



**Social Policy, Perceptions
and the Press: An Analysis
of the Media's Treatment of
Conditional Cash Transfers
in Brazil**

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December 2010

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FINAL DRAFT

SOCIAL PROTECTION DISCUSSION PAPER¹

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December 2010

¹ The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this study are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the World Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries it represents. Moreover, these findings are the result of a research study and have no links with the World Bank's direct engagement with the Bolsa Familia Program or with the BFP itself. For further information on the paper, please contact Kathy Lindert, klindert@worldbank.org

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This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on the political economy of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) by analyzing perceptions about these social policy instruments as portrayed and debated in free and independent press in Brazil. We catalogued and analyzed over 6,500 articles from six newspapers over a six year period (2001-06), covering two governments and two policy regimes (the Bolsa Escola/pre-Bolsa Familia era, from 2001-03; and the Bolsa Familia era, from 2004-06). Our analysis shows that CCTs have been highly visible in the Brazilian press, and the frequency of media coverage expanded as the programs scaled up. We also find that while the press may endorse the overall *concept* of CCTs as a social policy instrument, the quality of *implementation* matters not only for program effectiveness but for public acceptance. The press will publicize perceived weaknesses with increased scrutiny, particularly in the face of elections (political interplay). The press *also* reports favorably on Government actions to improve implementation quality. Without claiming causality, we observed several junctures in which this *interplay* between vibrant public debate in the media, on the one hand, and proactive and transparent actions by the Government, on the other hand, seems to have contributed to strengthening the program through what could be viewed as a “virtuous cycle” of accountability (technical interplay). Finally, our analysis suggests a possible “political economy” equation surrounding key design and implementation parameters for CCTs:

- **“Public Perceptions Assets:”** Some design and implementation features help garner public support for these instruments of social policy, for example: conditionalities *when monitored* (political role for conditionalities); targeting accuracy and perceptions of fairness; implementation quality (it matters!).
- **“Public Perceptions Liabilities:”** Other aspects spawn media criticism, such as perceptions of unchecked fraud and errors, perceived weaknesses in registries, a lack of monitoring of conditionalities, and perceptions of welfare dependency.

These parameters seem to matter both technically (for program effectiveness) and politically (for legitimacy and credibility in the public eye). In other words, we suggest that what works technically (“good policy”), works politically (“good politics”) – and public debate around this intersection of the technical and the political can help promote accountability in social policy.

Acknowledgements

This paper is the second in a series of papers on the experience of CCTs in Brazil. The first covered the “nuts and bolts” of designing and implementing the Bolsa Familia Program in Brazil’s decentralized context, and is considered the “technical companion” paper to this study of the media’s treatment of CCTs.

Data collection (construction of the media database of articles on CCTs) and analysis for this paper was conducted in 2007-08 while the authors were based in Brazil. The findings were presented to, and discussed with, the Minister and officials from Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development, as well as the broader Social Cabinet (Gabinete Social), in a series of meetings in March 2008. We greatly appreciate their feedback and insights into the findings. That same month, we also presented the preliminary findings of the study to journalists from the Brazilian press. Due to the time demands of job changes for both authors, the finalization of the report was delayed until early 2010. In the interim, the authors presented the findings on numerous occasions to practitioners of CCTs and other social assistance programs from countries around the world (e.g., at the World Bank’s core social safety nets course and other seminars). The feedback and comments received in all of these discussions were highly appreciated.

We would also like to thank Mauro Azeredo for his continuous guidance on the study and comments on earlier drafts, as well as peer reviewers Harold Alderman, Margaret Grosh, Helena Ribe, Ian Walker, and Cesar Zucco for their encouragement and insightful suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper. We have done our best to incorporate the feedback kindly provided from all reviewers.

Finally, this paper is dedicated in the memory of Rosani Cunha, former head of the Bolsa Familia program. A devoted professional, Rosani clearly understood the importance of quality in management and implementation of the program, both for generating impressive impacts and for garnering public support for its sustainability. Her legacy endures with the contributions of the Bolsa Familia Program to improving the lives of over 50 million Brazilians – and the lives of countless poor families that benefit from the support of similar CCT programs in countries around the world.

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Social Policy, Perceptions and the Press:

An Analysis of the Media's Treatment of Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

What are CCTs? Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are social policy instruments that provide cash assistance to poor families on the condition that those households invest in the human capital of their children in pre-specified ways. They seek to help (a) reduce current poverty and inequality, by providing a minimum level of income for extremely poor families; and (b) break the inter-generational transmission of poverty by conditioning these transfers on beneficiary compliance with human capital requirements (e.g., school attendance, vaccines, pre-natal visits).

The Spread of CCTs. The use of CCTs as an instrument of social policy has spread to some thirty countries around the world over the past 15 years. Initiated in Brazil and then Mexico in the mid-1990s, some 15 countries in Latin America now have CCT programs. Elsewhere, CCT programs are under implementation or being introduced in countries in East Asia (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, for example), South Asia (Bangladesh, Pakistan for example), Europe and Central Asia (Turkey, Macedonia, Kazakhstan), Africa (examples include: Ethiopia, Malawi, Morocco, South Africa) – and recently in higher-income OECD countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States (New York City and Washington, DC). Both within and across countries, CCTs have been espoused by Governments representing political parties and views across the political spectrum.

Proven Impacts of CCTs. As researched extensively in Fiszbein and Schady (2009), there is good evidence that CCTs have improved the lives of poor people. CCTs have been among the most evaluated instruments of social policy. Many programs have built in randomized impact evaluations from the start. Many have demonstrated impressive impacts, raising consumption levels, reducing poverty and inequality, and promoting use of education and health care services.³ These impacts have been widely publicized both internationally and within the countries where they occur, and are viewed in some instances in helping preserve CCT programs across government transitions (e.g., with Mexico's Progres-Oportunidades transition).

Economic Rationale for CCTs. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) also explore the justification for attaching human-capital conditions to cash transfers as an instrument of social policy. From a micro-economics perspective, such conditions can be justified if households are under-investing in the human capital of their children. Under-investing can occur either because market imperfections make private investment in human capital too low in the absence of such “demand-side” conditionalities (because parents are unclear about the subsequent returns to these investments, or because of “incomplete altruism” between parents and their children) or because positive

³ See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for an overview of the international evidence of impacts of CCTs. Offsetting effects that could have blunted the impacts of transfers – such as potential reductions in labor market participation of adult beneficiaries – have been relatively modest.

externalities of health and education make private investment lower than what would be socially optimal.

Political Rationale for CCTs. Political economy considerations also suggest a rationale for CCTs, and the present paper focuses on this strand of the debate. The literature explores the potential link between CCTs and politics from two angles: (a) the philosophical appeal of CCTs as a “social contract;” and (b) the “long road to accountability” with CCTs generating votes for politicians as returns to “good policies.”

First, the literature suggests the philosophical appeal of CCTs as advancing a “*social contract*” whereby attaching conditions to the behavior of beneficiaries of cash transfers can help make redistribution to the poor more “palatable” to society and to taxpayers whose support is needed to fund the program. As Fiszbein and Schady (2009) eloquently summarize: those who object to unconditional cash transfers as “pure handouts” might be more inclined to support them if they are part of a “social contract” that requires recipients to take concrete steps to improve their lives or those of their children. With this view, CCTs are viewed as an anti-poverty program with both short- and long-run impacts, rather than a plain social assistance transfer. In Brazil, CCTs have found support as a social policy instrument adopted by local and national governments across the political spectrum (as discussed in more detail below). However, the *rhetoric* among politicians and in the media emphasizes differing views of the role CCTs play in the social contract in society.

Second, the literature emphasizes the *potential electoral impacts of CCTs* via the “long road to accountability,” with CCTs generating votes for politicians as returns to “good policies.” With CCTs, it seems, that “what works technically” (targeting accuracy, fraud and error controls, monitoring of conditionalities, and proven impacts), largely aligns with “what works politically” (with increased political support and votes). While this broad alignment of “the technical” with “the political” may occur for CCTs, one does not commonly observe it for other areas of social policy, such as taxation, labor policy, or pension reforms. It is important to note that the potential impacts of CCTs on voter decisions is indirect since enrollment in the program does not require political brokers or intermediaries, since receipt of benefits is not conditional on demonstrating political loyalty, and since there is no penalty to beneficiaries for voting against the government.⁴ As such, any potential impact of CCT programs on electoral patterns represents a “long route to accountability,”⁵ whereby elected officials derive rewards or punishments from the electorate for their perceived role as service provider. These perceptions matter in eliciting (or rebuffing) votes not only from actual and potential beneficiaries, but also the perceptions of the value and implementation of the program by the general population.

De Janvry et. al. (2006) provide some initial evidence of this “long route to accountability” with their finding that voters in Brazil were more likely to re-elect incumbent mayors⁶ when they were

⁴ Hunter and Power (Spring 2007).

⁵ De Janvry et. al. (2006).

⁶ As discussed in Lindert et. al. (May 2007), while the federal government oversees the Bolsa Familia Program (and previously the Bolsa Escola program), municipalities are responsible for implementing certain functions, such as registration of potential beneficiaries (but not eligibility determination which is carried out centrally with automated criteria and cross-checks), monitoring of compliance with conditionalities, and local program oversight (including through citizen’s oversight councils – social controls).

perceived as managing the Bolsa Escola (early CCT) program effectively.⁷ They also find that voters in Brazil were more likely to re-elect incumbent mayors in municipalities with higher measured educational impacts of the Bolsa Escola program (early CCT).

In another study, Zucco (October 2009 and December 2009) uses municipal-level data on voting patterns⁸ and program coverage to assess the electoral impacts of Brazil's flagship CCT program (the Bolsa Familia program). To assess the potential impact of Bolsa Familia on voting patterns, Zucco applies a variety of modeling techniques that allow for the separation of the effects of Bolsa Familia into its direct effect over beneficiaries and the indirect effects it has as an economic stimulus (even for non-beneficiaries). He finds that the operation of the program contributed both directly and indirectly to President Lula's re-election in 2006 by garnering support among an estimated 5 million additional pro-Lula voters (representing a significant share of the 6.5 million margin by which Lula won the final election). Zucco also notes that this effect derives from "good policy" (technical quality, impacts) leading to "good politics" since the program appears to have had an impact on both beneficiaries (without being conditional on voting) and non-beneficiaries.

Similarly, Hunter and Power (Spring 2007) find that the Bolsa Familia program had a significant impact on electoral results in the presidential elections of 2006, by consolidating his voter base (particularly among swing voters) in states with higher degrees of program penetration and increasing voter turnout. They note that the social policy impacts of Bolsa Familia are "the single most plausible explanation of Lula's re-election. Put simply, the poor are significantly better off now (in 2006) than they were when Lula assumed the government in January 2003, and this group exerted the most influence in re-electing him."⁹

Objectives of the Paper. In this context, this paper seeks to make a modest contribution to the literature on the political economy of CCTs by analyzing perceptions about CCTs as portrayed and debated in free and independent press in Brazil. The motives behind the study are to contribute to an understanding of the public debate about this type of social policy instrument, given its widespread popularity and potential to reduce poverty and inequality and the replication of this type of instrument in many countries around the world. We examine the "flavor" of this public debate at two levels: (a) the "macro level," looking at overall press coverage and the tone of media articles towards CCTs in Brazil; and (b) the "micro level," digging deeper into the media treatment of technical design and implementation features.

Overview of Methodology. The basic methodology for analyzing the media's treatment of CCTs and social policy reforms involves cataloguing articles from the printed press into a database and then analyzing them using basic descriptive quantitative and qualitative techniques. Specifically,

⁷ Specifically, de Janvry et. al. (2006) found that voters were more likely to re-elect incumbent mayors in municipalities with higher coverage, higher targeting accuracy (perceptions of lower errors of inclusion), established social oversight councils, and higher impacts than those with less effectively managed Bolsa Escola benefits. These results were statistically significant for the 2004 elections, controlling for other factors (mayoral characteristics, municipal characteristics, program management, political and governance characteristics, public information, etc.), for a sample of 261 randomly-selected municipalities in the Northeast.

⁸ See Zucco (October 2009 and December 2009). An important contextual factor for this voter analysis is that voting is *required* of all citizens in Brazil, a feature that is not necessarily replicated in countries with CCTs around the world.

⁹ Djissey Shikida, et. al. (May 2009) dissent, however. Using spatial analysis and econometric methods, they find that President Lula had more votes in less developed municipalities and suggest that his electoral success in these areas derived more from changes in the labor market, low inflation, and other economic factors, thus casting doubt on the analyses that attribute significant electoral impacts to the Bolsa Familia program.

we catalogued and analyzed more than 6,500 articles from six newspapers¹⁰ (national and regional) to evaluate press treatment of CCT programs over a six year period (2001-06), covering two governments and two policy regimes (the Bolsa Escola/pre-Bolsa Familia era, from 2001-03; and the Bolsa Familia era, from 2004-06). We complement this primary data source (printed press articles) with technical knowledge and information on the implementation of these programs, as documented in the “nuts and bolts” companion paper to this study (see Lindert et. al. (May 2007)). We acknowledge limitations to the research methodology, including potential sample biases associated with the limited non-random sample of six Brazilian newspapers, as well as the descriptive nature of the analysis, which does not attempt to establish causality.

Actors in the Policy Debate. That Brazil has a free and government-independent press is of considerable importance and the premise for this analysis. This premise is not always replicated elsewhere. In this analysis, we view the media as an important actor in the debate around social policy, both reflecting and influencing public opinion. However, we do not attempt to determine if the *press* is the main *driver* of public debate or if the media simply *reflects* the on-going debate in broader society. Articles often report on the views of multiple informants, reflecting diverse sources of information and opinions – in addition to their own. Nor do we attempt to determine causality regarding who sets the policy agenda. In the course of events and the analysis, there are some points where it does *appear* that the press was an important actor in pushing and influencing the debate around key features of CCTs (for example on conditionalities monitoring, oversight and controls, and welfare dependency). Moreover, in several cases, that debate seems to have contributed (along with other factors) to the Government undertaking actions to strengthen the program. The Government was *also* an important participant in the debates on social policy, and took a stance of communicating transparently on both positive and negative aspects. In turn, the tone and frequency of press coverage seems to adjust to reflect both weaknesses and improvements accurately over the broad course of the six year study period. Yet we also recognize that many factors are operating simultaneously at any given moment, and as such we cannot establish such causality and hence have tried to be cautious about the use of language that could infer cause and effect. Suffice it to say that this interplay between the free and independent press, the Government and other actors seems to have contributed to the high quality of the debate, and ultimately to the success of the programs.

Applicability and Interest to CCTs Around the World? It is also important to note that, while we believe that many of the findings are of interest to policy makers and CCT program managers around the world, one cannot generalize the experience of one country and assume that all findings apply elsewhere. Nonetheless, we believe that the findings are of interest to the broader international “CCT community.” At the very least it is instructive to think about (a) which design and implementation features of CCTs attract press attention and what is the tone of the media towards these aspects; (b) the almost inevitable political ebb-and-flow of press tone towards flagship social programs with the electoral cycle; and (c) the interplay between the tone of the media debate and technical weaknesses and improvements to the programs – which suggests a potential virtuous cycle of accountability on both sides (media and government).

¹⁰ The study seeks to analyze the overall debate about these programs in the (printed) press, but does not attempt to analyze or identify specific editorial lines of specific newspapers. As discussed in more detail in the section on research methodology below, this study uses articles from the printed press (six newspapers) for reasons of practicality and does not analyze the flavor of the debate in other media sources, such as radio, television (broadcast news), or the internet.

Summary of Main Messages. With these caveats, we suggest ten key take-away messages. The first five relate to “macro perceptions” of CCTs as an instrument of social policy. The second set of five relate to “micro perceptions” of specific design and implementation features. Their potential implications for policy makers and practitioners of CCTs around the world are discussed in the concluding section.

1. **High Visibility.** CCTs have been highly visible in the Brazilian press. The frequency of press coverage of CCTs has increased over time and with the scale of the program, averaging an article a day in each newspaper under the Bolsa Familia Program by 2006. This vibrancy of public debate around key social policy issues should be welcomed.
2. **General endorsement of the concept of CCTs.** Overall, most articles endorse the general *concept* of CCTs as a social policy instrument in Brazil, though a significant share do emphasize concerns about *implementation*.
3. **Scaling-Up Dilemma.** Rapid scaling up carries both benefits and risks. On the one hand, increased program coverage (which was mirrored by an increase in press coverage) – can be viewed as being responsive to social, political and poverty challenges – particularly in a context with general endorsement of the overall concept of CCTs. On the other hand, scaling up also requires mature operating systems that are not always fully functional in the early stages of program implementation. The press will “jump on” perceived weaknesses as the program scales up.
4. **Technical Interplay.**¹¹ Press treatment of CCTs does reflect *both* technical strengths and perceived weaknesses in the implementation of the program. While the press will report on technical weaknesses with increased scrutiny and criticism, the tone of media coverage will also become more favorable when the Government makes improvements in implementation quality, implying a potential “virtuous cycle” of accountability for both the press and the Government.
5. **Political Interplay.** As with all flagship social programs, elections bring increased scrutiny. The findings do suggest a spike in press attention of CCTs before elections in Brazil, and this pattern of increased press scrutiny is independent of program or political regime (it was observed for governments on both ends of the political spectrum).
6. **Sequencing of Social Policy Challenges.** Press coverage mirrored the expected evolution of “first generation challenges” (targeting, benefits administration) and “second generation” issues (graduation agenda, welfare dependency).
7. **Targeting Accuracy, Perceptions of Social Justice.** In Brazil, press reports primarily emphasize errors of inclusion (even though leakages to the non-poor are empirically small) over errors of exclusion. This could reflect society’s emphasis on perceptions of “justice for the poor,” fairness,” and a possible preference for narrow targeting in Brazil.
8. **Fraud and Errors = Political Liability.** While all programs suffer some degree of fraud and errors, the challenge for governments is to develop systems to minimize them. If the media perceives irregularities and weaknesses in oversight and controls systems, it will publicize these “scandals” in a highly visible manner (particularly in pre-election periods). Even individual “outlier” cases of fraud and errors can serve as a “political liability” when

¹¹ While this paper focuses on the perceptions and debate about CCT programs as portrayed in the media, it also builds upon substantial technical knowledge about the implementation (challenges and improvements) of these programs, as documented in the “nuts and bolts” companion paper to this study (see Lindert et. al. (May 2007). The “take-away messages” pertaining to this “technical interplay” thus rely on both the media analysis and this companion technical assessment.

they “hit the headlines.” However, the tone of the media does improve when the government is perceived as taking bold, credible and transparent steps to systematize oversight and controls and minimize fraud and errors.

9. **Conditionalities and Political Legitimacy.** When monitored, conditionalities appear to confer political legitimacy to cash transfer programs. This legitimizing role seems to derive from diverse views about the role of conditionalities in the “social contract.” Specifically, they are viewed as promoting long-run impacts, establishing incentives for investments in human capital, building credibility for transfer programs by reducing concerns about “*assistencialismo*” (welfare dependency, clientelism), and to a lesser extent, helping the poor take up their basic citizens’ rights to social services. Without proper monitoring, however, that legitimacy can be called into question. It is not enough to merely “announce” the existence of conditionalities; they must be viewed as being monitored and enforced to be credible.
10. **Welfare Dependency vs. Graduation from Poverty.** Allegations of “welfare dependency” (continuous reliance by the poor on transfers) appear to be an increasing “political liability” of transfer programs as they mature (second-generation issue). In the Brazilian press debate, proposed solutions emphasize measures to promote long-run graduation from *poverty* rather than short-run measures to force graduation from the *program*.

Road Map. The report is structured as follows. Section II presents an overview of CCTs in Brazil. Section III details the methodology used in the media analysis, with a discussion of the research questions, an overview of the main elements of the methodology, an explanation of sample selection, and a discussion of the content and quantity of the variables included in the CCT media database. Section IV presents the “macro level” findings of the media analysis with respect to “visibility” (press coverage) and “tone.” Section V presents the “micro level” findings, assessing which design and implementation features of CCT programs are reported with more frequency in the press. It also digs “deeper” into several key design and implementation issues that are of common interest to policy makers and CCT practitioners so as to better understand the “flavor” of the debate surrounding these key social policy issues in the press. Finally, Section VI offers tentative conclusions and main messages – inferring implications for policy makers and program managers of CCTs in the international context.

II. OVERVIEW OF CCTs IN BRAZIL: “A QUIET REVOLUTION IN SOCIAL POLICY”¹²

A. Context: Perceptions, Conceptual Origins, and Early Policy Debates

The use of CCTs as an instrument of social policy reflects the widespread belief in Brazil that people are poor due to “unjust society.” These beliefs are evident in the results of the World Values Survey, which show that 76% of Brazilians believe that the poor are poor because “society is unjust” and that the poor “have very little chances to escape from poverty” on their own. These perceptions are similar – but even stronger – to those held in Continental Europe and even in LAC on average (Table 1). They contrast with popular perceptions in the United States, where 61% believe the poor are poor because “they are lazy,” but where about 70% of the population believes that the poor do have a chance to escape from poverty own their own, if they would only put enough effort into it.

Table 1 – Perceptions of Poverty, World Values Survey

| | PERCEPTIONS: % who believe that: | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|---|
| | The poor are poor because: | | The poor have very little chance to escape from poverty |
| | "Society is Unjust" | "They are Lazy" | |
| LAC - Average | 65.8 | 28.3 | 62.0 |
| Mexico | 65.8 | 24.6 | 56.9 |
| Argentina | 74.0 | 26.0 | 74.5 |
| Brazil | 75.7 | 20.5 | 70.5 |
| Chile | 55.6 | 36.9 | 58.5 |
| Peru | 56.5 | 34.2 | 47.1 |
| Venezuela | 52.9 | 47.1 | 59.6 |
| Uruguay | 77.2 | 12.4 | 73.5 |
| Dom. Republic | 68.6 | 24.5 | 61.2 |
| Colombia | n.a. | n.a. | 55.8 |
| Continental Europe | 63.3 | 17.1 | 60.2 |
| United States | 38.8 | 61.2 | 29.5 |

Source: Based on data from the World Values Survey, Summarized from Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro (August 2006)

In fact, poverty and inequality are high in Brazil. Poverty is estimated at around a quarter of the population, depending on the poverty line used. Brazil has historically had one of the highest degrees of income inequality in the world, with a Gini coefficient persistently hovering around 0.60 since the 1970s (until recent years).

Reflecting these widespread beliefs, the concept of CCTs first emerged in policy debates in Brazil in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The debates at that time focused on – and ultimately linked two

¹² This section draws extensively from Lindert et. al. (May 2007), the technical companion to this paper.

strands of thought: one emphasizing the concept of providing a minimum income to the poor, and the other zeroing in on the realization that poverty reduction strategies needed to go beyond the symptoms (low current incomes) and address the underlying structural sources of poverty. Education was seen as crucial for breaking the inter-generational cycle of poverty, but mere enrollment was not sufficient: poor students also needed support to maintain a minimum level of attendance. The basic premise for linking school attendance to cash assistance was based on demand-side constraints: even if schools are available, poor children cannot always attend due to direct and indirect (opportunity) costs. Conditional cash transfers were seen as an incentive to help counter these demand-side constraints and promote school attendance.

B. Evolution of CCTs in Brazil

Municipal CCTs: Social-Policy Appeal Across the Political Spectrum. Following these debates, the first two CCTs were launched in two localities during the same week in January 1995: then governor Cristovam Buarque launched the “Bolsa Escola” program in the Federal District and Mayor Jose Roberto Magalhaes Teixeira initiated the “Guaranteed Minimum Family Income Program” in the Campinas municipality. Both programs followed what is now known as the “CCT” approach: providing cash assistance to poor families in exchange for minimum school attendance of their children. These two programs were launched by governments from two different political parties, with Governor Buarque representing the Workers Party (PT) and Mayor Teixeira representing the Social Democratic Party of Brazil (PSDB). By 2001, over a hundred municipalities and many states were operating local CCT programs in Brazil, launched by governments and parties along the political spectrum.

Pre-Bolsa Familia Era (2001-03). That CCTs appealed across the political spectrum is also reflected at the national level with Presidents from both the PSDB and the PT launching federal-level CCTs. Notably, the Government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC; PSDB) introduced the federal-level CCT “Bolsa Escola Federal” at the national level in 2001. The federal Bolsa Escola program was modeled after the municipal programs, providing targeted cash transfers to poor families conditional on minimum school attendance of their school-aged children. Soon after, FHC’s government also launched the “Bolsa Alimentacao” program, which provided cash transfers to poor families conditional on compliance with various health-related conditions (pre-natal and post-natal care, growth monitoring for young children, vaccines). FHC’s government also introduced a third transfer (the Auxilio Gas transfer) in 2002 (see Timeline in Table 2 below), as a compensatory measure for the phasing out of cooking gas subsidies. Recognizing the similarities in the target groups across these three transfer programs, the government also initiated efforts to begin merging their registries into a single unique registry (the Cadastro Unico) in 2002.

The Bolsa Familia Era (2004-06). Soon after coming into office,¹³ President Lula began considering the possibility of integrating the major cash transfer programs into a single program. Although each of these programs maintained its own emphasis, they all provided cash transfers to roughly the same target group of poor families. Separate administrative structures and procedures created inefficiencies, resulted in considerable gaps and duplications in coverage, and missed

¹³ Prior to the launch of the BFP in 2003, President Lula briefly launched a pilot conditional cash transfer program called “the Programa do Cartao Alimentacao” (PCA), focused on promoting food security among the poor under his flagship umbrella “Zero Hunger” initiative (Fome Zero). This PCA program was also folded into the BFP along with the other pre-reform programs.


important synergies from jointly promoting education and health. Recognizing potential administrative efficiencies and synergies from an integrated approach, President Lula formally launched the Bolsa Familia Program on October 20, 2003 as a merger of the pre-reform programs.

