INNOVATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

URBAN RESETTLEMENT
Mumbai Urban Transport Project
Resettlement and Rehabilitation in a Large Metropolis

The Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP) commenced in 2002 to improve transport services in India’s premier megacity. It involved urban resettlement on an unparalleled scale. Over 100,000 people living along roads and railways tracks were to be resettled to improve rail and road transport services. While resettling people is difficult anywhere, it appeared almost intractable in the complex socio-political environment of Mumbai, a linear city that lies along a narrow north-south peninsula and is one of the most densely populated urban areas in the world.

Almost ninety-five percent of the affected people did not have legal title to the land they occupied. Affected structures included an assortment of residences, businesses, religious and community facilities, schools, dispensaries, nurseries, and so on. Getting people from diverse social and economic backgrounds to accept homogenous resettlement options was not easy. Even more challenging was finding alternative resettlement sites in land-scarce Mumbai and mobilizing the resources to develop these.

The unprecedented scale and complexity of the process called for innovative solutions. To solve both land and financial constraints, the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) - the agency responsible for the project’s Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) activities - enlisted private participation. It offered private developers ‘development rights’ and cash incentives to construct new resettlement sites in the less-dense northern suburbs of the city.

Recognizing people’s concerns regarding involuntary resettlement, the MMRDA altered its approach from one that narrowly focused on compensating people for their losses towards one that sought to arrive at a ‘win-win’ solution for all. This resulted in wider consultation and negotiation with the affected people, with the help of NGOs.

The agency’s willingness to adapt and explore alternative solutions, often going beyond the scope of the R&R policy, enabled it to come up with innovative resettlement options that were more agreeable to the affected people. This was a critical factor in helping to reduce the number of complaints. It cut down the costs and delays involved in litigation and speeded up the implementation process.

In addition, proactive information disclosure, a transparent grievance redressal mechanism, and an independent panel of eminent citizens who regularly monitored the resettlement sites and listened to people’s concerns played...
an important role in resolving grievances and building people’s confidence in the resettlement process.

Going beyond the provision of brick and mortar resettlement sites, the MMRDA helped the resettled people to adapt to their new environments. Resettlement colonies were provided with schools, day-care centres, and women’s centres. People’s livelihood options were expanded through skills training for the youth and micro-credit for women.

An independent study has found that the provision of formal housing to resettled families has raised their social status and improved their employability and creditworthiness. It has also given them, especially the women, a greater sense of security in their new homes.

The project has become a worldwide example of urban resettlement on a mega scale. Mumbai’s suburban rail services, which cater to over 7 million passengers a day, have witnessed a greater frequency of trains and lower levels of congestion. The MMRDA has now been identified as the nodal agency for urban resettlement in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. The lessons learnt from the project have equipped the MMRDA to effectively deal with the resettlement challenges of future infrastructure projects in the city.
Known for its economic dynamism, traffic jams and vast slums, Mumbai, India’s financial capital, is home to some 20 million people. Affordable housing is a challenge, pushing poor migrants to settle in slums. Seven million people live in 3,000 slums across the city, encroaching public lands. These slums often obstruct vital infrastructure such as roads, railway tracks, airports, storm-water drains, stations, markets, etc. Resettling slum-dwellers is often the biggest hurdle to expanding much-needed infrastructure, more so in a very densely populated city like Mumbai where finding land for resettlement is particularly difficult.

In 2002, the Government of Maharashtra and the World Bank began implementing the Mumbai Urban Transport Project (MUTP, $555 million) to improve transport services in the city. Public transport is the lifeline of Mumbai. Every day over 7 million commuters use the suburban rail services while the buses carry another 4.5 million. In fact, Mumbai’s western suburban rail corridor carries the highest passenger traffic in the world. The project aimed to increase the speed and length of suburban trains and widen east-west roads to ease congestion and improve connectivity. It also aimed to modernize traffic management and planning to enable the smoother flow of traffic and improve safety. Several project activities required large-scale resettlement of families, commercial establishments, public facilities, as well as cultural and religious structures.

Slums often obstruct vital infrastructure such as roads and railway tracks.
The MUTP was the first attempt in India to resettle a large number of urban dwellers. In view of the magnitude of the task, resettlement was initially planned as a separate project. However, it was retained as an element of the larger transportation project to better align resettlement activities with the implementation of civil works.

