

# **QUALITY AT ENTRY IN FY04–05 (QEA7)**

## **A QAG ASSESSMENT**

**February 1, 2006**



QUALITY ASSURANCE GROUP

## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACS	Administrative and Client Service	MDG	Millennium Development Goals
AFR	Africa Region	M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
APL	Adaptable Program Loan	MNA	Middle East and North Africa Region
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy	MP	Montreal Protocol
CDD	Community-Driven Development	OPCS	Operations Policy and Country Services
CMU	Country Management Unit	OVP	Operational Vice President
CPAR	Country Procurement Assessment Review	PAD	Project Appraisal Document
CPIA	Country Policy & Institutional Assessment	PCD	Project Concept Document
CPAR	Country Procurement Performance Review	PHRD	Policy & Human Resource Development
DO	Development Objectives	PIP	Project Implementation Plan
EA	Environmental Assessment	PREM	Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Network
EAP	East Asia and Pacific Region	PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ECA	Europe and Central Asia Region	PSAL	Programmatic Structural Adjustment Loan
EMP	Environmental Management Plan	PSD	Private Sector Development
ERL	Emergency Recovery Loan	PSI	Private Sector Development and Infrastructure Network
ESSD	Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network	PSR	Project Status Report
FIL	Financial Intermediary Loan	QAG	Quality Assurance Group
FM	Financial Management	QEA	Quality at Entry Assessment
FMS	Financial Management Specialist	QER	Quality Enhancement Review
FSE	Financial Sector Network	QSA	Quality of Supervision Assessment
GEF	Global Environment Facility	SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
HDN	Human Development Network	SAP	Systems, Applications, and Products in Data Processing
IAD	Internal Auditing Department	SAR	South Asia Region
IP	Implementation Progress	SMU	Sector Management Unit
IRIS	Integrated Records and Information System	SIL	Specific Investment Loan
LCR	Latin America and the Caribbean Region	TAL	Technical Assistance Loan
LIL	Learning and Innovation Loan	TF	Trust Funds
		TTL	Task Team Leader

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Prem Garg, Director, Quality Assurance Group, guided the overall effort.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Sample Size, Robustness and Assessment Focus

- QEA7 was the seventh in a series of assessments of quality of new loan/credit approvals, aimed at increasing accountability and enhancing learning for better quality.
- QEA7 included 130 randomly selected operations approved by the Board in FY04–05, representing 23% by number and \$10.8 billion or one-fourth of total approval commitments.
- The sample size was set to permit robust results at Bank-wide (confidence interval: 95%; margin of error: +/- 5%), and most Regional and Network levels (90%; +/- 10%). The sample was stratified by Region and by status as “simple/repeater” projects to permit robust conclusions on this group taken as a whole (90%; +/- 10%). Results for small cohorts (e.g., smaller Regional/Network samples, sectors, lending instruments) should be interpreted with caution.
- The main assessment focus continued to remain, “Are we doing the right thing, and are we doing it right?”, with quality evaluated along eight major dimensions, and also of Bank inputs and processes.
- Ratings were, for the first time, on a 6-point scale of *highly satisfactory*, *satisfactory*, *moderately satisfactory*, *moderately unsatisfactory*, *unsatisfactory*, and *highly unsatisfactory*, moving from the previous 4-point scale. Ratings below “*satisfactory*” (2) show scope for improvement, among which ratings of 4, 5 and 6 are relevant for accountability.

## Key Findings: Bank-wide

- Overall quality at entry in FY04–05 shows improvement to 92% *moderately satisfactory or better (MS+)* from 86% in QEA5–6; however, this result includes 29% of the sample rated *moderately satisfactory*, a rating introduced in QEA7 to help identify missed opportunities for enhancing development impact in projects of acceptable quality.
- All major quality dimensions are rated at around or over 90% *MS+*. The strongest dimension is of Fiduciary Aspects, where procurement and FM are rated at 95% *satisfactory or higher (S+)*, respectively, confirming good internalization of policy and procedures in design, which are also confirmed as appropriate by the respective Sector Boards.
- Other particularly strong aspects are:
  - Consistency with country/sector strategies;
  - Country and sector knowledge underpinning operations;
  - Quality of environmental assessments;
  - Clarity of role definitions and mandates for implementing agencies;
  - Continuity and experience of task teams; and
  - Quality of support from LEG and LOA.
- "Simple and repeater" investment operations showed comparable entry quality (91% *MS+*) to other operations (92%) along with substantial savings in time (about 40%) and costs (about 30%) on average.

(cont'd)

- Scope for improvement, as shown by ratings of *moderately satisfactory or less*, is greatest in implementation arrangements, including prospects of timely implementation and M&E (44% of the sample); Bank inputs and processes (41% of the sample); and risk assessment (31% of the sample).
- Clarity and realism/scope of Development Objectives (DOs) show considerable scope for improvement (40% of the sample). On related aspects of the results framework, arrangements for evaluating impact/monitoring outcomes, and availability/quality of baseline surveys are among the lowest rated items, with 40–50% of the sample showing scope for improvement.
- Assessment of risks to financial viability and social risks, as well as feeding back risk assessment into design are areas with scope for improvement on almost half the sample. Attention to gender and social development aspects more generally could be improved in about 40% of the sample.
- Among Bank inputs and processes, peer reviewers' advice could have been better used in about one-third of the sample. Resource use was relatively inefficient, according to panelists, in about one-third of the projects; and, candor, quality, and completeness of documentation were rated *satisfactory or higher (S+)* in only half the operations. The role of sector management was considered as showing scope for improvement in almost half the sample.
- The DO most frequently considered by task teams to be highly important is *institutional development/capacity building*, in about 60% of the sample; panelists consider it *likely* to be achieved in about two-thirds of these operations.

- While the Bank naturally works with borrowers who have weak capacity (one-third of the projects), it could improve realism and appropriateness/design of capacity building measures in all of these. Panelists signal need for greater attention during preparation to setting capacity building in a more holistic framework in the sector and country; taking more fully into account incentives to develop further and use the capacity built under Bank-financed projects; and to be more realistic in setting institutional development objectives.
  
- Task teams consider *poverty reduction* as a highly important DO in only one-fourth of the sample; panelists rate its achievement as likely in two-thirds of these operations. Further analysis is required to establish how poverty focus of operations and design for poverty alleviation can be enhanced.

## **Key Findings: Regional**

- Overall, the best-performing Region is *LCR* (90% *S+*): it also has the highest proportion, about one-fifth of the Regional sample, rated *highly satisfactory*.
- All Regions other than *LCR* have 30–40% of their entering cohorts rated *moderately satisfactory*, signaling missed opportunities to enhance development impact on specific aspects as reported Bank-wide.
- *ECA* (99% *MS+*), *MNA* (100% *MS+*, for a small sample), *SAR* (95% *MS+*) show significant improvements in quality from *QEA5–6*, while *EAP* (89% *MS+*) registers some decline and has particularly low ratings for efficiency of resource use and quality of Regional inputs and processes.
- *AFR* (83% *MS+*) lags the rest of the Bank with little change from *QEA5–6*. Additional to aspects noted Bank-wide, panelists reported scope for improving the skills mix of the Bank’s inputs on about one-third of the operations.

## **Key Findings: Network/Sector**

- Among the Networks with large cohorts, INF (95% *MS+*), HDN (90% *MS+*), and PREM (93% *MS+*) showed significant improvement from QEA5–6. ESSD (88% *MS+*) reported a slight decline from QEA5–6 (91%).
- PREM is the best-performing Network, with a result of 88% *S+*.
- Of the Sector Boards with large cohorts, the Rural Sector (87% *MS+*) showed some decline (from 94%), and results indicate significant scope for improvement on all items noted more generally Bank-wide, as well as regarding borrower ownership; quality of economic analysis/rationale; appropriateness/realism of conditionality.
- Education had overall quality of 83% *MS+*, with improvement from 62% in QEA5–6). Scope for further improvement is particularly great on realism of DOs and implementation schedules – on two-thirds of the operations.
- Panelists flagged systemic issues for follow-up by the Financial Sector Board (FSB) to enhance attention to sustainability in intermediation operations not classified as FILs; and by HDN on HIV/AIDS operations, to strengthen implementation arrangements including M&E.

## **Key Findings: By Source of Funds and Instrument**

- IBRD results (95% *MS+*) are at about the same level as in QEA5–6 (92%).
- IDA/SPF results (91% *MS+*) show significant improvement (82% in QEA5–6) and confirm the upward trend observed in QEA6. However, entry quality is lower in low-CPIA Group countries (83% *MS+*), especially on results focus; realism of implementation schedules; M&E; and, quality of risk assessment, management and mitigation.
- Likelihood of reaching DOs of HD, Poverty Reduction, and PSD are significantly lower on IDA than IBRD operations.
- Development policy lending (100% *MS+*) shows results above investment projects (91%), and issues reported in QEA6 have not re-surfaced on DPLs.
- In several cases of ERLs, panels noted there were components of a non-emergency nature, and because of lower attention to technical, financial or institutional aspects of these, there could be pressures on implementation.

## Conclusions

- Quality at entry has emerged from the plateau of around 85% *MS+* reported in FY02–03, and is at the 90–plus goal set by management, with clear internalization of policy and process requirements in procurement and FM, and good underpinning of operations in country/sector knowledge and strategies.
- There is still significant scope for improvement on:
  - sharpening realism/clarity of DO and their linkage to the project components;
  - implementation schedules and arrangements, especially for M&E and capacity building;
  - risk assessment and feedback into design;
  - attention to social and gender aspects;
  - efficiency of resource use;
  - taking on board more systematically peer reviewers' and QER advice; and
  - oversight/guidance from sector management.
- "Simple and repeater" operations have not sacrificed quality, but show significant savings in processing time and costs (about 30–40%). In a few cases, despite significant new features/lessons yet to be internalized, operations classified as "repeaters" did not receive adequate attention or managerial guidance.

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- An increasing number of highly visible projects are multi-country, regional and even global (HIV/AIDS treatment; locust control; river basin management, etc). Examples of both good and poor practice in QEA7 suggest a need for more uniform attention to analytical rigor and applied economics in such operations while ensuring a rapid response to important constituencies.
- Notwithstanding the higher proportion of operations rated overall as having acceptable quality (*MS+*), the Bank can contribute to better development outcomes on about 30–40% of the new operations which are rated *moderately satisfactory* in every Regional cohort other than LCR.
- Quality in AFR remains static, and operations in low-CPIA countries are rated as a group lower in quality. However, such results are not driven by country context but by inconsistent quality of Bank inputs and processes, as AFR also has operations in such countries which are rated *satisfactory* or in one case *highly satisfactory*.
- The high rating for fiduciary aspects in QEA7 (100% *MS+*) is consistent with previous assessments and reflects internalization of operating policy and process in design of procurement and FM. It is up to supervision to ensure that appropriate design and risk mitigation features are actually implemented. Experience of Regions and INT data show issues in implementation of fraud and corruption. It would be appropriate to enhance capacity in preparation to identify potential risks through a multi-disciplinary approach, factoring in fiduciary, governance, and transparency aspects, while protecting staff to effectively delivery on the development mandate.

## **Recommendations**

➤ ***Senior Management:***

- Strengthen staff and managerial incentives for greater realism, tighter results frameworks, and candor on risks;
- Re-visit roles and responsibilities of sector managers for operational quality; and
- Ensure more consistent analytic rigor on quick response, high-visibility operations.

➤ ***OPCS:***

- Define, by end–FY06, modalities to strengthen the results frameworks in Bank-supported projects;
- Work with LCR to analyze further LCR’s good performance to disseminate good practices among other Regions;
- Improve guidance for ERLs to address implementation pressures caused by including non-emergency components with limited preparation of technical, financial and institutional aspects;
- Examine and propose improvements in the PAD format to promote greater clarity and rigor of presentation for all operations, and in particular for SWAp and GEF projects; and
- Clarify procedures for “repeater” operations so that projects with significant changes from the preceding operation or lessons yet to be internalized receive due attention from management during preparation.

➤ ***Regions and Sector Boards:***

- Act on QEA7 findings to improve quality; suggestions are provided in this report. Progress will be monitored by S+ results in the next evaluation.

## I. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

### OBJECTIVES

- The principal objective remained of promoting excellence in Bank performance by:
  - ***Increased accountability*** – through real-time feedback to management and staff on various aspects of quality at entry; and
  - ***Enhanced learning*** – through drawing conclusions for dissemination in key areas of operational quality and processes.
  
- A secondary objective, at the request of OPCS, was to analyze benefits in reduced preparation time and costs, and trade-offs, if any, with quality at entry for “simple/repeater” operations.

## METHODOLOGY

- The methodology and guidance questionnaires for investment lending were essentially the same as in previous assessments, with sharpening of focus on the Results Framework.
- Guidance for Development Policy Lending reflected OP/BP 8.60 and the report of the PREM/DEC/OPCS task force following QEA6. The questionnaire was reformulated to focus more sharply on the quality of the program supported.
- A Stage 2 assessment was available to all (16) operations rated *less than moderately satisfactory* in the first review. Where Regions continued to express disagreement; QAG carried out independent managerial validations of the panel assessments, taking into account the Regional rejoinders. All such reviews in QEA7 (for 3 projects) confirmed the panels' judgments.
- To mainstream learning, QEA7 had participation by observers (in 77 panels). QEA7 also targeted learning by increasing participation of current senior Bank staff/managers as panelists (at a high of 60%). Their presence did not inhibit objectivity of judgments.
- A new 6-point ratings scale (*highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory*) was used, as in QSA6, and similar to the scale used by OED. Mapping of ratings with the previous 4-point scale are shown in the table below.

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- The critical cut-off point in the 6-point scale is between 3 and 4.
- QAG confirmed, through an independent review of all operations rated 3 or 4 in QEA7, that this cut-off corresponds to the previous distinction between 2 and 3 on the 4-point scale.
- Improvements in ratings reported on QEA7 are therefore not ascribable to the change in the scale.
- Ratings of 3 and lower indicate scope for improvement.

<b>QEA7 Six point scale</b>	<b>QEA6 Four point scale</b>
<b>Satisfactory</b>	
<i>1 = Highly satisfactory</i>	<i>1 = Highly satisfactory</i> ----- <i>2 = Satisfactory</i>
<i>2 = Satisfactory</i>	
<i>3 = Moderately satisfactory</i>	
<b>Less than satisfactory (Below the Line)</b>	
<i>4 = Moderately unsatisfactory</i>	<i>3 = Marginally satisfactory</i> ----- <i>4 = Unsatisfactory</i>
<i>5 = Unsatisfactory</i>	
<i>6 = Highly unsatisfactory</i>	

## **SAMPLE AND ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS**


- The QEA7 sample included 130 out of 571 operations approved in FY04–05:
  - ***By source of funding:*** IDA—73; IBRD—40; GEF—12; SPF—5; and
  - ***By lending instrument:*** 16 DPLs; 114 Investment Projects, of which—81 SILs, 12 APLs, 9 ERLs, 7 TALs, 3 SIMs, 1 FIL, and 1 LIL.
  
- The sample was stratified first by Region and then by “simple/repeater” status.
  
- Sampling fractions were set for each Region based on *a priori* probabilities indicated by QEA5–6 results, with the minimum sample size for a Region at 15 operations.

(cont'd)

- ***Weighting:*** Each operation in the sample was assigned a weight, which was the inverse of the ratio of the sample size in the respective stratum by Region and “Simple/Repeater” status to the portion of the universe from which the sample was drawn.
- ***Results in this report are presented on a weighted basis*** to adjust for over/under-representation in the sample because of stratification and sample design.
- ***QEA7 results are statistically robust:***
  - Bank-wide, at a confidence level of 95%, with a margin of error of +/- 5%; and
  - For Regional/Network/"Simple and Repeater" cohorts, at 90%; +/- 10%.
- ***Results are not robust for small cohorts*** (MNA, FSE, PSDN, several sectors and lending instruments).
- ***A comparison of OED evaluated outcomes with QEA results*** for over 240 operations shows that QAG panel judgments are a good statistical predictor of *unsatisfactory* outcomes (see Slide 19).


**Figure 1: QAG vs. OED Ratings**

- Operations rated *less than satisfactory* in QEA are about twice as likely as others to have *unsatisfactory* evaluated outcomes on exit several years later.
- However, QEA ratings of *less than satisfactory* are not the last word, and there is scope for improving outcomes during implementation.
- Conversely, a rating of *satisfactory or better* in QEA should not lead to complacency during supervision, which is important for outcomes.



## II. ASSESSMENT FINDINGS

Figure 2: Bank-wide Results, QEA1-7



\* QEA4 (FY00/01) was based on a random sample of 100 projects approved by the Board between January 1, 2000 to Jun 30, 2001.


## Bank-wide Results

- **The QEA7 overall result** (92% *MS+*) shows improvement from the level recorded in QEA5–6 (86%) and is at the accountability target of *90-plus %* set by Senior Management. All major quality dimensions are rated at or around 90% *MS+*.
- The highest-rated quality dimension in QEA7 is Fiduciary Aspects (procurement and FM), at *100% MS+*, with only 5% of operations rated *MS*. This result shows good internalization of policies and process in design: supervision would still need to address issues of implementation.
- Other particularly strong aspects, with less than 10% of the sample showing scope for improvement, are:
  - Consistency with country/sector strategies;
  - Country and sector knowledge underpinning operations;
  - Quality of environmental assessments;
  - Clarity of role definitions and mandates for implementing agencies;
  - Continuity and experience of task teams; and
  - Quality of support from LEG and LOA.
- "Simple and repeater" operations have not sacrificed quality, but show significant savings in processing time and costs (about 30–40%), although in some cases of "repeaters" there were significant changes from the previous operation or important lessons yet to be internalized which did not receive sufficient attention.

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- Panelists rated 29% of the operations in QEA7 “3”, above the threshold of acceptability overall, but showing missed opportunities to enhance development impact. They also rated 8% of the sample as below the accountability standard.
- QEA7 panels note scope for improvement as particularly significant (on one-third to half the sample) regarding:
  - sharpening realism/clarity of DOs and their linkage with project components;
  - implementation schedules and arrangements, especially for M&E and capacity building;
  - risk assessment and feedback into design;
  - attention to social and gender aspects;
  - efficiency of resource use;
  - taking on board more systematically peer reviewers’ and QER advice; and
  - oversight/guidance from sector management.
- The scope for improvement on operations rated “3” is shown graphically as the space between the two quality “diamonds” in Slide 27.
- The distinction between operations rated “3” and those rated “4” and “5” is along a continuum, and represents the best cumulative judgment of panelists along several quality dimensions.

**Figure 3: QEA7 Bank-wide Ratings (%)**



\* 2 projects were rated *unsatisfactory*, accounting for 0.5% of the sample, rounded off to 0%.

## **Operations Rated *Highly Satisfactory***

- 8% of the sample is rated *highly satisfactory*, compared with the average of 11% in QEA5–6.
- LCR has the highest proportion of operations with *highly satisfactory* quality at entry (21% of the Regional sample), while EAP and MNA have no operations in this category.
- Operations rated *highly satisfactory* are characterized by:
  - High strategic relevance;
  - Thoughtful choice of approach;
  - Sharp results frameworks and fully satisfactory or superior arrangements for M&E;
  - Strength of policy and institutional understanding and design;
  - Good integration of social and poverty considerations;
  - Clear and realistic implementation arrangements; and
  - Excellent Bank inputs – staff and managerial – and processes of a high standard.

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### **Operations Rated *Highly Satisfactory***

<b>Region</b>	<b>Network</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Project Name</b>
AFR	PREM	Cape Verde	PRSC
AFR	HDN	Eritrea	HIV/AIDS/STI/TB/Malaria/RH
ECA	INF	Romania	Mine Closure
ECA	PREM	Romania	Prog. Adj. Loan
LCR	HDN	Argentina	Public Mat. & Child Health SAL
LCR	HDN	Chile	Social Protection
LCR	PREM	El Salvador	Broad-Based Growth
LCR	PREM	Nicaragua	PRSC I
SAR	INF	Afghanistan	Emerg. Communications
SAR	INF	Nepal	Rural Access

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## Good Practice Examples


### Eritrea, HIV/AIDS/STI/TB/Malaria/RH

- ***A “repeater” project, prepared in two months, built on strong borrower ownership with realism***
  - Systematically applied lessons from the previous operation;
  - Health Ministry, President and VP of country, plus various line ministries closely involved in preparation with joint Bank-country reviews;
  - Permitted prudent management of scarce country financial and human resources; and
  - Integrated social aspects of behavior, poverty, gender across interventions.
- ***Design was responsive***
  - Refocused on high-risk groups and targeted specific geographical areas;
  - Allowed flexibility through periodic adjustments in funds allocation based on performance and new evidence during implementation;
  - Balanced responsibilities between central and local government and communities; and
  - Included RH program – a clear sector priority and unmet need.
- ***Corrected weakness in M&E***
  - Helped finalize and implement national M&E framework with KPI with better balance between disease surveillance and program management; and
  - Added M&E specialist to PMU staff.

### El Salvador, Programmatic Broad-Based Growth DPL

- ***Good strategic choice and sequencing***
  - Sequenced approach to the country’s development;
  - Well-conceived and targeted medium-term program in support of government’s own initiatives; and
  - Simple program design without clutter in reform agenda.
- ***Correct focus in first DPL of series on initial building blocks***
  - Fiscal measures to stem growth of debt, ensure space for social investments; and
  - Growth, with emphasis on widening trade opportunities, continuing public sector modernization.
- ***Strong ownership and solid preparation***
  - Ruling and opposition parties support approach;
  - Top-quality in-country consultation and dissemination;
  - Built on extensive, excellent, well-focused AAA program;
  - Consultation with the poor to meet needs of vulnerable; and
  - Hands-on participation of CD and Lead Economist.
- ***Clear Benefits***
  - Helps diversify and secure financing on better terms; and
  - Approach leading to DPL helped return country to borrowing status.

