

**Targeted anti-poverty interventions:
A selected annotated bibliography**

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Introduction to the annotated bibliography

a) Overview

While there is a fairly rich literature on targeted programs, much of it documents single programs. Even comparative pieces tend to cover either a single region (eg. Grosh, 1994, for Latin America and the Caribbean; Braithwaite, Grootaert and Milanovic, 2000 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia;), or method (Bigman et al, 2000 on geographic targeting), or intervention (Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz and van Domelen, 2001 on social funds). Consequently, it is difficult to make broadly valid quantitative statements about the effectiveness of different targeting methods or to draw policy-relevant lessons.

This annotated bibliography brings together empirical evidence on targeting in low and middle-income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU), the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South and East Asia.¹ Its purpose is to provide policy makers with a ready source of background information on experiences with targeted interventions, information presented, as much as possible, in a clear and consistent fashion. In order to make the review tractable only those programs with the following characteristics were included: (1) their principal objective is poverty reduction; (2) documentation on the program or intervention contains, at a minimum, information on the targeting method used; and (3) they are relatively recent (generally, but not always, from 1985-2000).

Interventions with poverty reduction as their principal objective included: ‘welfare’ payments – cash or in-kind transfers; non-contributory pensions; targeted price subsidies (principally food and housing; and also includes food stamps and ration shops); public works; and social funds. Focusing the review in this way necessarily means excluding a number of programs or interventions that may, in some cases, be targeted, and may have poverty reduction as one of their objectives. Thus, excluded are: ‘occupationally based transfer schemes’ such as formal sector unemployment insurance or occupational old age or disability pensions (here, the principal mechanism that determines eligibility and benefit levels are employment and contributions history rather than current poverty status); credit and micro credit schemes (although these are often targeted, they are

¹ We would like to continue to update this bibliography as new studies become available. Please send details to Margaret Grosh at Mgrosh@worldbank.org.

motivated, in large part, by credit market failures); supplementary feeding programs based on clinical measurements of malnourishment in children (partly because, by design, they are highly unlikely to include any child who does not meet criteria for inclusion and partly because our initial foray into the vast literature on this type of intervention did not yield studies that satisfied the criteria described above); most short-term emergency aid (because although this has a clear poverty focus, and is often targeted by need, the time scale on which it operates typically precludes an assessment of the distribution of the benefits).

Most studies of targeting – especially those outside of Latin America and the Caribbean - do not appear in peer-reviewed journals. Searches of the “gray” literature were undertaken using Web search engines found at the World Bank, ELDIS and IFPRI web sites; using the following key words: safety nets; targeting; social funds; pensions; public works; subsidies. Additional cases were found via canvassing colleagues about work that had not yet been catalogued in these places. Searches were also undertaken in the following academic journals for the years 1990-2003: *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, the *Journal of Development Economics*, the *Journal of Development Studies*, the *Journal of Public Economics*, the *World Bank Economic Review*, the *World Bank Research Observer* and *World Development*. Additional cases were found through reviews of existing compilations such as Grosh (1994) and Braithwaite, Grootaert and Milanovic (2000).

Geographically, the 102 programs that appear in the annotated bibliography are distributed in the following way:

Table 1: Geographical distribution of programs in annotated bibliography

Latin America and the Caribbean	29
Eastern Europe and FSU	25
Middle East and North Africa	8
Sub-Saharan Africa	9
South Asia	15
East Asia	16

These programs deliver targeted benefits in a number of ways, by providing cash, ‘near-cash’ and food transfers (including the purchase of a given quantity of food at a subsidized price), by providing a subsidy (for example, allowing individuals to purchase

unlimited amounts of an ‘inferior’ commodity), or access to employment. Distribution by type of program is listed below. Note that in the case of programs with multiple components (such as South Africa’s VAT exemption scheme on selected foods), each component is counted separately so that the total number of interventions listed below is greater than 102.

Table 2: Programs in annotated bibliography by type of intervention:

Cash transfers	48
Near cash and food transfers	30
Targeted food and non-food subsidies	23
Public works	12
Social funds	8

Note that the distribution of programs in our bibliography is not necessarily reflective of the distribution of programs that exist in the world, but rather of those that have some measurement of targeting outcomes that has been written up in the catalogued English language literature that we have been able to access. Programs are more likely to be written up this way if one or more of the following features apply: it is from a country with a household survey that measures consumption and participation in government programs; it is in a country with a culture of evaluation as part of decision-making; it receives funding from an international agency that requires measurement of outcomes; it is a program that by virtue of methods or setting is deemed attractive by analysts and editors.

We suspect that programs using community based methods and agents are under-represented. These are often only locally funded and the methods chosen when there is poor data and low administrative capacity, features which all reduce the likelihood of an evaluation being done and finding its way into the international literature. For similar reasons, it is likely that we under-represent the literature on public works in sub-Saharan Africa. Proxy means tests are, on the other hand, relatively over-represented, with a large share of all such programs in the world showing up in this sample.

b) Using the annotated bibliography

For each program included in the annotated bibliography, we include details on the study itself (title, authors, reference details, year of publication, study objective), background information on the intervention (program name, year implemented, program description, type of benefit, program coverage and budget, transfer levels), targeting method – what criteria were used to determine eligibility, targeting mechanism – how the intervention operated, targeting performance (who benefited), impact on welfare and information on the costs of targeting.

Each program is given a code always found in the first row of the description. Programs 101-199 are from Latin America and the Caribbean, 201-299 from Eastern Europe and the FSU, 301-399 from the Middle East and North Africa, 401-499 from Sub-Saharan Africa, 501-599 from South Asia and 601-699 from East Asia. Within each geographical grouping, countries are listed alphabetically.

c) Cross-references by type of targeting

Below we list program codes by type of targeting:

Table 3: Means test

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	106, 112, 113, 116, 118, 119, 122, 124
E. Europe and FSU	207, 208, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225
Middle East and North Africa	302, 304, 308
Sub-Saharan Africa	402, 405, 407
South Asia	508, 515
East Asia	608, 609, 612

Table 4: Proxy means test

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	107, 108, 109, 114, 123
E. Europe and FSU	204
Middle East and North Africa	
Sub-Saharan Africa	
South Asia	512
East Asia	602

Table 5: Selection of beneficiaries by the community

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	105, 110, 119
E. Europe and FSU	201, 225
Middle East and North Africa	
Sub-Saharan Africa	401, 406
South Asia	501, 504, 506
East Asia	604, 606, 611

Table 6: Geographic targeting

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 110, 115, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129
E. Europe and FSU	202
Middle East and North Africa	303, 308
Sub-Saharan Africa	401, 408
South Asia	501, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 514
East Asia	601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 607, 611, 613, 614, 615

Table 7: Age based targeting

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 114, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129
E. Europe and FSU	203, 205, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 223, 224, 225
Middle East and North Africa	308
Sub-Saharan Africa	401, 402, 403, 405, 409
South Asia	501, 513
East Asia	603, 604, 605, 606, 608, 609, 610, 612, 613, 614, 615

Table 8: Self-selection

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	101, 102, 103, 105, 111, 120, 125, 127, 128
E. Europe and FSU	202, 212, 220
Middle East and North Africa	301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307
Sub-Saharan Africa	401, 404, 406, 408
South Asia	502, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 514
East Asia	603, 607, 611

d) Cross-references by type of intervention

The tables below list program codes by type of intervention:

Table 9: Cash transfers

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 113, 116, 118, 121, 123, 126, 129
E. Europe and FSU	201, 203, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225
Middle East and North Africa	308
Sub-Saharan Africa	402, 403, 405, 409
South Asia	513
East Asia	604, 608, 609, 610, 616

Table 10: Near cash and food transfers

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	110, 114, 117, 122, 124, 127
E. Europe and FSU	204
Middle East and North Africa	
Sub-Saharan Africa	401
South Asia	501, 502, 503, 504, 507, 508, 509, 512, 513, 514, 515
East Asia	602, 606, 613, 614, 615

Table 11: Targeted subsidies

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	112, 115
E. Europe and FSU	
Middle East and North Africa	301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307
Sub-Saharan Africa	404, 407
South Asia	507
East Asia	605, 607, 612

Table 12: Public works

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	101, 103, 111, 128
E. Europe and FSU	
Middle East and North Africa	
Sub-Saharan Africa	401, 406
South Asia	505, 506, 510, 511
East Asia	601, 603

Table 13: Social funds

<i>Region</i>	<i>Program Code</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	102, 105, 120, 125, 128
E. Europe and FSU	202
Middle East and North Africa	
Sub-Saharan Africa	408
South Asia	
East Asia	611

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Study Title	(1) Monitoring targeting performance when decentralized allocations to the poor are unobserved; (2) Income gains to the poor from workfare: Estimates for Argentina's Trabajar Program; (3) Reaching poor areas in a federal system
Study Authors	(1): M. Ravallion; (2): J. Jalan and M. Ravallion; (3): M. Ravallion
Study Reference	(1): Policy Research Working Paper #2080, World Bank; (2) mimeo, Development Research Group, World Bank; (3) Policy Research Working Paper #1901, World Bank
Study Year	(1): 1999; (2): 1999; (3): 1998
Country	Argentina
Program Being Evaluated	Trabajar II
Year Implemented	1997
Program Description	Provide short-term work at low wages to unemployed individuals from poor families. These individuals are employed on projects that create or repair local infrastructure
Program Coverage	(2) reports 65, 321 participants; (3) reports 250000 participants
Type of Benefit	Cash wage
Study Objective	(1) Assessing targeting performance across provinces in Argentina; (2) Assessing income gains to the poor
Targeting Method	Federal government provides block grants to provinces. Projects are proposed by local governmental and non-governmental organizations. These are assessed against a range of criteria, including how well targeted they are to poor areas, what benefits they bring to local communities and how much the area has already received from the program. Workers are recruited to projects once they are funded; workers cannot receive unemployment benefits or participate in other training programs and are paid a low wage (hence self-targeted).
Targeting Mechanism	Federal government provides funds. Program is implemented by provinces who fund projects proposed by local governments and NGOs.
Program Budget	\$100 million (US) in first year
Transfer Levels	\$200 (US) per person per month
Targeting Performance	40% of participants are drawn from the poorest 5 th centile; 60% are drawn from the poorest decile, and 80% from the poorest quintile. Participants tended to be male, married and heads of households and there is a slight propensity for them to be members of political parties and neighbourhood associations. About 80% of participants are poor.
Impact on Welfare	Net gains – after accounting for foregone earnings – average about \$100 per month
Targeting Costs	No information

102	
Study Title	(1) The Bolivian social investment fund: An analysis of baseline data for impact evaluation (2) Poverty Targeting Performance (Draft)
Study Authors	(1) M. Pradhan, L. Rawlings and G. Ridder; (2) J. Van Domelen, L. Rawlings, and L. Sherburne-Benz
Study Reference	(1) World Bank Economic Review, vol. 12; (2) Chapter 5 from an upcoming publication “Evaluating Social Fund Performance: International Evidence from Community-Based Poverty Reduction Programs”
Study Year	(1) 1998; (2) 2001
Country	Bolivia
Program Being Evaluated	Social Fund
Year Implemented	(1) 1991 (2) 1986-
Program Description	(1) Bolivian Social Investment Fund (SIF) is a financial institution designed to promote sustainable investments in the social sectors, specifically health, education and sanitation. SIF is a co-financier, providing funding for infrastructure, training and equipment. SIF projects are demand driven by beneficiaries who may be from the private, public or not-for-profit sectors. Typically, the SIF provides 80 per cent of funding, with the remaining 20 per cent being co-financed by the requesting institution. (2) The first social fund was created in 1986 targeted to those affected by the economic crisis and adjustment process in the 1980’s, through temporary employment, income generation and social assistance. The ESF was subsequently closed in 1991, and its successor agency the Social Investment Fund was created with longer-term objectives of improving the coverage and quality of basic services in education, health, water and sanitation. After 1995, this focus shifted to incorporate an explicit objective of supporting the transition of social infrastructure responsibilities to local governments due to a national decentralization policy.
Program Coverage	Social sector (education, health, sanitation) in Bolivia
Type of Benefit	Infrastructure construction and some employment generation
Study Objective	(1) Assess the targeting of these projects in five provinces of the Chaco region and 17 other rural provinces, termed the Resto Rural. (2) The study reviews the performance of social funds to see whether social fund investments are distributed in a geographically progressive manner and whether program benefits actually reach the poor and extremely poor.
Targeting Method	(1) Not available (2) Geographic – by district/municipality poverty designation. Other targeting done through self-selection via a menu of interventions that include goods and services more likely to be used by the poor.
Targeting Mechanism	(1) SIF funds, but does not execute projects. Regional offices assist communities in preparing proposals which are approved by the SIF central office. (2) Proactive outreach to remote areas or to NGOs serving vulnerable groups; community participation to prioritize needs and incorporate the poor in decision making; opening of regional offices to allow for easier access by poor communities.
Program Budget	(1) Between 1991 and 1998, \$187 million (US) has been provided to more than 3000 projects. (2) 4 projects beginning in 1987 for a total of US\$277.3 million (with sources from the World Bank, other funders and domestic funds) Source: World Bank Social Funds Data Base
Transfer Levels	Not available

Targeting Performance	<p>(1) No relation between household welfare (as measured by log consumption per capita) and benefits from SIF interventions in education. SIF investments in health and basic sanitation benefited households that were relatively better off. In the Resto Rural localities, schools selected for benefits tended to be better equipped, as measured by blackboards per classroom and desks per student and were situated in communities with a larger number of NGOs and greater knowledge of SIF.</p> <p>(2) Social funds have broad geographic coverage, though coverage rates for employment benefits of social funds were considered low. Significant share of poor households have benefited. Geographic distribution of social fund expenditure has been progressive (improving over time), with the poor districts receiving more than the rich ones; the poorest decile of districts received 10.8% of resources between 1991 – 1998, the poorest quintile of districts 24.4%, and the poorest two quintiles 52.0% while the richest decile received 2.8%. There is a wide variation between per capita investment. In Bolivia, the poorest municipalities have received between US\$0.50-US\$197.30 of social fund financing per person versus a national average of US\$33.20. At household levels, social fund benefits are concentrated among the poor; poorer households were slightly more likely to benefit from a social fund investment than better-off households.</p>
Impact on Welfare	<p>(1) Not available;</p> <p>(2) Though social funds have not been able to address all investment needs of poor communities, they had significant impact on overall investment in selected sectors, especially in improving public education and health facilities. They have also played a significant role in water provision. The average ESF worker experienced a net increase of 22% in wages, and a 45% increase in weekly earnings.</p>
Targeting Costs	Total administrative costs were 12%.

103	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 3, 36, 119 - 120
Study Year	1994
Country	Bolivia
Program Being Evaluated	Emergency Social Fund (ESF)
Year Implemented	1980s – 1990s
Program Description	Labour intensive public works
Program Coverage	About 48 000 person months of employment per year
Type of Benefit	Cash wage
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Categorical (communities were ranked according to poverty criteria); self-selection – localities had to put forth project proposals; and some self-selection (workers paid ‘going wage for unskilled physically demanding construction work)
Targeting Mechanism	Central government provides funds; communities propose labour intensive projects to rehabilitate local infrastructure. These are vetted by quasi-independent government agency who use, as criteria, poverty of the locality. Once project is approved, work is contracted out to private firms who can hire whoever they wish at ‘going wage for unskilled physically demanding construction work.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	31% of benefits go to workers who would have been in the bottom quintile had they not had their ESF jobs; 77% of benefits would have been in the bottom 40%; 0% go to richest 20%
Impact on Welfare	Simulation work showed that 76% of ESF workers would have belonged to the poorest 40% of the urban population without the ESF jobs. With these jobs, only 15 per cent fell in this range.
Targeting Costs	Direct costs not available. Total administrative costs were 3.5% of program budget or US\$8.50 per beneficiary per year.

104	
Study Title	Cash Transfers A Case Study: Bolivia's Bonosol
Study Authors	Jennifer Leach
Study Reference	Draft
Study Year	Not available
Country	Bolivia
Program Being Evaluated	Bonosol
Year Implemented	mid-1997
Program Description	Fixed payment to all those over age 65.
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Not available
Study Objective	Not available
Targeting Method	Universal. Eligibility for the Bonosol requires that individuals are resident Bolivian citizens who were 21 at the end of 1995 (about 3.5 million people in total). The annuity is then paid out annually, for life, once the individual reaches age 65.
Targeting Mechanism	The Bonosol uses proceeds from the capitalization of the 5 major public enterprises for untargeted old-age annuity, utilizing returns on a portfolio of shares, representing the Government's 50% ownership of the capitalized enterprise. The Bonosol is implemented by 2 private financial associations, which were chosen through international competitive bidding.
Program Budget	The Bonosol payment represents about 27% of Bolivia's per capita income. Payments of US\$94 million were made in 1997., with US\$46 million from planned resources and the rest from loans.
Transfer Levels	The annuity is set at US\$248 per person per year for the first 5 years, thereafter to be revised every three years. The amount is established through a series of assumption (demographics. Return on shares of capitalized firms...).
Targeting Performance	It has been suggested that the Bonosol has strong progressive and regressive features: since the benefit is fixed in nominal terms, it represents a larger proportion of annual income for poorer beneficiaries than for richer ones. Yet, the poorer groups are likely to have a lower life-expectancy than the rich, so their chance of receiving benefits, as well as the number of years they would receive benefits re lower. Women (due to longer life expectancy) can expect to receive larger lifetime benefit, though women have lower incomes and a higher poverty incidence. In the first year of implementation, problems included not enough cash from the specified sources, and fraud (counterfeit identity cards, multiple birth certificates of those who were not 65, and non-citizens). Loans were needed to cover the shortfall.
Impact on Welfare	There are two estimates: one shows that the Bonosol represents about 42% of the annual minimum salary; 40% of the rural poverty line: and 91% of the extreme poverty line in rural areas; another estimates that the Bonosol replaces 85% of the income of the extremely poor, and 50% of that of the poor.
Targeting Costs	Not available

105	
Study Title	Social investment funds: A case study: Brazil's Northeast rural poverty alleviation program
Study Authors	S. Quinn
Study Reference	Mimeo, World Bank
Study Year	1997
Country	Brazil
Program Being Evaluated	Northeast rural poverty alleviation program
Year Implemented	1995
Program Description	Social Fund
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Provide basic social and economic infrastructure, and employment and income generating opportunities for the rural poor.
Study Objective	Brief description of the Northeast rural poverty alleviation program
Targeting Method	Categorical – geographical (municipalities are selected by poverty level and other characteristics; importance is attached to ensuring the program reaches rural communities). Communities identify poor beneficiaries
Targeting Mechanism	Several approaches are used. Most notably, municipal councils approve subprojects for financing by the State Project Coordinating Unit. In addition, communities submit project proposals directly to state governments. Municipalities and communities implement projects.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	“In 1995, it was estimated that as much as 93 per cent of funds disbursed were reaching the targeted beneficiaries.”
Impact on Welfare	Not available.
Targeting Costs	Direct costs not available. Administrative costs are “10% of subproject costs.”

106	
Study Title	Ex-ante Evaluation of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: The Case of Bolsa Escola
Study Authors	F. Bourguignon, F. Ferreira and P. Leite
Study Reference	Mimeo
Study Year	2002
Country	Brazil
Program Being Evaluated	Bolsa Escola
Year Implemented	April 2001
Program Description	Cash transfer program to households with children aged 6-15 years made conditional on school attendance. Created by law of April 2001 within the broader context of the social development initiative known as Projeto Alvorada. It is a generalization at the federal level of earlier programs, which pioneered in the Federal District (Brazilia) and in the city of Campinas (SP) in 1995 and later extended to several other localities. The law made these various programs uniform in terms of coverage, transfer amounts and the associated conditionality.
Program Coverage	Estimated that some 10 million children from 6 million households will benefit; 17% of the whole population.
Type of Benefit	Cash.
Study Objective	To simulate impact on education.
Targeting Method	Geographic, categorical and means testing. At federal level, the number of beneficiaries claimed by municipal governments will be checked for consistency against local aggregate indicators of affluence. In the case of discrepancy, local governments will have to adjust the number of beneficiaries on the basis of income per capita rankings. Households with children aged 6-15 years and monetary income per capita below R\$90 (US\$30 at August 2002 exchange rate), which is equivalent to half a minimum wage when the law was introduced, are eligible. Transfer conditional on 85% school attendance.
Targeting Mechanism	Program designed at federal level but administered by municipal governments. Transfers paid to mother, upon presentation of a magnetic card. Municipalities have responsibility for checking the veracity of self-reported incomes.
Program Budget	Federally funded. Budget is slightly below 0.2% of GDP.
Transfer Levels	Monthly transfer of R\$15 per child, with a maximum of R\$45 per household. Total household transfers estimated at no more than 5% of income of the bottom two deciles.
Targeting Performance	Not available.
Impact on Welfare	Not available.
Targeting Costs	Not available.

107	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 3, 36, 79-81
Study Year	1994
Country	Chile
Program Being Evaluated	CAS – SUF (Unified Family Subsidy)
Year Implemented	1980s-1990s
Program Description	Cash transfers to poor households
Program Coverage	About 887 000 individuals per year
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Proxy means test based on housing characteristics, education levels and labor market activity. Benefits go to families with children under 16 or pregnant women.
Targeting Mechanism	Small unit with the central Ministry of Planning oversees the CAS. Proxy means tests are conducted by local municipalities; data entry and calculation of proxy means test follows a centrally set formula, and is done either by municipalities or contracted out to private firms.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	57% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 83% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 2% to top quintile
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Direct targeting costs are approximately 1.6% of program budget or \$5 (US) per beneficiary per year.

108	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 3, 36, 79-81
Study Year	1994
Country	Chile
Program Being Evaluated	CAS – PASIS (Pension Assistance Program)
Year Implemented	1980s-1990s
Program Description	Cash transfers to poor, elderly households
Program Coverage	About 292 000 individuals per year
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Categorical (age related) and proxy means test based on housing characteristics, education levels and labor market activity
Targeting Mechanism	Small unit with the central Ministry of Planning oversees the CAS. Proxy means tests are conducted by local municipalities; data entry and calculation of proxy means test follows a centrally set formula, and is done either by municipalities or contracted out to private firms.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	50% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 73% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 3% to top quintile
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Direct targeting costs are approximately 1.4% of program budget or \$5 (US) per beneficiary per year.

109	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 3, 36, 79-81
Study Year	1994
Country	Chile
Program Being Evaluated	CAS – Viviendas Basicas (basic housing program)
Year Implemented	1980s-1990s
Program Description	Cash transfers to households to assist with mortgage payments
Program Coverage	About 20 000 individuals per year
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Households self-select in to program by making a a down payment to purchase a home. A proxy means test is then used based on housing characteristics, education levels and labor market activity
Targeting Mechanism	Small unit with the central Ministry of Planning oversees the CAS. Proxy means tests are conducted by local municipalities; data entry and calculation of proxy means test follows a centrally set formula, and is done either by municipalities or contracted out to private firms.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	28% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 50% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 12% to top quintile
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Direct targeting costs are approximately 0.1% of program budget or \$5 (US) per beneficiary per year.

110	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 3, 36, 103-106
Study Year	1994
Country	Chile
Program Being Evaluated	School feeding program
Year Implemented	1980s-1990s
Program Description	Children receive either free breakfast and lunch, or free lunch and afternoon snack, depending on whether they attend school in the morning or afternoon.
Program Coverage	About 570 000 individuals per year
Type of Benefit	In-kind transfer (food)
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Target population is selected school children within selected schools. Schools are selected according to a set of child and parental criteria (height for age of children; mother's education levels; repetition rates; number of children 'urgently' or 'very urgently' in need of school lunch). Teachers identify children in need, though in practice it appears that some teachers are reluctant to exclude students.
Targeting Mechanism	Central government sets targeting criteria; schools are responsible for forwarding data to central authorities. Provision of meals is contracted out to private sector; quality and quantity of food provided is monitored.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	53% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 79% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 3% to top quintile
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Total administrative costs are approximately 5.0% of program budget or \$3.7 (US) per beneficiary per year. Direct targeting costs are virtually zero.
Notes:	Unit costs of providing snacks has fallen since this was contracted out, and there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that food is now prepared under more hygienic circumstances.

111	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 4, 36, 120-121
Study Year	1994
Country	Chile
Program Being Evaluated	PEM and POJH (public works)
Year Implemented	1980s
Program Description	Labour intensive public works
Program Coverage	About 117 000 individuals per year
Type of Benefit	Cash wage
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Categorical (beneficiaries had to be of working age and 'physically and psychologically able to work') and self-selection (wage set below the statutory minimum wage)
Targeting Mechanism	Central government provides funds; work organized and managed by local authorities. At least 80% of project costs were to be wage costs; in practice, municipalities found it difficult to meet this criterion and, as a result, would estimate non-wage costs, then multiply by four when submitting budgets.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	51% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 71% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 3% go to richest 20%
Impact on Welfare	Access to PEM and POJH lifted beneficiaries from the poorest to the second poorest income deciles (although these calculations make no allowance for alternative activities in the absence of PEM or POJH).
Targeting Costs	Not available

112	
Study Title	Safety net programs and poverty reduction
Study Authors	K. Subbarao et. al
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book)
Study Year	1997
Country	Colombia
Program Being Evaluated	Housing subsidy
Year Implemented	1980s – early 1990s
Program Description	Not available
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Not available
Study Objective	Program reported as part of broader review of safety net and poverty reduction programs
Targeting Method	Means test
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	35% of benefits to poorest quintile; 60% to poorest 40%; 1.6% to top 20%
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

113	
Study Title	Colombia Social Safety Net Assessment
Study Authors	L. Rawlings
Study Reference	Mimeo, World Bank
Study Year	2002
Country	Colombia
Program Being Evaluated	<i>Subsidio Familiar</i> and <i>Casas de Compensación</i> (Family subsidy and compensation)
Year Implemented	1949
Program Description	Cash subsidies to poor, formal sector workers as well as in-kind transfers (medicine, food, schoolbooks)
Program Coverage	Estimated as 6 million with 200000 drawing benefits in 1999.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfers and some in-kind benefits
Study Objective	Review the effectiveness of social safety nets in Colombia
Targeting Method	Individual assessment, workers who receive less than 4 times the minimum wage based on the number of dependents they support.
Targeting Mechanism	Transfers undertaken by NGOs working under government supervision.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	7% of benefits to poorest quintile; 20% of benefits to poorest two quintiles
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

114	
Study Title	Colombia Social Safety Net Assessment
Study Authors	L. Rawlings
Study Reference	Mimeo, World Bank
Study Year	2002
Country	Colombia
Program Being Evaluated	<i>Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar</i> (ICBF, Colombian Institute for Family Welfare)
Year Implemented	1968
Program Description	Principal components are day care and school feeding
Program Coverage	Estimated to be 1.3 million children for day care and 2.3 million for school feeding
Type of Benefit	In-kind transfers, child care and school feeding
Study Objective	Review the effectiveness of social safety nets in Colombia
Targeting Method	Categorical (children) and proxy means test based on SISBEN or NBI.
Targeting Mechanism	SISBEN: Interviewers complete a simple questionnaire on household size and composition, education, employment, possession of goods, income and dwelling characteristics. Each family receives a score based on this information which is valid for three years at which point families can re-apply. Additionally, if the family lives in sub-standard housing, has school-age children not attending school, it is eligible under the NBI criterion. Daycare and school feeding are provided by local NGOs.
Program Budget	622 (1990) million pesos in 2000. 0.47% of GDP. Program is financed by mix of payroll tax and limited contributions from beneficiaries.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	28% of benefits to poorest quintile; 60% of benefits to poorest two quintiles
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not known, but total administrative costs are 12% of program budget.

