new direction were the ruling party, businesses, the military, and some civil society groups. |
| Key stresses: South Africa’s stresses were primarily internal: huge inequities between black and white citizens; ethnic tensions; high unemployment. Colombia faced high internal social inequity, but also external stresses from organized crime networks. |
| Institutional challenges: Both countries had relatively high capacity, but low accountability in state institutions, as well as low social cohesion. |

South Africa
In South Africa, inclusive-enough coalition-building in the run-up to the 1994 election meant involving all political parties and civil society in discussions over the country’s future, although the ANC maintained a hierarchy in which it led decision making among other ANC Alliance and United Democratic Front members. In Colombia, an inclusive-enough coalition to implement the new government’s Democratic Security Policy did not include all parties: FARC rebels were automatically excluded since they were not recognized by the Colombian government as a political organization. The ruling party instead galvanized support from the military; most business organizations; and some civil society groups, who were also instrumental in leading popular protests demanding action on security; as well as community leaders in violence-affected areas. Business groups were important in supporting the new government’s wealth tax, which provided an important source of finance for the Democratic Security Policy.

In both countries, the main protagonists sent signals to demonstrate a break with the past. In South Africa, this involved a move within the ANC to adopt an inclusive approach to other parties and interests and a move by the National Party from discourse over group rights to discourse over individual rights—immediate actions such as the ANC’s unilateral suspension of armed struggle and the National Party’s decision to release Nelson Mandela and unban the ANC, Communist Party, Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), and Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO); and announcements on future policy, such as the creation of provincial governments to provide opportunities for power for the smaller parties, job security for white civil servants, and free maternal and child health care for the broader population.

Colombia
In Colombia, the use of the word “democratic” in describing security approaches was intended to show that future policy would not involve the human rights abuses that had been common in the past in Colombia and other Latin American countries. Redeployment of military forces to protect civilian road transit and budget increases to the military were designed to foster business, military, and popular support. In South Africa, however, announcements about future policy went much further than Colombia in the commitments of the Reconstruction and Development Program to social and institutional transformation, reflecting the political background of the ANC Alliance as well as the greater space for change at the time of the transition. In both countries, the degree to which these initial signals have been maintained in the longer term is still a subject of debate, but they were undoubtedly important in mobilizing support.

Leaders in each country used different types of commitment mechanisms to provide guarantees that policy announcements would not be reversed: broad mechanisms for transitional decision making, constitutional and legal change, and electoral monitoring in South Africa, reflecting more inclusive coalition-building; and narrower mechanisms in Colombia to ensure cooperation between the military and civilian agencies, such as the creation of a new coordination framework, Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral (CCAI), reporting to the President.

Sources: South Africa: WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa, 2010; Eades 1999; Piron and Curran 2005; Roque and others 2010. Colombia: Arboleda 2010; Guerrero 1999; Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral 2010; WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010; WDR interview with former president Álvaro Uribe, 2010.
strong local support. Transitional justice processes can and often should form part of a dialogue on new directions, but inclusion strategies can change over time as it becomes possible to marginalize consistently abusive groups, as with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.18

With regard to the trade-off between inclusion and efficiency, the main question is how far to go. Exclusion of groups or regions from core coalitions has the risk of fostering resentment and generating pent-up pressure for later rounds of contestation and violence. But including everyone risks stretching collaborative decision-making capacity too far. This tension often takes specific form for political leaders in broadening appointments to power through the creation of new senior posts and expanded participation in decision making, when these actions may also slow the delivery of results. For national policy, political parties and governments have been clear that there is a hierarchy of decision making—with many present at the table presenting views and engaged in action to implement strategy, but with one body taking final decisions. For local participatory decision making, the mere fact of engaging communities is often seen as a positive signal, which merits taking the time necessary to gain local buy-in.

**Insight 1:** Multisectoral community empowerment programs are important to build state-society relations from the bottom up, as well as to deliver development improvements. Top-down programming through the state can help build technical capacity, but may be misaligned with the process of forging and reforging trust in state institutions and in state-society relations. Bottom-up program design works with community structures to identify and deliver priorities for violence prevention. The clearest signal is to entrust community structures with their own funds to identify and deliver local activities, as with the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program. A second model, which can be combined with community block grants, is for state agencies and NGOs working in concert to consult with community councils on their activities. Examples are the Latin American multisectoral violence prevention programs, which combine community policing with access to local justice and dispute resolution services, creating a safe physical environment (such as public trading spaces, transit); employment and vocational training; civic education; and social and cultural activities. Activities that "recognize" community membership can be an important part of this, through programs as simple as registering births and life events.