**Figure 4: Results by Quality Dimension**



- R1 = Strategic Relevance and Approach
- R2 = Technical, Financial and Economic Aspects
- R3 = Poverty, Gender and Social Development
- R4 = Environmental Aspects
- R5 = Fiduciary Aspects
- R6 = Policy and Institutional Aspects
- R7 = Implementation Arrangements
- R8 = Risk Assessment
- R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

## **Results by Quality Dimension**

- QEA7 shows improvement over the QEA5–6 average on all quality dimensions on the accountability benchmark (*MS+*).
- Scope for further improvement is greatest on: Implementation Arrangements, (including M&E), *S+* at 56%; Risk Assessment (including risk management/mitigation), *S+* at 69%; and Bank Inputs and Processes, *S+* at 59%.
- Good internalization in design of policies and process is reflected on Fiduciary Aspects, rated at 95% *S+*. This result, consistent with high ratings on previous assessments, on both procurement and FM, still means, of course, that appropriate design needs to be followed through in implementation.
- Compliance is good on ENV and Social safeguards, with scope for further improvement on resettlement and pest management related processes.

## **Operations Rated *Moderately Satisfactory***

- Sample comments from panelists on operations rated *moderately satisfactory*:
  - Project activities could have been linked better to DO with improved management of implementation risks; the baseline is incomplete and critical information is missing;
  - Opportunities were missed to seek to improve performance; a stop-gap measure was reluctantly agreed for the implementing agency; provisions for training are unclear and sustainability is in doubt;
  - Designs and bidding documents for works were not ready, and Borrower commitment to the proposed reforms seems less than complete;
  - Project design was overly elaborate. The Bank should have questioned the appropriateness and realism of the M&E indicators, and supported counterparts to arrive at key, simple indicators;
  - Responsibilities of the two responsible ministries are not clearly defined, and indicators are only very loosely linked to the main DO, without specific targets, even broad ranges;
  - The panel found little justification for the scale of the on-lending which was out of proportion to the reform program or budget. Insufficient attention was given to larger questions of social risk. Management’s decisions for reasons of “country relations” should be accompanied by greater candor; and
  - The project missed important opportunities for increasing impact, which were raised during project design. Speedy processing was preferred, but paradoxically, approval of the project nearly a year ago has not been followed by rapid disbursement.


## **Results for "Simple and Repeater" Operations**

- QEA7, responding to a request from OPCS, was stratified to permit conclusions on quality at entry of “simple/repeater” operations, of which there were 30 in the sample.
- Overall, and in most quality dimensions, quality at entry is similar between “simple/repeater” (91% *MS+*) and other operations.
- Scope for improvement is greatest for the group of “simple/repeater” operations on poverty and social aspects and implementation arrangements including M&E.
- Savings in time and preparation costs were substantial on “simple/repeater” operations: about 43% and 32%, respectively.
- In a few instances of “repeaters” there were significant differences with the previous operation or lessons not internalized – greater management attention to these aspects in processing would have helped enhance entry quality.

## **DOs and Results Focus**

- Each assessment included questions to position the operation in terms of likelihood and sustainability of achievement of the DOs listed by the team as of *high* importance.
- As in other recent evaluations, Institutional Development/Capacity Building is the most widely cited DO (59%); followed by Infrastructure Development; Structural/Sector Policy Reform; and Human Development. Poverty Reduction is considered of high importance by task teams in one-fourth of the operations.
- Panelists rate likelihood of achieving DOs highest for operations which target improved macroeconomic management (98%) or infrastructure (85%). They rate most other DOs, including Poverty Reduction, as likely to be achieved in around two-thirds of the operations.
- The consistency of design with outcomes in the DOs shows scope for improvement in 30% of the sample; clarity, realism, and definition of project scope can be improved in 40% of the operations.
- In addition, availability and quality of baseline surveys, arrangements for evaluating impact and measuring outcomes could be strengthened in 40–50% of the sample.

**Figure 5: Results by Region**



## Results by Region

➤ **Regions above the Bank average:**


- *LCR* (95% *MS+*), while only slightly above its QEA5–6 average (92%), is the best-performing Region on quality at entry. It has the smallest proportion of any Region of its cohort rated *moderately satisfactory* (90% *S+*) and also the highest proportion rated *highly satisfactory*;
- *ECA*, at 99% *MS+* showed improvement from QEA5–6 (88%). However, about one-third of *ECA* operations are rated *moderately satisfactory*, with room for improvement on the aspects noted generically Bank-wide;
- *MNA* (100% *MS+*), has results very superior to QEA5–6 (69%), but the cohort is small, and *MNA* also has over 40% of its cohort rated *moderately satisfactory*. Scope for improvement on poverty and social aspects is reported on over half the *MNA* cohort, and on implementation readiness and realism of implementation schedules, on one-third of the cohort; and
- *SAR* (95% *MS+*) also shows improvement over QEA5–6 (81%), but has 43% of its cohort rated *moderately satisfactory*, with greatest scope for improvement on M&E (two-thirds of the cohort) and quality/realism of capacity building (half the cohort).

(cont'd)

➤ ***Regions below the Bank average:***

- *AFR* (83% *MS+*) shows little change overall from QEA5–6 (81%). 30% of the cohort is rated *moderately satisfactory*. Skills mix showed scope for improvement in over one-third of the operations, and value added by sector management in half the cohort. Operations in low-CPIA countries in AFR have lower quality at entry than others in the Regional cohort, but several AFR operations in such countries are also rated *S+*, indicating that the issue is of ensuring more uniform standards; and
  
- *EAP* (89% *MS+*), shows some decline overall from QEA5–6 (95%). Panelists note scope for improvement on efficiency of processing and value added by management in two-thirds of EAP operations. 38% of the EAP cohort is rated *moderately satisfactory*.

Figure 6: Results by Network




## Results by Network

- **PREM (93% MS+)** showed improvement overall from QEA5–6 (84%), and in several dimensions, with particular strength on policy and institutional aspects. Panelists rate only 12% of the cohort as with scope for further improvement (88% S+).
- **ESSD (88% MS+)** results mark a slight decline from QEA5–6 (91%), with scope for improvement on about half the cohort.
- **INF (95% MS+)** overall entry quality improved from 83% in QEA5–6, but shows scope for further improvement on about 30% of the cohort.
- **HDN (90% MS+)** results also improved overall, from 82% in QEA5–6, with further scope for improvement on about 40% of the cohort.

## Results by Sector

- Among the **sectors** with large cohorts in the sample:
  - The Rural Sector (87% *MS+*) shows some decline (from 94% in QEA5–6), and results indicate significant scope for improvement on almost half the cohort. Apart from items noted more generally Bank-wide, borrower ownership; quality of economic analysis/rationale; and appropriateness/realism of conditionality are aspects signaled for such improvement;
  - HNP (89% *MS+*) also shows a slight decline (from 93%), and scope for improvement on about half the cohort, especially on policy and institutional aspects and implementation arrangements and readiness, including M&E; and
  - The Education Sector (83% *MS+*) improved significantly overall (from 62% in QEA6), but shows greatest scope for improvement on implementation readiness and arrangements, including M&E, in about 60% of the cohort.

**Figure 7: Results by Source of Funding**



## Results by Source of Funding

- Results for IDA-funded operations are, at 91% *MS+*, only slightly below those for IBRD (95%) confirming the QEA6 finding that the previous large variation had been closed. Scope for improvement is similar, on about one-third of the cohort.
- IDA results lag IBRD and show greater scope for improvement on adequacy of institutional capacity building measures and quality of risk assessment. IDA operations are considered significantly less likely than IBRD operations to reach HD, Poverty Reduction, and PSD DOs.
- Results for low-CPIA countries (83% *MS+*) are significantly below those for high-CPIA borrowers (96%), overall, and on:
  - realism/scope of DOs, and arrangements for monitoring and evaluating results;
  - quality/coherence of economic analysis;
  - appropriateness/realism of conditionality and capacity building measures;
  - prospects for timely completion;
  - risk assessment/management in design; and
  - quality of sector management inputs.
- The overall result for the small GEF cohort (12 operations) was comparable, at 89% *MS+*, to the Bank-wide average.

## **Results by Lending Instrument, TTL Location, etc.**

- Results for Development Policy Lending (100% *MS+*), show improvement over QEA5–6 (84%). Quality at entry of DPLs is rated higher than for investment lending overall (91% *MS+*) and on several quality dimensions, with the difference being widest on implementation arrangements, including M&E, and Bank inputs and processes.
- Results for other instruments, such as ERLs (a cohort of 9), TALs (a cohort of 7) are not statistically robust because of small numbers. However, the cumulative results for APLs from QEA5–7 (26 operations) show considerable scope for improvement in implementation arrangements including triggers of performance in about half the operations.
- Results for the small cohort of 23 operations with TTLs in the field were better (97% *MS+*) than for the 107 operations where they were at HQ (91%).
- Operations with smaller loan-size (less than \$25 million) had slightly lower quality (87% *MS+*) than others, esp. on implementation readiness and M&E.

## **Bank Inputs and Processes**

- Panelists rate Bank inputs and processes overall at 89% *MS+*, at almost the same level as in QEA6. They signal scope for improvement on about 40% of entering operations (*S+* at 59%).
- Strengths noted by panelists are in:
  - Continuity of the task team;
  - Appropriate choice of peer reviewers; and
  - Support from the Network Anchors, Legal, LOA.
- Areas signaled by panels for improvement are:
  - Time taken to process the operation (one-third with scope for improvement);
  - Sector management inputs (one-half with scope for improvement);
  - Use of advice from QERs and peer reviewers (one-third with scope for improvement); and
  - Candor, clarity and completeness of documents (one-half with scope for improvement); many panelists also considered that the PAD format is not conducive to clear or adequate substantive analysis and presentation.

## Systemic Observations of Panels

- In *high-visibility operations of global importance and urgency*, the Bank's interventions need to be fast enough to respond to important constituencies, but if these are not sufficiently evidence-based or rigorous in analytics and applied economics, the Bank's effectiveness as well as its reputation could be impaired.
- For *financial intermediation not classified as FRLs*, such as in agriculture/rural development; energy; and social sectors, guidelines of OP8.30 need to be followed more systematically regarding design and sustainability of the intermediaries to avoid indefinite dependence on subsidies. Non-compliance, when justified by circumstances should be based on an explicit management decision.
- *ERLs* increasingly have non-emergency components with relatively limited preparation of technical/financial/institutional aspects, putting more pressure on implementation. Processing (documentary) requirements for post-conflict operations should be further simplified to eliminate standard annexes which are difficult to expect in such situations.
- Focus on *institutional development and capacity building* should be accompanied by more explicit attention to incentives required for players to develop and use these capacities, be set in a more holistic country/sector framework, and the objectives should be more realistic.
- For HIV/AIDS projects, while the standard *MAP* template has served the Bank and its clients well, there is need to improve implementation arrangements and M&E in specific country situations.

## **Suggestions to Regions and Sector Boards to Improve Quality**

➤ ***Regions:***

- *AFR* should develop an action plan to move up from the plateau of the last several years, specifically through more uniform quality on operations in low-CPIA countries; and
- *EAP* should examine how to raise efficiency of resource use and quality of managerial inputs in project processing.

➤ ***Sector Boards:***

- The Rural Sector Board should verify if the decline in entry quality is more widespread, and if so, prepare an action plan for improvement;
- The Education Sector Board should support and consolidate the trend of improvement reported, with special focus on realism of DOs and implementation schedules;
- WBI, in collaboration with OPCS and the Public Sector Governance Board should help strengthen focus, realism and quality of institutional development and capacity building components in operations;
- The SDV Sector Board, in collaboration with Regions, should help enhance attention to SD aspects more generally, and gender, in particular, in design;
- FSB should, in collaboration with ARD, SDV, and EWD, improve attention to sustainability for financial intermediation in operations not classified as FILs in terms of OP8.60;
- The Procurement and FM Sector Boards should advise on how to improve follow-up during implementation of design for fiduciary aspects, including through enhancing capacity for identifying at the preparation stage risks which could later emerge in implementation;
- The Poverty Reduction Board should advise on how to enhance poverty focus of operations at entry and improve design for achievement of the Poverty Reduction DO; and
- HDN should help strengthen attention to implementation arrangements and readiness as well as M&E for outcomes in HIV/AIDS operations.

## Feedback from TTLs, Panelists and Observers

- The 156 TTLs, 177 panelists, and 72 observers who participated in QEA7 were requested to rate and comment on the quality and performance of panels, the assessment approach and process, and usefulness of QEA. Response rates were: TTLs—58%; Panelists—73%; Observers—82%.
- Key *MS+* ratings of responding TTLs are regarding:
  - Panels' skills mix—93%;
  - Fairness and professionalism—89%;
  - Familiarity with country specific issues—74%;
  - Level of burden placed on the TT—93%;
  - Learning through the assessment—76%; and
  - Overall—80%.
- *S+* ratings of TTLs flagged scope for improvement by QAG in enhancing focus/value of interviews and country knowledge of panels; QAG will work on both. Familiarity with country issues already shows a significant improvement, from 55% in QEA6. Since the main objective of QEA is accountability, it is also encouraging that three-fourths of TTLs consider it at least *moderately satisfactory* for learning.
- Panelists (98% *MS+*) and observers (95%) rated overall QAG performance in QEA7 considerably higher than TTLs. TTLs receiving ratings of *S+* on their operations also had far more favorable feedback on QEA7 than other TTLs, who seemed to reflect dissatisfaction with the ratings outcomes. The overall rating by TTLs for QEA7 is at the same level as in QEA6 (79%).

(cont'd)

- In QEA7 TTLs were asked to rate and comment on selected factors affecting project quality positively or negatively. Responding TTLs rated high as positive factors: task team skill mix (97% *MS+*) and donor coordination (88%).
- TTL satisfaction with support from sector and country management (96–99% *MS+*) was also high, as in QEA6 – but did not coincide with panelists’ lower ratings of sector management.
- Three-fourths of the TTLs considered budget availability as at least *moderately satisfactory* for preparation, and 83% the preparation time.
- Sign-off on procurement and FM was provided by accredited team members in the great majority of projects; for social and ENV safeguards this was still largely provided by Regional specialists outside the task team. Task team expressed satisfaction with such delegation where it had taken place.

### III. FOLLOW UP TO QEA6 RECOMMENDATIONS: A SCORE CARD

Issue	Actions Taken	Results	QAG Rating of Follow-up
Quality of adj. loans, esp. in LCR	OPCS/DEC/PREM task force examined issues raised by QEA6 and made recommendations to clarify preparation and improve QAG methodology in light of OP/BP 8.60	QEA7 does not raise similar issues	S
Lower quality of MNA operations	Region carried out training for TTLs	MS+ at 100% but considerable scope for further improvement on S+ basis	MS
Crisis/conflict responses: need to strengthen strategic relevance/approach, technical, econ., fin. aspects	Guidance from task force on adj. loans; continuing work to revise OP/BP on emergency lending	Issues continue- variable tech. rigor on high-visibility, quick response operations and ERLs	MS
Realism of DOs	Sr. Mngt. messages	Still a major issue	U
Candor of risk assessment and incorporation in design	Continuing training and support by Regional quality units and Networks	Progress as seen in MS+ results; still considerable scope for improvement	MU
ENV aspects of IBRD oper. and SECALs	Continuing support from ENV to task teams; clearer guidance in OP/BP 8.60	Improvement in QEA7 on IBRD operations and DPLs	S
Quality of Econ. Policy, Educ., and Urb. Dev. Operations	Continuing support from Sector Boards	Improvement in Econ. Policy & Educ. Oper. although still scope for further improvement on Educ. Projects. No specific issues in Urb. Dev. Projects in QEA7, but too few for judgment	Econ. Policy: HS Education : MS Urban Dev. : NR
<b>Overall rating of follow-up to QEA6</b>			<b>MS</b>

**Annex 1****LIST OF QEA7 OPERATIONS**

<b><i>Africa (AFR)</i></b>		<b><i>East Asia and Pacific (EAP)</i></b>	
Africa	3A-Afr Emergency Locust Prj (BD FY05)	China	CN - Jiangxi Integrated Agric. Modern.
Africa	Senegal River Basin GEF Project	China	CN-Wuhan Urban Transport
Africa	3A-Regional HIV/AIDS Treatment Prj (FY04)	China	CN-GUANGDONG/PRD UR ENVMT
Cameroon	Educ. Dev. Capacity Building	Indonesia	Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas
Cape Verde	CV-Road Sector Support SIL (FY05)	Indonesia	ID-UJPP3
Cape Verde	CV-PRSC (FY05)	Indonesia	ID-USDRP
Chad	TD-Local Dev Prog Sup APL (FY05)	Lao People's Democratic Republic	LA - APL2 Road Maintenance Program
Congo, Democratic Republic of	CD-Emergen Living Conditions Impr (FY05)	Mongolia	MN-UB SERVICES IMPROVMT 2
Congo, Republic of	CG-HIV/AIDS & Health SIL (FY04)	Philippines	PH LAGUNA DE BAY INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHEN
Congo, Republic of	Support to Basic Education	Philippines	PH: Diversified Farm Income & Mkt. Devt
Eritrea	ER-HIV/AIDS/STI/TB/Malaria/RH SIL (FY05)	Philippines	PH-GEF-Electric Cooprtv System Loss Redu
Ethiopia	ET-Post Secondary Education SIL (FY05)	Timor-Leste	TP-POWER SECTOR PRIORITY INVESTMENTS
Ethiopia	ET-ICT Assisted Development SIM (FY05)	Tonga	TO-HEALTH SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT
Ghana	GH-Community Based Rural Dev	Vietnam	VN-ROAD NETWORK IMPROVT
Ghana	GH-Urban Env Sanitation 2 (BD FY04)	Vietnam	VN-2nd Rural Energy
Kenya	KE-GEF W KE Int Ecosys Mgmt SIL (FY05)		
Malawi	Education Sector Support Project 1		
Malawi	MW-GDLN LIL (FY04)		
Mali	ML: SAC IV		
Mauritania	MR: Integr. Dev. Prog. for Irr. Agric - APL2		
Mauritania	MR Higher Education		
Mozambique	MZ Energy Reform and Access Project		
Namibia	NA-GEF Intgrtd CB Ecosystm Mgmt (FY04)		
Niger	Financial Sector		
Rwanda	RW-Public Sector Cap Bldg TAL (FY05)		
Senegal	SN-GIRMAC SIL (FY05)		
Senegal	Private Sector Adjustment Credit		
South Africa	ZA-GEF Great Addo SIL (FY04)		
Tanzania	Second Health Sector Dev.		
Zambia	ZM-Road Rehab Maintenance Prj (FY04)		

(cont'd)

## LIST OF QEA7 OPERATIONS

<i>Europe and Central Asia (ECA)</i>		<i>Latin America and the Caribbean (LCR)</i>	
Albania	INTGD WATER/ECOSYS MGMT (GEF)	Argentina	AR-Prov. Maternal-Child Hlth Adj PMCHSAL
Albania	ECSEE APL #2 (ALBANIA)	Brazil	BR GEF-RJ Sust IEM in Prod Landscapes
Armenia	IRRIG DAM SAFETY 2	Brazil	BR-(Amapa) Sustainable Communities
Armenia	SOC PROT ADMIN	Brazil	BR-PERNAMBUCO INTEG DEVT: EDUC QUAL IMPR
Armenia	PUB SECT MOD	Brazil	BR PRGM. FISCAL REF - SOCIAL SEC REFORM
Azerbaijan	RURAL INVSM (AZRIP)	Chile	CL-Social Protection TA Loan
Azerbaijan	PENSION & SOC ASST	Chile	GEF CL Sus Trans & Air Quality Santiago
Azerbaijan	IDP ECON DEVT SUPPORT	Colombia	CO- 2nd Prog. Labor & Social Sector Ref
Bosnia-Herzegovina	EMPLYMT 2	Costa Rica	CR EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY OF EDUCATION
Croatia	RENEW ENERGY RES (GEF)	Dominican Republic	DO Social Crisis Response Adjustment Loa
Georgia	SEC/LOC ROADS	Dominican Republic	DO Power Sector TA Project
Kazakhstan	AGRIC COMPETITIVENESS	El Salvador	SV (CRL2) Program. Broad-Based Growth DP
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of	PSMAL 2	Guyana	GY: HIV/AIDS PREVENTION & CONTROL
Moldova	ENERGY 2	Honduras	HN LAND ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM
Romania	IRRIG REHAB	Honduras	HN FORESTS & RURAL PRODUCTIVITY
Romania	MINE CLOSURE, ENV & SOCIO-ECO REG (CRL)	Honduras	HN Nuestras Raices Program
Romania	ECSEE APL #1 (CRL)	Honduras	HN Trade Facilitatio & Productivity Enha
Romania	PAL	Nicaragua	NI - (APL2)HEALTH SECTOR II
Russian Federation	KAZAN MUNICIPAL DEVT	Nicaragua	NICARAGUA PRSC I
Serbia and Montenegro	HEALTH SYSTEM (MONTENEGRO)	St. Lucia	LC Water Supply Infrastr. Improvement
Serbia and Montenegro	TRNSPT REHAB		
Turkey	SEISMIC RISK MITIGATION		
Turkey	PSSP 2		
Turkey	RENEW ENERGY		
Turkey	PFPSAL 3		

(cont'd)

## LIST OF QEA7 OPERATIONS

<b><i>Middle East and North Africa (MNA)</i></b>		<b><i>South Asia (SAR)</i></b>	
Egypt, Arab Republic of	Integrated Irrig Improv. & Mgmt.	Afghanistan	AF Investment Guarantee Facility
Egypt, Arab Republic of	EG-Early Childhood Education Enhancement	Afghanistan	Strengthening Higher Education Program
Iran, Islamic Republic of	BAM EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY RECONSTRUCTION	Afghanistan	AF: Emergency Communications Development
Iran, Islamic Republic of	IR-URBAN UPGRADING AND HOUSING REFORM	Afghanistan	Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project
Iraq	IQ-TF Emergency Textbook Provision	Bangladesh	HNP Sector Program
Iraq	IQ-TF EMERG. WATER, SANITATION & URBAN	Bangladesh	Economic Management TA Program (EMTAP)
Iraq	IQ-EMERGENCY PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT	Bangladesh	Development Support Credit II
Tunisia	TN - ECAL IV	Bhutan	Decentralized Rural Development
Tunisia	TN-ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM/INDUSTRIAL	Bhutan	HIV/AIDS and STI Prevention and Control
Tunisia	TN-ICT Sector Development Project	India	Uttar Wtrshed
Tunisia	TN-EXPORT DEVELOPMENT II	India	Assam Agric Competitiveness
West Bank and Gaza	GZ-Social Safety Net Reform Project	India	GEF Biosafety Project
Yemen, Republic of	RY-Groundwater & Soil Conserv Proj	India	RAJASTHAN HEALTH SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
Yemen, Republic of	RY-THIRD PUBLIC WORKS	India	India Tsunami ERC
<b>Other (OTH)</b>		India	MAHAR RWSS
World	Targeted Research for Coral Reefs	India	ALLAHABAD BYPASS
		Maldives	Integrated Human Development Project
		Nepal	Education for All Project
		Nepal	Rural Access Improve. & Decentralization
		Nepal	Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Project
		Pakistan	NWFP Community Infrastructure II ( CIP2)
		Pakistan	Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehab. & Modern
		Pakistan	Second Poverty Alleviation Fund Project
		Pakistan	NWFP SAC II
		Pakistan	Tax Administration Reform Project

**Annex 2**

**QUALITY AT ENTRY ASSESSMENT IN FY04-05 (QEA7)**

**APPROACH PAPER**

**INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES**

1. Quality at Entry is often a prime determinant of successful development outcomes, and deficiencies in design are difficult to correct during implementation. Beginning with the assessment of Quality at Entry for calendar 1997 (QEA1), QAG has carried out six such assessments, the most recent, QEA6, covering FY03. After a steady improvement in the overall rating to 94% in FY00–01, entry quality has stabilized at a lower plateau of around 85% in FY02–03. Meanwhile, the most recent assessment of the quality of Bank supervision (QSA6, FY03–04), again signals that issues in quality at entry of projects are a major constraint to supervision and to reaching development outcomes, especially because of inadequate results frameworks, unrealistic objectives, and lack of readiness for implementation.