The objectives of the Bolsa Familia Program are to (a) alleviate current poverty and inequality via direct monetary transfers to poor families; (b) break the inter-generational transmission of poverty through incentives for investments in human capital; and (c) help empower beneficiary families by linking them to complementary services. The program uses both geographic and means-testing approaches to target benefits to poor and extreme poor families throughout the country. Benefit values depend on the extent of poverty (with higher base benefits for extreme poor families) and demographic household composition (with variable benefits for children and pregnant/lactating women). BFP transfers are conditional on all age-relevant family members complying with key human development conditionalities: school attendance for school-age kids, pre- and post-natal care for pregnant/lactating mothers, and growth monitoring and vaccines for young children. Faced with high expectations for visible social progress, the Government has aimed for universal coverage of the poor, scaling up rapidly from 2003-06 (and again in the recent global economic and financial crisis in 2008-10), as shown in Figure 1 below.

Since its launching at the end of 2003, the BFP has undergone three phases of maturation (see Timeline in Table 2 below). As discussed below (“take-away message” number six), the media debate clearly mirrored these phases of evolution in the program.

First, following the program launch, the BFP underwent a **transition year in 2004**, in which the program’s conceptual, legal and institutional foundations were established (and sometimes debated, as discussed below) – even as the program began its exponential expansion in coverage. As discussed below, the Government faced a common “scaling up dilemma:” high expectations on the Lula administration to demonstrate social progress and scale-up benefits rapidly while at the same time facing the institutional and technical challenges of establishing and strengthening the necessary structures and systems to support the program (e.g., registries, intake and eligibility processes, monitoring of conditionalities – which was temporarily suspended that year – and oversight and controls).

Figure 1 – Rapid Scaling Up of the Bolsa Familia Program (2003-06)



Second, 2005 represented a year of consolidation and maturation for the BFP. Following media criticism which spiked in 2004 (as discussed in detail below), President Lula presided over a technical event to launch and strengthen the systems for overseeing the program. The Ministry of Social Development then seized this high-level mandate and the “window of opportunity” of an election-free year to strengthen the “core architecture” of the program. Close to twenty more legal and operational instruments were issued during the year, institutionalizing various aspects of the program and its decentralized implementation. Massive efforts were also undertaken to strengthen the program’s household registry, carry out a nation-wide recertification process, systematize oversight and controls mechanisms, and strengthen the monitoring of conditionalities (see Lindert et. al. (May 2007) for details).

Third, maturation -- with some important innovations -- continued in 2006 (and beyond). As discussed in Lindert et. al. (May 2007), MDS continued efforts to strengthen the registry in 2006, conclude the nation-wide certification effort, and introduce various innovations to strengthen and reward quality implementation in Brazil’s decentralized context.¹⁴ The “graduation” agenda also began to attract attention (as discussed in relation to the media debate, below), and the Government explored ways to link Bolsa Familia beneficiaries with complementary and activation services both at the Federal level (with partnerships with literacy programs in the Ministry of Education and labor programs in the Ministry of Labor) and the sub-national level (through agreements with state and municipal governments).

¹⁴ For a more thorough discussion of these innovations, please see Lindert et. al. (May 2007).

C. Impacts of this “Quiet Revolution” in Social Policy (Summary)

While it is beyond the scope of this paper to present a full-fledged report card on the impacts of Brazil’s CCTs, the achievements of what has become known as “the Quiet Revolution”¹⁵ of social policy are notable:

- **Near universal coverage of the poor**, reaching 11 million families, or 46 million people, by 2006, representing 25% of the population (coverage has since been increased in response to the global economic crisis, and now reaches about 13 million families or 55 million people);
- **Strong targeting accuracy**, with 73% of benefits going to the poorest 20% of the population and 94% of benefits received by the poorest 40% of the population (data from 2004 PNAD; targeting outcomes similar from later household surveys);¹⁶
- **Contribution to reduction in poverty and inequality**, with the BFP accounting for 18% of the significant reduction in the Gini coefficient of inequality from 2001-06 and 25% of the fall in extreme poverty over that same period¹⁷
- **Bringing kids to school – and keeping them there**, with increased enrollment,¹⁸ higher attendance,¹⁹ and lower drop-out rates;²⁰ though with mixed results for repetition rates, which makes sense given that the program promotes increased retention of at-risk students;²¹
- **Reducing hours worked by children – but not adults**, with BF children working less and studying more than control groups²² but without discouraging adults from working;²³
- **Higher food consumption and dietary diversity;**²⁴ but no significant differences for health care usage or health outcome indicators;²⁵ and
- **For a relatively cheap “price tag”** of less than 0.4% of GDP.

¹⁵ Minister Patrus Ananias of the Ministry of Social Development has coined the term “Quiet Revolution” in social policy to describe Bolsa Familia in many of his speeches.

¹⁶ See Lindert et. al. (May 2007).

¹⁷ See Paes de Barros / IPEA (2006). Drop in inequality and squared poverty gap also found by Fiszbein and Schady (2009).

¹⁸ See Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2003),

¹⁹ See Bastagli (2008), Glewwe and Kassof (2008), Oliveira (2009) – as compared with control group for no program

²⁰ De Janvry et. al. (2008), Glewwe and Kassof (2008), Oliveira (2009)

²¹ De Janvry et. al. (2006); Glewwe and Kassof (2008); Oliveira (2009); and Viani et. al. (2009).

²² Oliveira (2009); evaluations of earlier CCTs also found that beneficiary children worked fewer hours. Bastagli (2009), however, found no effect on child labor.

²³ Oliveira (2009) found that adult BFP beneficiaries were more likely to be searching for a job than control groups; Bastagli (2008) found no effect of benefits on adult labor (i.e., the program does not discourage work effort as some fear with cash transfers), except that poor male beneficiaries were more likely to work. Medeiros et. al. (2007) found higher work effort for adult BFP beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries.

²⁴ Olinto et. al. (2004); MOH evaluations (2004, 2005); Monteiro et. al. (2006)

²⁵ CEDEPLAR (2006) and MOH evaluations (2005).

Table 2 - Timeline of Key Developments: the Pre-Bolsa Familia Era (2001-03) and the Bolsa Familia Era (2003-06)²⁶

| | “Pre-Bolsa Familia” Era | | | “Bolsa Familia Era” | | |
|---|--|--|--|---|---|--|
| | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
| Political Context | | | | | | |
| Presidency | President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), PSDB political party in office | President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), PSDB political party in office | President Lula takes office | President Lula | President Lula | President Lula |
| Election Year? | No | Presidential Elections, Lula elected (October-November) | No | Municipal Elections (October-November) | No | Presidential Elections, Lula re-elected (October-November) |
| Program Highlights | | | | | | |
| Program | FHC launches: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bolsa Escola • Bolsa Alimentacao | FHC launches Auxilio Gas (transfer to replace gas subsidy) | Lula launches: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fome Zero, PCA pilot program • BFP in October | BFP | BFP | BFP |
| Implementation Challenges & Developments (see companion paper: Lindert et al., (May 2007) for details). | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initial challenges with registry, payments; • Partial conditionalities monitoring | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Move to begin merging program registries • Continued efforts to monitor conditionalities (albeit with partial info systems) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Merging of 4 programs into BFP • Merging of registries • Much discussion around setting of the new benefits level in relation to the previous benefits | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid scale-up • Registry merger • Oversight & Controls weaknesses • Conditionalities monitoring temporarily dropped | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid scale-up • Lula presides over technical event to launch “oversight & controls network” • Nationwide recertification launched • Conditionalities monitoring resumes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rapid scale-up completed by June (before election quarantine) • Nationwide recertification completed • Many efforts to review, strengthen registry, O&C procedures |

²⁶ Bolsa Familia continues, of course, well beyond 2006 and operates to this day. This paper, however, focuses on the periods from 2001-03 (the “pre-Bolsa Familia era”) and 2004-06 (the “BFP era”).

III. MEDIA ANALYSIS – METHODOLOGY

This section presents the methodology used in the media analysis, with a discussion of the research questions, an overview of the main elements of the methodology, an explanation of the sample selection, and a discussion of the content and quantity of the variables included in the CCT media database.

A. Media Analysis: Main Research Questions

As discussed above, this paper seeks to document how the media has treated CCT social policy reforms. It is important to emphasize at the outset that Brazil has a mostly *free and government-independent press*, and this is a fundamental premise on which this research is based. We examine the “flavor” of this debate in the press at two levels: (a) the “macro level,” looking at overall press coverage and the general “tone” of the media towards CCTs in Brazil; and (b) the “micro level,” digging deeper to look at which design and implementation features get the most attention (“hot button” issues).

“Macro Level:” Coverage and Tone. Key research questions at the “macro level” focus on the issues of coverage and tone. With respect to coverage, it is important to document the extent to which the media covered the social policy reforms in general, and over time. How much exposure did the Brazilian Press give to this “quiet revolution in social policy?” How much coverage was there? Lots? Little? How visible were these articles?

With respect to tone, the study attempts to “measure” or “classify” the overall disposition of the press towards CCTs. How favorable or critical has been the Media’s treatment of CCTs and how has this overall “disposition” evolved over time and with improvements in implementation? How has this disposition evolved within the broader time period in response to other contextual events, such as political election cycles?

“Micro Level:” Digging deeper into the Media’s treatment of design and implementation issues helps us track the evolution of the social policy debate according to key themes. This is instructive not only in Brazil, but also around the world in other countries at various stages of designing and implementing CCT programs to help policymakers anticipate the issues that will arise as they roll out their programs. Which design and implementation issues have gotten more media attention in the press (“hot button issues”)? Issues of coverage? Targeting? Fraud and fraud control? Conditionality? Welfare dependency and graduation (exit strategies)? How has this attention to specific design and implementation issues varied over time? Which issues came up first (first generation) and which came up later (second generation)? What is the overall flavor of debate about each of these issues and how has that evolved?

B. Media Analysis: Overview of Main Elements

The basic methodology for analyzing the Media’s treatment of CCTs and social policy reforms involved cataloging press articles into a database and analyzing them using basic descriptive quantitative and qualitative techniques. The key elements of this methodology included:

- **Unit of analysis.** The main unit of analysis is the printed press: newspaper articles (reports, briefs, interviews, opinion columns). This clearly excludes other important media and press sources, such as radio, television, and the Internet. Limiting the analysis to the printed press was simply the result of considerations of feasibility of research.
- **Study period: 6 years, 2 Social Policy “Eras” and 2 Political Regimes.** The database of printed press articles covers a period of six years. Importantly, this period covers two “social policy eras:” (a) the “pre-BFP Era” (pre-Bolsa Familia), covering three years, from 2001-03, and the four pre-reform programs described in Section II above; and (b) the “Bolsa Familia Era,” covering the three years from 2004-06. Moreover, the study period covers two different political regimes, with President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (representing the Brazilian Social Democratic Party, PSDB) in the early years of the study (up to end 2002) and President Lula (Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, representing the Workers Party, PT) in the later years (from 2003 to the present).
- **Sample of 6 Newspapers.** As discussed in detail in the next section, the database covers all articles mentioning any of the CCT programs in six newspapers. Three of the newspapers are national in coverage, and three are state/regional papers.
- **Classifying Articles into Database.** The basic methodology involved identifying the articles (using search engines), printing them, reading them, and then cataloging their type, content and tone into a “CCT Media Database” across the six years and six newspapers. Each article was classified according to numerous quantitative and qualitative variables, as discussed in more detail below.

C. Media Analysis: Sample Selection

Unit of Analysis. As discussed in the previous section, the unit of analysis is the printed press (“newspaper articles”). This includes press reports, short briefs, interviews and opinion columns, from readers, public figures, columnists and editors. This clearly excludes other important media and press sources, such as radio, television, and internet. Limiting the analysis to the printed press was merely the result of considerations on the feasibility of research and the need for “hard copies” and documentation. While we recognize that this could imply potential biases in the research methods, we expect that other media also follow similar tenets of credible journalism and reporting.

Non-Random Sample of Six Brazilian Daily Newspapers. While there are several hundred newspapers in Brazil,²⁷ the various constraints of time and availability of data led to select a non-random sample of six Brazilian daily newspapers.²⁸ In an attempt to represent the different regions of the country, as well as the range of national and local press, three national and three local publications were identified for the purpose of this analysis. The selection of these six newspapers was also guided by access to newspapers’ archives and the design and availability of archive search engines, which were critical in facilitating the research. While it could have been desirable to gather articles from all major Brazilian national and local newspapers, data collection was constrained by access to archives and search engines, as well as feasibility of scope.

²⁷ There are about 490 daily newspapers in Brazil and over 3,000 non-dailies, including magazines, for a total of some 8 million copies.

²⁸ This clearly excludes major weekly news magazines.

Overall Debate, Not Specific Editorial Lines. The study seeks to analyze the overall “flavor” of the debate about these social policy reforms in the Brazilian media. It does not attempt to analyze or identify editorial lines of specific newspapers. As such, the analysis does not discriminate by source and the papers are deliberately not identified – the purpose is not to deviate from the discussion of the broader media debate. Suffice it to say that all are daily newspapers, the three national papers are “large” with “national” coverage, and the three regional papers come from states in the Northeast, the middle of the country, and the south. Naturally, they cover a range of editorial lines. At some points in the paper, we draw on quotes from specific press articles and even from one broadcast news story because they represent critical points in the evolution of the debate around CCTs in Brazil. Inclusion of explicit reference to these newspapers (and the broadcast news show) does not imply that that particular newspaper was included in the quantitative media database.

Acknowledging Potential Sample Biases and Caveats. It is important to recognize the potential sources of bias derived from the newspaper selection process. This selection was guided by research feasibility (access to archives, search engines, manageability of scope) as well as a general objective of obtaining “rough” representativity both geographically and editorially (politically), while recognizing that this “representativity” is far from scientific. Selecting one newspaper versus another could result in different outcomes in the analysis, but is unavoidable. Such potential bias is acknowledged here.

Archival Research. The search was conducted using the archives and search engines of each newspaper to gather all articles published from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2006. This date range was chosen because it encompasses the period immediately preceding the launch of Bolsa Escola Federal (launched February 2001), and ends immediately after the 2006 elections (October 2006), which coincides with the end of the first term of President Lula. Using the available electronic search engines, the name of each CCT program considered in this study - Bolsa Familia (BFP), Bolsa Escola (BE), Bolsa Alimentação (BA) and Auxilio Gás / Vale Gás²⁹(AG/VG) - was looked for in all sections of the newspapers within the chosen date range.

D. The CCT Media Database: Classification of Articles

Quantity Overview. As a result of the archival search specifications, the CCT media database is composed of **6,531 articles** published in the six selected newspapers from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2006.³⁰ Using the data collection methodology described above, the archival search returned all articles which mention at least once in the body of the text one of the four conditional cash transfer programs considered in this study, in any section of the selected newspapers.


The article database is composed of (a) articles that focus specifically on one or several CCT(s) (called in this paper “**Focused Articles**”); and (b) articles which do not focus necessarily on CCTs but mention the name of one or several of them in the body of the text (called in this paper “**Mere Mention Articles**”). The set of “focused articles” allows analyzing in detail the way in which the press addresses CCT programs. The primary subject of these articles is one or several CCT program(s). There are **1,991 articles** of this type in the database. The set of “mere mention articles”

²⁹ Since Auxilio Gás is often referred to as Vale Gás, two separate searches for this program were conducted in the archives of each newspaper using alternatively one name and the other.

³⁰ It would be informative to put this in the context of the universe of “all articles” of any kind, or covering any type of public policy issue, during the time period. This was not possible with the “key word” search engine methodology used for this study.

allows understanding the context in which the names of CCT programs appear. The primary subject of these articles is not CCTs, but the name of one or several CCT program(s) is mentioned in relation to the main subject of the article. There are **4,540 articles** of this type in our database.

Figure 2 – Quantity Overview of the CCT Media Database



Two Periods for Comparative Analysis. As discussed above, the analysis divides the six-year time span into two equal periods of three years, to reflect the period before and after Bolsa Familia. Therefore, the “Pre-Bolsa Familia Program Era” or “**pre-BFP era**” ranges from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2003; and the “Bolsa Familia Program Era” or “**BFP era**” ranges from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2006.³¹ Throughout the paper, the quantitative analysis of the CCT media database will provide average values for each period. The table below summarizes the amount of articles by type and era:

Table 3 – Number of Articles by Era

| | Number of Articles | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| | Focused Articles | Mere Mention Articles | Total |
| Pre-BFP Era (2001-2003) | 782 | 1,663 | 2,445 |
| BFP Era (2004-2006) | 1,209 | 2,877 | 4,086 |
| Total | 1,991 | 4,540 | 6,531 |

Source: authors’ calculations from CCT media database. *NOBS-All Articles: 6,531*

³¹ Other cut-off dates for these two periods were considered, such as the launching day of BFP (October 21, 2003) or the day the name “Bolsa Familia” first appeared in the press (September 19, 2003). While these cut-off dates also make sense, we decided to use two periods of three full years to allow easier comparisons.

Overview and Classification of Variables. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques. For the quantitative analysis, a set of variables was devised to capture the content of the articles and help answer the main questions of interest. Most of the variables are binary variables, with a code of 1 whenever the topic considered was mentioned in the article, and a code of 0 when it was not. There are no continuous variables in the database. There are few discrete variables, principally identification variables, which differentiate between various options (type of article, location in the newspaper, etc). The variables can be grouped as follows:

- **Basic Identification Variables:** They allow identifying each article using descriptive variables: date of article, size/weight of article (length, placement in the newspaper, visuals used to catch the reader’s attention such as pictures and cartoons), type of article (focused on CCT or mere mention), nature of article (reporting, editorial, opinion column, interview/quote, short brief), name of CCT(s) mentioned in the article, author of the article if different from journalist, and “amount” of data used in the article (tables, facts / figures).
- **Contextual Variables:** They frame the discourses on CCTs within Brazil and internationally: topics addressed in the article (elections, public expenditure, education, poverty, etc), mention of similar programs in other countries (Mexico, other Latin-American country, rest of the world), and mention of international organizations/donors.
- **Perception Variables:** They are used to understand the perception of CCTs in the press: Overall disposition / tone of the article (favorable, favorable but with some restrictions, opposed, indifferent/neutral³² - as discussed in more detail below), types of informants (CCT beneficiary, politician, Brazilian researcher, CCT program manager / coordinator, international researcher / international organization official), mention of political use of CCTs, classification of perceived roles of CCTs in social policy (“*assistencialista*,” pro-poor (important for poverty reduction), pro-redistribution (important for reducing inequality), role in reducing child labor, important complement to economic development policies), an acknowledgment of whether the tone of journalist clearly differs from the tone of informants, and headlines and interesting quotes for qualitative accounts on CCT perceptions.
- **Program-Related Variables on Design and Implementation of CCTs:** They identify which design and implementation features of CCTs are addressed by the press: a classification of program design and implementation issues (quality of operations of the program registry / targeting efficiency, coverage / reach of the program, fraud and fraud control (*fiscalização*), conditionalities, welfare dependency/graduation strategies, unit value of transfer, etc), and reform variables addressing aspects of program that reportedly need reform or are subject to improvements³³ (reform perceived as an improvement or not, before/after reform launch, classification of design and implementation feature of the program which is being or should be reformed).

The number of variables identified differed for “Focused Articles” and “Mere Mention Articles.” For “mere mention articles”, only a few variables were coded: since the name of CCT

³² Despite some inevitable subjectivity in coding these “perception” variables, the intention is to report the main take-away message from the articles—as a typical reader would understand the tone of the article after reading it through. See below for further explanations on the way the tone variable was coded.

³³ Only when the word reform is used explicitly in the article.

programs was mentioned only once or a few times in the body of the text, there was less substance to analyze what was said about the programs. Thus the variables recorded for “mere mention articles” were: date, name of newspaper, section of newspaper in which the article is located, CCT mentioned (BF, BE, BA, VG/AG), topics,³⁴ and tone associated with the mention of CCTs in the article. For “focused articles,” these same categories were coded, as well as a more comprehensive set of variables reflecting in greater detail the depth and range of discourses on CCTs. A recapitulation of each variable type and category is found in Table 4 below.

Mutually Exclusive vs. Non-Exclusive Variables. Most of the variable categories presented above are composed of multiple binary variables. For example, the contextual variable category called “topics addressed in the article” contains about 20 binary variables in it. Whenever a variable category encompasses several binary variables, the inner binary variables are not mutually exclusive. Since a code of 1 was recorded whenever a topic was mentioned in an article, it is possible –and likely- to have several topics in one article at the same time.

Table 4 – Classification of Variable Categories

| Variable Category | Type of Variable | Number of Variables |
|---|-------------------------|---------------------|
| Date of Article | Identification | 6 |
| Newspaper | Identification | 1 |
| Section of Newspaper | Identification | 1 |
| CCT Mentioned | Identification | 4 |
| Focus of Article (CCT or not) | Identification | 1 |
| Topics Addressed in the Article and Related to CCTs | Context | 18 |
| Tone | Perception | 1 |
| Length of Article | Identification | 1 |
| Special Location of Article | Identification | 2 |
| Type of Article | Identification | 1 |
| Author | Identification | 1 |
| Data/Visual | Identification | 4 |
| Informants | Perception | 5 |
| Donors/ International Organizations Mentioned | Context | 1 |
| Design and Implementation Issues | Design / Implementation | 8 |
| <i>Drill Down on Operations</i> | <i>Various</i> | 20 |
| <i>Drill Down on Fraud & Controls</i> | <i>Various</i> | 15 |
| <i>Drill Down on Conditionalities</i> | <i>Various</i> | 24 |
| <i>Drill Down on Dependency & Exit Doors</i> | <i>Various</i> | 19 |
| Perception of CCTs Role in Social Policy | Perception | 9 |
| <i>Drill Down on Assistencialismo</i> | <i>Various</i> | 19 |
| International Experience | Context | 3 |
| Political Use of CCTs | Perception | 5 |
| Headline | Perception | 2 |
| Interesting Quotes | Perception | 1 |
| TOTAL | | 172 |

Coding the Tone Variable. Coding in an objective and consistent manner perceptions of CCTs presented in the press (or the tone associated to the discussion of CCTs in each article) posed a couple of challenges. This is an inherently subjective exercise. There are indeed three levels of

³⁴ Both the main theme of the article and the theme immediately associated with the mention of a CCT.

subjectivity: (a) the perception presented in the article as the author intended it; (b) the perception of the informants which may contrast with or support the perception of the author; and (c) the way these perceptions are understood and perceived by the person coding the article. We recognize that several sources of bias may arise in this exercise. We attempted to reduce variability (increase consistency) by having only one person read and code the entire set of 6,531 articles in a consistent manner.

The tone variable was coded and understood as follows: “**What is the take away message on CCTs the average reader will keep in mind after reading the entire article?**”³⁵ Therefore, the tone variable does not reflect the particular tone of one quote within the article; it rather reflects the overall perception of CCTs within the entire article. This implies that both the arguments presented by the journalist and the various informants are taken into account when assessing the overall perception of CCTs presented in the article. Consequently, it is not possible to say whether a politician quoted in an article is favorable or not to CCTs; rather, it is only possible to say that a politician is quoted in an article whose overall tone toward CCTs is positive / negative. Likewise, it is not possible to associate the tone of the article to a particular theme mentioned in it. For example, the theme of fraud can be mentioned in an article whose overall perception of CCTs is positive. Four tone categories were designed (see Table 5):

- The “**no tone**” category, for articles that are purely informative/factual and do not present any judgment on CCTs;
- The “**positive tone**” category, for articles that present a positive judgment on CCTs, meaning that CCTs are good policies both conceptually and in their implementation;
- The “**ambiguous tone**” category, for articles presenting both positive and negative judgments on CCTs. For example, the opinion of the journalist/columnist may be contrasted with perceptions expressed by quoted informants. The articles falling under this category generally assess the CCT concept as good, but the program implementation is perceived as presenting challenges which should be improved.³⁶ This is the case when the article points to program shortcomings and calls for reform or improvements; and
- The “**critical tone**” category, for articles opposed to CCTs, implying that CCTs simply do not work and are not desirable policy options.

The “tone” variable was analyzed for two aspects: (a) perceptions or tone regarding the overall *concept* of CCTs; and (b) perceptions or tone regarding the *implementation* of CCTs (see Table 5). This distinction was made because many articles have different tones regarding the overall concept of the social policy instrument (the CCT) versus the implementation of the specific program. For example, some articles may have a “positive” (or favorable) stance towards the overall *concept* of

³⁵ In hindsight, we wish we had coded the “headline” separately from the “whole article” as headlines tend to be stronger in tone (particularly in the “critical” direction) than the overall article. In general, in press journalism, headlines are normally written by sub-editors and not the journalists who originated the original article – which can lead to interesting tensions between the two. Lesson learned for future media research.

³⁶ It could be possible for articles to be critical of the *concept* of CCTs but positive about their *implementation*. These would also have been coded in the “ambiguous” tone category but these instances were not frequent and hence did not merit a separate category.

CCTs as an instrument for social policy, but may be critical of the way a specific program is being *implemented*. We found this distinction to be quite useful as feedback to social policy technicians and policy makers.

Table 5 – Explanation of Tone Categories

| | Overall Perception | Perception of CCT Concept | Perception of CCT Implementation | Code |
|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|---|-------------|
| “No tone” | Undefined | Undefined | Undefined | 0 |
| “Positive” | Favorable | Positive | Positive | 1 |
| “Ambiguous” | Favorable with limitations | Positive | Critical | 2 |
| “Critical” | Opposed | Critical | Critical | 3 |

Methodology for Qualitative Drill Downs. The methodology described above allows quantifying the frequency with which certain themes and topics appear in newspaper articles, opinion columns, and interviews. However, it does not allow understanding the deeper substance of the debate on key “hot button” topics relating to social policy design and implementation. In order to better understand the “flavor” of the debate in the press, a number of qualitative “drill-downs” were made on a select group of topics that are of particular interest to the broader “social policy debate” and also to technicians working on CCT programs. Specifically, we sought to further analyze the nature of the debate for the following topics: targeting and payments, fraud and fraud controls, conditionalities (existence, monitoring), and the related topics of perceptions of “welfare dependency” (*assistencialismo*) and graduation (“exit doors”).

To keep this deeper qualitative analysis more manageable, a random sub-sample of focused articles were selected for further analysis.³⁷ The initial quantitative analysis of all CCT-focused articles included variables to specifically identify these topics. Articles were then selected randomly within each group in order to construct sub-samples of articles mentioning each theme. To allow for adequate sub-sample size, 20% of all focused articles mentioning issues pertaining to targeting, the registry and payments were selected randomly (since the total number of articles covering these topics was already large). For all other “drill-down” topics, we selected 40% of all focused articles randomly for the additional qualitative analysis. Table 6 below summarizes the sample selection for the “drill-down” qualitative analysis of these “hot button” design and implementation themes.