**Resetting complex slum clusters**

The complexity of the resettlement challenge was evidenced by its sheer size: about 100,000 people had to be relocated—over 17,500 residential households, some 1,800 shops, more than 100 community and cultural properties including temples, mosques, ‘madrasas’, Buddhist and Sikh shrines, churches, as well as a site designated as a Jewish cemetery. There were also a number of community and child welfare centres and dozens of public toilet blocks. There were decades-old slums on railway lands, some sprawling precariously close to the railway tracks, and settlements occupying prime public and private lands beside key east-west roads. The homes to be relocated were equally varied: there were legal homeowners living in multi-storey buildings, ‘pagdi’ holders who claimed ownership, tenants and lessees, as well as squatters without formal title. Businesses similarly ranged from petty vendors to well-established shops, plus a whole host of manufacturing and service activities, such as recycling units, factories, warehouses, auto repair workshops, fuel stations, restaurants, nurseries, and dairy farms. Almost ninety-five percent of these households and businesses did not have legal title. If this were not enough, the project required relocation of a host of utilities including underground water and electricity pipelines, telephone cables, drains, and a few large transmission towers.

Moving organically evolved slums in Mumbai is like moving unique worlds. Successive waves of migrants had settled in distinct groups along caste, religious and regional lines, sharing living space, basic amenities, and places of worship, despite marked diversities of incomes, age, and aspirations. The people in each slum cluster had their own leaders and political affiliations that they hoped would protect them from eviction. Both slum residents and shopkeepers were organized and vocal.

Almost ninety-five percent of the people to be resettled did not have legal title to the land or buildings they occupied.

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1 Under Mumbai’s ‘pagdi’ system, properties are purchased by tenants at lower-than-market prices but legal ownership remains with the landlords. Tenants must contribute towards the upkeep of the property and pay a monthly rent—mostly just nominal sums. In return, they are protected from arbitrary evictions and exorbitant rents. If tenants want to sell the properties, they must share the profits with the owner.
Moving people from horizontal to vertical settlements

Relocating people from horizontal settlements to high-rise buildings posed additional challenges. People accustomed to living in close communities in mixed-use neighbourhoods which offered both housing and informal job opportunities were to be shifted into multi-storey buildings in homogenous resettlement townships away from their places of work. They would have to live as members of registered housing societies and pay for all basic services such as water and electricity, in addition to paying property taxes, and fees for the maintenance of their buildings. They would also have to manage their surroundings including internal roads, drains, and common lighting facilities. Moreover, religious and community structures could not be resettled in high-rise buildings and required alternative sites for their re-establishment. Relocating multi-storey residential buildings was even more contentious, for the residents, who had legal titles, would not move unless they were first provided with comparable housing at similar locations. An even bigger challenge was relocating large businesses that earned good incomes beside major roads and railway stations, given their justified fears of losing business if they moved.

Finding land and finances

Resettling over 100,000 people required finding several resettlement sites in land-scarce Mumbai as well as mobilizing the huge financial resources needed to construct new townships. Free housing and shops of 225 sq. ft. each were to be provided to all those who had lost land and assets, including to land owners and tenants, as well as to squatters, in accordance with the Government of Maharashtra’s R&R Policy for the project. Affected shopkeepers and landowners were also allowed to buy additional floor area up to 525 sq. ft in proportion to their loss.
Given the scale and complexity of the resettlement process, several preparatory measures were taken. These included consultations with the affected people, studies to understand the project’s impacts, steps to address the social and economic needs of the affected people, the drawing up of resettlement action plans, and the establishment of mechanisms and capacity for implementation. The government did all that was required to successfully plan and implement the resettlement activities: it established a resettlement cell at MMRDA, hired NGOs, carried out census surveys, prepared resettlement plans, and established public information centres as well as a Grievance Redressal Mechanism (GRM). Despite these efforts, the challenges on the ground proved enormous and serious grievances emerged, requiring flexibility and innovative measures in dealing with them.