2. The objectives of QEA7 are to:

- Provide management and staff with real-time feedback on various aspects of Quality at Entry at the Bank-wide, Regional, and Network levels;
- Draw conclusions for learning and dissemination in key areas of operational quality and processes; and
- Analyze benefits in reduced preparation time, and trade-offs, if any, with quality at entry, for “simple/repeater” operations on a fast-track.

**AREAS OF FOCUS**

3. Several of the areas of focus of QEA7 flow from the findings of QEA6 and QSA6:

- Results focus at entry and realism of DOs;
- Readiness for implementation;
- Risk assessment—balance between risk and reward, the lowest area of quality in QEA6, and at a similar level in QEA3–5; and
- Environmental aspects in IBRD operations, where a downturn was noted by QEA6.

4. QEA7 will verify if improvements reported in QEA6 on IDA operations, social and poverty, policy and institutional aspects, M&E, and Bank inputs and processes have been

sustained. To the extent QEA6 drew lessons on “crisis response” operations and adjustment lending, QEA7 will also report on relevant developments in quality in these areas.

#### SAMPLE SELECTION, COVERAGE AND ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS

5. QEA7 would cover all operations approved in FY04–05, for a universe expected at about 550 operations, and a sample of 125 operations. The sample will cover about 23% by number of the approvals in FY04–05.

- To reduce evaluation load on TTLs of multiple assessments, QAG will exclude operations for which TTLs or specific tasks were covered by specified QAG assessments (QSA6, Other ESW, NLTA<sup>1</sup>) with interviews of the TTL since April 2004, or which were subject recently to IAD or Inspection Panel review, or which have already exited the portfolio and have been evaluated by OED;
- The sample of 125 operations will be publicly drawn on a random basis, stratified by Region and “simple/repeater” status. A brief note to explain sample stratification and weighting is attached; and
- QEA7 results will be statistically robust, Bank-wide, at a confidence level of 95% +/- 5%, and at the level of most Regions, Networks, and for “simple/repeater” operations at about 90% +/- 10%. Results for smaller cohorts, such as MNA (+/- 16%), FSE, several sectors and lending instruments, would not be statistically robust to the same degree.

#### METHODOLOGY

6. The main assessment focus would continue to remain: “Are we doing the right thing, and are we doing it right?” Panels would assess the quality of the operation at Board approval, and the process/inputs to get to that stage. The *Guidance Questionnaire* for panels would structure the interviews with task teams. Apart from some simplification and shortening, the *Guidance Questionnaire for Investment Lending* is essentially the same as used in QEA6. It has been improved for sharper focus on Results Framework, based on feedback received. A copy of the template is attached.

7. Development Policy Lending: Guidance to panelists will reflect OP/BP 8.60 on Development Policy Lending, approved by the Board on September 1, 2004, and the report of the PREM/DEC/OPCS task force on evaluating quality at entry of adjustment lending operations following QEA6. The *Guidance Questionnaire for Adjustment Lending* has been reformulated to focus more sharply on the quality of the program being supported (rather than the type of instrument being used); provide a brief checklist for “crisis lending;” recognize the specific nature of programmatic operations; and outline a framework for evaluating the macro-policy framework. A copy of the template is attached.

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<sup>1</sup> Given the significant miscoding of NLTA, clearly operations which were miscoded and not actually assessed will not count for exclusion of the TTL.

8. Panelists will assess “simple/repeater” operations processed according to streamlined procedures focusing on: (i) overall quality of these operations; (ii) implementation readiness; (iii) gains in preparation time and costs; and (iv) any lessons for wider replication.

#### **ASSESSMENT PROCESS**

9. The following bullets summarize process on documentation, orientations, observers, panel selection and norms, QAG moderation, panel ratings, Stages 1 and 2 procedures and turn-around times:

- QAG will extract copies of relevant documents readily available electronically (Project Portal, IRIS), and request TTLs to provide the balance as specified in each notification to the TTL—in an electronic version, within 10 working days of notification;
- QAG will provide orientation sessions to TTLs, panelists, and observers;
- As in other recent evaluations, every assessment will be open to participation by observers nominated by their managers; the observers will not provide evaluation ratings;
- Panelists would be selected from senior (grade H+) and high-potential Bank staff, current and retired. Regions and Networks are requested to help enhance participation of current senior staff. Every operation will be reviewed by at least two panelists with substantial Bank experience, other than reviewers for specialized areas;
- QAG will make its best efforts to assuring that every panel has at least one panelist with relevant country background and language capacity, and also to allot a moderator with a similar profile and appropriate substantive expertise;
- Based on the successful experience under QEA6, external participants (from NGOs, bilateral donor agencies, the private sector, academia), would be invited as panelists to help provide an outsider perspective from development practitioners with relevant substantive/country insights. About half the panels in QEA7 are expected to have an external (third) panelist;
- Panelists would be expected to conduct their assessments in a spirit of cooperation and knowledge-enhancement, and ensure an expeditious turn-around so that teams/line managers can receive the assessment reports within two weeks of the panel interview;
- Panelists would strictly avoid situations of actual and potential conflict of interest—e.g., where they had prior involvement in preparation of the operation;
- Every assessment would be *moderated* by QAG to ensure professional rigor, objectivity, a collegial dynamic, consistency across operations, sectors, and

Regions. The moderator would guide panels on ratings and help them produce the first draft of the assessment report *within a day of the interview*;

- Following the Linn panel recommendation on QEA/QSA, stakeholder inputs will generally not be sought on individual operations, but as part of more global country lending/AAA assessments. However, in exceptional cases, where panels consider that inputs from some key stakeholders are essential for meaningful judgments, QAG will arrange to check with them after consulting with the TTL/line manager;
- Stage 1 assessments: Panels for these will work in 2–3 person teams, combining subject matter expertise with country background, development operational experience, and to the extent feasible, relevant language skills;
- Panelists will review documents and indicate to the task team as soon as possible, but no later than two days prior to the interview, on which aspects of the *Guidance Questionnaire* they expect to focus. Interviews with TTLs will include team members and sector/country managers/directors *at the discretion and request of the TTL*;
- Specialized reviewers in FM, environment, poverty and social aspects, will review these areas, contact specialists on the task teams, and advise the panels of their findings prior to the task team interviews. They would attend panel interviews only where there is still need for clarification/discussion after their bilateral contacts. Accordingly, task team specialists in these areas would also not need to attend panel interviews in most cases, reducing staff time inputs to the assessment;
- Ratings: Panelists' ratings will be on a six-point scale, similar to that used by OED in its evaluations, and recently introduced by QAG in QSA6.<sup>2</sup> Panelists are instructed to use the full range of the scale according to the standards explained below, and encouraged to provide comments to explain the basis for ratings. The overall rating is not an average, and not mechanistic, but requires careful judgment by panelists. Key areas for panelists to consider would be those related to

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<sup>2</sup> The six-point scale consists of the following ratings:

1 = *Highly Satisfactory*: An exemplary operation, demonstrating good practice in several areas of preparation and design, part of a sub-set, at the upper end, of *satisfactory* operations.

2 = *Satisfactory*: *Satisfactory or better* on all key areas of preparation and design, likely to meet stated Development Objectives, and complying with Bank policies and procedures. The operation also seeks to achieve rewards commensurate with risks.

3 = *Moderately Satisfactory*: *Satisfactory* on all key areas of preparation and design, but showing some deficiencies and missed opportunities, part of a sub-set at the lower end of *Satisfactory* operations.

4 = *Moderately Unsatisfactory*: Significant deficiencies in one or two areas of preparation and design, affecting prospects of reaching stated Development Objectives, or/and compliance with Bank policies and procedures; the risks are not commensurate with the rewards. At the upper end, in quality, of the set of *less than moderately satisfactory* (“below the line”) operations.

5 = *Unsatisfactory*: Significant deficiencies in several key areas of preparation/design.

6 = *Highly Unsatisfactory*: A broad pattern of deficiencies.

achieving stated Development Objectives for the operation, in the context of strategic relevance and approach, sound economic, financial, and technical rationale, compliant with Bank policies and procedures in the specific institutional, policy, and implementation context, with clear judgment on the balance between risks and rewards;

- QAG will provide the task team, sector and country managers, and Regional quality director, within two weeks of the panel interview, the draft assessment report, requesting comments within a week. QAG will then finalize the report, normally within two weeks of receiving the comments;
- Stage 2 Reviews: If the overall rating is *less than moderately satisfactory*, at the request of the Region, QAG will call together a fresh panel, and transmit its draft report within two weeks of the interview, for finalization within a week of transmittal. The Region could, at this stage, still express disagreement by providing a brief (one page) rejoinder, which would be part of the final report; and
- Since increasingly, Regions do not request a Stage 2 review, they could, in the event of disagreeing with a Stage 1 panel's overall rating, where the latter is *less than moderately satisfactory*, choose to send a written rejoinder. As in the case of rejoinders after Stage 2 reviews, this would be appended to the panel report. QAG would request an independent, director-level validation of the panel assessment in light of the Region's objections, when there is a rejoinder.

#### **SPECIALIZED REVIEWS**

10. To streamline Quality at Entry assessments, the Linn panel recommended doing away with specialized reviews of procurement, financial management, environmental, and social safeguards aspects in QEA, as these were already subject to explicit checks before Board approval. However, there could be issues of institutional credibility if the Bank were to discontinue assessing and reporting on safeguards and fiduciary aspects in real time as part of QEA. Also, QEA6 reported lower quality on environmental aspects of IBRD operations, suggesting need for a further check in QEA7. QEA7 would therefore only drop specialized review of procurement, given the consistently high ratings in this area. Main panelists would, however, be able to call on a procurement specialist in cases which they identify as needing closer review. Specialized reviews for FM, environmental, social and poverty aspects and safeguards will be integrated into the QEA7 assessments.

#### **FEEDBACK FROM TTLS, PANELISTS, OBSERVERS**

11. Such feedback is an integral part of the assessment, and the synthesis report would analyze and discuss comments received. TTLS, panelists, and observers will be requested to provide their feedback immediately after finalization of each assessment report.

#### **SYNTHESIS REPORT**

12. A summary report of findings on Quality at Entry for FY04–05 would be issued at the end of the assessment, presenting analysis of the areas for special attention signaled above.

Results would be disaggregated by Region and Network. All issues requiring follow-up would be flagged for action by the respective level of management and operating unit.

**DISSEMINATION**

13. QAG would help disseminate QEA7 findings and carry out further analysis as needed in collaboration with Regions, Networks, WBI, OED, and OPCS.

**COSTS**

14. The cost of QEA7 is estimated at about \$1.3 million, including the time of specialized reviewers (environment, poverty and social aspects) and moderators. About half of specialized reviewers' time (\$100,000) would be funded by the respective Sector Boards. TTL feedback in QEA6 indicated that task teams spent about 5 staff-days per assessment; this is likely to be lower in QEA7 to the extent document collection and specialized reviews are further streamlined.

**SCHEDULE**

15. QEA7 will commence with the sampling and notifications to TTLs and line managers by early April 2005; the synthesis report is expected to be ready for OVP review by mid-December 2005. Steps in the assessment process will be as follows:

<b>Steps</b>	<b>Dates</b>
• Draw first part of sample (100 operations), notify TTLs, request observer participation	April 4–7, 2005
• Collect documents, mobilize panelists, arrange orientations for TTLs, panelists, and observers	April 2005
• Start interviews of task teams	May 2, 2005
• Draw second part of sample (25 operations)	Mid-June 2005
• Collect documents, assign panelists, arrange further orientations	June 2005
• Complete interviews of task teams	September 2005
• Finalize all assessment reports	Mid-October 2005
• Working level review of draft synthesis report	October 2005
• Review by Quality Directors of draft synthesis report	November 2005
• Review by OVPs of draft synthesis report	December 2005

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**Annex 4**

**TABLE 1: RESULTS BY REGION**

**A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY NUMBER OF PROJECTS (#)**

Region	Total Projects			Total Assessed			HS #			S #			MS #			MU #			U #			HU #		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
AFR	40	26	30	40	26	30	2	2	2	31	21	13	0	0	9	6	3	4	1	0	2	0	0	0
EAP	18	11	15	18	11	15	1	1	0	16	9	8	0	0	5	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
ECA	28	17	25	28	17	25	8	7	2	17	8	15	0	0	7	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
LCR	27	16	20	27	16	20	4	2	4	20	11	14	0	0	1	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
MNA	9	6	14	9	6	14	0	0	0	7	4	8	0	0	6	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTH	0	0	1	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0
SAR	13	9	25	13	9	25	1	0	2	11	9	11	0	0	11	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

**B. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY PERCENTAGE (%)**

Region	Total Projects			Total Assessed			HS (%)			S (%)			MS (%)			MU (%)			U (%)			HU (%)		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
AFR	40	26	30	40	26	30	3	6	5	78	81	48	0	0	30	16	12	15	3	0	2	0	0	0
EAP	18	11	15	18	11	15	5	10	0	90	82	51	0	0	38	5	9	11	0	0	0	0	0	0
ECA	28	17	25	28	17	25	28	49	5	60	41	61	0	0	32	12	10	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
LCR	27	16	20	27	16	20	12	11	21	80	72	69	0	0	5	8	17	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
MNA	9	6	14	9	6	14	0	0	0	69	48	59	0	0	41	31	52	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTH	0	0	1	NA	NA	1	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0
SAR	13	9	25	13	9	25	9	0	7	71	100	46	0	0	43	19	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

- OA = OverAll Assessment
- R1 = Strategic Relevance and Approach
- R2 = Technical, Financial and Economic Aspects
- R3 = Poverty, Gender And Social Development
- R4 = Environmental Aspects
- R5 = Fiduciary Aspects
- R6 = Policy and Institutional Aspects
- R7 = Implementation Arrangements
- R8 = Risk Assessment
- R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

(cont'd)

**TABLE 1: RESULTS BY REGION**

**C. % MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER**

Region	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
AFR	40	26	30	81	88	83	88	89	88	87	100	93	92	95	83	83	95	84
EAP	18	11	15	95	91	89	100	100	94	95	91	83	94	100	94	90	82	100
ECA	28	17	25	88	90	99	91	97	100	98	97	99	81	82	97	97	93	100
LCR	27	16	20	92	83	95	95	89	95	94	87	95	79	83	100	93	80	100
MNA	9	6	14	69	48	100	92	87	91	65	61	100	90	84	89	58	79	100
OTH	0	0	1	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	0
SAR	13	9	25	81	100	95	81	100	95	100	100	95	69	100	100	100	100	93
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

Region	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
AFR	40	26	30	91	82	100	87	92	89	61	80	88	77	72	83	77	88	83
EAP	18	11	15	95	91	100	100	100	100	80	91	94	85	71	100	89	91	67
ECA	28	17	25	100	100	100	87	97	100	73	100	86	91	90	100	82	90	96
LCR	27	16	20	97	94	100	91	94	95	90	92	90	76	76	100	86	83	100
MNA	9	6	14	91	100	100	100	100	100	77	61	94	69	48	100	61	87	100
OTH	0	0	1	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	0	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	0
SAR	13	9	25	100	100	100	100	100	95	86	91	89	73	86	95	73	86	90
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

OA = OverAll Assessment  
 R1 = Strategic Relevance and Approach  
 R2 = Technical, Financial and Economic Aspects  
 R3 = Poverty, Gender And Social Development  
 R4 = Environmental Aspects

R5 = Fiduciary Aspects  
 R6 = Policy and Institutional Aspects  
 R7 = Implementation Arrangements  
 R8 = Risk Assessment  
 R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

**TABLE 2: RESULTS BY TASK TYPE**

**A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY NUMBER OF PROJECTS (#)**

Task Type	Total Projects	Total Assessed	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Simple and Repeater	30	30	2	17	7	2	2	0
Non-Simple and Repeater	100	100	8	53	32	7	0	0
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>

**B. OVERALL ASSESSMENT BY PERCENTAGE (%)**

Task Type	Total Projects	Total Assessed	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Simple and Repeater	30	30	3	66	22	4	5	0
Non-Simple and Repeater	100	100	8	55	29	8	0	0
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>

**C. % MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER**

Task Type	Total Projects	OA	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9
Simple and Repeater	30	91	88	91	82	95	100	95	91	93	93
Non-Simple and Repeater	100	92	95	94	95	95	100	95	89	95	88
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>89</b>

OA = OverAll Assessment

R1 = Strategic Relevance and Approach

R2 = Technical, Financial and Economic Aspects

R3 = Poverty, Gender And Social Development

R4 = Environmental Aspects

R5 = Fiduciary Aspects

R6 = Policy and Institutional Aspects

R7 = Implementation Arrangements

R8 = Risk Assessment

R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

TABLE 3: RESULTS BY NETWORK/SECTOR BOARD

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Network	Sector Board	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
		QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
<b>ESSD</b>		<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>90</b>
	Environment	3	1	9	65	100	100	65	100	84	65	100	100	100	100	91	100	100	100
	Rural Sector	15	11	21	94	91	87	100	100	100	94	91	83	100	100	84	94	90	92
	Social Development	6	3	2	100	100	62	100	100	62	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	62
<b>FSE</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>100</b>
	Financial Sector	8	5	4	100	100	100	100	100	100	81	100	100	100	100	100	50	50	100
<b>HDN</b>		<b>33</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>98</b>
	Education	11	6	11	62	51	83	80	91	100	77	51	100	80	91	81	90	67	100
	Health, Nutrition and Population	12	10	12	93	89	89	100	100	89	100	100	89	90	86	97	73	86	97
	Social Protection	10	5	11	100	100	98	100	100	100	100	98	91	100	94	69	100	100	
<b>INF</b>		<b>33</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>97</b>
	Energy and Mining	12	5	13	90	100	90	100	100	90	90	100	90	82	100	100	79	100	100
	Global Information/Communications Technology	0	0	2	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	0
	Transport	8	5	9	100	100	100	91	80	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Urban Development	6	5	11	68	53	100	85	79	100	100	100	100	52	75	93	85	79	100
	Water Supply and Sanitation	7	4	6	68	100	93	68	100	93	100	100	93	71	100	93	100	100	77
<b>PREM</b>		<b>34</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>0</b>
	Economic Policy	10	6	5	69	50	100	79	50	100	80	76	100	95	87	100	100	100	0
	Poverty Reduction	4	4	3	70	70	100	70	70	100	100	100	100	70	70	100	100	100	0
	Public Sector Governance	20	13	6	92	94	81	96	100	81	92	94	81	72	84	94	89	75	0
<b>PSDN</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
	Private Sector Development	3	2	5	100	100	100	100	100	88	100	100	100	66	42	100	100	100	100
<b>Bank-wide</b>		<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

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R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

(cont'd)

TABLE 3: RESULTS BY NETWORK/SECTOR BOARD

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Network	Sector Board	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
		QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
<b>ESSD</b>		<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>80</b>
	Environment	3	1	9	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	95	100	100	100	65	100	80
	Rural Sector	15	11	21	94	91	100	100	100	92	83	91	80	78	63	92	94	91	85
	Social Development	6	3	2	100	100	100	100	100	100	70	70	62	82	100	62	82	100	62
<b>FSE</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
	Financial Sector	8	5	4	86	74	100	85	100	100	85	100	100	89	80	100	81	100	100
<b>HDN</b>		<b>33</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>88</b>
	Education	11	6	11	100	100	100	100	100	83	69	60	78	54	34	83	80	91	83
	Health, Nutrition and Population	12	10	12	93	89	100	95	92	97	61	89	83	93	89	97	93	89	88
	Social Protection	10	5	11	100	100	100	100	100	100	83	100	87	94	85	100	67	100	93
<b>INF</b>		<b>33</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>92</b>
	Energy and Mining	12	5	13	100	100	100	90	100	90	70	86	90	82	73	100	80	100	100
	Global Information/Communications Technology	0	0	2	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100
	Transport	8	5	9	83	100	100	100	100	100	82	60	100	91	80	100	100	100	100
	Urban Development	6	5	11	100	100	100	69	100	100	69	100	100	37	53	100	68	53	74
	Water Supply and Sanitation	7	4	6	100	100	100	68	100	93	53	100	93	100	100	93	42	71	93
<b>PREM</b>		<b>34</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>93</b>
	Economic Policy	10	6	5	95	87	100	90	100	87	81	100	100	69	50	100	69	50	100
	Poverty Reduction	4	4	3	100	100	100	70	70	100	70	70	100	70	70	100	70	70	100
	Public Sector Governance	20	13	6	93	88	100	89	90	100	87	100	81	84	94	81	84	94	81
<b>PSDN</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>
	Private Sector Development	3	2	5	100	100	100	100	100	100	66	42	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Bank-wide</b>		<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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TABLE 4: RESULTS BY SECTOR