³⁷ The “drill-down” sub-samples were drawn exclusively from focused articles (not mere mention articles). The random selection respected the chronological order of these focused articles and was carried out as by selecting one (or two) in every 5 number of articles from the earliest article to the most recent (sorted by date) such that the drill-down samples represent 20% (or 40%) of each design and implementation issue.

Table 6 – Sub-Sample for “Drilling Down” on “Hot Button” Issues

| | CCT-Focused Articles Covering Theme: | | |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|--|
| Theme | % of Total Focused Articles | Total Articles (Full Sample) | Drill Down # (and % of full sample) |
| Cadastral (registry, payments, targeting) | 44% | 875 | 174 (20%) |
| Fraud & Fraud Controls | 25% | 494 | 197 (40%) |
| Conditionalities | 24% | 483 | 193 (40%) |
| “Assistencialismo” | 11% | 219 | 88 (40%) |
| Welfare Dependency, Graduation, Exit Doors | 9% | 184 | 73 (40%) |

IV. “MACRO-LEVEL” FINDINGS: VISIBILITY AND TONE

As discussed above, this paper examines the “flavor” of the debate about social policy reforms and CCTs in Brazil at two levels: (a) the “macro level,” looking at the issues of overall press coverage and tone; and (b) the “micro level,” digging deeper into the discussions around key design and implementation features (“hot button” issues). This section presents the “macro level” findings with respect to “visibility” (press coverage) and tone.

A. Coverage and Visibility of CCTs in the Brazilian Press

Press coverage of CCTs has been significant. In the six selected newspapers, we found a total of 6,531 articles published during the six year period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2006 (mentioning at least one of the CCT programs in question). This is significantly more than what we anticipated at the start of the research project. Of these, close to two thousand (1,991) were directly *focused* on CCTs, while the rest (4,540) mentioned the name of at least one CCT, but were focused on other topics.

Press coverage of CCTs has increased over time. The total number of articles almost tripled over the six-year period (Figure 3), increasing from 855 total articles in 2001 (when Bolsa Escola was first launched) to 2,172 articles in 2006. In the “BFP era” (2004-06), almost twice as many articles were published on CCTs as in the “pre-BFP era” (2001-03). The number of articles *focused* on CCTs increased by 55% from one social policy era to the next, while the number of articles with “mere mentions” of CCTs increased by 73%.

By 2006, there was on average one article mentioning CCTs in every newspaper every day. In that year, each of the six newspapers in our sampled published at least one article every day directly or indirectly addressing CCTs. Of these six daily articles (in six daily newspapers) containing the name of one or several CCTs, between 1-2 articles on average was essentially *focused* on CCTs (among the six newspapers). The number of “mere mention articles” in the press was also at its highest, averaging between 4-5 such articles per day (among the six newspapers). The vibrancy of public debate around key social policy issues in the free press should be welcomed.

Bigger program, more visibility. Without inferring causality in either direction, expansion in media coverage closely paralleled the expansion in the program itself, as shown in Figure 4 below. As CCT programs grew in coverage, so did media attention to these social policy instruments. For CCT managers, both in Brazil and elsewhere, increased visibility implies a need for a clear public relations strategy for the program, both to share pertinent information in a transparent manner and to respond to press articles (see Box 1). Reflecting this visibility (in press coverage, program coverage, and government communications), public opinion polls suggest significant “brand-name recall” of CCT programs among Brazil’s general public (see Box 2 below).

Take-Away Message #1:
CCTs are highly visible in
the Brazilian Press, and
media coverage
increases with the scale
of the program.

Figure 3 – How Much Press Coverage? LOTS





Figure 4 – Press Attention Increases with Expansion of the Program



Box 1 – Visibility and Transparency: The Government’s Own Communications Strategy

CCTs have been highly visible in the Brazilian press – and the frequency of media coverage has increased with the scale of the program. This vibrancy of public debate around key social policy issues is welcome. For managers of CCT programs, this (potential) visibility implies a need for a clear public relations strategy, both to share pertinent information and to respond transparently to inquiries by the press and the public. The Government of Brazil has adopted many communications tools for its CCT programs (beginning especially with Bolsa Escola and more recently with Bolsa Família). Some examples:

Branding. At the most basic level, both the Bolsa Escola program and the Bolsa Família program have had recognizable names and logos, which reflect and communicate their basic identity and philosophy. The importance of this “branding” cannot be under-estimated in terms of creating a “social policy trademark” that is visible and recognizable to the general public – and the media.³⁸ It has clearly contributed (among other factors) to “brand-name recall” of CCT programs among Brazil’s general public (see Box 2). The name and logo are visible on all government communications for the program – including the well-known yellow electronic benefit cards³⁹ (previously blue for Bolsa Escola), shown here.



Communications Tools. The Ministry’s official principle for the BFP has been to disseminate information about the program and to respond to press queries under any circumstances -- positive or negative. Some communications tools that have been used include:

- **For interactions with the media and general communications:** The Ministry operates a communication unit covering various topics and programs, and within that unit two staff are dedicated full time to working on communication aspects and press interactions specifically for the Bolsa Família Program (in addition to staff in the unit that actually manages the program).
- **For communicating with the broader public:** Television and radio information campaigns, websites, electronic bulletins. "Radio-novelas" have been produced to publicize stories of beneficiaries and other information about the program. Monitoring reports, audits, error reports, evaluations and other studies are also publicly disseminated. There is also a "0 800" hotline with trained operators to respond to queries and complaints about the program.⁴⁰
- **For communicating with municipal program managers** about developments on the program: electronic bulletins, teleconferences, distance-learning training, and occasional regional seminars.
- **For communicating with beneficiaries:** (a) publication and dissemination of a "beneficiary brochure" (booklet) explaining the program and the responsibilities of the beneficiaries; (b) communicating messages through local program managers (at the municipal level); and (c) including informational notices or updates on the payment documents (receipts) that beneficiaries receive when they withdraw their payments from the banking system.⁴¹

How visible were the articles on CCTs? We also analyze factors that affect “visibility” in the coverage of CCTs in the press. Specifically, we examine factors such as “placement,” size,

³⁸ In the case of Brazil’s Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Família programs – as well as Mexico’s Progres a / Oportunidades programs, these trademarks also became “exportable” as replicable social policy instruments adapted in numerous other countries.

³⁹ Since state and federal governments also partner with the Bolsa Família Program, in some cases adding additional “top-up” benefits for their citizens, they also attach their own logos to the BFP electronic benefit card, as shown here for the Government of the state of Acre.

⁴⁰ The Ministry of Social Development (MDS) operates a call center (*central de relacionamento*) with a 0800 hotline to respond to questions about CCTs (Bolsa Família), the unified registry, and a number of other programs. The hotline currently has 129 trained operators divided into different levels of technical responses: 115 generalists, 9 specialists (of which 5 are dedicated to handling questions on the Bolsa Família program and the unified registry for the SENARC secretariat and 4 are dedicated to handling questions on other social assistance programs under the SNAS secretariat), and 5 “ombudsman” operators (*ouvidoria*) for specific complaints and denunciations.

⁴¹ For specific initiatives, they also contract firms for specialized information campaigns. For example in 2009 they contracted specialized agencies to contact and send updates to 3.4 million families who had been in the program over two years and needed to update their registry information.

headlines, and use of visuals to accompany articles. We also look at other factors that could influence the “weight” or type of readership of these articles, such as “type of article,” informants, and the context of articles.

Placement. The placement of articles in the newspaper plays an important role to catch the reader’s attention. Whether on the front page, the national or the local news section of the newspaper, the placement helps situate the debate on CCTs in the press. Is it national news, local news? Are there important considerations that allow articles on CCTs to appear on the front page? The analysis of placement reveals that the majority of articles, both focused and mere mention, were located in the National News section of the newspapers, followed by the Politics section and the Opinion section. This shows that the discourse on CCTs in the press occupied a large volume of opinion/analytical debate in the press, and was not solely portrayed through objective reporting. In addition, 9% of CCT-focused articles appeared on the *front* page and 2% appeared in “special folders” (*cadernos especiais*), which were entire special *sections* dedicated to the themes of CCTs, which shows an important place allocated to the CCT news coverage over the period.

Size. Most articles focused on CCTs are medium-sized (between 3 and 7 paragraphs). Over time articles become more substantial, as evidenced by the decreasing share of small-size articles (1 to 2 paragraphs) and increasing share of medium-size articles. The share of large articles (more than 7 paragraphs) does not vary much over the period.

Headlines. Over the period 2001-2006, 41% of articles focused on CCTs contain the name of a CCT in the title. This average number does not vary much over time, except in 2003 where it is significantly lower at 26%. Besides the 826 focused articles containing the name of one CCT in the headline, there were 32 mere mention articles with a CCT name in the headline.⁴² Those articles focus on topics other than CCTs but still use a reference to CCTs as a possible way to catch the reader’s attention.

Use of Visuals. Over the period 2001-2006, one fourth of focused articles display a picture, possibly an important device to catch the reader’s attention. Tables are the second most frequently displayed visual (10%). Very few articles are accompanied by a chart (1%).

Type of Articles. The type of article and informant also affect the “weight” of the article. The database is composed of 63% of news reports, 17% of opinion columns –from prominent officials, columnists and readers- 14% of news briefs, 4% of interviews and 2% of editorials.

Types of Informants. It is important to understand who defines the judgment/perception in articles about CCTs, besides the journalist / columnist. The main informant categories are: (1) CCT beneficiary, (2) politicians (no distinction between government/opposition politician, federal or local), (3) Brazilian researcher, (4) CCT program manager/administrator, and (5) international researcher/ international organization staff. The category of informants was only recorded when directly quoted, not when their statement were reported/paraphrased by the journalist/columnist. However, as mentioned above, the particular tone of each individual informant was not recorded

⁴² Some mere mention articles used the name of a CCT in the headline as a way to “catch the reader’s attention” but were on other topics. Examples of such headlines: “Accidents at work cost more than Bolsa Escola” or “Minister mentions advances in education and praises Bolsa Familia” (for an article on education).

separately. In our sample, politicians⁴³ are the most frequently quoted informants in articles focusing on CCTs, in one third of focused articles. CCT program managers are the second most frequently quoted informant category, in 17% of focused articles. Brazilian researchers and scholars as well as CCT beneficiaries are quoted respectively in 12% and 11% of focused articles. Finally, international organization staff members and researchers or international officials were quoted in 5% of focused articles.

Context of Articles. In order to situate the debate on CCTs in the press, a list of contextual variables was recorded. A number of topics which frequently appeared in articles side by side with the mentions of CCT programs were identified. They allow understanding the manner in which the CCT debate is framed in the press, both within national and international news topics.

- **National Context News Topics.** The national news topics which most frequently appeared in articles focused on CCTs or merely mentioning CCTs include: the *Fome Zero* (Zero Hunger) program; budget/public expenditure issues; corruption; poverty/social policy issues; elections; politics (federal, state and municipal politics, political parties, general politics); education/schooling issues; health/nutrition issues; gas prices/subsidies; the economy; employment/labor issues; minimum wage; crime issues; the operating agent (*Caixa Econômica Federal*) or the lottery (*lotéricas*) where transfer payments are made; consumption issues; inequality; and women/empowerment issues. The topics which most frequently appeared were: poverty/social policy issues; politics; and budget/public expenditure issues. Looking at the set of focused articles, the elections theme and the mention of corruption appeared about twice as frequently in the BFP era as in the pre-BFP era. On the contrary, the mention of education/schooling topics dropped by half.
- **International Context News Topics.** The debate on CCTs also included references to international experience with similar programs. CCTs in Mexico were mentioned in 2% of focused articles, as were CCTs in other Latin American countries. CCTs in other countries and regions of the world were referred to in 3% of articles (including: Africa (various countries), China, East Timor, India, and NYC). In addition, articles focused on CCTs mentioned international organizations in 10% of cases, including: The World Bank, The Inter-American Development Bank, the UN, Unicef, Unesco, OIT, IMF, FAO, UNDP, WHO, and OAS.

B. Tone: Disposition of the Press Towards CCTs

With respect to tone, the study attempts to “measure” or “classify” the overall disposition of the press towards CCTs. How favorable or critical has been the Media’s treatment of CCTs and how has this overall “disposition” evolved over time? How has this disposition evolved within the broader time period in response to technical changes in the program (implementation weaknesses or improvements)? How has it evolved with political cycles, such as elections?

⁴³ Note that this category does not make the distinction between government and opposition politician, nor federal or local politician.

As discussed above, a “tone variable” was coded and understood as the “take-away message on CCTs that the average reader would keep in mind after reading the entire article.” Tone was judged in terms of the “perceptions of the overall concept of CCTs” versus “perceptions of the implementation of a specific CCT program.” Four tone categories were designed (see Table 5 above): (a) “no tone” (score of 0) for articles that are purely informative and do not present any judgment on CCTs (concept or implementation); (b) “positive tone” (score of 1) for articles that present a positive judgment on CCTs both conceptually and in their implementation; (c) “ambiguous tone” (score of 2) for articles presenting a positive judgment of the concept of CCTs but a negative judgment of the implementation of CCTs; and (d) “critical tone” (score of 3) for articles opposed to both the concept and implementation of CCTs (critical overall).

General Endorsement of the Concept of CCTs as a Social Policy Instrument

Overall, the Brazilian media is supportive of the *concept* of CCTs as an instrument of social policy, though there is more critique of the *implementation* of specific programs (as discussed in more detail below). On average, 81% of all focused⁴⁴ articles had a tone that was favorable to the *concept* of CCTs, including 43% that were “positive” judgment of both the *concept and implementation* of CCTs and 38% that were supportive of the *concept* of CCTs but raised concerns about implementation (“ambiguous” overall tone code). Just 7% of all focused articles were completely “critical” of both the *concept and implementation* of CCTs (Figure 5 below). About a tenth (13%) of all focused articles and just under a third (31%) of mere mention articles were purely informative / factual (“no tone”), and the share of “no tone” articles remained fairly constant across the two study periods.⁴⁵ The media’s general endorsement of the *concept* of CCTs as a social policy instrument is consistent with the views expressed by the general public in opinion polls (see Box 2 below).

Take-Away Message #2:
The media is generally supportive of the *concept* of CCTs as a social policy instrument in Brazil.

The social policy role of CCTs is understood primarily for reducing poverty and inequality. For the most part, press reports portray the role of CCTs as a social policy instrument that helps reduce poverty and inequality (Figure 6). Specifically, 64% of focused articles suggest that CCTs are a “pro-poor” or “poverty reduction” policy, followed by 28% that view the role of CCTs as a “redistributive policy to reduce inequality.” A slightly higher share of articles portray the role of CCTs as redistributive in the second period (BFP era, 2004-06), with a greater emphasis on reducing inequality in that period (Figure 6). Conversely, a slightly greater share of articles emphasizes the poverty reduction role of CCTs in the earlier period (pre-BFP era, 2001-03). Overall, less than 10% of focused articles viewed CCTs as a complement to economic development

⁴⁴ This section reports the tone of “focused articles” (those focused on CCTs). Patterns in tone for “mere mention” were similar in terms of magnitudes and trends across years, though there was a higher share of “mere mention” articles with “no tone” vis-à-vis the CCT (as would be expected). See Statistical Appendix for detailed tables.

⁴⁵ See Statistical Appendix for detailed tables on tone by category and time period.

policies or as a tool to fight child labor, and just 1% of focused articles viewed CCTs as a “right” that “promotes dignity and citizenship.”⁴⁶

Figure 5 – Evolution of Tone of Press Articles on CCTs Over Time: 2001-06





Figure 6 – What Role do CCTs Play as Instruments of Social Policy? Perceptions From Media Articles (% of focused articles)




⁴⁶ The authors were somewhat surprised at how infrequently the “citizenship/rights” role was emphasized in the Brazilian press, as it seemed more common in rhetoric by politicians and government officials. Perhaps the “debate” around this “right” was less pronounced (during the study period) since the concept of social assistance is already included as a general citizen’s “right” in the 1988 constitution.

Box 2 – The CCT Trademark in Brazil: Product Recall and Approval in Public Opinion Polls

Public opinion polls suggest significant knowledge (or “brand-name recall”) of CCT programs among Brazil’s general public. Specifically, an IPSOS poll conducted in May 2006 shows that virtually all Brazilians know of these programs, with 99% reporting knowledge of the Bolsa Familia Program. This compares with lower “program recall” for other social programs in Brazil (see graph). Earlier public opinion polls reveal similar “brand-name recall” with virtually all respondents indicating knowledge of the program in surveys by DataUFF in September 2005 (with over 6000 respondents) and Pesquisa Vox Populi in December 2004 (with close to 2000 interviewees).


**How Well do People Know the Program?
Opinion Poll – Knowledge / Exposure**



Ipsos survey of 1000 respondents (nationally representative for sex, age, education, PEA, region)

The media’s general endorsement of the concept of CCTs as a social policy instrument is consistent with the views expressed by the general public in opinion polls. Specifically, in a public opinion poll conducted by Pesquisa Vox Populi in December 2004, close to 97% of 1963 randomly-selected interviewees assessed CCT programs (specifically, the BFP) positively, with over 90% citing specific impacts, such as perceptions that the program promoted improved nutritional quality (93%), improved health conditions (91%), and improved school attendance. Virtually all respondents (98%) endorsed the need to enhance the responsibilities of beneficiary households through the use of conditionalities. Nonetheless, about half cited concerns about implementation, with 46% noting delays in the distribution of electronic benefits payment cards and close to half citing concerns about errors of inclusion and exclusion in the program. Similarly, a public opinion poll of 1000 randomly-selected citizens conducted by IPSOS (“Pulso Brasil”) in September 2007 suggested that Bolsa Familia was considered one of President Lula’s major successes (see graph), with 43% citing that Bolsa Familia was the main accomplishment of the Lula administration, followed by economic stability (20%). The endorsement was high not only among the poorest income group (where over 60% of respondents cited the BFP as President Lula’s main success) but also among higher income groups (with over a third of those in the top income group citing the BFP as his main success). Moreover, there is stronger consensus that President Lula succeeded with the BFP (43% overall) than there is about what people perceive he did poorly (with 23% overall ranking “corruption” as the top ranked item of concern for “what he did poorly”).

**What has Lula done well in Office? FIRST MENTION
(IPSOS September 2007)**



Technical Interplay: The Media’s Tone Reflects the Quality of Implementation

While the Brazilian media is generally favorable to the concept of CCTs, press disposition towards CCTs is also affected by perceptions of the quality of implementation. Indeed, as this

section demonstrates, there seems to be a “technical interplay” between perceptions about implementation quality and the tone of the Brazilian media towards CCTs.

Bigger or Better? Policy-Makers’ Scaling-Up Dilemma. Having launched the Bolsa Familia at the end of 2003, policy makers faced a common dilemma: scale-up coverage of a nascent program rapidly even if operating systems are imperfect or hold off until systems are improved. With President Lula facing huge expectations for rapid social progress early in his first term, the Government took the choice to scale up rapidly and the program increased from 3.6 million beneficiary families in late 2003 to over 11 million families in mid 2006. This decision was taken in part on the basis of a rapid evaluation of registry capacity⁴⁷ at that time which concluded that the database – while imperfect and in need of significant improvements – was sufficient to operate the program at that time. As such, while scaling up, the Ministry undertook further analyses and steps to improve the registry during 2004. The scope for improvements was large, however, and such systems improvements take time, particularly in Brazil’s decentralized context with four pre-reform program registries merging into one.⁴⁸

Press attention – and criticism -- increased with the scaling-up of the program. As shown in Figure 4 above, this rapid scale up in program coverage was mirrored by an increase in media attention to the program. With increased attention on the program, the media picked up on implementation weaknesses during the “transition year” of 2004 as the Government attempted to rapidly scale-up in terms of coverage without fully matured operating systems (see Figure 7 below). This critique gained momentum in September and October of that year, with a spate of articles raising concerns about inadequate monitoring of conditionalities (see Section V and Boxes 6 and 7 below) and a well-publicized Sunday evening TV news show (*Fantastico* on the *Globo* network) that used investigative journalism to raise questions about leakages, fraud and errors program (see Box 3 below). A surge of critical articles “hit the headlines,” raising questions about the quality of management and implementation of the program. Specifically, the weighted average “tone score” increased in 2004 (Figure 7), with the higher score reflecting higher criticism of the program that year. The share of focused articles with “ambiguous tone” (critical of implementation, supportive of CCT concept) increased from an average of 33% during the 2001-03 pre-reform period to 46% in 2004 (transition year). The share of focused articles entirely critical of CCTs (both implementation and concept) also increased from 4% on average during the 2001-03 pre-reform period to 10% in 2004.⁴⁹


Take-Away Message #3:
Policy Dilemma: Rapid
Scale Up with
Imperfect Systems?

⁴⁷ Registry evaluation conducted by DFID and the World Bank: see de la Briere and Lindert (2005).

⁴⁸ Further improvements were needed in registry management and data cleaning, oversight and controls, and systems for monitoring conditionalities. With respect to the latter, the active monitoring of conditionalities was (at least partially) suspended during the merger and transition of the program and a significant debate ensued in the press and among policymakers regarding whether or not there was a need for active monitoring of conditionalities or whether or not the mere existence of conditionalities would suffice to promote behavioral change. Monitoring of conditionalities resumed in September-October 2004 and the share of beneficiaries with active, updated compliance information increased over the subsequent months and years. These issues are further discussed in the next section on “micro hot-button issues.”

⁴⁹ See Statistical Appendix for details on tone by year and type of article.

Figure 7 – Technical Interplay: Press Disposition Towards CCTs Reflects Perceptions of the Quality of Implementation (both Strengths and Weaknesses)



Media tone towards CCTs became more favorable in 2005, as implementation systems improved. The Government took the critique of the program seriously. Across the period from 2005-06 (and beyond) the Ministry of Social Development and its partner agencies invested significantly in improving the various operating systems for the Bolsa Familia Program.⁵⁰ As discussed in Section V below, in January 2005, President Lula presided over an event to launch a multi-agency network for overseeing the Bolsa Familia program. That President Lula himself presided over a technical event relating to the program is significant. It sent the message that the Government was serious about improving the implementation quality of the program. It also suggests that the Government had understood that a flagship social program such as Bolsa Familia could be a political liability or asset – and that the balance of this equation depended significantly on the quality of implementation of the program. The media responded to these improvements favorably: the share of articles with “ambiguous tone”(critical of implementation, supportive of CCT concept) fell from its peak of 46% in 2004 to 38% in 2005, and the share of overtly critical articles fell from 10% to 6% (see Figure 5).⁵¹ Importantly, the share of “positive” articles rose from 34% to 46% from 2004 to 2005. Reflecting these improvements, the weighted average score for “tone” decreased (more favorable) in 2005 and 2006 (Figure 7).

Take-Away Message #4:
 “Technical Interplay:”
 The media reflects both concerns about, and improvements in, implementation of CCTs.

⁵⁰ These systems improvements (such as the overhaul of the registry, the nation-wide recertification, the launching of the oversight and controls network and the re-institution and strengthening of monitoring of compliance with conditionalities) are documented in more detail in Lindert et. al. (May 2007), our companion paper on the nuts and bolts of implementation.

⁵¹ See Statistical Appendix for details on tone by type of article and year.

This interaction of the media with perceptions of the technical quality of program implementation is notable. The above discussion suggests an interesting interaction between the media and public policy. As the government attempted to scale-up the program during the transition of 2004, the press reported on weaknesses in program implementation and sparked significant public debate about ways to improve it (both in terms of increased media coverage and criticism). The government took significant steps to enhance its efforts to improve the program's operating systems in 2005-06.⁵² The press then reflected these improvements with more favorable tone in articles on CCTs. This could suggest a "virtuous cycle" of accountability on both sides. Causality cannot be established, however, and other factors also come into play. Suffice it to say that there seems to be an empirical association between media attention (in press coverage and tone) and government management of CCTs (in program coverage and implementation quality).

Political Interplay: Elections Bring Increased Scrutiny

As with all flagship social programs, elections tend to bring increased scrutiny. The findings suggest increased scrutiny of conditional cash transfers in advance of all three elections observed during the study period: (a) the presidential elections of 2002 (covering the Bolsa Escola Program under the Fernando Henrique administration); (b) the municipal elections of 2004 (covering the Bolsa Família Program under the Lula administration); and (c) the presidential elections of 2006 (covering the Bolsa Família Program under the Lula administration). Specifically, as shown in Figure 8 below, there is a spike in the scores for "tone" in advance of each of these elections (with the higher score reflecting higher "criticism" – as per scoring in Table 5 above).⁵³ Importantly, this spike in criticism is observed independent of incumbent political party or specific CCT program, occurring both under Bolsa Escola and President Fernando Henrique (2002 elections) and under Bolsa Familia and President Lula (2004, 2006 elections). Based on this pattern, one would expect another spike in scrutiny of the Bolsa Familia program during the coming 2010 Presidential elections.

Take-Away Message #5:
"Political Interplay:"
Elections bring
increased scrutiny of
flagship CCT programs.

Media articles do raise questions about perceived political use of CCTs (clientelism / patronage). The press reported on alleged political use of CCTs both directly (in articles and opinion columns) and indirectly (reporting statements made by other informants). Overall, 18% of focused-articles mentioned the alleged patronage/vote buying of CCTs across the six year period. Such allegations were rarely supported by empirical evidence and mostly represented anecdotal accusations of the existence of vote-buying and patronage practices. Typically, these articles alleged that CCT programs were being used to "buy votes" (with some articles coining the term


⁵² These improvements are discussed in more detail in Lindert et. al., (May 2007).

⁵³ We did not observe such a marked increase in the total volume (frequency) of articles on CCT programs in advance of each election. Although the total number of articles mentioning CCTs did increase slightly before each election (mere mention articles plus focus articles), these smaller "spikes" pale in comparison to the general trend of increasing coverage of with the scale of the program over time (see Figure 4 above). So while elections seem to bring more scrutiny (in terms of critical tone), they do not necessarily generate more debate (in terms of volume) about public policy.