1. Incentives to Private Developers

Recognizing the need for huge financial resources to build the resettlement sites, the state government encouraged private participation by offering additional ‘Transfer of Development Rights’ (TDR) or ‘Floor Space Index’ (FSI) to private developers willing to resettle slum dwellers at their own cost. (Box 1) Landowners in the affected areas were also offered TDR or additional floor space in lieu of cash compensation for the land they had lost; they could utilize these to build properties elsewhere. Private interest in resettlement increased as the developers learnt to convert TDR/FSI into profitable investments in the Mumbai real estate market. Some 30 resettlement colonies were developed in this manner by the MMRDA; of these, 13 were earmarked for people affected by the MUTP. Most resettlement colonies housed over 1,000 households with the two larger ones at Anik and Mankhurd housing over 5,000 households each.

2. Consultations and Negotiations

R&R activities hit roadblocks when it came to resettling households and commercial establishments affected by the widening of the two major east-west road corridors, the Santa Cruz Link Road (SCLR) and the Jogeshwari-Vikhroli Link Road (JVLRL). Unlike the people living along the railway tracks who were waiting to be rescued from their harsh living

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**BOX 1 Transfer of Development Rights**

Transfer of Development Rights, or TDR, is a certificate from the city administration that the owner of a property gets for developing public utilities such as parks, schools and hospitals. Under the TDR policy, land owners are compensated in kind if they surrender some of their land to the government for purposes such as widening a road, creating a park or rehabilitating slum dwellers. These rights can be sold to other builders or can be used for development by the land owner her/himself in lieu of the plot that has been surrendered. TDRs cannot be exercised within the Mumbai city limits. If a property has been designated as a park in the city’s master plan, and the owner of that property develops the park and hands it over to the city administration, the administration will issue a TDR certificate that allows the owner to build on an equivalent area in one of the suburbs. Most TDRs are generated from the redevelopment of slums, initiated by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and MMRDA. In the case of slum resettlement, developers are offered additional TDR/FSI between 1.5 to 2.5 times the floor area created, which they can use to develop other properties at a profit. One sq. ft. of TDR can cost about Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 3,000 (US$50-60) in Mumbai, depending on the location. TDRs or FSI can be used at the same location or further north of the area where the land was acquired or given out for public purposes (land values decline as one moves away from the southern tip of the Mumbai peninsula).
conditions, those affected by road construction were a heterogeneous group that included landowners, lease holders, large commercial units, and religious structures. Tied to their locations with established incomes and social networks, they resisted relocation with all their might, and especially resented being equated with slum dwellers. It proved particularly difficult to engage with the large shopkeepers, who put up stiff opposition with the backing of local leaders. Misperceptions, lack of trust, and the fear of forcible relocation kept large shopkeepers and landowners away from meetings and negotiations with MMRDA. The failure to establish a dialogue increased MMRDA’s impatience with the project-affected people, leading to a hardening of positions on both sides. This adversarial relationship, marked by ideological tensions, stalled the relocation process. The people affected by the project complained to the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, questioning the adequacy of R&R options for shopkeepers, the suitability and quality of resettlement sites, the quality of information disclosure and consultation, and the grievance redressal processes. The Inspection Panel took up the case and issued a report in December 2005; the Government of Maharashtra and the World Bank then prepared a remedial action plan.

Exploring alternative solutions
Among the key remedial measures taken were consultation and negotiation with the affected residents and shopkeepers. MMRDA broke the ice by proactively holding consultations to discuss resettlement options with resident and shopkeeper associations, and the managing committees of religious structures. During these consultations, which were documented, MMRDA explored alternative resettlement solutions, often going beyond the scope of the R&R policy. Additional resettlement sites were offered, lengthy land acquisition procedures were bypassed through deals with landowners, and in-situ resettlement was recommended for the large shopkeepers. The MMRDA also managed to relocate multi-storey apartments through redevelopment.

With running water and toilets, the new 225 square foot apartments are a huge improvement on makeshift slum dwellings. 360 shopkeepers and landowners were offered space in the upmarket Powai Shopping Plaza.
near the same sites and to relocate religious structures through negotiations with local communities.

Resettling high-value shops in upmarket areas
The consultations also enabled MMRDA to negotiate alternative resettlement options with the large and medium shopkeepers who were unwilling to shift in apprehension of loss of business. MMRDA signed MoUs with three shopkeeper groups affected by the construction of the SCLR to resettle them at the same sites or in the vicinity. After these negotiations, the shopkeepers made way for road works to be carried out by removing the affected portions of their shops, even before the resettlement sites were completed. Similarly, some 360 shopkeepers and landowners affected by the JVLR were offered alternative space at the upmarket Powai Shopping Plaza; in the case of land owners, the space offered was equivalent in size to the area they had lost. The Powai Plaza, developed by a private builder through the grant of TDR, is a good example of finding an upmarket resettlement solution for high-value shops through private participation.