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Sector	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Agriculture	11	7	16	84	86	84	91	96	98	88	94	83	97	100	82	92	88	89
Education	13	8	15	69	59	82	83	86	94	81	63	97	83	90	82	86	73	95
Energy and mining	13	6	10	93	99	100	99	98	100	93	99	100	76	99	100	82	94	100
Finance	8	6	6	98	97	100	100	100	97	89	99	100	99	99	100	90	87	100
Health and social serv	29	19	20	85	83	92	89	90	93	95	99	94	89	89	98	82	88	96
Industry and trade	5	4	6	82	83	98	93	90	97	87	92	88	90	80	100	95	94	100
Info and communication	2	1	3	94	100	100	100	100	88	69	100	100	81	100	100	69	100	100
Law and public admin	34	22	29	90	88	92	95	95	88	92	91	92	84	84	96	94	94	95
Transportation	10	6	13	98	95	97	98	95	97	99	97	99	81	88	99	100	100	97
Water/sanit/fld prot	10	7	11	69	86	95	70	88	93	99	98	97	78	90	87	88	88	91
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

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(cont'd)

TABLE 4: RESULTS BY SECTOR

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Sector	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Agriculture	11	7	16	94	90	100	98	99	89	82	90	82	72	54	89	84	86	85
Education	13	8	15	99	99	100	98	97	88	73	70	75	61	44	82	80	86	76
Energy and mining	13	6	10	99	95	100	89	99	99	66	89	97	84	80	100	85	99	100
Finance	8	6	6	85	77	100	93	99	98	86	98	99	85	77	100	85	94	100
Health and social serv	29	19	20	96	93	100	93	93	99	67	86	90	80	80	97	74	82	92
Industry and trade	5	4	6	97	94	100	91	98	99	82	87	98	84	83	100	82	83	88
Info and communication	2	1	3	97	95	100	94	100	100	94	100	100	79	100	100	62	100	100
Law and public admin	34	22	29	95	92	100	93	95	94	85	94	87	84	85	96	86	90	90
Transportation	10	6	13	89	100	100	88	100	100	72	69	95	78	79	97	98	95	92
Water/sanit/fld prot	10	7	11	100	100	100	73	94	97	68	94	90	92	85	95	47	75	77
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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TABLE 5: RESULTS BY THEME

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Theme	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Economic management	6	4	2	88	89	100	90	89	100	93	96	100	89	83	100	100	100	100
Envir and natural res	9	6	15	89	88	88	92	94	91	93	97	89	93	100	79	90	85	87
Fin and pvt sector dev	19	10	17	97	100	96	100	100	94	90	100	95	83	94	99	91	95	100
Human development	20	15	24	76	72	86	91	91	94	85	81	93	91	92	88	74	84	96
Public sector govern	21	12	15	91	94	91	97	100	91	95	94	93	78	89	100	92	87	91
Rule of law	4	2	2	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	93	95	100	100	100	100
Rural development	11	7	15	79	94	88	82	95	95	89	90	89	93	98	96	85	81	96
Social dev/gender	17	8	12	79	73	96	85	87	90	91	85	100	83	80	92	94	100	92
Social prot and risk	15	11	11	81	79	97	83	82	99	94	93	97	90	98	94	90	87	97
Trade and integration	4	3	5	92	100	100	92	100	94	92	100	94	70	63	100	100	100	100
Urban development	9	6	9	82	70	96	92	88	96	94	92	98	66	77	98	86	86	95
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

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R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

(cont'd)

TABLE 5: RESULTS BY THEME

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Theme	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Economic management	6	4	2	100	100	100	95	100	100	86	100	100	90	91	100	90	91	100
Envir and natural res	9	6	15	97	94	100	100	100	89	80	90	87	82	64	89	84	83	86
Fin and pvt sector dev	19	10	17	96	90	100	85	100	95	75	92	95	81	83	99	85	98	96
Human development	20	15	24	95	92	100	94	96	91	67	77	80	75	70	89	80	87	83
Public sector govern	21	12	15	96	93	100	90	95	96	83	100	88	80	82	94	88	93	89
Rule of law	4	2	2	97	94	100	97	93	100	89	100	100	96	92	100	76	100	100
Rural development	11	7	15	99	98	100	88	99	98	82	94	81	78	74	97	74	89	82
Social dev/gender	17	8	12	98	95	100	89	86	100	61	71	90	83	77	96	75	83	94
Social prot & risk	15	11	11	95	91	100	97	98	99	83	90	92	72	68	99	72	78	98
Trade and integration	4	3	5	76	82	100	100	100	100	69	61	100	98	97	100	92	100	88
Urban development	9	6	9	88	94	100	95	94	98	79	89	96	72	55	96	65	70	83
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

\* Since some of the projects in the QEA7 sample do not have the percentages assigned to them in the business warehouse, so the sum of all the themes in the QEA7 sample does not equal 130 projects.

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R8 = Risk Assessment

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TABLE 6: RESULTS BY LENDING INSTRUMENT

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Instrument	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
<b>Development Policy Lending</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>0</b>
DPL	0	0	2	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	0
PRC	5	3	2	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0
PSL	6	5	3	60	48	100	77	71	100	60	48	100	82	77	100	0	0	0
SAD/SECAL	3	2	2	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	0
SAL	14	8	7	84	78	100	91	78	100	92	100	100	88	89	100	81	69	0
SSL	1	1	0	100	100	NA	100	100	NA	100	100	NA	100	100	NA	0	0	NA
<b>Investment</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>95</b>
APL	14	8	12	81	78	87	96	91	87	87	91	100	89	91	100	73	86	87
ERL	14	8	9	80	70	100	76	60	85	93	100	100	66	85	100	78	84	100
FIL	0	0	1	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100
LIL	4	1	1	63	0	0	100	100	0	63	0	0	100	100	0	100	0	0
SIL	58	36	81	88	96	93	90	100	96	94	97	95	85	89	90	95	95	95
SIM	1	1	3	0	0	100	100	100	100	100	100	67	100	100	100	0	0	100
TAL	15	12	7	100	100	72	100	100	72	100	100	72	80	90	100	100	100	100
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

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(cont'd)

TABLE 6: RESULTS BY LENDING INSTRUMENT

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Instrument	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
<b>Development Policy Lending</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>100</b>
DPL	0	0	2	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100
PRC	5	3	2	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	78	58	100	100	100	100
PSL	6	5	3	82	77	100	59	77	100	77	100	100	60	48	100	60	48	100
SAD/SECAL	3	2	2	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
SAL	14	8	7	89	72	100	88	89	90	69	100	100	88	89	100	88	89	100
SSL	1	1	0	100	100	NA	100	100	NA	100	100	NA	0	0	NA	0	0	NA
<b>Investment</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>87</b>
APL	14	8	12	94	87	100	91	100	100	61	87	76	77	69	87	74	78	85
ERL	14	8	9	100	100	100	74	85	100	55	71	100	73	84	100	59	70	100
FIL	0	0	1	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100	NA	NA	100
LIL	4	1	1	100	100	100	100	100	100	63	0	0	63	0	0	75	100	0
SIL	58	36	81	98	100	100	95	98	95	80	94	89	82	75	95	80	93	87
SIM	1	1	3	0	0	100	100	100	100	0	0	90	0	0	100	0	0	67
TAL	15	12	7	95	93	100	100	100	82	94	93	72	91	100	90	100	100	90
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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R8 = Risk Assessment

R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

TABLE 7: RESULTS BY SOURCE OF FUNDS

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Source of Funds	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
IBRD *	53	32	40	92	85	95	97	93	97	92	90	93	80	89	96	90	78	100
IDA/SPF	80	53	78	82	85	91	89	93	93	92	93	96	88	90	93	87	95	94
GEF	2	NA	12	50	NA	89	50	NA	89	50	NA	89	100	NA	89	100	NA	86
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

Source of Funds	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
IBRD *	53	32	40	98	100	100	94	98	97	81	88	91	84	81	100	90	93	87
IDA/SPF	80	53	78	94	88	100	90	95	96	72	88	87	76	72	93	73	83	90
GEF	2	NA	12	100	NA	100	100	NA	89	100	NA	92	100	NA	89	50	NA	86
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

\* IBRD includes BLEND.

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R4 = Environmental Aspects

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R7 = Implementation Arrangements

R8 = Risk Assessment

R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

TABLE 8: RESULTS BY CPIA GROUP

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Source of Funds	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
High CPIA	73	49	81	89	87	96	95	95	100	90	88	95	89	91	94	90	90	95
Low CPIA	62	36	48	82	82	83	87	90	81	93	97	91	80	87	92	87	89	93
No CPIA Ratings	0	0	1	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

Source of Funds	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
High CPIA	73	49	81	98	97	100	95	97	98	86	91	93	84	78	98	83	90	92
Low CPIA	62	36	48	93	88	100	88	95	90	65	82	80	76	73	89	76	84	83
No CPIA Ratings	0	0	1	0	0	100	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

\* Those countries with CPIA ratings below 3.5 are labelled as Low CPIA group, the countries with CPIA ratings equal to or above 3.5 are labelled as High CPIA. Those countries without CPIA ratings are labelled as No CPIA Ratings.

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**TABLE 9: RESULTS BY TTL LOCATION**

*(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)*

TTL Location	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Field	22	18	23	84	92	97	84	92	97	95	92	93	89	100	93	100	100	100
Headquarters	113	67	107	86	83	91	93	93	93	91	92	94	84	87	93	86	86	93
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

TTL Location	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Field	22	18	23	100	100	100	97	96	97	87	100	92	72	74	97	72	88	88
Headquarters	113	67	107	95	92	100	91	96	95	74	85	88	82	76	94	81	88	89
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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**TABLE 10: RESULTS BY QUARTER OF APPROVAL**

*(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)*

Approval Quarter	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Quarter 1	31	21	20	77	73	80	87	89	88	79	83	96	84	91	92	85	86	81
Quarter 2	23	12	26	81	86	96	89	94	91	95	100	96	89	100	90	76	72	100
Quarter 3	22	13	28	87	89	89	87	89	94	96	89	89	76	100	91	85	87	91
Quarter 4	59	39	56	93	91	97	97	96	97	95	95	95	87	82	97	98	96	98
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

Approval Quarter	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
Quarter 1	31	21	20	97	94	100	95	97	89	72	83	73	74	60	85	77	84	69
Quarter 2	23	12	26	95	86	100	86	100	100	65	86	96	84	69	100	66	86	90
Quarter 3	22	13	28	100	100	100	93	100	90	80	86	88	72	89	93	78	89	99
Quarter 4	59	39	56	93	92	100	92	93	99	82	91	92	86	83	97	90	90	91
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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TABLE 11: RESULTS BY LOAN SIZE

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Loan Size	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
a. <= 25 US\$ Million	50	23	59	84	80	87	91	96	90	86	81	92	82	82	90	91	100	93
b. > 25 and <= 50 US\$ Million	26	19	22	85	86	100	97	95	100	95	100	100	89	95	95	82	82	100
c. > 50 and <= 100 US\$ Million	26	20	20	93	89	91	93	89	92	100	100	86	91	100	96	91	86	95
d. > 100 US\$ Million	33	23	29	84	91	100	86	87	100	94	96	100	85	85	97	88	93	95
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

Loan Size	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
a. <= 25 US\$ Million	50	23	59	97	93	100	91	97	93	70	86	82	80	73	91	77	89	87
b. > 25 and <= 50 US\$ Million	26	19	22	90	86	100	91	95	100	67	81	100	77	74	100	78	81	87
c. > 50 and <= 100 US\$ Million	26	20	20	92	96	100	97	96	96	92	96	85	84	76	96	93	89	77
d. > 100 US\$ Million	33	23	29	100	100	100	90	96	97	88	92	99	80	83	100	79	91	100
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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**TABLE 12: RESULTS BY ELAPSED TIME (FROM CONCEPT TO BOARD)**

*(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)*

Elapsed Time	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
a. 0 - 6 Months	34	21	30	80	72	96	86	78	94	90	93	96	70	83	97	87	92	100
b. 6 - 12 Months	39	28	37	85	84	91	92	96	95	92	86	95	88	89	87	89	91	97
c. 12 - 24 Months	43	26	45	92	90	92	99	97	96	94	94	90	86	92	92	88	82	93
d. > 24 Months	19	10	18	83	100	90	83	100	88	88	100	96	100	100	100	91	100	92
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

Elapsed Time	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
a. 0 - 6 Months	34	21	30	97	95	100	85	95	97	68	91	91	64	70	97	67	72	97
b. 6 - 12 Months	39	28	37	97	95	100	94	95	92	75	79	85	82	79	94	91	95	94
c. 12 - 24 Months	43	26	45	94	88	100	97	100	95	84	90	93	82	71	95	85	90	91
d. > 24 Months	19	10	18	95	100	100	87	93	100	74	100	86	96	90	94	67	90	70
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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**TABLE 13: RESULTS BY ELAPSED TIME FOR “SIMPLE AND REPEATER” OPERATIONS (FROM CONCEPT TO BOARD)***(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)*

Elapsed Time	Total Projects	OA	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9
a. 0 - 6 Months	9	93	80	93	82	100	100	100	93	100	100
b. 6 - 12 Months	13	96	96	96	85	100	100	100	96	96	96
c. 12 - 24 Months	8	80	80	80	73	75	100	80	80	80	80
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>

**TABLE 14: RESULTS BY ELAPSED TIME FOR NON-“SIMPLE AND REPEATER” OPERATIONS (FROM CONCEPT TO BOARD)***(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)*

Elapsed Time	Total Projects	OA	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9
a. 0 - 6 Months	21	96	96	96	100	100	100	96	90	96	96
b. 6 - 12 Months	24	89	95	95	88	96	100	89	82	94	94
c. 12 - 24 Months	37	93	98	91	93	94	100	96	94	96	92
d. > 24 Months	18	90	88	96	100	92	100	100	86	94	70
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>88</b>

OA = OverAll Assessment

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R8 = Risk Assessment

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TABLE 15: RESULTS BY PREPARATION COST (US\$ '000)

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Preparation Cost	Total Projects			OA			R1			R2			R3			R4		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
a. 0 - 300 K	47	32	58	83	79	91	93	91	95	86	84	94	82	86	88	84	95	99
b. 300 - 500 K	32	20	33	86	80	95	96	91	98	96	100	95	80	87	95	90	92	90
c. > 500 K	56	33	39	87	95	92	88	96	90	93	95	93	90	95	99	90	83	93
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>

Preparation Cost	Total Projects			R5			R6			R7			R8			R9		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
a. 0 - 300 K	47	32	58	97	94	100	87	92	92	76	86	90	74	80	94	80	88	94
b. 300 - 500 K	32	20	33	93	85	100	96	100	95	72	83	92	80	68	95	86	80	96
c. > 500 K	56	33	39	97	97	100	93	98	99	79	93	85	85	76	96	76	92	77
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>89</b>

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R4 = Environmental Aspects

R5 = Fiduciary Aspects

R6 = Policy and Institutional Aspects

R7 = Implementation Arrangements

R8 = Risk Assessment

R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

TABLE 16: RESULTS BY PREPARATION COST FOR “SIMPLE AND REPEATER” OPERATIONS (US\$ '000)

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Preparation Cost	Total Projects	OA	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9
a. 0 - 300 K	16	89	92	89	75	95	100	96	89	92	92
b. 300 - 500 K	9	100	79	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
c. > 500 K	5	87	87	87	78	87	100	87	87	87	87
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>93</b>

TABLE 17: RESULTS BY PREPARATION COST FOR NON-“SIMPLE AND REPEATER” OPERATIONS (US\$ '000)

(% MODERATELY SATISFACTORY OR BETTER)

Preparation Cost	Total Projects	OA	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	R9
a. 0 - 300 K	42	92	95	95	91	100	100	92	90	95	95
b. 300 - 500 K	24	94	100	94	94	88	100	94	91	94	95
c. > 500 K	34	92	90	93	100	93	100	100	85	96	77
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>88</b>

OA = OverAll Assessment

R1 = Strategic Relevance and Approach

R2 = Technical, Financial and Economic Aspects

R3 = Poverty, Gender And Social Development

R4 = Environmental Aspects

R5 = Fiduciary Aspects

R6 = Policy and Institutional Aspects

R7 = Implementation Arrangements

R8 = Risk Assessment

R9 = Bank Inputs and Processes

TABLE 18: AVERAGE ELAPSED TIME AND PREPARATION COST BY LENDING INSTRUMENT

Instrument	No. of Projects			From Concept to Appraisal (Months)			From Appraisal to Board (Months)			From Concept to Board (Months)			Average Preparation Costs (US\$ '000)		
	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7	QEA5-6	QEA6	QEA7
<b>Development Policy Lending</b>															
DPL	0	0	2	NA	NA	2.9	NA	NA	1.5	NA	NA	4.0	NA	NA	261
PRC	5	3	2	5.0	4.3	7.5	3.4	3.3	2.0	8.8	7.8	10.0	452	440	401
PSL	6	5	3	2.9	1.4	8.3	3.0	3.0	8.3	6.0	4.5	16.3	291	214	752
SAD	3	2	2	3.3	2.5	2.0	2.5	3.0	6.3	6.0	6.0	8.3	438	541	267
SAL	14	8	7	3.8	2.9	3.6	3.9	3.0	2.1	7.8	6.1	5.8	416	373	344
SSL	1	1	0	3.0	3.0	NA	1.0	1.0	NA	4.0	4.0	NA	20	20	NA
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>5.8</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>402</b>
<b>Investment Lending</b>															
APL	14	8	12	9.8	10.1	9.8	4.7	5.5	5.4	14.8	15.9	15.0	526	630	466
ERL	14	8	9	2.0	2.4	3.3	3.3	3.7	2.1	5.1	6.1	5.4	249	398	298
FIL	0	0	1	NA	NA	2.0	NA	NA	6.0	NA	NA	8.0	NA	NA	146
LIL	4	1	1	13.4	3.0	NA	4.6	7.0	NA	18.2	10.0	8.0	333	112	12
SIL	58	36	81	12.5	11.9	13.4	9.4	5.8	6.2	22.2	18.1	19.5	752	584	520
SIM	1	1	3	14.0	14.0	11.6	3.0	3.0	5.2	17.0	17.0	17.3	1049	1049	515
TAL	15	12	7	9.5	10.5	11.6	3.9	4.6	5.4	13.2	14.7	17.0	395	451	233
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>12.3</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>17.3</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>577</b>	<b>521</b>	<b>480</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>6.2</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>15.6</b>	<b>13.8</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>544</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>468</b>

TABLE 19: AVERAGE ELAPSED TIME AND PREPARATION COST BY "SIMPLE AND REPEATER" OPERATIONS

Task Type	No. of Projects	From Concept to Appraisal (Months)	From Appraisal to Board (Months)	From Concept to Board (Months)	Average Preparation Costs (US\$ '000)			
					BB	TF	Other	Total
Simple and Repeater	30	6.4	3.8	10.0	232	234	200	329
Non-Simple and Repeater	100	11.7	5.7	17.4	372	245	NA	486
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>16.6</b>	<b>356</b>	<b>244</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>468</b>

**TABLE 20: PROJECT OBJECTIVES**  
**(% OF THE TOTAL PROJECTS IN A CATEGORY)**

Project Objectives	Dev. Policy Lending	Investment Lending	IBRD *	IDA/SPF	GEF	Bank-wide
<b>% of H among total projects</b>						
DO-A1 Poverty Reduction	39	20	27	26	0	23
DO-A2 Structural and Sector Policy Reform	93	21	39	32	12	32
DO-A3 Private Sector Development	16	13	21	7	18	13
DO-A4 Institutional Development/Capacity Building	27	65	64	58	50	59
DO-A5 Human Development	33	22	22	28	9	24
DO-A6 Environmental Sustainability	0	21	7	6	100	18
DO-A7 Infrastructure Development	0	40	27	41	19	34
DO-A8 Other	7	14	12	17	0	13
DO-A9 Macroeconomic Management	65	1	20	7	0	11
<b>% of projects rated H Likely to be achieved</b>						
DO-B1 Poverty Reduction	90	54	84	50	NA	64
DO-B2 Structural and Sector Policy Reform	89	51	76	67	0	68
DO-B3 Private Sector Development	86	80	95	73	49	81
DO-B4 Institutional Development/Capacity Building	56	62	64	61	58	62
DO-B5 Human Development	100	53	95	51	0	63
DO-B6 Environmental Sustainability	NA	66	29	70	73	66
DO-B7 Infrastructure Development	NA	85	94	83	67	85
DO-B8 Other	100	44	61	43	NA	48
DO-B9 Macroeconomic Management	100	73	100	94	NA	98
Sustainability	<b>75</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>52</b>

\* IBRD includes BLEND.