“vote grants” (*bolsa votos*) to describe the various “bolsa” CCT programs) or to influence votes through electoral propaganda allegedly distributed to CCT beneficiaries or through local officials allegedly requesting voter registration cards at the point of registration for CCT programs.

Brazil has adopted a number of measures to reduce the risks of clientelism / patronage in its CCT programs. In terms of registration, new beneficiaries cannot be enrolled in the program during the pre-election quarantine period (from July 1 to October elections) in order to reduce the chances of direct new “vote buying” during that period. Politicization of payments is also reduced by channeling the payments via the banking system (rather than via local politicians, for example). Despite these measures, allegations of clientelism and patronage still persist in the media debate.

Figure 8 – Elections Bring Increased Scrutiny



V. “MICRO-LEVEL” FINDINGS: MEDIA PERCEPTIONS OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

This section presents the “micro level” findings and seeks to assess which main design and implementation features of CCT programs are reported with more frequency in the press. It also digs “deeper” in to several key design and implementation issues that are of common interest to policy makers and technicians designing CCT programs, so as to better understand the “flavor” of the debate surrounding these key social policy issues in the press.


We assert that key design and implementation features of CCT programs matter not only for technical and administrative quality (program effectiveness and impacts), but also for acceptance by the media (political acceptability). Solid design and implementation of social policies should be rewarded by the press; conversely, weak implementation should result in media discussion that holds the program accountable for improvements.

The first section reports on the frequency of design and implementation issues as reported in the press. For this, the analysis relies on the universe of 1,991 “focused articles.” The second section “drills down” for a deeper analysis using a random sub-sample of selected articles on key “hot button” design and implementation issues, including: (a) targeting, registry and payments processes; (b) fraud and fraud controls; (c) conditionalities; and (d) welfare dependency, “*assistencialismo*” and the “graduation agenda.”

A. Press Treatment of Design and Implementation Issues: Frequency and Tone

Overall, the issues of targeting and coverage received the most press coverage. As shown in Figure 9 below, the issues of “targeting/registry/payments” and “coverage” were each mentioned in 44% of all focused articles on CCTs. This frequency is followed by the issues of “fraud and controls” and “conditionalities” which were each discussed in about a quarter of all focused articles. Other topics, such as the unit value of the benefit, financing, and the graduation agenda were mentioned with less frequency over the entire period.

Figure 9 – Which Design and Implementation Features Receive the Most Press Coverage?



Press coverage has mirrored the expected evolution of “first generation” and “second generation” issues for social policy design and implementation. In general, when designing social safety net programs (conditional and non-conditional transfers), the initial concerns include basic design parameters such as targeting and coverage (“getting the right people into the program”) and benefits and payments (“making sure payments are made reliably”). These program basics could be called “first generation reforms,” and, as key systems inputs, they do take time to design and implement properly. Pretty quickly, policy makers learn that they need to attend to issues of fraud and fraud controls to ensure fiduciary oversight, transparency and accountability – and these issues could almost be considered as an “intermediate generation” in terms of sequencing. As these first (and intermediate) generation features become systematized, public social policy debate almost inevitably turns to issues of welfare dependency and graduation reflecting concerns of “how long will these people rely on these benefits?” The media debate has mirrored these “first generation” and “second generation” issues, as shown in Figure 10 and discussed below.

“First-Generation” issues feature more prominently in the earlier years. Specifically, key “first generation” topics such as targeting, payments and registry operations were discussed in 52% of articles in 2001 when CCTs (Bolsa Escola) were first launched at the federal level. However, by 2006, the issues of targeting, payments and registry operations were reported in less than a third of all focused articles on CCTs (see Figure 10 below). Similarly, the issue of “beneficiary coverage” was discussed in 58% of all articles in 2001, whereas treatment of the “coverage” question had dropped to 38% of all articles by 2006. Likewise, while the issues of “how much is enough or too much” (unit value of the transfers) were discussed in 25% of all focused articles in the early years (2001-03), only 8% of focused articles treated these issues in the later years (2004-06). Media coverage of other “first generation” aspects of benefits administration – such as conditionalities monitoring or fraud and error controls⁵⁴ – followed the technical cycle of perceived “weaknesses”

⁵⁴ The slightly delayed increase coverage of the issue of “fraud and errors” (and the partner theme “oversight and controls”) could suggest that this topic is somewhat of an “intermediate generation” in terms of prioritization in the sequencing of topics that merit attention in successful design and implementation of cash transfer programs. This makes some intuitive sense: the issue of fraud and error controls might not be as prominently emphasized (by either policy makers or the public) at the very outset of a program

and “improvements” in these systems (with a spike in media concerns in 2004 when problems were perceived and a subsequent improvement in media coverage in 2005-06 as systems were strengthened), as discussed in more detail below.

“Second generation” issues such as the graduation agenda took prominence in media debate in the later years. In the early years of CCTs, press reports virtually ignoring the issues of the graduation agenda and welfare dependency (Figure 10). However, as “first-generation” systems were strengthened, these issues rose to prominence at the forefront of media coverage by 2006, with close to a quarter of all focused articles treating the issue, which was also widely debated in the Presidential election that year.

Press coverage and tone both vary across specific design and implementation features. Is no news good news? Or is more news good news? In other words, are topics with more or less coverage favored more or less by the press? To explore this question, a scatter plot was designed by crossing each design and implementation feature with the average tone of articles in which they were mentioned (Figure 11 below). The chart shows no apparent correlation between the amount of articles dedicated to a specific issue and the average tone of the articles in which they appear. For example, the issues of program funding and targeting/registry/payments have the same “average tone” but significantly different frequency in the press. Similarly, the issues of “conditionalities” and “fraud and controls” have similar coverage, but significantly different tone. Overall, the issues of welfare dependency/graduation agenda and fraud/fraud controls appear in articles with more “critical tone,” while topics such as coverage and provision of “complementary programs/services” to beneficiaries are associated with articles with more positive tone, despite widely different frequency of mention of these topics in press reports.

*Take-Away Message #6:
Press coverage mirrors
the expected evolution
of “first-generation” and
“second-generation”
challenges in social
policy.*

(when the focus is really on getting people in the program and payments processes worked out). Program managers should address the issue of fraud and error controls pretty quickly, however, as the program scales up: or they are likely to face increased public criticism as shown in Figures 10 and 14.

Figure 10 – “First- and Second-Generation” Design and Implementation Issues: Evolution of Media Coverage





Figure 11 – Frequency and Tone of Key Design and Implementation Features



B. The Flavor of Press Debate for Key Design and Implementation Issues

The analysis of frequency and tone is instructive, but it does not allow for an understanding of the deeper substance of the debate on key “hot button” topics related to social policy design and implementation. In order to better understand the “flavor” of the debate in the press, a number of qualitative “drill-downs” were made on a select group of topics that are of particular interest to the broader “social policy debate” and also to technicians working on CCT programs. Specifically, we sought to further analyze the nature of the debate for the following topics: (a) targeting, registry operations and payments; (b) fraud, errors and controls; (c) conditionalities (existence, monitoring), and (d) the related topics of perceptions of “welfare dependency” (*assistencialismo*) and graduation (“exit doors”).

As discussed in the methodology section above, to keep this deeper qualitative analysis more manageable, a random sub-sample of articles were selected for further analysis. The initial quantitative analysis of all CCT-focused articles included variables to specifically identify these topics. Articles were then selected randomly within each group in order to construct sub-samples of articles mentioning each theme. To allow for adequate sub-sample size, 20% of all articles mentioning issues pertaining to targeting, the registry and payments were selected randomly (since the total number of articles covering these topics was already large). For all other “drill-down” topics, we selected 40% of all articles randomly for the additional qualitative analysis (See Table 6 above). This section presents the findings of these “drill-down” sub-samples for each topic covered.

Thematic Drill-Down: Registry Operations, Payments and Targeting

The press reported extensively on targeting, registry and payments processes of CCT programs. In particular, Brazilian news reports discussed the various programs’ registries, the accuracy of CCT targeting and the payments of benefits. Over the period 2001-2006, 44% of all articles focused on CCTs addressed operational issues (Figure 9). The accounts were either purely informative—for example, information about how to register in the program and the deadlines to receive payments were advertised in the newspapers—or they evoked challenges encountered with CCTs operations. Generally, the tone of articles which addressed operational topics was favorable to CCTs, but the majority (42%) acknowledged limitations in the programs implementation. In the pre-BFP era, the tone was positive most of the time when operational aspects were mentioned (50%). In the BFP era, however, there were more articles with a mitigated tone than any other tone category (46%). The share of negative articles also increased significantly, rising from 1% to 8% from one era to the next, though this is largely due to the problems of rapid scale-up alongside systems weaknesses that were highlighted in 2004 (as discussed above).

In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the flavor of media debate on targeting, registry and payments processes in the press, a sub-sample of articles mentioning these topics was analyzed in detail. Specifically, we drew a random sub-sample of 20% of total focused articles mentioning these topics to dig deeper into the debate around the following topics:

- What was the nature of press attention to operational aspects (institutional responsibilities, eligibility mechanisms, registry and payments operations, etc.)?

- What was the nature of press attention to targeting outcomes? Does the press pay more attention to: (a) errors of exclusion (missing coverage of the poor); or (b) errors of inclusion (leakages to the non-poor)?

Operational Aspects

The Brazilian press has closely followed operational aspects of CCT programs, including the institutional division of responsibilities, eligibility criteria, registry operations, recertification, and payments processes (all “first generation” issues).

First, close to 60% of articles focusing on operational mechanisms addressed the **institutional division of responsibilities** (Figure 12). Nearly half of these articles were purely informative (“no tone”), reporting on administrative responsibilities. Two key themes were raised regarding institutional responsibilities:

- **Potential Duplication with Sub-National Programs.** With the launch of the Federal Bolsa Escola program in 2001, the federal program had to co-exist along with municipal or state-sponsored CCT programs. The challenge of avoiding potential duplication between federal and sub-national programs was addressed by the press in both eras (2001-03, and 2004-06). The government has since introduced measures by which payments to beneficiaries of both federal and sub-national programs can be made with the same electronic benefit card (with joint logos). The media also reported on resistance by states and municipalities headed by opposition parties around the launch of federal programs (in 2001 with the federal Bolsa Escola Program and again in 2003-04 with the launch of the Bolsa Familia program).
- **Challenges of Implementation in a Decentralized Context.** As discussed briefly in the introductory sections above, while the federal government has been operating CCT programs since 2001, implementation responsibilities are shared with over 5,000 autonomous municipalities (which are responsible for registration of potential beneficiaries, monitoring of conditionalities, and operation of local social controls councils) and the Caixa Economica Federal, a federal bank responsible for managing the national registry and payments processes.⁵⁵ The media has often reported on management challenges associated with disparities in the municipalities’ administrative and financial capacities to implement their roles in the program. The media then reported in 2005-06 on federal administrative cost-sharing incentives and indices for monitoring implementation quality at the municipal level. As solutions were found to clarify inter-governmental institutional roles and improve communication and cooperation between actors, the press responded with more favorable coverage, and the share of critical tone articles treating institutional issues dropped from 16% in 2003 to 5% in 2006.

Second, over 42% of the sub-sample of articles addressed CCT programs’ **eligibility criteria**, such as income thresholds. Eligibility issues were more prominent in press debate in the earlier pre-BFP period (2001-03), as shown in Figure 12 below. Most articles reported on the issue of eligibility criteria in a purely informative way (70% had “no tone”) – usually simply reporting on what the eligibility criteria were (e.g., thresholds). Relatively few articles touched on challenges with

⁵⁵ See Lindert et. al. (May 2007) for additional information on these administrative and implementation arrangements within Brazil’s decentralized context.

eligibility criteria per se. Those that did discussed the issues of the definition of the poverty line and associated calculations of the target population, as well as challenges related to the content of the interview of prospective beneficiaries (such as requesting a fixed address, while some individuals cannot provide this information). The tone of the press towards the issues of targeting and eligibility became more favorable in the BFP era (up to 56% with favorable tone in 2006), as evidence became available that the program was well-targeted (as discussed with respect to targeting outcomes below).

Third, almost half (44%) of all sub-sampled articles mentioned **registry operations** (the “Cadastro Unico” or “unified registry”), and the pattern and tone of media coverage of registry operations illustrates the technical interplay of the media in reflecting challenges and improvements in CCT implementation. Specifically, with the launching of the Bolsa Familia program as a merger of four pre-reform programs, the administration faced the challenge of rapidly scaling-up program coverage on the basis of registries inherited from the pre-reform programs. While a rapid technical evaluation of the registries suggested this was a “workable” solution, it also pointed to numerous weaknesses in the existing registries.⁵⁶ Registry improvements were initiated, but these types of systems overhauls require significant investments (technical, institutional, IT, etc.) and time to carry them out. At that time, a significant share of media articles (34% over the whole period) had an “ambiguous tone,” signaling concerns about implementation. This ambiguity in tone spiked during the transition year of 2004 (to 53% of articles in the drill-down sub-sample as compared with 14% average in the three-year period before that), as the Government faced the onerous task of merging and strengthening the registries. The “political liability” of registry operations was also apparent that year, with an increase in articles with an outright “critical tone” (to 24% of articles in the drill-down sub-sample in 2004, as compared with just 3% in the three year period preceding that year). As the Ministry advanced with registry improvements in 2005,⁵⁷ the overall tone of press articles about CCT registries improved. This once again suggests the “technical interplay” in which the tone of press articles mirrors technical weaknesses and improvements accordingly.

Take-Away Message #4:
“Technical Interplay:”
The media reflects both concerns about, and improvements in, implementation of CCTs (e.g., registry operations).

Fourth, closely related to registry operations, about a third (30%) of all sub-sampled articles reported on **recertification** efforts and challenges, which tend to improve the quality and update registry information. Press coverage of recertification issues was quite low in the pre-BFP era (2001-03), with only 13% of sub-sampled articles touching on this issue Figure 12). By 2005, however, over half of sub-sampled articles addressed this issue – reflecting both the dire need for updating and recertification of the registry (which hadn’t been carried out in a systematic manner since the first federal Bolsa Escola program was launched in 2001) and massive government


⁵⁶ Cadastro evaluation conducted by DFID and the World Bank: see De la Briere and Lindert (2005).

⁵⁷ Specific details on registry improvements are documented in Lindert et. al., (May 2007), the technical companion paper to this study.

attempts to carry out recertification. Indeed, in 2005-06, the government carried out a full-fledged nationwide recertification of all beneficiaries (which resulted in many that were no longer eligible being excluded from the program). The media reported widely on this process both in terms of increased frequency and coverage of the issue in press articles and with a favorable tone (with 73% of articles on the topic with a fully “positive” tone in 2005).

Finally, over a third of sub-sampled articles addressed the issue of **payments processes**, including information on how to retrieve benefits, delays in receiving benefits (in the early years), blockages or suspension of benefits, etc. The issues of payments operations was more frequently reported in the earlier years (pre-BFP era, 2001-03) than in the later years (BFP era, 2004-06), as shown in Figure 12. This is because the arrangements for paying beneficiaries through the banking system with electronic benefits cards was still being developed in the early years, and there were problems with confusion on when and where to retrieve benefits, timeliness of payments (with press pictures showing long lines of people waiting for benefits in the very beginning of Bolsa Escola for example), delays in issuance of electronic benefits cards (EBCs), and unclaimed cards – all reported visibly in the press. Similar transitional challenges with delays in distribution of EBCs at the beginning of the Bolsa Familia program in 2004, and these concerns were registered in both media articles and opinion polls conducted at that time.⁵⁸ The tone of articles on payments processes improved over time, with a higher share of articles with critical or ambiguous tone in the early days, and more favorable press coverage of payments processes in the later years.

Figure 12 – Press Treatment of Various Operational Aspects of CCTs (Sub-Sample)



Targeting

About a third of articles in the thematic sub-sample addressed the issue of targeting. Press coverage touched upon three aspects of targeting: (a) the philosophical and policy debate about narrow

⁵⁸ Specifically, a public opinion poll of 1963 interviewees conducted in December 2004 by Vox Populi found that 46% of respondents noted delays in the distribution of electronic benefits cards.

targeting versus universal benefits; (b) perceptions of targeting outcomes; and (c) evidence of actual targeting outcomes.

The *philosophical policy debate* between a targeted approach versus a universal social benefits surfaces from time to time in the media articles. Early on in the first Lula administration, a sharp debate erupted in the media and fueled by competing statements by policy makers, academics and journalists, with one side accusing that “targeting” was a concept being pushed by the “Washington Consensus” and others retorting that targeting was necessary to ensure that benefits actually reach the poor within a limited budget envelope. At other points, the media reported on long-standing efforts by Senator Suplicy to push forward with legislation to support a basic “citizen’s income” universal for all Brazilians. This universal movement culminated in the passage of a law, sponsored by the Senator, establishing the rights of all citizens to a minimum “citizen” income. This law was passed in January 2004 – the same month as the adoption of the law formally establishing Bolsa Familia. Pending fiscal space, the Bolsa Familia Program was viewed as the first step in implementing the minimum citizen income by extending universal coverage of the poor – and the secretariat which houses the BFP was symbolically named the “Secretariat of National Citizens’ Income (*Secretaria Nacional de Renda de Cidadania*, SENARC).

Many press articles also report on *targeting outcomes* – either perceived or measured. Indeed, over 30% of articles in the sub-sample discussed targeting outcomes. Initially, due to a lack of independent measurement of targeting outcomes via household survey data, much of the reporting was on *perceived targeting outcomes* or anecdotal evidence. Perceived targeting errors, such as errors of exclusion (missing coverage of the poor) or errors of inclusion (leakages to the non-poor), were often reported in the press as “irregularities” or “fraud,” reflecting problems with the registry. In an absence of empirically measured outcomes, much of the press coverage of targeting errors came from investigative journalism, with the media (newspapers and TV programs) responsible for “uncovering” targeting errors in 14% of articles in the sub-sample. The investigative trend on perceived leakages and irregularities was sparked by the *Fantastico* television news report of October 17, 2004 (see Box 3 below), which was followed by a wave of press articles on perceived weaknesses in the program as well as Government measures to detect and remedy irregularities. *Fantastico* is a widely watched Sunday evening news show on the *Rede Globo* media network.

Empirically-measured targeting outcomes were also highlighted in the press articles, once they became available. In 2005, the National Statistics Agency (IBGE) released data from the 2004 household income survey (PNAD). The 2004 PNAD survey was the first ever to include a detailed module on social benefits programs (including CCTs) in the questionnaire. Data from the 2004 PNAD revealed that, in fact, the Bolsa Familia Program and other CCTs in Brazil were *very* well targeted (as discussed in Section 2 above). These results were highlighted by IBGE, Brazilian researchers, and a World Bank report.⁵⁹ The World Bank report compared targeting outcomes (absolute benefit incidence) for eight countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the results showed that Brazil’s BFP performed quite well, even better than similar programs in other countries. These results were trumpeted in the Brazilian press, with headlines such as “Brazil has the largest and best targeted cash transfer program in Latin America” or “Bolsa Familia benefits effectively reach the poorest.” The release of independent household survey data that empirically

⁵⁹ IBGE (2004). Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios; Soares et.al (June 2006); and Lindert, Skoufias and Shapiro (World Bank, 2006).

measured targeting outcomes contributed to the press debate by making it more evidence-based. While investigative journalism and anecdotal evidence or perceived (not measured or confirmed) targeting errors continued to be reported in the press (and still are today), press reports on targeting increasingly turned to official statistics for the evidence base.

So which targeting outcomes (perceived or empirical) got more press attention? Errors of inclusion (benefits going to the non-poor) or errors of exclusion (missing coverage of the poor)? As shown in Figure 13 below, the press clearly focused more attention on errors of inclusion.⁶⁰ Of those articles covering the issue of targeting outcomes in the thematic drill-down subsample, 70% of them highlighted the issue of errors of *inclusion* (leakage of benefits to the non-poor), and only 30% touched on the issue of errors of *exclusion* (missing coverage of the poor). Moreover, press tone when discussing errors of inclusion is far more “critical” than articles on errors of exclusion (Figure 13 below).⁶¹

This focus on errors of inclusion could be explained by several factors. **First**, as the program became more universal in coverage of the poor, errors of exclusion became much smaller. The media analysis does support this possibility, in that press coverage of errors of exclusion was higher in the earlier pre-BFP period when program coverage was lower. By 2006, official coverage (total number of beneficiaries) of the poor was “universal,” covering over 11 million families or 46 million people (about a quarter of the population, equivalent to estimates of the share of the poor in the population).⁶² **Second**, media focus on errors of inclusion could reflect perceptions of a high degree of leakages in the program. However, as shown in the PNAD 2004 (and subsequently in the PNAD 2006) data, targeting accuracy for the Bolsa Familia Program is quite impressive, with 73% of benefits going to those in the poorest quintile and another 21% of benefits going to those in the next quintile (moderately or near-poor). Data from the PNAD 2004 (and again in 2006) suggest that *zero percent* of benefits are received by those in the top quintile of the population and only *one percent* of benefits were received by those in the fourth quintile. In other words, actual leakages to the elite are empirically insignificant.

Take-Away Message #7:
Press coverage of targeting accuracy could reflect society's preferences for social justice, fairness and narrow targeting to the poor.


⁶⁰ The data presented in Figure 13 beg some explanations. As discussed above, we drew a 20% sub-sample of articles mentioning the topics of “Targeting, registry (cadastro) and payments.” The total number of articles covering those topics was 875, and the thematic drill-down sub-sample was 174 (20% of those articles). The blue bar in Figure 13 represents the share of articles in that 20% drill-down subsample that specifically mention targeting outcomes (*focalizacao*), which was 56 articles or just over 30% of the drill-down subsample of 174. Of those articles mentioning targeting outcomes, about 70% mention errors of inclusion and about 30% mention errors of exclusion (a few mention both) – yellow bars.

⁶¹ Press emphasis on errors of inclusion could reflect the basic journalistic tenet that “dog bites man” is no news as opposed to “man bites dog”. Errors of inclusion are more newsworthy in Brazil and anywhere. Unless people were deliberately being excluded from the program for no defensible reason, or there were signs of government cover-up or huge incompetence, diffuse problems of coverage (errors of exclusion) are not headline news.

⁶² Program coverage has since expanded to around 13 million families (or close to 55 million people), with the advent of the global economic and financial crisis.

A **third** explanation for *the media’s focus on errors of inclusion could reflect society preferences for narrow and accurate targeting – and perceptions of “social justice.”* There is some corroborating evidence for this hypothesis. First, as discussed above, data from the World Values Survey suggests a widespread belief by the majority (76%) of Brazilians that people are poor due to the fault of an “unjust society.” So when the public perceives that “non-deserving,” non-poor people are benefitting from CCTs, this could strike a negative chord of “injustice” in society, and the media’s coverage of such leakages could be a reflection of those indignations. Second, this possible “preference” for “narrow” and “fairly-applied” (accurate) targeting is also corroborated by a study de Janvry et. al. (2006) which found that, controlling for other factors, perceptions of targeting accuracy *do* seem to have political dividends for incumbent mayors (increasing their chances of re-election), but only if the programs minimized errors of inclusion; perceived errors of exclusion did not generate political costs for incumbent mayors.⁶³ In other words, the media’s focus on reporting on perceived errors of inclusion could reflect society’s preference for narrow targeting and perceptions of fairness.

Figure 13 – Does the Press Pay More Attention to Errors of Inclusion or Exclusion?



Thematic Drill-Down: Fraud, Errors and Controls

No social transfer program in any country is completely immune to fraud and errors (F&E). All programs experience “irregularities,” ranging from unintentional administrative errors such as address problems, missing or inconsistent data or other typos, to intentional fraud by claimants or

⁶³ Statistically significant results from 2004 municipal elections, controlling for other factors (including mayor characteristics, municipality characteristics, political and governance variables, variation in program management and implementation quality, and program outcomes, public information, etc.), for sample of 261 randomly-selected municipalities in Northeast. World Bank study by de Janvry, Finan, Sadoulet, Nelson, Lindert, de la Brière, and Lanjouw (2005) and subsequent paper by de Janvry et. Al. (July 2008).

corruption by officials. The key is to design and implement effective oversight and controls (O&C) tools to detect, remedy and minimize such irregularities.

In general, the main “pressure points” for potential fraud, errors, and / or political interference in cash transfer programs can occur primarily in: (a) the registration process (which in Brazil is implemented by over 5,000 municipalities with varying capacity); and in (b) the payments process (though some risks of interference in the payments process are lower in Brazil as payments are channeled through the banking system). In Brazil, the Government has instituted numerous mechanisms⁶⁴ to manage, monitor and reduce these risks including: (a) establishing and systematizing formal controls mechanisms, many in conjunction with the Supreme Audit Agencies (e.g., financial and operational audits, random-sample municipal quality control reviews, case-by-case investigations); (b) centralized (rather than decentralized) determination of eligibility according to “objective” criteria and a series of automated internal and external cross-checks to reduce potential for discretion or errors; (c) bi-annual re-certification (instituted since 2005); (d) federal monitoring of municipal implementation quality using a “decentralized management index;” and (e) citizens oversight committees (social controls) and publication of beneficiary lists. These systems, however, took time to develop and implement in a systematized manner.

In 2004, just before municipal elections were to be held across the country, the media picked up on weaknesses in the systems with an outburst of articles about leakages, fraud and errors in the press. Until that time, the press had been fairly silent on the issue of fraud and errors (see Figure 14). The issue burst onto the scene with the *Fantastico* television report of October 17, 2004 (see Box 3). This broadcast news report triggered a wave of articles on perceived fraud and errors by all newspapers in the sample (Figure 14) with many highly-visible front-page articles (Figure 15 and Box 5). The tone of media attention to the issue also became more critical (Figure 14). The *Fantastico* report and subsequent upsurge in media attention also appears to have elicited a upsurge of complaints to ministry hotlines. One newspaper remarked on that trend, noting that “Complaints of irregularities increased since the airing of the *Fantastico* report on TV Globo, which pointed to fraud in the main social program of the federal government. From October 17, when the report aired, to October 25, the Ministry of Social Development received a total of 1,946 complaints [via hotlines] from all over the country.” These investigations surfaced other forms of “irregularities” such as some people receiving duplicate benefits, or municipal employees and their relatives or other local elite receiving benefits.