115	
Study Title	Colombia Social Safety Net Assessment
Study Authors	L. Rawlings
Study Reference	Mimeo, World Bank
Study Year	2002
Country	Colombia
Program Being Evaluated	<i>Subsidios de Servicios Básicos</i> (Subsidy of basic services)
Year Implemented	1994
Program Description	In-kind subsidy achieved through application of progressive tariffs
Program Coverage	Not known
Type of Benefit	Subsidy of basic services: water, sewerage, gas and electricity
Study Objective	Review the effectiveness of social safety nets in Colombia
Targeting Method	Categorical (geographic) targeting based on neighborhood characteristics.
Targeting Mechanism	Implemented by municipalities and departments responsible for service provision
Program Budget	0.10% of GDP
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	15% of benefits to poorest quintile; 33% of benefits to poorest two quintiles
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

116	
Study Title	1) Administering targeted social programs in Latin America; 2) Costa Rica: Social Spending and the Poor
Study Authors	1) M. Grosh; 2) World Bank/T. Castaneda, J. Cercone and L. Fernandez
Study Reference	1) World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 4, 36, 76-78; 2) World Bank Report No. 24300-CR
Study Year	1) 1994; 2) 2002
Country	Costa Rica
Program Being Evaluated	Pensiones no Contributivas (Non-contributory pensions)
Year Implemented	1974
Program Description	Cash transfers to poor, elderly households
Program Coverage	1) About 74 000 individuals per year in 1990; 2) 97,000 in 1999, or about 19% of the population aged 65 and older
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	1) Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America; 2) assessment of the social spending and the poor in Costa Rica.
Targeting Method	Categorical (priority groups are: elderly indigent aged 65 or older; handicapped persons of any age; widows 55 and older; orphans under 15; indigents 45-65 with 'limited' work ability); and individual assessment by a social worker
Targeting Mechanism	Program administered by Social Work sections of the Pension Administration. Individuals can apply at any one of 69 local branches. Applicants must provide information on family composition; income; regular expenses; housing. No detailed guidelines on who is considered "evidently needy"; social workers informally use minimum incomes at which social security contributions are required as the informal eligibility cut-off point. Some suggestion that handicapped receive priority treatment (perhaps because of ease of verification).
Program Budget	1) Not stated. But maximum number of beneficiaries is limited to 50 000; 2) 2.5 billion colones or 0.3 percent of GDP in 1999.
Transfer Levels	Maximum of US\$31 per month (for beneficiaries with three or more dependents); average in 1990 was US\$25. 2) in 2000, average monthly pension is about US\$33 (10,000 colones) or half of the poverty line.
Targeting Performance	1) in 1986, 39% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 59% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 11% to top quintile . 2) In 1999, from poorest to richest quintile the share of benefits is, respectively 45, 24, 15, 12 and 4.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	1) Direct targeting costs are approximately 0.4% of program budget or \$1.36 (US) per beneficiary per year.
Notes:	1) There is no regular recertification and so, once accepted, beneficiaries receive transfers indefinitely. Also, "most applicants have letters from local political party activists recommending that the pension be granted" (p. 77).

117	
Study Title	1) Administering targeted social programs in Latin America; 2) Costa Rica Social Spending and the Poor
Study Authors	1) M. Grosh; 2) World Bank/ T. Castaneda, J. Cercone and L. Fernandez
Study Reference	1) World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 4, 36, 106-107; 2) World Bank Report No. 24300-CR
Study Year	1) 1994; 2) 2002
Country	Costa Rica
Program Being Evaluated	Comedores Escolares (School lunches)
Year Implemented	1970s – 2000s
Program Description	Children receive free lunch (and in some cases, breakfast)
Program Coverage	1) About 450 000 children per year; 2) about 471,000 per year in 2000
Type of Benefit	In-kind transfer (food)
Study Objective	1) Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America; 2)) assessment of the social spending and the poor in Costa Rica.
Targeting Method	Geographic. All schools participate, but they receive different levels of benefit according to need. The Ministry of Planning has a poverty map that divides the country into three tiers of need. These, together with school size, are used to assign schools to 'priority' levels ranging from I (most needy) to IV (least needy), system recalibrated in 1994 from three levels of need to four.
Targeting Mechanism	Ministry of Education is responsible for determining the priority level for each school.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	1) in 1991, Priority I schools get US\$0.12 per student per day; Priority II schools get US\$0.08 per student per day; Priority III schools get US\$0.05 per student per day. 2) In 1999, the percentage of daily calories meant to be provided on school days were 34, 30, 23, and 15% for schools in priority groups I to IV, respectively.
Targeting Performance	1) In 1986, 33% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 62% go to bottom 40%; 6% go to top quintile.2) In 1999, the shares going to the poorest to richest quintile are 39, 26, 18, 11, 5 percent respectively.
Impact on Welfare	2) calculates that when food expenditure are averaged over all 365 days of the year, not just school feeding days, the estimated daily caloric contribution per child rose from 5.5 in 1990 to 12% in 1999 and surmises that it will have little nutritional impact.
Targeting Costs	1) Direct targeting costs are 0.4% of program budget or US\$0.08 per beneficiary per year.
Notes:	1) Some suggestion that community groups in wealthiest areas lobby heavily for their schools to be upgraded to Priority II.

118	
Study Title	Dominica Social Protection Review
Study Authors	World Bank/A. Mason et al.
Study Reference	World Bank Report 26254–DM
Study Year	2003
Country	Dominica
Program Being Evaluated	Public assistance
Year Implemented	Not stated
Program Description	A cash transfer program targeted in indigent households, including single parent families and families in which both parents are re-unemployed.
Program Coverage	1752
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	Assess the social protection system in Dominica
Targeting Method	Means test
Targeting Mechanism	The means test includes a home visit. Final decisions are made by the Permanent Secretary. There are not documented criteria for eligibility. As a general rule, social workers assess health status, age, whether there are other means of income, the number of dependents and the condition of the home. In theory, eligibility is subject to annual review, however, because of staff and resource constraints, annual reviews are not done systematically.
Program Budget	US\$ 1.2 million
Transfer Levels	\$100 per adult per month, which is 35 percent of the adult equivalent poverty line and 60 percent of the adult equivalent indigence line. Children receive \$85 month, with a family maximum of \$250 month. At the discretion of the social worker, supplemental benefits may be given for school transportation costs. The average annual amount received was \$1099 for the indigent, \$1348 for the poor but not indigent and \$2748 for the non-poor.
Targeting Performance	About 60 percent of benefits to the poorest quintile.
Impact on Welfare	Not available.
Targeting Costs	Administrative costs for the unit that oversees Public assistance, Child Welfare and Blind Welfare was about 12 percent of total division expenditures.

119	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 4, 36, 61
Study Year	1994
Country	Honduras
Program Being Evaluated	Program for Family Assistance (PRAF) - the Bono de Madre Jefe de Familia (BMJF) and Bono Madre-Infantil (BMI)– food stamps
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Eligible mothers receive food stamps
Program Coverage	About 185 000 individuals per year
Type of Benefit	Food stamps
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	BMJF –geographical, categorical (female headship), simple means test (income levels); BMI – geographical, self-selection through use of use of public primary health centers.
Targeting Mechanism	Both programs operated in only some parts of the country, selected by the poverty map used by the Honduran social fund. BMJF-- Primary school teachers conducted informal means tests at the beginning of the school year, often in the school, sometimes going to the household of the mother of the child. Teachers were also to determine whether a household was female-headed, using de facto criteria about whether an absent husband or an informal parter was contributing. The BMI in addition to the geographic targeting was implicitly self-targeting through the use primary public health centers.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	About US\$30-40 per year per beneficiary.
Targeting Performance	Not available
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Direct costs not available. Total administrative costs were 12% of program budget or US\$4.50 per beneficiary per year.

120	
Study Title	Poverty Targeting Performance
Study Authors	J. Van Domelen, L. Rawlings, and L. Sherburne-Benz
Study Reference	Chapter 5 from an upcoming publication "Evaluating Social Fund Performance: International Evidence from Community-Based Poverty Reduction Programs"
Study Year	2001 (?)
Study Title	Poverty Targeting Performance (Draft)
Study Authors	J. Van Domelen, Lynne Sherburne-Benz, Laura Rawlings (check?)
Study Reference	Upcoming Book
Study Year	2001 (?)
Country	Honduras
Program Being Evaluated	Social Fund Program
Year Implemented	1990-
Program Description	The Honduras Social Investment Fund (FHIS) was initially set up in 1990 to mitigate the social costs of adjustment and allow economic reform measures to be put into place rapidly with the necessary support of the population; as well as lay the basis for a decentralized program of direct support for the poor and malnourished and to support the improvement of service delivery in the social ministries. In the mid 1990's, this mandate was broadened to include support to the Government's decentralization strategy and a more explicit focus on targeting scarce resources in poorer areas.
Program Coverage	National
Type of Benefit	Infrastructure and employment opportunities
Study Objective	Examines whether benefits from social fund investments reach the poor.
Targeting Method	Geographic – by district/municipality poverty. Honduras has fixed allocation per district, and also overall targets by poverty level. Other targeting through self-selection via a menu of interventions that include goods & services more likely to be used by the poor.
Targeting Mechanism	Proactive outreach to remote areas or to NGOs serving vulnerable groups; community participation to prioritize needs and incorporate the poor in decision making; opening of regional offices to allow for easier access by poor communities.
Program Budget	(2) 4 projects beginning in 1991 for a total of US\$384.45 million (with sources from the World Bank, other funders and domestic funds) Source: World Bank Social Funds Data Base
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Social funds have broad geographic coverage, though coverage rates for employment benefits of social funds were considered low. Significant share of poor households have benefited. Geographic distribution of social fund expenditure has been progressive (and improving over time), with the poor districts receiving more than the rich ones; the poorest decile received 13.3% of resources between 1994 – 1998, while the riches decile received 6.6%. At household levels, the poor received a significantly greater share of resources on a per capita basis. In Honduras, the poverty level of social fund beneficiaries was higher than that of the national average.. The poor comprised 54% of the population and received 58% of the benefits (11 and 16%, respectively for the extremely poor). The poorest decile of population received 19% of benefits, the poorest quintile received 32% of benefits and the poorest two quintiles received 51% of benefits. Household targeting results do vary by the type of investment; the beneficiaries of latrine, health and education projects were much poorer than national averages, while beneficiaries of water projects were slightly better off and sewerage projects significantly better off. For latrines, 41% of beneficiary households were in the lowest 20% of household income distribution.
Impact on Welfare	Though social funds have not been able to address all investment needs of poor communities, they had significant impact on overall investment in selected sectors, especially in improving public education and health facilities, and in water provision.
Targeting Costs	Total administrative costs were 13%, targeting only costs are not available.

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Study Title	<i>Social Nutrition Programs with Explicit Targeting</i>
Study Authors	S. Morris et al
Study Reference	IFPRI, mimeo.
Study Year	2001
Country	Honduras
Program Being Evaluated	Family Allowance Program (PRAF)
Year Implemented	2000
Program Description	Cash transfers to households with young children or pregnant women conditional on primary school attendance and check-ups at health clinics. Results presented are only for direct nutrition component (i.e. households with pregnant women and young children).
Program Coverage	Covers 40 (out of 297) municipalities with total population of around 400,000 persons. In all 70 municipalities with the highest rates of stunting were deemed eligible, the 40 were chosen by lottery to be in Phase II of program.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To compare distributional power of similar programs in Mexico and Nicaragua.
Targeting Method	Categorical (geographical) targeting of localities based on stunting rates.
Targeting Mechanism	Federal authority with operational bodies at state level.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Transfer value was 55 Lempiras per month (nearly US\$4), with maximum of two beneficiaries per family permitted (but all relevant persons must comply with conditions).
Targeting Performance	22.1% of beneficiary households are in the lowest national consumption decile, 42.5% in the bottom 20%, 66.9% in the bottom 30% and 79.5% in the bottom 40%.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available
<i>Notes:</i>	

122	
Study Title	(1) Administering targeted social programs in Latin America; (2) Jamaica's food stamp program: Impacts on poverty and welfare; (3) Jamaican Survey of Living Conditions 1997 (4) Jamaica Social Safety Net Assessment
Study Authors	(1) M. Grosh; (2) K. Ezemenari and K. Subbarao (3) S. Razmara et. al., (4) L. Blank, et al.
Study Reference	(1) World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 4, 36, 60-68; (2); (3) World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region (4) World Bank, Latin America and Caribbean Region, Social Protection unit, processed
Study Year	(1) 1994; (2) 1999; (3) 1998; (4) 2000
Country	Jamaica
Program Being Evaluated	Food Stamps Program
Year Implemented	1980s and 1990s
Program Description	The program has two parts – the maternal-child half and means-tested half for the elderly and poor families. In the former, all pregnant and lactating women and all children under age six are eligible. Originally registrations and food stamp distributions for this part of the program were done in public health clinics to encourage self-targeting and use of services. In recent years, these transactions are conducted more often at paystations not related to clinics. In the later all persons already receiving social assistance benefits automatically qualified for food stamp. Other potential beneficiaries, such as the elderly, handicapped and indigent categories were means-tested.
Program Coverage	About 200 000 individuals per year; (4) 263,000 in 1998
Type of Benefit	Food stamps. Although these are good for purchases of cornmeal, rice and powdered milk, they are considered legal tender and are accepted at commercial grocery outlets.
Study Objective	(1) Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America; (2) Assess poverty impact of Jamaica's food stamp program. (3) Abstract of survey results. (4) assessment of safety net programs
Targeting Method	Means-tested and categorical targeting
Targeting Mechanism	Screenings were conducted by the local poor relief office and primary health care clinics. All pregnant or lactating women and children under five years had to register through the primary health care clinics. Other potential beneficiaries, such as the elderly, handicapped and indigent categories, were screened by officials who visited the homes of applicants to collect information and confirm their eligibility based on housing conditions. Final approval was granted by a local committee appointed by the Ministry of Social Security.
Program Budget	4) US\$8 million in 1998
Transfer Levels	4) The average value of food stamps received varied between 15 and 17 percent of the adult poverty line for an individual, however, the average number of equivalent adults per household is five, implying an effective per person receipt of only about 3 percent of the poverty line.
Targeting Performance	(3) Calculations based on raw numbers in Table G-5. In 1997 for children, 39% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 69% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 10% of benefits go to top 20%. For pregnant/lactating women, 24% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 45% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 14% of benefits go to top 20%. For the elderly/disabled, 31% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 52% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 8% of benefits go to top 20%. (4) The percentage of benefits going from poorest to richest quintile for the program overall is 26.7, 20.6, 20.6, 18.7 and 13.3.
Impact on Welfare	(2) Being a recipient raises expenditures per capita by about 11%; the poverty gap is reduced, but the extent of this reduction is not stated.(4) based on the low transfer levels (around 3% of the poverty line for the household) and that the means test requires household incomes to be less than 20 percent of the poverty line, the impact on poverty is deduced to be low.
Targeting Costs	Direct costs not available. Total administrative costs were 10% of program budget or US\$4.00 per beneficiary per year.

123	
Study Title	<i>Targeting and the Poor in Mexico: An Evaluation of the Selection of Households into PROGRESA</i>
Study Authors	E. Skoufias, B. Davis and S. de la Vega
Study Reference	World Development, 29(10), pp1769-84.
Study Year	2001
Country	Mexico
Program Being Evaluated	PROGRESA, an integrated education, health and nutrition program in Mexico
Year Implemented	1997
Program Description	The program involves the transfer of cash to females in poor households conditional on regular child attendance at school and family attendance at health clinics for check-ups and health lectures (for mothers). Also nutritional supplements for infants and pregnant mothers.
Program Coverage	Poor households in most marginal localities. By end of 1999 included nearly around 2.5 million families in 50,000 rural localities in all the 31 states, equivalent to around 40% of all rural households and 11% of all urban and rural households in Mexico.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfers, nutritional supplement.
Study Objective	To evaluate the targeting method used by PROGRESA in identifying beneficiary households.
Targeting Method	Categorical (geographical) targeting of localities based on a locality marginality index, followed by household assessment based on income (adjusted for other variables), followed by self-targeting. Information at community level led to increase in proportion of families classified as poor from 52% to 78% (so-called densification process).
Targeting Mechanism	Federal authority with operational bodies at state level and a beneficiary representative for each community.
Program Budget	By end of 1999, total budget was \$777 million, equivalent to 20% of Federal poverty alleviation budget and 0.2% of GDP.
Transfer Levels	Average monthly cash transfer per family was around \$295 made up of \$90 for food (conditional on health visits) and the rest for school going children. There was a transfer cap equal to \$555 per family. On average, this constitutes around 29% of total household consumption for poor households and 22% of the poverty gap.
Targeting Performance	Undercoverage and leakage were both around 26% prior to densification process when 52% of households in the chosen localities were classified as poor (16% post-densification when 78% poor). Compared to 38% if only locality targeting used. Targeting errors (at both locality and household levels) concentrated around poverty line, suggesting low welfare losses. Morris et al (2001) show that 22% of beneficiary households are in the lowest national consumption decile, 39.5% in the bottom 20%, 51.9% in the bottom 30% and 62.4% in the bottom 40%. Coady (2001) shows that this is an underestimate of the distributional power of benefits.
Impact on Welfare	Program decreases poverty headcount from 52% to 48% (i.e. by 8.2%), poverty gap by 23.6%, and severity of poverty by 34.5%, substantially higher than program if only geographical targeting was used which would have resulted in decreases of 8.5%, 21.6% and 31.0% respectively. Slightly lower than figures for perfect targeting: 0.2%, 26.4% and 42.2%. So program particularly good at getting at poorest households.
Targeting Costs	Estimates ranged from \$170-\$60 per household: higher estimate includes total survey cost, lower just portion of survey required for targeting. Small if consider program to be a 3-year program.
<i>Notes:</i> See also (i) E. Skoufias, B. Davis and J. Behrman , 1999, “An Evaluation of the Selection of Beneficiary Households in the Education, Health and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA) of Mexico”, IFPRI Final Report; D. Coady, 2001, “An Evaluation of the Distributional Power of PROGRESA’s Cash Transfers in Mexico”, Discussion Paper, No. 117, Food Consumption Nutrition Division, IFPRI, Washington DC; S. Morris et al, 2001, “Social Nutrition Programs with Explicit Targeting Strategies”, IFPRI, mimeo.	

124	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 4, 36, 68-70
Study Year	1994
Country	Mexico
Program Being Evaluated	LICONSA (subsidized milk)
Year Implemented	1970s - 1990s
Program Description	Subsidies for liquid milk; milk can be purchased at 25% of market price in special LICONSA shops.
Program Coverage	About 10 000 000 individuals per year in urban areas
Type of Benefit	Food subsidy
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Categorical/geographical (LICONSA shops are located in poor localities within urban areas); categorical/demographic – restricted to families with children <12; means tested; self-selection
Targeting Mechanism	Poverty maps are used to locate LICONSA shops in poor areas. Social workers from a central government agency are used to conduct means test (eligible households must have incomes less than twice minimum wage); and this information is verified sometimes by informal home visits. Finally, opening hours are restricted and beneficiaries must supply their own containers to transport liquid milk.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	64% of benefits go to bottom quintile (* note that at time of writing, program was largely restricted to urban areas)
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Direct costs not available. Total administrative costs were 28.5% of program budget or US\$5.75 per beneficiary per year.

125	
Study Title	Poverty Targeting Performance
Study Authors	J. Van Domelen, L. Rawlings, and L. Sherburne-Benz
Study Reference	Chapter 5 from an upcoming publication “Evaluating Social Fund Performance: International Evidence from Community-Based Poverty Reduction Programs”
Study Year	2001 (?)
Country	Nicaragua
Program Being Evaluated	Social Fund Program
Year Implemented	1990-
Program Description	The Emergency Social Investment Fund of Nicaragua was established in 1990 to help the government sustain its poverty alleviation efforts and maintain social cohesion during the period of economic adjustment until line ministries strengthen their institutional capacities and complete policy reform programs. By the mid-1990’s FISE’s objectives included supporting the Government’s decentralization strategy, strengthening the local contracting industry, supporting the targeting of resources to more depressed areas, and helping to meet the special needs of the indigenous population. By the late 1990s the focus was on providing essential small-scale infrastructure, mainly in education, health, and water supply and sanitation for poorer communities; and strengthening, on a pilot basis, municipal management to foster more sustainable subprojects at the local level.
Program Coverage	National
Type of Benefit	Infrastructure and employment opportunities
Study Objective	Review the performance and targeting of social funds.
Targeting Method	Geographic – by district/municipality poverty designation. Nicaragua sets overall target by poverty level. Other targeting done through self-selection via a menu of interventions that include goods and services more likely to be used by the poor.
Targeting Mechanism	Proactive outreach to remote areas or to NGOs serving vulnerable groups; community participation to prioritize needs and incorporate the poor in decision making; opening of regional offices to allow for easier access by poor communities.
Program Budget	(2) 3 projects beginning in 1993 for a total of US\$346.1 million (with sources from the World Bank, other funders and domestic funds) Source: World Bank Social Funds Data Base
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Geographic distribution of social fund expenditure has been progressive, with the poor districts receiving more than the rich ones; and is improving over time; the poorest decile of districts received 14.7% of resources between 1991 – 1998, the poorest quintile of districts received 29.1 % and the poorest 2 quintiles of districts 43.3% while the richest decile received 4.7%. At household levels, social fund benefits are concentrated among the poor; poorer households were slightly more likely to benefit from a social fund investment than better-off households. The poverty level of social fund beneficiaries was higher than that of the national averages. The bottom quintile accounted for 23% of social fund beneficiaries, and the poorest two quintiles 44%. However, a significant share of beneficiaries are not poor. Household targeting results vary by the type of investment; health projects are the most progressively targeted, with 53% of resources targeted to the bottom 20% (65% of the beneficiaries were classified as poor). Education projects are also pro-poor with 37% of resources targeted to the bottom 20% (59% of the beneficiaries were poor), while sanitation is concentrated both in the lowest deciles (typically latrine projects which benefited 73% of the poor, with 34% of the beneficiaries being in the lowest 20% of the individual income distribution) and in the upper-middle income range (sewerage projects, only 9% were classified as poor). Municipal infrastructure is regressively distributed (urban bias), while social assistance projects are concentrated in the middle income range.
Impact on Welfare	They appear to have had a significant impact on overall investment in selected sectors, especially in improving public education and health facilities. They have also played a significant role in water provision.
Targeting Costs	Total administrative costs are 10%. Targeting only costs are not available

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Study Title	<i>Social Nutrition Programs with Explicit Targeting</i>
Study Authors	S. Morris et al
Study Reference	IFPRI mimeo
Study Year	2001
Country	Nicaragua
Program Being Evaluated	Red de Protecction Social, RPS
Year Implemented	2000 (pilot)
Program Description	Transfers conditional on children going to primary school plus a uniform unconditional transfer (results below only for uniform transfer) and attending health clinics regularly.
Program Coverage	Two of the countries seventeen departments selected for their high poverty rates, reasonably good access to schools and health centers, demonstrated organizational capacity, and ease of access from capital. Within these, six (out of total of 23) municipalities were chosen. Within these, 21 of the 41 (out of around 60) most marginal census districts were chosen
Type of Benefit	Cash transfers,
Study Objective	To compare distributional power to similar programs in LAC.
Targeting Method	Departments selected on basis of poverty rates and access to supporting infrastructure. Districts selected on basis of marginality index, which is weighted combination of access to potable water, illiteracy rate, and access to latrines and sewerage.
Targeting Mechanism	Center transfers directly to households.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Approx. US\$19 per month per household.
Targeting Performance	32.6% of beneficiary households are in the lowest national consumption decile, 55.0% in the bottom 20%, 70.2% in the bottom 30% and 80.9% in the bottom 40%.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available
<i>Notes: Some of above numbers taken from Coady, D. (2000): "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of PROGRESA's Transfers", IFPRI Preliminary report.</i>	

127	
Study Title	Administering targeted social programs in Latin America
Study Authors	M. Grosh
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book). See especially pages 5, 36, 101-102
Study Year	1994
Country	Peru
Program Being Evaluated	“Glass of milk” - food supplement
Year Implemented	1980s – 1990s
Program Description	Daily glass of milk provided to participants
Program Coverage	About 2 900 000 individuals per year in urban areas
Type of Benefit	Food transfer
Study Objective	Assess cost-effectiveness and distribution of targeted social programs in Latin America
Targeting Method	Categorical/geographical (poor localities within urban areas); categorical/demographic – restricted to pregnant and lactating women & children under five and (with lower priority) school age children; self-selection – communities must organize, then petition for inclusion; mothers must be willing to pick up, prepare and serve milk.
Targeting Mechanism	Funding provided by national government. Neighbourhoods must organize, then request municipal governments for inclusion. A municipal social worker assesses this request via visual inspection of the housing materials used in the neighbourhood and confirmation of the existence of an active community organization. Mothers are responsible for picking up powdered milk on a daily basis.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	42% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 72% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 3% go to richest 20%
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Direct targeting costs are 1.0% of program budget or US\$0.09 per beneficiary per year.

128	
Study Title	Poverty Targeting Performance
Study Authors	J. Van Domelen, L. Rawlings, and L. Sherburne-Benz
Study Reference	Chapter 5 from an upcoming publication “Evaluating Social Fund Performance: International Evidence from Community-Based Poverty Reduction Programs”
Study Year	2001 (?)
Country	Peru
Program Being Evaluated	Social Fund Program
Year Implemented	1991-
Program Description	FONCODES was set up in 1991 to provide direct financing to community initiatives as part of a program to address the social costs of adjustment. FONCODES was originally established as a domestically financed program. The World Bank and IDB entered as the main external financiers in early 1994. As the immediate economic crisis ebbed, the objective expanded to include building local capacity in project planning, execution, operations and maintenance of small scale infrastructure and public services (mainly through community groups) and longer term poverty reduction through investments in productive projects designed to stimulate economic activity in poor communities.
Program Coverage	National
Type of Benefit	Infrastructure and employment opportunities
Study Objective	Review the performance and targeting of social funds.
Targeting Method	Geographic – by district/municipality poverty designation. Other targeting done through self-selection via a menu of interventions that include goods and services more likely to be used by the poor.
Targeting Mechanism	Proactive outreach to remote areas or to NGOs serving vulnerable groups; community participation to prioritize needs and incorporate the poor in decision making; opening of regional offices to allow for easier access by poor communities.
Program Budget	(2) 2 projects beginning in 1994 for a total of US\$925.0 million (with sources from the World Bank, other funders and domestic funds) Source: World Bank Social Funds Data Base
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Geographic distribution of social fund expenditure has been progressive (improving over time), with the poor districts receiving more than the rich ones; the poorest decile received 25.3% of resources between 1992 – 1998, while the riches decile received 0.7% (partly attributable to its more rural focus). At household levels, social fund benefits are concentrated among the poor. The bottom quintile in Peru accounted for 23% of social fund beneficiaries, and the bottom half accounted for 58% of the beneficiaries. A 1994 analysis in Peru found that 57% of workers were below the poverty line, and 36% extremely poor. 71% of jobs went to rural workers, and women accounted for 17% of those employed in FONCODES, the Peruvian social fund. Though a significant share of beneficiaries are not poor (showing no ability of excluding the better-off from enjoying the benefits of these local infrastructure investments), the wealthier population is at more of a disadvantage in accessing social fund resources. Household targeting results do vary by the type of investment. Latrines showed the best targeting with 81% of beneficiaries among the extreme poor, compared to 75% for sewerage, 74% for education, 73% electrification, and 65% in water projects. Sewerage projects show the largest leakage to the non-poor with 6% of beneficiaries among the non-poor.
Impact on Welfare	They appear to have had significant impact on overall investment in selected sectors, especially in improving public education and health facilities. They have also played a significant role in water provision.
Targeting Costs	Not available

129	
Study Title	Cash Transfers A Case Study: Venezuela's Subsidio Familiar
Study Authors	Jennifer Leach
Study Reference	Draft
Study Year	Not available
Country	Venezuela
Program Being Evaluated	Subsidio Familiar (Family Subsidy Program)
Year Implemented	Not available
Program Description	To improve the income of families of children, up to the sixth grade, attending official or private schools (only those that do not charge tuition).
Program Coverage	3.1 million children, and 97.72% of eligible children were reached.
Type of Benefit	Not available
Study Objective	Not available
Targeting Method	Geographic; targets marginal urban, indigenous, or frontier areas, or with those types of populations in attendance. Targeted at schools.
Targeting Mechanism	The subsidy was paid to designated representatives once every two months via a non-transferable check that could be cashed in almost any bank in the country.
Program Budget	In 1996, the budget came to US\$396.8 million, representing 71% of all resources assigned to family welfare programs, and 48.6% of all social safety net programs.
Transfer Levels	4,800 bolivares (about US\$9.33) per child per month, up to a maximum of 3 children.
Targeting Performance	Not well targeted, since it focuses on the school rather than the individual. About 90% of schools were eligible for participation in the FSP, and an estimated 50% of beneficiaries came from less impoverished groups. It also excluded key groups of the poor, including families with no children or with children under 6 years of age. Yet, it did encourage school attendance, was very inexpensive to operate and had little leakage.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Administrative cost of the program was only 0.28% of total costs.

EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

201	
Study Title	(1) Do local officials know something we don't? Decentralization of targeted transfers in Albania; (2) Social Assistance in Albania
Study Authors	(1) H. Alderman; (2) H. Alderman
Study Reference	(1) Journal of Public Economics; (2) World Bank, Living Standards measurement Study Working Paper No.134
Study Year	(1) 2000; (2) 1998
Country	Albania
Program Being Evaluated	Ndihme Ekonomika (NE) 'Economic Support Program'
Year Implemented	1994 (with further changes in 1995)
Program Description	(1, 2) Cash transfers to poor. The program was designed to support urban families with no other source of income and rural families between the time when they received their share of former cooperative landholdings and the time when they brought in their first private harvest and those with small landholdings.
Program Coverage	As of August 1996, 145 000 families (about 20% of the population) received payments under this program.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	(1, 2) Assess targeting of this program
Targeting Method	Central government provides block grant to local (commune) governments. Individuals apply to the commune's office of social assistance. Local programme administrators draw up lists of eligible recipients and estimated needs, the latter based on household size, landholdings, access to wage income, pensions or unemployment insurance. The elected commune council determines actual allocation, and may add or drop names from the initial list.
Targeting Mechanism	(1, 2) Central government is funder. Local (commune) governments under take targeting and are responsible for delivering benefits. In October 1995, local administrators were given the right to retain 50% of the difference between the block grant and the amount allocated to local households, with these funds to be used to finance community public works.
Program Budget	(2) 291 million lek (\$3.1 Million) in 1995, accounting to 1.6% of GNP. In 1996, the amount decreased to 241 million lek (\$2.3 million) accounting for a little more than 1% of GNP.
Transfer Levels	Transfers were 2150 lek (\$1=105 lek) for the first adult in a household, and between 400 and 510 lek for others in different age categories. The upper limit was capped based on household size. Maximum transfers were 5375 lek (\$51) per household.
Targeting Performance	(1) 49% of households in the poorest per capita consumption decile received assistance as did 26% of households in the next poorest decile. The poorest decile received 36% of all transfers; the next poorest decile received 17% of transfers. Only 3% of households in the richest quintile received assistance, accounting for only 2.4% of total program transfers. In richer communes, targeting was less well targeted towards the poor. (2) The system is hampered by the absence of a clear objective criterion to determine the size of the grants from the center to the communes and limited information that might be used to implement this criterion. Targeting by local officials displays better performance than only using proxy indicators been used.
Impact on Welfare	(2) Few people change from being poor to being non-poor on the basis of receiving NE benefits (3% using lower definition, and 3.5% using higher poverty line)
Targeting Costs	Not available

202	
Study Title	Poverty Targeting Performance
Study Authors	J. Van Domelen, L. Rawlings, and L. Sherburne-Benz
Study Reference	Chapter 5 from a forthcoming publication “Evaluating Social Fund Performance: International Evidence from Community-Based Poverty Reduction Programs”
Study Year	2001
Country	Armenia
Program Being Evaluated	Armenia Social Investment Fund
Year Implemented	1996-
Program Description	Support vulnerable groups through improvement of basic social services and creation of employment opportunities.
Program Coverage	National
Type of Benefit	Infrastructure and employment generation
Study Objective	Reviews the geographic and household targeting of social funds
Targeting Method	Geographic – by district/municipality poverty designation. Armenia sets overall targets by poverty level. Other targeting done through self-selection via a menu of interventions that includes goods and services more likely to be used by the poor.
Targeting Mechanism	Proactive outreach to remote areas or to NGOs serving vulnerable groups; community participation to prioritize needs and incorporate the poor in decision making; opening of regional offices to allow for easier access by poor communities.
Program Budget	Two projects beginning in 1996 for a total of US\$50.22 million (with sources from the World Bank, other funders and domestic funds).
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	The poorest decile received 8% of benefits; the poorest quintile received 15%, the poorest two quintiles received 37% and the richest decile received 13.9%. Initially, there was little explicit geographical poverty targeting. At the household level, social fund benefits are concentrated among the poor; poorer households were slightly more likely to benefit from a social fund investment than better-off households. Social Fund beneficiaries had a higher likelihood of registering for unemployment benefits, tended to experience arrearages in wages to a greater degree, and had a higher percentage receiving social assistance than households nationwide. However, the wealthiest quintile accounted for about 20% of beneficiaries. Household targeting results vary by the type of investment; latrines and health facilities target the poor best, education and water investments are pro-poor, while sewerage projects are not.
Impact on Welfare	These social funds had significant impact on overall investment in selected sectors, especially in improving public education and health facilities. They have also played a significant role in water provision.
Targeting Costs	Not available

203	
Study Title	Improving Social Assistance in Armenia
Study Authors	A. Mark et al.,
Study Reference	World Bank Report No.19385-AM, Human Development Unit, Country Department III, Europe and Central Asia
Study Year	1999
Country	Armenia
Program Being Evaluated	Family benefit
Year Implemented	January 1999
Program Description	A cash benefit targeted to the poor that replaced an earlier program of social benefits.
Program Coverage	By April 1999, the number of beneficiary families is estimated to reach 230,000.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To assess causes of changes in poverty since 1994, to reassess options and priorities for the government's poverty strategy, and to provide recommendations on improving the poverty focus of social assistance programs.
Targeting Method	Proxy means testing system (Paros) introduced in Armenia in 1994 (see 204)
Targeting Mechanism	Government has proposed that a single eligibility threshold be set for a defined period, probably one year. This will allow scores to be calculated in local social services centers, and may simplify the explanation to applicants.
Program Budget	Budget allocated in 1999 (beginning of the program) amount to about 15% of the national budget. Total budget is 22 billion drams (about \$41 million) for 1999 (up from \$30 billion in the 1998 budget).
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Not available
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

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Study Title	Improving Social Assistance in Armenia
Study Authors	A. Mark et al.,
Study Reference	World Bank Report No.19385-AM, Human Development Unit, Country Department III, Europe and Central Asia
Study Year	1999
Country	Armenia
Program Being Evaluated	Humanitarian Assistance
Year Implemented	Proxy means testing was introduced in 1994 and became the official system for humanitarian aid in 1996.
Program Description	The government developed a system of proxy means testing (the Paros Program) to target humanitarian assistance to the neediest. The system has since been used for 18 programs of distribution of humanitarian assistance provided by various donors.
Program Coverage	In 1998, the Min. of Social Security was expected to distribute cash transfers to 200,000-250,000 households via the Paros system.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To understand changes in poverty since 1994, to assess priorities for poverty reduction and recommendations on improving the poverty focus of social assistance programs.
Targeting Method	Proxy means testing (Paros). The proxy means test algorithm is complex though not secret. For humanitarian aid, no single threshold existed which determined whether households received benefits. Instead, for each shipment of humanitarian aid, those with the highest scores received a ration until the shipment was exhausted. Households were obliged to report any changes in their status when they occurred, thus eligibility could change over time. Social workers can edit (5% of) the lists they receive and can use their own criteria for distributing up to 15% of the assistance through additional lists.
Targeting Mechanism	Households go to the local Social Services Center with documentation that substantiates the family's position. Birth and marriage certificates, copies of disability certifications, pay stubs etc.. are required. A social worker interviews the applicant and fills out a "social Passport". From these data, a "Paros score" is calculated for each registered household.
Program Budget	Humanitarian assistance totaled US\$34.5
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	About 71% of households were registered with Paros in 1996 but this fell to about 50% of households in 1997 due to the reduced likelihood of receiving benefits, self-targeting and emigration. In 1996, the percentage registered increases from about 71% of households in the poorest decile to 79% in the fourth decile, then falls to 64% in the richest decile Errors of exclusion were due to: barriers in registration for the poor (transport cost, fees, documents, etc.), problems with measurement of proxies; and informal procedures used by social workers to pre-screen beneficiaries before registering them. Errors of inclusion were due to the difficulty of using proxies and lack of home visits for verification. 54% of transfer targeted through Paros accrued to the poorest 40% of the population. Comparing the Paros ranking scores with household per capita consumption showed that of those in the poorest quintile, only a third are in the lowest per capita consumption quintile. Only 8% of the benefits accrue to the bottom 2 deciles.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

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Study Title	(1) Social safety net and the poor during the transition: The case of Bulgaria; (2) Family Support Policies in Transitional Economies: Challenges and Constraints
Study Authors	(1) F. Hassan and R. Peters; (2) G. Fajth
Study Reference	(1) Policy Research Working Paper 1450, World Bank, Washington D.C.; (2) Innocenti Occasional Papers Economic Policy Series, Number 43
Study Year	(1) 1995; (2) 1994
Country	Bulgaria
Program Being Evaluated	(1) Child allowance; (2) Family allowance
Year Implemented	On going through out the early 1990s
Program Description	(1) Child allowance; (2) As of 1993, family allowance was supplied through social insurance.
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Evaluate how well social safety net expenditures reach the poor
Targeting Method	Categorical – paid to households with children
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Approximately 1.6% of GDP in 1990; likely higher in 1992
Transfer Levels	Not available; Child allowance is payable for each child, rising per child until the fourth child
Targeting Performance	(1) 19% of benefits go to poorest quintile; 69% of benefits go to middle three quintiles; 12% of benefits go to richest quintile. (2) the per-child benefit rose with the income of the parents. This reflects that in Bulgaria low-income families tended to be excluded from the social insurance system, while higher income families tended to be included; among those who were not insured, only single mothers could apply for the allowance (the bottom decile gets less than 6% of the total amount, while the top decile gets close to 12%).
Impact on Welfare	Not directly known; but all social transfers comprise 54% of the income of poor households (50% for male headed households; 59% for female headed households)
Targeting Costs	Not directly known; but non-benefit expenditures (which are approximately equal to administrative costs) of all social benefits represent about 5.6% of total expenditures on social benefits.

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Study Title	Social safety net and the poor during the transition: The case of Bulgaria
Study Authors	F. Hassan and R. Peters
Study Reference	Policy Research Working Paper 1450, World Bank, Washington D.C
Study Year	1995
Country	Bulgaria
Program Being Evaluated	Pensions
Year Implemented	On going through out the early 1990s
Program Description	Old age pension
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Evaluate how well social safety net expenditures reach the poor
Targeting Method	Categorical – women over the age of 55; men over the age of 60
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Approximately 7.8% of GDP in 1990; 8.4% of GDP in 1992
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	22% of benefits go to poorest quintile; 58% of benefits go to middle three quintiles; 20% of benefits go to richest quintile.
Impact on Welfare	Not directly known; but all social transfers comprise 54% of the income of poor households (50% for male headed households; 59% for female headed households)
Targeting Costs	Not directly known; but non-benefit expenditures (which are approximately equal to administrative costs) of all social benefits represent about 5.6% of total expenditures on social benefits.

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Study Title	(1) Social safety net and the poor during the transition: The case of Bulgaria; (2) Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data; (3) Poverty and Social Assistance in Transition Countries (4) Bulgaria Public Expenditure Issues and Directions for Reform
Study Authors	(1) F. Hassan and R. Peters; (2) B. Milanovic; (3) J. Braithwaite, C. Grootaert, and B. Milanovic; (4) World Bank/D Rignold and E. Lasagabaster
Study Reference	(1) Policy Research Working Paper 1450, World Bank, Washington D.C; (2) The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2328; (3) St. Martin's Press, New York. (4) World Bank Report No. 23929-BUL
Study Year	(1) 1995; (2). 2000; (3) 2000 (4) 2002
Country	Bulgaria
Program Being Evaluated	"Social assistance"
Year Implemented	(1) On going through out the early 1990s (3) 1995?
Program Description	"Social assistance" to poor households
Program Coverage	(3) Only 2.5% report as receiving some social assistance.(4) Of poor households, 11.1% covered in 1995, 8.8 in 1997, 31.0 in 2001.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	(1) Evaluate whether social safety net expenditures reach the poor; (3) To make recommendations on how to improve targeting; (4) evaluate the efficiency and equity of public expenditure
Targeting Method	(1) "To poor households"; (2) Eligibility threshold as % of mean per capita expenditures comes to 28%.; (3) Income cut-off, based on the "guaranteed minimum income," a basket of 22 goods defined in 1991 and whose value was periodically, but not automatically, adjusted for inflation. The value of the basket was \$20 for the first quarter of 1995. The "guaranteed minimum income" was as for the first adult member 100% of the basket value, 80% for other adults and 40% for each child under 14.
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	(1, 2) Approximately 0.1% of GDP in 1990; likely higher in 1992; (3) Family benefits and social assistance amounted to 1.8% of GDP, amounting to approximately lev 0.039 million monthly.(4) .34% of GDP in 2001.
Transfer Levels	(2) \$10 per month per recipient household; (3) Average monthly social assistance per recipient household was about \$14 per month among the poor and \$9 among the non-poor with an overall average of \$10. (4) The ratio of benefits received by the poor to pre-benefit consumption of the poor is 33.3 in 1995, .06 in 1997, 93.7 in 2001, though the report notes that benefits often irregular or in-kind, so that the official level is an exaggeration of their value.
Targeting Performance	(1) 33% of benefits go to poorest quintile; 57% of benefits go to middle three quintiles; 10% of benefits go to richest quintile; (2) 22.3% of social assistance was received by the lowest decile; (3) Only 8% of the recipients were poor. The rest (92%) was thus leakage. The probability of a poor household receiving assistance was 9.6%, the probability of a rich household 2.4%.(4) The following percent of resources are received by the poor 26.9% in 1995, 39.7 % in 1997, 53.1% in 2001. Alternatively, results by quintile for 2001 are 60.5% of benefits to the poorest, followed by 17.6,12.4, 9.3 and 0.3 respectively.
Impact on Welfare	(1) Not directly known; but all social transfers comprise 54% of the income of poor households (50% for male headed households; 59% for female headed households); (2) 2.55% of households receive social assistance. Social assistance comes to 4.1% of recipient household expenditure. Social assistance to the bottom decile as % of the poverty gap (after social assistance) comes to 1.3%; (3) Social assistance covered about a third of the poverty gap. Given 88% leakage to the non-poor, social assistance effectively eliminated only 4% of the poverty gap. For those who were recipients of social assistance, it covers about 4% of their expenditures with the proportion rising to almost 28% among the poor.
Targeting Costs	Not directly known; but non-benefit expenditures (which are approximately equal to administrative costs) of all social benefits represent about 5.6% of total expenditures on social benefits.

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Study Title	(1) Poverty and Social Assistance in Transition Countries; (2) Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data
Study Authors	(1) J. Braithwaite, C. Grootaert, and B. Milanovic; (2) B. Milanovic
Study Reference	(1) St. Martin's Press, New York; (2) World Bank Policy Research Working paper #2328
Study Year	(1) 2000; (2) 2000
Country	Estonia
Program Being Evaluated	Social Assistance
Year Implemented	1995
Program Description	Cash transfers to poor households
Program Coverage	2.7% of all households report receiving social assistance.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	(1) To make policy recommendations on how to improve targeting
Targeting Method	(1, 2) Income cut-off. A household would, in principle, be qualified for social assistance if its monthly per capita income was less than \$29. This poverty line was equal to 39% of average monthly per capita expenditures.
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	(1) Family benefits and social assistance amounted to 2.6% of GDP. The monthly amount came to about EEK27,455.
Transfer Levels	Average assistance per recipient household was about \$33 per month, \$36 per month for the poor and \$33 among the non-poor.
Targeting Performance	(1) Among the poor, the share of social assistance recipients is 10.3%; among the non-poor, 2.4%. The share of recipients declines with level of welfare, except for a sudden peak around the sixty-fifth percentiles. The leakage in terms of recipients amounts to 84%. The probability of the poor receiving social assistance was four times higher than that of the non-poor (10.3% vs. 2.4%) but the amounts received were almost equal. Overall, 90% of the poor received no social assistance; (2) 34.7% of social assistance was received by the lowest decile.
Impact on Welfare	(1) To close the entire poverty gap one would need to transfer to the poor (only) only 0.2% of total population expenditure, which reflects an austere poverty line. Total social assistance was in excess of 1.5 times the poverty gap. However, only 12% of that amount was paid to the poor, thus "covering" only 18% of the poverty gap. On average, social assistance accounted for 0.7% of total expenditures. Among the poor, social assistance paid for 5.2% of expenditures; among the non-poor, it was negligible (0.3% of expenditures). For recipient households, social assistance covered about 15% of expenditures, and for poor recipients 41.5%. (2) 2.7% of households receive social assistance. Social assistance comes to 14.8% of recipient household expenditure. Social assistance to the bottom decile as % of the poverty gap (after social assistance) comes to 7%.
Targeting Costs	Not available

209	
Study Title	(1): Poverty and social transfers in Hungary; (2) The Hungarian pension system in transition
Study Authors	(1) C. Grootaert; (2) R. Palacios and R. Rocha
Study Reference	(1): Policy Research Working Paper 1770, World Bank, Washington D.C; (2) World Bank, Washington D.C. (book)
Study Year	(1): 1997; (2) 1998
Country	Hungary
Program Being Evaluated	Pensions
Year Implemented	On going through out the early 1990s
Program Description	Old age pension
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	(1) Assess how well the system of cash social transfers prevents or alleviates poverty in 1993; (2) Outlines changes to pension system enacted in the mid-1990s.
Targeting Method	Categorical – women over the age of 55; men over the age of 60. Changes in the late 1990s will raise this age and introduce limited means-testing.
Targeting Mechanism	Undertaken jointly by central government and the Pension Insurance Fund
Program Budget	10.4% of GDP in 1993
Transfer Levels	Average about 61% of net wages in 1995
Targeting Performance	Coverage is universal in pensioner households. 60% of households in bottom 5 th percentile receive pension; 65% of households between the 5 th and 30 th centiles receive the pension. Approximately 41% of households in the top two quintiles receive the pension.
Impact on Welfare	62% of households who receive pensions are lifted above the poverty line. For households in the bottom 5 th percentile, pension income accounts for 76% of expenditures. For households between the 5 th and 30 th centiles, pension income accounts for 64% of expenditures. For households in the top two quintiles pension income accounts for 21% of expenditures.
Targeting Costs	Not available

210	
Study Title	(1): Poverty and social transfers in Hungary; (2) The targeting of family allowances in Hungary (3) Family Support Policies in Transitional Economies
Study Authors	(1) C. Grootaert; (2) S. Jarvis and J. Micklewright; (3) G. Fajth
Study Reference	(1): Policy Research Working Paper 1770, World Bank, Washington D.C; (2) World Bank, Washington D.C. (book); (3) Innocenti Occasional Papers, Economic Policy Series, Number 43
Study Year	(1): 1997; (2) 1995; (3) 1994
Country	Hungary
Program Being Evaluated	Family (child) allowance
Year Implemented	On going through out the late 1980s and early 1990s
Program Description	(1, 2) Cash transfer paid to families with children under 16 (3) In 1990, family allowance became fully universal as the restrictions for families with one child were removed.
Program Coverage	Not available. (3) The coverage of 0-18 year olds by family allowance stood at 93.1% in 1993, an increase from 84.3% in 1989, when eligibility became universal.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	(1) Assess how well the system of cash social transfers prevents or alleviates poverty in 1993; (2) Assesses the targeting of family allowances around 1987-1990.
Targeting Method	Categorical – recipient households must have children under 16 (or older but in full-time education)
Targeting Mechanism	Central government
Program Budget	4.2% of GDP in 1993
Transfer Levels	Depend on number of children and whether one or both parents reside with child. In 1990, average family payments were equivalent to about 30% of average earnings.
Targeting Performance	From (1): Coverage is nearly (+96%) in households with children. 48% of households in bottom 5 th percentile receive family allowance; 40% of households between the 5 th and 30 th centiles receive the family allowance. Approximately 47% of households in the top two quintiles receive the family allowance. (2) Although nearly 63% of benefits accrue to poorest 40% of individuals, nearly 9% accrues to top 20%. (3) In Hungary in 1991, comparing the income deciles, the incidence of per-child benefit values was flat.
Impact on Welfare	From (1): In 1993, for households in the bottom 5 th percentile, family allowance accounts for 16% of expenditures. For households between the 5 th and 30 th centiles, family allowance accounts for 9.1% of expenditures. For households in the top two quintiles pension income accounts for 5% of expenditures. From (2): In 1987, 23% of total expenditures on family allowance go to bottom decile of pre-allowance income; 16% go to second decile; 12.4% to the third and 10.7% to the fourth; about 23% goes to top two quintiles.
Targeting Costs	Not available

211	
Study Title	(1) Poverty and Social Assistance in Transition Countries; (2) Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data
Study Authors	(1) J. Braithwaite, C. Grootaert, and B. Milanovic; (2) B. Milanovic
Study Reference	(1) St. Martin's Press, New York; (2) The World Bank Research Working Paper #2328
Study Year	(1) 2000; (2) 2000
Country	Hungary
Program Being Evaluated	Social Assistance
Year Implemented	1993
Program Description	This covers 34 programs, the most important ones being child allowance and income supplement for the long-term unemployed.
Program Coverage	24.4% of households report receiving some social assistance.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To assess and improve targeting
Targeting Method	(1) Income cut-off, linked to the minimum pension (known as national anchor), which on average amounted to \$70 in 1993; (2) Eligibility threshold as % of mean per capita expenditures comes to 55%
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	(1) Family benefits and social assistance amounted to 4.7% of GDP, about Ft.3.1 million on a monthly basis; (2) 1.1% of expenditures
Transfer Levels	Average social assistance was \$4 per month, with \$12 among the poor and \$3 among the non-poor. Average assistance received by the recipient household was \$17. Among the poor, the average amount was \$30 and \$15 for the non-poor.
Targeting Performance	(1) The percentage of recipients was high among both the poor and non-poor; 43% of the poor versus 23% of the non-poor were recipients. Hard-core poor have a higher probability of receiving assistance at 49% than the rest of the poor. Leakage is almost 87%. The poor had about two times greater probability of receiving social assistance (43 vs. 23 percent) than the non-poor. Among the poor, social assistance recipients were not, on a per capita basis, significantly poorer than those who did not receive assistance. (2) 27.2% of social assistance was received by the lowest decile.
Impact on Welfare	(1) Total spending on social assistance covered the entire poverty gap. However, only about 23% was transferred to the poor, while the rest leaked to the non-poor. Social assistance eliminated 23.3% of the expenditure-based poverty gap. On average, social assistance accounted for 1.5% of total expenditures; this rises to 5.8% for the poor, and accounts for less than 1% for the rich. For those who receive social assistance, it covers 4.7% of their expenditures with almost 13% among the poor households and almost 4% among the non-poor; (2) 24.4% of households receive social assistance. Social assistance comes to 4.7% of recipient household expenditure. Social assistance to the bottom decile as % of the poverty gap is 28.8%.
Targeting Costs	Not available

212	
Study Title	Kyrgyz Republic: Enhancing Pro-poor Growth
Study Authors	Tesliuc, E.
Study Reference	World Bank Report No. 24638-KG
Study Year	2003
Country	Kyrgyz Republic
Program Being Evaluated	Unified monthly benefit
Year Implemented	1995, reformed 1998
Program Description	Provides a cash transfer to cover the gap between the “guaranteed minimum level of consumption” and average monthly per capita income for individuals in the family who are eligible – 1) children under 16, or 18 if in secondary school; 2) students under 21.
Program Coverage	146,000 beneficiaries. 13% of households nationally, 31% of poorest quintile, 15, 10, 7, 4 % of successively richer quintiles
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	Cover the income gap of the poorest families up to the indigence line
Targeting Method	Means test
Targeting Mechanism	1. Cash income from many (formally observable) sources is tallied. Farm income is estimated from landholdings of the household, based on norms that vary by area, type of land and irrigation status of land. Total household income is divided by the number of members in the household. Then any special categories of need for the family are determined .
Program Budget	0.6% of GDP in 2001. The law allows up to 1.5% of GDP but this has not been allocated in recent years.
Transfer Levels	The GMLC, however, is more determined by budget availability than household need – in 20001 and 2002 it was equivalent with 1/3 of the extreme and 1/5 of the total poverty line. Resulting benefits constitute to .3% of household consumption nationally, 2% for those in the poorest decile. Participation costs for households can be significant and program administrators have insufficient resources for outreach, client service.
Targeting Performance	54% of benefits to poorest quintile, 20, 13, 7, 6% to successively richer quintiles
Impact on Welfare	Total social assistance spending, of which the UMB is the major component, lowers the headcount by 2%, the poverty gap by 4% and the severity index (FGT3) by 7%; for the extreme poverty line, it lowers the headcount by 4%, the poverty gap by 9% and the severity index by 15%.
Targeting Costs	Not available

213	
Study Title	Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data
Study Authors	B. Milanovic
Study Reference	The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2328
Study Year	2000
Country	Latvia
Program Being Evaluated	Old Age Pension
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Cash transfers to elderly households
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	The paper assesses the performance of Latvia's system of social transfers.
Targeting Method	Categorical (age related)
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Pensions have a pro-rich bias. The bottom two deciles received between 5.5% and 14.8% of transfers. The top two deciles received between 17.3% and 21.8% of transfers (depending on whether one uses per capita income, per capita expenditure or per adult equivalent measurements).
Impact on Welfare	The program accounts for 20.2% share in total gross income.
Targeting Costs	Not available

214	
Study Title	Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data
Study Authors	B. Milanovic
Study Reference	The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2328
Study Year	2000
Country	Latvia
Program Being Evaluated	Family allowances (including maternity, family allowance, child care allowance, and birth grant)
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Not available
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Assess the performance of Latvia's system of social transfers.
Targeting Method	Family benefit, paid when there are children under 18, is not means tested.
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Family benefits, paid in respect of all children under 18, in 1998 was 4.5 lats per month.
Targeting Performance	When ranked by per capita income, for non-pension transfers (family allowances, social assistance, unemployment benefits and other social transfers), the bottom decile receives 13% of transfers, and the top two deciles about 10% each; The distribution is slightly pro-poor (in absolute terms), as the poorer households (according to income per capita) receive slightly more than the rich. Family benefits are pro-poor since children are disproportionately represented among the poor. When ranked by per capita expenditure, family allowances remain pro-poor. When ranked by equivalent expenditure, the bottom decile receive 12.8% of transfers.
Impact on Welfare	The program accounts for 2.3% share in total gross income.
Targeting Costs	Not available

215	
Study Title	Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data
Study Authors	B. Milanovic
Study Reference	The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2328
Study Year	2000
Country	Latvia
Program Being Evaluated	Social assistance
Year Implemented	mid-1990s
Program Description	Social benefits include: Low-income family benefits, which has a maximum payment of 21 lats paid in cash and in-kind; housing benefits which is paid in cash or in-kind; Care benefit in cash given if elderly or child care is needed; funeral benefits and other additional benefits. Social care benefits are for the elderly, children (kindergartens, orphanages) etc. paid in kind.
Program Coverage	Only 1.5% of households report receiving social assistance. Among the poor, the share of social assistance is 2%; among the non-poor 1.4%.
Type of Benefit	Cash and in-kind transfers
Study Objective	Assess the performance of Latvia's system of social transfers.
Targeting Method	A person's eligibility lasts for three months and is then reviewed.
Targeting Mechanism	Social benefits are paid by Local Authorities based on the 1995 Welfare Law. Housing benefit is paid directly to utilities or municipal housing authorities. Social care benefits are paid out of central and Local Authorities funds.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	On average, a recipient household would receive \$45 (26 lats) per month versus the average wage of slightly over \$200..
Targeting Performance	When ranked by per capita income, social assistance decreases in importance as one moves from the poorest to the middle-class, but then increase. The two bottom deciles of income distribution together receive only 11% of social assistance, while the top decile receives 20% of social assistance. When ranked by per capita expenditure, the program becomes more targeted on the poor, with the bottom two deciles now receiving 20% of social assistance. When ranked by adult equivalent expenditure, the bottom decile received 10% of transfers. The recipients of social assistance among the poor is only 2%; among the non-poor 1.4%. and 0% among hard-core poor household (of which there are 6.4%).
Impact on Welfare	The program accounts for only 0.3% share in total gross income. Total disbursed social assistance amounted to LVL 2,882 or less than 1/10 of the poverty gap (estimated at LVL32,500). Since only 23% of the amount was paid to the poor, it covers only 2% of the poverty gap. Though social assistance "paid" for about 0.3% of total population expenditures (0.8% among the poor and 0.28% among the non-poor), the importance of social assistance for the recipient households was substantial; it covered one-third of the poor's expenditure and 17% for the non-poor. Thus social assistance was distributed in relatively large chunks to a few people.
Targeting Costs	Not available