**Annex 5A****QEA7 GUIDANCE QUESTIONNAIRE***(% Moderately Satisfactory or Better)*

	QEA1	QEA2	QEA3	QEA4	QEA5	QEA6	QEA7
OA OverAll Assessment	82	86	89	94	86	85	92
R1 Strategic Relevance and Approach	85	90	91	93	90	93	94
R2 TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS	81	85	88	87	91	92	94
R3 Poverty, Gender And Social Development	70	68	80	87	80	90	93
R4 Environmental Aspects	95	93	90	90	87	89	95
R5 Fiduciary Aspects	NA	77	89	95	98	93	100
R6 Policy and Institutional Aspects	74	68	83	90	87	96	95
R7 Implementation Arrangements	76	81	82	83	64	88	89
R8 Risk Assessment	72	72	73	78	85	76	95
R9 Bank Inputs and Processes	75	85	81	91	72	88	89
DO-A1-1 Poverty Reduction	0	0	10	23	11	26	23
DO-A1-2 Structural and Sector Policy Reform	0	0	25	45	32	37	32
DO-A1-3 Private Sector Development	0	0	0	19	12	10	13
DO-A1-4 Institutional Development/Capacity Building	0	0	37	70	61	63	59
DO-A1-5 Human Development	0	0	0	0	17	24	24
DO-A1-6 Environmental Sustainability	0	0	11	20	11	10	18
DO-A1-7 Infrastructure Development	0	0	28	31	30	25	34
DO-A1-8 Other	0	0	0	17	25	17	13
DO-A1-9 Macroeconomic Management	0	0	0	10	8	16	11
DO-B1 Poverty Reduction	NA	NA	0	89	100	44	64
DO-B2 Structural and Sector Policy Reform	NA	NA	0	91	70	76	68
DO-B3 Private Sector Development	NA	NA	NA	92	87	61	81
DO-B4 Institutional Development/Capacity Building	NA	NA	0	90	64	70	62
DO-B5 Human Development	NA	NA	NA	NA	61	87	63
DO-B6 Environmental Sustainability	NA	NA	0	92	100	100	66
DO-B7 Infrastructure Development	NA	NA	0	100	100	100	85
DO-B8 Other	NA	NA	NA	90	87	84	48
DO-B9 Macroeconomic Management	NA	NA	NA	92	100	67	98
Sustainability Sustainability	NA	NA	NA	91	53	60	52
1.1 Coherence and consistency of development rationale and results framework underpinning the project (panelists to give special attention to this in the overall rating)?	80	78	83	91	93	97	97
1.1(a) Results focus of the project design consistent with the outcomes listed in the DO under A above?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	95	86
1.1(b) Consistency of the project's objectives with the country and sector strategies?	NA	NA	NA	97	97	96	99
1.2 Clarity, realism, and scope of the project's development objectives?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	92	93
1.3 Appropriateness of project approach and complexity?	83	84	84	86	82	89	92
1.4 Extent to which lessons of experience are adequately reflected in project approach?	78	79	83	88	76	85	93
1.5 Adequacy of country and sector knowledge underpinning the project?	NA	85	85	96	99	98	99
1.6 Level of borrower ownership?	80	88	92	97	90	99	95
1.7 Appropriate partnership arrangements with other donors?	NA	92	90	89	85	96	99

(cont'd)

	QEA1	QEA2	QEA3	QEA4	QEA5	QEA6	QEA7
2.1 Technical soundness of the project?	89	86	92	86	92	98	95
2.1* Appropriateness of the macroeconomic policy framework and extent of Bank assessment of the framework (citing existence of an on-track IMF program is not in itself sufficient) [OP8.60 paragraph 5]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.1a* Extent to which there is a consistent and realistic scenario of key macroeconomic variables to underpin the Bank's assessment of the adequacy of the macroeconomic policy framework?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.1b* Quality of analysis underpinning the Bank's assessment of the adequacy of the macroeconomic policy framework?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	92
2.1c* Demonstration of medium-term debt sustainability (and credit-worthiness, for IBRD borrowers) [OP8.60 paragraph 4]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	93
2.2 Quality and coherence of economic rationale and analysis underpinning the project?	79	72	82	73	93	85	96
2.2* *Degree to which the country's overall program supported by the operation is fully funded, including finance from the operation being considered?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3 Appropriateness and realism of project conditionality?	77	72	76	86	59	85	95
2.3* Appropriateness of arrangements for "Crisis Lending"?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3a* Extent to which the operation's content and design exhibit a degree of flexibility, innovativeness, realism and speed commensurate with the special "crisis" circumstances and the country's development needs?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3b* *Adequacy of description in the program document of when and how remaining design considerations would be addressed [OP8.60 paragraph 33]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3c* Extent to which there is a clear diagnosis of the crisis, particularly of the structural aspects (pre-crisis, or forward-looking in a non-borrowing country)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3d* Overall quality of the corporate review process (typically OC)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3e* Where applicable, adequacy of prior actions agreed with government for subsequent lending to deal with the crisis and reduce likelihood of future crisis?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3f* Adequacy of provisions in the operation (or other related programs) to ameliorate impact of the crisis on the poor, including financial support for the social sectors and poverty alleviation/social safety net programs for ensuring access/coverage of critical services for poor and vulnerable?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.3g* Appropriateness of the exit strategy for the Bank, including clear assessment of risks and benefits of continued engagement?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
2.4 For revenue-earning projects, quality of financial analysis?	NA	NA	NA	83	63	100	94
2.5 Adequacy and realism of the project's financing plan?	86	87	90	85	87	88	97
2.6 Projects in Disputed Areas (OP7.60)	NA	100	100	100	NA	NA	100
2.7 Projects on International Waterways (OP7.50)	NA	100	83	100	100	100	100
3.1 Quality and appropriateness of the project's focus on poverty issues?	NA	NA	NA	91	80	88	92
3.1* *Quality and adequacy of measures to safeguard against significant poverty and social consequences?	65	74	63	77	66	84	100
3.1(a)* Appropriate implementation of provisions to assess whether policies supported by the operation have a significant poverty and social impact [OP8.60 paragraph 10]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
3.1(c)* In case of significant gaps in analysis or in the borrower's systems, adequacy of proposed measures to address these gaps.	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
3.1(b)* In cases of significant impact, adequacy of the borrower's systems for reducing adverse poverty and social effects and enhancing positive effects associated with the specific policies being supported by the operation?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	93

(cont'd)

	QEA1	QEA2	QEA3	QEA4	QEA5	QEA6	QEA7
3.2 Adequacy of attention to gender issues?	NA	NA	NA	69	66	81	88
3.2a* Adequacy of arrangements for consultations and participation relevant to the operation, and the outcomes of the participatory □ process adopted in formulating the country's development strategy [OP8.60 paragraph 6]?	NA	NA	NA	69	64	91	100
3.2b* Adequacy of arrangements to make the relevant analytic work available to the public as part of the consultation process, in line □ with the Bank's disclosure policy [OP8.60 paragraph 6]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	93
3.3 Adequacy of attention to social development issues?	77	70	78	81	69	82	93
3.4 Quality of stakeholder analysis and consultation?	NA	NA	NA	78	68	92	96
3.5 Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10)	NA	100	100	100	100	94	100
3.6 Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12)	NA	90	78	87	90	100	95
3.7 Cultural Property (OPN 11.03)	NA	100	67	100	100	100	100
4.1 Appropriateness and quality of environmental impact and risk assessment?	91	91	88	85	86	93	96
4.2 Adequacy of arrangements for mitigating adverse environmental impacts?	NA	86	79	84	84	89	95
4.3 Appropriateness and quality of the Environmental Management Plan? □	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	87	97
4.3* *Adequacy of upstream analytic work and arrangements to ensure that policies supported by the operation will not lead to negative impacts on the country's environment, forests, and other natural resources[OP8.60 paragraph 11]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4.4 Adequacy and appropriateness of institutional arrangements for managing the environmental aspects?	NA	NA	NA	81	90	96	94
4.4* *Extent to which the borrower's systems are adequate to reduce such adverse effects and enhance positive effects [OP8.60 paragraph 11]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
4.5 Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01)	NA	94	92	91	93	93	99
4.5* Extent to which the operation adheres to environmental Good Practice (only applicable to DPL)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	100	68	NA
4.6 Natural Habitats(OP 4.04)	NA	93	89	75	84	100	98
4.7 Forestry (OP 4.36)	NA	75	100	89	100	100	100
4.8 Pest Management (OP 4.09)	NA	90	86	95	100	100	81
4.9 Safety of Dams (OP 4.37)	NA	75	100	100	100	100	100
FM Financial Management	NA	NA	NA	94	88	92	99
5.1 Adequacy and quality of FM arrangements?	NA	NA	NA	94	88	92	99
PROC Procurement	NA	96	92	91	95	96	100
5.2 Adequacy and quality of procurement arrangements?	NA	96	92	91	95	96	100
6.1 Extent to which the implementing agencies have:	69	63	77	87	79	90	95
6.1a Appropriately defined role and clear mandate for project execution?	87	73	81	95	86	95	98
6.1b Capacity to implement the project?	NA	NA	NA	75	68	73	94
6.1c Commitment and incentives to implement the project and promote the stated objectives?	NA	NA	NA	92	84	96	95
6.1d Political backing/support to carry out reforms and institutional changes included in the project?	NA	NA	NA	79	81	84	95
6.1e Capacity to implement the project's poverty and social development agenda?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	93
6.1f Capacity to implement the environmental agenda?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	90
6.2 Appropriateness and realism of the institutional capacity building measures?	NA	NA	81	78	81	91	94

(cont'd)

	QEA1	QEA2	QEA3	QEA4	QEA5	QEA6	QEA7
7.1 Prospects for completing the project within the prescribed time-frame?	78	81	82	69	59	83	75
7.2 Readiness of the first year's program for implementation?	77	75	84	82	74	88	92
7.2(a)* *Appropriateness of arrangements by which the borrower will carry out its responsibilities for monitoring progress during implementation and evaluating results on completion? [OP8.60 paragraph 16]?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	84
7.2(b)* *Appropriateness of arrangements by which Bank staff will review and verify during supervision fulfillment of program conditions and compliance with legal covenants, and validate monitoring and evaluation findings [OP8.60 paragraph 16]? □	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
7.3 Adequacy of arrangements for monitoring and evaluation (panelists to give special attention to this for overall rating)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	88
7.3a Availability and quality of baseline survey?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	83
7.3b Appropriateness of arrangements for monitoring implementation?	NA	74	78	91	75	87	97
7.3c Appropriateness of arrangements for evaluating impact and measuring outcomes?	72	65	64	73	62	85	80
7.3d Appropriateness of arrangements for monitoring poverty and social aspects?	NA	NA	NA	73	52	76	86
7.3e Appropriateness of arrangements for monitoring adverse environmental impacts?	NA	NA	NA	73	83	85	95
8.1 Quality of risk assessment?	NA	NA	NA	NA	83	82	94
8.1(a) Country capacity (Macroeconomic and political environment, governance problems and borrower commitment)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	78	84	92
8.1(b) Institutional effectiveness to implement the project?	NA	NA	NA	NA	68	88	96
8.1(c) Economic viability (Economic soundness based on cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	81	89	97
8.1(d) Financial viability (For revenue-earning projects, financial soundness based on financial rate of return or NPV, appropriateness of tariffs in relation to marginal cost and O&M cost; reliability of financial reporting; for all other projects, fiscal sustainability upon project completion)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	74	74	91
8.1(e) Social risks (Risks of adverse social impact like exclusions of key groups; lack of socio-political support; presence of indigenous people or resettlement issues)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	54	85	92
8.1(f) Environmental risks (Including natural resources management)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	82	86	97
8.1(f)* Resilience to exogenous factors (reaction of local and external civil society advocates, support from relevant stakeholders)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	72	89	90
8.1(g) Financial management capacity (Assessment of financial management risks in the country that may impact the project)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	95	89	96
8.1(h) Procurement capacity (Assessment of procurement risks that may impact the project and measures taken to mitigate □ them)?	NA	NA	NA	NA	91	95	99
8.2 Quality of design to mitigate/manage risks?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	92
8.3 Extend to which the rewards are commensurate with the non-mitigable/residual risks?	NA	NA	NA	73	78	70	99
9.1(a)(i) Elapsed time : Concept-Appraisal	NA	NA	NA	NA	9.9	8.8	11.1
9.1(b)(i) Elapsed time : Appraisal-Board	NA	NA	NA	NA	7.6	4.9	5.5
9.1(b)(ii) Elapsed time : Appraisal-Board : Was the service standard of 5 months met?	NA	NA	NA	50	63	70	63
9.1(c)(i) Elapsed time : Board Effectiveness	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	5.1
9.1(c)(ii) Elapsed time : Board Effectiveness : Was the service standard of 4 months met?	NA	NA	NA	46	54	42	38

(cont'd)

	QEA1	QEA2	QEA3	QEA4	QEA5	QEA6	QEA7
9.2(d) Preparation/Processing Expenditures : Average	NA	NA	NA	NA	603	484	468
9.3 Task team's composition in relation to the operation's complexity?	NA	NA	NA	91	95	97	98
9.3(a) Skill-mix?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	94
9.3(b) Continuity?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	97
9.3(c) Experience?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
9.3(d) Staff/consultants mix?	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	100
9.4 Appropriateness of processing time considering the project's complexity and urgency?	NA	89	90	85	91	85	92
9.4a If the time was too much, assess whether because of : Bank internal delays =10 (29%), Borrower procedures/decision-making= 25 (69%), Project complexity = 2 (3%)							
9.5 Overall efficiency of resources used in relation to operation's complexity?	85	86	86	86	75	84	87
9.6 Value Added from management	NA	NA	NA	86	73	81	87
9.6a Country Management	NA	NA	NA	87	78	85	94
9.6b Sector Management	NA	NA	NA	80	76	81	90
9.6c Regional Quality Assurance Team	NA	NA	NA	88	76	88	95
9.7 If QER, adequacy of arrangements for quality enhancement?	NA	NA	NA	NA	64	88	86
9.7a Appropriateness of reviewers' selection?	NA	NA	NA	95	100	87	93
9.7b Quality of guidance given?	NA	NA	NA	86	81	92	96
9.7c Appropriate use of advice provided?	NA	NA	NA	86	64	88	87
9.8 Adequacy of arrangements for peer review?	NA	NA	NA	NA	63	91	87
9.8a Appropriateness of reviewers' selection?	NA	NA	NA	92	92	94	96
9.8b Quality of guidance given?	NA	NA	NA	93	82	92	96
9.8c Appropriate use of advice provided?	NA	NA	NA	86	72	85	83
9.9 Quality of support provided?	NA	98	94	94	95	98	100
9.9(a) Anchor?	NA	NA	NA	93	89	96	99
9.9(b) Legal?	NA	NA	NA	92	89	97	99
9.9(c) LOA (Disbursement)?	NA	NA	NA	94	94	99	100
9.10 Quality of Bank's documents (PAD, legal documents)	85	78	80	75	59	79	82

- In the above table the number for DO-A1-1 to DO-A1-9 are percentages of DOs rated by the task team as High in importance.
- Sufficient Data is not available for:
  - "Elapsed time: Concept-Appraisal" for QEA1-4 assessments.
  - "Elapsed time: Appraisal-Board" for QEA1-4 assessments.
  - "Elapsed time: Board Effectiveness" for QEA1-6 assessments.
  - "Preparation/Processing Expenditures: Total" for QEA1-4 assessments.
- Elapsed time: Board Effectiveness does not include projects that are not yet effective.
- In the above table QEA1-6 assessment ratings are % *satisfactory or better* since they were rated on a 4-point scale.

**Annex 5B****“SIMPLE AND REPEATER” VS. OTHER OPERATIONS**

	"Simple and Repeater"		Others	
	# Rated	% MS or Better	# Rated	% MS or Better
OA OverAll Assessment	30	91	100	92
R1 Strategic Relevance and Approach	30	88	100	95
R2 TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS	30	91	100	94
R3 Poverty, Gender And Social Development	30	82	96	95
R4 Environmental Aspects	26	95	64	95
R5 Fiduciary Aspects	30	100	100	100
R6 Policy and Institutional Aspects	30	95	100	95
R7 Implementation Arrangements	30	91	100	89
R8 Risk Assessment	30	93	100	95
R9 Bank Inputs and Processes	30	93	99	88
DO-A1-1 Poverty Reduction	7	26	23	23
DO-A1-2 Structural and Sector Policy Reform	3	10	35	35
DO-A1-3 Private Sector Development	2	10	13	14
DO-A1-4 Institutional Development/Capacity Building	20	67	57	58
DO-A1-5 Human Development	5	10	24	25
DO-A1-6 Environmental Sustainability	2	5	18	19
DO-A1-7 Infrastructure Development	15	57	34	31
DO-A1-8 Other	9	28	12	11
DO-A1-9 Macroeconomic Management	0	0	12	12
DO-B1 Poverty Reduction	4	71	12	62
DO-B2 Structural and Sector Policy Reform	2	78	22	68
DO-B3 Private Sector Development	0	0	10	88
DO-B4 Institutional Development/Capacity Building	12	68	33	61
DO-B5 Human Development	3	62	14	63
DO-B6 Environmental Sustainability	0	0	12	68
DO-B7 Infrastructure Development	12	84	29	85
DO-B8 Other	5	63	6	44
DO-B9 Macroeconomic Management	0	NA	11	98
Sustainability Sustainability	30	58	100	51
1.1 Coherence and consistency of development rationale and results framework underpinning the project (panelists to give special attention to this in the overall rating)?	29	88	99	99
1.1(a) Results focus of the project design consistent with the outcomes listed in the DO under A above?	30	86	84	86
1.1(b) Consistency of the project's objectives with the country and sector strategies?	30	100	84	99
1.2 Clarity, realism, and scope of the project's development objectives?	30	93	100	93
1.3 Appropriateness of project approach and complexity?	30	92	84	92
1.4 Extent to which lessons of experience are adequately reflected in project approach?	30	91	100	94
1.5 Adequacy of country and sector knowledge underpinning the project?	30	95	100	100
1.6 Level of borrower ownership?	30	95	100	95
1.7 Appropriate partnership arrangements with other donors?	29	98	94	99

(cont'd)

	"Simple and Repeater"		Others	
	# Rated	% MS or Better	# Rated	% MS or Better
2.1 Technical soundness of the project?	30	94	84	95
2.1* Appropriateness of the macroeconomic policy framework and extent of Bank assessment of the framework (citing existence of an on-track IMF program is not in itself sufficient) [OP8.60 paragraph 5]?	0	NA	16	100
2.1a* Extent to which there is a consistent and realistic scenario of key macroeconomic variables to underpin the Bank's assessment of the adequacy of the macroeconomic policy framework?	0	NA	16	100
2.1b* Quality of analysis underpinning the Bank's assessment of the adequacy of the macroeconomic policy framework?	0	NA	16	92
2.1c* Demonstration of medium-term debt sustainability (and credit-worthiness, for IBRD borrowers) [OP8.60 paragraph 4]?	0	NA	16	93
2.2 Quality and coherence of economic rationale and analysis underpinning the project?	25	95	78	96
2.2* *Degree to which the country's overall program supported by the operation is fully funded, including finance from the operation being considered?	0	NA	1	100
2.3 Appropriateness and realism of project conditionality?	27	95	80	95
2.3* Appropriateness of arrangements for "Crisis Lending"?	0	NA	1	100
2.3a* Extent to which the operation's content and design exhibit a degree of flexibility, innovativeness, realism and speed commensurate with the special "crisis" circumstances and the country's development needs?	0	NA	1	100
2.3b* *Adequacy of description in the program document of when and how remaining design considerations would be addressed [OP8.60 paragraph 33]?	0	NA	1	100
the structural aspects (pre-crisis, or forward-looking in a non-borrowing	0	NA	1	100
2.3d* Overall quality of the corporate review process (typically OC)?	0	NA	1	100
2.3e* Where applicable, adequacy of prior actions agreed with government for subsequent lending to deal with the crisis and reduce likelihood of future crisis?	0	NA	1	100
2.3f* Adequacy of provisions in the operation (or other related programs) to ameliorate impact of the crisis on the poor, including financial support for the social sectors and poverty alleviation/social safety net programs for ensuring access/coverage of critical services for poor and vulnerable?	0	NA	1	100
2.3g* Appropriateness of the exit strategy for the Bank, including clear assessment of risks and benefits of continued engagement?	0	NA	1	100
2.4 For revenue-earning projects, quality of financial analysis?	5	85	13	95
2.5 Adequacy and realism of the project's financing plan?	30	93	84	98
2.6 Projects in Disputed Areas (OP7.60)	0	NA	2	100
2.7 Projects on International Waterways (OP7.50)	3	100	7	100
3.1 Quality and appropriateness of the project's focus on poverty issues?	27	81	64	94
3.1* *Quality and adequacy of measures to safeguard against significant poverty and social consequences?	0	NA	16	100
3.1(a)* Appropriate implementation of provisions to assess whether policies supported by the operation have a significant poverty and social impact [OP8.60 paragraph 10]?	0	NA	14	100
3.1(c)* In case of significant gaps in analysis or in the borrower's systems, adequacy of proposed measures to address these gaps.	0	NA	10	100
3.1(b)* In cases of significant impact, adequacy of the borrower's systems for reducing adverse poverty and social effects and enhancing positive effects associated with the specific policies being supported by the operation?	0	NA	12	93

(cont'd)