Take-Away Message #4:
“Technical Interplay:”
The media reflects both
concerns about, and
improvements in,
implementation of CCTs
(e.g. O&C mechanisms).

The Government responded with strong measures to combat fraud and errors. At first, the Government carried out its own case-by-case investigations to confirm or invalidate the allegations of irregularities and block payments when needed, and these actions were also reflected in the media. Bold steps were needed, however, to strengthen oversight and controls systems and take on

⁶⁴ Lindert et. al. (May 2007), the technical companion paper to this study, presents a more detailed review of these mechanisms.

the issue of fraud and error head-on. Such steps were taken just months after the “scandals” broke in the press. Specifically, in January 2005, President Lula himself presided over an event to ratify and launch a multi-agency “oversight and controls network” (*rede de fiscalizacao*) of the Bolsa Familia Program. This event involved signing formal agreements with the Supreme Audit Agencies and their sub-national counterparts to systematize and strengthen oversight and controls mechanisms for detecting and remedying fraud and errors in the program. Subsequently, the Ministry of Social Development and the Supreme Audit Agencies made significant investments in improving O&C mechanisms. That President Lula himself presided over the event is significant, signaling that the Government was taking the allegations seriously and would act swiftly and systematically. The move also suggested a political calculation – and a recognition that if the flagship social program could become a lasting political liability if these errors were not properly and visibly controlled.

**Box 3 – Broadcast Media Sparks Wave of Investigative Journalism on CCTs:
Globo’s Fantastico Report on Leakages, Fraud and Errors in the Bolsa Familia Program**

A wave of investigative journalism on irregularities in the Bolsa Familia was sparked by the *Fantastico* television news report of October 17, 2004, just prior to nationwide municipal elections. *Fantastico* is a widely watched Sunday evening news show on the *Rede Globo* media network. The October 17 episode used investigative journalism methods to suggest that, in three cities (Pedreiras, MA; Caceres, MT; and Piraquara, PR), people did not fit the beneficiary profile of the program but were nonetheless benefitting from the program. They also showcased a young girl who allegedly lacked benefits despite appearing quite poor – and who, at least for a period of time – became a symbol representing errors in the program. Newspapers and the Government both responded in the wake of the *Fantastico* report:

- **The printed media responded with wave of investigative reporting (crossover between broadcast and print journalism).** After the *Fantastico* broadcast news report, newspapers around the country went on to conduct their own investigative journalism in various localities around the country to “uncover” irregularities in the Bolsa Familia program. This upsurge in the frequency of articles can be seen for CCTs in general in Figure 4 above, and in the spike in the frequency and visibility of articles on fraud and errors in Figures 14 and 15 below.
- **Government efforts to detect and remedy irregularities.** Rather than trying to squelch the debate or clamp down on such reports, the Government responded openly to the episode (and the subsequent wave of press articles on the program) – both (a) with formal statements and responses in the media about the importance of reducing irregularities and efforts to improve the registries inherited from the pre-reform programs; and (b) with Government responses to detect and remedy irregularities. At first, the Government countered with its own case-by-case investigations to confirm or invalidate the allegations of irregularities and block payments when needed – and these actions were transparently communicated in formal statements and through media interactions. Subsequently, the Government’s efforts became more systematized, with bold steps to strengthen the registry operations and the oversight and controls network (as detailed in the technical companion report to this study, Lindert et.al. (May 2007).

These bold efforts to control fraud and errors paid off in terms of media attention. Notably, press coverage reflected these improvements with reduced frequency and criticism, *even in the face of elections in 2006*. The frequency of articles on fraud & errors and oversight & controls fell from its peak of 53% of all focused articles on CCTs to 17% by 2006 (Figure 14). The topic also attracted fewer “front-page” headline articles even though the total number of front page articles on CCTs increased in 2006 (Figure 15). Moreover, the tone of these articles improved (Figure 14), with the share of “critical” articles covering F&E and O&C falling from 13% in 2005 to 5% by 2006 and the share of those with “ambiguous tone” (critical of implementation) falling from 60% to 53% across the same period. It is notable that, with these recognized improvements in oversight

and control systems, the topic of fraud and errors was not hyped as a major issue in media reports (in tone, frequency, or visibility) in 2006 – *despite the fact that 2006 was an election year.*

Figure 14 – Press Attention to Issues of Fraud and Errors, Oversight and Controls





Figure 15 – Front-Page Visibility of Articles on Fraud & Errors, Oversight & Controls



Box 4 – Measuring Errors in Practice (Official Reports)

The Brazilian Government has developed numerous mechanisms for controlling error and fraud in its CCT programs. One such mechanism is the random-sample municipal operational audits (quality control reviews, QCRs) conducted by the General Controllers Office (CGU). A summary of findings from the CGU's operational audits (QCRs) conducted during the study period (from 2003 to 2005, covering 19 municipal audits, 981 municipalities, 5064 families, and 4 state audits) highlights the following for the BFP:

- **Targeting Errors - Minimal.** The QCRs found that 7% of families visited exhibit evidence of incomes higher than the eligibility thresholds for the program. In practical terms, this is probably a lower bound estimate of leakages, since a family earning only a few *reais* (or dollars) over the eligibility threshold would probably not exhibit observable evidence of higher incomes. The CGUs errors would likely only pick up evidence of stark examples of deviations from income eligibility levels.
- **Payments “Irregularities.”** Payments irregularities were found for 9% of families in the sample, where “irregularities” indicate that the families: (a) received duplicate benefits; (b) ceased receiving payment; or (c) received amounts diverging from those expected. These payments error rates are not significantly higher than those measured for transfer programs in OECD countries.⁶⁵
- **Actions of the Municipal Coordinators** (results for 243 municipalities visited in 2005). The QCRs found that registration or updating was not being carried out on a permanent basis in 36% of the municipalities (these results reflect the situation *before* the recent nation-wide recertification conducted for all beneficiaries from 2005-06). In 13% of municipalities, part of the “constant” information in the Cadastro database diverged from the information reported in the questionnaires of the sampled families (any kind of information difference for at least one family).
- **Actions of Local Caixa Branches** (258 branches visited). In 5% of the Caixa branches visited, the agencies failed to publicize the dates of payments; in 32% of the Caixa branches visited, the agencies failed to mobilize logistics for distribution of cards, resulting in pending (delayed) distribution of cards to beneficiaries; and in 17% of the Caixa branches visited, proof of delivery of the cards to beneficiaries was missing (for at least some beneficiaries, not necessarily all).

Source: Summarized in Lindert et. al. (May 2007) from CGU official reports covering period from 2003-05.

In order to get a deeper understanding of the “flavor” of the debate on fraud and fraud control in the press, a sample of articles mentioning these themes was analyzed in detail. With a sub-sample of 40% of articles mentioning the theme (197 out of 494 articles total),⁶⁶ we went back into the text of these articles to explore the following topics in the media discussion:

- What is the balance in reporting between press coverage of alleged fraud and errors (F&E) versus media attention to oversight and controls (O&C) mechanisms?
- Does the press distinguish between “fraud” (intentional) and “errors” (unintentional) when reporting on “irregularities?” What are the types of F&E reported most frequently? Who “uncovers” (alleges) fraud and errors in press reports? What are the attitudes towards fraud and errors in press articles?
- What is the flavor of the discussion regarding oversight and controls mechanisms? How does the press assess oversight and controls mechanisms implemented by the government and how has this changed over time?

⁶⁵ A study of fraud and error rates in five OECD countries found that rates for the entire social protection system ranged from 2-5% of total social protection spending (corruption was not an issue in these countries). Within the social protection system, means-tested safety net programs had fraud and error rates ranging from 5-10% of spending on benefits. Grosh et. al. (2008).

⁶⁶ The sample is random: after organizing all articles on fraud and errors (F&E) and oversight and controls (O&C) chronologically, one in every five articles was selected to construct the thematic drill-down database.

Fraud and Errors vs. Oversight and Controls. Quantitatively, the press reported slightly more frequently on oversight and controls mechanisms (88% of the thematic drill-down subsample covered the issue of O&C) than on fraud and errors (75% of the thematic drill-down sample covered the issue of F&E). Many articles covered both themes. Press coverage of F&E increased over time (from 70% to 78% of thematic drill-down subsample) while attention to O&C diminished slightly (from 93% to 86% of articles in thematic drill-down sub-sample). Headlines, however, focus more on the issue of F&E (see Box 5), dramatizing even individual “outlier” cases of fraud and errors, which can serve as a “political liability” when they “hit the headlines” or the “front pages” (as shown in Figure 15 above).

Box 5 – Examples of Headlines on Fraud and Fraud Control in the Press

Council member with salary of R\$1.8 thousand received Auxilio Gas

BOLSA FAMILIA (LOCAL) COORDINATOR ARRESTED

Government chases ghosts in the Bolsa Familia Program

Bolsa Familia is suspected to have 50 thousand duplicated benefits

CONTROL OF BOLSA FAMILIA IS ENHANCED

Bolsa Escola benefits politician’s godsons

Elected mayor receives Bolsa Familia in Piaui

Federal Police Investigates Bolsa Familia in Minas


Bolsa Familia: 174 benefits are cancelled in Piaui

Fraud vs. Errors (F&E). Not all “irregularities” represent fraud or corruption. Indeed, the technical literature⁶⁷ distinguishes between (a) *errors*, which are unintentional violations of program or benefit rules that result in the wrong benefit amount being paid or in payment to an ineligible applicant. Other unintentional customer or clerical errors include missing or inconsistent data in official registries; and (b) *intentional abuses* such as fraud by claimants (e.g., deliberately providing misleading information or concealing information to receive benefits) and corruption by officials (e.g., manipulation of beneficiary rosters, for example, registering ineligible beneficiaries to garner political support, staff accepting illegal payments from eligible or ineligible beneficiaries, or diversion of funds to ghost beneficiaries or other illegal channels).

The Brazilian press did make distinctions between fraud (intentional) and irregularities (unintentional errors), reporting on both phenomena. Overall, press reports focused more on alleged irregularities (59%) than on fraud (45%) (Figure 16). However, it was not uncommon to see reporters using the words on fraud and irregularities interchangeably. Moreover, even individual “outlier” cases of alleged fraud can garner the attention of visible headlines (see Box 5). Even though error rates in Brazil’s CCT programs are not unreasonably high relative to other countries (see Box 4), even individual cases of fraud and errors can become perceptions “liabilities” in the media debate.

⁶⁷ See Grosh et. al. (2008).


Figure 16 – Does the Press Distinguish between Intentional Fraud vs. Unintentional Errors?



The array of types of alleged fraud and errors reported in the press is vast. In decreasing order of frequency, the press mentioned the following types of alleged fraud and errors in CCT programs across the period (sub-sample of articles, see Figure 17): (a) **fraud for clientelistic purposes**, by politicians who allegedly register potential beneficiaries (friends, relatives, party members) to garner political support for program benefits (38% of thematic sub-sample of articles); (b) **errors of inclusion** or “leakages” to the non-poor (38% of articles); (c) **duplications** of beneficiaries in the program registry (20% of articles); (d) alleged **corruption**, i.e., the interception of funds by elected officials or an unjustifiable enrollment of elected officials in the program (17% of articles); (e) **fraudulent interception of electronic benefits cards** by intermediary parties, e.g., theft or inappropriate use of benefit payments for personal use of purchases (12% of articles); (f) **errors of exclusion** (missing coverage of the poor, 11% of articles); (g) errors resulting from a **lack of updating of the registry**, e.g., when socio-economic status of beneficiaries changes and is not updated in the registry (10% of articles); and (h) unintentional **official errors** when a mistake (act or omission) by staff or beneficiaries (10% of articles). It is interesting to compare the difference in relative weights put on these types of alleged errors reported in the press with actual errors uncovered by official random-sample reviews (Box 4).

The press and society played an important role in “uncovering” alleged cases of fraud and errors in press reports. Overall, 27% of articles reporting on alleged cases of fraud and errors were “uncovered” by investigative journalism sources (Figure 18). The press praised its own role in uncovering alleged cases of fraud and errors, and its perceived influence on forcing government to intensify its own oversight and control efforts. For example, an article from one newspaper asserted that “the government decision to track fraud and errors throughout the country was taken after a series of reports published in [that same newspaper].” Another article acclaimed the role of the *Fantastico* TV news report in forcing the government to take action to minimize irregularities (as discussed in Box 3).


Figure 17 – Alleged Types of Fraud and Errors Mentioned in Press Articles, Frequency



On the other hand, a significant share of articles on fraud and errors were reported from government sources (Figure 18), including government ministries (16% of articles reporting on cases of F&E) and the supreme audit agencies⁶⁸ (17% of such articles), during official audits and database cross-checks. In addition, the source of 27% of mentions of fraud and errors in press articles came from complaints channeled via official “hotlines.” The press did note government intentions to follow up and investigate these reported complaints. While headlines in the media still often dramatized reports of fraud and errors, it is objectively a “good thing” when official systems effectively detect and remedy fraud and errors. Press articles also conveyed government attitudes towards fraud and irregularities, with many articles containing statements by the government condemning fraud and errors. For example, the Minister of Social Development, Patrus Ananias, was quoted in one newspaper saying “We won’t be sympathetic to corruption and irregularities (*desvios*). We will fight them on all fronts. We will have a zero tolerance policy towards all types of fraud.”

⁶⁸ Note that the tone of media articles was slightly more critical when the source of reports on fraud and error came from the Supreme Audit Agencies versus the other sources (government ministries, hotlines, journalism), as shown in Figure 18. While it could be perceived as a “good” thing to have formal systems (such as supreme audit agencies) detect (and thus remedy) fraud and errors because it could be viewed as a sign that the “system is working” it might also be that fraud and errors detected by supreme audit agencies are viewed as more serious than when reported by other sources. Subject for further investigation.

Figure 18 – Sources of Allegations of Fraud and Errors in Press Reports



Oversight and Controls (O&C). The press also reported on government systems for oversight and controls. Two types of controls were commonly addressed in the press: (a) controls of the quality of targeting, registry and payments (79% of sub-sample of articles on O&C); and (b) controls of monitoring of compliance with program conditionalities (33% of articles).

Media perceptions of the quality of oversight and controls were mixed. Some 40% of articles on O&C mentioned that monitoring mechanisms were strong and well-functioning, but 25% of articles indicated that O&C systems were weak. Perceptions of the quality of O&C systems were more negative in 2004, when the “*Fantastico*” TV news report triggered a series of investigative journalism reports on fraud and error “scandals” (see Box 3). In that year, media perceptions held that O&C systems were largely weak (39% of articles in the sub-sample). However, after January 2005, when President Lula launched the formal Oversight and Controls Network and efforts to overhaul the registry, the press reported more favorably on efforts of the government to strengthen O&C systems. Specifically, the share of articles with negative perceptions of O&C systems decreased (to 14% of articles in the sub-sample in 2005), while the share of positive articles increased to 60%. One newspaper, for example, highlighted the efforts of Government systems to detect and resolve irregularities, citing a government report on the matter: “In a note, the ministry informed that the alleged duplicated payments were uncovered by routine checks made in the Bolsa Familia registry. Since 2004, the ministry has adopted routine processes to identify duplications and program control measures. These routines have led to the cancellation of 562,351 benefits [to date].”

In summary, unchecked fraud and errors can present a significant political liability for flagship social transfer programs. While all programs suffer some degree of fraud and errors, the challenge for governments is to develop systems to minimize them. If the media perceives irregularities and weaknesses in oversight and controls systems, it will publicize these “scandals” in a highly visible manner (particularly in pre-election periods). Even individual “outlier” cases of fraud and errors can serve as a “political liability” when they “hit the headlines.” However, the tone of the media does improve when the government is perceived as taking bold, credible and transparent steps to systematize oversight and controls and minimize fraud and errors.

Take-Away Message #8:
Unchecked fraud and errors = political liability for flagship social programs.

Thematic Drill-Down: Conditionalities

While there is much literature on the impacts of CCTs on poverty, inequality and human capital,⁶⁹ this paper asserts that human-capital conditionalities⁷⁰ have *also* played a “political role” in enhancing the legitimacy of the cash transfers – and that political role has been widely debated in the press. Notably, this political role appears via (a) an affirmation in the press debate of the importance of both the existence and monitoring of conditionalities; (b) clarity in the press debate on the perceived role of conditionalities not only for their structural impacts as poverty-reducing interventions, but also for the legitimacy that they confer on cash transfers via (i) incentives (social compact role); and (ii) reducing perceptions of “*assistencialismo*” (welfare dependency and clientelism).

In order to get a deeper understanding of the debate on conditionalities in the press, a “drill-down” thematic sub-sample was analyzed in detail. With a 40% sub-sample of articles mentioning conditionalities (or 193 articles out of 483), we went back into the text of these articles to explore the following levels of debate:


- Which conditionalities got more attention? Education or health?
- Who cares about conditionalities?
- Why does society (as reflected in the press debates) emphasize the importance of conditionalities? What roles are attributed to conditionalities in enhancing the effectiveness of the transfer programs?
- Is it the existence or the monitoring of conditionalities that matters?

⁶⁹ See Fiszbein and Schady (2009) for an international review of impacts of CCTs, plus the following on Brazil: de Janvry et. al. (2008), Bastagli (2008), Glewwe and Kassouff (2008), Paes de Barros (2006) and others.

⁷⁰ Human capital conditionalities are requirements for beneficiary families, such as minimum school attendance for school-aged children, growth monitoring and vaccines for young children, and pre- and post-natal care for pregnant/lactating mothers. Relevant members of beneficiary families must comply with these conditions in order for the family to receive the cash transfers (CCTs).


Which conditionalities got more attention in the press? Short answer: education. The debate on cash transfer conditionalities has focused more on the education requirement (school attendance) than the health component (vaccines, growth monitoring, prenatal care). Some 86% of articles addressing program conditionalities (sub-sample) explicitly refer to the school attendance obligation while only a third mentions health conditionalities (Figure 19). The relatively stronger emphasis on education in the press may reflect that the primary objective of the original CCTs in Brazil was to increase school attendance. Press attention to health conditionalities increased in 2003, however, when the pre-reform CCTs were merged into the Bolsa Familia Program. When the Bolsa Familia Program was launched, President Lula explained that it would maintain the menu of conditionalities from its predecessors, the Bolsa Escola and the Bolsa Alimentacao programs, in order to promote synergies between education and health investments. Correspondingly, press attention to the health dimension did increase somewhat, with around 40% of articles mentioning the health conditionality (sub-sample).

Figure 19 – Which Conditionalities Get More Attention? Education or Health?



Who Cares About Conditionalities? The debate on conditionalities can appear in the press because journalists write about these topics. Conversely, journalists write about conditionalities because external events encourage them talk about conditionalities — e.g. political speeches, interviews, or actions taken by the government. In this manner, the media plays both roles of agenda-setter and reflection of society’s perceptions, so it is important to examine who triggers the debate in the media on conditionalities. In the pre-BFP era, conditionalities mattered to all types of informants in about the same frequency (around 20%, see Figure 20 below). In the BFP era, however, both journalists and politicians picked up on the importance of conditionalities, while researchers shifted their focus to other aspects of the programs (see, for example, section on welfare dependency). Politicians stated that conditionalities were important in 55% of articles, while journalists made explicit comments in 38% of the articles.

Figure 20 – Who Suggests Conditionalties Are Important?



Why are conditionalties viewed as important – and how does this relate to the social contract? The debate in the press suggests several different views on the role of human capital conditionalties in CCTs, possibly reflecting differing philosophical views of the social contract in Brazil (Box 6). These different perspectives also imply a potential *political role* for conditionalties in garnering support for the program.


- **Conditionalties are associated with promoting *long-run structural impacts***, such as poverty reduction and social inclusion. Close to 40% of articles mentioning conditionalties emphasized the potential for long-run structural impacts as important (sub-sample, see Figure 21). This is consistent with the perceived role of CCTs more generally (viewed as reducing poverty and inequality, see Figure 6). Examples of quotes in press articles emphasizing the importance of conditionalties for long run impacts emphasize the link between the cash transfer and education: “without that link between the benefit and education, there is no eradication of poverty.” “Minimum income serves to alleviate the poverty of today’s adults. Bolsa Escola, besides this goal, eradicates poverty in the future.”
- **Conditionalties are also perceived as establishing *incentives* for families to invest in human capital as a “social contract.”** A significant share of articles emphasizes the contractual and incentives view of conditionalties (26% of articles in the sub-sample, Figure 21). The “contractual role” of CCTs in promoting incentives is evident in the following quote from a newspaper article: “The program is based on the premise that it is impossible to prevent parents from using their children in activities to supplement family income. To solve the problem, the State decided to pay for parents to keep children in school. In doing so, the program eliminates child labor and guarantees the only exit that these children will have to improve their lives.”

- **Conditionalities are also viewed as reducing the “assistencialist” nature of cash transfers.** Over a third (35%, Figure 21) of articles in the sub-sample emphasize the importance of conditionalities for reducing perceptions of *assistencialismo* (welfare dependency, clientelism). In this manner, conditionalities are thus conferring political legitimacy on what could otherwise be perceived as simple “cash handouts.” Examples of the flavor of debate asserting this position include the following: the programs “should require enrollment, attendance and performance of children in school and deliver money to the parents afterwards. Otherwise we will continue with programs that are assisting the poor without representing life-changing solutions” and “without the conditionalities, it is merely a handout.”

Take-Away Message #9:
Conditionalities can confer political legitimacy on cash transfer programs...

- **The emphasis on CCTs as promoting *basic citizens rights* is less emphasized in media articles** (Figures 6 and 21). This was somewhat surprising to us, as it appeared more prevalent in the rhetoric of politicians and government officials than the media frequency seemed to reflect. Perhaps the debate around this “right” was less frequently pronounced during the study period, since the concept of social assistance, education and health are already included as citizens’ rights in the 1988 constitution. An example of a quote in newspaper articles advocating that CCTs can help citizens take up their rights to social services makes the link to monitoring (in 2006 after monitoring was improved): “The very monitoring of health and control of school attendance in the Bolsa Familia Program announces major advances – 97% of beneficiary children attend school! The more systematic monitoring we implemented is also a form of verifying that the State secures the conditions that allow citizens’ access to these two elementary rights.”

Figure 21 – Conditionalties Promote Impact – and Political Legitimacy.



**Box 6 – Political Legitimacy Across the Spectrum:
Diverse Perspectives on the Role of Conditionalties in the Social Contract**

The political economy literature suggests that CCTs have a philosophical appeal of advancing a “*social contract*” whereby attaching conditions to the behavior of beneficiaries of cash transfers can help make redistribution to the poor more “palatable” to society and to taxpayers whose support is needed to fund the program (Fiszbein and Schady (2009)). In Brazil, CCTs have found support as a social policy instrument adopted by local and national governments *across the political spectrum*. However, the *rhetoric* among politicians, academics and journalists emphasizes differing views of the role CCTs play in the social contract in society, with:

- Some emphasize that the social assistance is needed to help repay society’s historical debt to the poor and the conditionalties help the poor take-up their basic universal rights to education and health, and in doing so, CCTs thus help break the inter-generational transmission of poverty in a structural manner;
- Others underscore the role of conditionalties as “contracts” or “incentives” that go beyond simple “cash handouts” by requiring the poor to do their part to take steps to improve their lives, invest in their children’s education and health, and thus break the inter-generational transmission of poverty -- or face penalties.

Our analysis of the treatment of CCTs in the Brazilian media finds both strands of this debate present, with media articles emphasizing:

- The role of CCTs as a social policy instrument to reduce poverty and inequality (Figure 6); and
- The perceived roles of conditionalties as (a) promoting long-run structural impacts; (b) providing contractual incentives to invest in education and health; and (c) reducing welfare dependency and perceptions of “*assistencialismo*” (Figure 21). A smaller share of articles emphasizes the role of conditionalties in helping citizens take up their universal rights to social services.

These diverse perspectives suggest that conditionalties do have a role in promoting political legitimacy of cash transfers – and that different actors perceive these roles with distinct “lenses” across the political spectrum. Moreover, political credibility does seem to hinge not only on the existence of conditionalties but also on monitoring their compliance, as discussed in the text.

Monitoring of compliance with conditionalities is a key ingredient for political credibility. The debate in the media has increasingly emphasized the importance of monitoring of compliance with conditionalities. While the press debates primarily emphasized the *existence* of conditionalities in the earlier pre-Bolsa Familia period (2001-03),⁷¹ by the later years under the Bolsa Familia program (2004-06), the debates squarely centered on the importance of *both* the *existence* of and the *monitoring* of conditionalities (Figure 22) below.⁷² Specifically, of those articles mentioning conditionalities (sub-sample), about half emphasized the importance of their existence as a policy mechanism *and* their monitoring and enforcement (with the remainder of articles refraining from judgment on the issue of whether or not conditionalities were important).

Take-Away Message #9:
...but conditionalities
need to be monitored to
maintain credibility.

A lack of credible monitoring of compliance with conditionalities can be a political liability. Overall coverage and tone both spiked in frequency and criticism in 2004 – when systematic monitoring of conditionalities was temporarily dropped (see Box 7). While the issue of conditionalities is mentioned in a quarter of all focused articles across the study period (Figure 23), the frequency of the topic gained momentum in late 2004. While there were on average 61 articles per month mentioning CCTs in the six-newspaper sample from January to August of that year, over 150 were written in September 2004 alone, including 84 CCT-focused articles. Of those, almost two-thirds addressed the topic of conditionalities. The tone also spiked in terms of criticism that year (Figure 23), with the share of fully critical articles almost doubling (from 6% in 2003 to 11% in 2004) and the share of articles critical of implementation (ambiguous tone) increasing from an average of 26% in the pre-Bolsa Familia period to 53% in 2004.