**Program approaches to link early results to transforming institutions**

**Basic tools**

The way programs are designed must vary according to country circumstances, but experience suggests a core set of basic program tools, delivered at scale either nationally or subnationally, that can be adapted to different country contexts—from low to high income and with different mixes of criminal and political violence (table 8.3). These are programs based on the concept of building a rhythm of repeated successes, linking regular early results for confidence-building with longer-term institutional transformation. They are deliberately kept small in number to reflect country lessons on the priority areas of citizen security, justice, and jobs. These basic program tools are designed to be delivered in combination. Action on security alone has not had a good track record in delivering long-term results on the ground. Nor are economic programs sufficient on their own to address problems of violence. Five common insights for program design can link rapid confidence-building to longer-term institutional transformation.

**Insight 2:** Prioritization of basic security and justice reform programs has been part of the core tools countries use to develop resilience to violence. Community-based
Country experiences that can provide insights include Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Sierra Leone.

- Linking security and justice reform is important. One of the most common weaknesses in country experiences has been increasing actions to reform security systems without complementary action to reform justice systems. This causes several problems. First, increases in arrests by the security forces not processed by the courts result in either grievances over prolonged detention without due process or the release of offenders back into the community, as in the relatively successful police reforms in Haiti in the 1990s and the 2000s. Second, where civilian justice systems are absent in insecure areas, the military exists to reintegrate former security force members into civilian life.

### TABLE 8.3 Core tools for transforming institutions

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<tr>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foundational reforms and “best-fit” approaches</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Security sector reform:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Justice sector reform:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Multisectoral community empowerment programs:</strong> Combining citizen security, employment, justice, education, and infrastructure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Designed to deliver citizen security benefits</td>
<td>• Independence and links to security reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Capacity increases linked to repeated realistic performance outcomes and justice functions</td>
<td>• Strengthening of basic caseload processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Dismantling of criminal networks through civilian oversight, vetting, and budget expenditure transparency</td>
<td>• Extending of justice services, drawing on traditional/community mechanisms</td>
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<td>• Use of low-capital systems for rural and community policing</td>
<td><strong>Phasing anti-corruption measures:</strong></td>
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<td>• Demonstration that national resources can be used for public good before dismantling rent systems</td>
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<td>• Control of capture of rents</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Use of social accountability mechanisms</td>
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<td><strong>Gradual, systematic programs</strong></td>
<td><strong>• Political and electoral reform</strong></td>
<td><strong>• Structural economic reforms such as privatization</strong></td>
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<td>• Phased capacity and accountability in specialized security functions</td>
<td>• Decentralization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Transitional justice</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Comprehensive anti-corruption reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Employment programs:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Humanitarian delivery and social protection:</strong> With planned transition from international provision</td>
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<td>• Regulatory simplification and infrastructure recovery for private sector job creation</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Long-term public programs</td>
<td><strong>Macroeconomic policy:</strong> Focus on consumer price volatility and employment</td>
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<td>• Asset expansion</td>
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<td>• Value-chain programs</td>
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<td>• Informal sector support</td>
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<td>• Labor migration</td>
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<td>• Women’s economic empowerment</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Use of social accountability mechanisms</td>
<td><strong>• Phasing anti-corruption measures:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDR team.
tary and police will end up performing justice and correction functions beyond their mandate and capacity—and perhaps result in abuses.

- Security and justice reforms should go beyond paper reforms, and reach into local communities. Extending access to the formal justice system in underserved areas can help, as with mobile courts. The capacity of formal justice systems to deal with local dispute resolution is often limited, however. Blending of formal and informal systems, such as Timor-Leste’s incorporating traditional justice measures into the formal system; community paralegals; and the use of non-governmental organization (NGO) capacity to support access to justice for the poor, as in Nicaragua and Sierra Leone, can help bridge this divide.21

**Insight 3:** Shifting back to basics on job creation goes beyond material benefits by providing a productive role and occupation for youth. There is still debate over what works in generating jobs and widening economic stakes in prosperity—not only in fragile areas but worldwide in the wake of the global financial crisis. Because there is no consensus on the exact set of policies that can generate employment—and even less so in environments where insecurity is a constraint to trade and investment—program design needs to draw from what is known about pragmatic interventions that have worked. The lessons here, drawing from the experiences in chapter 5, include the following:

- The role of jobs in violence prevention argues for judicious public financing of employment programs, as in India or Indonesia. To ensure that these are compatible with long-term job creation and strengthening of social cohesion, it makes sense to deliver employment programs through community institutions, ensure that wages are set to avoid distorting private sector activities and programs, keep the design simple to match administrative capacity, and complement programs with vocational training and life skills.22
- Easing the infrastructure constraints to private sector activity is important for early results and longer-term labor-intensive growth. Trade and transit infrastructure such as roads and ports can be crucial for private sector activity, but the number one constraint cited by businesses in World Bank enterprise surveys in violent areas is electricity.23 Approaches to restitute electricity capacity may involve programs that are fast, even while these are technically suboptimal in the early period, as in the experience of Lebanon and Liberia after the civil war.24
- Regulatory simplification, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s removal of the bureaucratic constraints to business activity, can gain business confidence.25 Simplification, rather than the addition of complexity in business regulation, is crucial to demonstrating fast results and adapting to institutional capacity constraints.
- Investment in the value chain for labor-intensive sectors—bringing together producers, traders, and consumers—can support job creation and address links between different regional, social, or ethnic groups affected by violence, as in Rwanda’s investments in coffee and Kosovo’s in dairy.26
- Agriculture and informal sector jobs are often viewed as second best in relation to the formal sector—but they often offer the only realistic prospect for large-scale job creation. Support can include access to finance and training, sympathetic regulation, and basic market and transit infrastructure.
- Asset expansion programs have helped in some successful transitions from violence—such as land reform in the Republic of Korea and Japan and housing programs in Singapore.27 But they require the political capital to succeed in redistribution (in the Republic of Korea and Japan
the power of landowning classes had been considerably weakened) as well as considerable public resources, access to private finance, and institutional capacity. Smaller programs that provide transfers to victims of violence, such as Timor-Leste’s transfers to displaced people, provide a simpler model of asset expansion.28

- Labor migration agreements also provide an example of best-fit policies in some circumstances: all countries would prefer to generate jobs at home, but where massive youth unemployment exists, managed migration agreements that inform and protect workers are a good “best-fit” alternative.29

**Insight 4: Involving women in security, justice, and economic empowerment programs can deliver results and support longer-term institutional change.** While the pacing of involvement of women in reforms will vary by local context, experience across regions and forms of violence shows the value of accelerating the involvement of women. Given the large number of female-headed households in violence-affected communities, women often engage in economic activities out of necessity. Targeting women’s economic empowerment can be a core part of job creation programs, as in Nepal,30 and may have more lasting effects on women’s status than national gender action plans. Reforms to increase female staffing and gender-specific services in the security forces and justice systems, as in Nicaragua, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and a number of high-income police forces facing urban violence have delivered good results.31 Involving women leaders in decision making in community-driven programs can also shift attitudes toward gender—but as the Afghanistan example in chapter 5 shows, this takes time.

**Insight 5: Focused anti-corruption initiatives demonstrating that new programs can be well governed are crucial for credibility.** This does not mean addressing all corruption at once—it is as impossible for developing countries with high levels of corruption to eliminate it overnight, as it was for OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) societies to do so at earlier stages of their development. Moreover, deep-rooted patronage systems are a way of holding together potentially violent situations, however imperfect, so dismantling them before other, more transparent institutions are embedded to take their place can increase risk. However, high levels of corruption increase the risks of violence, making action on corruption important. Two main mechanisms emerge as realistic early measures to improve controls over corruption in highly fragile situations:

- The first is to prevent serious corruption in major new concessions and contracts, including those for natural resources, by making processes more transparent and drawing on private sector audit and inspection capacity.

- The second is to use social accountability mechanisms to monitor the use of funds—making budgets transparent and using community and civil society capacity to monitor them, as with the use of local budget transparency in community-driven programs.

**Managing trade-offs: Toward more systematic reform**

The key trade-off in best-fit approaches that link rapid confidence-building with longer-term institutional transformation is balancing their positive effects with their possible negative and distortionary effects. An oversized security sector draws resources away from other productive activities. Services provided by nongovernment groups or the private sector can be costly. Publicly funded employment, if badly designed, can draw people away from private sector work.

Where best-fit approaches can have some costs that will exceed benefits once security, state institutional capacity, and competitive markets return to normal, it helps to design a clear but flexible exit strategy. This can in-
volve the move from nongovernment to state systems, or from informal to formal systems.

Next, mitigate the negative consequences. For example, labor migration agreements can be accompanied by information and protection for workers. And public action to support employment can be designed to avoid pressure on private sector recruitment by keeping wages at self-selecting levels and using controls on incremental job creation by employers.

Similar lessons apply to systematic but more gradual reform (see table 8.3). Marking these areas as “systematic and gradual” does not mean they are unimportant—they have played a big role in successful transitions, from devolution in Northern Ireland to transitional justice and education reform in South Africa and Germany. What they have in common, however, is that they involve a complex web of institutions and social norms. So, in most situations, systematic and gradual action appears to work best.

**Monitoring results**

National reformers and their international partners in-country need efficient ways to monitor results from these programs, both to demonstrate successes and to create a feedback loop on areas that are lagging. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been crucial for shifting attention to poverty and social issues, and remain important long-term goals even in the most fragile situations. But they move too slowly to act as a feedback loop for policy-makers—and they do not focus on citizen security, justice, or jobs.