	"Simple and Repeater"		Others	
	# Rated	% MS or Better	# Rated	% MS or Better
3.2 Adequacy of attention to gender issues?	26	87	66	89
3.2a* Adequacy of arrangements for consultations and participation relevant to the operation, and the outcomes of the participatory <input type="checkbox"/> process adopted in formulating the country's development strategy [OP8.60 paragraph 6]?	0	NA	13	100
3.2b* Adequacy of arrangements to make the relevant analytic work available to the public as part of the consultation process, in line <input type="checkbox"/> with the Bank's disclosure policy [OP8.60 paragraph 6]?	0	NA	13	93
3.3 Adequacy of attention to social development issues?	30	90	80	94
3.4 Quality of stakeholder analysis and consultation?	29	90	95	96
3.5 Indigenous Peoples (OP 4.10)	5	100	25	100
3.6 Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12)	9	94	28	95
3.7 Cultural Property (OPN 11.03)	0	NA	7	100
4.1 Appropriateness and quality of environmental impact and risk assessment?	26	97	62	96
4.2 Adequacy of arrangements for mitigating adverse environmental impacts?	26	95	63	95
4.3 Appropriateness and quality of the Environmental Management Plan? <input type="checkbox"/>	26	97	61	97
4.3* *Adequacy of upstream analytic work and arrangements to ensure that policies supported by the operation will not lead to negative impacts on the country's environment, forests, and other natural resources[OP8.60 paragraph 11]?	0	NA	0	NA
4.4 Adequacy and appropriateness of institutional arrangements for managing the environmental aspects?	26	95	64	94
4.4* *Extent to which the borrower's systems are adequate to reduce such adverse effects and enhance positive effects [OP8.60 paragraph 11]?	0	NA	0	NA
4.5 Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01)	25	100	62	99
4.5* Extent to which the operation adheres to environmental Good Practice (only applicable to DPL)?	0		0	
4.6 Natural Habitats(OP 4.04)	7	82	17	100
4.7 Forestry (OP 4.36)	3	100	5	100
4.8 Pest Management (OP 4.09)	4	100	9	78
4.9 Safety of Dams (OP 4.37)	4	100	3	100
FM Financial Management	30	100	100	99
5.1 Adequacy and quality of FM arrangements?	30	100	100	99
PROC Procurement	30	100	92	100
5.2 Adequacy and quality of procurement arrangements?	29	100	92	100
6.1 Extent to which the implementing agencies have:	29	98	99	95
6.1a Appropriately defined role and clear mandate for project execution?	30	98	100	99
6.1b Capacity to implement the project?	30	98	100	93
6.1c Commitment and incentives to implement the project and promote the stated objectives?	30	96	100	95
6.1d Political backing/support to carry out reforms and institutional changes included in the project?	27	97	95	95
6.1e Capacity to implement the project's poverty and social development agenda?	29	95	88	93
6.1f Capacity to implement the environmental agenda?	25	94	61	90
6.2 Appropriateness and realism of the institutional capacity building measures?	29	90	98	95
7.1 Prospects for completing the project within the prescribed time-frame?	30	89	84	73

(cont'd)

	"Simple and Repeater"		Others	
	# Rated	% MS or Better	# Rated	% MS or Better
7.2 Readiness of the first year's program for implementation?	30	93	99	91
7.2(a)* *Appropriateness of arrangements by which the borrower will carry out its responsibilities for monitoring progress during implementation and evaluating results on completion? [OP8.60 paragraph 16]?	0	NA	16	84
7.2(b)* *Appropriateness of arrangements by which Bank staff will review and verify during supervision fulfillment of program conditions and compliance with legal covenants, and validate monitoring and evaluation findings [OP8.60 paragraph 16]?	0	NA	14	100
7.3 Adequacy of arrangements for monitoring and evaluation (panelists to give special attention to this for overall rating)?	29	87	99	89
7.3a Availability and quality of baseline survey? □	27	88	82	83
7.3b Appropriateness of arrangements for monitoring implementation?	30	95	84	97
7.3c Appropriateness of arrangements for evaluating impact and measuring outcomes?	30	76	83	80
7.3d Appropriateness of arrangements for monitoring poverty and social aspects?	28	85	78	86
7.3e Appropriateness of arrangements for monitoring adverse environmental impacts?	26	95	62	96
8.1 Quality of risk assessment?	29	93	99	94
8.1(a) Country capacity (Macroeconomic and political environment, governance problems and borrower commitment)?	29	93	100	91
8.1(b) Institutional effectiveness to implement the project?	30	95	100	96
8.1(c) Economic viability (Economic soundness based on cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis)?	25	97	71	97
8.1(d) Financial viability (For revenue-earning projects, financial soundness based on financial rate of return or NPV, appropriateness of tariffs in relation to marginal cost and O&M cost; reliability of financial reporting; for all other projects, fiscal sustainability upon project completion)?	27	92	52	91
8.1(e) Social risks (Risks of adverse social impact like exclusions of key groups; lack of socio-political support; presence of indigenous people or resettlement issues)?	29	91	94	92
8.1(f) Environmental risks (Including natural resources management)?	26	95	61	98
8.1(f)* Resilience to exogenous factors (reaction of local and external civil society advocates, support from relevant stakeholders)?	0	NA	16	90
8.1(g) Financial management capacity (Assessment of financial management risks in the country that may impact the project)?	30	92	99	97
8.1(h) Procurement capacity (Assessment of procurement risks that may impact the project and measures taken to mitigate □ them)?	30	96	83	100
8.2 Quality of design to mitigate/manage risks?	30	93	100	92
8.3 Extend to which the rewards are commensurate with the non-mitigable/residual risks?	29	98	100	99
9.1(a)(i) Elapsed time : Concept-Appraisal	30	6.4	100	11.7
9.1(b)(i) Elapsed time : Appraisal-Board	30	3.8	100	5.7
9.1(b)(ii) Elapsed time : Appraisal-Board : Was the service standard of 5 months met?	30	83	98	60
9.1(c)(i) Elapsed time : Board Effectiveness	30	4.9	100	5.1
9.1(c)(ii) Elapsed time : Board Effectiveness : Was the service standard of 4 months met?	27	45	92	37

(cont'd)

	"Simple and Repeater"		Others	
	# Rated	% MS or Better	# Rated	% MS or Better
9.2(d) Preparation/Processing Expenditures : Total	30	329	100	486
9.3 Task team's composition in relation to the operation's complexity?	30	93	98	98
9.3(a) Skill-mix?	30	88	100	95
9.3(b) Continuity?	30	100	100	96
9.3(c) Experience?	30	98	100	100
9.3(d) Staff/consultants mix?	29	100	93	100
9.4 Appropriateness of processing time considering the project's complexity and urgency?	30	98	100	91
9.4a If the time was too much, assess whether because of :		Bank internal delays =1 (21%), Borrower procedures/decision-making= 2 (79%)		Bank internal delays =9 (29%), Borrower procedures/decision-making= 23 (68%), Project complexity = 2 (3%)
9.5 Overall efficiency of resources used in relation to operation's complexity?	30	98	100	86
9.6 Value Added from management	29	88	100	86
9.6a Country Management	30	98	99	94
9.6b Sector Management	30	88	100	90
9.6c Regional Quality Assurance Team	28	93	97	95
9.7 If QER, adequacy of arrangements for quality enhancement?	14	82	30	87
9.7a Appropriateness of reviewers' selection?	14	94	30	92
9.7b Quality of guidance given?	14	94	30	96
9.7c Appropriate use of advice provided?	14	77	30	89
9.8 Adequacy of arrangements for peer review?	25	93	95	86
9.8a Appropriateness of reviewers' selection?	25	98	94	96
9.8b Quality of guidance given?	25	98	93	96
9.8c Appropriate use of advice provided?	25	91	92	82
9.9 Quality of support provided?	28	98	100	100
9.9(a) Anchor?	17	91	72	100
9.9(b) Legal?	29	100	100	99
9.9(c) LOA (Disbursement)?	29	100	96	100
9.10 Quality of Bank's documents (PAD, legal documents)	30	83	100	82


1. In the above table the number for DO-A1-1 to DO-A1-9 are percentages of DOs rated by the task team as High in importance.
2. Elapsed time: Board Effectiveness does not include projects that are not yet effective.

**Annex 6****POVERTY AND SOCIAL ASPECTS**

1. This year's review of the quality of attention at entry to poverty, gender and social development issues covered 110 investment and 16 development policy lending operations (four were not applicable). These issues included: (a) appropriateness of poverty diagnosis and design; (b) attention to gender issues; (c) adequacy of social development analysis; (d) extent of stakeholder participation; and (e) attention to social safeguards. In addition, the review contributed to assessments of appropriateness and realism of measures for dealing with poverty and social issues in institutional capacity building; design of arrangements for monitoring; and addressing social risks. Two supplementary questions on processing of social safeguards issues were also included.<sup>3</sup>

**KEY FINDINGS**

2. Although the overall 92% *moderately satisfactory or better* rating reflects an improvement over previous years, the 28% of the operations rated *moderately satisfactory or lower* (as shown in the graph), indicates room for improvement. Performance remains uneven across Regions, with AFR having seven of the ten projects rated *less than satisfactory*. LCR and SAR, taken together, accounted for 42% of all projects rated *moderately satisfactory or better*. LCR stands out as the only Region with all projects rated *satisfactory or better*, of which four projects are considered good practice. All other Regions have a significant portion of their portfolio (ranging between 53 and 27 percent) in the *moderately satisfactory or lower* category.



3. With 34% of the SILs and 36% of the ERLs rated *moderately satisfactory or lower*, there is considerable scope for improvement. Despite the small sample sizes classified by instrument, some improvement would be needed in several dimensions such as disaggregating impacts by broad social groups in poverty diagnosis and adequacy of country arrangements for stakeholder participation and outcomes of this process in informing the country's development strategy, especially in nine of the 12 APLs where the rating for these dimensions was *moderately*

<sup>3</sup> The benchmarks that were used in QEA6 were rescaled in accordance with the new six-point scale applied in QEA7.

*satisfactory or lower*. Although all of the 16 DPLs are rated *moderately satisfactory or better* (with only two rated *moderately satisfactory*), just 69% contained adequate mechanisms for addressing potential adverse social impacts and risks. The two DPLs with *moderately satisfactory* ratings were weak in assessments of social risks and adequacy of borrower's systems for reducing adverse poverty and social effects.

4. Because of the small sample size, the comparisons by network and sector were made in relation to average ratings from reviews in QEA5–6. In the ESSD network, there is a slight decline from 100% *satisfactory or better* in QEA5–6 to 88% in QEA7. More troubling, however, is the large proportion (48%) of projects in this network that are rated *moderately satisfactory or lower*. However, it is noted that in QEA7, the lower ratings in ESSD were accounted for by three projects rated *moderately unsatisfactory* in the rural sector, though there is scope for improvement in all three sectors making up this network, with *moderately satisfactory* ratings or lower of 38% in Social Development, 45% in Rural and 58% in Environment. In HDN, three projects (two in education and one in the health sector) were rated *moderately unsatisfactory or lower*. All three sectors in the network had a relatively low number of projects (about 25% of the cohort) with scope for improvement.

5. Task Teams considered the poverty reduction DO as having “high importance” in 30 operations (or 23% of the sample). Sixteen of these operations or 64% were rated as “highly likely” or “likely” to achieve the poverty DO. This reflects an increase from the 44% level in QEA6 (11 out of 25 projects).

6. There are 92 projects in the QEA7 cohort where gender issues were relevant. Quality of gender analysis and design was rated 89% *moderately satisfactory or better*, an increase from the 80% rating in QEA6, though with 43% of the sample rated *moderately satisfactory or lower*, there is ample scope for further improvement. When broken down by sub-criteria for assessing quality of gender analysis, the weakest areas were in design of activities for empowering women and for monitoring gender impacts, similar to observations raised in QEA6.

7. Quality of attention to safeguards issues improved for indigenous peoples from 93% in QEA6 to 100% but declined slightly for involuntary resettlement (from 100% in QEA6 to 95%), mostly due to two out of the 54 projects where resettlement issues were applicable. With regard to the supplementary questions on safeguards processing, there were 59 projects where sector managers were delegated some responsibility for social safeguards clearance, of which eight projects relied solely on the sector manager for decision making. Only two of these eight projects had better integration and teamwork as a result of such delegation, but it is difficult to make any conclusions given the very small sample and limited process documentation.

8. Quality of stakeholder analysis and design of stakeholder participation mechanisms continues to improve from about an average of 80% in QEA5–6 to 96% in QEA7. Progress is attributed to better quality in stakeholder analysis but more can be done in designing mechanisms for sustaining participation where 18 projects were rated *moderately satisfactory* because of weaknesses on this aspect.

9. The QEA7 cohort includes 31 projects in 14 countries that are classified by the World Bank as “conflict-affected.” Of these, the nine ERL projects where expedited preparation procedures apply were rated *moderately satisfactory or better* on quality of poverty, gender and social issues. This shows an improvement from the 66% average rating in QEA5–6 (14 projects).

10. There are 27 projects with CDD activities that are rated 53% *satisfactory or better* (four projects are *highly satisfactory*) on quality of poverty, gender and social issues. Ten projects are rated *moderately satisfactory or lower*. This indicates a decline from the combined 32 projects with CDD activities in QEA5–6, with an average rating of 90% *satisfactory or better*. The areas for improvement in the three projects rated *moderately unsatisfactory* include monitoring of progress at the local level, especially of elite capture, and of progress in moving resources from the national to community levels.

#### **FOLLOW-UP OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM QEA6**

11. In QEA6, the recommendations called for support from the SD anchor and Regional SD managers to Regions and TTLs on the following aspects: (a) integrating results from poverty diagnosis into design; (b) being flexible yet responsive to country needs especially in emergency situations and in conflict-affected countries; (c) improving gender analysis; (d) scaling up of M&E in CDD projects; and (e) sharing review benchmarks more widely. Quality of upstream or analytical work informing poverty design improved. Ninety two (out of 107) projects referred to completed poverty assessments or socio-economic surveys but there needs to be better integration into design as shown in 28 projects that were rated *moderately satisfactory or less* on design of pro-poor activities.

12. In terms of ERLs and projects in conflict-affected countries, Bank-wide technical assistance has increased and Regions recognize that a balance is needed between timeliness of interventions and ensuring longer-term impacts from such interventions. For example, the Bank introduced post-conflict performance indicators (PCPIs) for the FY04–05 cycle for measuring change in countries eligible for exceptional post-conflict allocations from IDA. Critical interventions are judged in terms of security, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, reconciliation processes and displaced populations. In QEA7, the cohort of 31 projects in conflict affected countries includes the nine ERLs, but also other projects in these countries where consideration of political and social risks was covered at a more general or macro level. The sub-rating on these 31 projects on quality of risk analysis improved slightly at 84% *moderately satisfactory or better*, compared to the 80% rating in QEA6 (20 projects).

13. The results of PREM's support to Regions on improving gender analysis are encouraging, although they require further strengthening. In FY04–05, there were 18 new country gender assessments that were completed (or nearly completed) bringing the total to 38 countries. Of the 92 projects where gender issues were relevant in QEA7, 27 projects were in countries with completed country gender assessments, but 8 projects did not cite the assessments. However, 16 projects that contained explicit gender objectives referred to findings from the assessment. There is still scope for increasing support as shown in the 35 out of 92 projects that were rated *moderately satisfactory or less* on quality of gender analysis, where the weak areas were in quality of design of activities for empowering women and monitoring their impacts.

14. The revised QEA7 benchmarks included revised criteria developed by the Bank-wide CDD thematic group, including scaling up of CDD programs at the national level. These criteria covered activities related to local decision making by participatory elected local government officials and effectiveness of community control in management of investment funds. In addition, the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) completed a review of community-based and community-driven development projects in October 2005. The review recommended that M&E systems in CDD projects "need to allow for systematic assessments of local capacities" but

that “individual subproject cycle is too short to sustainably enhance community capacity where it is weak or does not exist.”

## RECOMMENDATIONS AND NEXT STEPS

15. ***Provide more strategic support to AFR Region and ESSD and HDN networks.*** SDV and PREM should discuss with key partners in these units how to improve design of poverty, gender and social aspects. Specifically, in the AFR Region which accounts for three-fourths of the number of projects rated *moderately unsatisfactory or less*, the areas for improvement are in: (a) quality and depth of poverty diagnosis; (b) gender empowerment; (c) monitoring or gender impacts; (d) analysis of social risks; and (e) attention to safeguards issues. Within sectors, special attention would be needed in: (a) agriculture and rural community based operations, in particular, monitoring of adverse social impacts; (b) environment projects with community-based initiatives, especially the GEF co-financed projects which received lower ratings on poverty design and consideration of social impacts in the allocation and use of natural resources; and (c) education projects with CDD components, including monitoring of poverty and gender impacts and mitigating adverse social risks.

16. ***Incorporate into design results from analysis of country social context and political risks.*** Several observations were made regarding weak use of socio-cultural, political and institutional contexts. If these are covered, they are broadly mentioned as project risks. These shortcomings occur despite the availability of informed findings, for example, from completed Poverty Assessments, Social Analysis, Gender Assessments, etc. Additionally, there are several country indicators that can be used in better defining social development and poverty outcomes, many of which are already used in the Bank’s CPIA, etc. Task Teams and Country units need to ensure that such contexts are taken into consideration, especially in high-risk ERL projects.

17. ***Share good practices in DPLs.*** The DPLs that were rated *highly satisfactory* anticipated, in most ways, the requirements set out in OP 8.60. Three aspects are worth sharing more broadly across Regions, country units and networks. First, these operations took into account, and integrated into design, work done on poverty, gender and social issues, including findings from poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA). Second, there was attention to vulnerable groups even though these operations were designed primarily for macro impacts. Specific mechanisms were built into the operations to ensure cushioning of these groups from negative impacts. Lastly, the operations included arrangements for monitoring impacts on vulnerable groups, including use of non-income poverty and social outcome indicators.

18. ***Provide benchmarks for addressing social risks in ERLs and in operations in conflict-affected countries.*** It would be helpful if OPCS and the SD Sector Board could clarify the standards to be followed in preparing the poverty, gender and social aspects of projects officially classified as ERLs. These should be differentiated with assessments of political and social risks of operations within classified conflict-affected countries where the impacts of such assessments on design would be indirect, such as consideration of the general context of stability.

19. ***Develop separate benchmarks for CDD and community-based “repeater” projects.*** Attention should be given to assessing poverty, gender and social outcomes in design of “repeater” or second phase types of operations, especially in CDD and community-based projects where the programmatic outcomes are often difficult to measure. As noted in the Bank’s OED review (2005), QEA7 findings note the mismatch between the project’s long-term impacts versus

the Bank's short project cycle. SDV and PREM should provide differentiated benchmarks for looking at project-specific and longer-term outcomes.

20. ***Integrate social safeguards into design of poverty and social aspects.*** The continued increase in attention to social safeguards issues shows that the policies and the Bank's procedures are better understood by Task Teams. However, preparation work is sometimes constrained by dealing with Task Team members (including local consultants) who would look only at safeguards issues without linking them to overall poverty, gender and social considerations. SDV should further disseminate guidance on integrating safeguards into project level social analysis.

**QEA7: POVERTY, GENDER AND SOCIAL ASPECTS: EXAMPLES OF GOOD PRACTICE**

***Dominican Republic Social Crisis Response DPL.*** This operation took into account the political realities and the specific risks arising from macroeconomic contraction, depreciation of the local currency, rampant inflation, and capital flight that resulted in utility breakdown, declining services delivery and worsening of incomes. The impacts of the crisis, and proposed response in this operation, were considered especially for the increasing number of so-called undocumented vulnerable populations. Monitoring of these impacts would be bolstered by a well-designed social accountability mechanism involving civil society groups but focused on capacity enhancement of government counterparts especially in the finance and social sectors.

***Cape Verde Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit (PRSC) DPL.*** Although this operation deals largely with macro or country level issues, such as financing, governance and social sector reforms, it provides elements for increasing local access by communities to the judicial system and set up dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms as part of the overall support to improving governance. This includes empowerment of communities, including participatory monitoring of service delivery to the poor. The feedback from extensive consultations were included in the project's design, resulting in strong ownership and "deep grounding that is likely to penetrate to municipal and community levels."

***Romania Mine Closure, Environment and Socio-Economic Regeneration (MCESERP).*** This repeater project makes use of lessons drawn from previous experience, especially progress in the legal framework that underpins the mine closure program. It does this by twinning legal and technical issues and social concerns over mine workers, both of which placed the country at a strategic pathway towards European accession. Institutional development was informed by particular attention to stakeholder interests. The socio-economic regeneration component covers a range of issues not normally found in technical and repeater projects of this type. The interventions were designed towards households, rather than individuals, with a focus on gender issues and a strong participatory approach towards design of alternatives for addressing impacts of mine closure.

***Nepal Rural Access Improvement and Decentralization.*** This project is designed to improve capacity and institutions for rural transport infrastructure and services in 20 districts in Nepal. It applies a multi-criteria participatory selection process for roads upgrade and maintenance and gives equal weights to social criteria to ensure access by the poorest communities. Despite difficulties in preparation, mainly due to security risks, the mitigation elements introduced in the project focused on Village Development Committees, Road User Committees and District Road Coordination where women's groups are well represented and actively involved. Through active community involvement, the issues of social risks became more transparent. Mechanisms for reducing security risks were well designed and aligned with the objectives of strengthening and building capacities for implementing the country's decentralization programs.

**Annex 7****ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS****OVERVIEW**

1. A team of Environment Specialists assessed the quality of the integration of Bank environmental management and planning requirements in the design of 130 QEA7 sampled projects. Environmental safeguards and other environmental protection issues were found to be relevant in 85 (63%) of the projects. This annex discusses key findings, analyzes the adequacy of the treatment of environmental issues, identifies strengths and weaknesses in the application of environmental safeguards and offers recommendations to improve performance. Major areas in which environmental performance was assessed included:

- Assessment of environmental impacts and risks;
- Adequacy of arrangements for mitigating, managing and monitoring adverse environmental impacts during project implementation and operation;
- Appropriateness and quality of the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) or equivalent;
- Adequacy and appropriateness of institutional arrangements for managing and mitigating environmental impacts; and
- Compliance with the Bank's environmental safeguards policies.

2. In rating these aspects the specialists took the view that unless a project had gone beyond the expected norms (i.e., that there was innovation in implementation arrangements, the project included significant departures in addressing environmentally sustainable development issues/opportunities, innovative tools had been adopted, etc.), it would be rated *satisfactory*. Only one project in the present cohort met this standard.

**SAMPLE PROFILE**

3. Table 2 shows the distribution of the environmental impact categories of the QEA7 sample. Some 37 % category C or uncategorized projects posed no significant environmental impacts relevant to project preparation and implementation. Accordingly, the remaining 63 % projects were reviewed and the quality of the Bank's treatment of environmental issues was rated on the basis of the above performance criteria. These projects covered investment loans for energy, infrastructure, rural development, environment and health and education sectors, and were sometimes funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Compared to representations of impact categories in QEA5–6, there was a significant reduction in the proportion of category A projects.