The issue of monitoring of compliance erupted into a full-blown philosophical debate that questioned the credibility of CCTs as a social policy instrument – and this debate played out visibly in the press. As one informant noted in a newspaper article: “the biggest problem of these cash transfer programs is not their conception, but the lack of monitoring” and “without monitoring [of school attendance], the program would stop being an educational program and would become merely a minimum income program.” Reflecting differing philosophical views of the role of conditionalities and CCTs (Box 6), the debate centered on whether or not systematic monitoring of conditionalities was needed, or if mere existence of conditionalities would suffice:

- On the one hand, some policymakers contended that the mere existence of conditionalities sent the message of the importance of education and health investments to beneficiaries. Proponents of this view maintained that the conditionalities primarily served to support citizens in taking up

⁷¹ It is interesting that the press debates did not emphasize monitoring of conditionalities as frequently under the pre-Bolsa Familia era (2001-03). This could perhaps reflect the fact that the larger CCT program at the time – Bolsa Escola – was situated in the Ministry of Education (rather than the social ministry). Perhaps the press (society) assumed that the Ministry of Education was automatically monitoring school attendance anyway – or perhaps the association with the education ministry de-emphasized the cash transfer aspects of the program.

⁷² The classification of this variable begs explanation. The sub-sample is drawn from the set of articles mentioning conditionalities (40% sub-sample of those articles, or 193 articles from a total of 483 (see Table 6 above). Of those the sub-sample of 193 articles *mentioning* conditionalities, Figure 22 identifies the share of those mentioning that conditionalities (existence and/or monitoring) were viewed as important. The remaining shares passed no judgment on the importance of conditionalities (it’s not that the other share said they were not important, they simply didn’t discuss the issue of importance).

their “rights” to universal social services, such as education and health. The cash transfers provided the necessary income support to help citizens take up these rights, and the existence of conditionalities was enough to symbolically make that connection. Moreover, there was a strong sentiment that the extreme poor should not be penalized if they were still too poor to take up these rights, given Brazil’s historical exclusion of the poor and the “social debt” that society owed the poor.

- Opposition to this view gained momentum among academic and government circles and particularly in the press. The rationale was that if conditionalities are not monitored or enforced, then (a) the program will not achieve the long-term structural impacts needed to reverse the inter-generational transmission of poverty; and (b) the program will be nothing more than a “cash handout,” with some coining the term *Bolsa Esmola*, (or “handout”) that would foster “*assistencialismo*” (welfare dependency). Both the *existence* of the conditionality and the *monitoring* of compliance were deemed important. This opposing view gained momentum with a series of strong editorials and articles. “Bolsa Familia, Without School” was the headline of one particularly critical article in O Globo (September 7, 2004). The opinion article, signed by a leading journalist, asserted that “Even the critics of ‘*assistencialist*’ programs, such as the Bolsa Familia Program, are comfortable when they know that the counterpart conditionality is the obligation to keep children in school...Then, be prepared for the bad news: there is no counterpart mechanism (conditionality), because there is no oversight.” Other newspapers followed, with a regional newspaper noting, for example: “The people in charge of Bolsa Familia cannot forget the nice experience of Bolsa Escola. The success of the initiative was basically due to two factors: first, fleeing from *assistencialismo*. Second: the obligation of the conditionality.”

The Government responded to and participated in this philosophical debate. The Government initially contended that monitoring was “one of the important criteria” but “not the essential criterion” of the program (official interview published in Valor Economico and other newspapers, September 8, 2004). A surge in critical articles followed. While there were on average 61 articles per month from January-August of 2004, 151 articles were published in September of that year, including 84 focused on CCTs. Of these, 84 articles, almost 2/3 (65%) addressed the issue of conditionality. The crisis gained momentum – alongside implications at the polls in nationwide municipal elections. The Government responded, announcing plans to reinstate and systematize the monitoring of compliance with program conditionalities (“*contrapartidas*”). At the same time, the Government emphasized that monitoring of compliance should not be viewed as “punishing the poor.” One official explained: “our objective is not to punish families. We only want to guarantee that children show up to at least 85% of classes. We need to monitor this because Bolsa Familia is not a paternalist program.” President Lula himself chimed in: “requiring counterpart actions (conditionalities) such as going to the doctor cannot be understood as a punishment, but as a benefit for families,” as reported in the press. Reflecting this nuanced view of the importance of monitoring combined with the need to avoid “punishing the poor,” the Government instituted a gradual menu of consequences for non-compliance, beginning with a “warning” intended to trigger additional social worker support, with financial penalties only being activated upon subsequent instances of non-compliance (Box 7).

Monitoring was thus reinstated – and the tone in the press debate improved. Following the media (and electoral) crisis of late 2004, the ministry’s technical team was replaced and a new team brought in with clear instructions to solidify all oversight and controls mechanisms – including for

monitoring of conditionalities. By 2006, 99% of municipalities and 93% of schools were reporting on compliance with school attendance conditionalities (see Box 7). As the government took steps to reinstate systematic monitoring of the conditionalities, the tone of the press articles improved – again exhibiting the “technical interplay” of the media with implementation challenges and improvements (Figure 23 below). Notably, the share of articles treating the issue of conditionalities with outright critical tone fell from 11% in 2004 to 6% in 2006, and the share with ambiguous tone fell from 53% to 44% across that same period.

Figure 22 – Which Aspects of Conditionalities Matter in the Press Debates?

Articles mentioning importance of conditionalities (existence or monitoring) as % of sub-sample of articles mentioning conditionalities (remainder passed no judgment on important or not)





Figure 23 – Frequency and Tone of Articles Addressing Conditionalities



Box 7 – Monitoring of Conditionalities in Practice

In general with CCTs, when assessing the monitoring of conditionalities, it is important to distinguish between monitoring of compliance and consequences for non-compliance. A quick overview of those functions in practice in Brazil:

- **Institutional Arrangements for Monitoring.** The Ministries of Education and Health have the responsibility for overseeing the monitoring of education and health conditionalities. This assignation of responsibilities was maintained even after the merger of the pre-reform CCTs (Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Alimentacao) into the Bolsa Familia Program in order to promote links to sectoral policies and to take advantage of existing sectoral information systems. Actual collection of data on school attendance and health care use (vaccines, growth monitoring, pre-natal care) is carried out at the local level with teachers (health care facilities) passing on information on compliance to the municipalities who then consolidate information and pass it onto the central agencies (see Lindert et. al. (May 2007) for a more detailed explanation of these information flows.
- **Monitoring in Practice.** The degree to which conditionalities have been monitored has varied over the years. Monitoring under the pre-reform programs was far from complete, with 19% of schools reporting under the Bolsa Escola program. During the transition year of 2004, the Ministry of Social Development temporarily stopped requiring municipalities to consolidate and transmit compliance information to the central government. This hiatus reflected the conceptual, legal and administrative transitions of the program during that transition period. Central monitoring of conditionalities resumed at the end of 2004, following the issuance of a government regulation. Since that time, monitoring of compliance has increased substantially, and by mid-2006 had reached close to 100% of municipalities and 93% of schools. Since the time of the study period, efforts have continued to bring higher shares of schools and students with full information into the monitoring system. The share of beneficiaries covered by data on compliance with health conditionalities has also gradually increased over time since monitoring was reinstated at the end of 2004, though in general, the monitoring of health conditionalities is extremely challenging from a technical information systems perspective in any country.
- **Consequences for Non-Compliance.** In Brazil (unlike other countries, such as Mexico), the consequences for non-compliance with conditionalities are gradual, beginning with a “warning” for the first infraction, followed by blockage, then suspension and ultimately cancellation of benefits for recurring infractions. This gradual approach reflects the philosophy that non-compliance should first serve as a signal that a family might be at risk or in need of additional services. With this philosophy, the first consequence for non-compliance is for the Ministry of Social Development to send a notification letter to the non-complying beneficiary family and to the municipal authorities. In municipalities where capacity permits, they can then send a social worker to investigate the reasons for non-compliance and diagnose if other services or assistance is needed to help bring the family into compliance. If non-compliance continues, the contractual penalties phase is activated, including blockage, suspension and finally cancellation of benefits. With this gradual approach to enforcement, few families actually face a full cancelation of benefits. According to ministry data, some 127,000 beneficiaries have been completely removed from the program due to recurring instances of non-compliance with conditionalities (out of some 4 million who have been removed from the program since 2003 for various reasons, including loss of eligibility from recertification).

Sources: MDS and Lindert et. al. (May 2007) .

Thematic Drill-Down: the Graduation Agenda and “Assistencialismo”

As discussed above, the media took up the graduation and welfare dependency agenda as a second-generation issue. This rise in the graduation debate as a second-generation issue is vividly evident in Figure 24 below. The “push” for the “graduation agenda” often comes from political pressures that can stem from public perceptions of possible transfer dependency and/or work disincentives. Depending on the socio-economic and political context, this “graduation debate” can emphasize “graduation from *poverty*” *or* it can put more emphasis on the shorter-term “graduation from *the program*.” The policy implications of these two “graduation” agendas are quite different. Graduation from *poverty* implies a policy focus on complementary measures and investments that can help structurally improve assets and living conditions such that beneficiaries – or their growing children – no longer need to rely on transfer benefits. Graduation from *the program* often translates into incentive measures, such as time limits or benefits reductions, to “force” reduced dependence on transfers.


Take-Away Message #6:
Press coverage mirrors
the expected evolution
of “first-generation” and
“second-generation”
challenges in social
policy.

In order to get a deeper understanding of the debate on the “graduation agenda” in the press, we analyzed two “drill-down” thematic sub-samples of articles in detail. Specifically, we pulled a 40% sub-sample of articles mentioning (a) key words such as welfare dependency, disincentive effects, exit doors (*portas de saída*) and the graduation agenda (73 articles in the thematic sub-sample); and (b) the related concept of “*assistencialismo*” (see Box 8), (88 articles in the thematic sub-sample). We went back into the text of these sub-sampled articles to explore the following aspects of the debate:

- What concerns does the media debate raise in relation to welfare dependency?
- Who is driving the media debate around “*assistencialismo*?”
- What are some suggested ways to reduce the phenomenon of “*assistencialismo*” in social programs?
- What is meant by “exit doors” in the press debate?
- Does the debate in the Brazilian press emphasize “graduation from the *program*” or “graduation from *poverty*?”

Figure 24 – The Rise of the Graduation Agenda in Media Debate

Mentions of Welfare Dependency and Graduation Strategy: Evolution




The graduation debate in the Brazilian media has focused more on “welfare dependency” than “work disincentives.” Among the articles reviewed in the graduation sub-sample (73 articles), about 40% accuse CCTs of creating disincentive effects. Of those, a larger share (48%) focused on concerns about “welfare dependency” than “work disincentives” (17%, Figure 25). Concerns about welfare dependency were often alleged alongside rhetoric about “*assistencialismo*,” with 35% of articles on *assistencialismo* also mentioning the issue of welfare dependency. Articles assert that public transfers become “addictive” and lead beneficiaries to “accommodate” their needs with monthly transfer income. Other examples of such rhetoric include allegations that the program “trains beggars” or creates a “generation of dependents.” The recurring idea is often expressed with allegations that “cash handouts” (*esmolas*) “give the fish without teaching how to fish” – with undertones that the programs are “emergency-based” (*emergencial*) but do not address the structural challenges of poverty reduction. Some articles (17% of graduation sub-sample) also touch on issues of work disincentives, for example, with anecdotal stories from employers claiming they can no longer find workers who are “willing to work” due to the cash transfer programs. Articles allege that beneficiaries of the cash transfer programs would have “an incentive to stay poor” to continue to benefit, or that the benefits act like an alternative to a “stable wage.” While 40% of articles in the “graduation agenda” sub-sample accuse CCTs of creating disincentive effects, 8% defend the opposite view by refuting these allegations.

Few articles present empirical evidence on disincentives (welfare dependency or work disincentives).⁷³ Few articles alleging such disincentives back up these statements with supporting evidence (only 10%). In contrast, about half of articles *refuting* claims of disincentive effects offer

⁷³ In fact, most impact evaluations find little or no adverse impacts on work efforts. See Bourguignon-Ferreira-Leite (2003), Paes de Barros et. al. (2003), Bastagli (2008), and Oliveira (2009).

supporting data to sustain their statements (e.g., with impact evaluation or household survey results). In fact, impact evaluation studies suggest that CCTs have had little or no empirical impact on adult work effort (and if anything, program beneficiaries were *more likely* to be looking for work than comparable non-beneficiaries).⁷⁴

Figure 25 – What Incentive Concerns are Raised by the Brazilian Press?



Assistencialismo and welfare dependency: A debate driven by the press. The press played an important role in triggering the debate about “*assistencialismo*” (see Box 8). Overall, journalists and columnists made allegations about the “*assistencialista*” nature of CCTs in 54% of articles in the sub-sample (Figure 26). Other than the press itself, politicians (most likely from the opposition) were responsible for 29% of the allegations of “*assistencialismo*” in the CCT programs. The press also played an important role in perpetuating allegations of welfare dependency. In fact, over half of concerns about welfare dependency (in the graduation sub-sample of articles) were alleged by the press itself (journalists and columnists). The newspaper *O Globo* even published a special multi-page issue (*caderno especial*) on the topics of welfare dependency and *assistencialismo* on August 12, 2006 as part of the 2006 election press coverage. The special issue included 27 articles with pictures, charts, tables and large headlines such as “Program Generates Dependency and Disincentives to Work,” “Bad With Them (cash transfers), Worse Without Them,” and “The Promises to Teach How to Fish.”



⁷⁴ See evaluations by Medeiros et. al. (2007), Bastagli (2008), and Oliveira (2009).

Box 8 – What is Meant by “Assistencialismo” in the Press Debate?

Assistencialismo is term used in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America to refer to a perceived phenomenon that seems to comprise “welfare dependency,” “patronage,” and “clientelism.”

- The welfare dependency aspect of *assistencialismo* is often portrayed in the press as an “addiction” to monthly transfers as a source of income. This aspect is generally used to suggest that such programs do not address the root causes of poverty, as summarized in the following quote in one newspaper editorial: “Billions are distributed as alms without improving the social status of beneficiaries. Pure and inefficient *assistencialismo*.”
- Press use of the term *assistencialismo* is also often portrayed alongside perceptions of “clientelism” and “patronage,” which imply some sort of (indirect) electoral use of programs. While the technical literature defines clientelism as the “explicit exchange of private benefits for votes,” the rhetoric in the press uses these terms more loosely, noting that targeted cash transfers can confer political gains in the form of votes from poor beneficiaries. For example, one newspaper article links President Lula’s electoral success to the impact and coverage of the Bolsa Familia Program in an editorial: “For the government, the votes were the return for a righteous policy. For the opposition, (they were the) fruit of a demagogic *assistencialista* scheme.”

Figures 26 and 27: Who Accuses and Who Refutes the Notion of *Assistencialismo*?



Politicians and program managers refute these claims. Faced with the press’s allegations that the CCT programs were “*assistencialista*,” politicians and program managers tended to send a different message in the press (Figure 27). Overall, 43% of refuting statements that CCTs are not *assistencialista* were made by politicians and 21% were made by program managers. Journalists and columnists accounted for only 21% of these refuting comments.


Why do the press and others allege the perception of “*assistencialismo*?” The articles that accused CCTs of being “*assistencialista*” generally offered three reasons to back-up their statements. The most common views were that (a) CCTs were perceived as causing *welfare dependency* (32% of articles in the sub-sample), as discussed above; (b) CCTs were perceived as being “*clientelistic*” (vote buying, mentioned in 24% of articles in the sub-sample); and (c) CCTs were *assistencialista* because “there is no monitoring of program conditionalities” (23% of articles in the sub-sample) – again, an important nod to the political importance of conditionalities (Box 6).

Take-Away Message
#10: Welfare
dependency vs.
graduation from
poverty.

What reasons are given to defend CCTs as not being “*assistencialista*?” The reasons most frequently presented in the press to support the statements that CCTs are not “*assistencialista*” included the view that (a) CCT constitute the *rights* of Brazilian citizens (37% of articles in the sub-sample); and (b) the existence and monitoring of *conditionalities* enhance the structural aspects of the social policy instrument and thus prevent “*assistencialismo*” (22% of articles). Once again, this represents an instance of conditionalities playing an important role in the political debates around CCTs (Box 6).

Reducing “*assistencialismo*” centers on the graduation agenda and human capital links. Some of the articles alleging that CCTs are “*assistencialista*” suggested ways to reduce “*assistencialismo*.” The most frequent solution was to provide adequate tools for the poor to exit from poverty, the so-called “exit doors” (*portas de saida*), as shown in Figure 28. This solution is tied to the perception that CCTs may create dependency on public assistance. The argument thus follows that CCTs need to be “linked with public policies whose objective is to effectively include the poor into the economy.” This may be achieved via “technical and professional training, labor market insertion, and opportunities for studying.” In addition, strengthening the education system is also presented as an important complementary policy to reduce “*assistencialismo*.” Investing in education and strengthening the monitoring of conditionalities are suggested as “antidotes” to *assistencialismo* in 22% of the articles (Figure 28).

Figure 28 – How to Reduce “Assistencialismo?”



Graduation from *poverty* versus graduation from the *program*? Many articles in the sub-sample discuss the notion of “exit doors” (*portas de saida*). As shown in Figure 29 below, very few of these articles emphasize measures to promote graduation from the *program* itself (e.g., time limits). Rather, most articles discussing “exit doors” focus on measures that could help the poor graduate from *poverty* through structural shifts that promote “emancipation” and/or tools that improve productivity and employment opportunities (Figure 29). Minister Patrus Ananias explained his understanding of the “exit door” debate in a newspaper column in 2005: “The Bolsa Familia Program is the entry door for poor families to have access to basic rights such as nutrition, education and health, as well as to meet the conditions to take part in the country’s productive processes. In the meantime, efforts are made to vigorously broaden our integrated actions (with other programs within the Ministry itself and with other ministries, along with our partnerships with municipal and state governments) to implement the so-called ‘exit doors,’ policies of emancipation which generate employment, income, citizenship and civic education.”

Examples of graduation measures (exit doors) focus on activation tools. The most common examples of exit doors cited in the Brazilian press include: adult literacy and socio-educational programs (50% of articles in the sub-sample); job training programs⁷⁵ (43%); and micro-credit programs (32%), as shown in Figure 30. The debate on exit doors thus focuses on complementary programs and services that are external to the immediate jurisdiction of the CCTs. The challenge facing Brazilian policy makers and CCT program managers is that these complementary programs are generally operated by other ministries, agencies and levels of government. As such, formally linking CCT beneficiaries to these services is institutionally complex. The Government has made efforts to prioritize and link Bolsa Familia beneficiaries to other complementary services (e.g., through agreements with sectoral ministries and sub-national governments).⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Interestingly, the possibility of linking adult BFP beneficiaries to adult education and / or job training services has become a frequent topic in media articles on the program in 2010 – in advance of the upcoming presidential elections.

⁷⁶ As discussed in Lindert et. al. (May 2007).

Figure 29 – Graduation from Poverty or Graduation from the Program?





Figure 30 – Examples of Exit Doors: the Activation Agenda



VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CCTs

This paper seeks to make a modest contribution to the literature on the political economy of CCTs by analyzing perceptions about CCTs as portrayed and debated in free and independent press in Brazil. The motives behind the study are to contribute to an understanding of the public debate about this type of social policy instrument, given its widespread popularity and potential to reduce poverty and inequality and the replication of this type of instrument in many countries around the world.

Quality Debate, Quality Policies. That Brazil has a free and government-independent press is of considerable importance and the premise for this analysis. This premise is not always replicated elsewhere. We view the media overall as an important *actor* in the debate around social policy, both reflecting and influencing public opinion. However, we do not attempt to determine if the *press* is the main *driver* of public debate or if the media simply *reflects* the on-going debate in broader society. Articles often report on the views of multiple informants, reflecting diverse sources of information and opinions – in addition to their own. Nor do we attempt to determine causality regarding who sets the policy agenda. In the course of events and the analysis, there are some points where it does *appear* that the press was an important actor in pushing and influencing the debate around key features of CCTs. The Government was also an important participant in the debates on social policy, and took a stance of communicating transparently on both positive and negative aspects. In turn, the tone and frequency of press coverage seems to adjust to reflect both weaknesses and improvements accurately over the broad course of the six year study period.

Without claiming causality, there are several junctures in which this *interplay* between the press actively pushing vibrant debate and the Government responding transparently *seems to* have contributed to strengthening the program. Some examples of these critical “turning points” include:

- **Quality of Operations and Oversight.** The *Fantastico* broadcast news episode and the wave of newspaper articles on perceived leakages, fraud, and errors in the Bolsa Familia program, which “hit the presses” just before the 2004 elections. Coinciding with the observed tendency of media scrutiny to increase just before elections (political interplay), this spate of articles did seem to contribute to an important debate about the quality of program implementation (technical interplay). The Government responded on the outreach front, with transparency in communicating about registry weaknesses and errors in the program. It also took decisive actions to strengthen the program, with President Lula himself launching a multi-agency oversight and controls network, along with numerous other measures to improve operating systems.
- **The Legitimizing Role of Conditionalities.** The spate of news articles questioning the (temporary) suspension of monitoring of compliance with conditionalities. Again, the press aired these concerns just before the 2004 elections (political interplay). Nonetheless, what surfaced was a vibrant public debate about the diverse perspectives on the role of CCTs in social policy – and on the role of *conditionalities* as a legitimizing and critical feature the “social contract.” The importance of conditionalities was emphasized for multiple reasons: (a) promoting long-term structural impacts to reduce poverty and inequality; (b) establishing incentives for families to invest in human capital; (c) reducing perceptions of *assistencialismo* (welfare dependency) and thus making redistributive cash transfers more

“palatable;” and, to a lesser extent, (d) helping the poor take-up their basic citizens’ rights to social services. The debate in the press emphasized not only the role of conditionalities in garnering political support for the program, but also the need for credible monitoring of compliance to maintain that legitimacy. The Government responded, reinstating monitoring and expanding monitoring of compliance. It also instituted a gradual menu of consequences for non-compliance beginning with a “warning” intended to trigger additional social worker support before activating financial penalties. This mix of monitoring with gradual consequences for non-compliance reflects the diverse views about the legitimizing role of conditionalities in Brazil and the need to avoid unduly “punishing the poor.”

Yet we also recognize that many factors are operating simultaneously at any given moment, and as such we cannot establish such causality. Suffice it to say that this interplay between the free and independent press, the Government, and other actors seems to have contributed to the high quality of the debate, and ultimately to the success of Brazil’s CCT programs.

Take-Away Messages for the International CCT Community. We recognize that the media debate for one country could not be presumed to apply directly elsewhere. Nonetheless, we believe that the findings are of interest to the broader international “CCT community.” At the very least it is instructive to think about (a) which design and implementation features of CCTs attract press attention and what is the tone of the media towards these aspects; (b) the almost inevitable political ebb-and-flow of press tone towards flagship social programs with the electoral cycle; and (c) the interplay between the tone of the media debate and technical weaknesses and improvements to the programs – which suggests a potential virtuous cycle of accountability on both sides (media and government).

With these caveats, we suggest **ten key take-away messages with their potential implications for policy makers and CCT practitioners** (see Table 7 below). The first five relate to “macro perceptions” of CCTs as an instrument of social policy. The second set of five relate to “micro perceptions” of individual design and implementation features.

Looking across these messages, we suggest **three cross-cutting points about the political economy of CCTs as a social policy instrument.** *First*, vibrant public debate around social policy should be promoted through free press *and* proactive communications efforts by program managers to transparently disseminate information and to respond to queries from the press and the general public about CCT programs. As noted above, there are several junctures in which this *interplay* between the press actively pushing vibrant debate and the Government responding transparently *seems to* have contributed to strengthening CCT programs in Brazil. *Second*, while the press may endorse the overall *concept* of CCTs as a social policy instrument, quality of *implementation* matters not only for program effectiveness but for public acceptance. While the press will “jump on” perceived weaknesses – and it may do so in the face of elections (political interplay) – it will also report on subsequent improvements in implementation quality in what could be viewed as a “virtuous circle” of accountability for both the press and the Government (technical interplay). And *third*, CCT practitioners should pay close attention to a possible “political economy” equation surrounding key design and implementation parameters:

- **“Public Perceptions Assets:”** Some design and implementation features help garner public support for these instruments of social policy, for example: conditionalities *when monitored*

(political role for conditionalities); targeting accuracy and perceptions of fairness; implementation quality (it matters!).

- **“Public Perceptions Liabilities:”** Other aspects spawn media criticism, such as perceptions of unchecked fraud and errors, perceived weaknesses in registries, a lack of monitoring of conditionalities, and perceptions of welfare dependency.