Table 8.4 shows sample indicators for measuring early results of programmatic interventions. These outcome-oriented measures will vary by country context, but could include, for example, freedom of movement along transit routes, electricity coverage, number of businesses registered, and employment days created. These will not, however, provide a more systematic picture of risk and progress. Useful complementary indicators would cover the areas most directly related to citizen security, justice, and jobs over the short and longer terms—actual levels of insecurity; employment; access to justice; and differences in welfare and perceived welfare between ethnic, religious, geographical, and social groups, as shown in table 8.4. They would also cover developments in trust, state society relations, and institutional legitimacy. Governance indicators take time to shift—a useful short-term measure is polling citizen perceptions of institutions, as Haiti did to measure early shifts in the performance of its police. Such polling data are a regular part of government policy information in high-income and many middle-income countries, but much less so in the lowest income fragile states, where, arguably, they would be of most use to policy-makers.

As with the discussion of early results, it is important that progress indicators set the right incentives for later institution-building. For example, if security forces have targets set based on the number of rebel combatants killed or captured or criminals arrested, they may rely primarily on coercive approaches, and there would be no incentive to build longer-term trust with communities. Targets based on citizen security (freedom of movement and so on), by contrast, create longer-term incentives for the role of the security forces in underpinning effective state-society relations. Similarly, if progress on security, justice, and jobs is monitored only through indicators of access, there are fewer incentives for state institutions to work with communities in violence prevention and pay attention to citizen confidence that institutions are responsive to their needs. A mix of indicators that measure citizen perceptions and security, justice, and employment outcomes to monitor progress can help address both areas.

**Fitting program design to context**

The idea of best-fit approaches has been used throughout the WDR: rather than copying programs that have been used elsewhere, adapting their design to local context can ensure that they will deliver results within local political dynamics. For example, while
Liberia and Mozambique, which both drew on nongovernmental capacities to monitor key functions. In Liberia, a history of funds corrupted from natural resource extraction sources, as well as concern over the risk of diversion of public funds following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003, argued for the use of intensive state–private sector and state-international partnerships to prevent a recurrence of corruption-fueled violence. In Mozambique, corruption had been less of a divisive issue during the conflict, but increases in trade linked to reconstruction programs created new risks, for example, in customs functions.

multisectoral community approaches can be effective in contexts as different as Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, and Northern Ireland, specific stresses in Côte d’Ivoire and Northern Ireland linked to geographical or religious divides makes it imperative for program designs to ensure that activities are seen not as targeted to one ethnic or religious group and instead build bonds between groups. Box 8.2 shows how the core tool of multisectoral state-community programs has been adapted to different contexts.

Different types of stresses and institutional challenges make a difference. Box 8.3 shows an example of anti-corruption approaches in Liberia and Mozambique, which both drew on nongovernmental capacities to monitor key functions. In Liberia, a history of funds corrupted from natural resource extraction sources, as well as concern over the risk of diversion of public funds following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2003, argued for the use of intensive state–private sector and state-international partnerships to prevent a recurrence of corruption-fueled violence. In Mozambique, corruption had been less of a divisive issue during the conflict, but increases in trade linked to reconstruction programs created new risks, for example, in customs functions.

### Table 8.4 Feasible indicators for results measurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample program indicators:</td>
<td>Freedom of movement along transit routes (redeployment of security forces, focus on citizen security)</td>
<td>Number of additional people with access to justice services (e.g., mobile courts, community paralegals, traditional justice systems)</td>
<td>Coverage and representation in state and community decision-making mechanisms (multisectoral community programs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome-oriented results (sample associated program in parentheses)</td>
<td>Decline in crime rate statistics</td>
<td>Number of cases prosecuted/backlog (processing of judicial caseloads)</td>
<td>Number of employment days and small infrastructure or income-generating projects produced (employment programs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transparency of decision making and meeting of targets (publication of budgets, expenditures, and audits)</td>
<td>Number of businesses registered and operating, including large, labor-intensive businesses resuming operations in insecure areas (security, regulatory simplification, infrastructure bottlenecks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of vulnerable groups reached with services and transfers through national institutions (community social protection, humanitarian aid, vaccination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electricity coverage/number of hours of blackouts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in level/volatility of consumer prices (macropolicy and/or infrastructure bottlenecks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term systematic monitoring of confidence in institutions</td>
<td>Number of violent deaths</td>
<td>Perception surveys by groups (ethnic, geographical, religious, class) regarding whether their welfare is increasing over time and in relation to others</td>
<td>Perceptions of whether employment opportunities are increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perception survey data on trends in security and trust in security forces</td>
<td>Perception survey data regarding trust in national institutions, justice sector; and on corruption, nationally and by region and group</td>
<td>Business confidence surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term systematic monitoring of institutional transformation</td>
<td>Victim surveys</td>
<td>Household survey data on vertical and horizontal inequalities and access to justice services</td>
<td>Household data on employment and labor force participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Governance indicators refocused on degree of progress within historically realistic time frames</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: WDR team.
BOX 8.2 Adapting community-level program design to country context: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, and Rwanda

The basic elements of community-based programs for violence prevention and recovery are simple and can be adapted to a broad range of country contexts. All community programs under state auspices consist, essentially, of a community decision-making mechanism to decide on priorities and the provision of funds and technical help to implement them. Within this model there is a great deal of variance that can be adapted to different types of stresses and institutional capacities, as well as to different opportunities for transition. Three important sources of variance are in how community decision-making is done, who controls the funds, and where programs sit within government.