216	
Study Title	(1) The dynamics of poverty and the effectiveness of Poland's safety net (1993-96); (2) Family Support Policies in Transitional Economies: Challenges and Constraints;
Study Authors	(1) W. Okrasa; (2) G. Fajth;
Study Reference	(1) Policy Research Working Paper 2221, World Bank, Washington D.C; (2) Innocenti Occasional Papers, Economic Policy Series, number 43
Study Year	(1) 1999; (2) 1994
Country	Poland
Program Being Evaluated	Family (child) allowance
Year Implemented	Early-mid 1990s
Program Description	(1) Cash transfers to poor families with children; (2) Since 1993, the registered unemployed have become ineligible for the family allowance as soon as their eligibility for unemployment benefits expires; at this time they can begin to receive social assistance.
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Assess how social benefits affect transitions in and out of poverty
Targeting Method	Categorical – recipient households must have children under 16 (or older but in full-time education). Means tested: Income per family member must be below 50% of average wages.
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	All 'social' benefits (including family allowance) accounted for 1.9% of GDP in 1995
Transfer Levels	7% of 'minimum' incomes
Targeting Performance	(1) 63 per cent of households received benefit for at least one year out of four between 1993 and 1996. Approx 60 per cent of non-poor households received family benefit; 80 per cent of the poorest households received them. Average period of time hh received benefit between 1993-96 was 21 months, 18 months for 'non-poor' hh; 34 months for the poor. Poor appears to mean being in the lowest consumption quantile. (2) The per-child benefit appears to rise with family income. In 1992, the bottom decile received less than 9% of the total amount, while the top decile received more than 12%..
Impact on Welfare	Reduces the median time spent in poverty by 3 months (from 25.4 to 22.3 months) over a four year period
Targeting Costs	Not available

217	
Study Title	(1) Poverty and Social Assistance in Transition Countries; (2) Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data
Study Authors	(1) J. Braithwaite, C. Grootaert, and B. Milanovic; (2) B. Milanovic
Study Reference	(1) St. Martin's Press, New York; (2) The World Bank Research Working Paper #2328
Study Year	(1) 2000; (2) 2000
Country	Poland
Program Being Evaluated	Social Assistance
Year Implemented	1993
Program Description	A household qualified if its monthly per capita income is less than the minimum pension (\$72 in 1993), and also if it fulfilled one of the 11 "dysfunctionality" conditions (e.g., long-term unemployed members, single-parent headed, alcoholism, etc.)
Program Coverage	3.7% of households report receiving some social assistance.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To make recommendations on how to improve targeting
Targeting Method	Income cut-off and categorical. A household qualifies if its monthly per capita income was less than the minimum pension (\$72 in 1993) and also has one of the 11 'dysfunctionality' conditions, for example to have long-term unemployed members, single-headed household, drug-related problems, etc., . (2) Eligibility threshold as % of mean per capita expenditures comes to 77%
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	(1) Family benefits and social assistance were 2.3% of GDP in 1993, (monthly amount of ~t Zl.0.55 billion)
Transfer Levels	(1) Average social assistance was about \$2 per household per month, with \$3.50 among the poor, and \$1.10 among the non-poor. Thus, the average amount of assistance given per recipient household amounts to \$54 with no difference between the poor and the non-poor. (2) \$54 per month per recipient household
Targeting Performance	Among the poor, the share of social assistance recipients was 6.3%; among the non-poor, 2.1%. The share of recipients clearly declines with level of welfare. Among the poorest, one household in ten receives some social assistance; among the richest, less than one in one hundred does. In terms of the number of recipients, 35.5% is leakage. 93% of the poor receive no social assistance. The percentage of the excluded poor declines slightly as one moves toward the more poor, indicating some improvement in targeting with increasing depth of poverty. (2) 20.5% of social assistance was received by the lowest decile.
Impact on Welfare	Social assistance expenditures were equivalent to 6.2% of the poverty gap. Social assistance to the poor amounted to 4.1% of the poverty gap and eliminated 3.9% of the poverty gap. Social assistance accounts for 1% of total household expenditures (2% for the poor, and 0.4% for the rich). (2) 3.7% of households receive social assistance. Social assistance comes to 22.1% of recipient household expenditure. Social assistance to the bottom decile as % of the poverty gap (after social assistance) comes to 9.4%.
Targeting Costs	Not available

218	
Study Title	(1) Social security programs throughout the world: Romania (2) Romania: Poverty and social policy (3) Romania: Poverty assessment
Study Authors	(1) United States Government (2) World Bank (3) World Bank
Study Reference	(1) Social Security Administration, United States Government (2) Report No. 16462-RO, Europe and Central Asia Region (3) World Bank Report No. 26189-RO
Study Year	(1) 1999 (2) 1997 (3) 2003
Country	Romania
Program Being Evaluated	Family allowances
Year Implemented	Current laws: 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998
Program Description	Cash transfers to families with children
Program Coverage	(3) In 2002, 4,835,606 children (state allowance) and 1,022,900 families (supplementary allowance)
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	Describe social assistance policies
Targeting Method	(1) Categorical targeting. To receive benefits, households must contain resident children who are under 16 (and attending school) or under the age of 18 if disabled or a student. Those over age 7 must attend classes regularly.
Targeting Mechanism	(1) Family allowances are fully funded by the Romanian government. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection provides general supervision. Local offices of labor and social protection, local councils, and other institutions support the administration of benefits.
Program Budget	(2) Comprises 80% of total government expenditures on cash transfers in 1994. (3) 0.68% of GDP in 2002.
Transfer Levels	(1) Family allowance amounts to 65,000 lei (US\$6.53) per month per child. This amount is doubled to 130,000 (US\$13.06) for totally disabled children. Supplementary allowances for families with more than one child are available in the following amounts: 2 children – 40,000 lei (US\$4.02); 3 children – 80,000 lei (US\$8.04); 4 or more children – 100,000 lei (US\$10.05). A birth grant of 339,788 lei (US\$34.14) is awarded for each additional birth after the second. A supplementary allowance of 42,845 lei (US\$4.31) per month is also available for wives of military conscripts if they are: (a) 4 months pregnant, (b) totally disabled, or (c) caring for dependent children under age 7. (3) . Beginning with January 2003, the level of the benefit is set for 210,000 ROL/month. For the poorest quintile receipt of child allowances is about 5% of consumption.
Targeting Performance	(2) Moderately progressive. Bottom quintile receives 25.9% of benefits; top quintile receives 15.5% of benefits. (3) Almost strictly proportional, with share of benefits per quintile from poorest to richest, being 20, 20, 20, 19 and 21.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

219	
Study Title	(1) Social security programs throughout the world: Romania (2) Romania: Poverty and social policy
Study Authors	(1) United States Government (2) World Bank
Study Reference	(1) Social Security Administration, United States Government (2) Report No. 16462-RO, Europe and Central Asia Region
Study Year	(1) 1999 (2) 1997
Country	Romania
Program Being Evaluated	Discretionary Social assistance
Year Implemented	Current laws: 1993, 1995, 1997 and 1998
Program Description	Cash transfers to households meeting certain criteria.
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Cash and in-kind transfers
Study Objective	Describe social assistance policies
Targeting Method	(2) Categorical targeting including handicapped, elderly, war veterans and their widows and “politically persecuted persons”.
Targeting Mechanism	(1), (2) The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection provides general supervision. Local offices of labor and social protection, local councils, and other institutions support the administration of benefits.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	(2) Varies widely – see (2), pp. 42-47.
Targeting Performance	(2) Cash transfers are slightly regressive. Bottom quintile receives 18.0% of benefits; top quintile receives 21.7% of benefits. In-kind transfers are strongly regressive. Bottom quintile receives 3.4% of benefits; top quintile receives 45.6%.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

220	
Study Title	Romania: Poverty Assessment
Study Authors	Tesliuc, E. et. al
Study Reference	World Bank Report No. 26189-RO
Study Year	2003
Country	Romania
Program Being Evaluated	Minimum Income Guarantee
Year Implemented	2002
Program Description	The MIG benefit covers the gap between the program threshold and the actual family income. For able-bodied family members, benefits are conditioned by a workfare requirement of up to 72 hours per month, in an attempt to self-target program benefits to those in need.
Program Coverage	At the end of 2002, 380,000 families or about 5.5% of the population.
Type of Benefit	Cash, plus health insurance and heating subsidies. Program provides lump-sum benefits for low income families during the cold season (November to March), the size of the benefit depending on the aggregate income level of the family and the source / type of fuel used for heating (district heating, gas or wood/coal). In January and September 2002 the GOR issued ordinances modifying the MIG law, and raised the heating subsidy eligibility threshold above the MIG threshold in an attempt to cover a larger share of the population.
Study Objective	Understand poverty in Romania
Targeting Method	Income and asset tested
Targeting Mechanism	Local councils administer the program, trying to quantify informal sector earnings and conducting imputations of income from assets, for example from land and livestock. There is considerable variability in imputation formulas across localities, the study suggest that the variation is greater than warranted. There is also variation in standards as to what documentation the applicant needs to supply.
Program Budget	0.28% of GDP in 2002
Transfer Levels	The mean benefit is 1 million ROL. For the poorest quintile, benefits are about 4% of household consumption.
Targeting Performance	62% of benefits are received by the poorest quintile, 21, 12, 4, and 2 percent by successively richer quintiles.
Impact on Welfare	The MIG lowers the total poverty headcount by 8 percentage points from a base of 78 percent. Lowers extreme poverty headcount by 12 percentage points from a base of 54 percent.
Targeting Costs	Not available.

221	
Study Title	(1) Poverty and Social Assistance in Transition Countries; (2) Social Transfers and Social Assistance: An Empirical Analysis Using Latvian Household Survey Data
Study Authors	(1) J. Braithwaite, C. Grootaert, and B. Milanovic; 2. B. Milanovic
Study Reference	(1) St. Martin's Press, New York; (2) The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #2328
Study Year	(1) 2000; (2) 2000
Country	Russia
Program Being Evaluated	Social Assistance
Year Implemented	1993-1994
Program Description	Cash transfers to poor households
Program Coverage	13% of households received some form of social assistance from local authorities.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To make recommendations on how to improve targeting
Targeting Method	Income cut-off, using the official average per capita poverty line for the entire population amounting to about \$32, which is updated monthly using CPI. Given the vastness of the country and the differences in socio-economic conditions, the effectively used poverty threshold lines differed. The amount was equal to 65% of average monthly per capita expenditures, placing Russia among the countries with high poverty lines.
Targeting Mechanism	Decentralized, local authorities.
Program Budget	Family benefits and social assistance amounted to 2.5% of GDP. The monthly amount came to about Rb. 4.2 billion.
Transfer Levels	(1) Average social assistance was only 60 cents per household per month, with no difference between the poor and non-poor. The average amount of assistance given to recipients was less than \$5 per household. (2)\$5 per month per recipient household.
Targeting Performance	(1) There was little difference between the poor (12.7%) and the non-poor (13.1%) recipients. Almost two-thirds of recipients (64.6%) did not qualify for social assistance. Overall, 87% of the poor receive no social assistance. The percentage of the excluded poor declines as one moves toward the less poor, those closer to the poverty threshold. (2) 13% of households receive social assistance. Social assistance comes to 3.5% of recipient household expenditure. Social assistance to the bottom decile as % of the poverty gap (after social assistance) comes to 3.3%.
Impact on Welfare	(1) 11% of total population expenditure would need to be transferred to close the poverty gap. The total social assistance amounted to only 4.1% of the poverty gap, and covered only 1.5% of the expenditure-based poverty gap. On average, social assistance accounts for about 1% of total expenditure. Among the poor, social assistance pays for 1% of expenditure, and among the rich one-third a percent only.
Targeting Costs	Not available

222	
Study Title	(1) Transition from Cash Benefits to Work: The Case of Slovenia (2) Explaining the increase in inequality during the transition
Study Authors	(1) Milan Vodopivec (2) B. Milanovic
Study Reference	(1) Empirical Economics (1998) 23:177-202 (2) Policy Research Working Paper 1935, World Bank
Study Year	(1) 1998 (2) 1998
Country	Slovenia
Program Being Evaluated	Social Assistance
Year Implemented	Introduced in 1979, current law 1992.
Program Description	(1) Social assistance is provided as a supplementary source of income for individuals capable of work, but who have insufficient means due to factors outside their control. Social assistance is the next option for those who have exhausted unemployment compensation and assistance.
Program Coverage	(1) Numbers vary over time, from 10240 in 1988 to 17500 in 1993 to 26400 in 1995.
Study Objective	(1) Discusses issues associated with social benefits in Slovenia
Type of Benefit	(1) Cash benefit and may also include coupons, bill reimbursements or a housing subsidy.
Targeting Method	(1) Social assistance is means tested and available to individuals or families below the threshold income, which is expressed as a percentage of the guaranteed wage. These percentages are as follows: 52% for an adult, 42% for a school-attending child over 15, 34% for a child between 7 and 14, 29% for a child under 7. The benefit is paid monthly for up to 6 months and may be renewable.
Targeting Mechanism	(1) Social assistance programme is administered by 62 local centers for social work and primarily funded by the central budget.
Program Budget	(1) Varies from 0.07% (1990) to 0.17% (1993) to 0.24% (1995) of GDP.
Transfer Levels	(1) The amount of the benefit is the difference between the threshold income for the individual or family and the actual income. The average monthly real benefit in 1995 was 16 951 SIT (approximately US\$135)
Targeting Performance	(1) Not formally assessed but the majority of recipients (71%) are unemployed and 10% of recipients are officially employed. The proportions of male and female recipients are nearly equal, however women make up 83% of single parent claimants. (2) Argues that the distribution of benefits has become more pro-poor after 1990.
Impact on Welfare	(1) In 1993, non-pension cash benefits (which include unemployment insurance and social assistance benefits, but also child allowances, sickness and maternity leave pay, and scholarships) constituted 14.7 percent of all income for the first and 10.8 percent for the second decile of households ranked by income
Targeting Costs	Not available.

223	
Study Title	Targeting Child Benefits in a Transition Economy
Study Authors	E. Edmonds
Study Reference	Unpublished, Department of Economics, Dartmouth College.
Study Year	July, 2001 (Using household data set for 1993)
Country	Slovenia
Program Being Evaluated	Child Benefit Program (Otroški Dodatek) providing minimum income guarantee.
Year Implemented	1966 (In its present targeted form)
Program Description	Benefits to families with children
Program Coverage	In 1993 75,259 households with 147, 478; this was 28% of all children who meet the age qualifications for the child benefit.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfers
Study Objective	Evaluates the targeting performance and participation pattern for the program.
Targeting Method	Self-reporting means-tested demographic program; all households with children aged 15 or less are eligible, or aged 26 or less if child is full-time student or disabled. Parents must apply annually (by March) by filling out form in person at the local social work center, providing information on wage earnings of parent and partner and other non-wage earnings in previous calendar year, as well as list of children and ages. For purpose of benefit, household defined as nuclear family and benefit paid to applicant. May reapply every three months if substantial change in household income or composition. Household must sign a statement attesting to accuracy of income and composition information; no other documentation required. A criminal penalty is associated with misreporting information, and households can be investigated to verify the validity of the information; but, in practice, virtually zero monitoring of validity of income that is reported. Benefits are transferred to applicant's bank account.
Targeting Mechanism	Central government determines eligibility rules and implements it through social work center.
Program Budget	In 1993, the program's budget was SIT\$(7.6 billion (US\$58 million), equivalent to 0.5% of GDP and 4% of total social spending (including pensions, 87%, and maternity leave compensation, 5%); so 54% of social welfare spending (i.e. excluding pensions).
Transfer Levels	In 1993, household per child monthly benefit was the amount required to bring household income up to a minimum, specified as 43% and 23% of average monthly per capita household income for non-farm and farm households respectively. So transfers were fully graduated, i.e. a 100% marginal tax rate. The formula amounted to a maximum monthly benefits for a household with one child of SIT\$20,135 (US\$153) and SIT\$10,770 (US\$82) for non-farm and farm households respectively. Average monthly household income, excluding child benefit, was SIT\$97,508 (US\$741).
Targeting Performance	Estimated that 42%, 65% and 78% of benefits accrue to bottom 10%, 20% and 30% of national income distribution.
Impact on Welfare	Not available. Targeting performance suggests large. But this may be negated by adverse labor-supply incentive effects due to 100% marginal tax rate, especially for farm households.

224	
Study Title	(1) Ukraine: Social safety nets and poverty (2) Social Security Programs Throughout the World
Study Authors	(1) The World Bank (2) United States Government
Study Reference	(1) World Bank Report No. 22677 (2) http://www.ssa.gov/statistics/ssptw/1999/English/
Study Year	(1) 2001 (2) 1999
Country	The Ukraine
Program Being Evaluated	Social assistance
Year Implemented	First law 1944, current law 1993 and 1999
Program Description	Assistance to low income families
Program Coverage	Poor families with children or elderly dependents. (2) Lists a total of 7165 families receiving assistance as of January 2000.
Type of Benefit	Cash (sometimes in-kind)
Study Objective	Describe social assistance policies
Targeting Method	(1) Categorical and means tested with cut off placed at UAH 41 per person per month (approximately US\$11.70 in 1999).
Targeting Mechanism	(1) The program is administered by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. It is funded through central and local government subsidies. Local and state governments may provide supplementary funds. Benefits are calculated and paid by different levels of government including state social protection offices, branches of the pension fund and local authorities
Program Budget	(2) In 1999, UAH 0.5 billion (US\$142 million) was allocated for family allowance benefits, despite payment requirements of approximately UAH 2 billion (US\$571 million). In the 2000 budget, UAH 7 million (US\$2 million) was allocated for assistance for low income families.
Transfer Levels	(1) Children under age 16 (18 if student) (income tested): 50% of minimum wage per child. Families with 3 or more children under age 16 (income tested): monthly benefit equal to 100% of minimum wage; families with 4 or more children: 200% of minimum wage. Single mothers (including widows and widowers not receiving survivor pension or social pension) and children whose fathers evade child support (income tested): 50% of minimum wage for each child under 16 (18 if student). Guardians of children under age 19 (income tested): 200% of minimum wage. Carers for disabled children under age 16: 100% of minimum wage; additional 200% of minimum wage payable to mothers who undergo prescribed prenatal care regime. (Minimum wage was UAH90.7 or US\$25.9 per month in Jan/97.) (2) Monthly family allowance benefits range from UAH5.2 and UAH16.6 (US\$1.48 and US\$4.74 in 1999). Assistance for low income families averaged UAH106.8 (US\$30.5) per month, payable for 6 months for families with working members or 3 months for families with non-working members.
Targeting Performance	(2) Based on household survey data, only 16 percent of households with children received family benefits during the first 9 months of 1999. This statistic reflects means testing, but also non-payment and self selection by families for whom the low level of benefit is not worthwhile. (The average monthly benefit is between 3 and 10 percent of the average wage.) Furthermore, only 52% of families with children aged under 3 received allowances in the first three quarters of 1999, despite high poverty rates in this demographic group.
Impact on Welfare	Not available.
Targeting Costs	Not available

225	
Study Title	(1) Targeting Social Assistance in a Transition Economy: The Mahallas in Uzbekistan; (2) Social Protection in Uzbekistan
Study Authors	(1) A. Coudouel, S. Marnie, and John Micklewright; (2) K. Mehra and M. Rashid
Study Reference	(1) Innocenti Occasional Papers, Economic and Social Policy Series no.63; (2) World Bank.
Study Year	(1) 1998; (2) 2002
Country	Uzbekistan
Program Being Evaluated	Social Assistance
Year Implemented	1994
Program Description	Child allowances (CA) and low income benefits (LIB, or social assistance).
Program Coverage	In 2000, over 1.6 million beneficiaries from 12.4% of all households in CA and 0.35 million from 3.5% of all households in LIB; down by 25% and 49% of 1995 levels respectively.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfers
Study Objective	Evaluate operation and targeting performance of government programs.
Targeting Method	(2) CA are provided to low-income families with children under 16 years (to be extended to 18 years from 2002 if child is in education). Levels range from 50% of minimum wage for families with one child to 175% for those with four or more. LIB provided to all households below a particular income threshold. The level of benefit can vary between 1.5-3 times the minimum wage. For both programs, Federal guidelines provide several indicators for determining eligibility of claimant, including monthly per capita income, family composition, labor force participation, and ownership of land or durables. Mahallahs (community groups) decide who meets these criteria without any external monitoring, and there are concerns that they may exclude poor not meeting accepted community social norms and that process imposes social stigma.
Targeting Mechanism	The programs have been administered by two separate agencies, the Ministry of Labor is responsible for the implementation of the low income benefits and the Ministry of Social Development for child allowances. In 2002 the programs and staff were combined into a single ministry, the Ministry of Labor and Social Maintenance. Administration of both schemes decentralized to local communities (Mahallahs), who both determine eligibility and size of benefits according to local norms; there are about 10,000 Mahallahs comprising on average 200 individuals each. The program pays the salary of the chairman of the Mahallah and the state investigation officer who participates in monitoring claims. It appears that the Mahallahs receive funds according to the number of benefits awarded in the previous year (as opposed to geographic targeting by poverty levels). Claimants fill out application forms providing information on income, household composition and assets. The committee's recommendation is discussed and decided upon during the next Mahalla plenary session. House visits to validate the data appear to be common.
Program Budget	In 2000 budget for CA was 0.92% of GDP, compared to 0.1% for LIB. This level of financing is about half that in 1998.
Transfer Levels	(2) With CA average monthly benefit levels ranged from UZ\$2919 for the lowest quintile to UZ\$2152 for the highest. The average annual level was about 30% of the minimum wage or UZ\$3000, on average around 14% of per capita consumption. Eligibility lasted six months (renewable). With LIB average monthly benefit ranged from UZ\$2004 for poorest quintile to UZ\$1833 for richest. The average transfer level was about UZ\$4000 in 2000, around 40% of average wage, comprising about 17% of total household consumption (30% for poorest). Cash transfers are granted for 3 months (renewable). They should be between 1.5 and 3 times the minimum wage.
Targeting Performance	(2) With CA in 2000, 28.4% of expenditure goes to the bottom 20%, 54% to the bottom 40% and 74.5% to the bottom 60%. With LIB in 2000, 22.6% went to the bottom quintile, 40.5% to the bottom 40% and 62% to the bottom 60%. (1) Poorest quintile gets 30%, poorest 40% get 62%.
Impact on Welfare	Not available

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

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Study Title	Consumer Food Subsidy Programs in the MENA Region
Study Authors	S. Razmara et. al.,
Study Reference	World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region
Study Year	1999
Country	Algeria
Program Being Evaluated	Discussion of food price subsidy reforms
Year Implemented	1970s
Program Description	Subsidies were reformed from 1992 to 1996, so that by the end most subsidies were phased out altogether. Two direct cash transfer programs were implemented as part of the reforms.
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Universal food subsidies on semolina, pasta, couscous, flour, bread, pasteurized and powdered milk.
Study Objective	Provide an overview of food subsidy programs in MENA and assesses on-going reform programs.
Targeting Method	Gradual price liberalization, indicator targeting and self-targeting.
Targeting Mechanism	The subsidy program was transferred in 1982 to a specially created Compensation Fund, an extra-budgetary account. Subsidies for most products were injected at upstream stages of the marketing chain, usually on raw materials; this proved administratively simpler than direct retail subsidies. The Fund covered the difference between unit cost prices and fixed wholesale prices. In addition to the Compensation Fund, operated under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy's Direction Generale des Prix et de la Concurrence, the subsidy involved several major agencies.
Program Budget	Food subsidy expenditure in 1995 was 2.9% of government's budget and 0.9% of GDP.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	In 1995, 12.1% of the value of the subsidy accrued to the poorest quintile; 28% to the poorest two quintiles and 29.2% to the richest quintile.
Impact on Welfare	Expenditure on subsidized goods as a share of total expenditure was 20.8% for the poorest quintile versus 8.1% for the richest quintile. Note though the relative incidence for the fourth richest quintile amounted to 22.7%.
Targeting Costs	Not available

302	
Study Title	(1) Identifying the Needy: Proxy Means Tests For Food Subsidies in Egypt; (2) Consumer Food Subsidy Programs in the MENA Region
Study Authors	(1) Akhter Ahmed and Howarth Bouis; (2) S. Razmara et. al.,
Study Reference	(1) Project Report, IFPRI, 1999; (2) World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region, 1999
Program Being Evaluated	Food subsidy system in Egypt
Program Description	(1) Subsidies for baladi bread (57%) and wheat flour (43%) universally available. Subsidized sugar (43%-62%) and cooking oil (43%-54%) restricted to monthly per capita quota to those holding ration cards.
Program Coverage	(1) Over 80% of population hold rations cards: over 36 million beneficiaries have green cards (70%) and nearly 7 million have red cards (11%). (2) By 1992, there were 10.9 million ration cards, covering 48 million individuals or almost 86% of the population
Type of Benefit	Food subsidies
Study Objective	To identify options for a targeted food subsidy system that protects food security of the poor in a cost-effective manner. Evaluates a proposed proxy means test based on subset of verifiable household characteristics (i.e. household size, education, electricity/telephone bills, access to private toilet, and ownership of consumer durables and assets). (2) Provide an overview of food subsidy programs in MENA and assesses on-going reform programs.
Targeting Method	Bread and flour subsidies universally available (self selection). Two categories of ration cards: green and red cards, former with a higher subsidy meant for low-income families, latter with a low subsidy meant for high-income families. Eligibility for ration cards determined through self-reported income. Proposed proxy means tests based on household characteristics and scores taken from regression analysis.
Targeting Mechanism	(1) Ministry of Trade and Supply administers a form to all ration-card holders every three years in order to update targeting efficiency, removing names of the deceased and out-migrants from the system and converting green cards to red cards for wealthy households. Operational arms at governorate level.
Program Budget	(1) Subsidies cost LE 3.74 billion (\$US=3.41 LE in October 1999) in 1996/7, accounting for 5.5% of government expenditures (down from 14% in 1980/1). Four commodities accounted for bread (62%), flour (15%), sugar (13%) and oil (10%) in 1996/7. Ration cards subsidies accounted for LE 874 in 1997. (2) Food subsidy expenditure in 1995 was 4.6% of government's budget and 1.3% of GDP. By 1996/97, it has risen to 6.4% of government's budget and 1.7% of GDP.
Transfer Levels	Average benefit from subsidized wheat flour was only LE 0.45 per capita per month and ranged from LE 2.78-LE5.46 for bread. Around LE 0.65 per capita per month for sugar and LE 0.35 for oil. Total then around LE 5.45 per capita per month.
Targeting Performance	(1) Nearly 60% of food subsidies goes to non-poor (i.e. those in top 60% of income distribution). This rises to over 60% when operational leakages are included. The percentage of subsidies going to the bottom 40% is 39% (bread), 40% (flour), 38% (sugar), 38% (oil). Proposed proxy means targeting method had undercoverage rates of 28% and leakage (defined a included non-poor as percentage of non-poor) of 16%. Eliminating undercoverage raises leakage to 34% and would include around 58% of population (when only 36.5% are considered poor). (2) For bread and wheat flour, absolute incidence self-targets the poor; relative incidence favors the poor. For sugar and cooking oil, absolute incidence favors the rich, while relative incidence favors the poor. In 1997, the absolute incidence of transfers was 19.5% and 20.7% for the rural and urban poorest quintile residents respectively, while it was 21% and 16.8% for the richest quintiles. Relative incidence was 8.7% for the poorest rural quintiles and 6.4% for the poorest urban quintiles, while it was 2.6% and 1.1% for the richest rural and urban quintiles respectively.
Impact on Welfare	Value of subsidized goods to low income households was 6% of per capita food expenditure in urban areas and 8% in rural areas.
Targeting Costs	(1) Cost of transferring LE 1 to poor (all) households, including the transfer, are: bread, 2.81(1.16);, flour, 3.56 (1.52); sugar, 3.49 (1.37); and oil, 5.39 (2.07). Cost-effectiveness of total system is LE 2.79 per LE 1 transferred to poor.
<i>Notes:</i> Information is also taken from Ahmed, A., H. Bouis and S. Ali (1999) : "Performance of the Egyptian Food Subsidy System: Distribution, Use, Leakage, Targeting and Cost Effectiveness" and A. Ahmad et al (2001): "The Egyptian Food Subsidy System", IFPRI Research Report 119.	