**KEY FINDINGS**

4. Overall, the projects reviewed rated 95% *moderately satisfactory* (MS), *satisfactory* (S) or *highly satisfactory* (HS) on environmental aspects compared to 88% in QEA5–6 and 89% for all QEA exercises. Taking into account the projects with scope for improvement (MS or lower), about 20% of the operations assessed during the review had scope for improvement. Four Regions (EAP, ECA, LCR and MNA) achieved a 100% *satisfactory* rating but two of them (ECA and MNA) had, respectively, 17% and 20% of the cohort rated *moderately satisfactory or lower*. SAR was close to the Bank’s average with 93% *satisfactory* but with 32% of the cohort rated *moderately satisfactory or lower*. Only AFR (83% overall and 33% *moderately satisfactory or lower*) continues to exhibit significant lapses in handling safeguards. Ratings by network were highest in FSE (100%) and PSDN 100%, followed closely by HDN (98%), INF (96%) and ESSD (91%). However, both ESSD and HDN had 29% of their cohort rated *moderately satisfactory or lower* and there is clearly scope for further improvements in these two networks. By investment instrument, APLs rated the lowest (87% overall and 13% rated *moderately satisfactory or lower*). Compliance with environmental safeguards was substantive save for some lapses in the application of the OP on Pest Management (81% compliance) and Natural Habitats in the case of “simple and repeater” projects (82% compliance).

***Triggering of Environmental Safeguard Policies and Level of Compliance***

5. Environmental safeguard policies were triggered a total of 139 times (many projects triggered more than one policy and thus the percentages in Table 1 below do not add up to 100%), with an expected preponderance of the Environmental Assessment Operational Policy 4.01.

**TABLE 1: ENVIRONMENTAL SAFEGUARD POLICIES TRIGGERED AND COMPLIANCE LEVELS**

Safeguard	QEA7 Policies Triggered		QEA7 Compliance	QEA5–6 Compliance
	No.	%	(%)	(%)
Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01)	87	67	99	93
Natural Habitats (OP 4.04)	24	18	98	87
Forests (OP 4.36)	8	6	100	100
Pest Management (OP 4.09)	13	10	81	100
Dam Safety (OP 4.37)	7	5	100	100

6. Two projects failed to trigger the application of the Pest Management OP but in both instances the requirements of the OPs are now being applied in substance along with appropriate mitigation measures. One project failed to apply the requirements of the EA and two others failed to comply with the Natural Habitats OP. This represents an improvement over previous QAE findings where there was both a failure to trigger and apply the OPs. Attention to consultation and disclosure of EAs was *satisfactory* and no instances of mis-categorization were found. Lastly, there were noticeably fewer instances of not involving Environment Specialists or Regional Safeguard Units during preparation of the projects, though there were some cases where their expertise was under utilized or ignored.

7. Ratings by environmental impact category are presented in Table 2 and show improvement in the treatment of A and C category projects; improvement for C projects is probably a reflection of more rigorous categorization, especially concerning health and education.

TABLE 2. RATINGS BY ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT CATEGORY (%)

Environmental Impact Category	No. of Projects				QEA7 <i>Moderately Satisfactory or Better (%)</i>	QEA5–6 <i>Moderately Satisfactory or Better (%)</i>
	QEA7		QEA5–6			
	No.	%	No.	%		
A	7	5	14	10	95	81
B	70	54	57	42	93	93
C	33	26	39	29	100	79
FI	7	5	7	5	100	100
U	13	10	18	14	0	75
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>88</b>

### *Implementation of Environmental Mitigation and Other Protective Measures*

#### *Investment Projects*

8. Areas rated substantively *highly satisfactory*, *satisfactory* or *moderately satisfactory* include: assessment of environmental impacts and risks (96%), arrangements for mitigating and monitoring adverse impacts during implementation (95%), the quality of the EMP (97%) and adequacy of institutional arrangements for conducting the EA (94%). Nonetheless, there is a clear case for improvement in the following aspects that are rated *moderately satisfactory or below*: assessment of impacts and risks (82%), mitigation and monitoring (85%), EMP (79%) and institutional arrangements (78%). Indeed, judged against QAE5–6 ratings, all these areas have actually fallen—quite significantly for EMPs and institutional arrangements (from 87% to 79% and 93% to 78%, respectively).

9. Performance by Region and Network are presented respectively in Tables 3 and 4. The best performing Regions are EAP, ECA, LCR and MNA at 100% *moderately satisfactory or better ratings*. SAR (93%) is somewhat below the Bank's average while AFR (83%) exhibits significant problems. An analysis of the *moderately satisfactory and lower ratings* shows ECA and MNA with 17% and 20%, respectively, while SAR and AFR had 32% and 33%, respectively. Overall, compared to previous years there has been a significant improvement in performance save for AFR and SAR.

TABLE 3. RATINGS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS BY REGION (%)

Region	Total No. of Projects Assessed	HS (%)	S (%)	MS (%)	MU or Lower (%)
AFR	22	0	67	16	17
EAP	15	0	94	6	0
ECA	15	0	83	17	0
LCR	12	0	92	8	0
MNA	8	0	80	20	0
SAR	18	7	61	25	7
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>

10. *Moderately satisfactory or better* ratings for Networks with significant number of projects were highest in HDN (98%) followed by INF (96%) and ESSD (90%). HDN and ESSD had a significantly higher percentage of *moderately satisfactory or lower* ratings (29% and 30%, respectively) compared to the other Networks. With the exception of ESSD, all Networks demonstrated significant improvement in performance (see Table 4 for details).

TABLE 4. RATINGS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS BY NETWORK (%)

Region	Total No. of Projects Assessed	HS (%)	S (%)	MS (%)	MU or Lower (%)
ESSD	30	0	70	20	10
FSE	2	0	100	0	0
HDN	19	0	71	27	2
INF	37	2	91	3	4
PREM	0	0	0	0	0
PSDN	2	0	100	0	0
<b>Bank-wide</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>5</b>

11. An analysis along sector lines shows a number of instances where a significant percentage of the projects fall into the *moderately satisfactory or lower* category; these include Environment (41%) and Rural (21%). Quality issues were also found in Education (53%) and Water Supply and Sanitation (39%), though with a small number of projects the results here must be interpreted with care. In terms of instruments, the majority of *moderately satisfactory and lower* ratings were limited to SIL (22%). All projects falling into the *moderately satisfactory* category have room for improvement in applying environmental safeguards.

#### *Adjustment/DPL Operations*

12. Task Teams (in consultation with the Regional Safeguards Units) categorized all these operations as C against criteria established in OP 8.60 Sectoral Adjustment. This categorization was confirmed in this review. There were two instances only where OP 8.60 Development Policy Lending applied as the Concept Review took place on or after 1 September 2004. Both were rated category C projects.

13. LCR has been especially active in PRSC and DPL operations in forging connections beyond safeguards, identifying environmental linkages with reform measures supported by Bank-funded projects and promoting inter-institutional coordination and the use of environmental indicators/benchmarks in addition to those for poverty.

**STRENGTHS**

14. Clear improvements include more substantive attention to conducting environmental assessments and risks and measures to mitigate adverse impacts and their monitoring. By detailing mitigation measures and monitoring and scheduling requirements, EMPs appear to be better mainstreamed, and the incorporation of environmental protection activities in operational manuals and contractors' bidding documents has assisted in the development of supervision arrangements for environmental safeguards. Though there is still scope for improvement, health and education projects incorporated environmental management needs at more *satisfactory* levels compared with previous years.

**WEAKNESSES**

15. The weakest area continues to be the adequacy of institutional arrangements for assuring environmental management during implementation. These are often insufficiently defined and reliant upon individuals or transient bodies (PIUs, etc.) ignoring longer term needs for sustaining functions in government sectors or agencies. This is partly because of poor analysis of capacity and organization and under appreciation of the constraints of policy, legal or regulatory processes of relevance to environmental safeguards.

16. Another major concern is the tendency to “ring fence” projects for safeguards application at the expense of the interests of the wider landscape, including effective integration with other development projects. Preparation of some projects (especially in the environmental and rural sectors) was deficient in examining the boarder environmental context of the project. Consequently, QAG panels judged these to be opportunities lost in attaining sustainable development—in some cases undermining the attainment of development objectives.

17. The application of OP 8.60 in DPLs needs attention by the Regional Safeguards Units if environmental dimensions are to be captured effectively under this instrument.

**ISSUES REQUIRING ATTENTION AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS**

***A. Compliance with Environmental Safeguard Policies***

18. QEA7 identified four instances of non-compliance with safeguards concerning the Natural Habitats and Pest Management OPs.

*Recommended Action*

- QACU and the Regions to continue with training sessions on the application of the natural habitats and pest management OPs and use of supportive manuals.

***B. Implementation Arrangements***

19. These continue to receive inadequate attention during project preparation. Arrangements in EA/EMPs were sometimes poorly defined, especially for coordination between the sectors and relevant agencies (including Environment) and at the district level. Responsibilities by the Borrower were also not clearly delineated for monitoring and evaluation of the arrangements along with line management and reporting mechanisms. Too often the project launch workshop was charged with agreeing institutional requirements without adequate guidance in project documents. A consequent outcome is that project staffs of the Borrower and the Bank are left without effective provisions to conduct supervision of environmental safeguards. Similarly, means to coordinate or link environmental requirements of the project with other sectoral agencies and the environmental agency were at the discretion of the government, usually the Project Implementation Unit—a situation likely to produce mixed results, especially where substantial mitigation measures have to be carefully phased with civil works and where cumulative impacts are anticipated.

20. Guidance provided in PIPs and Operational Manuals—frequently the only instruments providing guidance to consultants and contractors on the implementation of environmental protection measures (detailed in the EMP) —has improved and contract clauses on environmental protection are being widely adopted. Nonetheless, PIPs and Operational Manuals sometimes suffer from lack of sufficient pragmatic institutional arrangements delineating responsibilities, coordination and reporting.

21. Assessment of capacity needs was often conducted summarily, especially at the local level—no needs assessment to indicate weaknesses and required realignments—and opportunities lost for substantive upgrading of performance (responsibilities being left to PIU and consultants), thereby denying longer term benefits for government staff and other nationals.

22. The review found that training arrangements are now being given more attention. However, specific details on targeting, content and training of trainers are required if this is to become an effective instrument in helping mainstream environmental management in Government agencies and the consultant/NGO communities.

*Recommended Actions*

- Institutional capability and strengthening needs should be more rigorously assessed in a country context during preparation and specific details provided for implementation of recommended actions during supervision. To assist this, the Environment Department should prepare a guidance note for use by operations staff;
- Regional Environment Specialists should enhance progress in incorporating institutional arrangements for effective environmental management in PIPs and Operational Manuals. To support Task Teams, they might also develop more guidance on the inclusion of environmental protection measures in the preparation and implementation of such Manuals; and

- Training programs for project components should be more carefully designed to better target personnel and assure gains beyond the life of the project.

***C. Overcoming “Ring Fencing”***

23. In some cases, inadequate analyses were made of the dependency of the project upon the environmental services beyond the boundary of the project (e.g., groundwater resources); failure to integrate environmental planning and management needs with neighboring development projects helped further exacerbate this oversight.

*Recommended Actions*

- Environment Specialists should be more diligent in assisting Task Teams adopt a more systemic approach to capturing the full benefits of sustainable development by stipulating the wider requirements of environmental goods and services or minimizing the impacts beyond the project boundary. Focusing primarily on the safeguards window is proving insufficient. Likewise, Environment Specialists should be more proactive in helping Task Teams assess the need to coordinate/link with other geographically proximal Bank or donor-assisted projects having similar objectives to gain efficiencies in dealing with systemic issues and to enhance sustainable development. The possibility of generating indirect impacts should be similarly carefully assessed; and
- Training sessions for Bank staff on safeguards and other environmental management issues should include means to overcome the tendency to “ring fence” projects.

***D. Development Policy Loans***

24. The new OP/BP on Development Policy Lending requires a determination of whether policies supported by an operation pose significant environmental impacts and an assessment of the Borrowers capacity/commitment to mitigate adverse impacts within the operation or in parallel with other development initiatives. Some guidance has been provided by the Environment Department, but additional instruction on specific opportunities for policy/regulatory reform or capacity building and substantive linkage with extant Bank funded projects is needed if this lending instrument is to be used effectively for mainstreaming environmental planning and management in country operations.

*Recommended Actions*

- Regions and the Environment Department should assist Task Teams apply the new OP/BP effectively in dealing with environmental issues by developing a set of pragmatic guidelines on opportunities and mechanisms to better integrate environmental planning and management needs, e.g., building upon national assessments to define systemic opportunities for policy/regulatory reform, and linkage with currently funded projects to gain synergy and enhance a country’s environmental management capacity; and

- The Regions should run training programs on how to mainstream environmental planning and management under this policy.

***E. Evaluation Impacts and Measuring Outcomes***

25. Use of indicators and benchmarks to monitor progress remains very general in most project documents leaving supervision missions with no effective mechanism to quantify progress or identify trends (positive and negative) during implementation. This may compromise the implementation of environmental protection measures, including measuring the effectiveness of institutional arrangements.

*Recommended Action*

- Task Teams would benefit from assistance in the design and use of environmental performance indicators to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation and other protective measures in the performance of Bank-funded projects. Notes produced by the Environment Department are a valuable first step and should be elaborated, especially regarding changes in environmental quality and service delivery and efficiency of sustainable resources use.

26. On the plus side, independent monitoring is being increasingly utilized, if only at the MTR stage of supervision. This is a valuable check on due diligence, especially when it involves NGOs at the field level and should be applied more generally.

*Recommended Actions*

- Use of findings from independent monitoring and spot checks to assure due diligence in compliance with environmental safeguards at the field level should be more widely adopted; and
- Dedicated budgets for environmental supervision should be secured, especially for local staff.

***F. Environmental Management Plans***

27. Although the quality of EMPs has generally improved, continued vigilance is needed in this critical area.

*Recommended Action*

- The Regions and the Environment Department should continue to train Bank and Borrower operations staff in the preparation and implementation of EMPs to assure gains are sustained.

***G. Format of the PAD and PCN Meetings and Follow Up***

28. The new PAD format has undermined the substance of addressing environmental aspects and, consequently, the storyline covering assessment of impacts, proposed mitigation measures

and monitoring and institutional arrangements is often deficient. Task Teams have resorted to a cursory statement and mere ticking of safeguards. In addition, records of discussions on environmental safeguards at the PCN stage tend to be perfunctory, giving most attention to compliance with safeguards at the expense of tackling strategic and more systemic concerns, e.g., weaknesses in the sector agencies, policy issues, etc.

29. Discussions with the Regional Environment Units reveal that there is often a lack of follow up on environmental issues by the Task Team and, as appropriate, the Regional Environmental Unit after the PCN meetings and completion of ISDSs.

*Recommended Action*

- For projects not delegated to the Task Team, Regional Environment Units should follow up issues during the *entire* project preparation stage, closely monitoring discussions/actions taken necessary to successfully integrating safeguard requirements in project documents.

**Annex 8****FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ASPECTS****OVERVIEW**

1. As with previous QEAs, Financial Management (FM) reviewers<sup>4</sup> evaluated the adequacy and quality of project financial management arrangements at entry and the extent to which project documents provide information sufficient to enable the reader to arrive at conclusions on the appropriateness of the proposed FM arrangements.
2. Continuing established practice, standard questionnaires were employed for the purposes of the reviews. The method of rating the questions has changed since QEA6, from Yes/No answers to ratings based on a six point scale. Also, the questions related to Development Policy Operations are linked to the new OP8.60. Responding to concerns expressed in previous years concerning possible inconsistency of ratings, a smaller number of FM reviewers were involved in QEA7, with just two reviewers being responsible for over 80% of the total number of projects reviewed.
3. Out of a sample size of 130 operations (compared with 85 under QEA6) a total of 99% of the projects were rated in the *moderately satisfactory*<sup>5</sup> or *better* cluster. (In fact only one project was rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.) As shown in Table 1, this compares favorably with the earlier assessments.

**TABLE 1. OVERALL RATINGS**

% Satisfactory				
QEA3	QEA4	QEA5	QEA6	QEA7
89	97	92	92	99

4. The sample reviewed, consisted of 114 investment and 16 development policy lending operations. As in the past, separate questionnaires were used for each type of operation.
5. The assessment results, shown in Tables 2 and 3, and based on the new six point rating system, were as follows:
  - The overall results of FM quality at entry of projects in FY04–FY05 confirm, as in the past, that FM has been integrated within Bank operations over the past few years, and the existence of FM Assessment Guidelines has ensured that FM staff fully understand and implement Bank requirements in connection with FM assessments at entry;

<sup>4</sup> Douglas Graham, Brian Falconer, Marius Koen, Regis Cunningham, Xiomara Morel, Agnes Albert-Loth and Parminder Brar.

<sup>5</sup> The rating scale has been changed since QEA6, from a four point to a six point scale. Refer to the Appendix of this Annex for a comparison of the two scales.

- The 99% *moderately satisfactory or better* rating to a large extent reflects compliance with the FM process and therefore policy. As the institution increasingly focuses on the achievement of results, the attainment of this level of performance suggests that going forward there is now a need for greater emphasis on issues of relevance, substance and effectiveness of proposed FM arrangements;
- For the first time all Development Policy Lending (DPL) Operations were rated as either *highly satisfactory* or *satisfactory*. In addition, the percentage of DPL Operations rated as *highly satisfactory* increased from 5 % in QEA6 to 25% in QEA7;
- Fifteen operations representing 12%, (QEA6: 15%) of the sample were rated *highly satisfactory* with ECA representing 40%, AFR 27% and SAR 27% of these;
- Only 8% of operations were rated *moderately satisfactory*, a new category introduced in QEA7; and
- All Regions have shown an improvement in performance.

TABLE 2. RATINGS BY TYPE OF OPERATION

Type of Operation	Number of Projects						Total
	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU	
Investment	11	92	10	1	0	0	114
Dev. Policy	4	12	0	0	0	0	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>130</b>

HS - *highly satisfactory*; S - *satisfactory*; MS - *moderately satisfactory*; MU - *moderately unsatisfactory*; U - *unsatisfactory*; HU - *highly unsatisfactory*.

TABLE 3. RATINGS BY REGION

QEA	% Satisfactory					
	AFR	EAP	ECA	LCR	MNA	SAR
QEA7	100	100	100	100	100	96
QEA6	92	82	100	94	83	89

#### QUALITY AT ENTRY—INVESTMENT PROJECTS

6. FM reviewers addressed the specific issues laid out in Table 4 in arriving at conclusions in respect of investment operations. *Highly satisfactory* ratings are characterized by exemplary operations, demonstrating good practice in several areas which are more likely to result in FM arrangements which are responsive to project design, country environment and assessed risks.

FM assessment actions are highly pro-active and seek to contribute to the enhancement of overall borrower PFM systems while FM work is well-documented. At the lower end of the scale, an *unsatisfactory* rating would reflect the fact that there is no indication that the task team has considered significant FM issues for the project and there has been grossly insufficient follow up on issues raised in other country, sector or project diagnostics. There may be indications of significant deficiencies in most of the areas of the FM assessment affecting the preparation or design, and risk assessment of the project.

**TABLE 4. FM SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS FOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS**

Issues	HS (1)	S (2)	MS (3)	MU (4)	U (5)	HU (6)	NA	Total	MS or Better (1+2+3)
Adequacy and appropriateness of assessment to provide assurance that proceeds would be used for intended purposes	17%	74%	8%	1%	-	-	-	100%	99%
Time bound action plan to mitigate weaknesses agreed and actually implemented in time <i>or</i> agreed critical actions were in place by Board date	10%	67%	17%	3%	-	-	3%	100%	98%
FM risk assessment appropriate	24%	65%	7%	3%	1%	-	-	100%	96%
Agreement on form and content of interim and annual financial statements, and auditing arrangements	6%	84%	8%	2%	-	-	-	100%	98%
FM assessment adequately documented	12%	71%	12%	3%	2%	-	-	100%	95%

7. Projects rated *highly satisfactory* had the following characteristics in common:
- Full integration of FMS into task team with good coordination with TTL;
  - The FM assessment is comprehensive and issues are addressed with clarity;
  - Work is well-documented and management has been supportive, where required, in resolving FM issues;
  - The FMS has been proactive in resolving critical remedial actions to ensure their timely implementation; and

- The FM risk assessment was of a high quality, well documented and included appropriate mitigating measures.

#### QUALITY AT ENTRY—DEVELOPMENT POLICY OPERATIONS

8. FM reviewers addressed the specific issues laid out in Table 5 in arriving at conclusions in respect of DPL operations. In general, the FM review of DPL operations acknowledged the broad policy requirements in this area, focusing on the reasonableness of the decisions made by the task team. In conducting these reviews, a lesser degree of subjectivity needed to be exercised by FM reviewers than in the past due to the fact that clear guidance on fiduciary issues is now available in the new OP/BP8.60 and Guidelines. *Highly satisfactory* ratings are characterized by exemplary operations, demonstrating that the operation drew upon relevant PFM analytic work undertaken by the Bank, the country and third parties and that it is well factored into the operation. Also, funds flow, disbursement and audit arrangements are appropriately applied in terms of the assessed fiduciary risks. For operations with a PFM component, the PFM analytic work results in PFM conditions/triggers that are appropriate, results focused and sequenced. Operations are rated *satisfactory* when they adhere to the policies/guidelines and feature adequate disclosure in the project documents.