These parameters seem to matter both technically (for program effectiveness) and politically (for legitimacy and credibility in the public eye). In other words, we suggest that what works technically (“good policy”), works politically (“good politics”) – and public debate around this intersection of the technical and the political can help promote accountability in social policy.

| Table 7 – Top 10 Take-Away Messages and Potential Implications for CCT practitioners | | |
|--|---|--|
| | Main Finding – Media analysis in Brazil | Implications for CCTs |
| “Macro Perceptions” (Tone, Coverage) | | |
| 1. High visibility | CCTs have been highly visible in the Brazilian press. The frequency of press coverage of CCTs has increased over time and with the scale of the program, averaging an article a day in each newspaper by 2006. | The vibrancy of public debate around key social policy issues should be welcomed. For CCT managers, this visibility implies a need for a clear public relation strategy for the program, both to share pertinent information and to respond to inquiries by the press and the public. |
| 2. General endorsement of the concept of CCTs | Overall, most articles endorse the general <i>concept</i> of CCTs as a social policy instrument in Brazil, though a significant share do emphasize concerns about implementation. | Communication about the concept of CCTs is crucial. The public and the media should have a clear understanding of how the instrument is supposed to work. |
| 3. Scaling Up Dilemma | Rapid scaling up carries both benefits and risks. On the one hand, increased program coverage (which was mirrored by an increase in press coverage) – can be viewed as being responsive to social, political and poverty challenges – particularly in a context with general endorsement of the overall concept of CCTs. On the other hand, scaling up also requires mature operating systems that are not always fully functional in the early stages of program implementation. The press will “jump on” perceived weaknesses as the program scales up. | Governments often feel the pressure to scale-up coverage rapidly. Increased coverage comes with increased visibility in the press. As such, decisions to scale up rapidly should take into account the quality and capacity of operating systems. |
| 4. Technical interplay | Press treatment of CCTs does reflect both technical strengths and perceived weaknesses in the implementation of the program. While the press will report on perceived technical weaknesses with increased scrutiny and criticism, the tone of media coverage will also become more favorable when the Government makes improvements in implementation quality, implying a potential “virtuous cycle” of accountability for both the press and the Government. | This potential “virtual cycle” of accountability for both the press and the Government implies that the technical quality of the program is linked to broader acceptance and support for CCTs. In other words, “what works technically works politically” – and conversely, “technical weaknesses can be political liabilities.” |
| 5. Political interplay | As with all flagship social programs, elections bring increased scrutiny. The findings do suggest a spike in press attention of CCTs before each election in Brazil, and this pattern of increased press scrutiny is independent of program or political regime (it affected governments on both ends of the political spectrum). | CCT practitioners and policy makers should anticipate increased scrutiny before elections. Transparent implementation and proactive public relations efforts are important ingredients. Pre-election measures – such as enrollment quarantines – are also important steps to reducing claims of clientelism and vote buying. |

Table 7 – Top 10 Take-Away Messages and Potential Implications for CCT practitioners, continued

| | Main Finding – Media Analysis in Brazil | Implications for CCTs |
|---|---|---|
| “Micro Perceptions” (Design and Implementation Features) | | |
| 6. Sequencing of social policy challenges | Press coverage mirrored the expected evolution of “first generation challenges” (targeting, benefits administration) and “second-generation” issues (graduation agenda, welfare dependency). | Practitioners of CCTs should focus first on “getting the program working well” and “getting the right people in the program” (core architecture: registries, payments, monitoring and oversight). They will then face “inevitable” pressures to confront second-generation issues such as the “graduation agenda.” |
| 7. Targeting Accuracy, Perceptions of Social Justice | In Brazil, press reports primarily emphasize errors of inclusion (even though leakages to the non-poor are relatively small) over errors of exclusion. This could reflect society’s emphasis on perceptions of “justice for the poor,” “fairness,” and a possible preference for narrow targeting. | Perceptions of social justice and poverty vary significantly around the world – as do degrees of inequality (Gini). As such, this result may not be generalizable to other countries. Some societies may have a preference for broader targeting (political base). Nonetheless, we suspect that perceptions of fairness in eligibility decisions probably matters for public opinion regardless of how narrowly eligibility thresholds are set. |
| 8. Fraud and errors = political liability. | While all programs suffer some degree of fraud and errors, the challenge for governments is to develop systems to minimize them. If the media perceives irregularities and weaknesses in oversight and controls systems, it will publicize these “scandals” in a highly visible manner (particularly in pre-election periods). Even individual “outlier” cases of fraud and errors can serve as a “political liability” when they “hit the headlines.” However, the tone of the media does improve when the government is perceived as taking bold, credible and transparent steps to systematize oversight and controls and minimize fraud and errors. | Invest significantly and boldly in transparent and credible oversight and controls mechanisms. Publish reports on fraud and error control and detection in a transparent manner. And be prepared to handle allegations of even “outlier” allegation cases of fraud and errors with a transparent and straightforward public relations campaign. Anticipate that these allegations will become even more prevalent during pre-election periods. |

Table 7 – Top 10 Take-Away Messages and Potential Implications for CCT practitioners, continued

| | Main Finding – Media Analysis in Brazil | Implications for CCTs |
|---|--|---|
| “Micro Perceptions” (Design and Implementation Features) | | |
| 9. Conditionalities and political legitimacy | When monitored, conditionalities appear to confer political legitimacy to cash transfer programs. This legitimizing role seems to derive from diverse views about the role of conditionalities in the “social contract.” Specifically, they are viewed as promoting long-run impacts, establishing incentives for investments in human capital, building credibility for transfer programs by reducing concerns about “ <i>assistencialismo</i> ” (welfare dependency, clientelism), and to a lesser extent, helping the poor take up their basic citizens’ rights to social services. Without proper monitoring, however, that legitimacy can be called into question. It is not enough to merely “announce” the existence of conditionalities; they must be viewed as being monitored and enforced to be credible. | While conditionalities can bestow credibility on cash transfers, practitioners should recognize the importance of compliance monitoring in garnering public support. |
| 10. Welfare dependency vs. graduation from poverty. | Allegations of “welfare dependency” (continuous reliance by the poor on transfers) appear to be an increasing “political liability” of cash transfer programs as they mature (second generation issue). In the Brazilian press debate, proposed solutions emphasize measures to promote long-run graduation from <i>poverty</i> rather than short-run measures to force graduation from the <i>program</i> . | CCT practitioners should anticipate the second-generation issues of perceived “welfare dependency” and the need for “graduation strategies.” The relative emphasis on graduation from <i>poverty</i> vs. graduation from <i>the program</i> leads to distinct policy responses – and probably reflects each society’s perceptions of the poor and social justice. |

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The primary reference for this paper is the 6,531 media articles analyzed from six newspapers in Brazil over the period from 2001-06. The paper also builds on substantial technical knowledge about the design and implementation of CCT programs in Brazil, as documented in the “nuts and bolts” companion paper to this study (see Lindert et. al. (May 2007) below).

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**Social Policy, Perceptions and the Press:
An Analysis of the Media's Treatment of Conditional Cash Transfers in
Brazil**

Statistical Appendix

Table A1 – Coverage of CCTs in the Printed Press (Amount of Articles and division of MM vs FA)

| | Number of Articles | | | Average Number of Articles Per Day | | |
|---------------|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|
| | Focused on CCTs | With Mere Mention of CCTs | Total | Focused on CCTs | With Mere Mention of CCTs | Total |
| 2001 | 321 | 534 | 855 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 2.3 |
| 2002 | 183 | 614 | 797 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 2.2 |
| 2003 | 278 | 515 | 793 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 2.2 |
| 2004 | 349 | 625 | 974 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 2.7 |
| 2005 | 284 | 656 | 940 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 2.6 |
| 2006 | 576 | 1,596 | 2,172 | 1.6 | 4.4 | 6.0 |
| Total | 1,991 | 4,540 | 6,531 | 0.9 | 2.1 | 3.0 |
| Total 2001-03 | 782 | 1,663 | 2,445 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 2.2 |
| Total 2004-06 | 1,209 | 2,877 | 4,086 | 1.1 | 2.6 | 3.7 |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-All Articles: 6,531

Table A2 – Sections of Newspapers in Which Articles Were Published –All Articles

| | Number Articles | % of Articles Published in Each Section | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------|---|--------------|--------------|-------------------|------------------------|------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| | All Articles | National / General | Politics | Opinions | Economy / Finance | Supplements / Specials | Local | Other | World | Unknown |
| 2001 | 855 | 46% | 13% | 18% | 6% | 4% | 8% | 5% | 0% | 0% |
| 2002 | 797 | 36% | 12% | 19% | 14% | 9% | 6% | 4% | 1% | 0% |
| 2003 | 793 | 52% | 15% | 11% | 12% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 1% | 1% |
| 2004 | 974 | 42% | 21% | 18% | 8% | 3% | 5% | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| 2005 | 940 | 37% | 20% | 17% | 14% | 4% | 3% | 1% | 1% | 2% |
| 2006 | 2,172 | 29% | 27% | 19% | 14% | 5% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 1% |
| Total-Issue | 6,531 | 38% | 20% | 18% | 12% | 5% | 4% | 3% | 1% | 1% |
| <i>Total Number</i> | <i>6,531</i> | <i>2,472</i> | <i>1,302</i> | <i>1,153</i> | <i>764</i> | <i>312</i> | <i>259</i> | <i>169</i> | <i>52</i> | <i>48</i> |
| 2001-03 | 2,445 | 45% | 13% | 16% | 11% | 5% | 5% | 4% | 0% | 0% |
| 2004-06 | 4,086 | 36% | 23% | 18% | 12% | 4% | 4% | 2% | 1% | 1% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-All Articles: 6,531

Table A3 – Sections of Newspapers in Which Articles Were Published –Focused Articles

| | Number Articles | % of Articles Published in Each Section | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|------------------|---|------------|------------|-------------------|------------|------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| | Focused Articles | National / General | Politics | Opinions | Economy / Finance | Local | Supplements / Specials | Other | Unknown | World |
| 2001 | 321 | 44% | 7% | 20% | 3% | 11% | 4% | 10% | 0% | 0% |
| 2002 | 183 | 38% | 5% | 21% | 13% | 9% | 7% | 5% | 1% | 1% |
| 2003 | 278 | 60% | 20% | 7% | 5% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 0% |
| 2004 | 349 | 49% | 21% | 14% | 2% | 6% | 4% | 0% | 3% | 1% |
| 2005 | 284 | 51% | 20% | 13% | 6% | 3% | 4% | 0% | 4% | 0% |
| 2006 | 576 | 39% | 23% | 19% | 10% | 2% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 1% |
| Total-Issue | 1,991 | 46% | 17% | 16% | 6% | 5% | 4% | 3% | 2% | 0% |
| <i>Total Number</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>920</i> | <i>348</i> | <i>318</i> | <i>127</i> | <i>101</i> | <i>73</i> | <i>55</i> | <i>41</i> | <i>8</i> |
| 2001-03 | 782 | 47% | 11% | 16% | 7% | 7% | 4% | 6% | 1% | 0% |
| 2004-06 | 1,209 | 46% | 21% | 15% | 6% | 4% | 4% | 1% | 3% | 0% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A3 – Visibility of Articles Focused on CCTs: Special CCT-Dedicated Folders and Headlines

| | Number Articles | % of Focused Articles Published... | | |
|---------------------|------------------|--|---|--|
| | Focused Articles | On Front Page (of Newspaper or Folder) | In Special Folder (<i>Caderno Especial</i>) | With a Headline Containing Name of CCT |
| 2001 | 321 | 9% | 2% | 46% |
| 2002 | 183 | 7% | 7% | 41% |
| 2003 | 278 | 11% | 1% | 26% |
| 2004 | 349 | 9% | 3% | 42% |
| 2005 | 284 | 7% | 2% | 42% |
| 2006 | 576 | 9% | 1% | 46% |
| Total-Issue | 1,991 | 9% | 2% | 41% |
| <i>Total Number</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>177</i> | <i>48</i> | <i>826</i> |
| 2001-03 | 782 | 9% | 3% | 38% |
| 2004-06 | 1,209 | 8% | 2% | 43% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A4 – Size of Articles Focused on CCTs

| | Number of Articles Focused on CCTs | % of Articles Focused on CCTs With Length of... | | |
|---------|------------------------------------|---|----------------|----------------|
| | | 1-2 Paragraphs | 3-7 Paragraphs | > 7 Paragraphs |
| 2001 | 321 | 33% | 33% | 33% |
| 2002 | 183 | 38% | 34% | 28% |
| 2003 | 278 | 12% | 46% | 41% |
| 2004 | 349 | 21% | 46% | 33% |
| 2005 | 284 | 18% | 48% | 34% |
| 2006 | 576 | 25% | 40% | 35% |
| Total | 1,991 | 24% | 41% | 34% |
| 2001-03 | 782 | 28% | 38% | 34% |
| 2004-06 | 1,209 | 22% | 45% | 34% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A5 – Use of visuals

| | % of Focused Articles Displaying A... | | | |
|--------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| | Cartoon | Graph | Table | Picture |
| 2001 | 2% | 1% | 11% | 18% |
| 2002 | 4% | 0% | 11% | 19% |
| 2003 | 1% | 1% | 14% | 25% |
| 2004 | 1% | 1% | 7% | 27% |
| 2005 | 1% | 2% | 6% | 27% |
| 2006 | 5% | 2% | 10% | 28% |
| Total | 3% | 1% | 10% | 25% |
| 2001-03 | 3% | 0% | 12% | 21% |
| 2004-06 | 2% | 1% | 8% | 27% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A6 – Type of Article

| | Number of Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs |
|--------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|
| News Reports | 1,251 | 63% |
| Opinions | 341 | 17% |
| Briefs | 284 | 14% |
| Interviews | 80 | 4% |
| Editorials | 35 | 2% |
| Total | 1,991 | 100% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A7 – Type and Frequency of Informants Used

| | % of Focused Articles Quoting A... | | | | |
|--------------|------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------|--------------------|---|
| | Beneficiary | Politician | Brazilian Researcher | Program Manager | International Organization Staff / Foreign Official |
| 2001 | 11% | 46% | 7% | 17% | 4% |
| 2002 | 11% | 23% | 8% | 19% | 4% |
| 2003 | 9% | 39% | 10% | 24% | 10% |
| 2004 | 10% | 36% | 6% | 13% | 5% |
| 2005 | 10% | 32% | 9% | 20% | 5% |
| 2006 | 11% | 26% | 21% | 14% | 3% |
| Total | 11% | 33% | 12% | 17% | 5% |
| 2001-03 | 11% | 36% | 8% | 20% | 6% |
| 2004-06 | 11% | 31% | 12% | 16% | 5% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A8 – Context of Articles: References to International Organizations and International CCT Experiences

| | Number Articles | % of Focused Articles With Reference to... | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|--|-------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Focused Articles | International Organizations | CCTs in Mexico | CCTs in Latin America | CCTs in Other Regions |
| Total- Issue | 1,991 | 10% | 2% | 2% | 3% |
| <i>Total Number</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>194</i> | <i>40</i> | <i>47</i> | <i>53</i> |
| 2001-03 | 782 | 12% | 2% | 3% | 5% |
| 2004-06 | 1,209 | 9% | 2% | 2% | 1% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

International organizations mentioned in focused articles include: WB/IBRD, IDB, UN, Unicef, Unesco, OIT, IMF, FAO, UNDP, WHO, and OAS.

Other regions include: Africa (Mozambique, Sao Tome, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe), China, East Timor, India, and NYC.

Table A9 - Tone Overall

| | Type of Articles | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing CCTs With... | | | |
|---------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| | | | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total | Focused | 1,991 | 13% | 43% | 38% | 7% |
| | Mere Mention | 4,540 | 31% | 45% | 19% | 5% |
| | Total | 6,531 | 26% | 44% | 25% | 6% |
| 2001-03 | Focused | 782 | 12% | 50% | 33% | 4% |
| | Mere Mention | 1,663 | 33% | 48% | 16% | 3% |
| | Total | 2,445 | 26% | 49% | 21% | 3% |
| 2004-06 | Focused | 1,209 | 13% | 38% | 40% | 9% |
| | Mere Mention | 2,877 | 31% | 42% | 21% | 6% |
| | Total | 4,086 | 25% | 41% | 26% | 7% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database

NOBS-All Articles: 6,531

NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

NOBS-Mere Mention Articles: 4,540

Table A10 – Tone by Year and Type of Article

| | Type of Articles | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing CCTs With... | | | |
|------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| | | | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | Focused | 321 | 13% | 56% | 28% | 3% |
| | Mere Mention | 534 | 34% | 49% | 14% | 3% |
| | Total | 855 | 26% | 52% | 20% | 3% |
| 2002 | Focused | 183 | 13% | 51% | 28% | 8% |
| | Mere Mention | 614 | 26% | 55% | 15% | 4% |
| | Total | 797 | 23% | 54% | 18% | 5% |
| 2003 | Focused | 278 | 11% | 44% | 42% | 4% |
| | Mere Mention | 515 | 40% | 40% | 18% | 2% |
| | Total | 793 | 30% | 41% | 26% | 3% |
| 2004 | Focused | 349 | 10% | 34% | 46% | 10% |
| | Mere Mention | 625 | 29% | 45% | 21% | 4% |
| | Total | 974 | 22% | 41% | 30% | 6% |
| 2005 | Focused | 284 | 9% | 46% | 38% | 6% |
| | Mere Mention | 656 | 28% | 47% | 20% | 4% |
| | Total | 940 | 22% | 47% | 26% | 5% |
| 2006 | Focused | 576 | 17% | 35% | 38% | 9% |
| | Mere Mention | 1,596 | 32% | 39% | 21% | 8% |
| | Total | 2,172 | 28% | 38% | 25% | 8% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database

NOBS-All Articles: 6,531

NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

NOBS-Mere Mention Articles: 4,540

Table A11 – Reporting on Impacts of CCTs: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Impact of CCTs | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 8 | 2% | 0% | 75% | 0% | 25% |
| 2002 | 8 | 4% | 13% | 50% | 38% | 0% |
| 2003 | 21 | 8% | 10% | 48% | 29% | 14% |
| 2004 | 23 | 7% | 9% | 35% | 43% | 13% |
| 2005 | 19 | 7% | 5% | 53% | 37% | 5% |
| 2006 | 119 | 21% | 5% | 44% | 42% | 9% |
| Total-Issue | 198 | 10% | 6% | 45% | 38% | 10% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 37 | 5% | 7% | 58% | 22% | 13% |
| 2004-06 | 161 | 11% | 6% | 44% | 41% | 9% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database

NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A12 – Media Reporting on Perceptions of Political Use of CCTs (Clientelism / Patronage)

| | Articles Addressing Political Use of CCTs | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|---|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total-Issue | 367 | 18% | 11% | 35% | 41% | 14% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 85 | 11% | 4% | 44% | 40% | 12% |
| 2004-06 | 282 | 22% | 10% | 29% | 45% | 16% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database

NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A13 – Which Design and Implementation Topics Receive More or Less Coverage in the Brazilian Press: Evolution

| | % of Articles Focused on CCTs Addressing... | | | | | | | |
|---------------|---|-------------------|--------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|---------|--|------------------------|
| | Coverage | Value of Transfer | Registry, Targeting & Payments | Conditionalities | Fraud & Fraud Control | Funding | Welfare Dependency & Graduation Strategy | Complementary Programs |
| 2001 | 58% | 21% | 52% | 22% | 13% | 7% | 2% | 3% |
| 2002 | 49% | 20% | 48% | 22% | 9% | 8% | 5% | 2% |
| 2003 | 42% | 32% | 46% | 28% | 8% | 16% | 4% | 6% |
| 2004 | 37% | 5% | 51% | 34% | 53% | 7% | 4% | 3% |
| 2005 | 51% | 5% | 48% | 26% | 46% | 4% | 6% | 4% |
| 2006 | 38% | 13% | 31% | 17% | 17% | 6% | 22% | 5% |
| Total Percent | 44% | 15% | 44% | 24% | 25% | 8% | 9% | 4% |
| Total Number | 880 | 302 | 875 | 483 | 493 | 158 | 184 | 81 |
| 2001-03 | 49% | 25% | 49% | 24% | 10% | 11% | 4% | 4% |
| 2004-06 | 42% | 8% | 43% | 26% | 39% | 6% | 11% | 4% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database

NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Note: The variables are not mutually exclusive. A single article can address several of these topics at the same time.

Table A14 – Coverage: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Coverage | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 185 | 58% | 8% | 64% | 28% | 1% |
| 2002 | 89 | 49% | 10% | 58% | 30% | 1% |
| 2003 | 116 | 42% | 6% | 50% | 42% | 2% |
| 2004 | 128 | 37% | 7% | 46% | 41% | 5% |
| 2005 | 144 | 51% | 7% | 53% | 35% | 4% |
| 2006 | 218 | 38% | 18% | 39% | 34% | 9% |
| Total-Issue | 880 | 44% | 10% | 51% | 35% | 4% |
| Focused Articles | 1,991 | 100% | 13% | 43% | 38% | 7% |
| 2001-03 | 130 | 49% | 8% | 57% | 33% | 1% |
| 2004-06 | 163 | 42% | 11% | 46% | 37% | 6% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database

NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A15 – Value of Transfer: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Value of Transfer | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 69 | 21% | 4% | 32% | 55% | 9% |
| 2002 | 37 | 20% | 5% | 43% | 38% | 14% |
| 2003 | 89 | 32% | 9% | 52% | 38% | 1% |
| 2004 | 16 | 5% | 13% | 25% | 50% | 13% |
| 2005 | 15 | 5% | 0% | 27% | 60% | 13% |
| 2006 | 76 | 13% | 12% | 43% | 37% | 8% |
| Total-Issue | 302 | 15% | 8% | 41% | 43% | 7% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 65 | 25% | 6% | 42% | 44% | 8% |
| 2004-06 | 36 | 8% | 8% | 32% | 49% | 11% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A16 - Funding: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Funding | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 24 | 7% | 21% | 38% | 38% | 4% |
| 2002 | 15 | 8% | 7% | 40% | 47% | 7% |
| 2003 | 45 | 16% | 20% | 42% | 38% | 0% |
| 2004 | 25 | 7% | 16% | 52% | 28% | 4% |
| 2005 | 12 | 4% | 33% | 33% | 17% | 17% |
| 2006 | 37 | 6% | 19% | 19% | 54% | 8% |
| Total-Issue | 158 | 8% | 19% | 37% | 39% | 5% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 28 | 11% | 16% | 40% | 41% | 4% |
| 2004-06 | 25 | 6% | 23% | 35% | 33% | 10% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A17 – Registry, Targeting and Payments: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Registry, Targeting & Payments | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|--|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 167 | 52% | 11% | 55% | 33% | 1% |
| 2002 | 87 | 48% | 11% | 59% | 28% | 2% |
| 2003 | 128 | 46% | 16% | 36% | 47% | 2% |
| 2004 | 178 | 51% | 7% | 24% | 58% | 11% |
| 2005 | 137 | 48% | 7% | 45% | 42% | 6% |
| 2006 | 178 | 31% | 24% | 30% | 39% | 7% |
| Total-Issue | 875 | 44% | 13% | 40% | 42% | 5% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 127 | 49% | 13% | 50% | 36% | 1% |
| 2004-06 | 164 | 43% | 12% | 33% | 46% | 8% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A18 – Conditionality: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Conditionality | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 70 | 22% | 10% | 60% | 27% | 3% |
| 2002 | 40 | 22% | 15% | 63% | 20% | 3% |
| 2003 | 79 | 28% | 10% | 53% | 30% | 6% |
| 2004 | 120 | 34% | 8% | 29% | 53% | 11% |
| 2005 | 74 | 26% | 8% | 45% | 38% | 9% |
| 2006 | 100 | 17% | 17% | 33% | 44% | 6% |
| Total-Issue | 483 | 24% | 11% | 43% | 39% | 7% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 63 | 24% | 12% | 59% | 26% | 4% |
| 2004-06 | 98 | 26% | 11% | 36% | 45% | 9% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A19 – Fraud, Errors and Controls: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Fraud & Fraud Control | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|---|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 41 | 13% | 2% | 63% | 32% | 2% |
| 2002 | 17 | 9% | 12% | 41% | 41% | 6% |
| 2003 | 21 | 8% | 5% | 29% | 67% | 0% |
| 2004 | 184 | 53% | 8% | 20% | 60% | 13% |
| 2005 | 132 | 46% | 5% | 38% | 49% | 8% |
| 2006 | 98 | 17% | 13% | 29% | 53% | 5% |
| Total-Issue | 493 | 25% | 8% | 31% | 53% | 8% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 26 | 10% | 6% | 44% | 47% | 3% |
| 2004-06 | 138 | 39% | 9% | 29% | 54% | 8% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A20 – Welfare Dependency and Graduation Strategy: Frequency and Tone

| | Articles Addressing Welfare Dependency & Graduation Strategy | | % of Articles Addressing the Issue With... | | | |
|-------------------------|--|-------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| 2001 | 7 | 2% | 0% | 29% | 57% | 14% |
| 2002 | 9 | 5% | 11% | 33% | 33% | 22% |
| 2003 | 12 | 4% | 8% | 42% | 50% | 0% |
| 2004 | 15 | 4% | 13% | 40% | 33% | 13% |
| 2005 | 17 | 6% | 0% | 41% | 47% | 12% |
| 2006 | 124 | 22% | 4% | 29% | 50% | 17% |
| Total-Issue | 184 | 9% | 5% | 32% | 48% | 15% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | <i>1,991</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>13%</i> | <i>43%</i> | <i>38%</i> | <i>7%</i> |
| 2001-03 | 9 | 4% | 6% | 35% | 47% | 12% |
| 2004-06 | 52 | 11% | 6% | 37% | 43% | 14% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-Focused Articles: 1,991

TABLES, GRAPHS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: DRILL DOWN ON CADASTRO (Targeting, Registry, Payments) (20% SUB-SAMPLE)

Table A21 – Frequency of Articles on Operational Mechanisms

| | Number of Articles, "Cadastral" Sub-Sample | Share of Articles Mentioning XX Issue Over "Cadastral" Sub-Sample | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|---|--------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| | | Any Type of Operational Mechanisms | Institutional Responsibilities | Eligibility Criteria | Registry | Recertification Efforts | Payments Operations |
| 2001 | 33 | 97% | 55% | 42% | 18% | 3% | 55% |
| 2002 | 17 | 100% | 29% | 47% | 53% | 6% | 71% |
| 2003 | 26 | 96% | 73% | 62% | 50% | 31% | 35% |
| 2004 | 35 | 100% | 71% | 26% | 49% | 34% | 23% |
| 2005 | 28 | 100% | 57% | 61% | 82% | 54% | 32% |
| 2006 | 35 | 91% | 57% | 26% | 23% | 46% | 29% |
| Total-Issue | 174 | 97% | 59% | 42% | 44% | 30% | 38% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastral"</i> | <i>174</i> | <i>169</i> | <i>103</i> | <i>73</i> | <i>76</i> | <i>53</i> | <i>66</i> |
| 2001-03 | 76 | 98% | 52% | 50% | 40% | 13% | 53% |
| 2004-06 | 98 | 97% | 62% | 37% | 51% | 45% | 28% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastral"
 NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastral:" 174

Table A22 – Frequency of Articles Mentioning Challenges With Institutional Responsibilities

| | Articles Addressing Institutional Responsibilities (From "Cadastral" Sub-Sample) | | Of which: those Mentioning Challenges With Institutional Responsibilities As A Percent of Articles Addressing Institutional Responsibilities |
|------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadastral" | |
| Total-Issue | 103 | 59% | 31% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastral"</i> | <i>174</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>32</i> |
| 2001-03 | 42 | 52% | 49% |
| 2004-06 | 61 | 62% | 15% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastral"
 NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastral:" 174