Offering apartment owners larger flats at a cost
Consultations also helped find a solution for the residents of the 20 Maharashtra Housing Area Development Authority (MHADA) apartment buildings that needed to be relocated. The flat owners had refused to take part in the baseline census survey and demanded alternative land or redevelopment at the same site. MMRDA held a series of negotiations with MHADA residents to resolve the issue, at the same time initiating legal proceedings to acquire their properties. An agreement was finally reached for a redevelopment scheme that offered flats that were almost twice the size as the ones the residents had lost, with rental allowance for temporary accommodation paid to them in advance until the new buildings were ready. Some 440 households residing in 19 MHADA buildings were thus relocated. The residents of the last building were provided two apartments each at a resettlement site reserved for landowners.

The MMRDA’s willingness to remove bottlenecks by modifying its policy and procedures to accommodate people’s needs and demands played a key role in the success of the relocation. Several modifications in policies and procedures were established including for: (i) resettling large shops doing business for decades on very high-value land near the Bandra-Kurla Complex, which refused to relocate to the resettlement sites fearing loss of income; (ii) enabling partially-impacted shops and residences to retain the unaffected portions of their buildings; (iii) dealing with land-owning shopkeepers; and (iv) dealing with cases where negotiations had broken down (Box 2).

**BOX 2 Procedure for dealing with a breakdown in negotiations**

In order to keep the relocation process on track, a procedure was established to deal with shopkeepers that refused consultation and resisted resettlement. The procedure included mapping shopkeepers according to business categories, offering two suitable resettlement options, and notifying the shopkeepers to respond within 10 working days. If the shopkeepers did not respond, MMRDA would assign the most suitable option and issue an allotment letter, along with a notice approved by IMP, requesting the shopkeeper to: (a) accept the allotment; (b) request any changes within available options; or (c) appeal to the field-level Grievance Redressal Committee, if there was any grievance with the allotment. Finally, if the shopkeeper did not respond within five days of receiving the allotment letter, MMRDA would clear the site 48 hours after delivering a relocation notice.
3. **Post-resettlement Support**

Physical relocation is only the beginning of a long and arduous process of rehabilitation. Resettling people living in horizontally spread-out slums into multi-storey buildings is never easy. Without adequate support, the resettlement buildings run the risk of turning into vertical slums. Initially, the MUTP resettlement sites deteriorated after people were first shifted there. While NGOs provided crucial support to the newly relocated people, inadequate maintenance of common facilities such as open spaces, lighting, lifts, internal roads and drainage posed a challenge. Moreover, transport services, schools, hospitals and civic services such as waste management were inadequate.

Recognizing the need for good management of resettlement sites, MMRDA prepared a post-resettlement support strategy with the help of professional consultants and established a post-resettlement cell to address maintenance and management issues. Residents were mobilized to pass a resolution and apply for registering a co-operative housing society in each building. Once registered, MMRDA provided the housing societies with community management funds at Rs.1,000 per household and building maintenance funds at Rs. 20,000 per household; management committees were trained in leadership and financial management; residents were made aware of the importance of building maintenance; and federations of housing societies were organized so that they could take charge of the overall management of the resettlement colonies.

Society management offices, day-care centres, and women’s centres were provided in all the resettlement colonies, while common facilities such as schools, flour mills, community halls, and health centres were provided according to the assessed needs of the community. Estate officers were appointed to carry out building repairs and monitor maintenance. A program completion strategy with exit indicators

As residents of new housing societies, former slum dwellers have seen a rise in their social status and employability

Resettled slum-dwellers will legally own their own homes if they retain the property for ten years
was formulated, with management responsibilities to be handed over to the housing societies once these indicators were met. The exit indicators include: registration of societies, capacity building, transferring maintenance funds for financial sustainability, necessary repairs, and federating housing societies.

4. Livelihoods, Schools and Training

Instead of preparing a gender action plan, the project integrated gender considerations into the overall implementation process. The baseline survey was designed to generate gender-disaggregated data. This helped identify households headed by women and other vulnerable families who would be eligible for special treatment while offering alternative housing. Slots were also reserved for women in the management committees of the resettlement buildings. Moreover, each resettlement building had space for women’s activities as well as a children’s center, where pre-school learning opportunities and day-care facilities make it possible for the women to engage in productive activities.