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Study Title	Safety net programs and poverty reduction
Study Authors	K. Subbarao et. al
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book)
Study Year	1997
Country	Egypt
Program Being Evaluated	Social funds
Year Implemented	Early 1990s
Program Description	Not available
Program Coverage	Nationally available.
Type of Benefit	Not available
Study Objective	Program reported as part of broader review of safety net and poverty reduction programs
Targeting Method	Not available
Targeting Mechanism	Not available; partially described as a “demand driven, private delivery” mechanism.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Geographical targeting appears poor when program disbursements (based on the budget and the distribution of poverty) are compared to actual expenditures. It is reported that in five selected governorates, beneficiaries tended to be poorer than the population at large.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

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Study Title	Consumer Food Subsidy Programs in the MENA Region
Study Authors	S. Razmara et al.,
Study Reference	World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region
Study Year	1999
Country	Jordan
Program Being Evaluated	Consumer Food Subsidies (CFS)
Year Implemented	1990-1995
Program Description	Universal subsidy for wheat and barley. Subsidized sugar, rice and powdered milk are available, via coupons, to poor households who satisfy an income means test.
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Food subsidy
Study Objective	Provide an overview of food subsidy programs in MENA and assesses on-going reform programs.
Targeting Method	Self-targeting (subsidy to foods with low income elasticity) and incomes based means-testing for other commodities
Targeting Mechanism	Price controls and coupons
Program Budget	Food subsidy expenditure in 1995 was 3.8% of government's budget and 1.4% of GDP.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Distributive effects were perceived to be poor in that the share of benefits accruing to the richest quintile was believed to be higher than those accruing to the poorest quintile. Precise figures are not cited.
Impact on Welfare	Subsidies represented about 14% of expenditures for the lowest quintile versus 8% for the top.
Targeting Costs	Not available
Notes:	1995, it was proposed that these be replaced by a system of means tested cash transfers.

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Study Title	Consumer Food Subsidy Programs in the MENA Region
Study Authors	S. Razmara et al.,
Study Reference	World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region
Study Year	1999
Country	Morocco
Program Being Evaluated	Consumer Food Subsidies (CFS)
Year Implemented	Available in the 1990s and possibly earlier
Program Description	Ration scheme that provides subsidies for sugar, cooking oil, and low-grade flour.
Program Coverage	Universal, in principle.
Type of Benefit	Food subsidy
Study Objective	Provide an overview of food subsidy programs in MENA and assesses on-going reform programs.
Targeting Method	Self targeting
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Food subsidy expenditure in 1995 was 5.5% of government's budget and 1.7 % of GDP. The flour subsidy is subject to aggregate annual quota of 10 million quintals.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	In 1995, the richest quintile obtained 25% of the subsidy; the poorest quintile 15.3% and the poorest two quintiles, 34%. Incidence varied by commodity, with the poorest two quintiles obtaining 47% of the subsidy on flour, 34% of the sugar subsidy and 24% of the cooking oil subsidy.
Impact on Welfare	The top quintile consumes twice the value of subsidized foods as do those in the lowest quintile. An individual in the poorest quintile of the population derives about 13% of total caloric intake from subsidized goods.
Targeting Costs	Not available

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Study Title	(1) The potential and limitations of self-targeted food subsidies; (2) Consumer Food Subsidy Programs in the MENA Region
Study Authors	(1) H. Alderman and K. Lindert; (2) S. Razmara et al.,
Study Reference	(1) World Bank Research Observer, vol. 13(2); (2) World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region
Study Year	(1) 1998; (2) 1999
Country	Tunisia
Program Being Evaluated	Food subsidies to cereals, cooking oil, sugar and milk
Year Implemented	Evolving throughout the 1990s
Program Description	(1) The program involves self-targeting of food subsidies through quality differentiation. For example, subsidies are higher for semolina and lower for pasta and couscous. Milk subsidies are higher for reconstituted milk in less convenient ½ litre cartons and lowered for fresh milk and long-life milk stored in tetrabriks.
Program Coverage	Universal, in principle
Type of Benefit	Food subsidy
Study Objective	(1) To assess the impact of moving from a generalized to a self-targeted food subsidy program. (2) Provide an overview of food subsidy programs in MENA and assesses on-going reform programs.
Targeting Method	Although subsidized foods are universally available, higher subsidies are applied to foodstuffs with low income elasticities.
Targeting Mechanism	National government funds system; foods are available through private retailers.
Program Budget	(1) On self-targeted products, transfers are equivalent to 1% of GDP. (2) In 1990, the cost of food subsidies was 2.4% of GDP and 6.2% of total government expenditure. Food subsidy expenditure in 1995 was 4.5% of government's budget and 1.7% of GDP.
Transfer Levels	Value of subsidies on self-targeted foods is equivalent to an income transfer of 6% of income of the poor.
Targeting Performance	(1) 25% of the transfer goes to the poorest quintile; 14 % to the richest quintile; (2) In 1990, 17% of the transfer went to the poorest quintile versus 20% for the richest quintile. In 1993, the ratio of benefits accruing to the bottom compared to the top quintile rose from 5.4 to 7.2.
Impact on Welfare	(2) In 1990, subsidized goods represented a 5 times greater share of total per capita expenditure for the lowest relative to the highest quintile. Whereas subsidies continued to be important to the poor, representing 54% of total caloric intake, their significance to other income groups declined. For the top quintile, this share is 33% of total calorie consumption.
Targeting Costs	Not available.

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Study Title	Consumer Food Subsidy Programs in the MENA Region
Study Authors	S. Razmara et. al.,
Study Reference	World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region
Study Year	1999
Country	Yemen
Program Being Evaluated	Consumer Food Subsidies (CFS)
Year Implemented	Available in the 1990s (not clear if available earlier)
Program Description	Subsidized wheat and wheat flour via a system of preferential exchange rates for imports.
Program Coverage	Universal, in principle.
Type of Benefit	Food subsidy
Study Objective	Review of consumer food subsidy programs in Middle East and North Africa region and assessment of on-going reforms.
Targeting Method	Self targeting (subsidy to food with low income elasticity)
Targeting Mechanism	The Ministry of Supply and Trade authorizes and supervises wheat and flour imports, and set the level of permitted imports. The Ministry issues tenders to one of five private importers who sell the wheat to distributors. Each distributor delivers wheat and wheat flour to designated governorates. The Ministry sets the price and the percentage of wheat and wheat flour to be delivered to each governorate. Governorates sell the wheat to the public at the government-set price. Local agents are authorized to sell onto to families in the district. Unless there is a shortage, the subsidized goods are available in unlimited quantities.
Program Budget	Food subsidy expenditure in 1995 was 16.3% of government's budget and 4.9% of GDP. Implicit costs of Yemen's subsidy are 36% of budget and 10.6% of GDP.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	7% of the transfer goes to the poorest quintile; 18 % to the poorest two quintiles. The richest quintile obtains 45% of the subsidy.
Impact on Welfare	The top decile spends ten times more than the lowest on subsidized wheat and flour.
Targeting Costs	Not available

308	
Study Title	Poverty and Transfers in Yemen
Study Authors	D van de Walle
Study Reference	Middle East and North Africa Work Paper Series, No. 30,
Study Year	2002
Country	Yemen
Program Being Evaluated	Social Welfare Fund
Year Implemented	1996
Program Description	A cash assistance program
Program Coverage	450,000 households
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	Review of transfers and poverty in Yemen, for policy advice
Targeting Method	Geographic, categorical, means tested
Targeting Mechanism	The first stage is geographic targeting. Each governorate gets share of budget based on incidence of poverty, population, and cases of pre-SWF assistance. Governorates distribute cases to the districts on the basis of lists of the eligible. These allocations are likely to be influenced by political considerations. The program targets those in specific groups: 1) orphans; 2) widows with children; 3) widows without children; 4) divorced women with children; 5) divorced women without children; 6) single women; 7) the fully disabled; 8) the partially disabled; 9) the poor; 10) the elderly; 11) the temporarily fully disabled; 12) the temporarily partially disabled; 13) families with a missing head of household; 14) families with an imprisoned head of household; and 15) families with a head of household recently discharged from prison. In addition, recipients must also be deemed to be without income or income earning potential. Beneficiaries in groups 1-10 are identified as permanent, while those in 11 to 15 can receive assistance for not more than three years, with annual reviews. The application process involves lengthy documentation; outreach is done in principal, but the budget for it is too low. Checks are done at local and governorate levels and confirmation of case in Sana'a, the average time between governorate's approval and beneficiary's first payment 6 to 12 months.
Program Budget	In 2001, YR 8 billion
Transfer Levels	YR1000 per beneficiary, plus 200 for each additional dependent up to a maximum of YR2000 per household per month, made on a three monthly basis. For a family of 6 this is YR 24,000 or about 10% of the 1998 national poverty line.
Targeting Performance	Participation rates from poorest decile to richest are: 5.1,2.6, 2.1,2.2,1.6,1.7,1.4,1.3,1.2,1.1 percent, respectively. Average benefits per capita varied widely and not always systematically. Own calculations based on the van de Walle study suggest that about 68% of benefits go to the poorest decile.
Impact on Welfare	Negligible impact on poverty due to low coverage (only 5% of poorest decile receive it) and payment level (average amount received in the bottom decile equals only 1.2% of the poverty line).
Targeting Costs	Estimates of administrative costs range from 4 to 13%, with van de Walle recommending the higher figure.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

401	
Study Title	(1) Food aid targeting in Ethiopia: A study of who needs it and who gets it; (2) Giving to the Poor? Targeting of food aid in rural Ethiopia.
Study Authors	(1) Clay, D., D. Molla and D. Habtewold; (2) Jayne, T., J. Strauss, T. Yamano and D. Molla
Study Reference	(1) Food Policy, vol. 24, pp. 391-409. (2) World Development, vol. 29 (5), pp. 887-910.
Study Year	(1) 1999, (2) 2001
Country	Ethiopia
Program Being Evaluated	(Non-emergency) food aid and food-for-work
Year Implemented	1980s and 1990s
Program Description	Programs provide food to those in need either as a direct transfer or via a work requirement.
Program Coverage	(1) 20% of farm households received either food-aid or participated in food-for-work. (2) 13% food aid only, and 10% food-for-work only.
Type of Benefit	Food transfer. Cereals (wheat, maize, sorghum), oils, fats, pulses. Cereals accounted for 80% of benefits between 1992-5.
Study Objective	(1) Evaluate targeting performance based on food security; (2) Evaluate targeting performance based on income levels
Targeting Method	Food aid used categorical targeting based on geography, age and gender, especially those that cannot work. Food-for-Work used categorical (geographic) targeting as well as self-selection.
Targeting Mechanism	For food aid, central government oversaw distribution of food to regional “weredas” based on “need” which was then distributed to local peasant associations (PAs) who selected beneficiaries. Food-for-Work:
Program Budget	As much as 15 million tons of food per annum in 1990s.
Transfer Levels	Varied. Food-for-work provided approximately 3kg of wheat per day which was typically higher than the local market wage.
Targeting Performance	(1) Food aid had high leakage (78%) and undercoverage (51%) rates because age and female-headed households proved to be poor indicators of food insecurity. Also, a geographically targeted region, Tigray, was no longer chronically food insecure. (2) A high percentage of poor weredas did not receive food aid. Poor targeting may reflect high cost of setting up programs in face of shifting spatial distribution of insecurity over time.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available
Notes:	Study (2) draws on Jayne, T., J. Strauss, T. Yamano and D. Molla (2000): “Targeting of Food Aid in Rural Ethiopia: Chronic Need or Inertia?” mimeo, Michigan State University.

402	
Study Title	The GAPVU Cash Transfer Program in Mozambique: An Assessment
Study Authors	G. Datt, E. Payongayong, J. Garrett, and M. Ruel
Study Reference	FCND Discussion Paper No. 36, IFPRI, 1997
Country	Mozambique
Program Being Evaluated	Cash transfer program in Mozambique, introduced in September 1990.
Program Description	Improve nutritional status of poorest households in urban areas. Beneficiaries must provide proof of income and disability status; reviewed every year (six months for pregnant women). Cash transfer increases less than proportionately with household size.
Program Coverage	Around 70,000 beneficiary urban households in 1995 (16% of urban households), in 13 principal urban areas.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Evaluate how well program is working.
Targeting Method	Categorical targeting (households with children less than 5 years old with nutritional problems; with pregnant women with nutritional problems; with unemployed elderly persons over 60 years old living alone or in households without working age children; physically disabled persons over 18 years who suffer from some incapacity to work, who are employed, and who live alone or are heads of household without working age persons; with chronically ill head; or female-headed households with five or more children with no working age persons) followed by household assessment using means test (must prove that household income is less than Mt32,000 per person per month and have lived in respective cities for over 1 year, and have no working age persons absent working in South Africa or Mozambique). Need to apply introduces element of self-selection .
Targeting Mechanism	Under jurisdiction of Ministry of Social Action with strong links to Ministry of Finance. Administration decentralized to provinces through provincial directors of Ministry of Planning and Finance.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Around \$US 1.14 (or Mt. 10,353) per month equivalent to 13% of beneficiaries' per capita consumption expenditures.
Targeting Performance	Around 66% of beneficiaries are absolutely poor, incidence was progressive among these poor. But, as survey data were available only for beneficiaries, only a limited analysis of targeting could be carried out. 31% of transfers go to the poor. If used means test threshold as poverty line then leakage would have been substantially higher but the test seems to have been ignored in practice. Also, households appear to have received much less than should have (around 33% less).
Impact on Welfare	Decreases poverty headcount from 71% to 66%. Poverty would be 27% higher without program and severity of poverty 44% higher.
Targeting Costs	Not available

403	
Study Title	Namibia's social safety net: Issues and options for reform
Study Authors	K. Subbarao
Study Reference	Policy Research Working Paper #1996, World Bank
Study Year	1998
Country	Namibia
Program Being Evaluated	Pensions
Year Implemented	Program extended to Black majority population in 1990; evaluation examines performance around 1993-94
Program Description	Old age pension
Program Coverage	In 1994, approximately 90000 individuals were eligible, with about 44000 receiving a pension. The number of eligible individuals is rising by approximately 800 persons per year.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Evaluate how well program is working
Targeting Method	Categorical – individuals must be 60 or older to qualify
Targeting Mechanism	Funding provided by central government; general program administration undertaken by Department of Social Welfare with social workers responsible for ensuring eligible elderly individuals are enrolled; in selected provinces, cash distribution undertaken by a private firm
Program Budget	In 1996-97, about 3.7% of total government expenditure.
Transfer Levels	N\$160 per month
Targeting Performance	Approximately 88% of eligible individuals received the pension in 1998, up from 48% in 1993-94. Coverage is lower in remote, northern provinces and the likelihood of receiving the pension falls when social worker posts are unfilled. About half those individuals eligible for pensions are regarded as non-poor.
Impact on Welfare	Pensions account for 14% of rural incomes; 7% of urban incomes. Gini coefficient exclusive of pensions is 0.70; inclusive of pensions it is 0.69
Targeting Costs	Prior to 1995, administrative costs were 7% of value of pension (it costs N\$11 to transfer N\$160). After privatizing of deliver, costs rose to 14% as there was no corresponding contraction of public sector staff employed to administer the pension
Notes:	There is some evidence to suggest that the private firm contracted to deliver pension payments is economizing on the number of delivery points, making it difficult (and costly) for individuals to obtain their pensions.

404	
Study Title	The potential and limitations of self-targeted food subsidies
Study Authors	H. Alderman and K. Lindert
Study Reference	World Bank Research Observer, vol. 13(2)
Study Year	1998
Country	South Africa
Program Being Evaluated	VAT exemptions on selected foods in South Africa
Year Implemented	1993
Program Description	The program involves exempting value added tax (VAT) from selected food items: maize, fresh milk, beans, vegetable oil and brown bread.
Program Coverage	Universal, in principle
Type of Benefit	Implicit food subsidy
Study Objective	To assess the impact of the introduction of VAT exemptions on selected food items
Targeting Method	VAT exempt foods are universally available; however the exemption applies to foods with a wide range of income elasticities.
Targeting Mechanism	National government funds system; foods are available through private retailers.
Program Budget	1570 million rand (1993); calculated as the fiscal revenue loss associated with granting the exemption
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Percentage transfers (as measured by revenue loss) to the poor vary by commodity. They are: 65.4% for maize; 15.3% for fresh milk; 42.4% for beans; 35.9% for vegetable oil. Approximately 53% of the population is classified as poor.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

405	
Study Title	Large cash transfers to the elderly in South Africa
Study Authors	A. Case and A. Deaton
Study Reference	Economic Journal, vol. 108
Study Year	1998
Country	South Africa
Program Being Evaluated	Pensions
Year Implemented	Program extended to Black majority population in early 1990s; evaluation examines performance around 1993
Program Description	Old age pension
Program Coverage	Poor women over the age of 60; poor men over the age of 65
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Examine the distributive consequences of the old age pension in South Africa
Targeting Method	Categorical – individuals must be 60 or older to qualify; and means tested based on self-reported income and an income value assigned to assets
Targeting Mechanism	Funding provided by central government; administration and payments under taken by regional authorities
Program Budget	7 billion rand annually (approx \$2 billion US)
Transfer Levels	Maximum benefit in 1993 is 370 rand per month (in 1998, this was increased to 470 rand per month). Pension is reduced one for one as mean income exceeds 90 rand, until 370 rand per month at which point no pension is paid.
Targeting Performance	Multivariate regressions indicate that the likelihood of receiving pensions fall with household income. In practice, pensions are received by African households but rarely Whites. Conditional on meeting criteria for means testing, take-up is nearly universal.
Impact on Welfare	Pension reduces headcount poverty by about 5%
Targeting Costs	Not available
Notes:	Reports that that every R1 received as public pension crowds out R0.33 in private transfers.

406	
Study Title	Targeting Poverty Programmes: Community-Based Public Works in South Africa
Study Authors	M. Adato and L. Haddad
Study Reference	Mimeo, International Food Policy Research Institute, November 1999
Study Year	1999
Country	South Africa
Program Being Evaluated	101 Public Works Programs (in 7 programs) in Western Cape Province
Year Implemented	1995-97
Program Description	Public works with varying degrees of community involvement.
Program Coverage	Over 1995-96, the 101 projects generated approximately 1.4 million person days of employment, meeting 1.25% of the one year employment needs.
Type of Benefit	Provide short to medium term employment on projects that create or repair local infrastructure
Study Objective	Assess the targeting performance of seven public works programmes in Western Cape Province, South Africa.
Targeting Method	No method used to select beneficiary communities. Worker selection was partly categorical, based on “need” or employment status and partly self-selection.
Targeting Mechanism	Worker selection within communities was mainly handled by community members (in 7 out of 8 case studies). The processes were generally need-based as expressed by poverty or employment status, although the latter was not necessarily a good correlate of the former. Operation of specific projects was handled by government departments, NGOS and local communities.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	In general, the district share of province-wide public works expenditures was uncorrelated with district poverty, unemployment, or infrastructure shares. Instead, funds went to better endowed local authorities that already have the resources to bid for projects and build infrastructure. Some districts with very high poverty and unemployment have no labor intensive projects, while others with low poverty rates contain multiple projects. 78% of all projects set wages below the market wage, though it is difficult to do so in South Africa. There is evidence of biases against employing women in construction work.
Impact on Welfare	In five districts, these projects make a real dent in unemployment, accounting for over 10% of “unemployment days”. In other districts, there is little or no impact on unemployment.
Targeting Costs	Not available

407	
Study Title	Safety net programs and poverty reduction
Study Authors	K. Subbarao et. al
Study Reference	World Bank, Washington D.C. (book)
Study Year	1997
Country	Zambia
Program Being Evaluated	Housing subsidy
Year Implemented	Early 1980s
Program Description	Not available
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Not available
Study Objective	Program reported as part of broader review of safety net and poverty reduction programs
Targeting Method	Means test
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	28% of benefits to poorest quintile; 26% to next poorest quintile; 16% to middle quintile; 30% to top 40%
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

408	
Study Title	(1) Safety net programs and poverty reduction; (2) Poverty Targeting Performance
Study Authors	(1) K. Subbarao et. al; (2) J. Van Domelen, L. Rawlings, and L. Sherburne-Benz
Study Reference	(1) World Bank, Washington D.C. (book) ; (2) Chapter 5 in “Evaluating Social Fund Performance: International Evidence from Community-Based Poverty Reduction Programs” World Bank, forthcoming
Study Year	(1) 1997; (2) 2001
Country	Zambia
Program Being Evaluated	Social funds
Year Implemented	Early 1990s-
Program Description	(1) Social recovery project relies on community groups for the provision and production of services. (2) The Zambia Social Recovery Programme supports community initiatives to mitigate the negative effects on the poor from the economic crisis. Initially, the objective was to strengthen communities' ability to improve their situation through self-help focus as well as providing temporary employment. By the mid-1990s, the SDRP had more explicit medium-term institutional objectives in addition to its poverty alleviation focus, namely to improve the capacity of communities and government staff to plan, appraise, manage and maintain social investment projects. More recently, this strategy has been further refined to achieve improved, expanded, and sustainable use of services provided in a governance system where local governments and communities are mutually accountable
Program Coverage	Nationally available
Type of Benefit	Not available
Study Objective	(1) Part of broader review of safety net and poverty reduction programs; (2) Review the performance and targeting of social funds.
Targeting Method	(1) Not available. (2) Geographic – by district/municipality poverty designation. Other targeting done through self-selection via a menu of interventions that includes goods and services more likely to be used by the poor. (2) Proactive outreach to remote areas or to NGOs serving vulnerable groups; community participation to prioritize needs and incorporate the poor in decision making; opening of regional offices to allow for easier access by poor communities.
Targeting Mechanism	(1) Not available; partially described as a “demand driven, private delivery” mechanism. (2) Proactive outreach to remote areas or to NGOs serving vulnerable groups; community participation to prioritize needs and incorporate the poor in decision making; opening of regional offices to allow for easier access by poor communities.
Program Budget	(1) Not available; (2) 3 projects beginning in 1991 totaling US\$168.3 million (with sources from the World Bank, other donors and domestic funds) Source: World Bank Social Funds Data Base
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	(1) Poorly targeted across provinces; the higher the headcount index, the lower the level of per capita expenditures. (2) At the regional (district) level, the poorest decile of districts receiving 9.8% of resources between 1991 – 1998 and the richest decile receiving 8.6%. At the household levels, 15% of expenditures went to the poorest decile, 25% to the poorest quintile and 43% to the poorest two quintiles. Social fund beneficiaries had household expenditures 8% lower than non-social fund households in rural areas, though this tendency was reversed in urban areas. Many beneficiaries were not poor; the wealthiest quintile accounted for about 20% of beneficiaries and leakage of benefits is estimated at 29%. Targeting performance varied by the type of investment; health projects were better at reaching the urban poor, while education projects were better at reaching the poor in rural areas. Latrines and health facilities target the poor best, education and water investments are pro-poor; sewerage projects were most poorly targeted.
Impact on Welfare	(1) Not available. (2) Though social funds have not been able to address all investment needs of poor communities, they had significant impact on overall investment in selected sectors, especially in improving public education and health facilities. They have also played a significant role in water provision.
Targeting Costs	Not available

409	
Study Title	A social safety nets for the chronically poor? Zimbabwe's public assistance in the 1990s
Study Authors	L. Munro
Study Reference	Mimeo, Department of Policy, Planning and Development, Fordham University, New York.
Study Year	2003
Country	Zimbabwe
Program Being Evaluated	Public Assistance
Year Implemented	1988 onwards
Program Description	Public assistance is designed for destitutes who are unable to work, aged over 65 or disabled or chronically ill and having no known family who can look after them
Program Coverage	69000 in 1994, dropping to 20500 by 1998.
Type of Benefit	Cash, fee waiver for medical treatment and waivers for school and examination fees if they have dependent children of school going age
Study Objective	(1) Assess the design and implementation of Zimbabwe's public assistance program.
Targeting Method	Targeting is passive in that individuals must apply at a DSW office. There are few offices, and because individuals must make several trips to fill out forms, many potential beneficiaries never bother to apply or are discouraged from completing the application process. Social workers are supposed to complete a home visit before recommending the individual receives assistance.
Targeting Mechanism	Funds are provided by central government. Targeting and implementation are undertaken by the Department of Social Welfare (DSW)
Program Budget	In 1998, Z\$3.5 million (in 1990 Zim dollars). This is about 0.1% of national income.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	No figures available, though author suggests that given the tightness of the targeting method, errors of inclusion are likely to be very low while errors of exclusion are likely to be high.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

SOUTH ASIA

501	
Study Title	(1) Food For Education Program In Bangladesh: An Early Assessment; (2) Targeted Distribution; (3) Distributional Outcomes of a Decentralized Welfare Program; (4) Does Child Labor Displace Schooling? Evidence on Behavioral Responses to an Enrollment Subsidy; (5) Case Study from Bangladesh: Socio-Economic Impact of Food for Education Program (FFEP); (6) Filling the Gaps: Consolidating Evidence on the Design of Alternative Targeted Food Programs in Bangladesh; (7) Bangladesh Public Expenditure Review
Study Authors	(1) A. Ahmed and Kaafee Billah; (2) A. Ahmed; (3) E. Galasso and M. Ravallion; (4) M. Ravallion and Q. Wodon; (5) M. Alam; (6) P. Dorosh and S. Haggblade; (7) World Bank./S. Zaidi and R. Murgai.
Study Reference	(1) Manuscript No. 62, IFPRI, Dhaka; (2) Chapter 11 from “Out of the Shadow of Famine: Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh” edited by R. Ahmed, S. Haggblade, and T. Chowdhury; (3) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2316; (4) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2116; (5) Draft Report, BIDS; (6) The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. XXIII, Sept.-Dec. 1995, Nos.3&4, pages 47-80. (7) World Bank Report 24370-BD.
Study Year	(1) 1994, (2) 2000, (3) 2000, (4) 1999, (5) 1993, (6) 1995, (7) 2002
Country	Bangladesh
Program Being Evaluated	Food for education program in Bangladesh
Year Implemented	1993
Program Description	Poor households with at least one child aged 6-10 years that enroll all children in this age group receive 15 kilograms per child per month, but with a maximum of 30 kilograms, free of charge conditional on children achieving 85% attendance per month. The program’s objectives were to increase enrollment rates, increase attendance rate, and reduce dropout rate in primary school. Funded by Government, USAID and other donors.
Program Coverage	In one union (local government unit) in each of 460 rural <i>thanas</i> , including all government and registered non-government primary schools in the union. In 1993 the program distributed 9,500 metric tons of wheat per month. In 1994 4,787 schools were covered, with 698,000 beneficiary students out of a total student population of 1.48 million in participating areas (i.e. 47% coverage). In 1995-96, over 2 million children participated (13% of total primary enrolment nationally).
Type of Benefit	Wheat (in-kind); sometimes rice given.
Study Objective	(1) Evaluate impact on enrollment, attendance and drop-out rates; (2) Examines recent evaluations of alternative program designs, to distill lessons that will improve targeting; (3) To understand why community-level targeting of FFE worked better than central government’s in Bangladesh; (4) To identify how much child labor substitutes for schooling in program; (5) Evaluation of the education impact of the program; (6) Generalize from Bangladesh’s broad targeted food programs experiences, using a seasonal multi-market model to analyze the consequences of various program designs. (7) Assess effectiveness and equity of public expenditures
Targeting Method	Geographic targeting of poor (economically backward with low literacy rates) unions in poor <i>thanas</i> . Categorical targeting: (i) Landless households and those with less than 0.5 acres, (ii) Principle occupation of head is day laborer, (iii) Female headed household (widowed, separated from husband, divorced, disabled husband), and (iv) Low-income professions (e.g. fishermen, potters, blacksmiths, weavers, and cobblers). Must not be covered under any existing targeted intervention, e.g. Vulnerable Group Development Program or Rural Maintenance Program. Covered students are not to exceed 40% of the total enrollment.