**TABLE 5. FM SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY OPERATIONS**

Issues	HS (1)	S (2)	MS (3)	MU (4)	U (5)	HU (6)	NA	Total	MS or Better (1+2+3)
PFM analytic work drawn upon and adequately factored into the operation. If analytic work not available, the circumstances were clearly described	25%	75%	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
PFM analytic work resulted in PFM conditions/triggers and was appropriate, results focused and sequenced. These conditions were harmonized with DPs	31%	38%	-	-	-	-	31%	100%	100%
PFM arrangements proposed were appropriate in light of IMF Safeguards Assessment (SA). If SA not available, the PAD described assessment of forex management fiduciary risk. Arrangements for credit of DPL proceeds into govt. account were adequate	19%	81%	-	-	-	-	-	100%	100%

Where additional fiduciary arrangements were applied, the rationale for this was clearly brought out in the MOP and these arrangements were reflected in legal agreement	13%	81%	-	-	-	-	6%	100%	100%
Fund flow arrangements clearly documented.	13%	81%	6%	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
Fiduciary risks clearly identified and fiduciary concerns adequately addressed	13%	81%	6%	-	-	-	-	100%	100%
Tranche release & disbursement conditions clearly specified	19%	75%	-	-	-	-	6%	100%	100%
FM assessment adequately documented	13%	62%	25%	-	-	-	-	100%	100%

9. The four operations, that were rated *highly satisfactory*, comprehensively drew upon relevant PFM analytic work and scored high marks for both the integration of PFM analytic work in the design of the operation as well as for funds flow arrangements.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10. In addition to the trends observed, several issues were raised as a result of the review that require mentioning or need to be addressed.

- QEA7 results confirm earlier assessments' findings that FM staff pay attention to compliance with rules and guidelines;
- TTLs are becoming even more aware of the value added when the FMS is a fully fledged task team member during the preparation phase;
- An analysis of the results per Network and typology of Operation does not reveal noteworthy trends that may suggest evidence of significant variations in FM performance;
- The marked improvement in performance of DPL Operations can be attributed to the much wider availability of country diagnostics (CFAAs, PERs, ROSCs, PFM reviews); better integration of FM staff into the teams; FM staff having gained more experience with these kind of operations; as well as the clarity of the new OP8.60 policy and accompanying guidelines; and
- While in general documentation is of a better quality, it remains one of the areas that need further improvement. There is still an inconsistency in the quality of preparation and comprehensiveness of documentation.

**THE QAG PROCESS — GOING FORWARD**

11. Given the sustained good performance of FM quality at entry, it is timely to consider how the FM network, and the Bank, could maximize benefits from quality review processes in the future. The following recommendations and observations should be considered in this regard:

- In order to better serve the Financial Management Sector Board's (FMSB) commitment to continuously monitor, evaluate and improve service, the FMSB may consider alternative arrangements, *in addition to* the QAG process, for the continuous review of the quality of FM inputs at entry. Going forward with a commendable 99% success rate, the FMSB now wants to focus on issues of effectiveness of FM work at entry. In other words a more explicit connection should be made between implementation progress and FM quality at entry. In this regard a number of issues may be considered:
  - One suggestion is to take all *unsatisfactory* and *highly unsatisfactory* FM-ratings in ISRs and link this with FM work at entry to determine why acceptable FM arrangements at entry have become *unsatisfactory*. This would facilitate a process of looking back at substantive quality at entry issues;
  - Projects would be reviewed with an eye to determining the extent to which they complied with the new FM quality control arrangements set out in the forthcoming FM Practices Manual; and
  - Supervision work should be linked with the risk assessment framework (as envisaged in the forthcoming FM Practices Manual) to follow up on the operational implications of the risk mitigation measure identified during the preparation phase of the project and to confirm how the FM network is discharging its responsibility in this regard.
- As a result of the above recommendations the FMSB may want to consider not remaining part of QEA process, but to concentrate QAG activities on the QSA process with selective linkages to FM quality at entry. This would mean that the framework for measuring FM performance during QSA will have to be reworked; and
- The emerging trend for some Regional requirements to insist on projects having "zero effectiveness conditions", particularly in the fiduciary area, needs to be weighed against the current situation of a majority of projects having FM action plans to be completed after Board presentation. The desired alignment may require a phased and gradual approach to be implemented, by ensuring that projects taken to the Board have indeed in place sufficient and appropriate FM arrangements—recognizing that readiness for implementation is critical to project success (in terms of achieving the expected development outcomes) and, as far as FM is concerned, clearly dependent upon the early and timely involvement of FMS's in project preparation.

## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX 1. COMPARISON OF RATING SCALES BETWEEN QEA7 AND QEA6

QEA7 Six point scale	QEA6 Four point scale
<i>Satisfactory</i>	
1 = <i>Highly satisfactory</i>	1 = <i>Highly satisfactory</i>
2 = <i>Satisfactory</i>	2 = <i>Satisfactory</i>
<i>Less than satisfactory (Below the Line)</i>	
3 = <i>Moderately satisfactory</i>	3 = <i>Marginally satisfactory</i>
4 = <i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>	4 = <i>Unsatisfactory</i>
5 = <i>Unsatisfactory</i>	
6 = <i>Highly unsatisfactory</i>	

## APPENDIX 2. FM RATINGS BY REGION

Region	Number of Projects						Total
	<i>Highly Satisfactory</i> (1)	<i>Satisfactory</i> (2)	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i> (3)	<i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i> (4)	<i>Unsatisfactory</i> (5)	<i>Highly Unsatisfactory</i> (6)	
AFR	4	24	2	0	0	0	30
EAP	0	13	2	0	0	0	15
ECA	6	19	0	0	0	0	25
LCR	0	19	1	0	0	0	20
MNA	1	10	3	0	0	0	14
SAR	4	18	2	1	0	0	25
OTHER	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>130</b>

**Annex 9****FEEDBACK FROM TTLs, PANELISTS AND OBSERVERS**

1. Following completion of the QEA7 panel interviews, Task Team Leaders (TTLs), Panelists as well as Observers were asked to participate in a survey to provide feedback to QAG on QEA7's assessment of sampled projects. Of the 156 surveys sent to TTLs, the 374 surveys to Panelists and the 77 surveys to Observers, QAG received 91 (58%), 273 (73%) and 63 (82%) responses, respectively.<sup>6</sup>

**A. TTL FEEDBACK ON PROJECT PREPARATION****STAFF TIME INPUT FOR QEA7**

2. The TTLs reported that, on average, they and their task team members and ACS staff spent 42 hours preparing for and participating in the QEA7 process. This average is at about the same level as in QEA5 and QEA6 (40–42 hours).

3. Staff time input for QAG assessments remains a non-funded mandate for which TTLs are not provided with additional budgets. The issue of non-funded QAG assessments remains perhaps the single most important irritant *vis-à-vis* TTLs' attitude towards QAG reviews.

**ADDITIONAL FEEDBACK**

4. TTLs' *moderately satisfactory or better* (SAT) responses to all other QEA7 survey questions are presented in the following table and compared to QEA6 and QEA5 responses.

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<sup>6</sup> Since some operations had more than one TTL and since a number of Panelists and Observers served on more than one panel, the number of surveys sent exceeds the number of operations assessed (130) and the Panelist and Observer counts (177 and 72, respectively.)

Questions	QEA7		QEA6		QEA5	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
<b>Management Support</b>						
Sector Manager's guidance & support	90	85	93	55	83	36
Sufficient attention given by the Country Department	82	80	96	57	89	36
<b>Other Support</b>						
Support by the country field office	83	69	98	54	89	36
Support from legal	85	69	92	51	97	31
<b>Factors with negative influence on quality <sup>a</sup></b>						
Management changes	46	26	6	47	16	31
TM changes	41	34	7	46	10	30
Team Member changes	42	31	11	46	13	30
Inappropriate skill mix	3	68	11	46	10	30
Budget constraints	26	62	17	46	26	31
Processing time	12	64	NA	NA	NA	NA
Complications arising from donor coordination	12	52	32	47	27	30

NA = Not Applicable; N = Number of respondents

<sup>a</sup> In QEA7 TTL surveys, the percentages for the factors with a negative influence on quality are based on "Positive" ratings by the TTLs.

5. The table shows that there is improvement from both QEA5 and QEA6, in all areas where TTL opinion was sought (country department support remains unchanged but high at 96%), and in comparison to QEA5, QEA7 represents an improvement in all areas without exception. Specific findings are that:

- TTL satisfaction with the quality and timeliness of support, from sector management, the country field office and legal, rose since QEA6; and
- Most factors negatively influencing project preparation increased from the values recorded in both QEA6 and QEA5. Based on the QEA7 TTL survey responses, management changes (44%), team member changes (42%) and TM changes (41%) have the most notable negative influences on quality.

#### RESULTS OF THE TTL SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEY

6. At the request of the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS), new questions were added to the QEA TTL Survey to provide insight into the impact of recent simplification measures. The following table gives a profile of TTLs' responses to these queries.

Questions	NA/No Opinion (No.)	Total Responses (No.)
<b>1 Major internal factors affecting project quality:</b>		
(a) Management changes <b>Positive= 14 ( 56%)    Negative= 11 ( 44%)</b>	54	79
(b) TM changes <b>Positive= 20 ( 59%)    Negative= 14 ( 41%)</b>	46	80
(c) Team member changes <b>Positive= 18 ( 58%)    Negative= 13 ( 42%)</b>	45	76
(d) Task team's skill mix <b>Positive= 64 ( 97%)    Negative= 2 ( 3%)</b>	11	77
(e) Budget availability <b>Positive= 45 ( 75%)    Negative= 15 ( 25%)</b>	20	80
(f) Processing time <b>Positive= 52 ( 84%)    Negative= 10 ( 16%)</b>	18	80
(g) Donor coordination <b>Positive= 45 ( 88%)    Negative= 6 ( 12%)</b>	26	77
<b>2 Fiduciary Clearances:</b>		
(a) FM sign-off by a member of the task team? <b>Yes= 60 ( 86%)    No= 10 ( 14%)</b>	10	80
(b) Procurement sign-off by a member of the task team? <b>Yes= 53 ( 82%)    No= 12 ( 18%)</b>	14	79
<b>3 Social Safeguards Clearances:</b>		
(a) Provided by the regional safeguards unit? <b>Yes= 59 ( 89%)    No= 7 ( 11%)</b>	14	80
(b) Delegated to the responsible sector manager? <b>Yes= 14 ( 24%)    No= 44 ( 76%)</b>	17	75
If safeguards were delegated, did this help in:		
(c) Better integration of social safeguard issues in project design? <b>Yes= 14 ( 74%)    No= 5 ( 26%)</b>	36	55
(d) Promoting a more efficient or better teamwork? <b>Yes= 15 ( 68%)    No= 7 ( 32%)</b>	33	55
(e) Eliminating the need to resort to the regional safeguard unit? <b>Yes= 9 ( 69%)    No= 4 ( 31%)</b>	41	54
<b>4 Environment Safeguards Clearances:</b>		
(a) Provided by the regional safeguards unit? <b>Yes= 60 ( 90%)    No= 7 ( 10%)</b>	12	79
(b) Delegated to the responsible sector manager? <b>Yes= 12 ( 21%)    No= 46 ( 79%)</b>	14	72
If safeguards were delegated, did this help in:		
(c) Better integration of environmental safeguard issues in project design? <b>Yes= 12 ( 75%)    No= 4 ( 25%)</b>	31	47
(d) Promoting a more efficient or better teamwork? <b>Yes= 16 ( 84%)    No= 3 ( 16%)</b>	28	47
(e) Eliminating the need to resort to the regional safeguard unit? <b>Yes= 7 ( 54%)    No= 6 ( 46%)</b>	33	46

Questions	NA/No Opinion (No.)	Total Responses (No.)
<b>5 Procurement:</b>		
(a) Was a qualified procurement specialist a member of the task team? <b>Yes= 69 ( 100%)    No= 0 ( 0%)</b>	7	76
(b) If yes, did this specialist have full sign-off authority for procurement <b>Yes= 56 ( 81%)    No= 13 ( 19%)</b>	5	74
(c) Did this delegation of procurement clearance to the task team have significant influence on the: i) Design of the procurement arrangements? <b>Yes= 42 ( 76%)    No= 13 ( 24%)</b>	15	70

- Positive responses outweigh the negative. Questions relating to measures affecting project quality through task teams' skill mix (97%) and donor coordination (88%) and those relating to measures affecting the delegation of environment safeguards and social safeguards clearances to Regional safeguards units (90% and 89%, respectively) received the highest positive ratings; and
- The high number of questions where "NA" and "No Opinion" were indicated suggests that additional work is needed to better harmonize and coordinate these supplementary items. Nevertheless, these produce valuable insights into the various perceptions concerning institutional performance.

## **B. TTL, OBSERVER AND PANELIST FEEDBACK ON QAG'S PERFORMANCE**

7. QAG's performance was assessed by TTLs, Panelists and Observers in five main aspects: i) Assessment panel; ii) Assessment approach; iii) Assessment process; iv) Learning; and v) Overall QAG QEA7 performance. The first three main aspects include several sub-questions. The table below presents SAT percentages based on survey responses.

Questions	QEA7					
	TTL		Panelists		Observer	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
<b>1 Assessment Panel</b>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Panel skill mix	68	88	93	269	86	62
Panel Familiarity with country specific issues	43	88	79	267	75	63
Panel fairness and professionalism	66	89	NA	NA	88	62
<b>2 Assessment Approach</b>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Panel focused on relevant issues	56	89	NA	NA	NA	NA
Were there major omissions	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Panel's preparation	NA	NA	92	267	NA	NA
Appropriateness of the time allotted for the interview	86	89	87	271	81	63
Individual panelists views taken into account when rating the project	NA	NA	97	270	NA	NA
<b>3 Assessment Process</b>	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Fairness and transparency	NA	NA	97	270	90	62
Panel listening to the Task Team	NA	NA	94	259	90	63
Task team listening to the panel	NA	NA	78	269	87	61
Role of the moderator	51	88	92	268	83	62
Quality of QAG administrative support	79	88	98	268	95	59
QAG burden on the TT	60	88	NA	NA	NA	NA
Value added by the Interview	51	88	NA	NA	NA	NA
<b>4 Learning</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>5 Overall QAG QEA7 Performance</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>62</b>

NA = Not Applicable; N = Number of respondents

8. Based on the figures, the following observations can be made:

- QAG's overall performance received an overall 80% SAT rating from TTLs. This represents an increase from QEA6's 75% and QEA5's 74%. The 98% and 95% SAT ratings from Panelists and Observers, respectively, are about the same as in QEA6;
- As in past QEAs, SAT ratings given by TTLs are lower than ratings from the Panelists and the Observers, whereas ratings from Panelists and Observers are very similar and very high. For Panelists and Observers in QEA7, ratings concerning QAG's performance are all above 95% with the exception of the latter's ratings on panel familiarity with country specific issues (91%); and
- Like Observers, TTLs, have a somewhat more critical opinion of QAG panels in terms of their familiarity with country specific issues though ratings on this aspect improved from 55% in QEA6 to 74% in QEA7.

9. Analysis of the feedback surveys of QAG's performance, on the basis of S+ ratings shows:

- Sharp distinction in perceptions between TTLs whose operations were rated S+ and other TTLs. Those who received overall ratings of *satisfactory or better* on their operations in turn rated QEA7 as 72% S+. Other TTLs were much more negative on various aspects of the QEA7 process—only 16% of such responding TTLs considered QEA7 as *satisfactory or better*. Panelists (93% S+) and observers (90% S+) do not distinguish in their ratings of QAG processes between these operations with different results in the assessment. Apparently, TTLs who receive ratings of 3 or lower are transferring their disappointment to their views of the assessment process.
- Even TTLs whose operations received ratings of *satisfactory or better* indicated scope for improvement on:
  - (a) Panel familiarity with the country background;
  - (b) Value added from the panel interview;
  - (c) Role of the moderator; and
  - (d) QEA7 as a learning experience.
- QAG comments on areas for improvement:
  - (a) **Panels' country knowledge.** With the participation of senior staff and managers around the Bank, QEA7 succeeded in getting more panels than in previous assessments staffed with at least one panelist and often more, having familiarity with country background, though in some cases this was not based on recent country experience. However, such knowledge cannot, by definition, in many cases, be as recent or in-depth as the TTLs' own understanding. QAG's first priority remains to staff panels with credible substantive skills, background, and subject-knowledge; it will keep trying to also combine these with country knowledge.
  - (b) **Value added from the panel interview.** All panels provided questions in advance to task teams in order to help focus the interviews. Task teams were also requested to provide overall strategic context and priorities and discuss key aspects of design or processing. Of course, in terms of the TTLs' on-going work, an interview for an assessment purpose would not be so valuable; this is connected to the very similar rating by TTLs of QEA as a learning experience (see (d) below). QAG will, in future assessments, also ask TTLs to specify which documents require, in their view, more focus by the panels.

- (c) **Role of the moderator.** Task teams have a somewhat limited basis to judge the role of the moderator, since the greater part of this role is after the interview with the task team, in assuring clarity and consistency of panel judgments and helping complete the assessment process within tight deadlines, with due process for differences of views (on panels and with task teams). Panelists, who have the greatest inter-action with moderators, rated them 93% S+ in QEA7.
- (d) **QEA as a learning experience.** Given that the primary objective of QEA is to evaluate and report on standardized parameters of quality, it is indeed encouraging that so many TTLs (about half, overall, and two-thirds of those whose operations were rated 2 or better) consider it useful also as a learning experience. One way in which a lot of team members (especially new ones) learn is through looking at operational design critically and in some depth, through the eyes of panelists."

### COMMENTS ON QEA7

10. Below are some of the recurring opinions on the QEA7 exercise:

*From TTLs:*

- Though QEAs are expected to draw lessons for learning by the institution and QEA issues are expected to be flagged for action by the teams' respective management and operating units, TTLs would have liked QEA panels to share relevant best practices or pitfalls and to provide specific recommendations and guidance on their individual operations;
- TTLs suggested that QAG select Panelists with greater familiarity with the country context; and
- TTLs would have liked Panel members to spend more time in reviewing the project background and documentation.

*From Panelists:*

- Panels are well-constituted;
- Areas of the QEA that need revisiting: i) time allotted for project review (particularly, the documentation review time allotted for panelists involved in assessing complex projects); ii) assessment questionnaires; iii) document list; and iv) timing of the QEA;
- Panelists would have liked specialist inputs and questions to the task teams to be issued more in advance;

- Panelists suggested that new panelists, as well as the TTLs of the sampled projects, sit in as observers in another panel before their particular assessment takes place;
- Having documents on a CD-ROM and having a computer for the panel to enter data directly into at the end of each interview are process improvements;
- Need to increase focus on systemic issues and on management decisions/accountability to reduce pressure on task teams, particularly TTLs; and
- Need for periodic panelist meetings at QAG to discuss emerging observations.

*From Observers:*

- The value of QEA as a learning experience is very high, and Observers recognized that this activity would be a useful introduction to operations for new staff, particularly new TTLs;
- Some felt that observing in more than one panel would have been better in that this would have allowed for a fuller understanding of the QEA process; and
- The quality of the assessment Panels is very high, though Observers recognized the need for panelists to have stronger country knowledge in some cases.

**Annex 10****NOTE ON SAMPLE STRATIFICATION AND WEIGHTING**1. ***Objectives of Stratification***

- To provide robust measurements for most Regions—i.e., conclusions at a statistical significance of 90% +/- 10% (except for MNA, 90% +/- 15%); and
- To support valid conclusions on quality of “simple and repeater” operations approved according to streamlined procedures in FY04 and FY05.

2. ***Order of Stratification.*** First by Region, and then by “simple and repeater” operations.3. ***Sampling Fractions***

- Chosen for each Region based on *a priori* probability indicated by QEA 5–6 results;
- The minimum sample size for any Region is set at 15 operations—the smallest universes are expected to be EAP and MNA (15 operations);
- The sampling fractions for Regions are shown in para. 5; and
- The sampling fraction: By “Simple and Repeater” operations (45%)  
By Other Approvals (20%)  
Overall (23%)

4. ***Weighting***

- Each operation in the sample will be assigned a weight which is the inverse of the ratio of the sample size in the respective stratum for Region and “simple and repeater” operations to the portion of the universe from which it is drawn.

Example: There are expected to be 13 “Simple and Repeater” approvals for AFR, of which 10 would be drawn in the sample. This provides a ratio of 10/13 or a reciprocal of 13/10, i.e., 1.3. Each operation in this sub-sample of 10 would therefore be assigned a weight of 1.3, as it represents 1.3 operations in the sub-universe from which it is drawn.

- By carrying out the weighting for each of the 130 operations in the QEA7 sample, the results of the assessment can be scaled up to the universe of 571 operations from which the sample will be drawn, in a proportional manner which adjusts for the different sampling rates.

## 5. Estimated sampling fractions and confidence intervals:

**SAMPLING MATRIX FOR QEA7 (130 TASKS)**

Region	# of Operations Approved			# of Operations Sampled		
	"Simple and Repeater"	Non-"Simple" and Non-"Repeater"	Total	"Simple and Repeater"	Non-"Simple" and Non-"Repeater"	Total
AFR	13	142	155	10	20	30
EAP	5	68	73	2	13	15
ECA	12	105	117	7	18	25
LCR	9	106	115	2	18	20
MNA \a	17	24	41	4	11	15
SAR	11	59	70	5	20	25
<b>Total</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>130 \b</b>

Region	% of Sampled			Confidence Interval		
	"Simple and Repeater"	Non-"Simple" and Non-"Repeater"	Total	"Simple and Repeater"	Non-"Simple" and Non-"Repeater"	Total
AFR	0.77	0.14	0.19	10.2	13.4	10.6
EAP	0.40	0.19	0.21	22.0	9.0	8.3
ECA	0.58	0.17	0.21	13.6	11.5	9.5
LCR	0.22	0.17	0.17	29.5	9.6	9.1
MNA \a	0.24	0.46	0.37	34.3	17.2	15.8
SAR	0.45	0.34	0.36	22.4	11.8	10.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>6.1</b>	<b>5.2</b>

\a 1 non-Regional (world) task was included with the MNA cohort of approvals to permit completeness of the universe of Bank approvals for sampling.

\b 5 additional tasks were sampled at the request of LCR, which increased the total sample size from 125 as announced in the Approach paper to 130.