New livelihood opportunities for women

After a Resettlement Impact Assessment Study carried out in 2007-08 by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), the MMRDA took several measures to improve the quality of the post-resettlement process, including the establishment of a livelihood cell to promote income-generating activities for women at all the resettlement sites. While a first phase focused on the establishment of women’s self-help groups, a second phase laid emphasis on skill development, training, marketing and access to credit for the women. A women’s industrial cooperative called SANKALP was formed to undertake a range of economic activities including the supply of office stationery, the sale of vegetables, providing catering and housekeeping services, and conducting seasonal trade in a variety of consumer goods such as sarees, festival ware, processed food, etc.

Each resettlement building allocated space for a children’s centre

Additional primary schools were established at large resettlement colonies
To ensure safe neighbourhoods, some women have formed community police groups, with NGO support. The 11-member community police committees have seven women members, all of whom have been issued ID cards by the police department as ‘social police officers’. They focus on the resolution of domestic violence, marital conflicts, and financial disputes among the resettled people, especially when women are affected.

Schools for children
At the time of relocation, MMRDA provided a free bus service so that the children did not have to change school midway through the academic year because of the relocation. Where needed, as at large resettlement colonies such as Mankhurd and Anik, additional primary schools were established, and a secondary school was built at Mankhurd. MMRDA also provided the infrastructure for one private school at Mankhurd and two private schools at Anik that are managed by charities.

Job training for youth
In 2008, MMRDA organized an ‘opportunities fair’ to link educated youth with various employment opportunities. Youth groups were also trained in English language communication, etiquette and computer skills to improve their employability.

While these livelihood support activities may not have fully addressed the economic needs of all affected households, they opened a door to a range of income-generating activities for both women and young people.

5. Transparency, Monitoring and Grievance Redressal

The remedial actions taken by MMRDA after 2005 included the refurbishment of a three-tiered Grievance Redressal Mechanism (GRM). The GRM consisted of a field-level grievance redressal committee to consider individual grievances, a senior-level grievance redressal committee to consider appeals against the decisions of the field-level committee, and a higher-level grievance redressal committee to consider appeals against the decisions of the senior-level committee.
and an Independent Monitoring Panel (IMP) comprising eminent citizens empowered to consider group complaints and policy-related issues. The earlier GRM was dismantled as it included officers of the project implementing agency and therefore was not considered autonomous by the people. The new grievance redressal committees were fully independent with clear procedures for hearings and appeals. The “house allotment letters” informed project-affected people about the GRM procedure, which allowed a person to file a complaint and furnish evidence to substantiate his/her case within five working days. The IMP played a key role in resolving group interests or policy matters. Complainants not satisfied with the GRM retained the option to seek recourse in court, and 50 court cases were filed regarding R&R issues. In addition, MMRDA earmarked specific weekdays for addressing grievances related to issues other than entitlements, including post-resettlement issues. Moreover, MMRDA regularly sent its engineers to resettlement sites to hear peoples’ grievances and take remedial action.

**Independent monitoring**
The IMP was a key element of the implementation oversight process. Established by the Government of Maharashtra, it comprised a former additional chief secretary as its Chairman, a senior advocate, a senior journalist, a former vice chancellor of a university in Mumbai and a noted academic as its members. As a matter of practice, the IMP periodically visited R&R sites with officials, interacted with the people to understand their concerns, and recommended remedial actions for MMRDA to address. The IMP played a meaningful role in facilitating dialogue with the SCLR shopkeepers regarding their demand for private resettlement at the site itself. The 2007-08 Resettlement Impact Assessment recorded the commendable role played by the IMP in monitoring the resettlement process and addressing people’s concerns.

**Transparency**
MMRDA’s communication strategy emphasized transparency. Accordingly, resettlement action plans, summaries of implementation plans, and lists of people eligible for compensation were posted on the MMRDA website. Other documents posted online included the R&R implementation manual, the GRM brochure, resettlement procedures in case of failure of negotiations with shopkeepers, procedures for partially affected structures, etc. MMRDA also ran Public Information Centres at the project sites, in the resettlement colonies, as well as at its office. The application of the 2005 Right to Information Act further strengthened transparency and accountability practices.