Targeting Mechanism	First, economically backward areas are chosen by the center (administered by Primary and Mass Education Division, and executed by Directorate of Primary Education). Both the School Management Committee and the Compulsory Primary Education Ward Committee (composed of teachers, local representatives, parents, education specialists and donors to the school) choose beneficiaries (a list is drawn up), based on exploiting idiosyncratic local information. The Thana Officers and Education Officers (including teachers) implement the program in the field with the assistance of School Managing Committee. The Deputy Commissioners and the District Primary Education Officers supervise. Food grain distributed by commercial food grain dealers.
Program Budget	Program absorbs about 1/3 of the state educational development budget. Distribution cost (to school premises) is allotted at Tk.185/- per metric ton on average. At its peak, annual subsidy of \$29 million, with food grain distribution of 114,000 MT
Transfer Levels	(1) Nearly taka 90 per month, equivalent to nearly 4% of total household expenditure for poor households (based on average transfer of 20kg per month, a 1994 exchange rate of \$US=taka 37, average monthly expenditures for poor households of taka 390, and a market price of wheat of \$120 per ton).
Targeting Performance	(1) Does not calculate leakage or undercoverage rates or incidence indicators. Defines leakage as benefits lost to pilferage: the program has the lowest leakage of all targeted food intervention programs in Bangladesh. (2) Very low leakage estimated at 7%. Although the program has generally reached low-income households, it has so far failed to entice children of the ultra-poor to attend schools. (3) Amongst all villages, 16% of the poor receive the program, as compared to 4% of the non-poor; in participating villages, the corresponding proportions are 55% and 18%. A higher proportion of the poor receive help than do the non-poor. The center's targeting of the villages contributed less to overall targeting performance than intra-village targeting; the center's broad geographic coverage of the program constrained the scope for pro-poor village targeting. Targeting performance varied greatly between villages. While there is pro-poor targeting within villages, the program's official eligibility criteria at village level turn out to be rather weak indicators of inter-village differences in performances. There is a tendency for poorer villages to be less effective at reaching their poor, possibly indicating the relative power of the poor in local decisions. The study infers that higher inequality comes with lower power for the poor in village decision making, so the non-poor are able to capture the benefits of the program. There is also evidence, that local village institutions matter – the presence of coops for farmers and the landless appear to be associated with more pro-poor targeting, while the presence of recreational clubs has the opposite effect. The program appears to have chosen more developed villages (more irrigation and non-farm activities). In a later paper the authors show that 60% of program benefits accrue to the poorest 50% of households, and that geographic targeting accounts for over 90% of the total gains from targeting. (4) The transfer, with a value considerably less than the mean child wage, was enough to ensure nearly full school attendance among participants, and also reduced the incidence of child labor. None of the programs, including this one, has targeted what remains the most acute lean season for the poor – September and October. (7) Participation rates, from poorest to richest quintile are 5.3, 4.0, 1.3, 2.0 and 1.1 percent, with a national average of 2.8 percent.

<i>Impact on Welfare</i>	(1) No information. (2) Though the program has failed to reach the ultra-poor, it has been highly successful in increasing primary school enrollment, promoting attendance, and reducing dropout rates. On the other hand, due to increased enrollment rates and teachers' involvement with food distribution, there have been concerns about the drop in the quality of education. Per capita income transfer from the program relative to expenditure is not significant, amounting to only 5.8%. There was no noticeable improvement in nutritional status of pre-school children; the benefits were not sufficient to eradicate malnutrition of the vulnerable groups within households (need to incorporate non-food component into the programs). Find that 60% of benefits go to the poorest 50% of households. (3) Allocations to the poor increase significantly with an increase in the amount transferred from the center. On the other hand, the allocation to the non-poor does not increase significantly with a higher allocation to the village, implying that the program shifts the balance of power within the village in favor of the poor. More developed villages are more effective in reaching the poor. (4) The average wage for boys is 464 Tk/month and 291 for girls. The stipend's effect on child labor implies an average foregone income from participation of 16.7 Tk/month for boys and 6.4 Tk for girls. For a family with one school-age boy and one school-age girl, the foregone income is then 19% of the estimated monetary value of the stipend of 119 Tk/month. Thus there is a large net transfer benefit to poor households from the program. However, the results do lead the authors to question the seemingly common view that child labor is a major factor perpetuating poverty in this setting by keeping children from poor families out of school. (6) Beneficiaries received a transfer of 180 taka per household per month, with a net gain in income of 7%. Household sold 35% of grain. (Note discrepancy with other measures of benefit levels above).
<i>Targeting Costs</i>	(1) Lowest cost of all food-based targeted programs. It costs taka 1.59 to deliver taka 1 of benefit (i.e. the program costs constitute 59% of total benefits). This compares favorably to the lowest cost targeted program in Bangladesh, i.e. Rural Maintenance Program that gives cash for work, which costs 1.32 per taka transferred. Equivalent numbers for other programs were: Rural Rationing (6.55, or around 3.8 if pilferage ignored), Food For Work (2.56, around 1.94 if pilferage ignored), and Vulnerable Group Development (1.62, very low pilferage). (6) Commodity handling cost was \$54 per ton. (7) Based on comparisons of transfers identified in the 2000 HIES and what administrative records say should be found, the authors calculate that 10-25% of the grain is "not accounted for" or "leakage".
<i>Notes:</i> Some information based on calculations from study data.	

502	
Study Title	(1) Statutory Rationing: Performance and Prospects; (2) Targeted Distribution
Study Authors	(1) Haggblade, S., S. Rahman and S. Rashid; (2) A. Ahmed
Study Reference	(1) Draft Report, Dhaka: IFPRI, Bangladesh Food Policy Project, mimeo; (2) Chapter 11 from “Out of the Shadow of Famine: Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh” edited by R. Ahmed, S. Haggblade, and T. Chowdhury
Study Year	(1) 1993; (2) 2000
Country	Bangladesh
Program Being Evaluated	Statutory Rationing Program
Year Implemented	Began in major towns of East Bengal in 1956. Discontinued in 1994.
Program Description	All urban residents, regardless of income levels, received a ration card allowing them to purchase a weekly allotment of subsidized basic foods (e.g. wheat and oil).
Program Coverage	All urban residents
Type of Benefit	Subsidized-food ration card
Study Objective	(1) Evaluate operational and targeting performance; (2) Examines recent evaluations of alternative program designs, to distill lessons that will improve targeting.
Targeting Method	Categorical (i.e. geographical); all urban residents, regardless of income level
Targeting Mechanism	Central government operated
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	(1) High undercoverage of extremely poor and lot of leakage to higher income groups. Dealers leaked over 95% of all foodgrains distributed onto open market; (2) By early 1990s, the statutory ration cardholders were middle-to upper-income groups, not recent migrants or the urban poor.
Impact on Welfare	(2) The program did not benefit the needy, and only dealers gained from the system.
Targeting Costs	Not available
Notes:	See also Ahmed, A. (2000): Targeted Distribution, Ch. 11 in Ahmed, R., S. Haggblade and T. Chowdhury, eds., Out of the shadow of famine: Evolving food markets and food policy in Bangladesh, John Hopkins. DC.

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Study Title	(1) Operational Performance of the Rural Rationing Program in Bangladesh; (2) Targeted Distribution; (3) Filling the Gaps: Consolidating Evidence on the Design of Alternative Targeted Food programs in Bangladesh
Study Authors	(1) A. Ahmed; (2) A. Ahmed; (3) P. Dorosh and S. Haggblade
Study Reference	(1) Working Paper No. 5, Food Policy in Bangladesh, IFPRI; (2) Chapter 11 from “Out of the Shadow of Famine: Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh” edited by R. Ahmed, S. Haggblade, and T. Chowdhury; (3) Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. XXIII, Sept.-Dec. 1995, Nos.3&4, pages 47-80
Study Year	(1) 1992; (2) 2000; (3) 1995
Country	Bangladesh
Program Being Evaluated	Rural (or pally) foodgrain rationing program
Year Implemented	1989 – 1992
Program Description	Rural counterpart of urban rationing. Subsidized rice to administratively selected, low-income rural residents at 25% below market price. Funded by central government.
Program Coverage	Rural poor; 6.1 million cardholders in 1991; low-income rural residents
Type of Benefit	Ration card entitlement to subsidized rice (25% subsidy).
Study Objective	(1) Evaluate operation and cost-effectiveness of program. (2) Examines recent evaluations of alternative program designs, to distill lessons that will improve targeting. (3) Generalize from Bangladesh’s broad targeted food programs experience by using a seasonal multi-market model to analyze the consequences of existing and hypothetical program design.
Targeting Method	Categorical targeting: (i) landless or near landless food deficient for more than two months a year, (ii) households not required to pay over 3 taka local tax, (iii) household not covered by Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) program.
Targeting Mechanism	Beneficiaries selected by local officials. Private dealers collect foodgrains from government stores, receive a commission of 16 taka per 100kg collected, and distribute to ration shops. Commission too low for distant dealers with high transport costs and many sold foodgrain near government storage point and purchased smaller amount locally.
Program Budget	At its peak, annual subsidy of \$64 million, with food grain distribution of 448,000 MT
Transfer Levels	(1) Each household receives a maximum of three ration cards for three household members with each having a weekly entitlement of 1.5 kg of foodgrain. On average, households received a monthly subsidy of nearly 44 taka. Ahmed (2000, Table 11.3) indicates that the average per capita monthly transfer to beneficiaries is 7 taka compared to per capita monthly expenditures of 197 taka (i.e. 3.6%); a relatively small transfer. (3) 18.4 Kg per household per month, with a value of 170 taka.
Targeting Performance	(1) 70% leakage mainly due to corruption. Some unknowingly registered as cardholders (around 32%). Leakage to those deemed not to meet eligibility criteria was around 21%. Also 17% leakage due to liquidity constraint and not being able to take-up full entitlement. Costs 6.55 taka to deliver one taka to beneficiaries, which would fall to 1.73 if all leakage eliminated. (3) Has not targeted what remains the most acute lean season for the poor – September and October.
Impact on Welfare	(2) The program had negligible impact on the rural poor; per capita income transfer from the program relative to expenditure amounts to only 3.6%. The program was found to be the least effective at directing income to vulnerable households. (3) Beneficiary received a transfer of 51 taka per household per month, with a net gain in income of 5%.
Targeting Costs	(1) Cost the government taka 6.55 to transfer taka 1 to beneficiaries. Eliminating leakage would reduce this to taka 1.73. This partly reflects the low level of transfer. Ignores costs of storage of grains by government. (3) Admin / supervision cost was \$6 per ton, commodity handling \$54 per ton.
Notes:	See also Ahmed, A. (2000): Targeted Distribution, Ch. 11 in Ahmed, R., S. Haggblade and T. Chowdhury, eds., Out of the shadow of famine: Evolving food markets and food policy in Bangladesh, John Hopkins.

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Study Title	(1) Efficiency of Targeted Food Programs; (2) Filling the Gaps: Consolidating Evidence on the Design of Alternative Targeted Food programs in Bangladesh; (3) Targeted Distribution; (4) Bangladesh Public Expenditure Review
Study Authors	(1) C. del Ninno; (2) P. Dorosh and S. Haggblade; (3) A. Ahmed; (4) World Bank/ S. Zaidi and R.Murgai.
Study Reference	(1) Food Management and Research Support Project, IFPRI; (2) The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. XXIII, Sept.-Dec. 1995, Nos.3&4, pages 47-80; (3) Chapter 11 from “Out of the Shadow of Famine: Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh” edited by R. Ahmed, S. Haggblade, and T. Chowdhury; (4) World Bank Report No. 24370-BD
Study Year	(1) 1998; (2) 1995; (3) 2000; (4) 2002
Country	Bangladesh
Program Being Evaluated	Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)
Year Implemented	1975 onwards
Program Description	(1) Provides in-kind wheat payments to enable destitute rural women to improve their economic and social condition. A complementary package of development services was introduced in 1988. (2) WFP and other bilaterals fund the program. VGD also offers a range of development services to beneficiary households, including health and nutrition education, literacy training, savings, and support in launching income-earning activities such as poultry rearing. As of 1994, 29% of VGD households received the full development package, while the remainder received only the monthly wheat ration and savings component.
Program Coverage	(1) In 1994, 450,000 women received VGD rations. Year-round program; (2) 575 thousand households;
Type of Benefit	Monthly free ration wheat for two years. A complementary package of development services (see above) was introduced in 1988.
Study Objective	(1) To evaluate targeting efficiency; (2) Draw general lessons from range of programs; (3) Examines recent evaluations of alternative program designs, to distill lessons that will improve targeting. (4) assess effectiveness and equity of public expenditures
Targeting Method	Program concentrated in distressed areas (i.e. geographical targeting). Beneficiary selection by local women’s and official committees based on a wide range of categorical indicators (including personal characteristics, assets, family composition).
Targeting Mechanism	Overall responsibility lies with Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, which has administrative units at various levels.
Program Budget	(2) At its peak, annual subsidy of \$54 million, with food grain distribution of 214,000 MT
Transfer Levels	Monthly free wheat ration of 31.25 kg for two years. Average monthly transfer to beneficiaries was 41 taka compared to average monthly expenditures of 199 taka, i.e. 21%.
Targeting Performance	About 30-50% of grain is sold immediately rather than consumed. Around 15% of grain allotted did not reach intended beneficiaries (i.e. cardholders) - about 6% points of this going to depot; (2) Did not target most acute lean season. (4) From poorest to richest quintile participation rates are 8.5, 7.0, 3.9, 2.8, 2.1 percent, with a national average of 4.9 percent.
Impact on Welfare	(2) Though cash-based programs save on commodity handling costs and thereby allow scheme operators to reach 16% more recipient households than equivalent wheat-distribution programs, in-kind transfers of wheat increase wheat consumption dramatically – 70% for VGD households compared to 13.9% for its cash-based equivalent. This high wheat consumption stems from heavy transaction costs faced by (largely Muslim) female-headed households, in accessing local markets to sell their grain. As a result, VGD wheat distribution generates a greater calorie impact on its target group (16%) than an equivalent cash allocation (10%); (3) The source of income does make a difference: the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) food out of one’s own cash income was 0.58 for VGD versus 0.92 for MPC from income transfer in wheat. There was no noticeable improvement in nutritional status of preschool children.
Targeting Costs	(3) Costs 1.68 taka to deliver 1 taka to beneficiaries, falling to 1.44 if all leakage eliminated. (2) Administrative supervision cost was \$3 per ton, commodity handling \$54 per ton. (4) Based on comparisons of transfers identified in the 2000 HIES and what administrative records say should be found, the authors calculate that 34-59% of the grain is “not accounted for” or “leakage”.
Notes:	See also Ahmed, A. (2000): Targeted Distribution, Ch. 11 in Ahmed, R., S. Haggblade and T. Chowdhury, eds., Out of the shadow of famine: Evolving food markets and food policy in Bangladesh, John Hopkins. DC.

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Study Title	(1) Targeted Distribution; (2) Short Run Impacts of Food for Work Programme in Bangladesh; (3) Options for Targeting: Food Interventions in Bangladesh; (4) Development Impact of the Food-for-Work Program in Bangladesh; (5) Filling the Gaps: Consolidating Evidence on the Design of Alternative Targeted Food Programs in Bangladesh
Study Authors	(1) A. Ahmed (2) S. Osmani and O. Chowdhury; (3) International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); (4) Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and International Food Policy Research Institute; (5) P. Dorosh and S. Haggblade
Study Reference	(1) Chapter 11 from “Out of the Shadow of Famine: Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in Bangladesh” edited by R. Ahmed, S. Haggblade, and T. Chowdhury; (2) Bangladesh Development Studies, Volume XI, March-June 1983, Numbers 1 & 2; (3) Report by Working Group on Targeted Food Interventions, IFPRI; (4) Technical Paper, submitted to the World Food Programme; (5) The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. XXIII, Sept.-Dec. 1995, Nos.3&4, pages 47-80
Study Year	(1) 2000; (2) 1983; (3) 1994; (4) 1985; (5) 1995
Country	Bangladesh
Program Being Evaluated	Food-for-Work Program
Year Implemented	Initiated in 1975 after famine, ended 1984.
Program Description	(1) Provides wages in-kind (usually wheat) to rural laborers for working in labor-intensive public works (water, roads, forestry, fishery) on seasonal basis; 85% of program resources used during the December-May dry season, but with advancement of irrigation this no longer a slack season in many covered areas. Donor funded.
Program Coverage	100 million workdays of employment per year, directly benefiting about 4 million rural beneficiaries, equivalent to at least 17 days of additional employment for every landless worker in Bangladesh in the construction phase alone.
Type of Benefit	In-kind wage (wheat); often wheat is sold and payments made in cash.
Study Objective	(1) Draw lessons that will improve targeting (3) Evaluate targeting options in Bangladesh; (4) Address questions of both the program’s short-run effectiveness and longer-run contributions when it is geared to the construction and maintenance of the rural economic infrastructure. It examines and measures the direct and indirect effects of projects between two to five years after completion; (5) Learn general lessons.
Targeting Method	Geographic targeting combined with self-targeting to low-income beneficiaries by imposing an arduous work requirement . Mainly targeted at men. Targeted at dry season.
Targeting Mechanism	Delivery agent is Public Implementation Committee
Program Budget	At its peak, annual subsidy of \$134 million, with food grain distribution of 496,000 MT (over 20% of total national wheat consumption).
Transfer Levels	(3) Average per capita transfer (114kg per month) to beneficiaries was worth 171 taka compared to monthly expenditures of 286 taka, i.e. 60%.

Targeting Performance	(1) Due to irrigation-induced technology, the period when activities intensify now compete increasingly with the crop sector labor demand in many areas and may be having an adverse effect on crop productivity. Thus, incremental income gains may have fallen over time. Food-insecure times are difficult periods to undertake this work. (2) Appears to be successful in reaching those who are landless or near landless. While the average size of landholding is 1.36 acres in the total population, the participant households have an average holding of only 0.60 acre. 48% of the participating households (versus 34% for the general population are drawn from the pure landless category, and 69% (versus 50% for the general population) belong to what is called the functionally landless group (those with less than 0.50 acre of land). The average income of the participants is only 44% of national average, implying that the participants are drawn mostly from the poorest 20% of the population. Almost all the households who actually wanted to get work did. Return from program employment is higher than the return from other forms of employment, especially from that in the farm sector. (3) Leakage of 30-35% (made up of underpayment to workers and over-reporting of work done) – most due to former. Although food insecurity continues to be most pronounced during September and October, the program largely fails to address this problem because of difficulties in undertaking earthwork immediately after the monsoon season. (4) 90% owned less than 2 acres. The per capita income of worker households prior to the work season was less than half the national average. 80% of all workers gave agricultural labor or self-cultivation as their primary occupation.
Impact on Welfare	(1) Significantly increased food consumption and calorie intake at the household level; per capita income transfer from the program relative to expenditure was significant at 60%. There was no noticeable improvement in nutritional status of preschool children. The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) food out of one's own cash income was 0.53 for FFW, while it rises to 0.61 for income transfer in wheat, indicating that the MPC for in-kind subsidy transfer is substantially higher than that for cash income. (2) The net wage earning of the participant households was 55% higher in the six weeks' survey period compared to what they would have earned during the same period in the absence of the program. The net income gain in the entire program season amounted to about 10-11% of their annual wage income, and 7-8% of their total annual income in the year preceding the program. (4) The program had a significant positive effect on agricultural production (via irrigation, change in cropping pattern to high-yielding varieties, increase in labor and fertilizer use per unit of land), but at a lesser scale for the small farmers. The project increased income from crop production, also due to the presence of well-developed infrastructural facilities. There is also secondary effect on household income through stimulation of industry, trade and other services. The labor force participation rate is estimated from the survey at 29% of the total population and 43% of the population in the active age groups); also found to be lower in the project group (27.6%) than in control (30.3%). This apparently negative impact on supply of labor has a positive aspect since some of the children who participated in the labor force can go back to school as the household income increases with the project. The program thus directly contributes to reduction of seasonal fluctuations in employment. In addition, the nutritional level of the population is higher in the project areas. (5) Beneficiary received a transfer of 697 taka per household per month, with a net gain in income of 20%. Household sold 83% of grain.
Targeting Costs	It required 2.1 taka to transfer 1 taka to a household, which would fall to 1.49 if all leakage eliminated. (5) Administrative supervision cost was \$23 per ton, commodity handling \$54 per ton.
Notes:	(3) See also Ahmed, A. (2000): Targeted Distribution, Ch. 11 in Ahmed, R., S. Haggblade and T. Chowdhury, eds., Out of the shadow of famine: Evolving food markets and food policy in Bangladesh, John Hopkins. DC

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Study Title	(1) Targeted Distribution; (2) Filling the Gaps: Consolidating Evidence on the Design of Alternative Targeted Food Programs in Bangladesh
Study Authors	(1) A. Ahmed; (2) P. Dorosh and S. Haggblade
Study Reference	Ch. 11 in Ahmed, R., S. Haggblade and T. Chowdhury, eds., Out of the shadow of famine: Evolving food markets and food policy in Bangladesh, John Hopkins. ; (2) The Bangladesh Development Studies, Vol. XXIII, Sept.-Dec. 1995, Nos.3&4, pages 47-80
Study Year	(1) 2000; (2) 1995
Country	Bangladesh
Program Being Evaluated	Rural Maintenance Program (RMP)
Year Implemented	1983
Program Description	Employs destitute women fulltime to maintain rural earthen roads. Disburses cash through direct transfers through the women's group bank account. Funds generated from sale of Canadian food aid.
Program Coverage	Currently, in 2000 it employed 55,000 women to maintain approx. 88,000km of essential farm-to-market roads in 3,700 (out of 4,451) unions (i.e. administrative unit of around 10 villages). Year round, national.
Type of Benefit	Cash is disbursed through direct transfers to the women's group bank account.
Study Objective	(1) Contrast targeting efficiency across a range of programs; (2) Generalize from Bangladesh's experiences.
Targeting Method	Geographic, by gender and self-targeting.
Targeting Mechanism	Local committee identifies eligible women who self-select into program.
Program Budget	(2) At its peak, annual subsidy of \$18 million, with food grain distribution of 62,000 MT
Transfer Levels	Average monthly transfer to beneficiaries was 186 taka compared to monthly expenditures of 298 taka, i.e. 62%.
Targeting Performance	Use of cash instead of food seen as major factor in reducing leakage. Leakage is virtually zero in the program (by avoiding the physical handling of cereals). Did not target acute lean September-October season.
Impact on Welfare	(1) Significantly increased food consumption and calorie intake at the household level. Per capita income transfer from the program relative to expenditure at 62% is the highest amongst other similar programs in Bangladesh. The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) food out of one's own cash income was 0.53 for RMP versus 0.48 for MPC from cash income transfer for RMP households. There was no noticeable improvement in nutritional status of pre-school children. (2) Beneficiaries received a transfer of 728 taka per household per month, with a net gain in income of 33%.
Targeting Costs	(1) Costs 1.32 taka to deliver 1 taka to beneficiaries. (2) Administrative supervision cost was \$14 per ton, commodity handling \$27 per ton.

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Study Title	(1) Urban Bias in Indian Public Distribution System, (2) Public Distribution of Food in India: A Comment, (3) Consumer Subsidies In India: Is Targeting Effective? (4) India's Public Distribution System: A National and International Perspective; (5) Public Distribution of Food in India (6) Consumer Food Subsidy Programs in the MENA Region
Study Authors	(1), (2) Stephen Howes and Shikha Jha; (3) Shika Jha; (4) R. Radhakrishna and K. Subbarao with S. Indrakant and C. Ravi (5) D. Ahluwalia; (6) S. Razmara et. Al.,
Study Reference	(1) Economic and Political Weekly, May, 1992, pp1022-30; (2) Food Policy, 19(1), pp65-8; (3) Development and Change, 23(4), pp101-28; (4) World Bank Discussion Paper No.380, Work in Progress for Public Discussion (5) Food Policy, February 1993; (6) World Bank Report No.19561-MNA, Human Development Group, Middle East and North Africa Region
Study Year	(1) 1992, (2) 1994 (3) 1992 (4) 1997 (5) 1993 (6) 1999
Country	India
Program Being Evaluated	Public Distribution System
Year Implemented	In operation since Second World War.
Program Description	Transfers subsidized food (foodgrains, edible oils, sugar, coal, kerosene, and cloth) to poor households with ration cards through rations shops (over 350,000 shops in 1993). Any household with a registered residential address is entitled to be covered by the scheme (equal access). Consumer quotas are sold in a lump sum for a minimum period of a week
Program Coverage	In principle, all households with a residential address. (5) On average, over 1987-1989, PDS handled 15% of total net availability of rice and wheat in the country, 23% of edible oil and 43% of total sugar consumed.
Type of Benefit	Subsidized ration foods through ration card-shop system.
Study Objective	(1) To determine if there is an urban bias in the distribution of this benefit using data on access to such shops and amounts received. (4) To estimate the impact on poor households of PDS, in terms of poverty and nutritional improvements, and to estimate the costs per unit of welfare gains (6). The study provides an overview of the status of consumer food subsidy programs in Middle East and North Africa region and assesses on-going reform programs
Targeting Method	Geographic targeting of ration shops (350,000 outlets in 1993). Households self-select into system. Access is almost universal.
Targeting Mechanism	Center determines allocations across states according to need (with no firm and transparent guidelines (5)) but further distribution is the responsibility of state governments. (4) The cost of PDS is borne by both the Central and State governments. A specific portion of grain from producers or traders is sold to Government at a minimum support price fixed by the Government and is supplied to the States at a uniform issue price. The purchase, storage, movement and distribution of food are being carried out by the Food Corporation of India (FCI), a parastatal. Some States may have other institutions purchasing and selling on behalf of FCI. The purchased items are then distributed to the FPS. The issue price of FCI is lower than the cost incurred by it, the difference met through a central government subsidy.
Program Budget	(4) 0.7% of GDP in 1993-94; food subsidy given by the central government came to Rs. 55 billion.
Transfer Levels	Not available

Targeting Performance	(1) Although an urban bias exists, this is state specific and has been reduced substantially from 1978-1987; transformed into rural bias in 7 of the 18 states analysed. Also evidence of large leakage from PDS to those without ration cards. (2) Evidence of both high leakage and under-coverage. (3) Very high under-coverage rates varying across commodities: for rice, wheat and edible oils (the main ones) ranges from 83% for oils to 58% for rice in rural. Percentage of beneficiaries that are poor (defined as bottom 40%) is 53% (rice), 43% (wheat), 63% (jowar), 50% (edible oils), 43% (sugar) and 48% (kerosene). (4) access is particularly weak in the states with the highest incidence and severity of poverty. (5) Rural areas are nearly as well served by the PDS as urban areas (no evidence of serious urban bias). High leakage into the more lucrative free market. Given the universality of access to the PDS, there is lack of any serious targeting in the aggregate. Broadly speaking, a little more than a third of the foodgrains and sugar and over half of the edible oil that is supplied into the system do not reach actual users of the PDS; it leaks out of the program. Together with the lack of targeting discussed earlier, this diversion means that as little as 25-30% of the foodgrains that are supplied to the PDS actually reach the bottom four deciles of the population. (6) Leakage to non-needy is high, estimated at 50-60%. If through ration shops and utilizing geographic targeting, leakage is much less (5-10%)
Impact on Welfare	(4) The welfare gains of PDS in terms of income transfer were very meager and the impact on poverty and nutritional status minimal. The per capita income gain to the poor in 1986-87 from all (food and non-food) consumer subsidies was no more than Rs.2.01/month, or 2.7% of their per capita expenditure in rural areas, and Rs.3.4/month or 3.2% of per capita expenditure in urban areas. Considering India as a whole, subsidies reduced poverty (as measured by the headcount ratio) by only 1.66% in rural areas and 1.71% in urban areas; about 12.1 million persons may have moved out of poverty.
Targeting Costs	(4) Costs are exorbitant. Even with just the central government costs, an amount of Rs4.27 was incurred to transfer 1 rupee of income to the poor. When the costs are combined with state government, for instance the cost in Andhra Pradesh, it rises to Rs.6.35 to transfer 1 rupee. PDS turns out to be the costliest among other anti-poverty programs; PDS delivered 100 kcal of nutrients at 3 times the cost incurred under the direct nutrition program of Integrated Child Development Services. In terms of cost per rupee of income transfer PDS is much less cost efficient than employment and nutrition programs which incorporate self-selection to some extent.