Table A23 – Frequency and Tone of Articles on Institutional Responsibilities

| | Articles Addressing Institutional Responsibilities | | % of Articles Addressing Issue With... | | | |
|------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadaastro" | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total-Issue | 103 | 59% | 47% | 27% | 19% | 7% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadaastro"</i> | 174 | 100% | 48 | 28 | 20 | 7 |
| 2001-03 | 42 | 52% | 54% | 16% | 28% | 2% |
| 2004-06 | 61 | 62% | 42% | 39% | 10% | 9% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadaastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadaastro:" 174

Table A24 – Frequency of Articles Mentioning Challenges in Applying Eligibility Criteria

| | Articles Addressing Eligibility Criteria | | Of which: Articles Mentioning Challenges In Applying Eligibility Criteria As A Percent of Articles Addressing Eligibility Criteria |
|------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadaastro" | |
| Total-Issue | 73 | 42% | 22% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadaastro"</i> | 174 | 100% | 16 |
| 2001-03 | 38 | 50% | 17% |
| 2004-06 | 35 | 37% | 30% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadaastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadaastro:" 174

Table A25 – Frequency and Tone of Articles on Eligibility Criteria

| | Articles Addressing Eligibility Criteria | | % of Articles Addressing Issue With... | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadastro" | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total-Issue | 73 | 42% | 70% | 14% | 11% | 5% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastro"</i> | 174 | 100% | 51 | 10 | 8 | 4 |
| 2001-03 | 38 | 50% | 76% | 9% | 8% | 7% |
| 2004-06 | 35 | 37% | 49% | 24% | 15% | 11% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastro:" 174

Table A26 – Frequency of Articles Mentioning Challenges in Registry Operations

| | Articles Addressing Registry | | Of Which: Articles Mentioning Challenges In Registry Operations As A Percent of Articles Addressing Registry |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadastro" | |
| Total-Issue | 76 | 44% | 57% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastro"</i> | 174 | 100% | 43 |
| 2001-03 | 28 | 40% | 25% |
| 2004-06 | 48 | 51% | 65% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastro:" 174

Table A27 – Frequency and Tone of Articles on Program Registry Operations

| | Articles Addressing Registry | | % of Articles Addressing Issue With... | | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadaastro" | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total-Issue | 76 | 44% | 42% | 11% | 34% | 13% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadaastro"</i> | <i>174</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>32</i> | <i>8</i> | <i>26</i> | <i>10</i> |
| 2001-03 | 28 | 40% | 63% | 20% | 14% | 3% |
| 2004-06 | 48 | 51% | 17% | 10% | 47% | 26% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadaastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadaastro:" 174

Table A28 – Frequency of Articles Mentioning Challenges With Recertification

| | Articles Addressing Recertification Efforts | | Of Which: Articles Mentioning Challenges With Recertification As A Percent of Articles Addressing Recertification Efforts |
|------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|---|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadaastro" | |
| Total-Issue | 53 | 30% | 26% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadaastro"</i> | <i>174</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>14</i> |
| 2001-03 | 10 | 13% | 46% |
| 2004-06 | 43 | 45% | 24% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadaastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadaastro:" 174

Table A29 – Frequency and Tone of Articles on Recertification Efforts

| | Articles Addressing Recertification Efforts | | % of Articles Addressing Issue With... | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadastro" | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total-Issue | 53 | 30% | 32% | 45% | 15% | 8% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastro"</i> | 174 | 100% | 17 | 24 | 8 | 4 |
| 2001-03 | 10 | 13% | 13% | 13% | 42% | 33% |
| 2004-06 | 43 | 45% | 29% | 49% | 11% | 11% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastro:" 174

Table A30 – Frequency of Articles Mentioning Challenges With Payments Operations

| | Articles Addressing Payments Operations | | Of Which: Articles Mentioning Challenges With Payments Operations As A Percent of Articles Addressing Payments Operations |
|-----------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|---|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadastro" | |
| Total-Issue | 66 | 38% | 38% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastro"</i> | 174 | 100% | 25 |
| 2001-03 | 39 | 53% | 44% |
| 2004-06 | 27 | 28% | 25% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastro"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastro:" 174

Table A31 – Frequency and Tone of Articles on Payments Operations

| | Articles Addressing Payments Operations | | % of Articles Addressing Issue With... | | | |
|------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadastral" | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total-Issue | 66 | 38% | 59% | 18% | 17% | 6% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastral"</i> | <i>174</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>39</i> | <i>12</i> | <i>11</i> | <i>4</i> |
| 2001-03 | 39 | 53% | 49% | 19% | 23% | 8% |
| 2004-06 | 27 | 28% | 71% | 18% | 8% | 3% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastral"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastral:" 174

Table A32 – Frequency of Articles on Targeting Outcomes

| | Articles Mentioning Targeting Outcomes | | Articles Mentioning Issue As A Percent of Articles on Targeting Outcomes | | |
|------------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------|-------------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadastral" | Errors of Exclusion | Errors of Inclusion | Duplication of Benefits |
| Total-Issue | 56 | 32% | 32% | 71% | 16% |
| <i>Sample on "Cadastral"</i> | <i>174</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>18</i> | <i>40</i> | <i>9</i> |
| 2001-03 | 12 | 17% | 79% | 31% | 0% |
| 2004-06 | 44 | 46% | 19% | 80% | 20% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on "cadastral"
NOBS-Sub-Sample on "Cadastral:" 174

Table A33 – Frequency and Tone of Articles on Targeting Outcomes

| | Articles Mentioning Targeting Outcomes | | % of Articles Addressing Issue With... | | | |
|-----------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing "Cadaastro" | No Tone (Tone = 0) | Positive (Tone = 1) | Ambiguous (Tone = 2) | Critical (Tone = 3) |
| Total-Issue | 56 | 32% | 9% | 14% | 70% | 7% |
| Sample on "Cadaastro" | 174 | 100% | 5 | 8 | 39 | 4 |
| 2001-03 | 12 | 17% | 0% | 17% | 83% | 0% |
| 2004-06 | 44 | 46% | 12% | 15% | 65% | 8% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on “cadaastro”

NOBS-Sample on “Cadaastro:” 174

NOTE: Unlike other “frequency and tone” tables in the rest of the document, I used the tone of the entire article to construct this table. This is because I did not record the specific tone associated with the issue of targeting outcomes while I was reading the articles.

TABLES, GRAPHS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: DRILL DOWN ON FRAUD & FRAUD CONTROL (40% SUB-SAMPLE)

Table A34 – Frequency of Articles on Fraud and Errors vs. Oversight and Controls

| | Total Number of Articles Fraud & Fraud Control | % of Articles Mentioning... | |
|--|--|-----------------------------|----------------------|
| | | Fraud & Errors | Oversight & Controls |
| Total-Issue | 197 | 75% | 88% |
| <i>Sample on Fraud & Fraud Control</i> | 197 | 147 | 174 |
| 2001-03 | 31 | 70% | 93% |
| 2004-06 | 166 | 78% | 86% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on fraud and fraud control
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Fraud and Fraud Control: 197

Table A35 – Frequency of Articles on Fraud vs. Irregularities

| | Total Number of Articles on Fraud & Errors | % of Articles Mentioning... | |
|--|--|-----------------------------|----------------|
| | | Fraud | Irregularities |
| Total-Issue | 147 | 45% | 59% |
| <i>Sample on Fraud & Fraud Control</i> | 197 | 66 | 86 |
| 2001-03 | 21 | 47% | 54% |
| 2004-06 | 126 | 43% | 59% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on fraud and fraud control
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Fraud and Fraud Control: 197

Table A36 – Frequency of Types of Fraud and Errors Reported in the Press

| | Articles Addressing Fraud & Errors | | % of Articles Mentioning That Fraud & Errors Are... | | | | | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--|---|--------------------|---------------------|------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing Fraud & Fraud Control | Fraud For Clientelistic Purposes | Error of Inclusion | Duplicated Benefits | Corruption | Fraudulent Interception of EBCs | Error of Exclusion | Non-Actualization of Registry | Official Error |
| Total-Issue | 147 | 75% | 38% | 38% | 20% | 17% | 12% | 11% | 10% | 10% |
| <i>Sample on Fraud & Fraud Control</i> | <i>197</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>56</i> | <i>56</i> | <i>29</i> | <i>25</i> | <i>18</i> | <i>16</i> | <i>15</i> | <i>14</i> |
| 2001-03 | 21 | 70% | 38% | 37% | 17% | 10% | 29% | 17% | 0% | 16% |
| 2004-06 | 126 | 78% | 38% | 37% | 21% | 19% | 11% | 11% | 13% | 8% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on fraud and fraud control
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Fraud and Fraud Control: 197

Table A37 – Frequency of Articles on Fraud & Errors By Source / Informant

| | Articles Addressing Fraud & Errors | | % of Articles In Which Fraud & Errors Are Uncovered By... | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--|---|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing Fraud & Fraud Control | The Press/Media | Hotlines & Complaints | Federal Audit Agencies | Ministries (MDS, MEC, MTE, etc) |
| Total-Issue | 147 | 75% | 27% | 27% | 17% | 16% |
| <i>Sample on Fraud & Fraud Control</i> | 197 | 100% | 40 | 39 | 25 | 23 |
| 2001-03 | 21 | 70% | 3% | 44% | 20% | 10% |
| 2004-06 | 126 | 78% | 31% | 25% | 17% | 17% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on fraud and fraud control
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Fraud and Fraud Control: 197

Table A38 – Frequency of Articles on Government Response to Allegations

| | Articles in Which Fraud & Errors Are Uncovered by The Press and/or Hotlines | | % of Articles Mentioning That... |
|--|---|--|---|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing Fraud & Fraud Control | The Government Will Investigate Allegations of Fraud & Errors |
| Total-Issue | 69 | 35% | 45% |
| <i>Sample on Fraud & Fraud Control</i> | 197 | 100% | 31 |
| 2001-03 | 10 | 33% | 48% |
| 2004-06 | 59 | 37% | 82% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on fraud and fraud control
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Fraud and Fraud Control: 197

Table A39 – Frequency of Perceptions of Fraud and Errors

| | Articles Addressing Fraud & Errors | | % of Articles Mentioning That Fraud and Errors Are... | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--|---|--------------------|-------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing Fraud & Fraud Control | Inevitable | Highly Condemnable | No Judgment |
| Total-Issue | 147 | 75% | 7% | 27% | 65% |
| <i>Sample on Fraud & Fraud Control</i> | 197 | 100% | 11 | 40 | 96 |
| 2001-03 | 21 | 70% | 0% | 41% | 59% |
| 2004-06 | 126 | 78% | 8% | 25% | 67% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on fraud and fraud control
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Fraud and Fraud Control: 197

Table A40– Frequency of Perceptions of Oversight and Controls

| | Articles Addressing Oversight & Controls | | % of Articles Mentioning That Oversight & Controls Are... | | |
|--|--|--|---|------|-------------|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Addressing Fraud & Fraud Control | Strong | Weak | No Judgment |
| Total-Issue | 174 | 88% | 40% | 25% | 35% |
| <i>Sample on Fraud & Fraud Control</i> | 197 | 100% | 69 | 44 | 61 |
| 2001-03 | 29 | 93% | 44% | 22% | 34% |
| 2004-06 | 145 | 86% | 42% | 24% | 34% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on fraud and fraud control
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Fraud and Fraud Control: 197

TABLES, GRAPHS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: DRILL DOWN ON CONDITIONALITIES (40% SUB-SAMPLE)

Table A41 – Frequency of Articles on Education and Health Conditionality

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning Conditionalities | % of Articles Mentioning... | |
|-----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | | Education Conditionality | Health Conditionality |
| Total-Issue | 193 | 86% | 31% |
| <i>Sample on Conditionalities</i> | <i>193</i> | <i>166</i> | <i>60</i> |
| 2001-03 | 75 | 87% | 18% |
| 2004-06 | 118 | 85% | 37% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on conditionalities
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Conditionalities: 193

Table A42 – Frequency of What Matters About Conditionalities in the Press

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning Conditionalities | % of Articles Mentioning the Importance of ... | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------|
| | | Existence of Conditionalities | Monitoring and Compliance |
| Total-Issue | 193 | 45% | 35% |
| <i>Sample on Conditionalities</i> | <i>193</i> | <i>86</i> | <i>68</i> |
| 2001-03 | 75 | 36% | 16% |
| 2004-06 | 118 | 49% | 49% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on conditionalities
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Conditionalities: 193

Table A43 – Frequency of Perceived Roles of Conditionalities

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning that Conditionalities Matter | % of Articles Mentioning that Conditionalities Matter.... | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|----------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | As Rights to Social Services | For Incentives | For Long-Run Structural Impacts | To Reduce "Assistencialismo" |
| Total-Issue | 86 | 3% | 26% | 38% | 35% |
| <i>Sample on Conditionalities</i> | 193 | 3 | 22 | 33 | 30 |
| 2001-03 | 28 | 3% | 65% | 43% | 11% |
| 2004-06 | 58 | 3% | 10% | 35% | 43% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on conditionalities
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Conditionalities: 193

Table A44 – Who Cares About Conditionalities?

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning that Conditionalities Matter | % of Articles Indicating that Conditionalities Matter To.... | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|-------------|-----------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| | | Journalists | Politicians | Brazilian Researchers | Program Managers | International Organization Staff |
| Total-Issue | 86 | 33% | 47% | 14% | 15% | 7% |
| <i>Sample on Conditionalities</i> | 193 | 28 | 40 | 12 | 13 | 6 |
| 2001-03 | 28 | 21% | 23% | 20% | 23% | 14% |
| 2004-06 | 58 | 38% | 55% | 12% | 14% | 5% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on conditionalities
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Conditionalities: 193

Table A45 – Frequency of Monitoring Topics

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning Conditionalities | % of Articles Covering... | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|---------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| | | Monitoring of Compliance | Share of Beneficiaries Not in Compliance | Enforcement and Penalties |
| Total-Issue | 193 | 56% | 12% | 17% |
| <i>Sample on Conditionalities</i> | 193 | 108 | 23 | 33 |
| 2001-03 | 75 | 36% | 6% | 18% |
| 2004-06 | 118 | 70% | 18% | 18% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on conditionalities
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Conditionalities: 193

Table A46 – Frequency of Perceived Effectiveness of Monitoring Mechanisms

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning Monitoring | % of Articles Indicating that... | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | | Monitoring is Effective | Monitoring is Not Effective |
| Total-Issue | 108 | 16% | 47% |
| <i>Sample on Conditionalities</i> | 193 | 17 | 51 |
| 2001-03 | 26 | 7% | 10% |
| 2004-06 | 82 | 21% | 53% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on conditionalities
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Conditionalities: 193

TABLES, GRAPHS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: DRILL DOWN ON WELFARE DEPENDENCY AND EXIT DOORS (40% SUB-SAMPLE)

Table A47 – Frequency of Welfare Dependency Crossed with “Assistencialismo” Perceptions

| | Articles Addressing Welfare Dependency & Graduation Strategy | | % of Articles Addressing Welfare Dependency & Graduation Strategy Which... | |
|-------------------------|--|-------------------------------|--|--|
| | Number Articles | % of Articles Focused on CCTs | Also Refer to CCTs as "Assistencialist" Policy | Do Not Refer to CCTs as "Assistencialist" Policy |
| Total-Issue | 184 | 9% | 44% | 56% |
| <i>Focused Articles</i> | 1,991 | 100% | 11% | 89% |
| 2001-03 | 9 | 4% | 34% | 66% |
| 2004-06 | 52 | 11% | 41% | 59% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database
NOBS-FULL SAMPLE - Focused Articles: 1,991

Table A48 – Frequency of Dependency Perceptions

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning Welfare Dependency and "Exit Doors" | % of Articles Concluding that... | | |
|-----------------------------|---|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| | | CCTs create dependency | CCTs do not create dependency | Neither. Instead, article reflects on the best way to design CCTs so as to avoid dependency |
| Total-Issue | 73 | 40% | 8% | 51% |
| <i>Sample on Dependency</i> | 73 | 29 | 6 | 37 |
| 2001-03 | 11 | 22% | 0% | 78% |
| 2004-06 | 62 | 40% | 8% | 55% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on welfare dependency
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Dependency/Graduation Agenda: 73

Table A49 – Frequency of Evidence Supporting Dependency Perceptions

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning that CCTs Create Dependency | % of Articles Presenting Supporting Evidence | Total Number of Articles Mentioning that CCTs Do Not Create Dependency | % of Articles Presenting Supporting Evidence |
|-----------------------------|---|--|--|--|
| Total-Issue | 29 | 10% | 6 | 50% |
| <i>Sample on Dependency</i> | 73 | 3 | 73 | 3 |
| 2001-03 | 2 | - | 0 | - |
| 2004-06 | 27 | 14% | 6 | 30% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on welfare dependency
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Dependency/Graduation Agenda: 73

Table A50 – Frequency of Issues Related to Disincentive Perceptions

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning that CCTs Create Disincentives | % of Articles Mentioning... | |
|-----------------------------|--|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | | Adult work effort | Dependency on transfer incomes |
| Total-Issue | 29 | 17% | 48% |
| <i>Sample on Dependency</i> | 73 | 5 | 14 |
| 2001-03 | 2 | 50% | 50% |
| 2004-06 | 27 | 31% | 39% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on welfare dependency
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Dependency/Graduation Agenda: 73

Table A51 – Frequency of “Exit Door” Debate

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning Welfare Dependency and "Exit Doors" | % of Articles Mentioning... | |
|-----------------------------|---|-----------------------------|--|
| | | CCTs need "exit doors" | No need for "exit doors." CCTs should be replaced by other types of policies |
| Total-Issue | 73 | 60% | 14% |
| <i>Sample on Dependency</i> | 73 | 44 | 10 |
| 2001-03 | 11 | 67% | 11% |
| 2004-06 | 62 | 60% | 6% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on welfare dependency
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Dependency/Graduation Agenda: 73

Table A52 – Frequency of “Exit Door” Meanings

| | Total Number of Articles Emphasizing the Need for "Exit Doors" | % of Articles Mentioning that "Exit Doors" Mean... | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---|---|-------------------------|
| | | Emancipation (from dependency on poverty and transfer incomes) | Tools to live out of a productive activity / employment opportunity | Exit from CCT programs (time limits, graduation criteria and bonuses) | Dignity and citizenship |
| Total-Issue | 44 | 61% | 55% | 18% | 14% |
| <i>Sample on Dependency</i> | 73 | 27 | 24 | 8 | 6 |
| 2001-03 | 8 | 57% | 63% | 33% | 47% |
| 2004-06 | 36 | 70% | 73% | 7% | 11% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on welfare dependency
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Dependency / Graduation Agenda: 73

Table A53 – Frequency of “Exit Door” Examples

| | Total Number of Articles Emphasizing the Need for "Exit Doors" | % of Articles Mentioning that Examples of "Exit Doors" Include... | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|---|--------------|--------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| | | Socio-educational and adult literacy programs | Job training | Micro-credit | Health and food security | Time limits |
| Total-Issue | 44 | 50% | 43% | 32% | 16% | 5% |
| <i>Sample on Dependency</i> | 73 | 22 | 19 | 14 | 7 | 2 |
| 2001-03 | 8 | 70% | 53% | 47% | 13% | 0% |
| 2004-06 | 36 | 55% | 46% | 35% | 20% | 2% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on welfare dependency
NOBS-Sub-Sample on Dependency/Graduation Agenda: 73

TABLES, GRAPHS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS: DRILL DOWN ON ASSISTENCIALISMO (40% SUB-SAMPLE)

Table A54 – Frequency of Informants Assessing that CCTs Are “Assistencialista”

| | Total Number of Articles Concluding that CCTs are "Assistencialista" | % of Articles in Which the Assessment is Made By... | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| | | The Press (Journalist, Columnist, Reader) | A Politician | A Brazilian Researcher | A Program Manager |
| Total-Issue | 69 | 54% | 29% | 17% | 1% |
| <i>Sample on "Assistencialismo"</i> | 88 | 37 | 20 | 12 | 1 |
| 2001-03 | 11 | 59% | 33% | 8% | 8% |
| 2004-06 | 58 | 52% | 28% | 13% | 0% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on “assistencialismo”

NOBS-Sub-Sample on Assistencialismo: 88

Table A55 – Frequency of Informants Assessing that CCTs Are “Not Assistencialista”

| | Total Number of Articles Concluding that CCTs are not "Assistencialista" | % of Articles in Which the Assessment is Made By... | | | | | A Beneficiary |
|-------------------------------------|--|---|--------------|------------------------|-------------------|--|---------------|
| | | The Press (Journalist, Columnist, Reader) | A Politician | A Brazilian Researcher | A Program Manager | An International Organization Staff Member | |
| Total-Issue | 14 | 21% | 43% | 7% | 21% | 21% | 14% |
| <i>Sample on "Assistencialismo"</i> | 88 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 2001-03 | 4 | 15% | 50% | 33% | 50% | 33% | 0% |
| 2004-06 | 10 | 30% | 46% | 0% | 11% | 18% | 13% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on “assistencialismo”

NOBS-Sub-Sample on Assistencialismo: 88

Table A56 – Frequency of Reasons Mentioned to Support View that CCTs Are “Assistencialista”

| | Total Number of Reasons Supporting that CCTs are "Assistencialista" | % of Articles Mentioning that... | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|------------------------------|--|--|--------------------------------|--|--|
| | | CCTs generate dependency | CCTs are a way to gain votes | There is no control of conditionalities. CCTs are not educational programs | "Assistencialismo" is an inevitable characteristic of cash assistance programs | CCTs fail to eradicate poverty | CCTs substitute economic / employment policy | Value of transfer is too small to have effects |
| Total-Issue | 88 | 32% | 24% | 23% | 9% | 7% | 5% | 1% |
| <i>Sample on "Assistencialismo"</i> | 88 | 28 | 21 | 20 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 1 |
| 2001-03 | 13 | 0% | 36% | 0% | 0% | 25% | 13% | 33% |
| 2004-06 | 75 | 30% | 21% | 34% | 9% | 8% | 6% | 0% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on “assistencialismo”

NOBS-Sub-Sample on Assistencialismo: 88

Table A57 – Frequency of Reasons Mentioned to Support the View that CCTs Are “Not Assistencialista”

| | Total Number of Reasons Supporting that CCTs are not "Assistencialista" | % of Articles Mentioning ... | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|---|-------------------------------|---|---|---|
| | | CCTs constitute rights of Brazilian citizens | Existence and monitoring of conditionalities prevent "assistencialismo" | CCTs are educational programs | CCTs represent new forms of policy which break away from the "assistencialista" model | CCTs inject income into local economies | Electronic payment of benefits prevent political interference |
| Total-Issue | 27 | 37% | 22% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 7% |
| <i>Sample on "Assistencialismo"</i> | 88 | 10 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 |
| 2001-03 | 6 | 50% | 33% | 100% | 33% | 50% | 33% |
| 2004-06 | 21 | 42% | 28% | 11% | 22% | 20% | 33% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on “assistencialismo”

NOBS-Sub-Sample on Assistencialismo: 88

Table A58 – Frequency of Solutions Proposed to Reduce “Assistencialismo”

| | Total Number of Solutions Proposed to Reduce "Assistencialismo" | % of Articles Mentioning... | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------|-------------------------|
| | | Provide the tools to exit poverty / "exit doors" | Invest in education system | Monitor conditionalities | Employment | Integration of programs |
| Total-Issue | 49 | 33% | 22% | 22% | 20% | 2% |
| <i>Sample on "Assistencialismo"</i> | 88 | <i>16</i> | <i>11</i> | <i>11</i> | <i>10</i> | <i>1</i> |
| 2001-03 | 11 | 50% | 0% | 0% | 38% | 100% |
| 2004-06 | 38 | 34% | 30% | 34% | 19% | 0% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on “assistencialismo”

NOBS-Sub-Sample on Assistencialismo: 88

Table A59 – Frequency of Issues Associated With the Debate on “Assistencialismo”

| | Total Number of Articles Mentioning "Assistencialismo" | % of Articles Relating the Debate on "Assistencialismo" With... | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|--------------------|-------------------------|
| | | Conditionalities | Welfare Dependency | Vote-Buying / Patronage |
| Total-Issue | 88 | 32% | 35% | 35% |
| <i>Sample on Conditionalities</i> | 88 | <i>28</i> | <i>31</i> | <i>31</i> |
| 2001-03 | 15 | 27% | 37% | 21% |
| 2004-06 | 73 | 43% | 31% | 39% |

Source: authors' calculations from CCT media database – Drill down on “assistencialismo”

NOBS-Sub-Sample on Assistencialismo: 88

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
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Summary Findings

This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on the political economy of conditional cash transfers (CCTs) by analyzing perceptions about these social policy instruments as portrayed and debated in free and independent press in Brazil. We catalogued and analyzed over 6,500 articles from six newspapers over a six year period (2001-06), covering two governments and two policy regimes (the Bolsa Escola/pre-Bolsa Familia era, from 2001-03; and the Bolsa Familia era, from 2004-06). Our analysis shows that CCTs have been highly visible in the Brazilian press, and the frequency of media coverage expanded as the programs scaled up. We also find that while the press may endorse the overall concept of CCTs as a social policy instrument, the quality of implementation matters not only for program effectiveness but for public acceptance. The press will publicize perceived weaknesses with increased scrutiny, particularly in the face of elections (political interplay). The press also reports favorably on Government actions to improve implementation quality. Without claiming causality, we observed several junctures in which this interplay between vibrant public debate in the media, on the one hand, and proactive and transparent actions by the Government, on the other hand, seems to have contributed to strengthening the program through what could be viewed as a “virtuous cycle” of accountability (technical interplay). Finally, our analysis suggests a possible “political economy” equation surrounding key design and implementation parameters for CCTs:

- “Public Perceptions Assets”: Some design and implementation features help garner public support for these instruments of social policy, for example: conditionalities when monitored (political role for conditionalities); targeting accuracy and perceptions of fairness; implementation quality (it matters!).
- “Public Perceptions Liabilities”: Other aspects spawn media criticism, such as perceptions of unchecked fraud and errors, perceived weaknesses in registries, a lack of monitoring of conditionalities, and perceptions of welfare dependency.

These parameters seem to matter both technically (for program effectiveness) and politically (for legitimacy and credibility in the public eye). In other words, we suggest that what works technically (“good policy”), works politically (“good politics”) – and public debate around this intersection of the technical and the political can help promote accountability in social policy.

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