Different stresses and institutional capacities and accountability affect community decision-making. In many violent areas, preexisting community councils are either destroyed or were already discredited. A critical first step is to reestablish credible participatory forms of representation. In Burundi, for example, a local NGO organized elections for representative community development committees in the participating communes that cut across ethnic divides. Similarly, Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program began with village-wide elections for a community development council. But Indonesia’s programs for the conflict-affected areas of Aceh, Kalimantan, Maluku, and Sulawesi did not include holding new community elections. Community councils were largely intact, and national laws already provided for local, democratic village elections. Indonesia also experimented with separating grants to Muslim and Christian villages to minimize intercommunal tensions, but eventually used common funds and councils to bridge divides between these communities.

Different institutional challenges also affect who manages the funds. Programs must weigh the trade-offs between a first objective of building trust with the risks of money going missing and the elite capture of resources. Different approaches to program design to fit context include the following:

- In Indonesia, where local capacity was fairly strong, subdistrict councils established financial management units that are routinely audited but have full responsibility for all aspects of financial performance.

- In Burundi, lack of progress in overall decentralization and difficulties in monitoring funds through community structures meant that responsibility for managing the funds remained with the NGO partners. In Rwanda, by contrast, greater space for change after the genocide meant the councils could from the start be integrated into the government’s decentralization plans.

- In Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, NGOs also took on the initial responsibility for managing the funds while councils were trained in bookkeeping, but within a year, block grants were being transferred directly to the councils.

- In Colombia, where the primary institutional challenges were to bring the state closer to communities and overcome distrust between security and civilian government agencies, funds are held by individual government ministries, but approvals for activities are made by multisectoral teams in consultation with communities.

- In Nepal, community programs show the full range of design options, with some programs giving primary responsibility for fund oversight to partner NGOs, to their large-scale village school program, where community school committees are the legal owners of school facilities and can use government funds to hire and train their staff.

- In Cambodia’s Seila program, councils were launched under UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) auspices and then moved into the government’s newly formed commune structure.

The type of transition moment and governance environment also affects how community decision-making structures align with the formal government administration. Many countries emerging from conflict will also be undergoing major constitutional and administrative reforms, just as the early-response community programs are being launched. There may be tensions between national and local governance and power-holders at the center and the community. In Afghanistan, where center-periphery issues are a key driver of conflict, and where warlords are a continuing threat to stability, community-driven development (CDD) programs must be sensitive to national-local dynamics. Afghanistan’s Community Development Councils, though constituted under a 2007 vice presidential bylaw, are still under review for formal integration into the national administrative structure.

In other settings of either prolonged crisis or in authoritarian systems, CDD programs can be designed to sustain human capital and offer an avenue for local-level debate in the absence of national-level progress. CDD programs designed in environments with more limited space for change may rely more heavily on nongovernmental delivery of services, employing local workers for skill building and focusing on “neutral,” nonpolitical issues in community debates.

Source: Guggenheim 2011.
BOX 8.3 Anti-corruption approaches in Liberia and Mozambique

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of violence:</th>
<th>Both countries had faced long-standing civil war.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition opportunity:</td>
<td>Both countries went through major transitions: peace agreements followed by electoral transitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stresses:</td>
<td>Corruption under the transitional government in Liberia between 2002 and 2004 reached extremely high proportions, threatening progress in the peace agreement by denuding the country’s large natural resources and potentially financing renewed electoral violence. Increasing trade in Mozambique created the potential for increased customs revenue—but also increased vulnerability to corruption. High unemployment and a legacy of regional and ethnic tensions were issues in both countries—with a commensurate need to attract investors and donor funds to supplement public finances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stakeholders:</td>
<td>Government, opposition parties, civil society, and donors were important stakeholders relating to corruption issues in both countries: regional institutions played a higher-stake role in Liberia than in Mozambique on corruption-related issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional challenges:</td>
<td>Both countries had low-capacity state institutions and low state revenues, with accountability problems greater in Liberia than in Mozambique.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both countries outsourced some key functions to the private sector and undertook additional monitoring to guard against corruption and increase revenues. The functions chosen and the nature of external monitoring were different, however. Liberia focused on forestry inspections and natural resource concessions, reflecting the role of natural resource revenues in financing violence, while Mozambique focused on customs as a source of additional revenue that was vulnerable to corruption.