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Study Title	Targeting and efficiency in the Public Distribution System: Case of Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra
Study Authors	B. Dutta and B. Ramaswami
Study Reference	<i>Economic and Political Weekly</i> Vol. XXXVI(18), pp. 1524-1532
Study Year	2001
Country	India, Andhra Pradesh State
Program Being Evaluated	Grain distribution via PDS
Year Implemented	State involvement begins around 1983-84. Incidence data are based on 1993-94 data
Program Description	Center supplies food grains to states in proportion to incidence of poverty; AP State makes a ration of subsidized rice (of inferior quality) available to all citizens via PDS retail outlets, but with higher rations to poor households.
Program Coverage	Approximately 57 per cent of households in AP are beneficiaries.
Type of Benefit	Subsidized rice
Study Objective	Evaluate the targeting efforts of the PDS in AP State.
Targeting Method	“Ration quotas are fixed according to household size, age composition and a measure of income.” (p. 1532)
Targeting Mechanism	As per description of the PDS, ref #5xx.
Program Budget	As of 1994-95, total subsidy on a tonne of rice was 4204, of which 67% came from the State government and 33% from the Central government.
Transfer Levels	Each household is entitled to 5 kg of rice per person per month, capped at 20 kg per household through the Fair Price Shops (FPS) at below market prices.
Targeting Performance	In rural areas, 43.6% of subsidy goes to the bottom 40% of the population, 21.5% of subsidy to poorest quintile and 10.4% to poorest decile. In urban areas, 65.2% of subsidy goes to the bottom 40% of the population, 35.8% of subsidy to poorest quintile and 19.1% to poorest decile. The authors argue that better targeting in urban areas “because the relatively rich voluntarily opt out of the programme. This could be because of a number of reasons such as transactions costs and preference for higher quality grain available from private traders.” (p. 1531)
Impact on Welfare	Of households that actually receive the subsidy, the poorest quintiles in rural areas receive about 3.3 – 3.9 kgs per person per month compared to 4.3 – 4.9 kgs per person per month for the richest two deciles. The poorest quintiles in urban areas receive about 3.1 – 3.9 kgs per person per month compared to 4.1 – 7.8 kgs per person per month for the richest two deciles.
Targeting Costs	It costs 1.71 rupee to provide 1 rupee of subsidy. It costs 3.14 of subsidy to transfer 1 rupee to the poorest 40% and 5.81 to transfer 1 rupee to the poorest decile. 58.5% of expenditures on the programme are actually “income transfers”. “Operational inefficiency” accounts for 26.5% of programme costs and illegal leakage 15%.

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Study Title	Targeting and efficiency in the Public Distribution System: Case of Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra
Study Authors	B. Dutta and B. Ramaswami
Study Reference	<i>Economic and Political Weekly</i> Vol. XXXVI(18), pp. 1524-1532
Study Year	2001
Country	India, Maharashtra State
Program Being Evaluated	Grain distribution via PDS
Year Implemented	State involvement begins around 1983-84. Incidence data are based on 1993-94 data
Program Description	Center supplies food grains to states in proportion to incidence of poverty; Maharashtra State makes a ration of subsidized rice (of inferior quality) available to all citizens via PDS retail outlets.
Program Coverage	Approximately 33 per cent of households in Maharashtra are beneficiaries.
Type of Benefit	Subsidized rice and wheat
Study Objective	Evaluate the targeting efforts of the PDS in Maharashtra State.
Targeting Method	Ration quotas are fixed independent of household characteristics.
Targeting Mechanism	As per description of the PDS, ref #507
Program Budget	Not available.
Transfer Levels	Assumed to be around 4 kg of rice per person per month through the Fair Price Shops (FPS) at below market prices.
Targeting Performance	In rural areas, 41.7% of subsidy goes to the bottom 40% of the population, 17.8% of subsidy to poorest quintile and 7.6% to poorest decile. In urban areas, 54.5% of subsidy goes to the bottom 40% of the population, 26.3% of subsidy to poorest quintile and 10.4% to poorest decile.
Impact on Welfare	Of households that actually receive the subsidy, the poorest quintiles in rural areas receive about 1.4 – 2.1 kgs per person per month compared to 2.7 – 3.3 kgs per person per month for the richest two deciles. The poorest quintiles in urban areas receive about 2.1 – 3.3 kgs per person per month compared to 3.3 – 4.0 kgs per person per month for the richest two deciles.
Targeting Costs	It costs 1.82 rupee to provide 1 rupee of subsidy. It costs 4.00 of subsidy to transfer 1 rupee to the poorest 40% and 9.1 to transfer 1 rupee to the poorest decile. 56.0% of expenditures on the programme are actually “income transfers”. “Operational inefficiency” accounts for 16% of programme costs and illegal leakage 28%.

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Study Title	(1) On the Targeting and Cost-Effectiveness of Anti-Poverty Programmes in Rural India; (2) India's Public Distribution System: A National and International Perspective
Study Authors	(1) R. Gaiha, K. Imai, and P. Kaushik; (2) R. Radhakrishna, K. Subbarao, S. Indrakant, and C. Ravi
Study Reference	(1) Development and Change, 32, pp309-42; (2) World Bank Discussion Paper No.380, Work in Progress for Public Discussion
Study Year	(1) 2001, (2) 1997
Country	India
Program Being Evaluated	Jawahar Rojgar Yohana (JRY)
Year Implemented	1989 (merger between the National Rural Employment Program and the Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme).
Program Description	Alleviate poverty through creation of supplementary employment opportunities for the rural poor during agricultural slack periods. Other objectives are the creation of social assets and a positive impact on wages.
Program Coverage	Two components: In 1993-94, the first component created 952 million person days of employment; the second 7.35 million person days. Total of 1678 million person days of employment.
Type of Benefit	Food and cash (rural public works)
Study Objective	(1) To evaluate targeting performance and cost-effectiveness of program.
Targeting Method	Geographic, demographic and self-targeting. Central allocation of budget to states/unions on basis of their share in rural poverty using headcount index. State allocation to districts based on index of backwardness, which takes into account the proportion of the rural castes/tribes population, and an inverse of agricultural production per agricultural worker, with equal weights. Preference given to under-privileged groups (scheduled castes/tribes, freed bonded laborers); in addition 30% of the employment opportunities are earmarked for women. Wages are paid at the rate of the Minimum Wage Act for the relevant work, partly in food grains and partly in cash.
Targeting Mechanism	Central Government bears 80% of the cost while the States contribute 20%. Responsibility for implementation is vested in the District Rural Development Agency or Zilla Parishad (District Panchayat) at the district level, and in the Gram Panchayat (GP) at the village level. An annual Action Plan is prepared by the Center and handed down for implementation. Choice of projects by GP at village-level is limited. Broadly, 75% of funds earmarked for various infrastructure schemes. Rest assigned to social forestry projects. Decentralized implementation not transparent.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	(1) Percentage of beneficiaries that were poor was 31% in 1987 and 24% in 1993. (2) Since the program wage remained higher than the market wage, it tended to attract many of the non-poor to the program. From information below, possible to estimate that 43% of budget went to poor rural households.
Impact on Welfare	Since underemployment is estimated to be about 3,000 million person days, about one-third of the total underemployment may have been reduced by JRY. Yet, the programs impact appears to be modest at the household level, though in some backward states, the impact was higher. Food grains distributed (as part of wages) were negligible (Rs 0.21 worth of foodgrains per day per JRY worker). The program wage almost always remained higher than the market wage.
Targeting Costs	In 1991, it required a public expenditure of Rs 1.87 to transfer one rupee of income to a rural household. Taking into account the extent of mistargeting, it can be estimated that in 1991 Rs4.35 of public spending was required to transfer one rupee to a poor rural household. (Note: Implies that 43% of transfers went to poor).
Note: JRY recently renamed JGSY (Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana). Two changes have been introduced: (i) it will be exclusively implemented by village GPs, and (ii) main focus is now on infrastructure development, with employment generation relegated to a secondary objective. Now main burden of rural safety net has shifted to the Employment Assurance Scheme.	

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Study Title	(1) Transfer Benefits From Public-Works Employment: Evidence For Rural India; (2) Is Targeting Through A Work Requirement Efficient: Some Evidence For Rural India
Study Authors	(1) G. Datt and M. Ravallion; (2) M. Ravallion and G. Datt
Study Reference	(1) Economic Journal, 104 (November), pp1346-69; (2) in D. van de Walle and K. Nead (eds), Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence, John Hopkins.
Study Year	(1) 1994, (2) 1995
Country	India
Program Being Evaluated	Employment Guarantee Scheme, Maharashtra State
Year Implemented	Introduced as a statutory program in the mid 1970s
Program Description	Rural public-works employment that reduce poverty through income gains to the participating workers receiving low wage on a par with agricultural wages for unskilled manual labor. Mainly small-scale rural public-works projects (e.g. roads, irrigation facilities, re-forestation). Financed almost entirely out of taxes on urban sector of the State, including an income tax levy.
Program Coverage	By early 1990s average annual attendance reached about 100 million person days.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To evaluate welfare impact and targeting performance of program.
Targeting Method	Geographic placement of schemes followed by self-selection.
Targeting Mechanism	State responsible for placement of programs.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	On a par with unskilled agricultural wages.
Targeting Performance	Evidence that a much higher percentage of the poor participate (e.g. around 12-16% for the poor compared to 6% for non-poor. But the direct impact on poverty incidence was no greater than untargeted uniform transfers; although targeting efficiency of former higher, net transfers lower due to participation costs. But administrative costs for uniform transfers were assumed to be negligible and forgone income under workfare may be overestimated if surplus labor in communities.
Impact on Welfare	Average forgone income due to having to provide work was estimated as 21%-32% of wages received (using market wages would have led to a substantial overestimate of this at around 93%).
Targeting Costs	Based on wage bill being approx. two-thirds of total budget, it costs Rs1.5 to get Rs1 to beneficiaries.

512	
Study Title	The Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) in Uttar Pradesh, India – An Evaluation
Study Authors	S. Kriesel and S. Zaidi
Study Reference	World Bank Draft Report
Study Year	1999
Country	India
Program Being Evaluated	Grain distribution via TPDS
Year Implemented	June 1997
Program Description	Center supplies food grains to states in proportion to incidence of poverty; then targeted to households below the poverty line.
Program Coverage	Nationally, 320 million people (36% of the total population). 9.5 million cardholders in Uttar Pradesh (UP).
Type of Benefit	Each household is entitled to 10 kg of rice and wheat per month through the Fair Price Shops (FPS) at half the market price.
Study Objective	Evaluate improved targeting efforts, the effectiveness of supply, as well as reform of institutional arrangements that have been effected in UP since the introduction of TPDS (using data from 1997-98 UP-Bihar Survey of Living Conditions).
Targeting Method	Geographic and proxy-means testing of households using income, land-holding size and ownership of selected consumer durables.
Targeting Mechanism	State governments are responsible for identifying beneficiaries issuing cards following Center guidelines and to get transfer to households and other operations (financial and delivery arrangements, licensing the fair price shops, and supervising the sub-contracted agencies). Central government monitors state's performance; provision of the subsidized food grains to the states under the new system is conditional on their ability to target and deliver the food grain to the poor. The local governments also have a role; the gram panchayat in each village verifies poor status of beneficiaries obtained from the household census, and makes suggestions. The Panchayati Raj institutions are also supposed to be involved in the election of the shopkeeper and supervision of the TPDS. Finally there are also vigilance committees to supervise and follow-up on complaints.
Program Budget	The total transfer budget is estimated to be US\$90 million.
Transfer Levels	10 kg of rice and wheat per month household (annual subsidy of Rs396 per cardholder).
Targeting Performance	The Government of UP lifted quite a significant amount of its allocation of food grains compared to the previous years. In terms of targeting, it was found that households in the lowest income quintile were four times as likely to be on the list of beneficiaries compared to the richest quintile. In addition, the land and asset ownership criteria appear to have been followed fairly closely. Yet, when comparing the total allocation of food grains to UP with survey estimates of the amount of food grains received by households, there is a discrepancy; only a third of the subsidy reaches its beneficiaries. The current administrative arrangements are still too complex. Officials still saw the program as price stabilization and not as poverty alleviation. Direct stakeholder participation also helped the targeting.
Impact on Welfare	Transfers constitute 2.6% of annual income of beneficiaries (4.3% of total cash expenditures)
Targeting Costs	Based on above can calculate that costs Rs1.5 to transfer Rs1 to beneficiaries due to illegal leakage.

513	
Study Title	Social assistance for poor elderly: How effective?
Study Authors	S. I. Rajan
Study Reference	<i>Economic and Political Weekly</i> Vol. XXXVI(8), pp. 613-617
Study Year	2001
Country	India
Program Being Evaluated	National Old-Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS) and 'Annapurna'
Year Implemented	NOAPS begins in 1995; Annapurna begins in 1999.
Program Description	NOAPS provides cash payments to destitute elderly households. Annapurna provides rice or wheat to elderly destitutes "who have no one to take care of them" (p. 614).
Program Coverage	"On the basis of my earlier work, one can safely conclude that one-fourth of India's elderly already receive some social assistance from the state-level pension schemes or from the National Old-Age Pension Scheme/Annapurna Scheme." (p. 615)
Type of Benefit	NOAPS – cash; Annapurna – in-kind transfer of rice or wheat.
Study Objective	Describes coverage of NOAPS and Annapurna
Targeting Method	Categorical (age 65 or older) and informal individual assessment. For NOAPS, "The applicant must be a destitute in the sense of having little or no regular means of subsistence from his/her own sources of income or through financial support from family members or other sources. In order to determine destitution, the criteria, if any, currently in force in the state/union territory is to be followed.
Targeting Mechanism	Appears to vary across States.
Program Budget	Not available.
Transfer Levels	NOAPS - Rs 75 per month; Annapurna – 10kg of rice or wheat.
Targeting Performance	Not available.
Impact on Welfare	Not available.
Targeting Costs	Not available.

514	
Study Title	The Twilight of Flour Rationing in Pakistan
Study Authors	H. Alderman
Study Reference	Food Policy, August, pp. 245-256
Study Year	1988
Country	Pakistan
Program Being Evaluated	Subsidized wheat flour rationing in urban areas.
Year Implemented	1940s-1987
Program Description	In the late 1980s, it provided rationed subsidized wheat flour through ration shops.
Program Coverage	1.2 – 1.35 million households (9 million people) in urban areas.
Type of Benefit	Subsidized wheat flour.
Study Objective	Rationale for the policy change of the flour rationing in Pakistan. Evaluation of the system.
Targeting Method	Geographic targeting to urban poor and self-targeting (open market flour was perceived to be of higher quality).
Targeting Mechanism	Via ration depots.
Program Budget	Over 36 billion rupees (1985 prices) were spent on flour subsidies since FY 1974. In FY 1986, the amount was 3 billion rupees (1985 prices). 30% of all subsidies, 3.1% of current expenditures and 0.6% of GDP in 1985.
Transfer Levels	Average purchases per low-income purchasing family amounted to 60 kg/month. The flour subsidy in 1984-86 came to roughly 30 rupees per capita per year. The transfer was 4% of expenditure for poorest third urban households that took up the ration.
Targeting Performance	There was considerable illegal leakage. Approximately 69% of the subsidized wheat released by the government was not obtained by consumers from ration shops or subsidized bakeries. Rationing was ineffective instrument for poverty alleviation because the government subsidized the wheat released to mills rather than the flour <i>per se</i> ; this encouraged diversion of supplies and illegal profits. 22% of total subsidies went to urban third, compared to the 48% expected is no leakage.
Impact on Welfare	There was a marked decline in the number of households relying on ration shops in the 1980s, in part due to the de-rationing of flour; families may have discontinued to purchase rationed flour when they no longer had to visit the depot to obtain sugar. The urban population relied more on the rations than rural, mostly due to the availability of ration depots. In the urban areas, the budget share going to ration flour showed a steady decline in percentage of families using the ration, as well as a general pattern of decreasing budget shares going to flour as incomes rise (shop – from 50% in the lowest income group to only 21% in the highest bracket). For rural households as well, in April 1986, 35% of the rural households with a monthly income of less than 500 rupees and who had access to a ration depot reported using such a shop. The figure declined to 20% in the highest income decile. The degree of self-targeting apparently increased after sugar was de-rationed.
Targeting Costs	Based on illegal leakage of 70% (ignoring other administrative costs), costs at least Rs3.33 to transfer Rs1 to beneficiaries.
Notes:	Results from Coady, D. (1997) “Agricultural Pricing Policies in Developing Countries: An Application to Pakistan”, International Tax and Public Finance, 4, pp39-57, suggest that subsidized flour rations had a relatively high distributional power compared to other price subsidies.

515	
Study Title	The food stamp scheme in Sri Lanka: Costs, benefits and options for modification
Study Authors	N. Edirisinghe
Study Reference	IFPRI Research Report No. 58
Study Year	1987
Country	Sri Lanka
Program Being Evaluated	Food stamps
Year Implemented	1979/81
Program Description	Food and kerosene stamp that partially pays for basic foods and kerosene
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Food stamp
Study Objective	Assess the performance of the food stamp scheme introduced in 1981
Targeting Method	Means tested based on self-reported household income with marginal adjustments for household size
Targeting Mechanism	Households were required to apply for food stamps through a declaration of incomes and household composition.
Program Budget	In 1982, Rs 1.8 billion.
Transfer Levels	In 1982, households would receive monthly stamps worth Rs 25 for each child under 8; Rs 20 for each child 8-12; and Rs 15 for each member over 12. In addition, the household would receive stamps worth Rs 9.50 for kerosene. These transfers were equivalent to 15% of per capita expenditures of the poorest quintile. Unused stamps could be deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank. The real value of these stamps fell by 50% between 1979 and 1982.
Targeting Performance	27% of benefits go to bottom quintile; 50% of benefits go to bottom 40%; 14% go to richest 20%
Impact on Welfare	Gini coefficient is estimated to fall from 0.428 to 0.408. The contribution to calories from food stamps declines from 11.6 percent for the lowest quintile to less than 0.7 per cent for the highest.
Targeting Costs	Not available. It is noted that “The Treasury spends 98 cents for each 100 calories provided through the food stamp scheme to the intended target group. This is over 250 per cent of the actual cost of 38 cents per 100 calories”. Suggests a cost per Rs. transferred of Rs2.5.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

601	
Study Title	Regional poverty targeting in China
Study Authors	A. Park, S. Wang and G. Wu
Study Reference	Journal of Public Economics, October, Vol. 86(1): 123-153.
Study Year	2002
Country	China
Program Being Evaluated	Leading Group for Economic Development in Poor Areas
Year Implemented	1986 onwards
Program Description	Had three principal components, subsidized loans, food for work and budgetary grants for development
Program Coverage	Operated only in rural areas. Initially, program included 258 counties, it expanded to 373 by 1989 and 592 by 1993. Number of beneficiaries not available
Type of Benefit	Employment, food
Study Objective	Assess targeting performance across counties in China
Targeting Method	Central government targeted counties based on poverty lines. These were initially set at 150 yuan per person, but were higher (200 yuan) in old revolutionary base areas and counties with large minority populations. Poverty lines were not adjusted to reflect regional differences in cost of living.
Targeting Mechanism	Federal government provides funds. Programs are implemented at the country or sub-county level and in some cases, by bank managers who administer subsidized loans.
Program Budget	In 1996, 11.6 billion yuan or \$1.4 billion USD, equivalent to 5 per cent of central government expenditures. In 1997, 16.1 billion yuan.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	In 1986, only half the counties in the poorest income decile were included in the program. As the program expanded, undercoverage (measured at the county level) declined while leakage rose. Of the three program components, only the development grants appear to be progressively targeted. Minority areas received preferential treatment conditional on income levels and there is a suggestion that within county targeting was poor in some cases.
Impact on Welfare	The program had a modest effect on rural income growth; its impact on the poor is not known.
Targeting Costs	Not available

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Study Title	(1) Indonesia's experience with social safety nets: Lessons learned and future prospects; (2) Implementation of Special Market Operation (OPK): Results of a SMERU rapid field appraisal mission in five provinces; (3) Coverage and targeting in the Indonesian social safety net programs: Evidence from the 100 village survey; (4) Safety nets and safety ropes: Comparing the dynamic benefit incidence of two Indonesian "JPS" Programs; (5) Targeted programs in an economic crisis: Empirical findings from Indonesia's experience.
Study Authors	(1) S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi; (2) S. Kusumastuti, R. Akhmadi, H. Wibowo, S. Budiati, M. Nabiu, S. Marardi, S. Usman, L. Bailey and J. Maxwell; (3) A. Suryahadi, Y. Suharso and S. Sumarto; (4) S. Sumarto, A. Suryahadi and L. Pritchett; (5) L. Pritchett, S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi
Study Reference	(1) Mimeo (SMERU Research Institute); (2) SMERU Special Report, 18 December; (3) SMERU Working Paper, August; (4) SMERU Working Paper, February; (5) Mimeo
Study Year	(1) 1999; (2) 1998; (3) 1999; (4) 2000; (5) 2002
Country	Indonesia
Program Being Evaluated	OPK (Operasi Pasar Khusus); part of the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial), a social safety net program introduced after the economic crisis in August 1997.
Year Implemented	July 1998
Program Description	Sale of subsidized rice to targeted households; largest of the four JPS programs.
Program Coverage	Planned coverage was the 12.8 million poorest households.
Type of Benefit	Subsidized rice ration
Study Objective	To examine the targeting performance of various components of the JPS.
Targeting Method	Geographical and categorical household targeting: used the household classification created by the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency (BKKBN) under which households are divided into four socio-economic groups: KPS, KSI, KSII, and KSIII (the richest); KS I, II and III are usually grouped together as the 'prosperous' category. Households were classified in the poorest category (KPS) if any any one of the following held true: (i) the household cannot practice their religious principles; (ii) all household members do not eat at least twice a day; (iii) not all household members have different sets of clothing for home, work, school and visits; (iv) the household cannot seek modern medical assistance for sick children and family planning services for contraceptive users; and (v) the largest floor area of the house is made of dirt. This list has been updated annually by the village level workers of the family planning agency for use in targeting contraceptive subsidies and related efforts. This information was supposed to be based on household visits but in practice this does not seem to have been so formal. Also, the list was not centralized or computerized but the list of household names was maintained at the local level and the higher levels of government only had access to summary reports of the numbers of households in each group. So in practice, it appears that local officials had a large say in classification outcomes. Approximately 15% of the population (7.3 million households) was identified as KPS, with 12.8 classified as either KPS or KSI. Beneficiaries were initially only KPS but KSI households were subsequently included.
Targeting Mechanism	Programs were designed by the central government. Local leaders were responsible for the implementation of the program, but were supposed to use the eligibility criteria defined by BKKBN. In 1999/2000, especially in areas where BKKBN data had not been updated, procedures for determining eligibility were expanded to allow for local flexibility (such as such as food consumption and vulnerable groups, poor widows, orphans, fishermen/farmers) and the addition of households to the list along with increased transparency. Numerous field visits found that in some areas local decision-makers felt pressure from communities to change the distribution of rice from the designated "eligible" household to include other households deemed equally deserving, or even to extend coverage to the entire community. BULOG (the National Logistics Agency) made rice available to villages at the Dolog (Logistics Depot) and Sub-Dolog offices based on the eligibility lists, but actual distribution of the rice to households was carried out by local officials.

<i>Program Budget</i>	Rp. 5,450 Billion in 1998, Rp. 6,235 Billion in 1999, and Rp. 2,232 Billion in 2000 (due to change in fiscal year, FY2000 was only 9 months). Percentage of total safety net budget (including other programs) came to 5.62% in 1998/99, 5.58% in 1999/2000, and 2.98% in 2000.
<i>Transfer Levels</i>	Each eligible household could purchase 20kg of rice per month at a subsidized price of Rp. 1,000/kg (a third of the regular price in August 1998).
<i>Targeting Performance</i>	Based on numbers in (4), can calculate that poorest 20% of population received 26.4% of benefits: this is calculated as one minus the product of 0.8 and the “targeting ratio” (this is really an average across districts, i.e. an average of within district targeting). It should be noted that these are really averages of targeting performance within districts. Suggests only mildly progressive targeting with substantial leakage to all parts of the consumption distribution as well as possibly much undercoverage. Also evidence that more households than planned were included and that households thus received lower rations.
<i>Impact on Welfare</i>	Not available
<i>Targeting Costs</i>	Not available

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Study Title	(1) Indonesia's Experience with Social Safety Nets: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects; (2) Coverage and Targeting in the Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs: Evidence from 100 Village Survey; (3) Safety Nets and Safety Ropes: Comparing the Dynamic Benefit Incidence of Two Indonesian "JPS" Programs; (4) Targeted programs in an economic crisis: Empirical findings from Indonesia's experience.
Study Authors	(1) S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi; (2) A. Suryahadi, Y. Suharso, and S. Sumarto; (3) S. Sumarto, A.Suryahadi, and L. Pritchett; (4) L. Pritchett, S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi
Study Reference	(1) Mimeo (SMERU Research Institute); (2) SMERU Working Paper, August; (3) SMERU Working Paper, February; (4) Unpublished
Study Year	(1) 1999; (2) 1999; (3) 2000; (4) 2002
Country	Indonesia
Program Being Evaluated	Employment Creation: Padat Karya (PK) and PDM-DKE , part of JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial), a social safety net program introduced after the economic crisis in August 1997.
Year Implemented	July 1998
Program Description	PK is a loose, uncoordinated, collection of several 'labor-intensive' programs in various government departments. PDM-DKE is a 'community fund' program that provides block grants directly to villages for either public works or revolving credit funds. Most (64%) participated in repairing roads; other activities included repairing irrigation (35%), and cultivating unused land (14%); many did more than one activity. Block grants to local communities directed to poorer areas with menu including public works with a labor creating effect and special labor-intensive works carried out by sectoral ministries (e.g., the Manpower Ministry which re-trained laid off workers) in both rural and urban areas; and 'food for work' program typically launched by international donors and NGOs in drought stricken areas.
Program Coverage	Planned coverage was 12.7 million man-days. About 5.6% of households have at least one member who participated. As of February 1999, estimated number of employment creation beneficiaries was 3.5 million.
Type of Benefit	Mainly cash for work. Drought relief programs tended to pay wages in kind and urban construction programs tended to have high wages. Many programs used the government legal minimum wage, which was higher than the market wage in some areas and lower elsewhere.
Study Objective	To examine the targeting performance of various components of the JPS.
Targeting Method	Geographic (based on national classification of poor) and self-selection. For PDM-DKE, initially used pre-crisis data, but was updated the following year with Bappenas regional data; in addition, took into consideration local information. For PK used no geographic targeting but depended on various ministries, but later on targeted to urban areas based on employment rates.
Targeting Mechanism	Unlike the other components of JPS, which had centralized design and implementation, these labor-creating programs were really a diverse set of programs operated by different ministries and with different criteria; at one point there were 17 different programs. The community fund scheme component permitted maximum freedom at the local level with regard to the use of funds. Decision on beneficiary selection was left to the lowest level village governing body known as the Village Community Resilience Institution (LKMD). Since official targeting guidelines were general, almost any selection decision could be justified. Since the programs were implemented under 'crisis' situation, local officials often took 'community' decisions without adequate information campaign nor community consensus building.
Program Budget	Rp. 2,066 Billion in 1998, Rp. 1,000 Billion in 1999, and Rp. 441 Billion in 2000 (due to change in fiscal year, FY2000 only 9 months). Percentage of total safety net budget (including other programs): 5.62% in 1998, 5.58% in 1999, and 2.98% in 2000.
Transfer Levels	Average daily wage received by PK programs was Rp.6,073, with average monthly amount of Rp. 27,500 (as of February 1999).