Women feel a greater sense of security in their new homes
The project’s approach to resettlement and its mid-course corrections paid off. By the time the project closed in June 2011 - about seven years after the relocation process began - all but six residential households and 40 shopkeepers had been resettled. All religious structures, with the exception of three, had been relocated. Legal proceedings had been initiated for the few remaining cases.

- A total of about 100,000 people (including 17,566 residences and 1,782 shops) were resettled, including both legal owners and squatters. Squatters will gain formal title to their new homes and shops once they have retained these properties for ten years (to prevent them from selling them right after relocation).
- 95 percent of the cooperative housing societies have been registered, and their members have been trained to responsibly manage their own affairs. The resettled people have slowly accepted the change and gained confidence in managing their own affairs.
- The independent Resettlement Impact Assessment Study (TISS, 2008) showed that the provision of formal housing to resettled families has significantly empowered them. Their social status has risen, they feel a greater sense of security in their new homes, and their employability and creditworthiness has improved - all factors that have helped to integrate them into the formal economy.
- Women have benefitted from a variety of new livelihood opportunities at the resettlement sites. Their sphere of activity has expanded beyond the resettlement colonies with catering services and corporate canteens now being run in different parts of the city. Within two years, the group’s cumulative turnover exceeded Rs. 1 crore (about $200,000).
- Some 10,000 women living in different resettlement colonies enrolled in micro-credit activities through self-help groups formed by NGOs. This enabled the women to generate additional income for their families and contribute towards the education of their children, creating a positive impact on other poor women in the resettlement colonies (Resettlement Impact Study).
- The women’s community police groups have played a key role in rebuilding lost social capital and in resolving conflicts and differences in the resettlement buildings and colonies. According to the Resettlement Impact Study, the resettled women have also expressed greater satisfaction with their new homes compared to the men, because of their greater sense of privacy, safety and security.
- Some 9,500 resettled children have benefitted from the 39 schools and education centers in and around the rehabilitation sites. These schools are run by the government’s primary education program, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, as well as by charitable organizations.
- Consultations carried out by MMRDA with the project-affected people resulted in fewer complaints. Over 3,700 cases were resolved by the field-level grievance redressal committee. The 2007-08 R&R Impact Assessment Study recorded people’s high appreciation of the role of the grievance redressal mechanism. The fact that only about 50 court cases were filed by people who were not satisfied with the resettlement options provided bears testimony to the success of the approach adopted.
Many useful lessons have emerged from the project’s experience in urban resettlement.

A change of approach, from one that focused narrowly on compensating people for their losses towards one that sought to arrive at a ‘win-win’ solution through negotiation, helped deal with the challenges. To achieve this, resettlement policies and plans needed to be treated as living documents that could be rapidly adapted to changing demands and evolving contexts.

Offering landowners TDRs as a tradable benefit in lieu of compensation provided them with wider options for relocation, making the resettlement process more acceptable to them.

Consultation and communication with the affected people throughout the project cycle, along with the transparent provision of information on eligibility and entitlements, reduced misinformation and enhanced the people’s trust and confidence in the resettlement process.

A robust and transparent grievance redressal mechanism through independent and recognized committees helped resolve complaints, won people’s confidence, and reduced the costs and delays associated with litigation. Moreover, the establishment of an Independent Monitoring Panel and oversight committees helped resolve critical issues, reducing the number of complaints substantially.

Training NGOs, even those with significant experience, is important for managing large-scale resettlement.

Synchronizing R&R with civil works was important for timely completion of project works.

In fact, the commencement of civil works without serious progress in land acquisition and resettlement can result in massive time and cost overruns. And interagency coordination is critical to prevent inordinate delays in project implementation.

Independent reviews of the resettlement process helped to measure the effectiveness of actions taken, identify gaps, and formulate remedial measures. For instance, in large resettlement townships, common amenities such as schools, dispensaries, and other facilities should be developed prior to the relocation of people. Moreover, estate management should be integrated into the resettlement process to enable communities to manage the resettlement sites themselves.

The MMRDA has now been identified as the nodal agency for urban resettlement in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region. The lessons learned from the MUTP experience have enabled MMRDA to deal with the resettlement challenges of infrastructure projects with better preparedness.

The project has become a worldwide example of urban resettlement on a mega scale.
Contributions

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