Liberia undertook, through the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, “dual key” oversight by regional and international experts of major contracts and concessions. The African Union and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) were instrumental in reaching agreement on this arrangement, along with the international financial institutions, the UN, the United States, and the European Union, in recognition of the potential regional spillover effects of rising corruption. In its initial stages, this arrangement focused more on accountability than capacity transfer, reflecting the severe nature of corruption challenges at the time. More recently, the program has emphasized capacity transfer more strongly. Following the elections, the new government also contracted a private inspection company to build and operate a system to track all timber from the point of harvest through transport to sale. The system ensures the government collects all revenue because it will not issue an export permit until the Central Bank confirms that all taxes have been paid. In Mozambique, the government contracted a private company to run customs inspection functions and collect customs revenues. Both strategies delivered results, with domestic revenues rising and increased donor funds.


External factors: Reducing external stresses and mobilizing external support

Societies do not have the luxury of transforming their institutions in isolation—they need at the same time to mobilize external support for change and to manage external pressures, whether from economic shocks or from trafficking and international corruption. Many of these constraints on external assistance and the management of external stresses are beyond the control of each nation-state to address. Chapter 9 considers possible directions for international policy in these issues. National leaders and their international partners at a country level can, however, help to mobilize external support and
galvanize cooperation programs to address shared stresses with external partners.

**Factoring in external stresses**

National development strategies rarely involve an assessment of potential external stresses or collaborative action with others to address them—yet action on external stresses may be key to effective violence prevention. Regular assessment of risks and opportunities, as described earlier should also include considering and planning for possible external stresses. One example is the potential security impacts of economic stresses, such as volatile food prices. Another is increased insecurity of neighbors—how to mitigate, for example, the economic spillover of Somalia piracy on the neighboring economies and fishing industries. Still others include, ironically, considering the impact of a successful action against trafficking or rebel groups on neighboring countries—for example, whether these actions will push insecurity over borders, as Colombia’s dismantling of drug cartels did for Central America and Mexico.

Actions to address external stresses can be taken in security, justice, and developmental areas (table 8.5). Some of the actions to address potential external stresses and opportunities fall in the purely diplomatic and security sphere. (This Report does not attempt to address these in detail, but it is clear that they can be crucial for confidence-building with external stakeholders.) Border cooperation, redeployment of troops to signal non-interference or engagement in shared security approaches, or simple diplomatic signals, such as the visit of Sheikh Sharif of Somalia to the Government of Ethiopia in March 2010 immediately after his nomination as president or Timor-Leste’s outreach to the Government of Indonesia, can all form an important part of the basic tools for restoration of confidence.

Cross-border programs to link security and development approaches can be initiated by national governments. An openness to discussing both security and development cooperation across insecure border regions, based on shared goals of citizen security, justice, and jobs, has the potential to deliver results. Cooperation between China’s southeastern provinces and neighboring ASEAN states under the Greater Mekong Subregion initiative, while still with potential for expansion, has addressed some of these issues. EU member states have a range of models to address cross-border cooperation: while some may be appropriate only for advanced economic and institutional environments, many involve subregions that were historically underdeveloped and driven by conflict, either after World War II or more recently after the Balkan War.

Lessons from cross-border cooperation in Europe appear to include the need to start with economic and social issues (including pooled administrative capacity in universities), as well as shared actions on border security and trafficking—while avoiding actions that can cause political or cultural tensions, particularly those involving ethnic groups residing across borders.

A promising form of bilateral cooperation to address external stresses further afield is to address the complex web of corruption

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**TABLE 8.5 Core tools—National action to address external stresses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizen security</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Jobs and associated services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Border cooperation</td>
<td>• Coordination of supply and demand-side responses</td>
<td>• Pooled supplementary administrative capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military, police, and financial intelligence</td>
<td>• Joint investigations and prosecutions across jurisdictions</td>
<td>• Cross-border development programming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Building of links between formal and informal systems</td>
<td>• Social protection to mitigate global economic stresses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and money laundering through joint investigations or prosecutions. Where stronger jurisdictions pair with those with weaker institutions, these initiatives have the potential to build capacity as well as deliver practical results in diminishing impunity. Investigations and prosecutions involving trafficking can increase this type of cooperation, which can be differentiated for different environments, as in Haiti and Nigeria (box 8.4).

**Mobilizing international support**

Some constraints on international support come from policies and systems in the headquarters of multilaterals and donor coun-

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**Box 8.4 Bilateral cooperation against corruption and money laundering in Haiti and Nigeria**

**Key stresses:** In both countries, corruption with international money-laundering links has undermined the capacity of national institutions to combat violence.

**Key stakeholders:** Government, opposition parties, civil society, and donors were important stakeholders relating to corruption issues in Haiti, with the United States playing a particularly important role. Donors were less important in Nigeria, but civil society was much stronger than in Haiti.

**Institutional challenges:** Political obstacles to prosecuting grand corruption were high in both countries. Capacity in the criminal justice system to prosecute complex corruption cases was present in Nigeria but absent in Haiti.