<i>Targeting Performance</i>	Based on numbers in (4), can calculate that poorest 20% of population received 29.6% of benefits: this is calculated as one minus the product of 0.8 and the “targeting ratio” (this is really an average across districts, i.e. an average of within district targeting). It should be noted that these are really averages of targeting performance within districts. Suggests only mildly progressive targeting with substantial leakage to all parts of the consumption distribution as well as possibly much undercoverage. Undercoverage and leakage high: 8.3% of the poor and 4.9% of the non-poor benefited from employment creation programs. The proportion of households at the richest quintile who participated in PK is 30% of the participation at the poorest quintile.
<i>Impact on Welfare</i>	On average, each participating household claimed to have spent 27 man-days in padat karya programs during the 6 month evaluation program (4.5 person-days per month) for a monthly average of Rp. 27,500.
<i>Targeting Costs</i>	Not available

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Study Title	(1) Indonesia's Experience with Social Safety Nets: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects; (2) The Role of Social Safety Net Scholarships in Preventing Mass School Drop-Out During the Indonesian Economic Crisis; (3) Coverage and Targeting in the Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs: Evidence from 100 Village Survey; (4) Targeted programs in an economic crisis: Empirical findings from Indonesia's experience.
Study Authors	(1) S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi; (2) L. Cameron; (3) A. Suryahadi, Y. Suharso, and S. Sumarto; (4) L. Pritchett, S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi
Study Reference	(1) Mimeo (SMERU Research Institute); (2) Mimeo, Department of Economics, University of Melbourne; (3) SMERU Working Paper, August. ; (4) Unpublished
Study Year	(1) 1999; (2) 1999; (3) 1999; (4) 2002
Country	Indonesia
Program Being Evaluated	Education scholarships and block grants; part of the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial), a social safety net program introduced after the economic crisis in August 1997.
Year Implemented	July 1998
Program Description	The education program provides scholarships directly to elementary (SD), lower secondary (SLTP), and upper secondary (SMU) students, and also gives block grants to selected schools to help them continue operating; only evaluated targeting performance of scholarships.
Program Coverage	The program was intended to reach at most 6% of primary students (excluding the lowest three grades of primary school), 17% of lower secondary, and 10% of upper secondary school students nationwide including those attending religious schools. Coverage was expected to vary by districts due to targeting. In addition, the poorest 60% of schools in each district was targeted to receive a block grant. In practice, only 4% of all primary school students received scholarships, 8.4% lower secondary student recipients, and 3.5% of all upper secondary students. As of February 1999, estimated number of beneficiaries were: 1.2m for primary school scholarship, 0.87m for lower secondary school scholarship, and 0.24m for upper secondary school scholarship.
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	To examine the targeting performance of various components of the JPS.
Targeting Method	Geographic and categorical household targeting. For geographic targeting, initially used old data on enrolment and poverty data updated to 1998 the following year. Household targeting used school committees who were instructed to use the two lowest levels of the national BKKBN poverty classification of households (see Box 601). Where the number of eligible students exceeded the numbers of scholarships available to the school, then the following additional indicators were to be used: (i) living far from school, (ii) having physical handicaps, (iii) coming from a large or single-parent family, and (iv) the likelihood of the student to drop out. Also, a minimum of 50% of scholarships, if at all possible, was to be allocated to girls. It is unclear whether or not a score was actually calculated (we are assuming it was not).
Targeting Mechanism	Programs were designed by the central government. In the scholarship program, scholarship funds were first allocated to schools so that 'poorer' schools received proportionally more scholarships. In each school, the scholarships were then allocated to individual students by a school committee, which consisted of the principal, a teacher representative, a student representative, the head of parents' association as the representative of community, and the village heads. But scholarships were paid directly to students (or their families) twice a year via a cash transfer handled by the local post office.
Program Budget	Rp. 1,138 bil. in 1998, Rp. 1,251 bil. in 1999, and Rp. 667 bil. in 2000 (due to change in fiscal year, FY2000 was only 9 months). Percentage of total safety net budget (including other programs) came to 5.62% in 1998, 5.58% in 1999, and 2.98% in 2000.
Transfer Levels	The scholarships provide cash of Rp.10,000, Rp.20,000 and Rp. 30,000 per month for primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary school students respectively.

<i>Targeting Performance</i>	Based on numbers in (4), can calculate that poorest 20% of population received 28.8% of benefits: this is calculated as one minus the product of 0.8 and the “targeting ratio” (this is really an average across districts, i.e. an average of within district targeting). It should be noted that these are really averages of targeting performance within districts. Suggests only mildly progressive targeting with substantial leakage to all parts of the consumption distribution as well as possibly much undercoverage. Also evidence that more households than planned were included and that households thus received lower rations.
<i>Impact on Welfare</i>	Not available.
<i>Targeting Costs</i>	Not available.

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Study Title	(1) Indonesia's Experience with Social Safety Nets: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects; (2) Coverage and Targeting in the Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs: Evidence from 100 Village Survey; (3) Targeted programs in an economic crisis: Empirical findings from Indonesia's experience.
Study Authors	(1) S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi; (2) A. Suryahadi, Y. Suharso, and S. Sumarto; (3) L. Pritchett, S. Sumarto and A. Suryahadi
Study Reference	(1) Mimeo (SMERU Research Institute); (2) SMERU Working Paper, August; (3) Unpublished
Study Year	(1) 1999; (2) 1999; (3) 2002
Country	Indonesia
Program Being Evaluated	Health Program: BK (kartu sehat), part of the JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial), a social safety net program introduced after the economic crisis in August 1997.
Year Implemented	July 1998
Program Description	Provision of health card to eligible households, which entitled all members of household to obtain free services from designated public health-care (mainly primary health care clinics but also some services at hospitals) centers for medical and family planning purposes, and services for ante-natal and child birth services from designated providers. While health services were to be provided free, the health units were not reimbursed for the provision of those services; but there was a quite complicated financing scheme where, among other things, local clinic funds through the program were based on the number of health card holders in their administrative area, these funds only available for certain uses.
Program Coverage	The nutrition program had second highest coverage of the JPS program, with around 16% of household receiving the benefits. Planned coverage was 7.4 million KPS households.
Type of Benefit	Health cards to be used by all members of the household to obtain free services from designated hospitals, clinics, and health care centers for medical and family planning purposes, including pregnancy check-up and birth delivery services.
Study Objective	To examine the targeting performance of various components of the JPS.
Targeting Method	Geographic and categorical household targeting. Used the household classification created by the National Family Planning Coordinating Agency (BKKBN; see Box 601) to undertake both geographic (based on KPS rates) and household targeting with a bit of flexibility for household targeting.
Targeting Mechanism	Programs were designed by the central government. Modifications from BKKBN made by local administration via a "health committee".
Program Budget	Rp. 1,043 billion in 1998, Rp. 1,030 billion in 1999, and Rp. 867 billion in 2000 (due to change in fiscal year, FY2000 was only 9 months). Percentage of total safety net budget (including other programs): 5.62% in 1998, 5.58% in 1999, and 2.98% in 2000.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Based on numbers in (4), can calculate that poorest 20% of population received 33.6% of benefits: this is calculated as one minus the product of 0.8 and the "targeting ratio" (this is really an average across districts, i.e. an average of within district targeting). It should be noted that these are really averages of targeting performance within districts. Suggests only mildly progressive targeting with substantial leakage to all parts of the consumption distribution as well as possibly much undercoverage. Also evidence that more households than planned were included and that households thus received lower rations: about 16.5% of poor and 15.8% of non-poor households received the benefits from the nutrition program, while about 11% of the poor and 5% of the non-poor benefited from medical services. Coverage at the highest quintile relative to coverage at the lowest quintile is 29% for medical services, and 86% for nutrition program.
Impact on Welfare	Those who used the health cards spent an average out of pocket expenses of Rp. 41,312 while those who did not spent Rp. 2.97m showing a large potential saving from using the card. Some did not use probably wanting better medical treatment.
Targeting Costs	Not available

606	
Study Title	Is there an intrahousehold “flypaper effect”? Evidence from a school feeding program
Study Authors	H. Jacoby
Study Reference	Mimeo, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Study Year	1999
Country	Philippines
Program Being Evaluated	School Feeding Program
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Metropolitan Cebu area on the island of Cebu, Philippines. The main feeding program is sponsored by the relief agency CARE. Program characteristics vary across schools. Some operate multiple programs, some charge nominal fee for the food to defray the cost of preparing the food (almost all the schools charge for the indigenous programs, but fewer than half of the children covered by the CARE program are charged for it), but always less than half a peso, which is very small amount even by Filipino standards.
Program Coverage	On average about 15% of those who attended school on the reference day participated in some kind of school feeding program.
Type of Benefit	In-kind transfer
Study Objective	Assess the extent of intra-household re-allocation of food
Targeting Method	Demographic: school children. In some area, the program is available only to children in lower grades, and some screen recipients according to the severity of malnutrition.
Targeting Mechanism	Schools administer the programs.
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Provides about 303 kcal on average, or about 20% of daily calories.
Targeting Performance	Not available
Impact on Welfare	School feeding programs significantly increase caloric intake during these meals; on average, intakes increase by 90-100% of the program rations. The evidence indicates virtually no intra-household reallocation of calories in response to school feeding programs. The evidence also suggests that children’s gains from the programs are “taxed” more heavily in poorer households.
Targeting Costs	Not available

607	
Study Title	Strengthening policies and programmes on social safety nets: Issues, recommendations and selected studies
Study Authors	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Study Reference	Social Development Division, ESCAP, Social Policy Paper No. 8, Thailand.
Study Year	2001
Country	The Philippines
Program Being Evaluated	Rice subsidy program operated by the National Food Authority
Year Implemented	1981 onwards
Program Description	Food subsidy
Program Coverage	Universal, in principle
Type of Benefit	Food subsidy
Study Objective	Describe social safety nets in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.
Targeting Method	Self targeting (subsidy to food with low income elasticity), some use of geographical targeting and means testing (poor families, as identified by social workers, were given cards entitling them to discounts)
Targeting Mechanism	NFA is both a buyer and seller in the domestic rice market and the sole importer/exporter of rice. Rice is sold by registered retailers as well as NFA's own stores in "depressed and remote areas".
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Regional distribution of subsidized rice is not sensitive to regional poverty incidence. It is estimated that it costs 1.3 pesos to transfer 1 peso to consumers; it is estimated that it costs 2.5 pesos to transfer 1 peso to a poor consumer.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

608	
Study Title	(1) Cash Assistance in Korea; (2) Income distribution and public transfers as social safety nets in Korea; (3) Strengthening policies and programmes on social safety nets: Issues, recommendations and selected studies
Study Authors	(1) Sang Kyun Kim; (2) S. Kim and M.W. Lee (3) United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Study Reference	(1) Mimeo, Seoul National University; (2) Journal of Economic Development, December, Vol. 26(2): 61-75. (3) Social Development Division, ESCAP, Social Policy Paper No. 8, Thailand.
Study Year	(1) 1999; (2) 2001 (3) 2001
Country	Korea
Program Being Evaluated	Livelihood Protection System (LPS)
Year Implemented	1961 onwards
Program Description	(1) There are three types of care: institutional, home, and self-support care. The LPS (and TLPS, see 606) distinguishes between livelihood aid recipients and self-support recipients. For livelihood aid recipients, they provide livelihood aid differentially (transfers are classified into 1-6 levels and households are classified into 1-6 persons) in addition to Medicaid (type 1), educational care, maternity aid and funeral aid. For self-support recipients, they provide assistance during six months (January, February, March, October, November, December) according to the six income levels and also provide Medicaid, educational care, maternity aid and funeral aid. For self-support recipients and low income beneficiaries (whose income is less than W600,000 per month without any unemployment benefits or assets), there are special working projects providing W300,000 / 15 days of work per month. Also see (3)
Program Coverage	(1) 1.16 million beneficiaries or about 2.4% of the population. Also see (3)
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	(1) Analyze the changing process of cash assistance in Korea in the context of social safety nets, focusing on the period of economic crisis from November 1997 to 1999. (2) Assess impact of public transfers on income distribution. (3) Describe social safety nets in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.
Targeting Method	Categorical (demographic) and means-tested. For livelihood aid, recipients are children under 18, the elderly over 65, the disabled, and pregnant women with no one to support them. For Self-support aid, beneficiaries are people affected by unemployment, accident, disease, etc, targeting those with income less than W230000 and property of less than W29 million.
Targeting Mechanism	Applicants fill in application forms and submit them to the appropriate Eup, Myun, or Dong office. After the application form is received, public social worker makes home visits and conducts a means test which is subsequently verified.
Program Budget	(1) Budget of W1453 billion (W234 billion for livelihood aid to self-help recipients – see also TLPS).
Transfer Levels	(1) For livelihood aid, there is a gradation of benefits ranging from income levels 1-6 and household size of 1-6 (6 indicating more than 6 persons), with per person benefit ranging from Won 54,330 to Won 152,130 per month. There is Medicaid (total cost of outpatient/inpatient care), educational aid includes tuition of the children; maternity aid and funeral aid. The following are provided for self-support aid. Special livelihood aid (during only 6 months in 1999: Jan., Feb., Mar., Oct., Nov., Dec), based on 6 income level criteria (W79,000 for household of 1 person – W32,000 for household of 6 person). Special work project (W300 000 – 15 days of work per month) – qualifications of the recipients are low-income household without unemployment benefit or savings assets (55,000 persons expected per month); exceptions: more than average income household (W600,000 per month) benefited from public works, special work projects and ordinary working households. Another benefit is Medicaid (type 2): W15000 per visit for outpatient care / 20% co-payment for inpatient care. Educational aid includes tuition of the children, and maternity aid allows W120000 per person. For both LPS and TLPS, livelihood aid of W50,000 per month to 130,000 households among self-support recipients.
Targeting Performance	(2) 32.31% of benefits to poorest decile; 56.8% of benefits to poorest quintile; 72.3% of benefits to poorest two quintiles
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

609	
Study Title	Cash Assistance in Korea
Study Authors	Sang Kyun Kim
Study Reference	Mimeo, Seoul National University
Study Year	1999
Country	Korea
Program Being Evaluated	Cash assistance program: Temporary Livelihood Protection System (TLPS)
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	TLPS is one aspect of the reformed and expanded LPS (above) and has been implemented to secure the minimum standard of living for the low-income classes for a certain period (one year). TLPS can be considered as a transitional program toward establishing social safety nets as well as a countermeasure policy for unemployment. Both the LPS and TLPS make distinctions between livelihood aid recipients and self-support recipients. For livelihood aid recipients, they provide livelihood aid differentially (income is classified into 1-6 levels and household is classified into 1-6 persons) in addition to Medicaid, educational care, maternity aid and funeral aid. For self-help recipients, they provide special livelihood cost for the six months of 1999 (Jan. Feb. Mar. Oct. Nov. Dec.) according to the six income levels and also provide medicaid, educational care, maternity aid and funeral aid. For self-support recipients and also for the low income beneficiaries whose income is less than W600,000 per month among working households without any unemployment benefits or savings assets, there are special working projects providing W300,000 / 15 days of work per month.
Program Coverage	0.76 million beneficiaries - includes 0.19 million beneficiaries of livelihood protection and 0.38 million self-help program beneficiaries. 0.76 million includes 0.57 million recipients of temporary livelihood aid.
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Analyze the changing process of cash assistance in Korea in the context of social safety nets, focusing on the period of economic crisis from November 1997 to 1999.
Targeting Method	Categorical and means-tested. The livelihood protection program targets people unable to maintain themselves because of unemployment among daily construction workers, temporary guards, domestic servants, waiters, and other daily employed workers; and people unable to maintain themselves because of unemployment or loss of means of living among the self-help recipients. For self-support aid, beneficiaries are people unable to maintain themselves because of unemployment, accident, disease, etc., not in institutional care or home care. It targets those with income less than W230,000 and property of less than W29 million. Targeted towards low-income population with less than w230,000 per person by month/ less than W44 million (property).
Targeting Mechanism	Applicants fill in application forms and submit them to the appropriate Eup, Myun, or Dong office. After the application form is received, public social worker makes home visits and holds means test. Then the beneficiary is confirmed and informed.
Program Budget	Budget of W497 billion (W234 billion for livelihood aid to self-help recipients – see also LPS, 605).

<i>Transfer Levels</i>	Low-income unemployed can receive support up to W320,000 of livelihood aid. For livelihood protection, livelihood aid gradation of benefits is given. Additional benefits are the coverage of total cost of outpatient / inpatient care, maternity aid allows W120,000 per person. Funeral aid comes to W50,000 per person. The following are provided for self-support aid: special livelihood aid (in Jan., Feb., Mar., Oct., Nov., Dec), based on 6 income level criteria (W79,000 for household of 1 person – W32,000 for household of 6 person); special work project (W300,000 – 15 days of work per month) – qualifications of the recipients are low-income household without unemployment benefit or savings assets (55,000 persons expected per month). Exceptions: more than average income household (W600,000 per month) benefited from public works, special work projects and ordinary working households. Another benefit is Medicaid: W1,5000 per visit for outpatient care / 20% co-payment for inpatient care. Also educational aid includes tuition of the children, and maternity aid allows W120,000 per person. Funeral aid comes to W50,000 per person. For both LPS and TLPS, livelihood aid of W50,000 per month to 130,000 households among self-support recipients. Special benefit to all self-support recipients on Chu-Seok (Korean Thanksgiving Day) of W50,360/household.
<i>Targeting Performance</i>	Not available
<i>Impact on Welfare</i>	Not available
<i>Targeting Costs</i>	Not available

610	
Study Title	(1) Income distribution and public transfers as social safety nets in Korea; (2) Strengthening policies and programmes on social safety nets: Issues, recommendations and selected studies
Study Authors	(1) S. Kim and M.W. Lee (2) United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Study Reference	(1) Journal of Economic Development, December, Vol. 26(2): 61-75. (2) Social Development Division, ESCAP, Social Policy Paper No. 8, Thailand.
Study Year	(1) 2001 (2) 2001
Country	South Korea
Program Being Evaluated	National pension
Year Implemented	1988 onwards
Program Description	Old age pension
Program Coverage	(2) In 1998, 7.8 million people
Type of Benefit	Cash
Study Objective	(1) Assess impact of public transfers on income distribution (2) Describe social safety nets in Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand.
Targeting Method	Categorical – individuals must be 65 or older to qualify
Targeting Mechanism	Funds are provided by central government
Program Budget	(2) In 1998, 7.4 billion won.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	(1) 10.5% of benefits to poorest two quintiles
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

611	
Study Title	Social Investment Fund Annual Progress Report for the year 2000
Study Authors	Social Fund Office, World Bank
Study Reference	Mimeo, World Bank, Washington
Study Year	2000
Country	Thailand
Program Being Evaluated	Social Fund
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Projects include: 1) Capacity and Learning Development in Community Occupation and Community Economy; 2) Community Welfare and Safety; 3) Restoration, Protection, Management and Promotion of Culture, Environment and Natural Resources; 4) Community Capacity Building and Networking; and 5) Immediate Community Welfare for the Needy through Community Organization, added during April – June 1999. Community organizations requested the most sub-projects (6,425), followed by village committees (736 projects).
Program Coverage	Requests total of 8,548 projects during the period, covering 11 regions. Actual funded projects total 1,626. Approved sub-projects provide benefits to approximately 3 million beneficiaries.
Type of Benefit	In-kind project output
Study Objective	Not available
Targeting Method	Regional targeting map to select areas. Sub-projects under 5) use community-based targeting, and the community network organization has to present the list of the specific beneficiaries; beneficiaries are supposed to express their own needs.
Targeting Mechanism	Mechanism supposed to be consistent with the Fund's decentralization. Proposals are submitted to the Government Savings Bank branch offices nation wide. Registration is done by the Fund's office; the screening and appraising is done by the respective Provincial Task Forces. Regional Committee considers it and then the Fund's Executive Committee with the Regional Committee makes recommendations.
Program Budget	1,626 sub-projects with a total budget of 1,604 million baht have received SIF funding support.
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Of 3.2 million beneficiaries, the project reached 896,609 poor (28% of beneficiaries), 36,526 disabled, 261,666 homeward migrants, 599,176 women, 83,406 unemployed, 133,084 senior citizens, 356,526 children and youths, 6,605 HIV patients, 1,033 addicts.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

612	
Study Title	Thailand Social Safety Nets Policies and Programs
Study Authors	Not available
Study Reference	World Bank, Mimeo
Study Year	2001
Country	Thailand
Program Being Evaluated	Low-Income Health Card
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Cardholders receive health care services free from the government health care establishment.
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	In-kind (health services)
Study Objective	Overview of programs
Targeting Method	Means tested, categorical, demographic. Households with monthly income of less than 2,800, single persons with monthly income less than 2,000. Elderly, disabled, veterans, religious leaders, HIV/AIDS patients, and children 0-12 years old.
Targeting Mechanism	Administered by Health Insurance Office, Ministry of Public Health
Program Budget	7,835.1 million baht in 2000
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Not available
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

613	
Study Title	Thailand Social Safety Nets Policies and Programs
Study Authors	Not available
Study Reference	World Bank, Mimeo
Study Year	2001
Country	Thailand
Program Being Evaluated	School Lunch Project
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Lunch for pre-school and elementary schools, malnourished students
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	Food (in-kind)
Study Objective	Overview of programs
Targeting Method	Categorical: targeted to pre/elementary schools, malnourished
Targeting Mechanism	Administered by Ministry of Education
Program Budget	3,499.21 million Baht in 2001
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Not available
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

614	
Study Title	Thailand Social Safety Nets Policies and Programs
Study Authors	Not available
Study Reference	World Bank, Mimeo
Study Year	2001
Country	Thailand
Program Being Evaluated	School Milk Project
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Milk for pre-school and Grades 1-4 students
Program Coverage	Not available
Type of Benefit	In-kind (milk)
Study Objective	Overview of programs
Targeting Method	Categorical: Pre/elementary school (grades 1-4)
Targeting Mechanism	Administered by the Ministry of Education
Program Budget	4,752.4 million Baht in 2001
Transfer Levels	Not available
Targeting Performance	Not available
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available

615	
Study Title	(1) The static and dynamic incidence of Vietnam's public safety net (2) The Poor at Risk: Surviving the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia. Chapter 6 – Vietnam (3) Protecting the Poor in Vietnam's Emerging Market Economy
Study Authors	(1) D. van de Walle (2) Vu Tuan Anh (3) D. van de Walle
Study Reference	(1) Mimeo, World Bank, Washington D.C. (2) Centre for Southeast Asian Research / Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia (3) Policy Research Working Paper – 1969
Study Year	(1) 2002 (2) 2000 (3) 1998
Country	Vietnam
Program Being Evaluated	Social Guarantee Fund for Regular Relief
Year Implemented	1990s
Program Description	Help for such groups (orphans, the disabled, the insane, and the elderly without family support) unable to support themselves
Program Coverage	195 social relief centers (as of 1995)
Type of Benefit	Monthly cash or in-kind (rice) transfer, placement into specialized provincial care centers, and community support.
Study Objective	(1) Assess effectiveness of Vietnam's public safety net
Targeting Method	Categorical: orphans, the disabled, the insane, and the elderly without family support unable to support themselves. They are divided into two groups: those who are able to go about their daily lives with support from the community, and those who cannot.
Targeting Mechanism	Commune and district officials are responsible for implementation. They compile lists of people who qualify for regular relief according to the norms dictated by the Center. Lists are sent to central government, and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry for Planning and Investment each review and make recommendations to the national assembly for a final decision. Recommendations and decisions on transfers are based on various considerations (number of potential beneficiaries, population size, budget expenditures, and geographical classifications). Labor Departments at district and commune levels are in charge of distributing transferred funds from provincial budgets to individuals (and (1) identifies this as being problematic).
Program Budget	Not available
Transfer Levels	A monthly stipend of VND 24,000, often given in the form of rice (10-12 kg) for those unable to go about daily lives without support from the community. Placement into specialized provincial care centers and a monthly allowance of VND 96,000 for those unable to tackle daily lives even with support from the community.
Targeting Performance	(2), (3) MOLISA figures for 1993 indicate that, nationwide, only 10% of orphans, 21% of the “lonely” elderly, and 5% of the disabled population actually received program benefits. In addition, there is a large variance across regions in terms of eligibility and coverage.
Impact on Welfare	(1) Incidence is mildly progressive, poorest quintile receives 24.4% of benefits
Targeting Costs	Not available

616	
Study Title	Poverty, Social Services, and Safety Nets in Vietnam
Study Authors	N. Prescott
Study Reference	World Bank Discussion Paper No. 376,
Study Year	1997
Country	Vietnam
Program Being Evaluated	Safety Nets
Year Implemented	1990s (and possibly earlier)
Program Description	Pensions and social transfers for disability, war invalids/ martyr, natural calamities, regular relief and social evils
Program Coverage	In 1994, there were 5.2 million beneficiaries: 1.2 million pensioners, 500,000 disabled beneficiaries, 400,000 handicapped war veterans and one million martyrs' families, 2 million beneficiaries due to natural calamities, 140,000 beneficiaries of regular relief. These transfers benefit an estimated 15 million people; 21% of the population, living in households that received one or both kinds of transfers. These include about 10 million beneficiaries of spending on pensions and disability, and another 7 million beneficiaries of other social subsidy payments (some overlap and receive both kinds of transfer).
Type of Benefit	Cash transfer
Study Objective	Examines the changing role of the public sector in financing and provision of social services and safety nets in Vietnam, and assesses its efficiency in targeting public resources to the poor given the economic policy reforms initiated in 1989.
Targeting Method	Categorical
Targeting Mechanism	Not available
Program Budget	Public spending on social services and safety net programs absorbs around one-third of the government's discretionary current expenditure. By 1994, the budget for pensions and social relief has more than doubled since 1992 to 5,074 billion dong: 2,634 billion dong for pensions, 1,536 billion dong for the disabled, 371 billion dong for war invalids and martyrs' families, 400 billion dong for recipients due to natural calamities, 63 billion dong for recipients of regular relief, and 70 billion dong for social evils.
Transfer Levels	In 1994, expenditures per recipient amount to: 2,281,000 dong for pensions, 3,072,000 dong for the disabled, 265,000 dong for war invalids/martyrs' families, 200,000 dong for recipients due to natural calamities, and 450,000 dong for regular relief.
Targeting Performance	Transfers per beneficiary rise sharply across income groups. Pension and disability payments average only 158 thousand dong per year per beneficiary in the poorest 20% of the population, increasing threefold to 370 thousand dong per beneficiary from the richest quintile. The same is true for other social subsidies, which rise from 18 thousand in the bottom quintile to 50 thousand in the top quintile. The proportion of people in each quintile who benefit from the pension and disability payments also increases with income, rising from 9% of the poorest to 17% of the richest. This pattern is reversed for the other social subsidies – 13% of the poorest and 9% of the richest are beneficiaries of these payments. The poorest 20% of the population benefits from only 7% of national expenditures on pension and disability payments, and 13% of spending on other social subsidies (8% of combined expenditure on both programs). Only their share of social spending on "other social subsidies" exceeds the 8% of national consumption, which accrues to the poorest quintile. Instead, 38% of government social transfer expenditure goes to the richest quintile; most of it (over 80%) is spent on pension and disability payments, which pays more per beneficiary.
Impact on Welfare	Not available
Targeting Costs	Not available