Both countries developed links with the law enforcement institutions of other nations. Haiti’s government drew on capacity from the United States not only during the investigative phase but in the prosecution as well. In Nigeria, by contrast, local officials mainly drew on the investigative capacity of the United Kingdom to gather evidence to be used for convictions in Nigerian courts.

Since former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide fled into exile in 2004, successive Haitian governments have sought to recoup funds lost from a corrupt agreement with American telecommunications companies. According to the government, Haiti Teleco, Haiti’s state-owned telecom firm, had provided services at cut-rate prices to American providers in return for kickbacks to senior government officials and key Teleco staff. The case involved a complex scheme of favorable tariffs with kickbacks channeled through an intermediary’s offshore bank account. Proving it in a Haitian court would have been a challenge, given the absence of police and prosecutors with experience handling cases of sophisticated financial crime, and once the earthquake hit in January 2010 it would have been nigh impossible. In December 2009, the U.S. Department of Justice charged two former employees of Teleco who allegedly received kickbacks with money laundering offenses. In June 2010, one of the two was convicted and sentenced to four years in prison and ordered to pay US$1.8 million in restitution to the government of Haiti and forfeit another US$1.6 million. The second employee awaits trial.

In Nigeria, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) worked closely with the U.K. Crown Prosecution Service and Scotland Yard to develop evidence against the corrupt governors of three Nigerian states. The EFCC alerted British authorities to the possibility that the governors were hiding the proceeds of corruption in London banks or real estate investments. In one of the cases, the governor was charged in the U.K. for money laundering; in the other, the evidence was used to prosecute them in Nigeria. Under the Nigerian constitution, state governors enjoy immunity while in office. In one instance, evidence developed by the U.K. criminal justice agencies was presented by a U.K. law enforcement official to a committee of the state’s legislature, which voted to remove the governor from office, thus lifting his immunity and allowing him to be charged in Nigeria. During these investigations, the EFCC worked closely with U.K. officials and received on-the-job training.

**Source:** Messick 2011.
An important trade-off for national reformers and their international partners is to ensure that international delivery capacity can help deliver fast results while also supporting increases in the legitimacy of national institutions. International humanitarian assistance, for example, not only can save lives but also can help greatly in delivering quick confidence-building results. But humanitarian delivery of food imports can also distort production in local markets, and long-term international humanitarian provision of health, education, and water and sanitation services can undermine efforts to increase the credibility of local institutions. Much of this can be avoided through phased transitions from humanitarian capacity to local institutions (box 8.5). Similar approaches can be used in other sectors: the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, for example, combines local judicial capacity-building with the use of international staff to assist in investigations and prosecutions.38 The Governance and Economic Management Program in Liberia has shifted from an initial focus on international executive support for accountability over public resources to capacity-building in national systems.39

National reformers and their international partners in-country have a rich set of experiences to draw on—both in evaluating efforts in the past in their countries and in adapting experiences from around the world. The tools in this chapter offer options for this adaptation. Confidence-building through collaborative approaches and early results and the foundational reforms that can deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs have some elements in common. But they need to be well adapted to the local political context. The task of national reformers and international representatives in the field is made easier—or harder—by the supporting environments in global policy and in the headquarters of bilateral actors and the global institutions. Chapter 9 turns to directions for global policy to support countries struggling to prevent and recover from violence on the ground.
BOX 8.5 Phasing the transition from international humanitarian aid to local institutions: Afghanistan and Timor-Leste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of violence:</th>
<th>Both countries have a history of external and civil conflict, with significant ongoing violence in Afghanistan and, in Timor, a more limited wave of renewed political and communal conflict and gang-based violence in 2005–06.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition opportunities:</td>
<td>Significant transitions occurred in both countries: particularly significant was space for change under the UN transitional authority in Timor in 1999–2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stakeholders:</td>
<td>Government, civil society, and humanitarian and development donors were key stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional challenges:</td>
<td>Limited service delivery, severe capacity constraints, many donor players were the major challenges.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Timor-Leste

Following the UN supervised referendum on independence of August 1999, Timor-Leste suffered widespread violence and destruction of its infrastructure and collapse of state services. In the transition period before and after independence in 2002, Timor-Leste managed, however, to provide both rapid results and long-term institution-building in the health sector in four phases.

In the first phase international and national NGOs occupied a central role in providing emergency health services throughout Timor, independently funded through humanitarian assistance. In the second phase, the interim health authority established in 2000 developed a health plan and performance indicators and signed memoranda of understanding with NGOs to standardize the service packages provided in different parts of the territory still under independent humanitarian funding. In the third phase, NGOs were contracted directly by the transitional authority to perform both local management and service delivery functions. In the fourth phase, the Interim Health Authority was replaced by a new ministry of health, which assumed district management of the system and facilities, with NGOs important in specialized service delivery and a capacity-building role, but decreased local personnel over time. All the major international agencies in the health sector worked together within this framework.

By 2004 this gradual phasing of responsibility and capacity-building had led to 90 percent of the population having access to health facilities within a two-hour walking distance. Between 2000 and 2004, the use of these facilities rose from 0.75 outpatient visits per capita to 2.13. The health ministry and district operations were among the few state functions resilient to renewed violence in 2005–06, continuing to operate and, indeed, to provide assistance to the displaced population.

Afghanistan

In the wake of the fall of the Taliban in 2002, Afghanistan’s basic health services were in a dismal condition, with maternal mortality estimated at 1,600 per 100,000 live births. The Afghan ministry of public health outlined a package of priority health services in response (costing about US$4 per capita per year) and contracted NGOs to deliver them, while also establishing rigorous monitoring and evaluation. The NGOs were selected competitively and sanctioned for poor performance.

Early results have been optimistic, with a 136 percent increase in the number of functioning primary health care facilities between 2002 and 2007. Despite a worsening security situation, the number of outpatient visits between 2004 and 2007 also increased by nearly 400 percent. These outcomes have relied not only on political support but also on a commitment by the ministry of public health not to micromanage the process.

By contracting autonomously operating NGOs while ensuring accountability, the Afghan government both earned and sustained policy leadership in the health sector. It allowed the ministry of public health to address scarce human resources, a lack of physical facilities, and logistical hurdles. The depth of ongoing violence in Afghanistan has not permitted national institutions to assume the role played by NGOs over time, as in Timor-Leste, but the Afghan government and ministry of public health have still managed to achieve much needed health outcomes in an uncertain environment dominated by insecurity and institutional challenges.

Sources: Baird 2010; Rohland and Cliffe 2002; Tulloch and others 2003.

Notes

1. WDR Consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa, 2010; WDR team interview with former president Álvaro Uribe, 2010; WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organizations, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010.
2. Arboleda 2010; WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organizations, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010.
4. For more in-depth discussion, see the section on delivering early results in chapter 4.
7. CICIG 2009; Férnandez 2010; Donovan 2008; UN 2006a; Hudson 2010. Also see box 6.4 in chapter 6.
9. See section on support to building inclusive-enough coalitions in chapter 6.
10. See UNODC 2010a; Duffield 2000; Kohlmann 2004. Also see the section on spillover effects of violence and feature 1 in chapter 1.
13. For more information, see the section on delivering early results in chapter 4.
15. Dwan and Bailey 2006; Jahr 2010; Government of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009; Baily and Hoskins 2007. Also see box 4.3 and box 4.6 in chapter 4.
18. Dupuy and Binningsbø 2008. Also see discussion on inclusive-enough coalitions in chapter 4.
19. UNDPKO 2010a. Also see box 4.5 in chapter 4.
21. For Nicaragua, see Scheye 2009. For Sierra Leone, see Dale 2009. Also see the section on justice in chapter 5 for more in-depth discussion.
22. Lamb and Dye 2009; Tajima 2009; see section on public finance for employment in chapter 5 for in-depth discussion.
23. World Bank 2010d.
24. For Lebanon, see World Bank 2008f, 2009d; Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Environment 1999, box 5.9 in chapter 5. For Liberia, see Bailey and Hoskins 2007; McCandless 2008, box 4.6 in chapter 4; box 6.5 in chapter 6.
25. Herzberg 2004. Also see section on jobs in chapter 5.
26. USAID Rwanda 2006; Grygiel 2007; Parker 2008; Chohan-Pole 2010; Boudreaux 2010. Also see box 5.8 in chapter 5.
27. For Japanese land reforms, see Kawagoe 1999; For broader statebuilding experience in Japan, see Tsunekawa and Yoshida 2010; For Korean land reforms, see Shin 2006. For Singapore, see box 5.2 in chapter 5.
29. World Bank 2006b; Kireyev 2006; Economic Times 2008. Also see section on public finance for employment in chapter 5.
30. Ashe and Parrott 2001. Also see box 5.10 in chapter 5.
31. Mobekk 2010; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. Also see section on security in chapter 5 for more information.
32. For Northern Ireland, see Barron and others 2010. Also see the section on decentralization and devolution in chapter 5. For South Africa, see Hayner 2010; UNOHCHR 2006. For Germany, see Grim 2010. Also see the section titled “Transitional justice to recognize past crimes” in chapter 5.
33. UNDPKO 2010a. Also see box 5.5 in chapter 5.
34. Bowden 2010; Gilpin 2009. Also see section on spillover effects of violence in chapter 1.
35. World Bank 2006d. See section titled “Between the global and the national: Regional stresses, regional support” in chapter 7.
36. Greta and Lewandowski 2010; Otocan 2010; Council of Europe 1995; Council of Europe and Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia 2003; Bilcik and others 2000. Also see box 7.11 in chapter 7.
38. CICIG 2009; Férnandez 2010; Donovan 2008; UN 2006a; Hudson 2010. Also see box 6.4 in chapter 6.